17 April 1998 Joint Pub 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
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17 April 1998
Joint Pub 3-05
Doctrine forJoint Special Operations
PREFACE
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1. Scope
This publication provides guidance for theplanning and execution of joint specialoperations across the full range of militaryoperations. It also provides guidance forcommanders who determine the forcestructure, budget, training, materiel, andoperational requirements necessary to preparespecial operations forces (SOF) to conduct themissions and collateral activities hereindescribed. Further, it provides commandersinformation necessary to identify, nominate,and select objectives and missions appropriatefor SOF.
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrine forjoint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the Armed Forcesin preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.
3. Application
a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.
b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.
DENNIS C. BLAIRVice Admiral, US NavyDirector, Joint Staff
For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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PAGE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii
CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION
• Purpose..................................................................................................................... I-1• Special Operations.................................................................................................... I-1• Special Operations and the Range of
Military Operations................................................................................................ I-2• Special Operations Objectives................................................................................... I-3• Characteristics of Special Operations........................................................................ I-4• Special Operations and the Principles of War............................................................ I-4
CHAPTER IIFORCES AND MISSIONS
SECTION A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES..................................................... II-1
• Special Operations Forces........................................................................................ II-1• Characteristics of SOF............................................................................................. II-2
SECTION B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS.................................................. II-2
• SO Principal Missions.............................................................................................. II-2• Special Operations Collateral Activities................................................................. II-11• The Primacy of the Mission................................................................................... II-13
CHAPTER IIIORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL
• General.................................................................................................................. III-1• Assignment of SOF................................................................................................ III-1• Command and Control of SOF in Theater.............................................................. III-2• SOF Support to US Ambassadors........................................................................... III-5• C2 of PSYOP and CA Forces................................................................................. III-6• SOF Deconfliction and Coordination..................................................................... III-7• SOF Liaison Elements............................................................................................ III-7• Summary............................................................................................................... III-8
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CHAPTER IVPLANNING FOR JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS
• General.................................................................................................................. IV-1• SOF in the Strategic Planning Process.................................................................... IV-1• SOF Support to Mobilization Planning................................................................... IV-1• Theater Strategic and Campaign Planning.............................................................. IV-2• Theater SOC Support to the Theater Campaign...................................................... IV-2• SOF in the Targeting Process................................................................................. IV-3• SOF Mission Planning........................................................................................... IV-4• Operations Security................................................................................................ IV-5• Military Deception................................................................................................. IV-5• Summary............................................................................................................... IV-5
CHAPTER VPREPARATION AND SUPPORT OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
• General................................................................................................................... V-1• SOF Training Responsibilities................................................................................. V-1• Intelligence Support of SOF.................................................................................... V-2• Meteorological and Oceanographic Support of SOF................................................ V-3• SOF Logistic Support.............................................................................................. V-3• Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support of SOF...... V-4• PSYOP and CA Support of SOF............................................................................. V-5• Public Affairs Support of SOF................................................................................ V-5• Legal Support of SOF............................................................................................. V-5• Space Support of SOF............................................................................................. V-5• Combat Camera Support of SOF............................................................................. V-6• Medical Support of SOF......................................................................................... V-6
APPENDIX
A References........................................................................................................ A-1B Administrative Instructions................................................................................ B-1
GLOSSARY
Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions.............................................................................. GL-3
FIGURE
I-1 Principles of War............................................................................................. I-5II-1 Special Operations Forces Truths................................................................... II-3II-2 Special Operations Principal Missions............................................................ II-4II-3 Civil Affairs Operations............................................................................... II-10II-4 Special Operations Collateral Activities....................................................... II-11
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III-1 Theater-Level SOF Command and Control.................................................. III-3III-2 SOF Subordinate Joint Force C2 and Liaison............................................... III-4IV-1 Campaign Plan Objectives for SOF.............................................................. IV-2IV-2 SO Operational Mission Criteria.................................................................. IV-3V-1 Examples of SOF Intelligence Requirements................................................. V-3V-2 Space-Based Support to SOF........................................................................ V-6
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW
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An Introduction to Joint Special Operations
Provides an Introduction to Joint Special Operations
Discusses the Forces and Missions Used in Joint SpecialOperations
Describes Organization and Command and Control
Covers the Planning for Joint Special Operations
Discusses the Preparation and Support of Joint SpecialOperations Forces
Special operations (SO)have become an integralpart of a theatercampaign across therange of militaryoperations.
