3632175

The Esnaf and the Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730: A Realignment in Ottoman Politics?Author(s): Robert W. OlsonSource: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sep., 1974),pp. 329-344Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3632175 .

Accessed: 10/04/2014 08:47

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the Economic andSocial History of the Orient.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 194.27.202.75 on Thu, 10 Apr 2014 08:47:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3632175?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. XVII, Part 3

THE ESNAF AND THE PATRONA HALIL REBELLION OF 1730: A REALIGNMENT

IN OTTOMAN POLITICS?" BY

ROBERT W. OLSON

(Kentucky)

It is an established fact of Ottoman history that the Patrona Halil rebellion which occurred in Istanbul in 173o had vast repercussions on the subsequent social, economic and political history of the Ottoman Empire. In order to put the role of the esnaf in the Patrona Halil rebellion into proper perspective, I first wish to cite several authorities' views which attest to the significance of the 1730 rebellion.

The Patrona Halil rebellion temporarily and in some cases completely stopped the flow of ideas, literature, ambassadors and military consul- tants which had begun to take place between Europe, largely France, and the Porte during the reign of Ahmet III (1703-1730). The cultural

flowering of this period has been characterized by calling it the 'Tulip Period' (Lile Devri) which also indicates the craze developed by segments of Ottoman society for tulips. But in the opinion of Professor Ziya Enver Karal the word tulip was the symbol of nothing less than a 'new mentality' which manifested in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire the first serious attempt to undertake the necessary measures to try to

i) The term esnaf as it is employed in this article follows the definition used by H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, part I (Oxford, 1965), pp. 281-313 and Gabriel Baer, "The Administrative, Economic and Social Functions of Turkish Guilds", International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES), vol. i, no. I (January, I970), pp. z8-0o. I will use the term esnaf as Baer applies it to his 'second' group of esnaf consisting of artisans and craftsmen, artisan-merchants and merchants proper as well as those esnaf or guilds engaged in transport and services. Cf. Baer, "Turkish Guilds", p. 31-32.

I would like to express my thanks to Professors W. Jwaideh, B. Bayerle, B. Jelavich and C. Jelavich, and especially to C. Jelavich for all of the "kindnesses" which he demonstrated for me.



330 R. W. OLSON

understand one another 1). In the view of Professor Karal this first period of secularization (garphlasmak) which appeared so promisingly to introduce needed reorganization and reform into the Empire was put to an end with the outbreak of the 173o rebellion. The Patrona rebellion brought into being a situation in which those who wished for reform were "opposed by the ulema, Janissaries and the people of Istanbul" 2). Professor Karal concludes that antagonism between the two groups resulted in a continual state of instability and in the rebellions subsequent to 1730 victories resided with the second group. Those Sultans who desired reform too ardently were deposed, their Grand Vizers killed, usually in a cruel manner. A rebellion served notice to a 'reforming' Sultan and his ministers that more imitation of Europe would not be tolerated.

Another view of the significance of the Patrona rebellion is that of Professor Niyazi Berkes who states that the French influenced secular trend of the Tulip Period insofar as it originated in the rationalist spirit of the pre-revolutionary France "gave a religious colouring to the anti- reform movement. The religious reaction held the reformationists responsible for the destruction of both din (religion) and devlet (state), not only because of their alien innovations which undermined the ancient tradition, but also because of their complicity with those infidels

[French and Russian] who were now threatening Muslim rule from two sides and from within. Thus a religiously oriented anti-western movement became the second strand running across the whole history of the Turkish transformation, in contrast to the Westernist strand" 3) which had begun during the reign of Ahmet III.

According to Professor Serif Mardin, in one of the most recently expressed views, the Patrona Halil rebellion is an important example of the cleavage in the center-periphery relations of Ottoman and modern Turkish politics 4). The 'center' in the Ottoman Empire consisted of the

I) Enver Ziya Karal, "Tanzimattan Evvel Garphlasma Hareketleri (i718-1839)" in the volume TanZimat I (Istanbul, 1940), p. 19.

2) Ibid., p. I8. 3) Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal, 1964), PP. 52. 4) Serif Mardin S., "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?",

Daedalus, vol. ioz, no. i (Winter, 1973), PP. 169-190.



