3.8. Natural and technological hazards · Natural and technological hazards 227 3.8. Natural and technological hazards Since the late 1980s, natural hazards have had a bigger impact

Natural and technological hazards 227

3.8. Natural and technological hazards

Since the late 1980s, natural hazards have had a bigger impact on the environment.Furthermore, between 1990 and 1996, economic losses due to floods and landslides werefour times those in the whole of the preceding decade.

In spite of measures on major industrial accidents in force since 1984, the trend inaccidents shows that many of the often seemingly trivial ‘lessons learned’ from accidentshave not yet been sufficiently evaluated and/or implemented in industry’s practices andstandards. On the other hand, the risk of major accidents per unit of activity seems toshow a slight downward trend.

In contrast to industrial accidents in fixed installations, major oil spills due to marinetransport accidents as well as offshore installation accidents have shown a cleardownward trend.

Lack of sufficiently detailed, comparable information on the risks posed by certain typesof nuclear facilities, including the treatment of waste, means that the overall risk to theEuropean environment from accidental releases of radionuclides, even if small, cannot bequantified. However, a gradual improvement in the overall risk of accidents is expected. Acomplicating factor is the increasing deterioration of the older plants in Eastern Europe.

Sound information on current natural and technological hazards is essential. Importantquestions include: Which hazards are connected with chronic changes to the environment,such as global warming and sea-level rise? Are human activities increasing the risk fromvarious hazards?

Main findings

1. Accidents still happen

Accidents, whether natural or technological,continue to occur throughout the EU and inthe Accession Countries and lead to environ-mental damage and the premature deaths ofpeople. In 1997, there were a total of 37major industrial hazard accidents reportedin the EU, the highest annual number sincerecords began. The number of major floodsin the EU also increased during the 1990s.Although major hazards are less frequentthan, say, traffic accidents, they are of greatconcern as sources of impacts on the envi-ronment and human health. This concernarises mainly from their unpredictability interms of where and when they will happenand the scale of the impacts.

1.1. We are all living with riskThere is no such thing as ‘zero risk’ toindividuals, society or the environment. Nomatter how people occupy their time,whether at home or in a hazardous industry,they are exposed to a number of hazards andrisks. In a wide variety of industries, many ofwhich have benefited from many years ofdesign evolution and operational experi-

ence, there remains a residual risk whichmust be consciously managed and control-led. Moreover, in many areas, people areliving with a relatively high level of risk fromnatural hazards, such as earthquakes andflooding.

Clear factual information is required for thepublic and policy-makers to assist in recog-nising the problems associated with this riskand to help in the improvement of accidentprevention and disaster response. Thisincludes information about ‘reasonabledoubt’ concerning hazards or risks, or lackof information in areas of concern. Thepublic perception of various hazards andrisks, and the influence of various pressuregroups, can be a major factor, but theperceived risk is often far removed fromreality. For example, the number of fatalitiesfrom natural hazards far outweighs thosefrom major industrial hazards (95% of thetotal in the period 1985-96) which may becontrary to public perception.

1.2. Policies have been implemented…The 5th Environmental Action Plan hastargeted certain sectors to set out an inte-

Environmental Issues228

Box 3.8.1 General aims of Seveso II Directive

to limit major accidents which involvehazardous substances

to limit the consequences of major accidentsto humans and the environment

to ensure high levels of protectionthroughout the European Community in aconsistent and effective manner

Source: European Community, 1997a

grated policy-cum-strategy for both environ-mental themes and causes of environmentaldegradation. These sectors include industry(petrochemicals, chemical, manufacturing,water, etc.), energy (oil and gas, nuclear,etc.), transport (dangerous goods by road,rail, ship) and military.

The most significant EU Directive to helpprotect people and the environment frommajor accident hazards is the Seveso IIDirective (Box 3.8.1). This Directive appliesto those industries that use significantamounts of materials that are hazardous topeople and the environment. Operatorsmust demonstrate that they have a policy forthe prevention of major accidents (safetymanagement systems), that they have as-sessed the risks and are managing these, andthat they have adequate response plans incase of emergencies.

Previous policies and associated regulationson major hazards have focused on the acuteeffects, mainly on human health. However,there is a particular lack of information onthe long-term effects of accidents on theenvironment. This is often due to the paucityof baseline information available. It isvirtually impossible to assess the long-termecological damage from a spill of toxicchemicals into a river if the original state ofthe ecosystem had not been previouslyexamined. Hence the need for Directivessuch as the proposal to establish a frame-work for Community action in the field ofwater policy (European Community, 1997b).

1.3. … but some hazard types call for special attention

1.3.1. Radiation accidentsThe risk from an accidental release ofradioactivity from a nuclear installation is aspecial type of hazard arising from technol-ogy to which much attention has been givenby policy makers and the public. A large

radioactive release has the potential to causeirreversible and far-reaching effects, as wasseen by the accident at the Chernobylnuclear power station in the Ukraine in 1986which had huge health, social and environ-mental consequences. Accidental releases ofgaseous or liquid toxic materials into theenvironment are not subject to direct limita-tion of the amounts involved and the prob-ability of such releases in either the nuclearor non-nuclear fields. However, the compe-tent national authorities do carry out safetyanalyses of nuclear installations prior tolicensing and have in many cases developednational criteria for the consequences of anaccident occurring as a function of thepotential population exposure.

Thus, different countries have their ownnational approaches for acceptable levels ofdose and risk. There is no unifying legisla-tion but due to the work of ICRP, UNSCEARand others, there is a widely accepted phi-losophy of radiation protection and unifyingrecommendations by international scientificorganisations, which find their way intonational legislation. There is also a movetowards integrating radiation safety issuesinto the broader context of environmentalsafety. The perception of risk, however, is notuniform and different countries expresstheir standards of safety in different ways.The European Commission has formulatedBasic Safety Standards (BSS) for radiologicalprotection, which form part of EU legislation(European Commission, 1996a). The funda-mental limit on whole body exposure formembers of the public in the EU BSS is 1mSv per year. Probability criteria for risk ofdeath from an accidental release from anuclear installation have been set by anumber of countries in Europe, at levelsranging from 10-5 per year (United King-dom) to 10-6 per year (the Netherlands). Anumber of European countries have also setlimits on the probability of occurrence oflarge releases of radionuclides.