The successful conduct of special operations (SO) relyon individual and small unit proficiency in a multitudeof specialized, often nonconventional combat skills appliedwith adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance. The small size, unique capabilities, and self-sufficiency (for short periods of time) of special operationsforces (SOF) operational units provide the United Stateswith feasible and appropriate military responses. Theseresponses do not entail the degree of political liability orrisk of escalation normally associated with employment ofinherently larger or more visible conventional forces.Although they may be conducted as a single-Serviceoperation, they routinely require joint support andcoordination. In addition to being conducted across thefull range of military operations, SO may be focused onthe strategic, operational, or tactical levels of war. SOare characterized by certain attributes thatcumulatively distinguish them from conventionaloperations. SO can be designed and conducted to influencethe will of foreign leadership to create conditions favorableto US strategic aims or objectives. Alternatively, SO maybe principally offensive, of high physical and political risk,and directed at high-value, critical, and often time-sensitivetargets. The principles of war (objective, offensive, mass,economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security,
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surprise, and simplicity) apply to SO in the same way theyapply to conventional operations. SO planners mustunderstand the principles of war and how they relate toSO. Planners must also understand the synergistic affectof SO integration into conventional missions.
The need and opportunity to attack or engage strategic oroperational targets with small units drives the formation ofspecial units with limited, highly-focused capabilities. Thedemands of SO require forces with attributes thatdistinguish them from conventional forces. Commandersmust be familiar with these characteristics to ensure thatmissions selected for SOF are compatible with theircapabilities. SOF are not a substitute for conventionalforces, but a necessary adjunct to existing conventionalcapabilities.
SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specificallyto accomplish nine principal missions: direct action,special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense,unconventional warfare, combatting terrorism,psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA),counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, andinformation operations. SOF’s principal missions areenduring and will change infrequently; however, SOF’scollateral activities will shift more readily because of thechanging international environment. SOF frequentlyconduct the following seven collateral activities:coalition support, combat search and rescue, counterdrugactivities, countermine activities, foreign humanitarianassistance, security assistance, and special activities. SOFare not manned, trained, and equipped for collateralactivities. SOF conduct collateral activities using theinherent capabilities resident in their primary missions. SOFmay be tasked by the National Command Authorities(NCA), joint force commanders, US ambassadors, orother government agencies to perform missions for whichit is the best-suited among available forces, or perhaps theonly force available.
Success by a small forceagainst a strategic oroperational objectiveusually requires units withcombinations of specialequipment, training,people, or tactics that gobeyond those found inconventional units.
Forces and Missions
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Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, allSOF based in the United States are under the combatantcommand (command authority) (COCOM) of theCommander in Chief, US Special Operations Command.SOF assigned to a theater are under the COCOM of thegeographic combatant commander. The geographiccombatant commander may exercise this authority througha Service component command, functional componentcommand, or subordinate joint force. Normally, commandand control (C2) of SOF should be executed within theSOF chain of command. The identification of a C2organizational structure for SOF should depend uponspecific objectives, security requirements, and theoperational environment. C2 of SOF is executed throughone or more of the following: theater special operationscommand (SOC), joint special operations task force, or othercomponent commanders of a joint force. Forces assignedto support ambassadors or country teams will be under theoperational control of the geographic combatant commanderupon entering the theater. Although designated as SOF,PSYOP and CA C2 relationships are structured to supportboth SO and conventional forces. Deconfliction andcoordination with conventional forces are always criticalconcerns for SOF commanders. To fully integrate withconventional operations, SOF must maintain effectiveliaison with all components of the joint force that mayimpact the conduct of SOF activities in order to ensure thatunity of effort is maintained and risk of fratricide isminimized.
Experience has repeatedly demonstrated that SOF plannersmust be involved throughout the planning process andthat bringing SOF in early to the process can significantlyimprove the SOF contribution to the overall operation.Given the small size of SOF operational units and the typeof missions normally conducted, detailed planning mustbe conducted by those who will execute the mission. SOFcapabilities should be taken into consideration in thedevelopment of national security strategy. SOF offer the
Organization and Command and Control
Successful execution ofSO require centralized,responsive, andunambiguous commandand control.
