3.3 - Stojanovic, Svetozar - Marxism, Post-Marxism and the Implosion of Communism (en)

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Marxism, Post-Marxism and the Implosion of Communism

Marxism, Post-Marxism and the Implosion of Communism

by Svetozar Stojanovi

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 3+4 / 1990, pages: 205-212, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=d1bdefd8-6d05-473d-baba-ef37a525117ahttp://www.ceeol.com/


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ISM, POST-MARXISM ANDPLOSION OF COMMUNISMt

Svetozar Stojanovic1. From Marxism 0 Post-MarxismAs a reaction t the official "Marxism-Leninism", critical Marxism,especially in Easter Europe, passed through two stages in the fifties, sixtiesand seventies. The first was so called Authentic Marxism and the second

Revisionist Marxis .In rejecting "Ma xist-Leninist" ideology critical Marxists at first moved"back to authentic arx". Their basic idea was that "Marxism-Leninism" isan essential distorti n and not a creative development of the original thoughtof Karl Marx. True in returning to "realMarx" some in the spirit of a naivehermeneutic expect d to find a fully homogenous thought. The others knew,however, that their return to Marx had to be selective and critical from thevery beginning, si ce his opus is full of important tensions and evencontradictions.Itwas this insight hat logically led to Revisionist Marxism: 1 significant andeven crucial ideas 0 classical Marxism were subjected to revision. From thisfragmentation of arxism there was, however, only one step to its radicalrevision when even the basic modus of theorizing was put in question.But howmuch ca one change Marx'smode of theory construction and stillremain a Marxist 0 any sort? In other words, radical Marxist revisionismtends sooner or I ter to be transformed into Post-Marxism, whetherconsciously or only de facto. 2It goes without s ying that I have in mind the immanent evolution of atradition and that c nsequently considerable Marxist legacy and influence is

still present within ost-Marxism. Naturally, it is a theoretical and politicalorientation that d aws upon multiple traditions, especially the liberaldemocratic one, an not just upon revisionist Marxism.In my opinion, th turning point in the transition from revisionist Marxismto Post-Marxism is t e rejection ofMarx's fundamental canon that in the newsociety the dichoto y between state and civil society has to be overcome. It isPost-Marxism and ot any kind ofMarxism that claims that this dichotomy,on the contrary, 0 ght to be preserved and that progressive structuraltransformation of xisting communist systems is unthinkable without therenewal of the sph re of civil society independent from the state.This break with t e Marxist tradition is rendered quite radical once thepainful conclusion s reached that civil society is not feasible and viablewithout strong capi alist components, involving market in all its dimensions(goods, services, ca ital and labour) and pluralism of ownership forms.

Praxis International 10: 3/4 ctober 1990 & January 1991 0260-8448$2.00


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206 Praxis InternationalThere is a crucial lesson to be learnt from the fact that both mostproductive and most humane countries are capitalist ones but with a socialdemocratic face. It is imperative for leftists now to study in detail all thearrangements and achievements of this mix of capitalism, democracy and

socialism.In addition to political and ownership pluralism, a project of good societythat I call social-eco-democracy must also involve a combination of oppositeprinciples of social organization. Enterprise has to be a profit-makinginstitution and not a basic unit of social policy of the state. Roughly speaking,the basis of economy has to bemarket, whereas the state has to a great degreeto function according to the opposite principles of solidarism and ecologism.I do not have in mind some kind of "transition" between capitalism andMarx's communism, but a society in its own right with a mixed type ofownership, civil society, and entire organization.Let us, however, for the moment return to the Marxists' criticism of theruling communism in the name of Marx's communism. In my view, it used tohave subversive character, especially in Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland andCzechoslovakia. Because: (1) it successfully questioned the system's Marxistlegitimacy, and (2) it challenged the ideological monopoly of the ruling classon public discourse, thereby creating some free space not only for criticalMarxism but also for some non-Marxist intellectual orientations. The bitterreaction of officials and the persecution of Marxist critics showed thatpointing to the gap between "Marxist-Leninist" systems and Marx's

