3 Aggression and the Endangered Self

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Aggression and the endangered selfStephen A. Mitchell Ph.D.

ab

aTraining and Supervising Analyst, William Alanson White Institute

b251 West 71st Street, New York, NY, 10023

Published online: 20 Oct 2009.

To cite this article:Stephen A. Mitchell Ph.D. (1998) Aggression and the endangered self, Psychoanalytic Inquiry: A

Topical Journal for Mental Health Professionals, 18:1, 21-30, DOI: 10.1080/07351699809534167

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ggr ssion

and theEndangered Self

S T E P H E N A. M I T C H E L L , Ph.D.

A

GGRESSION is ONE OF THE MOST COMPLEX issues psychoanalysts

grapple with, both

in

theory

and in

daily clinical practice.

Aggression, like

all

central psychoanalytic problems involving

biological, historical andclinical concerns,issomething noneof us

individually,nor we as acollective discipline,arelikelytocometo a

fixed and final position

on.

The very word

ggression

issuchaclumsy tool todescribe what

are probably many, many different kinds ofexperiences.I amsure

thereare atleastasmany different kindsofaggression asthereare

different kinds ofsnow.As theEskimos developed many different

words

to

distinguish kinds

of

snow,

we are at a

point

in the

history

of

psychoanalytic ideas whereweneedtodevelop many different words

and different theoretical conceptstodistinguish kindsofaggression.

Giventhepresent crude stateof ourterminology andconcepts,it is

very difficult

to say

everything

one

would want

to

about aggression

all

at once. This article is avery schematic condensationof mycurrent

thinking about what might be termed destructive aggression or

sadism and the way itfitsinwith various linesofprior psychoana-

lytic theorizing. Destructive aggression is very different from other

closely related experiences like assertion, which, among other things,

hasavery different biology.

Since1908,theorizing about aggressionhastendedtobifurcate into

two positions, depending on whether one views aggression as a

Dr. M itchell is Editor,

Psychoanalytic Dialogues

andTraining and Supervising Analyst,

William Alanson White Institute.

See M itchell

(1993a, 1993b,

chapter6) for aconsiderably extended versionofthearguments

madeinthis paper.


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2 2 STEPHEN

A

MITCHELL

fundamental and irreducible human instinct. That question seemsto

be answerablebyeithera yes or a no, andwhich sideonecomes

downon hasprofound consequencesfortheory-making.If theanswer

is yes, aggression

in its

various manifestations

is

seen

to

operate

necessarily and inevitably at the center of emotional life. Sadism,

hatred,thethirstfor revengethe darker passionsare regardedas a

fundamentalandinescapable d omainof the self.Prolonged immersion

and direct workonnegative transference (andperhaps negative cou n-

tertransference) are viewed as crucial and unavoidable realms of

analytic experience.

Iftheansweris no, aggressionisseenasreactiveanddefensive,

lacking in primary dynamic significance. The explanatory emphasis

tends to shift to the environment that provokes aggressionfamily

pathology and early deprivation.The analytic focus similarly shifts

to the affective experience, which is felt to underlie or precede

the aggression:forSullivan,forexample, anxietyand for Kohut,the

experience of empathic failure and thedisintegration of a cohesive

self.

Polarization, one might almost say splitting, in thinking about

aggression transcends p sychoanalytic circles. Aggressionhasbeena

fundamental problemof human experiencein all cultures and at all

points in history. How one understands the origins of aggression

determines one's positionsonmanyof the most problematic features

of life: historical, philosophical, political,and theological.Howdoes

one account

for the

horrifying bloodbaths that characterize human

history, the nightmare, as Joyce's Stephen Daedelus says, from

whichwe aretryingtoawaken?Howdoesoneund erstandthecruel-

ties that seem to be a never-absent feature of human interactions?

Wha tare theorigins of social violence?Why aregood andevilso

closely intertwined?

The questionof thenatureandoriginsof aggressionis clearlynot

merelyanabstractor intellectual consideration.How onethinks ab out

and experiencestherootsofevilandcruelty,thedarker passions,is an

important partof theshapingof thepersonalself. Infindingaposition

for oneselfon theoriginsof aggression, eachof us isframing aview

of his or her own experience, establishing a version of personal

history, shapingthecategoriesandtonesofinner life. Where doesone

place oneself within one'sown life historical events?Howdoesone


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AGGRESSION

AND THE

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2 3

understand one's own motives? explain one's own cruelties and

betrayals?