1.3.2. Natural hazards also to be addressedCertain environmental hazards have notbeen addressed by previous environmentalpolicies. For example, the recent environ-mental disaster in the Guadiamar valley inSpain, where toxic mud burst from a minereservoir and cascaded down the valley,impacting the Doñana National Park, Spain’smost important nature reservoir (the Chemi-cal Engineer, 1998), is not addressed by theSeveso II Directive, although the environ-mental effects were catastrophic. There is aneed to identify such major hazards that are


not immediately obvious to policy makers orengineers.

There is no targeted policy to reduce naturalhazards, although programmes such asEPOCH (the European Programme OnClimatology and natural Hazards) havespecifically addressed this source of risk. Therelative importance of natural hazards mustbe addressed to determine the significanceof these in environmental concerns, particu-larly as such hazards have the potential tocause several hundred or even severalthousand fatalities in one incident. Humanimpacts can to some extent be prevented byintegrated land-use planning, although thespreading of settlements has seen a progres-sion into higher risk areas, for example fromflooding, where the risk appears to beincreasing, possibly with the onset of climatechange. Emergency response plans havebeen produced throughout the EU to reactto various natural disasters, but these appearto be ad hoc, generally not tested, and areconsidered unlikely to work well in practice.

2. Are we having more major accidents?

The available evidence shows that whilstthere has been a reduction in accidents insome areas, others have actually seen anincrease during the past decade.

2.1. Industrial accidents

2.1.1. Trend slightly increasingIn the EU, the number of major industrialaccidents reported every year has shown aslight upward trend since 1984, the yearwhen the Seveso Directive (EuropeanCommission, 1992) was introduced (Figure3.8.1). For the period 1984 to 1999, over 300accidents have been reported by the EUMember States to the European Commis-sion’s Major Accident Reporting System(MARS). Since the rate of reporting majoraccidents to MARS is in good correspond-ence to the actual rate of occurrence ofmajor accidents, this gives an indication thatmany of the often seemingly trivial ‘lessonslearned’ from accidents have not yet beensufficiently evaluated and/or implementedin industry’s practices and standards. There-fore, many efforts are still necessary tofurther reduce the risks related to majoraccidents from fixed industrial installations.On the other hand, since the industrialactivities which give rise to most of the majoraccident risks are increasing in intensity inEurope, the risks of major accidents per unit

of activity seem to have a slightly fallingtendency.

However, lessons learnt are soon forgotten.One of the foremost authorities on safety,Trevor Kletz, writes that organisations havelittle memory when it comes to safety (Kletz,1993). Industrial accidents for the most partare not new occurrences – their root causescan often be the same as previous accidentswhich did not involve significant damage orinjury to workers or bystanders. In manycases, companies investigate only the imme-diate causes, such as operator error or themisuse of substances, and thus the rootcause, such as inadequate engineering ormanagement failures, remain unaddressed.

Information for industrial sites from theMARS database indicates that major acci-dents involving hazardous substances usuallyresult from a number of simultaneouscauses, such as operator error, componentfailure, and uncontrolled chemical reac-tions. Recent detailed analyses of majoraccidents (Drogaris, 1993; Rasmussen 1996)indicate that component failure and opera-tor error were the two most common imme-diate causes of major accidents, but thedominant underlying causes identified (for67% of the accidents) were due to poorsafety and environmental management,resulting in a lack of control. Lack of ex-penditure on safety and environmentalaspects is often a result of pressure fromshareholders to increase profitability, al-though this may result in major losses in thelong run.

The age of process plant is a major factor inthe likelihood of accidents, as the probability

0

10

20

30

40

1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997

Num

ber

of a

ccid

ents

12

18 17

23 2421

2826

23

34

20

29

37

Figure 3.8.1Number of major accidents in the EU reported tothe MARS database, 1985-1997

Source: MARS database


of ‘wear-out’ failures increases with age. Themost frequent cause of accidental releases inthe hydrocarbon-chemical industries cited byM&M Protection Consultants (1997) is‘mechanical failure’, as shown in Figure3.8.2, and a significant proportion of theseare due to ‘wear-out’, which highlightsfailures in preventative maintenance pro-grams. Many plants are operated past theirdesign life in an attempt to gain the maxi-mum return on investment and, as such,accidents are more likely.

2.1.2. Accidents occur in a variety of industriesMany people associate the chemicals indus-try with major technological hazards andindeed the majority of sites that are subjectto the Seveso Directive would be describedas chemicals facilities. However, there aremany other sectors where serious accidentsoccur, resulting in fatalities and majorinjuries, although there may not be the samepotential for off-site effects. In France in1997, there were four sectors with a worseaccident record than the chemical industry,as shown in Figure 3.8.3.

Arguably, hydrocarbon accidents and oilspills at sea gain the most media attention.The Piper Alpha explosion in the North Seain 1988 caused 167 fatalities (Cullen, 1990).The most recent oil spill in the EU was thatof the Sea Empress near Milford Haven, UK,where 72 000 tonnes of crude oil impacted200 km of coastline (MIAB, 1997). Theenvironmental impact of oil spills can varyconsiderably. This depends less on thequantity of oil spilt than the type of oil,prevailing weather conditions and whetheror not the oil is spilt in coastal waters whichare ecologically sensitive. Furthermore,without overlooking the unacceptable short-or medium-term impacts of oil spills, it isworth noting that in the long term devas-tated areas can recover. Thus for example,the impacts caused by one of the largestspills ever, from the Amoco Cadiz 300 km offthe Brittany coastline in 1978, were only feltin the immediate years following (Bonnieuxet al., 1993) and the area is now thrivingagain. Currently, there is little evidence ofirreversible damage to marine sources,either from major oil spills or from chronicsources of oil pollution. However, there hasbeen little long-term monitoring of thebiological effects of oil on the various formsof marine life. More extensive monitoringand research will be required before thepotential chronic effects of oil spills areknown (ITOPF, 1998).