Special operations forces(SOF) are involved in allthree types of planningfor joint operations:campaign, deliberate,and crisis action.
Planning for Joint Special Operations
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NCA a set of uniquely trained and equipped (and regionallyoriented, if necessary) forces that can be tailored to executea range of overt and low-visibility activities designed tocontain or resolve crises. In addition, SOF can be integratedinto conventional campaigns. SOF capabilities andapportionment are outlined in the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP apportions resourcesto combatant commanders based on military capabilitiesresulting from completed program and budget actions. TheServices are charged with maintaining reserve forcesand preparing for the expansion of capabilities in timeof war. As part of that responsibility, the Services preparedetailed mobilization plans containing the identification ofthe actual forces.
The geographic combatant commander for each theaterrefines broad national or alliance strategic guidance intoa theater strategy or campaign plan. This documentprovides guidance for the deployment, employment, andsustainment of assigned and apportioned US forces(including SOF) and the forces of allied nations, to achievenational and alliance strategic objectives. The theater SOCparticipates in the development of theater campaignplans, operation plans, and operation plans in conceptformat. These plans translate the geographic combatantcommander’s concept of SOF employment into a sequenceof integrated SOF activities. Detailed mission planning,based on specific, comprehensive, current strategic,operational, and tactical intelligence is vital to successfulexecution of SOF missions and, potentially, the verysurvival of the SOF element. SOF personnel must have athorough knowledge of the operational area to includegeographic, political, social, economic, and environmentalconditions. Operations security is important to SOFactivities in denying information of intelligence value tohostile or even friendly agencies that could cause direct orindirect mission compromise. The execution of some SOFmissions may require, or be enhanced by, deceptionoperations. SOF may be employed in conducting orsupporting military deception operations.
The geographiccombatant commanderwill describe his conceptfor SO in the theatercampaign plan.
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SOF require a combination of basic military trainingand specialized skill training to achieve operationalproficiency. SOF specific training includes both individualskill training and extensive unit training to ensure maximumreadiness. Timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-sourceintelligence is vital in determining SOF mission objectives,identifying relevant targets, and mission planning andexecution. The nature of many SOF objectives and tacticsrequire intelligence support that is frequently more detailedthan that needed in conventional operations.Counterintelligence support must also be considered inprotecting sensitive SOF missions across the range ofmilitary operations. Meteorologic and oceanographicsupport services are critical to the success of SOFmissions. From initial planning through execution,environmental intelligence should be included in thedecision making process. The theater SOC commander(or, when a joint task force is established, the joint forcespecial operations component commander) determineslogistics requirements for SOF in-theater for thegeographic combatant commander. Logistic support forSOF units can be provided through one or more of thefollowing: Service support, joint in-theater support, orSO-peculiar support.
SOF command, control, communications, and computers(C4) support consists of multiple and varied groups ofsystems, procedures, personnel, and equipment thatoperate in diverse manners and at different echelons, fromnational to unit levels. SOF C4 systems must beinteroperable with each other, with conventional forces,with US national resources, as well as with allies and hostnations. The theater SOC integrates PSYOP and CAsupport of joint SOF activities. CA and PSYOP supportprovide the SOF commanders and their indigenouscounterparts the ability to motivate and mobilize crucialsegments of the population to enhance the probability ofmission success. The political sensitivity of many SO,especially in peacetime, mandates that thorough andaccurate public affairs guidance be developed during the
Preparation and Support of Joint Special Operations Forces
SOF require training,equipment, and supportthat are tailored tospecific missionrequirements, yet areflexible enough torespond to changingemployment parameters.
Command, control,communications, andcomputers support to SOFmust be global, secure,and jointly interoperable.
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CONCLUSION
operational planning stage and approved for use in advanceof most operations. In addition, commanders must seeklegal review during planning and execution of SOFmissions. As space-based support to military operationscontinues to improve, SOF commanders and planners mustbe aware of potential space support for their operationsand the integration of SOF with space assets.