In the choice of a psychoanalytic ideology, no small part is played

by the way in which one 's ideology explains one to

oneself,

assigning

blame and innocence, responsibility and victimization, locating causes

and justifications. And when it comes to issues related to aggression,

explanations tend to drift to the two clear and polarized positions: we

are driven by our instincts toward hatred and cruelty and life is a

struggle to master and renounce those passions, or we are born

innocent and some of us are made hateful through deprivation and

cruelty perpetuated upon us. Perhaps it is precisely because the theo-

retical issues have such profound personal dynamic implications and

resonances that we tend to move generally with great conviction

toward o ne or the other solution.

Fo r many analysts, the very identity Freu dian embodies this

central issue, pro and con. Those who choose it feel those who don't

are denying the darker, bestial side of human experience, taking the

easy way out by avoiding the deeper, darker truths about human

nature and motivation. Those who do not choose the identity of

Freud ian tend to feel that those who do, root human difficulties in a

psych ological version of original sin, rather than in the abuse,

neglect, and mystification perpetuated upon children.

The most important and compelling point of reference on any major

theoretical issue is Freud, and the choice of whether or not to commit

oneself to Freud on the problem of aggression has dominated the

course of subsequent theory development. Those who do are free to

grant aggression the psychodynamic centrality it seems to deserve in

light of the historical significance and universality of human destruc-

tiveness. Yet these same theorists are burdened by a vision of human

motivation fueled by innate, propulsive aggression, which, as I will

argue m omentarily, is both anachronistic and im probable. Those who

have developed approaches to aggression based on the abandonment

of drive theory do so in dialectical contrast to Freud; they tend to

portray aggression not as spontaneous, but as provoked, not as

inevitable, but avoidable, and not as central, but as peripheral to the

development and structuralization of theself.In the concern to break

with Freud on the originsof aggression, they have not dealt satisfacto-

rily with theimplicationsan d consequences of aggression.


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2 4 STEPHEN A. MITCHELL

I have been interested in exploring an alternative approach to the

problem of aggression, which struggles to avoid the customary two-

sided slippery slopes of the positions that have shaped themselves

around the question: Is there an aggressive drive, yes or no? The

approach I will develop is consistent with those who have abandoned

the belief in an aggressive drive when it comes to thinking about the

origins

of aggression, but much closer to those who have maintained

the belief in an aggressive drive when it comes to thinking about the

universality, depth and dynamic centrality of aggression.

Let us begin by reconsidering the larger context in which Freud

developed his concept of instinctual drive. One of the major projects

embedded in Freud's multifaceted and extraordinary contributions

was his application of the Darwinian revolution to psychology. What

are the implications for thinking about the psyche of Darwin's theory

of hum an evolution from wh at were felt to be low er and more

prim itive species? The structural model is a striking microcosm ic

replica of Darwin's theory of the origin of species. Mind is layered

according to its phylogenetic history; more primitive motives and

impulses of the id, the seething cauldron, the savage beast, are

overlaid and tamed, regulated and channeled, by higher, mo re

civilized and social imperatives and compromises of the ego and

super-ego. Libido constitutes our link to our animal past. After 1920,

aggression became a second link.

I have argued elsewhere (Mitchell, 1988) that the metapsychologi-

cal dimension of Freud's theory of sexuality has essentially been

superceded. In contrast to Freud's portrayal of drives as continual,

endogenous internal pressures, the evoking stimulus is now under-

stood to play a crucial role in both animal and human sexuality. Sexu-

ality, which is a powerful biological and physiological force, emerges

inevitably

within a

relational context, an object world. The evocation

of the physiological response, the manner in which the response is

experienced, and the form in which it is remembered are all shaped by

the interpersonal context within which the sexual response arises and

takes on psychological m eaning.

