3. Principles of Local Autonomy (Cases)

8/3/2019 3. Principles of Local Autonomy (Cases)

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POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION

G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,vs.MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO,SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents.

The City Legal Officer for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Caltex (Phils.).

Joseph Lopez for Sangguniang Panglunsod of Manila.

L.A. Maglaya for Petron Corporation.

CRUZ, J.:

The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code reading asfollows:

Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures;Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances andrevenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, Thatpublic hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenuemeasures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to theSecretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date ofreceipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect ofsuspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, orcharge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of thedecision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon theappeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent

jurisdiction.

Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declaredOrdinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with theprescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law andpublic policy. 1

In a petition forcertiorarifiled by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary'sresolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed.More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesturein the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomymandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines onlythe power of supervision over local governments. 2

The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 isconstitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the LocalGovernment Code had indeed not been observed.

Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-compliance with Circular 1-88, the

Solicitor General having failed to submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision.3

However, on motion forreconsideration with the required certified true copy of the decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view ofthe importance of the issues raised therein.

We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, thisauthority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and bindinglaws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts

jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, 4even as theaccused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged withviolating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover,Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and


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orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executiveagreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mindthe consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine ofseparation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments,or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of thisCourt in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate bodyand with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion. 5

It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation beforedeclaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and thelegislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finallyapproved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showingthat there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the requiredmajority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must bestruck down.

In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Codeunconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annulthem. He cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter

or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute thejudgment of the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lowerofficers perform their functions in accordance with law." 6His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to theSecretary the power of control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of thePhilippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, 7and of Section 5 onthe taxing powers of local governments, 8and the policy of local autonomy in general.

We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinanceand, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a taxordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government thatenacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with hisown version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis forits annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All hedid in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordancewith law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to thecity government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of meresupervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion,order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does notcover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himselfdoes not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are notobserved, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe

his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules arefollowed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and soperformed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

The case of Taule v. Santos 9cited in the decision has no application here because the jurisdiction claimed by theSecretary of Local Governments over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to theCommission on Elections by constitutional provision. The conflict was over jurisdiction, not supervision or control.

Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which provided in its Section 2 asfollows:

A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the

ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, That the Secretary of Finance shallhave authority to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twentydays after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied orimposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declarednational economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this authority the effectivityof such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty dayswithin which period the local legislative body may either modify the tax ordinance to meet theobjections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the taxordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked.Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or fee until such time asthe grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist.


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That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the taxor fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve theexercise ofjudgmentordiscretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitationsof the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was neverquestioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right todeclare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. Infact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein ofcertain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds

affected the legality, not the wisdom orreasonableness, of the tax measure.

The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code isanother matter.

In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the proposedManila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules ofthe Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of anewspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatorypublic hearings had been held. Neither were copies of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in thecity in accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the Local Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was nottranslated into Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their information and guidance,

conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the Code.

Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements had been observed in theenactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliancebefore the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all theevidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court.

To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion of the respondents and called for theelevation to it of the said exhibits. We have carefully examined every one of these exhibits and agree with the trialcourt that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent tointerested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the ManilaStandard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993

issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue ofBalita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.

The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity,considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy dueprocess. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but thisrequirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the localgovernment unit and not to tax ordinances.

We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as their validity has not been raisedin issue in the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court

insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding thatthe procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. Nopronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, andGRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitionersvs.THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:p

In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgatedon July 13, 1990, 1 the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violationswas not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and waspermitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public


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streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directlyprescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. No motion forreconsideration of that decision was submitted. The judgment became final and executory on August 6, 1990, and itwas duly entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990.

Subsequently, the following developments transpired:

In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for analleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.

On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the Court askingwho should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation oftheir driver's licenses, and where they should file their complaints.

Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against theconfiscation of his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.

This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscationof his driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force.

Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N. Trieste, another

lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center and the confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the MetropolitanPolice Command-Western Police District.

Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motorvehicles for traffic violations.

For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a memorandum datedFebruary 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police,authorizing such sanction under certain conditions.

Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment thathis office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in factdirected full compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitledRemoval of Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated February 28, 1991.

Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonongdecision prohibited only the removal of license platesand not the confiscation of driver's licenses.

On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "todetach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked orobstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."

On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:

The attention ofthe Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan ManilaAuthority of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, providing inter alia that:

Section 2.Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The MetropolitanManila Authority, thru the Traffic Operatiom Center, is authorized to detachthe license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motorvehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.

The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (asreported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may

not be detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, theCourt has received several complaints against the confiscation by police authorities ofdriver's licenses for alleged traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the saiddecision, not among those that may be imposed under PD 1605.

To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and motorists,the Court resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor General tosubmit, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, separate COMMENTS on such sanctions inlight of the said decision.


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In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adoptedpursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (itsgoverning body) the responsibility among others of:

1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic servicesrequiring coordination or consolidation for the Authority; and

2. Promulgation of resolutions and otherissuances ofmetropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic

services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied)

The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter wasmeant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation oflicense plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted.The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct actionchallenging its validity.

For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it representedan invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law,specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the

confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of thealleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.

On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early resolution of thequestioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their vahdity. A similar motion was filed by theMetropolitan Manila Authority, which reiterated its contention that the incidents in question should be dismissedbecause there was no actual case or controversy before the Court.

The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can bechallenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is notinflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the presentcontroversy.

The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of confusion amongmotorists about the state of the law on the questioned sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that thesesanctions are illegal, being violative of law and the Gonongdecision, and should therefore be stopped. We also notethe disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated a driver's license dismissed the Gonongdecision as"wrong" and said the police would not stop their "habit" unless they received orders "from the top." Regrettably, notone of the complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who arelawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights.

Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely presented to it and decide it ascategorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through itsinaction, allow them to fester.

The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. Unquestionably, the Court has the power tosuspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, topromulgate rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." 2 In proper cases, procedural rulesmay be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of arigid and formalistic adherence to such rules.

The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notablyAraneta vs. Dinglasan, 3 where Justice Tuasonjustified the deviation on the ground that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands thatthey be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."

We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate theattainment ofjustice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities thattend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. (Aznar IIIvs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court hassuspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever thehigher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisitionof the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceeddirectly to the merits of the case. (Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31).

Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were arguedseparately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question


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which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we willpass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in caseG.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies incases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion ofthese procedural matters, since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners'cause ofaction or the propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authorityon the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these casesdemands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in Araneta vs.

Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)

Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibitionagainst the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropohtan Manila Authority, and OrdinanceNo. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong. Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R.Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are considered co-petitioners and the Metropolitan Manila Authority and theMunicipality of Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as respondents. This petition is docketed as G.R. No. 102782.The comments already submitted are duly noted and shall be taken into account by the Court in the resolution of thesubstantive issues raised.

It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has recognized oftenenough as necessary to the orderly administration of justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is

because of the failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and thenecessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important substantive issues raised.

Now to the merits.

The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon itby EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodiedin the Local Government Code. 4 It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort andconvenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part toviolations of traffic rules.

The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing thatthe requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making thedelegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. 5

Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such thatall the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not thediscretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This hasbeen done in the case at bar.

As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, thefunction of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation fromrunning riot." This requirement has also been met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public,particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit thedelegate's authority. 6

But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve isthe validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature.Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity ofsuch acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down bythe accepted principles governing municipal corporations.

According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2)must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulatetrade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. 7

A careful study of the Gonongdecision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the firstcriterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow eitherthe removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in MetropolitanManila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission(and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions:

Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines andotherwise discipline drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws,ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such

penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the powers of the Land Transportation


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Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over such violations andpunishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. Whenthe proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver's license or certificateof public convenience, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shallsuspend or revoke such license or certificate. The suspended or revoked driver's license orthe report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent tothe Land Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be, fortheir records update.

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Section 3.` Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within atwelve-month period, reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject theviolator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00 for the and offense,P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver's license for the fourth offense,and a revocation of the driver's license for the fifth offense: Provided, That the MetropolitanManila Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of itsordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets andthoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila.