2.1.3. Community life often disrupted as a consequenceThe consequences of major industrialaccidents in the EU are listed in Table 3.8.1.About 16% of these accidents resulted in lossof life and about one-third included fatalitiesin neighboring communities. About two-thirds of the accidents resulting in ecologicalharm involved water pollution (reservoirs,rivers) and in about half of these the pollu-tion was caused by firewater runoff. However,it is difficult to gauge the long-term effects ofsuch accidents and there is insufficient data.

Source: BARPI database

18%

15%

16%

35%

Agriculture

Transport ofhazardousproducts

Travel andmiscellaneous

activities

Industryand

workshop

Unknown16%

Figure 3.8.3 Number of technological accidents in France in 1997

Source: M&M ProtectionConsultants, 1997

Mechanicalfailure

43%

Operationalerror21%

Sabotage/arson1%

Industrialaccident

11%

Natural hazard5%

Design error5%

Unknown14%

Figure 3.8.2 Causes of accidental releases in the hydrocarbon-chemical industries


2.2. Natural hazards are the most devastating

2.2.1. What are they?Natural hazards, such as earthquakes andlandslides, are often more devastating, interms of loss of life and environmentaldamage, and also have the potential toprecipitate technological hazards. As withtechnological accidents, the consequencesdepend both on the magnitude of the eventand on factors such as population density,disaster-prevention measures and emergencyplanning.

Figure 3.8.4 illustrates, for the whole ofEurope, the number of incidents associatedwith natural hazards and the associatednumber of fatalities between 1980 and 1996.Several types of natural hazard are describedand it is apparent that they have the poten-tial to cause large numbers of fatalities. Theavailable evidence suggests that the hazardsthat cause the largest numbers of fatalities inone event are earthquakes (Box 3.8.2). Inthe 1990s there have already been 13 earth-quakes world-wide where the fatalities haveexceeded 1 000 people. Next to earthquakes,landslides and flooding have the potential tocause the largest numbers of fatalities in oneevent.

2.2.2. Human influence causes the increaseThe trend for the annual number of natural-hazard accidents is more obviously upwardthan that for major industrial accidents. Thisis particularly clear for those precipitated byhuman activities, such as land clearing (seeChapter 2.3); other types of natural hazard,such as earthquakes and volcanoes, do notshow any increasing or decreasing trends.

Table 3.8.1.Consequences of industrial accidents in the UNnotified to MARS since 1984

Consequences Number of Accidents1

None or negligible 43

Fatalities - on site2 47

- of site 16

Injuries3 - on site 94

- of site 26

Ecological harm 21

National heritage loss 0

Material loss4 - on site 57

- of site 9

Disruption of comunity life 121

1 Each accident can have multible consequences, hence the total exceeds thetotal number of accident reported in the period.

2 Fatalities and injuries on-site are those to internal staff, contractors andemergency teams at or near the site of the accident.

3 Injuries include minor injuries as well as those requiring 24 hours or more ofhospitalisation.

4 Material losses refer to cases where credible cost estimates have been given.

Source: MARS database.

Since the late 1980s, there has also been anapparent increase in the impacts of naturalhazards (Swiss Re, 1993). As an example, atone city on the German-French border(Kehl), between 1900 and 1977 the Rhine’sfloodwaters rose over seven metres aboveflood level only four times, or about onceevery 20 years. Since 1977, that level hasbeen reached 10 times, an average of onceevery other year (UWIN, 1996). This leads toa multitude of economic losses. Data from

Num

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of f

atal

ities

0

5

10

15

20

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996

25

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

Num

ber

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ccid

ents

FloodingEarthquakes/landslidesWeather hazardsFatalities

Accidents involving natural hazards and the associated number of fatalities in Europe 1980-1996 Figure 3.8.4

Note: exact figures fornumbers of fatalities only for1980, 1982, 1983, 1987,1991. Where no exactnumber is available, asmallest estimate has beenused.

Source: OECDEnvironmental Data, 1997


Earthquakes are widespread in the EU (Wild, 1998).The most destructive events have occurred in theMediterranean countries, particularly Greece andItaly, which are in the collision zone between theEurasian and African crustal plates, as shown inFigure 3.8.5. Smaller earthquakes are felt by othernations, although there is generally little damage.

Box 3.8.2 Seismic activity in the EU

The European Mediterranean Seismological Centre(EMSC) co-ordinates rapid acquisition anddissemination of information on earthquakesgreater than 5.5 on the Richter scale. A majorearthquake is defined as having a magnitude of 7or greater on the Richter scale (USGS 1998a).

Examples of earthquakes in the EU in the past 25 years resulting in severe impact are as follows

1976 Greece, Thessaloniki 45 dead, 220 injured, major damage

1976 Italy, Frioul (twice) 977 dead, 2 400 injured, 189 000 homeless

1979 Italy, Umbria 5 dead, numerous injured, 2 000 homeless

1980 Italy, Campania 2 739 dead, 8 816 injured, 334 000 homeless

1980 Portugal, Azores 50 dead, 86 injured, 21 296 homeless

1981 Greece, south regions 19 dead, 500 injured, 12 220 buildingsdamaged/destroyed

1983 Belgium 1 dead, 26 injured

1984 Italy, central regions 7 500 homeless

1986 Greece, Kalamata 20 dead, 300 injured, 2 000 buildingsdamaged/destroyed

1990 Italy, SW Sicily 12 dead, 99 injured, 14 596 homeless

1992 Netherlands, Limburg Extensive damage

Source: European Commission, 1996b

Effects on people and the environmentThe list of earthquakes gives evidence of thepotential catastrophic effects that an earthquakecan have on society. However, the effects willcontinue long afterwards. There may be secondaryeffects such as flooding, landslides and fires, oreven the precipitation of major technologicaldisasters. Numerous people will need to berehoused, either due to the destruction of theirhomes or out of fear of a recurrence, althoughpeople generally remain in the area (EuropeanCommission, 1996b). The event (and its anticipationfor those in high risk areas) may cause severetrauma and this will be amplified by factors such asdecomposing bodies which have not been clearedaway, polluted drinking water and lack of essentialsupplies, particularly if the earthquake has affectedtransport.