THE ESNAF AND THE PATRONA HALIL REBELLION 33I

Sultanate, the ulema or learned religious class and the elite members of the asakir or military class. Mardin stresses that several factors contributed to the strained relations between the center and the periphery among which were the incompatibility of urban dwellers with the nomad society of Anatolia, the estrangement of the ruling elite from the

pre-Ottoman nobility during the early history of the empire and the

religious orthodoxy (Sunni) of the center and the heterodoxy (Shi'i sects) of the provinces: an incompatibility which often ended in rebellion or war. The fact that many members of the center-the military elite- which at this point were Janissaries and the Sultans' ministers, were converted Christians coupled with the organization of the non-Muslim communities into millets which provided them with a great deal of

autonomy further alienated the masses from governmental power centered in Istanbul. To be sure, as Professor Mardin relates, there were administrative and politically integrative institutions and elements which made the Ottoman governmental apparatus flexible enough to ameliorate from time to time the acculmulated tension among conflicting groups, but the Patrona rebellion introduced new disruptive urban elements on a scale hitherto unprecedented in the capital which culminated in the first anti-modern Turkish outbreak. Professor Mardin concludes,

There had been many rebellions in Istanbul before, but this [the Patrona Halil rebellion] was the first to show a syndrome that was thereafter often repeated: an effort to Westernize military and administrative organization propounded by a section of the official elite, accompanied by some aping of Western manners, and used by another interest group [ulema] to mobilize the masses against Westernization. Turkish modernists have concentrated exclusively upon the background of political intrigues by statesmen which, indeed, was an aspect of this and similar revolts. However, for a complete picture we should also dwell on the cultural alienation of the masses from the rulers, of the periphery from the center. During later phases of modernization, this alienation was to be compounded 1).

If we accept Professor Mardin's statement, the problem still remains of how to define and anlayze the extent of the cultural alienation of the masses from their ruler, and, in particular, how the Patrona Halil rebellion of 1730 and the esnaf contributed to this alienation.

i) Ibid., p. I7 5.



332 R. W. OLSON

During the course of the Patrona rebellion the rebels and some of their supporters succeeded for a short period of time in achieving some of the highest offices in the Empire with the support of elements, especially the ulema, which had formerly supported the Sultan. The rebellion of 1730 in effect caused a realignment of those groups which

supported or opposed the policy of increased contact with Europe advocated by the Sultan and his Grand Vizer. The major support of the Sultanate prior to 1730 had come from the military elite and the ulema. After 173o elements of the military elite, especially those opposed to the introduction of western military methods, and the ulema who were

opposed to the subversion of Ottoman society by Europe began to collaborate with the anti-Sultan forces whenever they felt it in their interest to do so. In effect, the post 1730-1731 alignment was much more volatile than the pre-1730 one, because elements of the Janissaries and/or the ulema could alternate their support for the Sultan or for his

opponents depending upon the circumstances and strength of the Sultan 1). The fluidity of the new alignment is also demonstrated by the actions of the esnaf or 'petite bourgeoise' of artisans and merchants who in 1730 were one of the most vocal opponents of the Sultan and Grand Vizer. In the spring of 173 I the esnaf in face of a threat to their business- es by the continuing disorders in the city, threw their support to the new Sultan, Mahmud I (1730-1754), and the last supporters of Patrona Halil were executed or imprisoned 2). Even though Mahmud I promised to rescind the extraordinary campaign taxes imposed by his predecessor, the newly won allegiance of the esnaf, many of whom were non-Muslim, was to be a mainstay of his regime. The switch of allegiance of the esnaf

I) Robert W. Olson, The Siege of Mosul: War and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1743,unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Indiana University, 1973), PP. 138-i40.

z) For this significant development see the dispatch of Lord Kinnoull, the British Resident in Istanbul, dated 4/I 5 April, 1731 in State Papers, (SP) Series 97, volume z6. Series 97 of the SP records correspondence between the British Residents of Istanbul with the Foreign Secretary and Foreign Office in London. The SP are deposited in the Public Record Office in London. For details of this period see Miinir Aktepe, Patrona Isyan (1730) (Istanbul, 1958): I. H. Uzuncarsllh, Osmank Tarihi, part I (Ankara, 1956), pp. 204-218 and Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'empire Ottoman, XIV, translated from the German by J. J. Hellert (Paris, 1839), PP. z 19-249.