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Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscatedbut theerring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by theMetropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount offine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city ormunicipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank orPhilippine Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance ofthe citation ticket.

If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, theMetropolitan Manila Commission or the law-enforcement agency concerned shall endorsethe case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing of the casewith the competent traffic court, city or municipal court.

If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an unpaidfine, his driver's license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and correspondingsurcharges.

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Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders,ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealedor modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).

In fact, the above provisionsprohibitthe imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission wasallowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penaltiesas are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed bythe decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly providesthat "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to theMetropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including theMunicipality of Mandaluyong.

The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local politicalsubdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature(except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitutionitself). 8 They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of theCongress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the

case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree,which has the force and effect of a statute.

The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measureitself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority toimpose the questioned sanction.

In Villacorta vs, Bemardo, 9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City forbeing violative of the Land Registration Act. The decision held in part:

In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared:


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From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justifythe enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinanceclearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does notrequire subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before thesame is submitted for approval to and verification by the General LandRegistration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisionsof Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03 persquare meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of

the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, becausethe latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the CityEngineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivisionplan; and the last section of said ordinance impose a penalty for its violation,which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additionalconditions.

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The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing toa halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. But

as already intimated above, the powers of the board in enacting such alaudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise ofrights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to alocal ordinance.

We affirm.

To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending andso violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could bepassed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to preventbigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, toforestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech,to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid,

would be ultra vires.

The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions thedecree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effectpartially repeal the law.

We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonongcase that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It isan exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation topunish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those herequestioned.

The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of

the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition andenforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the publicmisgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practicesdescribed in detail in the Gonongdecision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for andindeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area.Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of thedelegated legislative powers.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, eitherdirectly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in MetropolitanManila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates ofmotor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations

in Metropolitan Manila.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of theMetropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7, Series of1988 of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and

(2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motorvehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver licenses for traffic violations within the saidarea.


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SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.

G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991

MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,vs.HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government, NICANOR M.PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local Government and SALVADORCABALUNA JR., respondents.

G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the

Department of Local Government, respondents.

Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.

Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.

Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

SARMIENTO, J.:p

The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of LocalGovernment), to suspend and/or remove local officials.

The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the SangguniangPanglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed againsthim by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression,grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrarydetention. 1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna,her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao,Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod;

and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of therespondent Court of Appeals. 2 We quote:

xxx xxx xxx

In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health,Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having supported the rivalcandidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the exigencyof the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where herqualifications are best suited and assigned her to a work that should be the function of anon-career service employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of thePublic Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant's duties and functions, has been

detailed to take her place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments aimed at luring heraway from her permanent position or force her to resign.

In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her toperform task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that heroffice was padlocked without any explanation or justification; that her salary was withheldwithout cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given therun-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegasand that she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrativecomplaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).


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On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo City andcomplainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo PefiaPedondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaintarose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office wasunceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office,Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the othercomplainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner,together with its fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad.Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio station

and decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so manypeople who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the group could reach thearea, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in dozingwater to the people and the bystanders.

Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed byformer mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charges filedagainst him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at theCity Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by otherdetainees thereby causing injuries He was released only the following day. 3

The Mayor thereafter answered 4 and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals

also set forth the succeeding events:

xxx xxx xxx

The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21,1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices,through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties received them,including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled dateof hearing and was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty.Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for thetwo-day hearings but was actually held only on June 20,1988 in view of the inability andunpreparedness of petitioner's counsel.

The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-Iloilo City. Again,the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a postponement under theexcuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied themotion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of thescheduled hearings (Annex M).

In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants and theirwitnesses.

Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspensionorder on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.

Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again askedfor a postponement to September 26,1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants andpetitioner were present, together with their respective counsel. The petitioner sought for apostponement which was denied. In these hearings which were held in Mala the petitionertestified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.

The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testifiedincluding their witnesses.

On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved for a postponement of theOctober 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, themotion for change of venue as denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7,

1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venueand moved for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take thedeposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, theparties failed to come to terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, theinvestigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.

The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sickor cannot attend the investigation due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied andthe petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.


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On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and thehearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. OnDecember 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were consideredsubmitted for resolution.