Civil protectionEach EU member state has a programme for CivilProtection. In Greece, where there is a higher riskof major earthquakes, the Earthquake Planning andProtection Organisation (EPPO) is responsible forplanning national policy regarding seismic

prevention, education-information and protection(European Commission, 1996b. EPPO hasestablished an emergency scientific team of variousexperts to advise the government body that co-ordinates action plans in case of disasters.The EMSC has co-ordinated a two-year project toextend data communications and acquisitions toallow the rapid release of information for anyearthquake of a magnitude greater than 5.0occurring in the European-Mediterranean region(Wild, 1998). This information is issued in a two-step procedure, with the location, depth, time andmagnitude of the earthquake generally availablewithin one hour, followed later by detailedinformation on the earthquake’s source mechanism.Such forward planning and the rapid disseminationof information will help in the protection of thepublic in these high risk regions, although such isthe nature of earthquakes that there will always becasualties from major incidents. Unfortunately, cityplanning policies and building codes invariablyhave been insufficiently mature to ensure thatstructures are constructed in a manner thatmitigates earthquake damage and affords civilprotection (Gunn, 1998).

Munich Re (1997) reveal that in Europe inthe seven-year period 1990-96, economiclosses due to floods and landslides were fourtimes the loss in the complete 1980-89decade.

Landslides, one of the major causes offatalities, are likely to increase unless there isadequate management of the land to reducethe likelihood of soil erosion. There is alsoan increased likelihood of certain naturalhazards, such as flooding and droughts, due

to climate change, in many temperate andhumid regions (see Chapter 3.1). Further-more, susceptibility to these hazards may beenhanced by certain land-use activities, andthe lack of environmental management inland-use planning (see Box 3.8.3 and Chap-ters 3.12-15).

In Europe, as world-wide, storms and floodsare the most common natural disaster and,in terms of economic and insured losses, themost costly. The damage caused by floods


Box 3.8.3 The Campania landslide of 5 May 1998

What happened?After two days of incessant rain, torrents of mudand water engulfed hundreds of homes in thesouthern Italian region of Campania, killing almost300 people and leaving around 2 000 homeless.The area affected was a 50 km strip between thecities of Naples and Salerno. The landslide movedthrough the towns of Sarno and Quindici andsurrounding villages, tearing apart houses andbridges, submerging cars and causing severe panicamong residents, some of which sought escape onroofs. The mud then dried and solidified in intensesunshine, trapping persons caught in it. There waslittle preparation for the tragedy, although duringthe past 70 years 631 landslides have hit the regionand about 3 800 people in Italy have been killedfrom mudslides since 1945. Subsequently, there wasa lack of co-ordination between various responsegroups. Funds of about EUR30 million were laterearmarked to aid initial relief and reconstruction.

Underlying causesThe landslide was caused by heavy rain over twodays, although the 150 mm in total fell far short ofany records. The consequences were intensified byhuman changes to the surroundings. The clearing of

trees and burning scrub-land to create pastures ormake room for construction led to massive erosionin the Campania region. In some areas, chestnuttrees were replaced with hazelnut tress, which aremuch weaker and produce a smaller root system.Houses had been built without permission in areaswhere construction is forbidden because the land isgeologically unstable. The Sarno river hasdiminished, the water being used by industry andthe river bed had been built upon. Thus, there wasno natural path for flood waters to escape.

The need for improved land managementThe disaster revealed several shortcomings in landmanagement and disaster prevention and response.For the past half-century geologists have warnedagainst the construction of housing in the area, dueto the high risk of mudslides. This risk was increasedby removing vegetation from the mountains andinterfering with natural water channels. Improvedland management is essential to reduce the risk offurther landslides. Training exercises for disasterresponse would facilitate improved co-ordinationbetween the various response groups and thelessons learnt from this and other disasters need tobe widely disseminated.

Sources: Hanley, 1998; CNN, 1998; Ieropoli, 1998

Seismicity of Europe

301 – 800151 – 301

71 – 15133 – 71

0 – 33

Depth in km

Figure 3.8.5

Source: USGS NationalEarthquake InformationCenter, 1998b

0˚ 10˚10˚20˚ 20˚ 30˚ 40˚

40˚

50˚

60˚

70˚

40˚30˚20˚10˚0˚10˚20˚

70˚

60˚

50˚

40˚


depends on the duration and height of waterlevels, topography and use of the flood plain,flood defence measures, and the awarenessof the population likely to be affected byflooding. However, human activities caninfluence both the likelihood and magni-tude of the flooding, for example drainageof wetlands and straightening of riversincrease peak water flows. Also, in mountain-ous areas the clearing of land for agricul-tural purposes or developments, includingthose related to heavy tourism, may lead tosoil erosion and landslides. Land clearinghas been conducted by deliberately startingforest fires, although in many regions fireshave occurred by natural processes. Forestfires, which occur every year in the EU, cannot only cause fatalities, but can create vastclouds of smog over the surrounding area, aswell as the environmental disaster of the lossof extensive areas of forest.

2.3. Nuclear accident risk declined lately

2.3.1. Nuclear power production facilities are the focusGenerating electricity from nuclear power isa well-established technology, with morethan 30 countries world-wide operating orbuilding plants. Nuclear generation todayaccounts for about 17% of the electricityproduced globally and about 34% in the EU.While a number of European countries use

Source: ??

Belgium

Finland

France

Germany

Netherlands

Spain

Sweden

United Kingdom

Bulgaria

Czech Republic

Hungary

Lithuania

Romania

Slovak Republic

SloveniaSwitzerland

Russian Federation

Ukraine

0 20 40 60 80 100

Percentage of electricity generated by nuclear power

Figure 3.8.6The percentage of energy produced by nucleargeneration in European countries that utilisenuclear power.

nuclear power extensively and are likely tocontinue to do so (Figure 3.8.6), it is unclearto what extent nuclear power will be used tomeet the projected increases in demand forelectricity. The prospects for the extendeduse of nuclear power globally have recentlybeen reviewed by the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA, 1996c).