THE ESNAF AND THE PATRONA HALIL REBELLION 333

to the Sultan was one of the most sudden and significant changes resulting from the rebellion of 1730-1731, and it requires some dis- cussion of the role of the esnaf in the Patrona Halil rebellion itself. Since the political and social events surrounding the rebellion of 1730 have been stated in some detail in other works, I would like to confine

my comments to the esnaf and their economic grievances which played a role in helping to precipatate the Patrona rebellion 1).

The treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Istanbul (1700) turned Ottoman attention from Southeastern Europe to their eastern provinces and Persia. This policy culminated in the reopening of the Persian front in

1723 which in turn was followed by increased taxes, rising food prices and a scarcity of food supplies. It also necessitated the reimposition of the so-called extraordinary 'campaign' taxes of imad-i seferriye, avartrZ-i divantye and tekdif-i drfiye which fell most heavily on the esnaf2). The reopening of the eastern front caused an influx of refugees to Istanbul which, added to the emigrants from Rumeli, added greatly to the problem of provisioning the city and of finding employment for the new residents. The preparation for war with Esref Shah, the Afghan invader, in 1726 and the preparation for a second confrontation after the defeat of Ahmet Pasa, the Ottoman Commander, at Anchcan placed even more oppressive obligations on the reaya of Rumeli and Anatolia 3). The abandonment of the land by the peasants aggravated the financial situation of the Porte by reducing the agricultural taxes and resulted in an economic crisis. To combat the crisis mukataalar (state lands) began to be sold as malikdnes (lands usually held for life by an individual), a practice initiated after the Treaty of Karlowitz to raise revenue 4). Miri mukataa which were usually granted for one, two, or three years, began to be granted for longer periods of time. Rich officials purchased the mukataalar as malikdnes and administered them as their own property.

x) Aktepe, Patrona Isyam, pp. 11-2 I. 2) Ibid., p. 36. 3) Ibid., p. x i. 4) Ibid., p. 4 Cf. Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society, I, pp. 235-275 for land tenure

procedures during the eighteenth century.



334 R. W. OLSON

The tax farming privilege fell into the hands of a few rich 1). The

supervisors (mutasarriflar) of the malikidnes frequently sold the tax-

gathering privileges to someone else, always for a higher price than he had paid. The last person to purchase the tax-gathering rights to a malikdne was reduced to force the price of the malikdne from the peasants 2). In 1715 the Porte repossessed many lands sold as malikdnes and resold them as miri (state) land to tax farmers (miiltezim) for a stated period of time, usually three years. In other words, the Porte sold land as a malikdne or sold it to a mfiltezim, who paid for his tax-

gathering right in advance, depending on which method produced the most revenue.

Even prior to 1723 Ibrahim Pasa had taken measures to reduced

expenditures. One thing which he did was to call the yoklama (roster of

Sipahis) in I715 to save paying the salaries of the Janissaries whose

ulfife or quarterly paid wages were in arrears 3). He also reduced the salaries of numerous other sections of the army. The Grand Vizer's measures of increased taxation and of cutting back on the wages of the

Janissaries as well as provincial militia such as the kala muhafizlar (fortress soldiers) help to alienate these two important groups of Otto- man society. In 1726 and 1727 the levies of the extraordinary campaign taxes for the war with Esref Shah were demanded from a decreased and

poverty stricken reaya. The financial situation coupled with the tension in the city doubtlessly contributed to the conclusion of the treaty with

Esref Shah in the fall of 1727 after which the imad-i seferriye was can- celled 4). The temporary lifting of the campaign tax did not benefit the

reaya as the tax gatherers, despite orders to the contrary from the Porte, kept collecting it. Secondly no sooner had the treaty with Esref Shah been concluded when Nadir Khan, the powerful new military leader of

Persia, appeared as a major threat to the eastern provinces of the empire.

I) Aktepe, Patrona Isyanl, p. 4 states, "bes on zengine miinhasir kalarar", but this must be taken as an exaggeration.