In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention casefiled by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner's second preventivesuspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able toobtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced. 5

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondentSecretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded inobtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, inthe respondent Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending MayorGanzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor MansuetoMalabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, apetition for prohibition, 6 (Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeingMayor Ganzon ousted.)

On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5,1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24,1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by therespondent Secretary, to this Court.

On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from implementingthe suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions.

In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991,we gave due course thereto.

Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of Local Government in hearing the tencases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased,prejudicial and hostile" towards him 7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino party 8and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and localelections; 9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. 10 He also alleges that he requested theSecretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections ofNovember 14, 1988), 11 notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two moresuspension orders of the aforementioned cases. 12 He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to IloiloCity (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request. 13

He states that he asked for postponement on "valid and justifiable" 14 grounds, among them, that he was sufferingfrom a heart ailment which required confinement; that his "vital" 15 witness was also hospitalized 16 but that the latterunduly denied his request. 17

Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government isdevoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitionerMary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).

As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what manner theMayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis-Santos were (are) political rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation andalthough the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can nottake his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that "politicalfeud" has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints.

The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to

join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut hisallegations, we can not accept them, at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us acceptthem 18 for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say so's were never corroborated byindependent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, ispresumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can beascribed to him.

As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on accountof the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot andacademic since we have in fact restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners.19


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As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why weshould overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying hisrequests. Besides, postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on MayorGanzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.

The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon ofdue process of law.

We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can

suspend and/or remove local officials.

It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to bothpetitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deletingthe phrase 21as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is aview, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in questionreads as follows:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over localgovernments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities andmunicipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their

component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.22

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:

Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, oroffices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law,and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 23

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes,since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.

It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in

consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:

Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister oflocal Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require therespondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint,and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of suchanswer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately priorto an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the said period. Ifpreventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventivesuspension shall be lifted. 24

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the

Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincialgovernor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor ifthe respondent is an elective barangay official.

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, whenthere is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or actscomplained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense sowarrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnessesor pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases,preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in officewithout prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination.

However ' if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request,the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. 25

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting thephrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline,and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code?(3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?

It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charterdid not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existinglegislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be


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provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and tobreak Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake oflocal autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerningdiscipline.

Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federalgovernments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have comparedmunicipal corporations euphemistically to "small republics." 26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to theguiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as

the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government units from over-dependence on the centralgovernment.

It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among otherthings, the passage of a local government code, 27 a local tax law, 28 income distribution legislation, 29and a nationalrepresentation law, 30 and measures 31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that inspite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It isnoteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removalof local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local GovernmentCode has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more

responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system ofdecentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocateamong the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, andprovide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers andfunctions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization andoperation of the local units. 32

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, theobjective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed bythe Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation. 33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofaras existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed againstlocal officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.

The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, whichsupposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinaryauthority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority asthis Court has held, 34 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court hadoccasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President overlocal government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executiveofficials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control andsupervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent.

Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In administration lawsupervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinateofficers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take suchaction or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the otherhand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what asubordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgmentof the former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonablyinferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials doesnot include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service sorequires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. ... 35

xxx xxx xxx

"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinateofficer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter." 36

"Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinateofficers perform their duties. 37 As we held, 38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", althoughit is a lesser power than "altering". The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in atleast three cases, Lacson v. Roque, 39Hebron v. Reyes, 40 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 41 and possibly, a fourth one,Pelaez v. Auditor General. 42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but onlysupervision "as may be provided by law," 43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated thatthe President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary actionagainst him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." 44 However, neitherLacson


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norHebron norMondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authoritybecause she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.Thus, according to Lacson:

The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipalofficers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers arealways controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject toconstitutional limitations. 45

In Hebron we stated:

Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, thesame must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clearprovision to the contrary-which does not et with respect to municipal officers ... 46

In Mondano, the Court held:

... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision overmunicipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigatecomplaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of

any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit writtencharges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to theaccused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer(not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the chargeby one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the RevisedAdministration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by theDepartment Head over the administration of ... municipalities ... . If it be construed that itdoes and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Headby section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must bedeemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l), Article VII of the Constitution. 47

xxx xxx xxx

In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials except on appealfrom the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code. 48

Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because we didnot think that the President can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged thepower elsewhere. But in those cases ii which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan,found little difficulty in sustaining him. 49

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commissionto defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, becausealthough Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, 50Commissioner BlasOple would not. 51

The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code,Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the othernotwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spiteof the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 52

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local governmentstructure instituted through a system of decentralization." 53The Constitution as we observed, does nothing morethan to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put bypolitical adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is notmeant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and localgovernment units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step.

Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose thanprecisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government.

As we observed in one case, 54decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to thelocal levels. Thus:

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegatesadministrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of governmentpower and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable,"and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more


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effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the sametime, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables itto concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" overthem, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has nocontrol over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in thefavor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomousgovernment is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention

from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of poweramounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomesaccountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 55

The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothersthe Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges,the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yieldprima faciefindings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty ofmisfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, tosuspend him out of office. As we held: 56

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office

does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed bythe Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would havebeen all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He waselected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a basicassumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people areentitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance,any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance,criminally. In either case, Ms culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminalaction, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspensionmay be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a dueprocess question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to holdoffice had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him.Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga They

were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense,to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspensionhad outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due processis thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order ofsuspension should be lifted. 57

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, 58 and so also,because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as wehave held, 59 is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with hisinfluence and authority over possible witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the records and other evidence. 61

It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under

the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days,62

which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty dayslong if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors haveachieved their purpose in a shorter span.

Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure hispresence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless anduntil found guilty.

Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more thansixty days. As we held, 63 a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less thantyranny.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to allintents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents andpurposes, his suspension permanent.

It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, anyabsolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he isreinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.

The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is done inIloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, therespondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor


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without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down,so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondentSecretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legalpower, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless tosay, with a grave abuse of discretion.

The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in

fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days ofsuspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of theLocal Government Code which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of hisnatural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuatean arbitrary act.

As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.

We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for thepurpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned,we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expeditethe same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted,

and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remainingcomplaints, notwithstanding findings ofprima facie evidence.

In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:

1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in whichlocal officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide;

2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;

3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislativecontrol over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is

consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;

4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the mannerset forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;

5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which thePresident does not have);

6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer besuspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:

a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect

or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the timeof suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]

b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, thepetitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which propercharges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previoussuspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, ifwarranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued isLIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon,may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending

against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate allsuch administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.

The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

.R. No. 120082 September 11, 1996

MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner,vs.


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HON. FERDINAND J. MARCOS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch20, Cebu City, THE CITY OF CEBU, represented by its Mayor HON. TOMAS R. OSMEA, and EUSTAQUIO B.CESA, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law are the decision of 22March 1995 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 20, dismissing the petition fordeclaratory relief in Civil Case No. CEB-16900 entitled "Mactan Cebu International Airport Authorityvs. City of Cebu", and its order of 4, May 1995 2 denying the motion to reconsider the decision.

We resolved to give due course to this petition for its raises issues dwelling on the scope of thetaxing power of local government-owned and controlled corporations.

The uncontradicted factual antecedents are summarized in the instant petition as follows:

Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue ofRepublic Act No. 6958, mandated to "principally undertake the economical, efficient andeffective control, management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the

Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City, . . . and such other Airports as may beestablished in the Province of Cebu . . . (Sec. 3, RA 6958). It is also mandated to:

a) encourage, promote and develop international anddomestic air traffic in the Central Visayas and Mindanaoregions as a means of making the regions centers ofinternational trade and tourism, and accelerating thedevelopment of the means of transportation andcommunication in the country; and

b) upgrade the services and facilities of the airports and toformulate internationally acceptable standards of airport

accommodation and service.

Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption frompayment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter.

Sec. 14. Tax Exemptions. The authority shall be exempt from realty taxesimposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions,agencies and instrumentalities . . .

On October 11, 1994, however, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer-in-Charge, Office of theTreasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of landbelonging to the petitioner (Lot Nos. 913-G, 743, 88 SWO, 948-A, 989-A, 474, 109(931), I-M,

918, 919, 913-F, 941, 942, 947, 77 Psd., 746 and 991-A), located at Barrio Apas and BarrioKasambagan, Lahug, Cebu City, in the total amount of P2,229,078.79.

Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified, claiming in itsfavor the aforecited Section 14 of RA 6958 which exempt it from payment of realty taxes. Itwas also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmentalfunctions, citing section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which puts limitations onthe taxing powers of local government units:

Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local GovernmentUnits. Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powersof provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay shall not extend to the levyof the following:

a) . . .

xxx xxx xxx

o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the NationalGovernment, its agencies and instrumentalities, and localgovernment units. (Emphasis supplied)


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Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner's realty tax account, insisting thatthe MCIAA is a government-controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has beenwithdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Governmental Code that tookeffect on January 1, 1992:

Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privilege. Unless otherwise provided in this Code,tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons whether naturalor juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local waterdistricts, cooperatives duly registered under RA No. 6938, non-stock, and non-profit hospitals

and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.(Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 234. Exemptions from Real Property taxes. . . .

(a) . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(c) . . .

Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property taxpreviously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or

juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations are herebywithdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

As the City of Cebu was about to issue a warrant of levy against the properties of petitioner,the latter was compelled to pay its tax account "under protest" and thereafter filed a Petitionfor Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, on December 29,1994. MCIAA basically contended that the taxing powers of local government units do notextend to the levy of taxes or fees of any kind on an instrumentalityof the nationalgovernment. Petitioner insisted that while it is indeed a government-owned corporation, it

nonetheless stands on the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the nationalgovernment. Petitioner insisted that while it is indeed a government-owned corporation, itnonetheless stands on the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the nationalgovernment by the very nature of its powers and functions.

Respondent City, however, asserted that MACIAA is not an instrumentality of thegovernment but merely a government-owned corporation performing proprietary functions Assuch, all exemptions previously granted to it were deemed withdrawn by operation of law, asprovided under Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code when it took effect onJanuary 1, 1992. 3

The petition for declaratory relief was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16900.

In its decision of 22 March 1995, 4 the trial court dismissed the petition in light of its findings, to wit:

A close reading of the New Local Government Code of 1991 or RA 7160 provides theexpress cancellation and withdrawal of exemption of taxes by government owned andcontrolled corporation per Sections after the effectivity of said Code on January 1, 1992, towit: [proceeds to quote Sections 193 and 234]

Petitioners claimed that its real properties assessed by respondent City Government of Cebuare exempted from paying realty taxes in view of the exemption granted under RA 6958 topay the same (citing Section 14 of RA 6958).

However, RA 7160 expressly provides that "All general and special laws, acts, city charters,decress [sic], executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or partsthereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed ormodified accordingly." ([f], Section 534, RA 7160).

With that repealing clause in RA 7160, it is safe to infer and state that the tax exemptionprovided for in RA 6958 creating petitioner had been expressly repealed by the provisions ofthe New Local Government Code of 1991.

So that petitioner in this case has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties effectiveafter January 1, 1992 until the present.


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This Court's ruling finds expression to give impetus and meaning to the overall objectives ofthe New Local Government Code of 1991, RA 7160. "It is hereby declared the policy of theState that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine andmeaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliantcommunities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.Towards this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable localgovernment structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby localgovernment units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. Theprocess of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local

government units. . . .5

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court in its 4 May 1995 order, thepetitioner filed the instant petition based on the following assignment of errors:

I RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE THAT THEPETITIONER IS VESTED WITH GOVERNMENT POWERS ANDFUNCTIONS WHICH PLACE IT IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS ANINSTRUMENTALITY OR AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

II RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER ISLIABLE TO PAY REAL PROPERTY TAXES TO THE CITY OF CEBU.

Anent the first assigned error, the petitioner asserts that although it is a government-owned orcontrolled corporation it is mandated to perform functions in the same category as an instrumentalityof Government. An instrumentality of Government is one created to perform governmental functionsprimarily to promote certain aspects of the economic life of the people. 6 Considering its task "notmerely to efficiently operate and manage the Mactan-Cebu International Airport, but moreimportantly, to carry out the Government policies of

3. Principles of Local Autonomy (Cases)

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