communism did indeed irritate some sore spots.In addition to these two progressive functions, however, such criticism hadfrom the beginning a latent conservative function. But how could the ideaof the withering away of the state, for instance, even inadvertently contributeto the preservation of a social order, the essence of which is a structuralcontrol of one group over the state and, through it, over all key areas andmeans of social life?A realistic, and hence politically relevant program would have under thoseconditions focused on reducing (liberalization), and in the long runeliminating this control (democratization). The program of withering awayof the state, on the contrary, is an excellent example of how a utopia canindirectly contribute to preserving domination over people by drawing theirattention away from real problems and realistic ways to resolve them, i.e.from trying to create a civil society independent from the state and transformthe monopolizied into a legal and pluralistic state.Symptomatically, the effectiveness of the Marxist critique of rulingcommunism was increasingly waning as real prospects were increasing forconsiderable liberalization of the system: decentralization of government,some reliance on market and private property (in small businesses),establishing pockets of independent civil society, etc. Those critics of realcommunism who continued relying on Marx's utopia in such a politicalcontext were threatened with the deadly danger of becoming directlyconservative and even reactionary.Unfortunately, it did not require any effort to use Marx's critique of

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Praxis International 207bourgeois political economy against the above-mentioned measures andchanges. It is not hard to guess what Marx would say about them since hecharacterized even the principle of distribution according to work asbourgeois (even though market would be abolished).I believe that Post-Marxists should introduce a fundamental distinction inclassical Marxism between the principles of radical humanism, on the onehand, and the idea of communist social organization, on the other.These principles as is well-known are: praxis, de-alienation, de-reification,meeting authentic human needs, freedom of each and every individual as aprecondition for freedom of all. Marx expected them to be fully realized in anew classless and stateless society, where private ownership of forces ofproduction and the market economy were to be completely abolished, andthe distribution of social product was, in the first phase, to be carried out inaccordance with the work invested, and later in accordance with needs.However, life has proven Marx's idea of communism without market, stateand law to be incompatible with the feasible and viable programs of goodsociety.In my opinion, though, this is not to say that Marx's radical humanisticprinciples need have the same fate. Provided they are separated fromcommunist utopia and understood only as ultimate regulative-critical ideals,and not as constitutitive-operative principles as well, they can, naturallycombined with numerous mediations, be useful in evaluating existingsocieties and projects of the good society.2. Decadence of Communist ideologyIn my view ideology is a set of ideas which social groups at the expense oftruth use to justify what they do and discredit their opponents. Among suchideas it is ideals that play an especially important role, so important indeed

that we need a separate name for this dimension of ideology - thus my termidealogy.3Bourgeois liberalism and democracy, for instance, before becoming realityhad been a grand ideal-Iogy. Communism as well entered historical stage as agreat ideal-Iogy.This ideal-logical communist phase I have been calling "socialist realism"borrowing the phrase from the official soviet ideology but at the same timeextending its meaning to cover the whole communist ideology and not onlythat in arts and culture. In order to justify their monopoly of power officialsused to characterize it as "dictatorship of the proletariat" during the "transition period" toward a "communist future" (stateless and classless society). Alltheir problems, mistakes and crises were explained away as allegedly "unavoidable" and "understandable" on the path to this future state. It was onlytheir alleged "tendency" tomovein this direction thatwas really to be counted.This utopian stage lasted roughly until 1968, the turning point being theSovietmilitary intervention in Czechoslovakia. The reformist program of theCzechoslovak communists condensed in the formula of "socialism with ahuman face" had to be countered in ideology as well, and not only (by tanks)