Nuclear reactors generating electricity arenot the only plants in Europe (Table 3.8.2)which have the potential to cause accidentalreleases of radionuclides. Other types ofplant include nuclear reprocessing plants,other nuclear fuel-cycle facilities, plantsproducing pharmaceutical products andmedical sources, and nuclear weaponsdevelopment plants. Plants of all these typesexist in Europe; for example the numbers offuel-cycle facilities in Europe are shown inTable 3.8.3. In addition to accidents occur-ring at nuclear installations, accidentaldamage to radiation sources used in medicalor industrial applications may also result inreleases of radionuclides. There is also thepotential for accidents in nuclear-poweredsubmarines.

2.3.2. Radiation exposure risk assessment, a model to followApart from the Chernobyl accident in 1986other accidents have occurred in Europeover the past 40 years. Some of these havehad environmental consequences, althoughthese have been minor compared with theeffects of Chernobyl. These other accidentsinclude the 1957 Windscale fire in the UKand the nuclear weapons accident atPalomares in Spain in 1966. Environmentalcontamination from these accidents waslocalised, and the collective radiation doseswere low. There is little or no remainingcontamination in Western and CentralEurope now from accidental sources otherthan from Chernobyl.

Atmospheric testing of nuclear weaponsresulted in the largest release of radio-nuclides into the environment and by far thelargest collective effective dose from man-made sources (Table 3.8.4). By contrast,nuclear power production, nuclear weaponsfabrication and radioisotope productionresult in comparatively small doses to thepopulation. Accidents may have significantlocal impact, but only Chernobyl gave rise toa substantial population dose.

Much information is available on the currentlevels of radioactivity in the environment inEurope. This is published nationally, and is


Country In operation Under Shut down Suspended Cancelledconstruction

EU MemberStates

Austria 1

Belgium 7

Denmark

Finland 4

France 56 4 10

Germany 20 16 6

Greece

Ireland

Italy 4 3

Luxembourg

Netherlands 2

Portugal

Spain 9 1 4

Sweden 12 1

United Kingdom 35 10

EU total 145 4 42 3 11

Central & easternEuropean Accessioncountries

Bulgaria 6 1

Czech Republic 4 2 2

Hungary 4

Lithuania 2 1

Poland 2

Romania 2 3

Slovak Republic 4 4 1

Slovenia 1

CEE Accessioncountries total 21 8 1 3 6

Other countries

Switzerland 5

Armenia 1

Russian Federation 29 4 4 6 10

Ukraine 16 5 1 3

Total othercountries 51 9 5 6 13

Total Europe 217 21 48 12 30

Table 3.8.2.Status of nuclear power reactors in Europe (1995)

Source: IAEA, 1996a.

also collated by the European Commissionwhich periodically issues a compilation oflevels of environmental radioactivity in theEU, on the basis of reports from MemberStates. The most recent of these covers theyear 1993 (European Commission, 1998).

The assessment of risks from radiationexposure has led the field of environmentalrisk assessment for many years and has beenthe model followed for other sources ofcontamination. Therefore many aspects ofthe assessment from nuclear installations aresignificantly more developed than those inother fields. In particular, techniques forassessing the potential accidental risk posedby nuclear installations are well developed(London, 1995). However, the availability ofthe results of such studies varies.

Assessments of risks posed by the newerdesigns of nuclear power stations are compre-hensive, and have in some cases been pub-lished (Kelly and Clarke, 1982). Less and insome cases no information is available forother types of plants. For example, there is nopublished comprehensive summary of therisk of accidents from Europe’s reprocessingplants. Accident risk information for Europe’snuclear installations has not been collatedinternationally although much informationexists at a national level. Moreover, the use ofdifferent approaches at national level (asalready noted) would render any uniformcollation extremely difficult to prepare. It isnot known, therefore, to what extent existingnational risk assessments might be judgedinternationally to be sufficiently comprehen-sive as regards the range of accidents sce-narios and types of plant taken into account.

The older types of reactors found on anumber of sites in Eastern Europe present agreater hazard than the more modernWestern designs. This includes the RBMKreactors, found in Russia, Ukraine andLithuania, including the Chernobyl plants,and the first generation pressurised waterreactors (VVERs), located in Bulgaria andSlovakia. These are considered to have someof the most serious design deficiencies(IAEA, 1996d). It is also possible that acci-dents occurring at plants outside Europecould present an environmental threat tocountries in Europe – Chernobyl demon-strated the great distances potentially af-fected – but again information on the riskposed by plants outside Europe has not beencollated. The risk from potential accidentsinvolving medical and industrial radiationsources has also not been collated.


Table 3.8.3. Number of fuel cycle facilities

Country Mining & Fuel Fuel Spent fuel Otherore fabrication reprocessing storage

processing

Belgium 2 1

Bulgaria 1

Czech Republic 2

Denmark 1

Finland 1

France 2 4 5 2 12

Germany 1 1 4 2

Hungary 1

Netherlands 1

Portugal 2

Russian Federation 3 4 2

Slovak Republic 1

Spain 1 1

Sweden 1 1

Ukraine 1 1 1

United Kingdom 7 4 7 6

Total 10 20 9 22 25

Source: IAEA, 1996b.

Table 3.8.4. Doses from man-made sources

Source: Bennett, 1995Source Collective effective dose(man Sievert)

Atmospheric nuclear testing 30 000 000

Chernobyl accident 600 000

Nuclear power production 400 000

Radioisotope productionand use 80 000

Nuclear weapons fabrication 60 000

Kyshtym accident 2 500

Satellite re-entries 2 100

Windscala accident 2 000

Other accidents 300

Underground nuclear testing 200

2.3.3. How have radiation risks changed and how are they likely to change in the future?Since 1970 the number of nuclear installa-tions in Europe has increased and manyEuropean countries now have nuclear reac-tors at or towards the end of their workinglives (Figure 3.8.7). It can be seen from thetable that over the next 10 years there will bean increasing number of aged operatingreactors in Europe. Some of the plants thatwill be decommissioned will be replaced withplants with better safety features.