This publication provides guidance for the planning andexecution of joint special operations across the full rangeof military operations. It also provides guidance forcommanders who determine the force structure, budget,training, materiel, and operational requirements necessaryto prepare SOF to conduct the missions and collateralactivities herein described. Further, it provides commandersinformation necessary to identify, nominate, and selectobjectives and missions appropriate for SOF.
CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION
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1. Purpose
This publication provides basic conceptsand principles to guide the Services and thecombatant commands to prepare for andconduct special operations (SO). It describesthese military operations and provides generalguidance for military commanders to employand execute command and control (C2) ofspecial operations forces (SOF) whenassigned to a joint task force (JTF). Morespecific operational guidelines are providedin Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint Special OperationsOperational Procedures,” Joint Pub 3-05.5,“Joint Special Operations Targeting andMission Planning Procedures,” Joint Pub3-53, “Doctrine for Joint PsychologicalOperations,” and Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrinefor Joint Civil Affairs.”
2. Special Operations
a. SO are operations conducted byspecially organized, trained, and equippedmilitary and paramilitary forces to achievemilitary, political, economic, or informationalobjectives by unconventional military meansin hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.These operations are conducted across thefull range of military operations,independently or in coordination withoperations of conventional, non-specialoperations forces. Political-military
“First, break down the wall that has more or less come between specialoperations forces and the other parts of our military, the wall that some peoplewill try to build higher. Second, educate the rest of the military — spread arecognition and understanding of what you do, why you do it, and howimportant it is that you do it. Last, integrate your efforts into the full spectrumof our military capabilities.”
ADM William J. Crowe, USNChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Address during the USSOCOM ActivationCeremony, 1 June 1987
considerations frequently shape SO,requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibilitytechniques and oversight at the national level.SO differ from conventional operations indegree of physical and political risk,operational techniques, mode of employment,independence from friendly support, anddependence on detailed operationalintelligence and indigenous assets.
b. SO have become an integral part of atheater campaign across the range of militaryoperations. While SO can be conductedunilaterally in support of specific theater ornational objectives, the majority of SO aredesigned and conducted to enhance thelikelihood of success of the overall theatercampaign. SO must complement — notcompete with — conventional operations.
c. The successful conduct of SO relies onindividual and small unit pr oficiency ina mult i tude of special ized, oftennonconventional combat skills applied withadaptability, improvisation, innovation, andself-reliance. The small size, uniquecapabilities, and self-sufficiency (for shortperiods of time) of SOF operational unitsprovide the United States with feasible andappropriate military responses. Theseresponses do not entail the degree ofpolitical liability or risk of escalationnormally associated with employment of
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inherently larger or more visible conventionalforces.
d. SO can be conducted directly againstan enemy by forces acting in a singleengagement such as a raid against a criticalcommunications node, or indirectly , forexample, by organizing, training, andsupporting an indigenous force for foreigninternal defense (FID) or unconventionalwarfare (UW), or through the use ofpsychological operations (PSYOP) toinfluence the opposing military or the localcivilian populace. In either case, the resultsare normally disproportionate to the size ofthe units involved.
e. SO Are Inherently Joint. Althoughthey may be conducted as a single-Serviceoperation, they routinely require joint supportand coordination.
3. Special Operations and theRange of Military Operations
a. Military operations are conductedacross a range consisting of two generalstates: war and military operations otherthan war (MOOTW). (Joint Pub 3-0,“Doctrine for Joint Operations.”) This model
assists the geographic combatant commanderin articulating strategic situations within atheater that are described by a variety ofpolitical, economic, and military conditions.Although the following discussion of SOapplicability to the states within the range ofmilitary operations describes each in discreteterms, in actual circumstances there may beno precise distinctions where a particularstate ends and another begins. The modelgives the National Command Authorities(NCA) and the joint force commander (JFC)the ability to describe any strategic situationin clear terms and allows the JFC to defineneeds, devise strategies, and project resourcesto meet the threat.
b. SO are not bound by any specificenvironment. The principles by which SOare planned and conducted apply equallyto both war and MOOTW. In war, SO canbe conducted during the preconflict, conflictand, of increasing importance, postconflictphases of the campaign. In MOOTW, theoverarching objective is often restoringstability to a country or region. This cantake the form of foreign humanitarianassistance (FHA) after a natural or manmadedisaster, taking care of fleeing refugees, orsome form of peace operation. Small SO units
Special operations forces are made up of individualshighly proficient in specialized combat skills.