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208 Praxis Internationalin practice. For this purpose the syntagm of "real socialism" was invented. Itwas this slogan that meant to suggest that communist reformers werearbitrarily imagining some alternative socialism whereas in practice the onlyfeasible socialism was the one already existing in the communist countries. Inmy view this was the second major stage in the history of the officialcommunist ideology."Real socialism" as a reply to the project of "socialism with a human face"was indeed quite cynical since it was imposed by force. In addition to itscynicism the proclamation of "real socialism", according to analysts andcritics, was tautological as well: reality was supposed to be vindicatedprimarily by the fact that it was reality. The third characteristic of thecommunist ideology was conservatism that typically took "reality" as thestandard of evaluation."Real socialism" represents a minimal, borderline case of ideology.

Having entered this stage communist ideal-Iogy was transformed into a reallogy. The result was poverty of ideology, since the system became incapableof effectively relying on its own foundational ideals but instead had to invokethe fact that it exists.Naturally, there was no sharp demarcation line between this and thepreceding ideological phase: people were still expected on occasion to use thelanguage of "socialist realism" but without necessarily believing in it - henceever greater hypocrisy.The official ideology of the CPSU, of course, did not want to suggest thatthe Soviet Union was simply one of the countries of "real socialism". There

had to exist an international ("internationalist"!) hierarchy of "realsocialisms" headed by the SUas a country of "developed socialism" as well. Byimplication the other communist countries belonged to "undevelopedsocialism" that had yet to catch up with the level of the Soviet Union.However, if the SovietUnion had already achieved"developed socialism"why was it not passing to the stage of communism without classes and state, asenvisioned in the Marxist-Leninist scheme? Here is yet another immanentdifficulty of the ideology of "developed socialism": how come the SovietUnion, itself a model of "developed socialism", still had to catch up withdeveloped capitalism?But the main blow to ideologies is dealt by life and not by logicaldifficulties. As soon as the main ideological reference point became "reality"

rather than the utopian future, official communist policy was unavoidablyjudged by its practical performance, so that nobodywas willing any longer toforgive its faults in the name of the alleged communist future. In otherwords,communist reality was looking increasingly bad, especially in comparison tothe rich and democratic capitalistWest ("comparative crisis" of communism).Gorbachev's response to what he saw first as "stagnation" and then "crisis"was "perestroika of socialism". In my opinion, this is the third and last stageof communist ideology (in Europe). However, Gorbachev has recentlyradicalized his policy so much that we are dealing now not only with"perestroika" of communism but with post-communism as well.Naturally, he is unwilling to say so publicly because he does not want to


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Praxis International 209alienate moderate conservatives, or at least wants to neutralize them."Perestroika" is ideology (distorted picture) exactly because it has to concealsomething important. Unlike "perestroika" as an intrasystemic change,Gorbachev's call to "new thinking" logically speaking does not set any suchlimits.To this point we have distinguished three phases of communist ideology:"socialist realism," "real socialism" and "perestroika of socialism". Ofcourse, the trajectory of communist ideology can be viewed from otherangles as well. Based on its relationship to truth (which connects very well toits described attitude toward "reality") three following phases can bedepicted.The initial stage of ideologies is usually characterized by a mixture of truthsand untruths, which should be called distorted consciousness. The next phase

is false consciousness, consisting only of untruths, that adherents, however,still believe to be truths. The terminal stage in ideological decay should betermed mendacious consciousness, when nobody believes in the ideologicalclaims. It goes without saying that communist ideologues used to consciouslylie earlier as well, but this was not their dominant tendency.It is against this background of false and especially of mendaciousconsciousness that Gorbachev's policy of "glasnost" and its attraction is to beunderstood. In the atmosphere of openness everybody is given theopportunity to see and publicly talk about the reality of "real socialism" and

of its past.3. Negative dialetic of communist statismFor almost three decades I have been trying to elaborate a theory of