New advanced designs incorporate improvedsafety concepts and features to reduce thechance of significant releases of activity tothe environment. Following these develop-ments, it is likely that the overall risk fromnuclear accidents increased in the 1970s asmore plants were commissioned, but hassubsequently declined in the 1990s as olderplants have been taken out of service andbuilding of new plants has slowed, withincreasingly safe designs being used. Howthis trend will continue over the next decadeis, however, uncertain. A complicating factoris the increasing deterioration of the olderplants in Eastern Europe.

Safety concerns focus on certain olderdesigns of plant, in particular the RBMKreactors of which Chernobyl was an example:15 RBMK reactors continue to function inRussia, Ukraine and Lithuania. Implementa-tion of improved safety plans for thesereactors is delayed for a number of reasonsincluding the lack of financial resources inthese countries, despite significant assistancefrom the European Commission, EBRD andon a bilateral basis from individual Westerncountries.

The major technical causes of the Chernobylaccident were the coincidence of severaldeficiencies in the RBMK reactor’s physicaldesign and in the design of the emergencyshutdown system. These causes were com-pounded by violation of operating proce-dures made possible by the lack of an ad-equate ‘safety culture’. Development ofsafety measures have been in progress atRBMK plants since 1986, but plans to up-grade the safety of all RBMK plants arebehind schedule due to economic difficul-ties. Accelerated implementation of this isseen as a top priority for international co-operation (IAEA, 1996e).

Newer plants will incorporate improvedsafety features and will be less likely to suffersevere accidents, while older plants, built to


Source: IAEA Yearbook 1994 & M. Pohl, pers com

0

10

20

30

40

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

19 19

15

2225

27

36

43Belgium

Bulgaria

France

Sweden

Russian Federation

Switzerland

United KIngdom

Spain

Netherlands

Germany

Figure 3.8.7Operating Nuclear Power Plant Units in Europe

with an Age of 30-40 Years in 1998 - 2005

Loading/discharging

5%

Collisions29%

Groundings34%

Hullfailures

13%

Fires &explosions

7%

Others12%

Total 294 spills

Figure 3.8.9Causes of oil spills 1970-1997

Source: ITOPF, 1998

40

0

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70 75 80 85 90 95 970

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erye

ar >

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Tota

l am

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t o

f oil

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ed/y

ear

(’000

to

nnes

)

Figure 3.8.8Number of oil spills world-wide and total oil spilt

1970-1997

Source: ITOPF, 1998

standards lower than today’s will graduallybe decommissioned, particularly in Centraland Eastern Europe. While the result ofthese developments will gradually improvethe risk from nuclear accidents, it is notexpected that there will be a marked impacton the overall risk of accidents over the nextdecade. The lack of sufficiently detailed,comparable information on the risks posedby certain types of nuclear facilities, whichwould then allow a consistent generalisedanalysis, means that the overall risk to theEuropean environment from accidentalreleases of radionuclides, even if small,cannot be quantified. It seems likely that thegreatest hazard is presented by sites wherelarge quantities of radioactive materials arestored and used, such as nuclear powerstations, reprocessing plants and militaryplants. Chemical plants which produceradio-pharmaceutical products and hospitalspose lesser risks.

In addition to this there is the potential foraccidents to occur during the disposal ofradioactive sources. An increase in thenumbers of accidental smeltings of industrialand medical radiation sources may occur asmore sources reach the end of their usefullives. Lessons have been learnt from pastaccidents such as that in Goiânia, Brazil,where a caesium-137 source caused fourdeaths and about 20 serious exposures, andthe similar incident in Estonia in 1994 whena stolen caesium-137 source irradiated 19people. Many smelting plants that deal withscrap metal have radiation detectors toprevent this occurrence but this practiceshould be universal. A worldwide register ofsources is being prepared by IAEA. Whileseveral incidents reported in Europe haveled to radioactive contamination due to theaccidental disposal of a source, they do notseem to have had significant dose implica-tions for more than a handful of individuals.

2.4. Oil spillsWorld-wide, the annual number of oil spillsand the total oil spilt from tankers andbarges during transit and loading/discharg-ing is showing a downward trend, as illus-trated in Figure 3.8.8. The downward trendis also apparent in European waters, but isless obvious. On average, since 1970, 25% ofthe major spills world-wide (above 700tonnes) have been in European waters. Inthe 1980s this figure was about 24%, butduring the 1990s it increased to 32%.

Tanker safety is a major issue on the Interna-tional Maritime Organisation’s marine


Box 3.8.4 Criteria for the notification of anaccident in the Seveso II Directive

The criteria for notification of an accident relateto:

substances involved

injury to persons and damage to real estate

immediate damage to the environment

damage to property

cross-border damage.

Source: European Community, 1997a

protection agenda. The bulk of the world’stankers are being fitted with double hulls orscrapped within the next few years, which islikely to reduce the likelihood of spills,although most of the world’s tankers werebuilt in the 1970s and so do not comply withmany of the stricter standards introducedsince. Figure 3.8.9 provides evidence of thecauses of the 294 major oil spills that haveoccurred world-wide in 1970-1997, 76% ofwhich were due to hull failures, collisionsand groundings.

3. More management of hazards is necessary

There is no doubt that disasters will continueto occur throughout the EU. Some of thesewill be due to technology, some to the forcesof nature, others to the combined effects ofthe two. Inevitably there will be loss of lifeand environmental damage.

However, hazards can be managed to reducerisks. Even catastrophic events can be pre-dicted as to where they may happen, althoughthe question of whether they will in facthappen within any given timespan (forexample, the lifetime of an installation) is notpredictable. Nevertheless, it is at least possibleto pre-plan responses, so that loss of life andenvironmental impact can be minimised.

3.1. Hazard management procedures cover many industriesFor many technological hazards, holisticapproaches are becoming more prevalent,with increasing attention on the reduction ofrisk of long-term environmental impact aswell as acute health and property damagefrom accidents. In the case of the Seveso IIDirective, industrial operators must demon-strate that they have taken all the necessarymeasures to prevent major accidents and tolimit their consequences on humans and theenvironment. This is likely to reduce levelsof risk, especially from high-frequency, low-consequence accidents. Seveso II should alsohelp identify the potential for low-frequency,high-consequence events, although these areby nature difficult to address.