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accomplish these objectives generallyindirectly through operations that assist thehost nation (HN) authorities, othergovernmental agencies, nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs), private voluntaryorganizations (PVOs), or coalition partners inrestoring peace, strengthening theinfrastructure of the country, or providingdisaster relief assistance. SOF are regularlyemployed in mobile training teams (MTTs),joint and combined exercises, professionaldevelopment program seminars, and othermilitary to military activities which are a vitalpart of theater engagement strategies.
4. Special OperationsObjectives
In addition to being conducted across thefull range of military operations, SO may befocused on the strategic, operational, ortactical levels of war. (See Joint Pub 3-0,“Doctrine for Joint Operations,” for a detaileddiscussion on the levels of war.)
a. National strategic objectives aredirected toward the attainment ofnational or multinational objectives. TheNCA designates national objectives andsanctions the military means to achievethem. In pursuit of these objectives, SOmay be conducted under the directsupervision of the NCA.
b. Theater objectives are established bygeographic combatant commanders, based onnational objectives, and are an integral partof the theater campaign plan. Operationalobjectives established by subordinate JFCssupport theater objectives and lead directlyto theater success. SO provide the joint forcecommander with a selective, flexible deterrentoption or crisis response capability to achievehis operational objectives.
c. Although normally targeted at strategicand operational objectives, SO may beconducted in support of conventional forcetactical objectives as well.
SO TACTICAL SUPPORT TO CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS
Examples of SO tactical support to conventional operations include the seizingof tactical objectives in Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE, and the useof the Navy’s Underwater Demolition Teams to clear boat lanes for amphibiouslandings in all theaters during World War II.
SO STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
Examples of SO with strategic implications are the British SO Executiveoperation to destroy the German heavy water production at Vemork, Norwayin 1943 (and hence nullify the German capability to manufacture atomicweapons) and the US raid to rescue the prisoners of war at Son Tay, NorthVietnam in 1970.
SO OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Examples of SO with operational implications are the employment of Office ofStrategic Services operational detachments to organize behind-the-linesresistance in France and Burma in World War II and the German neutralizationof the Belgian fortress of Eban Emael by a surprise attack by glider in 1940.
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5. Characteristics of SpecialOperations
a. SO are characterized by certainattributes that cumulatively distinguishthem from conventional operations. SO canbe designed and conducted to influence thewill of foreign leadership to create conditionsfavorable to US strategic aims or objectives.This may involve a long-term commitmentto achieve the desired result. Alternatively, SOmay be principally offensive, usually of highphysical and political risk, and directed athigh-value, critical, and often time-sensitivetargets. Such operations rely on surprise,security, and audacity and frequently employdeception to achieve success. These missionsare routinely clandestine in nature and offerthe potential for high returns, but rarely asecond chance should a first attempt fail.
b. Special Operations
• SO normally require operator-levelplanning, detailed intelligence, andknowledge of the culture(s) andlanguage(s) of the area where the missionis to be conducted. Rigorous trainingand rehearsals of the mission areintegral to the conduct of the operation.
• SO are often conducted at great distancesfrom operational bases employingsophisticated communication systemsand means of insertion, support, andextraction to penetrate and return fromhostile, denied, or politically sensitiveareas.
• SO frequently require discriminateand precise use of force. This mayrequire development, acquisition, andemployment of weapons and equipmentnot standard for other Department ofDefense (DOD) forces.
6. Special Operations and thePrinciples of War
The principles of war apply to SO in the sameway they apply to conventional operations.However, in some cases, specific principles havevaried emphasis in the conduct of SO, primarilybecause SO are conducted by small units thatseldom work with large formations or sizablereserves. SO planners must understand theprinciples of war — and how they relate to SO.The principles are an important doctrinalfoundation and are essential to understandingand mastering warfare (See Figure I-1).
a. Objective. SO are best employed whenthey directly support the commander’sobjectives. The focus of each SO is theexecution of a mission that accomplishes astrategic or operational objective for the JFC.
b. Offensive. The lethal application of SOare inherently offensive in nature becausethey seek to strike or engage an adversary tocompel or deter his actions.
c. Mass. SO concentrate the effects ofcombat power at critical times and indiscriminate places to achieve decisive results.
d. Economy of Force. SOF cannotemploy their limited resources on secondaryor nonessential tasks. Economy of force iscritical to the successful conduct of SO giventhe small size and lack of redundantcapabilities inherent in SO tactical units.
e. Maneuver. Maneuver is essential toSO in order to strike enemies where andwhen they are most vulnerable and to avoidtheir strengths.
f. Unity of Command. SO require unityof command to integrate and synchronizeSOF with every aspect of the campaign plan.