2) Ibid., p. 4. 3) Halil Sahilloglu, "Sivis Yili Buhranlar", Iktisat Fakiiltesi Mecmuast (IFM),

27 (October, 1967-March, 1968), pp. 1o'-'oz.

4) Aktepe, Patrona Isyan:, p. I 1.




These economic measures of the Grand Vizer not only alienated the

Janissaries, provincial soldiery, and put increasing burdens on the

reaya, but they also put great demands and restrictions on the esnaf.

During the twelve-year Grand Vizerate of Ibrahim Pasa the esnaf's

complaints had mounted. Their major grievances centered on what they considered to be the three major problems: (i) the continued debase- ment of the currency and the problems which accompanied it (2) the

changes resulting in the guild system of the esnaf because of the influx of emmigrants from Anatolia and Rumeli (3) the tax (ordu akgesi) extracted from the esnaf in times of mobilization for war.

The first problem increased in 1719 when Ahmet III issued a hatt-t himajun (imperial rescript), which ordered the selling of one silver dirhem that had previously sold for twenty-one akge, for twenty akge. The same dirhem was being sold on the market for twenty-two akge. By such a measure the official price of the dirhem was less than the going street price. The government's idea was to raise the price of the akge. This policy, in turn, reduced the value of the silver that the people possessed and which they did not want to give up to the mint at a loss. The merchants also did not want to sell their goods at the new valuation. The mint was soon unable to strike new coins for the lack of silver. The silver which was on the market soon fell into the hands of Persian merchants who took it to Persia where it was minted into the Abbasi, a silver coin: 1) Persian merchants apparently played a significant role in reducing the value of the akqe and in contributing to the silver shortage. The merchants who brought food supplies into Istanbul would not accept akqes which contributed to the shortage of food in the city. Additional monetary woes came in 1723 when the Istanbul money market was flooded with silver akqes minted in Egypt and which were less than the standard weight of the akge in Istanbul. This precipitated the "problem of the counterfeit akge" (zuyuf akge meselesi), which further increased the tension among the merchants, government officials and money changers (sarraflar). The weak akqe remained a troublesome problem

I) Ibid., p. I9.



336 R. W. OLSON

from 1716 up to the outbreak of the Patrona Halil rebellion in 1730 1).

The second complaint of the esnaf in the decade preceding the rebellion of 1730 was the stress placed on their guilds as a result of the

unprecedented influx of people into Istanbul2). During the Grand Vizaerate of Ibrahim Pasa the guild system was put under great pressure. Among the people flowing into the capital were many artisans who wished to open their own shops or, at least, to work with a member of a

guild. Some of the guilds were attracted to the new labor supply and the

possibility of paying lower wages. The masters of the guilds were just as anxious to keep strict control on the number of journeymen permitted to become masters. Ibrahim Pasa also attempted to tax the previously untaxed products which were manufactured by the esnaf in Istanbul. After much complaint some of the newly imposed taxes were annulled, but a few remained in force until Ibrahim's death in 1730. One of the first requests of the esnaf to the new Sultan, Mahmud I, in 1730 was to annul the taxes levied by Ibrahim Pasa. Attempts to tax the esnaf made them bitter enemies of the Porte. In face of the new competition from the

provincial artisans, the esnaf took measures to protect themselves and to

keep non-guild members from producing goods. The esnaf's measures were partially successful. The non-guild members, unable to work, provided a united and somewhat organized dissatisfied group capable of

potential violence in the city. There was tension not only between guild and non-guild members but among the guilds themselves. The main bone of contention was that one of the esnaf would begin to produce which, according to guild regulations, was the exclusive right of another guild. In 1720 the earthenware pipe makers began to invade the market of the pots and pans and glass makers, contrary to all guild regulations. The same thing was happening among other groups of esnaf. The guilds which had previously held together under various difficulties began to break down in the years just prior to 1730.

Other government measures increased the esnaf's complaints. In 1726

i) Ibid., p. 2i. z) Baer, "Turkish Guilds", and Robert Mantran, Istanbul dans la seconde moitid

du XVIIe sidcle (Paris, 1962), pp. 287-424.