communist statism that is based on structural control of a group (statist rulingclass) over the state (thus the name "statism") and through it over theeconomy and other areas of social life.Comn1unist statism belongs to the family of socio-political formationswhere political power is primary and the economic secondary. In capitalismas a socio-economic formation, on the contrary, political domination isderivative whereas the economic is original. The statist class cannotdominate society without directly ruling it through the state (ruling-dominantclass). On the other hand, the capitalist class is capable of dominatingwithout ruling the state (non-ruling dominant class).It seems now that the most developed part of the world is beingtransformed into a socio-informational society, in which as the very nameindicates, the basic source of domination is control of information.What was the basis of the hopes of communist reformers during severaldecades before the sudden collapse of the East European communism in1989? They had relied on the structural room for intrasystemic changes thatlay between total, supercentralized and detailed control of communists(totalitarianism, for which Stalinism is a perfect example) and the minimumof their selective-strategic control.One of the main queries to be pondered is: what are the structural reasons


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210 Praxis Internationalfor the incapacity of the ruling class to consolidate minimal selective-strategicdomination? Communist conservatives have always believed that if thecontrol came to be eroded seriously it would be virtually impossible to stopthe process leading to its complete elimination. They have understood thestructural vulnerability of communism much better than communistreformers. However, this leads us straight to the negative dialectic of thesystem. Such a dialectic has been at work since communism's coming topower. However, its latent internal contradictions have only recentlybecome quite actual and produced results completely opposite to thoseintended by the system's architects.(1) The statist ruling class had an important but at the same timemisleading advantage over the bourgeoisie: unlike the latter, it did not haveto struggle for the influence on the state apparatus since it was overlappingwith and leading it. From the very beginning it was, however, a potentialweakness as well. Namely, if statists are denied their direct grip on the state,their rule in other areas as well will also be lost. There is no reserve powerposition for them to fall back upon. As already stated, in order to dominate,the statist class has to rule the state directly.First structural defense line of this class is at the same time its last one.Hence its incapacity to consolidate selective-strategic control. Capitalistpower structure, on the other hand, is incomparably more flexible and has adepth defense.(2) I have written elsewhere that the statist power is structurallytransparent whereas capitalist power is structurally concealed. It is in statismthat everybody knows that political ruling is the main source and center ofsocial power. It is also widely known where exactly this power is concentrated.The structural mixture of transparency and concentration of power, unlike itsdispersal and concealment in capitalism, has finally proven very vulnerable.The visible center of power, rendering mass mobilization and controleffective for a long time, has been transformed into a singular target of almostall critique, pressure and attack.(3) Politocracy, as the hard core of the ruling class, consists of professionalpoliticians who naturally have vested interest in their careers. Consequently,if under pressures a monopolistic politics is being transformed intodemocratic-competitive one, career politicians will try to play by new rules,leave communist parties, join or even form new parties, support radicalreforms, etc.What else is left them if their self-cooptation is being replaced bydemocratic elections?(4) Pressures from below have widened and deepened divisions within theruling class and party. They consist of various strata: politocracy,technocracy, officials of the administrative, military, police and propagandaapparatus, etc. Since these groups have somewhat different interests variousreformist and anti-reformist coalitions within the ruling class and party, aswell as between some of its parts and external groups have been coming intobeing.(5) To claim that the communist party rules is both true and misleading.There is no denial that the statist class has been organized as a political party.


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Praxis International 211It is exactly this party organization that until recently had brought aboutseveral great advantages to the class. First: it was through the party that as arule about ten percent of the population were directly organized, mobilizedand controlled. Second: it was the CP that served as the central "transmissionbelt" in the system of "transmission belts". The ideological claim that otherorganizations and institutionswere "transmission belts" of the CP covered upthe fact that the CP itself was in the same instrumental position vis-a-vis the"party within the party" or the ruling class. Third: it was in this way that classcharacter of the party and the state was disguised.On the other hand, from the very beginning there has been a latent tensionand evencontradiction between the ruling class andtheCP. In recent times thestructural advantage ofthe ruling class being organized as and disguised in theCP has in actuality turned into a systemic source of trouble for the class.Namely, the previously powerless party base has begun alienating itself from