In this view, sexuality is most usefully regarded not as

a push

from

within (although it is often experienced in just that way), but as a

response

within a relational field to an object, either an external or an


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AGGRESSION

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2 5

internal object. This doesn't make sexuality less biological or mini-

mize its physiological power. Rather, it posits a different understand-

ing of how the biology of sexuality works. In this view, sexuality is a

powerful physiological response, biologically mandated and prewired,

which emerges within the mutually regulatory, intersubjective, or

relational contexts, which constitute the medium within which mind

develops and operates.

Many of the authors who have rejected the belief in an aggressive

drive, including Guntrip, Sullivan, Kohut, and Fromm, have referred

to the notion drawn from classic mo tivation theory of fight/flight

behavior in response to danger and threat. This kind of approach is

also consistent with the major trends in contemporary ethology, where

(apart from Konrad Lorenz) aggression tends to be understood not as a

spontaneously arising endogenous stimulus, but as a reaction to

specific stimuli. As the ethologist Hinde (1977) puts it, Ea ch aggres -

sive act lies in a nexis of even ts that precede an d follow it (p. 5).

Those acts, Hinde argues, have eliciting factors and predisposing

factors.

W hat happens if we think about aggression, like sexuality, not as a

push from within, but as a response to others, biologically mediated

and prewired, within a relational context? Then the question of

whether there is an aggressive drive or not is replaced by questions

concerning the conditions that tend to elicit aggressive responses and

the nature and variation of those responses.

Viewing aggression in this way preserves, in a different manner

than drive theory, an emphasis on the importance of w hat the individ-

ual brings to the interpersonal field. Anyone who has spent any time

around babies knows they are

very

different, from very early on. There

is by now com pelling evidence that temperamental differences are

present at the beginning and hold up over time, and one of the most

important concepts emerging repeatedly from recent infancy and

childhood research is the importance of fit between the ba by 's natu-

ral rhythms and thresholds and those of the mother. All this suggests

thatwhetherand inwhat waya baby feels endangered is likely to vary

greatly from baby to baby. All babies feel u ncomfortable and insecure

some of the time, but there are strikingly different thresholds,

from easily ruffled and irritable on the one extreme to centered and


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AGGRESSION AND THEENDANGERED SELF 27

sure signsoffaltering loveoruncaringon thepartof thebeloved.The

victim,as we might well characterizeit, of a run of bad luck feels

curse d, lookingup to theskies, likeJob, anddemanding toknow,

W hy

me? For all of us

occasionally,

and for

many people chroni-

cally, life itself is cruel, and that very characterization personifies

an agent responsiblefor ourexp erienc e. We/


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2 8 STEPHEN

A

MITCHELL

self.Fromthenondrive theory side comesthenotion that aggressionis

not

a

pre-psychological push looking

for a

reason,

but

always

a

response to endangerment within a personally designed subjective

world.

The more interesting questions andpositions separating different

schools of psychoanalytic thoughtare now not whether there is an

aggressive drive or not, but their different assumptions about the

natureofhum an n eeds, possibilitiesfor relative security,andnorma-

tive responsestoinsecurity.Howsecureis theenvironment createdby

good-enough parents? Wh at is the normal range of narcissistic

injuryandthreat? W hatis therangeof fight/flight reactionsto such

threats? Wh at internal residuesdo theoriginal threats leave behindin

enduring psychic structures?

O necanthinkof aggressionas arelativelyad hoc,transitory re ac-

tion, likeadischarge, which servestoreestablishaself whose equilib-

rium has been underminedbynarcissistic injuryandthreat. This m ight

leadto theposition K ohut tookin hisdiscussionsof narcissistic rage

and revenge.He argued thatit is more useful to address aggression

indirectly, rather than directly,byfocusingon the narcissistic injury

that disturbs the equilibriumof the self, which the aggression func-

tionstoshoreup.This view positsanessentially singu lar, coherent,if

brittleself,with aggressionas abolstering device.

I find it more useful to think of aggressionnot as a bolster of a

singular, essentially nonaggressive self, but as a central organizing

component

of one

among multiple self-organizations.