Ibrahim Pasa introduced a new middleman into the commercial life of the city in an attempt to increase government revenue. The men who filled the new office were called dellals and were the middle men between the producers (miistahsiller) and the retailers (perakendeciler). Pre-

viously all produce entering Istanbul customs were distributed by senior members or stewards of the guilds. Now, as a result of Ibrahim's new measure the deldals were able to act as a wholesaler. The dellals

bought the produce at Istanbul customs and sold it to the retailers at the

highest price they could exact, splitting their profits with the government. The third major complaint of the esnaf was that military personnel,

especially the armorers (cebeciler) and Janissaries, were continually in-

creasing their esnaf operations. During Ahmet III's reign the Janissaries had begun even to be cooks of okra! The Janissaries and cebecis would force the growers of okra to sell their produce at prices lower than the market price. The growers as well as the esnaf were unable to offer any retaliation against the superior power of the Janissaries and cebecis. When Janissaries obtained the positions of dellal, the esnaf and the

growers were unable to oppose to them. The third major grievance of the esnaf and the one most directly

contributing to their unrest was the levying of the extraordinary campaign taxes with the commencement of the Persian wars in 1723. As mentioned above the appearance of Nadir Khan in Azerbayjan in 1730 once again compelled Ibrahim Pasa to impose the extraordinary campaign taxes. In 1730 Ibrahim Pasa and Ahmet III had begun mobilizing their forces at Uskiidar in advent of an eastern campaign. The days stretched into months and still the assembled troops did not depart for the Persian front. The esnaf who had paid their campaign taxes felt that they had been deceived and that the government was spending their tax money for something other than the war against Persia. Every day they remained at Uskiidar the esnaf's wrath mounted against Ibrahim Pasa. The bitterness of the esnaf was related directly to their involvement with the army's campaign. Whenever the Ottoman army left on a campaign the various esnaf and artisan groups attached a contingent of men from their respective guilds to the army to meet the

22



338 R. w. OLSON

army's needs for goods and repair during the course of the campaign. The esnaf members assigned to the army consisted of secondhand clothes dealers (haffaflar) to blacksmiths (demirciler) who would set up their tents and follow the campaign. All the expenses of the army esnaf (ordu esnafi) were paid by the esnaf guilds. For the privilege of selling goods to the army each guild had to pay a sum of money to the government. This tax was called the ordu akfesi or army akge and was paid by the guilds.

The army akge was paid per hayme or tent that each guild attached to the army, but the tax differed according to trade. In 1730 the ordu

ak4esi assessed by the government rose to 360,000 akge on some haymes. On July 5, 1730 the Kadl (chief judge) of Istanbul sent fermans to the

Aga of the Janissaries, the representatives of the esnaf (esnaf kethui- dalar) and the masters (iistalar) of each trade to set up haymes in Istanbul. Twenty-seven different esnafs and eighty-four haymes were set up for which the esnaf paid a total of 3,168,800 akge 1).

The ordu akjesi assessed in 1730 was much higher than those of

previous campaigns and the esnaf were only able to pay it with difficulty. Many esnaf were unable to pay the requested amount and went bankrupt. Those esnaf who did manage to pay were soon disillusioned. Every day the army hesitated at Oskiidar the lesser possibility of profit which they had hoped to make on the campaign. The rumors that much of the ordu akcesi had been embezzled (eklii bel) increased dissatisfaction.

Consequently, in the summer of 1730 the esnaf found themselves in the

position of having paid extraordinary campaign taxes plus the ordu

akfesi with a diminishing possibility of recouping their expenditures. The Janissaries had closed their shops and joined the army. Many of them hoped to sell their goods to the army; others had purchased sufficient goods to last them throughout the campaign. It was rumored that the leader of the 1730 rebellion, Patrona Halil, once had been a secondhand goods dealer (eskici) who had invested his small amount of money in hopes of selling the old clothes to the army. Patrona Halil

i) Aktepe, Patrona Isyan, p. 36. Cf. M. Miinir Aktepe, "Ahmad Ill. Devrinde *ark Seferine I?tirak Edecek Ordu Esnafi Hakkinda Vesiklar", Tarih Dergisi (TD), VII, no. io (September, 1954), PP. 17-30.