the party hierarchy, and using their organizations as legal and legitimatechannels of pressure upon it to allow for or at least not to hinder radical socialchanges.After all, the CP has always been more homogenous in ideology than inpractice. As the only real party in those countries it used to attract millions ofpeople, but with different and even opposite interests and views. Duringdeep crises they have tended to disintegrate, practically along the wholepolitical spectrum. Recently they have disintegrated completely. Some oftheleaders and manymembers ofthe new parties from the left to the right are excommunists. This is yet another indication that in those countries (except informer EastGermany) the de facto outcome for some time to comewillnot besimple and full negation of communism but rather post-communism.

4. Victorious "capitalist encirclement"Various ideological devices were invented to disguise, rationalize andcompensate for the inferiority of communist statism vis-a-vis democraticcapitalism. Until recently it had tried to function basically in isolation fromthe outside capitalist world and global market-place.The history of communism in power began as a "war communism" withoutmarket and money. When it led to economic disaster Lenin made a turnabout and introducedNEP with a partial rehabilitation ofmarket and privateproperty. Stalin put a terroristic end to NEP, initiating as itwere, a super-warcommunism with its anti-market, totally command economy. After World

War 11 he divided the world market ideologically into capitalist and socialistones in order to compensate for the autarchy and inferiority of thelatter.Finally, it was Gorbachev who came to the conclusion that there is reallyonly one world market and that communist countries have to integrate in iteven at the price of systemic transformations, i.e. of their own marketization.Global market economy is in my view a victorious form of the "bourgeois encirclement" of communist statism. As a factor of overdetermination the worldcapitalist "economic base" has been putting an irresistible pressure upon the


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212 Praxis Internationalcommunist "superstructure" to adjust to the needs of further technologicaldevelopment.Elsewhere I have reformulated Marx's insight into the prevalence of"economic base" in history in the following way: When the "superstructure"of human societies comes into conflict with their "economic base" they tendin the long run to change the former rather than to prevent increase in theproductivity of the latter. True, before the advent of capitalism there hadbeen societies and even whole civilizations whose rigid "superstructure" hadcompletely blocked economic development. However, the price for it wasusually very high indeed: they were overrun by technologically moreadvanced enemies. In otherwords, Marx made a mistake in overgeneralizinghis insight about the supremacy of "economic base" and in understanding ittoo deterministically. The more one goes back in history and the more onetakes local perspective, the less right is Marx with his "economic base"model. And conversely, history since the ascent of capitalism and gradualcreation of global market "economic base" has been increasingly supportiveof Marx in this regard.His economic paradigm is unable to explain the origin and functioning ofcommunist statism as a socio-political formation. On the other hand, Marxcan be helpful in explaining the final outcome of the competition and conflictbetween two dominant social formations in the contemporary world.Structural pressuresofcapitalism as a socio-economicformation wouldgreatlycontributed to the implosion of communist statism in Europe.

NOTESt This manuscript will also appear in the volume Crisis and Reconstruction: The State andCivil Society in Africa and Eastern Europe, edited by Prosser Gifford, University Press of

America, 1992.1. My first two books (in the projected tetralogy dealing with Marxism and communism):Between Ideals and Reality, Oxford University Press, New York, 1973 (original 1969) and InSearch of Democracy in Socialism, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1981 (original 1978) werewritten in this manner.2. See my third book (in the t e t ~ a l o g y ) : Perestroika: From Marxism and Bolshevism toGorbachev, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1988 (original 1987).3. See my definitions of "ideology" and ' '' ideal-Iogy'' in ch. 4 op. cit.

3.3 - Stojanovic, Svetozar - Marxism, Post-Marxism and the Implosion of Communism (en)

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