The problem of low-frequency, high-conse-quence events is likely to remain a key issuein terms of risk management. However, theextent and location of the technologicalhazards are generally known and, as such,pre-arrangements can be made in emer-gency response plans. The correct responsemay limit the consequences of an accident

by ensuring that escalation to a larger eventdoes not occur. Lessons learnt from previousaccidents should be essential research foroperating companies. Testing of emergencyplans at least every three years is a newrequirement under the Seveso II Directive,as experience has shown that unless a plan istested, the response during an actual acci-dent can be inappropriate and disorganised,particularly the liaison between differentgroups.

There is an improved culture with regard toaccident reporting and sharing the lessonslearnt from accidents. Several accidentsdatabases are already available. The im-proved reporting criteria (Box 3.8.4) formajor accidents will result in more accidentsbeing reported to the European Commis-sion, and the causes, lessons learnt andpreventative measures necessary to prevent arecurrence will be available to relevantbodies. This should lead to a better under-standing of the issues and root causes ofaccidents, and, if the process is managedwell, to a subsequent decrease in the numberof accidents.

The European Commission’s Accidentdatabase MARS is now complemented bySPIRS (Seveso Plants Information RetrievalSystem) (http://mahbsrv.jrc.it/spirs/Default.html). This was set up in response toArticle 9 of the Seveso II Directive requiringaccess to information for all interestedparties, including the European Commis-sion, on the contents of the safety report foreach ‘Seveso Plant’ in a Member State.

The main objective of SPIRS is to support theMember States in their risk managementrelated decision-making processes by givingan insight into the geographical component


0.0Num

ber

of a

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ents

per

100

0km

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 19961980

Figure 3.8.10Number of cross-country pipeline accidents in

Western Europe per 1000 km-yr, 1980-1996

Source:CONCAWE, 1983-1997

Risk

-orie

ntat

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ppro

ach

Arrang

emen

ts st

ill

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iteria

Austria

Belgium

Denmark

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Ireland

Italy

Luxembourg

The Netherlands

Portugal

Spain

Sweden

United Kingdom

Source: updated fromSmeder et al., (1996)

Figure 3.8.11Regulatory approaches in the EU

of risk from Seveso Plants. This is mainly doneby providing a map of all Seveso Plants in theEU together with information on their hazardand risk potential. So far, SPIRS is still in adeveloping phase and four EU Member Stateshave provided data on Seveso Plants in theircountries on a voluntary basis for inclusion inthe SPIRS prototype covering about 400major hazardous chemical plants.

For the nuclear industry the InternationalNuclear Event Scale (INES) and the IncidentReporting System (IRS), both under theaegis of the International Atomic EnergyAgency, are now used widely to collectinformation from around the world onunusual nuclear events in nuclear powerplants that may be important for safety oraccident prevention.

Research into the different approachesadopted in the EU for regulating technologi-cal hazards would be useful to determine ifany patterns have developed, i.e. are thereadvantages in using a risk-orientated, goal-setting approach where the risk must bebelow ‘acceptable’ levels, or rather a conse-quence-orientated approach where prescrip-tive codes and standards must be met. Theavailable data should be scrutinised in thefuture.

3.2. Where hazard management procedures are still neededOne area where it is difficult to predict thelocation of an accident is transportation. Inparticular, the consequences of a pipelinerupture could be severe, as a large amountof material could be released before insula-tion. For example, in Russia in 1989, therupture of a gas transmission line andsubsequent ignition of the flammable cloudresulted in the deaths of over 600 people ontwo passenger trains (Crooks, 1992). With anever-increasing pipeline network throughoutEastern Europe, there is an increasinglikelihood of such events if the risk is notmanaged adequately. The scope of theSeveso II Directive does not include pipe-lines and, thus, pipelines need to be ad-equately addressed in the future for anenlarged EU, although there is a downwardtrend in the number of accidents in WesternEurope, as illustrated in Figure 3.8.10.

For the EU Accession Countries, the use ofthe Seveso II Directive would be appropriateand, encouragingly, some are already usingthis. The comprehensive nature of theDirective in its mandatory requirements formanagement of safety and the environment

and its power to prohibit unacceptableactivities would provide an effective modelbefore accession. There is currently noequivalent database to MARS that coversCentral and Eastern Europe, but this maychange as a result of the EC’s co-operationprojects (PHARE and TACIS) and the workof UN-ECE’s regional co-ordinating centresfor the prevention of industrial accidents(Budapest) and for industrial accidenttraining and exercises (Warsaw). If a data-


base could be set up before accession, itwould be extremely useful to see how theadoption of the Seveso II Directive affectsthe frequency of accidents in the AccessionCountries, although the results could beconfused by progressive improvements inreporting practices.

3.3. Management of natural hazardsFor natural hazards, difficulties in forecast-ing and prediction, coupled with limitedtechnical or behavioural responses, seemlikely to lead to fewer improvements in bothlevels of exposure and associated damagefrom significant events.

As with technological hazards, the problem oflow-frequency, high-consequence events islikely to remain a key risk-management issue.However, a major difference is that it isextremely difficult to predict where, as well aswhen, they will occur, although it is appreci-ated that some areas may be more susceptibleto natural hazards than others, e.g. fromearthquakes, flooding and landslides.

Adequate land management is essential andthe management systems applied to techno-logical hazards can be used as a model.Moreover, risk assessment and land-useplanning can play a vital role in identifying,mitigating and avoiding such impacts. Theuse of societal risk limits could avoid thepotential for large population growth inareas that are susceptible to natural hazards.Figure 3.8.11 shows the regulatory ap-proaches in the EU and it can be seen thatsome Member States are already applyingland-use planning criteria.

Land-use planning clearly has to take intoaccount the environmental conditions of aparticular area. While scrub clearing tocreate agricultural land may increase thelikelihood of flooding, soil erosion andlandslides in areas susceptible to heavyrainfall, it may be advantageous in forestareas that are susceptible to fires. One of themajor underlying causes of forest fires is lackof land management resulting in the build-up of undergrowth that will easily ignite.However, clearing of such undergrowth toreduce the likelihood of fires must bebalanced with good ecological managementof the forests and in some areas it may bebetter from this point of view if forests were‘abandoned’.