was just one of many disgruntled esnaf and small traders and when the

army did not move the esnaf and the people did. When the news that Nadir Shah had captured Tebriz reached Istanbul the pregnant tension

gave birth to rebellion. On September, 173o, the largest and most influential rebellion of eighteenth century Ottoman history broke out and members and leaders of the esnaf were in the forefront of those

spearheading the rebellion. The strength of the rebels was such that they were able to demand and

obtain the execution of Ibrahim Pasa who in the eyes of the ulema

represented the French influences so hated by them. The deposition of Ahmet III on October 2, 1730, quickly followed the execution of the Grand Vizer and his two nephews, Kethiida Mehmed Pasa and Mustafa

Pasa. The deposition of the Sultan demonstrated the extent of power that the rebels had obtained in comparison to previous rebellions which

usually left the Sultan on the throne. Mahmud I's (1730-1754) accession to the throne was conditioned by his promise to the rebels that the

extraordinary campaign taxes would be rescinded and that the palaces and kiosks constructed by Ibrahim

Papa would be destroyed. The new

Sultan was also given to understand that in his reign the ranking ulema who had been among the main instigators of the rebellion would exer- cise great power by virtue of the high government offices to which they were appointed.

The execution of Patrona Halil and one his chief lieutenants, Manav Muslu, on November 25, 1730, temporarily lessen the rebels activities and enable Mahmud I to consolidate his new regime. Patron's execution was significant in that it also served notice that the ulema, led by Ziijlli Hasan Efendi, the new Seyhiilislam, and two of his chief lieutenants now felt secure enough in their new and restored offices to coop- erate with the Crimean Khan, Kaplan Giray and with Kabakulak Ibrahim Pasa, the men chosen by Mahmud I to suppress the rebellion 1).

However, Mahmud I, his chief lieutenants and supporters were not granted their wish for quiet because four months after the execution of

i) Uzungarsih, Osmani; Tarihi, IV, part 1, pp. 215-216; Hammer, Histoire, XIV, pp. 243-245.



340 R. W. OLSON

Patrona Halil rebellion again flared and threatened to reach the level of the previous September 1). The rebellion of March 25, 173 I, was trig- gered by the execution of the Greek butcher, Kasab Yanak, who had been appointed at the zenith of Patrona's power, but had not filled, the

position of Hospodar (governor) of Moldavia 2). Following the outbreak of March 25, 173 I, several thousand people were put to death in efforts to suppress the rebellion 3). At one point Sultan Mahmud I, relying upon the precedent of his predecessor had to display the sacred banner (Sancak-i Serif), usually unfurled only against foreign enemies, to quell the insurrection. The Sultan also enlisted the aid of Topal Osman Pasa who had been instrumental in pursuing and executing those

suspected of involvement in the March 25, 1731, rebellion. For his success in suppressing and executing those allegedly involved in the March rebellion, Topal Osman Pasa was elevated to the Grand Vizerate, but his short tenure of six months continued to be filled with rebellion 4) On July 21, 1731, and September 2, 173 1, there were again rebellions; the July 21 rebellion was accompanied by a conflagration begun by arson of which there were repeated cases during this period.

It is, however, a statement of Lord Kinnoull, the British Resident at Istanbul during the Patrona Halil and March 25, 1731

rebellion, which is of striking importance and great relevance. In his first report to Holles Newcastle, the British Foreign secretary, dated 4/15 April subsequent to the March 25 rebellion, Lord Kinnoull states that in his

i) Ibid., pp. 247-248; Mary Lucille Shay, The Ottoman Empire from I720-1734 as Revealed in the Dispatches of the Venetian Baili (Urbana, Illinois), p. 32 states that the Venetian Baili dated the rebellion as starting on March 26; Hammer states March 24; Uzungarsli follows Hammer as his date corresponds with Ramazan 15, i143; Aktepe places the date as March 24; Cf. Faik Resit Unat, Hicri Tarihleri Milddi Tarihe ?evirme Kzlavuzu (Ankara, I959), pp. 78-79.