In

this view,

all

ofus experienced enough dangerandthreatinchildhood, regardless

ofthebalanceofhealthorpathologyin ourcare-takers,tohave expe-

rienced at leastafair am ountofdestructive aggression.It isuniversal

to hate, contemplate revenge against,andwantto destroy those very

care-takers we also love . Therefo re, multiple self-organizations

developin different relationships with different significant othersand

with different dimensionsof thesame significant o ther.It isnormative

for these different self-organizations

to

remain somewhat discrete

from and in inevitable conflict with each other. In this view,one

would start withthehypothesis that each patient(andeach analystas

well)is likelytoexperience, either consciouslyorun consciously,one

or more versions of themselves as quite destructive, sadistic,and

vengeful. One important task of the analysis is to create an a tmo-


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AGGRESSION

AND THE

ENDANGERED SELF

2 9

spherein which that versionofselfcancometo life, becom e know n,

so thatthepatientcanbecom e better abletocontainand to berecon-

ciled with various versionsof the self, including destructive versions.

From this perspective, therefore,

one

cannot simply work

on or

through aggression indirectly because,in sodoing,onebypassesa full

immersionin andconscious processingof important domainsof self

experience.

Fromtheperspective d eveloped here, aggression inchildhoodand

in the analytic situation is always

both

justified and unjustified.

Becauseit is aresponse,not apush, aggressionis always subjectively

justifiedinthatitalwayshas

reasons

meanings relatedto thepercep-

tion of threat or danger. These are not post-hoc rationales for

discharge; theyare theactual

triggers

for theaggressive response.If

thereisaggression, thereis, bydefinition, threat.It is an appreciation

ofthesubjective co ntextofendangerment thatism issingin theclassi-

cal approachtoaggressionas anendogenous drive.Toregard aggres-

sion as a drive (in Freud's sense) and therefore, by definition, as

distorting

and

unjustified dem ands

a

wrenching

of the

aggression from

its psychological context of endangerment, forcing either a compli-

anceto ordefianceof theanalyst's interpretations, generally both.

Yet becausetheresponsetoendangerment is aprewired, individu-

ally styled response, arising in the context of a subjectively

constructed world, aggressionisnever simply reducibleto itsexternal

causes.Theaggressive response emerges fromanimportant versionof

th e

self,

with

its own

coherent structure

and

developmental history,

generally basedoncrucial identifications. T hereisalways m oreto say

abouttheaggressive response beyonditsprecipitant. Acknowledging

the subjective perception

of an

empathic failure,

for

example,

is not

enough.Thereason s never fully ex plainoraccountfor theresponse,

which requireananalytic inquiry intothestructureof theanalysand's

multiple subjectivities,thepersonal w orld, both externalandinternal,

in which the analysand lives and reacts, lovingly and aggressively.

Chronic aggressioniscontinually regeneratedin thecontextofongo-

ing commitments to internal object relationsand familiar patternsof

integrating interpersonal relations.

In conclusion,I would stress that analysands cometo the analytic

situationnotonly with good intentions,butalso w ithbad anddestruc-


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3 0 STEPHEN A. MITCHELL

tive intentions. The latter always

feel

subjectively necessary and may

be plausib ly justified, y et to regard that aggression a s simply a defense

against frustration of more fundamental, benign motives may draw the

patient away from some of the deep roots of his being. A full, rich

struggle with the dialectic between love and hate in human experience

entails not a dissolving of hate no longer necessary to allow love to

em erge, but an appreciation and reconciliation of the victim, the lover,

and the villain in us all.

REFERENCES

Grotstein, J. (1982 ), The spectrum o f aggression.

Psychoanal. Inq.

22:193-212.

Hinde, R. (1977), Study of aggression: Determinants, consequences, goals, and functions. In:

Determinants and Origins of Aggressive Behavior ed. J. DeWit W. Hartup. The Hague:

Mouton.

Mitchell, S. (1988),Relational Concepts in Psychoanalysis: An Integration.Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press.

(1993a), Aggression and the endangeredself

Psychoanal. Quart.

62:351-382.

(1993b),

Hope and D read in Psychoanalysis.

New Y ork: Basic.

Racker, H. (1968 ),Transference and Countertransference.New York: International U niver sities

Press.

Schafer, R. (198 3),The Analytic A ttitude.New York: Basic.

251 West 71st Street

New York NY 10023

3 Aggression and the Endangered Self

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