The flood experience of some countries isforcing them to re-evaluate approaches toflood prevention and environmental secu-

rity, but all such environmental considera-tions must be addressed for specific regions,not just those due to the hazard of flooding.A change of attitude is required, fromregarding hazard prevention and responseas essentially a technical problem to seeing itas part of a dynamic interaction betweenpeople and nature. The economic damageand massive social and environmentaldisruption that natural hazards can causecalls for more awareness and understandingof the interactions between human activitiesand natural systems throughout the EU andthe Accession Countries.

The United Nations launched the Interna-tional Decade for Natural Disaster Reduc-tion (IDNDR 1990-2000) to make peoplemore aware of actions to take to makethemselves safe from natural disasters.Guideline principles have been drafted fornatural-disaster prevention, preparednessand mitigation. Some EU Member Stateshave procedures in place for taking accountof the risks of flooding, avalanches, land-slides and earthquakes in their planning anddevelopment processes. However, it does notappear that procedures have resulted inadequate responses to natural disasters inpractice, and the impact on humans, theenvironment and the local economy has notbeen mitigated. Policy-makers need toinvestigate an overall approach to co-ordina-tion of disaster management, and lessonslearnt from previous incidents should becollected before they are forgotten, leavingthe door open for disorganised response tobe repeated. Real-time training exercises toprepare emergency teams for likely naturaldisasters would be beneficial.

3.4. There have been many initiatives following the Chernobyl accidentThe Chernobyl accident alerted the interna-tional community to the potential for seriousnuclear accidents to cause effects in bothneighbouring countries and also those atconsiderable distances. Attention focused onthe IAEA as a forum for obtaining agree-ments on nuclear safety, early notificationand international response. As a result, threeinternational conventions were developedunder the auspices of IAEA:

• The Convention on Nuclear Safety wasadopted in 1994, with the objective ofcommitting participating states to a highlevel of nuclear safety by setting interna-tional benchmarks to which the stateswould subscribe. It is unusual in thatthere are no legal sanctions for breaking


its terms, but instead States are requiredto submit reports to regular meetingswhere the reports are peer reviewed.

• The Convention on Assistance in theCase of Nuclear Accident or RadiologicalEmergency. This was adopted in 1986,and requires states to notify IAEA of theassistance they could provide in theevent of an accident.

• The Convention on the Early Notifica-tion of a Nuclear Accident. This wasadopted in 1986 and required States toreport accidents at nuclear sites topotentially affected States either directlyor via IAEA, and to the IAEA itself. Dataessential to an assessment of the situationmust also be transmitted.

Most recently, the joint Convention on theSafety of Spent Fuel Management and on theSafety of Radioactive Waste Management wasadopted on 5 September 1997. It followssimilar objectives to the Convention onNuclear Safety and has the same procedureof reporting and peer review. IAEA has alsodeveloped revised emergency responsecriteria and has issued guidance on thedevelopment of national plans for emer-gency preparedness (IAEA, 1997). IAEA alsofunds education, training, technical co-operation and expert missions to aid futurenuclear safety.

Following Chernobyl, the European Com-mission also initiated and supportedprojects aimed at improved data manage-ment and information transfer in the eventof a future accident. A comprehensivedecision support system (RODOS) is beingdeveloped with support from the EuropeanCommission as part of the procedures toimprove and harmonise future accidentresponse in Europe.

Since 1986, many countries and organisa-tions have developed sophisticated compu-terised systems for gathering, managing,assessing and disseminating informationabout a future accident. For example, a largenational network of accident monitoringstations has been established in Spain(NucNet 27/95). In the UK, the automaticmonitoring network RIMNET has beendeveloped, and the Netherlands has set upits National Radiation Monitoring (NRM)network. The German IMIS system (Inte-grated Measuring and Information System)is however by far the largest such network ofmonitoring stations in the EU. The interna-tional reporting of incidents and the sharingof information has progressed, with the

IAEA Convention on Early Notification, theInternational Nuclear Event Scale, interna-tional emergency exercises, and initiativessuch as ECURIE (European CommissionUrgent Radiological Information Exchange)and EURDEP (European Radioactivity DataExchange Platform). An enormous amountof environmental data is now being collectedin various systems across Europe, generatingresults with a daily volume of hundreds ofgigabytes. The major development nowrequired is to make these systems communi-cate with each other and to provide appro-priate information to non-specialists.

A Centre for Information and Valorisation ofEuropean Radioactive Contaminated Territo-ries (CIVERT) has been established at theEnvironment Institute of the EC’s JointResearch Centre, Ispra, with the aim ofproviding assistance to local and nationalauthorities in managing large contaminatedareas in the event of a future accident.

Guidance on food intervention levels havebeen developed to ensure food safety inEurope in the event of food being contami-nated after a future accident. The EU hasissued regulations (European Commission –Euratom) that will apply in Europe in theevent of a future accident, containingmaximum permitted activity concentrationsfor contamination in marketed food. Furtherregulations deal with food imported fromand exported to countries outside the EU. Inaddition to these, there are CodexAlimentarius Council (CAC) guideline levelsdeveloped by FAO/WHO for food moving ininternational trade (codex, 1989). IAEA andWHO have also issued advice on interven-tion levels in food. These levels issued by theEC, CAC, IAEA and WHO are not entirelyconsistent, and therefore despite attempts toharmonise action levels following a futureaccident, the potential for inconsistencyremains. In the longer term after an acci-dent, many different types of action may betaken to reduce the transfer of radionuclidesto food products. Practical advice on these isat present country-specific.

EU radiation protection legislation is sum-marised in the Community Radiation Protec-tion Legislation (European Commission,1996c) and includes the legislation underthe provisions of the Euratom Treaty.


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3.8. Natural and technological hazards · Natural and technological hazards 227 3.8. Natural and technological hazards Since the late 1980s, natural hazards have had a bigger impact

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