2) Hammer, Histoire, IXV, p. 241 has an interesting account of this episode and relates that when Patrona appointed Yanak as the Hospodar of Moldavia the Grand Vizer protested that the position of Hospodar could not be given to Yanak because he

(the Grand Vizer) had already sold it to Gregory Ghika, a phanoriot. Patrona Halil replied, "What's the difference between one infidel (gavur) or another?".

3) Ibid., p. 247 puts the number at 7,000 or more; Shay, The Ottoman Empire, quoting the Venetian Baili places the figure as high as 0o,ooo.

4) Topal Osman Pasa was Grand Vizer for approximately six months; September 10, 1731, to March I , 1732.




opinion there were three reasons for the rebellion of March 25: (i) that it was begun by the rebels who had managed to excape punishment to

avenge Patrona Halil's death (2) that the rebels for fear of further

prosecution by the Sultan decided to strike first (3) that the rebels with a relatively small force of I, 0oo men did it merely for plunder. It is at this

point in his report that Kinnoull make the striking statement that the rebels "have so far failed in their attempts that they made the G. Sig. [Grand Signor] stronger by showing the Janissaries that the merchants and tradesmen of the city will be always ready to join in

his.favour unless he should

make himself hated by some new impressions 1). [My italics]. The statement is remarkable in that it is evidence that one of the

groups most ardently opposed to the Sultan Ahmet III in September, 1730, became strong supporters of the new Sultan, Mahmud I in or by March, 173 I. It is difficult to analyze precisely this change in the position of the esnaf but several could have contributed to it. First, the promise of Mahmud I to rescind the extraordinary campaign taxes; secondly the reopening of the Persian front enabled the esnaf to recoup their investments in the ordu esnafi and it is doubtlessly also true that the esnaf were tired of the constant rebellion which curtailed greatly their business activities and was extremely detrimental to trade. The concern on the part of the Porte is indicated by the fact that when Ali Hekimoglu replaced Topal Osman Pasa as Grand Vizer in March, 1732, his first task was to restore confidence in the currency and revived trade-two issues with which the esnaf were greatly concerned 2).

In conclusion, the switch of the political allegiance of the esnaf between September, 1730, and March 25, 173 I, marked a fundamental

change in the alignment of the 'center' defined by Professor Mardin as

composed of the asakir or military elite, the Sultan and his officials and the ulema as opposed to the 'periphery': reaya or peasants, provincial notables, millets or non-Muslim communities, the lower classes of the

city and the esnaf or the 'petite bourgeoise' of artisans and merchants 3)

I) Lord Kinnoull's dispatch of 4/15 April, 1731 , SP 97, vol. 26. 2) Hammer, Histoire, XIV, p. 278. 3) Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations", p. 169-170.



342 R. W. OLSON

who at this point in time contained a large portion of Christians and

Jews 1). Professor Mardin has stated that in Europe confrontations between the 'center' represented by "Leviathan" and later on by the nation state and the 'periphery' represented by "the feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers, and later, industrial labor" led to a series of com-

promises between the two groups which resulted in "relatively well articulated structures" and "some integration of the peripheral force into the center was achieved". Professor Mardin further states that the "confrontations had varied: conflicts between state and church, between nation builders and localists, between owners and non-owners of the means of production. These cross-cutting cleavages introduced a

variety of political identifications which provided for much of the

feasibility of modern Western European politics", whereas "in the Ottoman Empire before the nineteenth century these characteristics of

multiple confrontation and integration seem to be missing. Rather, the

major confrontation was unidimensional, always a clash between the center and the periphery" 2). But the rebellion of 1730-173T I would seem to indicate that the major confrontation was not always unidimensional and not always a clash between the center and the periphery. It would

appear that after the rebellion 1730-1731 the Janissaries, a group, at

least their leadership, defined as belonging to the 'center' were gravit- tating toward the periphery in opposition to the center 3). Secondly, the esnaf which contained a large percentage of Christians and Jews who

I) It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain what percentage of the esnaf were Christians or Jews and what percentage Muslim. Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society, part i, p. z281 state that most trades and handicrafts were carried on by both Muslims and non-Muslims, although certain professions such as druggist and house painting were reserved for Muslims while Muslims controlled nine-tenths of the trade in foodstuffs. It should be remembered, however, that by the eighteenth century the most lucrative trade, that with Europe as well as a large majority of the internal trade, was in the hands of Christians and Jews. Cf. Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society, p. 308.

z) Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations" p. 170. 3) The placing of the Janissaries in 'center-periphery' schema of Ottoman society is,

of course, difficult because it is well known that in the eighteenth century many of the esnaf members were Janissaries. But the leadership cadre of the Janissary Corps and its most active members headed by the Aga of the Janissaries were still supporters of the 'center'.




belonged to the millets and hence were members of the 'periphery' began to adhere more strongly to the Sultan-the main force of the 'center'. A corollary of this development, as evidenced by Kinnoull's

report of April, 173 i, is that not only did the esnaf support the Sultan, but they opposed the Janissaries and the masses who were rebelling. Thus two groups of the 'periphery' - the esnaf and the masses-opposed each other. This development also resulted in a further reduction of the

power of the Janissaries who could now be balanced off even more effectively with the opposition of the esnaf. This development was also to aid subsequently the centralizing policies of Selim III (1789-I8o6) and Mahmud II (1806-1939) during whose reign the Janissaries were eliminated. The esnaf's support of the Sultan in March, 1731, had the effect of also increasing the cultural alienation of the masses for the rulers in that in post-March, 1731 Ottoman politics the leadership cadre of the ulema, who were an acknowledged influence on the masses, and the masses themselves often opposed a Westernizing or reforming Sultan, while the esnaf, particularly those Christians and Jews engaged in trade with Europe and other foreign nations, tended to support increased contact with the West. The reciprocation of the esnaf's

support by the Sultan had the additional consequence of increased commercial, tax and legal privileges for those Christian esnaf who were favored in the capitulations; plus the simultaneous prospering of Christians and Jews contributed greatly to the alienation of the masses from the rulers. Indeed, the Sultan's policy of acknowledging the

support of the esnaf reached the point that in the Istanbul rebellion 1740 the esnaf, including Christians and Jews, either willing or unwil- ling, were armed by Mahmud I and assisted him in suppressing the rebellion of that year 1). The opposition of the esnaf to the Janissaries was not a new phenomenon because as early as the reign of Siileyman the Magnificent (1520-I 566) the guild of the shoemakers received the privilege of punishing all offenders of guild laws with the stipulation

I) This is the subject of a forthcoming article I am writing and which is based partially on Everard Fawkener's, the then British resident at the porte, highly relevant dispatch dated January 6, 1742 in SP, vol. 3 1.



344 OLSON, THE ESNAF AND THE PATRONA HALIL REBELLION

there was to be no interference by officals of the Porte. The shoemakers received this privilege as a reward for their support of Siileyman against the Janissaries x). But, as mentioned above, by the eighteenth century the situation had changed drastically in that many members of the

Janissary corps were now enrolled as esnaf. The simultaneous mem-

bership of men in two organizations which, at times, came into conflict

presents several problems. One of the problems is to ascertain if the esnaf support for the Sultan came equally from Muslim and Christian and Jewish members or largely from Christians and Jews 2). Even if it did come equally from the Muslim and non-Muslim members of the esnaf, the fact remains that rich and prosperous Christian and Jewish esnaf and particularly armed Christian and Jewish esnaf would stand out more as potential targets of hostility in the public eye i.e. masses as

compared to their Muslim counterparts in the esnaf. It also poses the real or hypothetical possibility that if some members of the esnaf who were still enrolled Janissaries, did at times, actually actively participate as Janissaries, or supported the active Janissaries, it could have raised the specter of placing Christians and Jews against their Muslim counter-

parts in the esnaf.

I) Baer, "Turkish Guilds", p. 43. 2) Gabriel Baer, "Monopolies and Restrictive Practices of Turkish Guilds",

Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. XIII, Part II (April, 1970), pp. 156-i 58 maintains that guilds confined to a specific community rather than mixed guilds were more evident in the eighteenth century. This would tend to support my thesis of greater polarization among the esnaf vis a vis the policy of the Mahmud x (1730-1754) during the period of his reign.



3632175

Documents

patrona halil rebellion

term esnaf

ottoman politics

ottoman empire

group of esnaf

economic andsocial history

jstor terms

jstor archive