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SO C2 architecture is often tailored for eachmission to achieve this end.
g. Security. SO planning and executionrequire high levels of security to protect theclandestine nature of missions, often conductedin remote or denied areas. At the same time,SOF must balance security concerns with theneed to rehearse and to integrate operations withother committed forces. In addition, propersecurity planning and execution is essential toSOF force protection. Given their size, SOFunits are more vulnerable to potential hostilereaction to their presence than largerconventional units.
h. Surprise. Surprise is often the keyto the conduct of successful SO and toemployed SOF survivability. SOF mustachieve surprise to the extent that theenemy cannot react effectively prior tomission accomplishment.
i. Simplicity. Although SO may requiresophisticated and often unorthodoxmethods and equipment, the plans thatdrive its employment must be simple anddirect in order to facilitate understanding,withstand the stress of operationalenvironments, and adapt to changingsituations.
PRINCIPLES OF WAR
PRINCIPLESOF WAR
Simplicity
Security
Surprise
Economy ofForce
Unity ofCommand
Maneuver
Objective MassOffensive
Figure I-1. Principles of War
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OPERATION JUST CAUSE
On the night of 19-20 December 1989, SOF, organized into a 4,400-man jointspecial operations task force (JSOTF), spearheaded Operation JUST CAUSE,the invasion of Panama. US Army Rangers conducted predawn airborneseizures of critical airfields. Navy sea-air-land teams (SEALs) were employedto block possible escape routes of Panamanian dictator General ManuelNoriega, by denying him the use of his Learjet at Paitilla Airport and disablinga Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) patrol boat in Balboa Harbor. Air ForceSpecial Operations Command aircraft provided aerial insertion, pinpoint targetinterdiction, and aerial fire support. Army special forces (SF) set up asurveillance and antiarmor blocking position at the Pacora River bridge andconducted other operations to disable critical Panamanian telecommunicationssites. SF and SEALs also conducted direct action raids and roll-up operationsagainst Noriega’s infrastructure. The JSOTF accepted Noriega’s surrender atthe Papal Nunciatura after an 11-day standoff. Subsequent to the initialassaults, Spanish-speaking SF soldiers — often backed up by Air Force SpecialOperations Forces gunships, Rangers, and conventional forces — were usedto convince scattered PDF cuartels to surrender peacefully. Army and Air Forcepsychological operations units communicated a call for surrender to PDF units,“dignity battalions,” and other hostile parties via radio, television, print, andloudspeaker. As Operation JUST CAUSE gave way to Operation PROMOTELIBERTY, special operations forces and civil affairs units were employed toreconstitute the country’s political, economic, and security infrastructure.
SOURCE: Joint Military Operations Historical Collection
CHAPTER IIFORCES AND MISSIONS
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SECTION A. SPECIALOPERATIONS FORCES
1. Special Operations Forces
a. Throughout history, success by a smallforce against a strategic or operationalobjective usually has required units withcombinations of special equipment, training,people, or tactics that go beyond those foundin conventional units. These characteristicshave allowed such units to be employed inunconventional ways, for which the enemyoften was unprepared.
b. Conventional units are normally notspecially trained, equipped, nor organized toconduct SO; any wholesale change in theircapabilities would restrict their ability torespond to a broad range of threats. The needand opportunity to attack or engage strategicor operational targets with small units drivesthe formation of special units withspecialized, highly-focused capabilities.
c. Forces specifically designated as SOFinclude:
“It is not big armies that win battles; it is the good ones.”
Maurice de SaxeMes Reveries, iv, 1732
• US Army. Special forces, Ranger,special operations aviation (SOA)(rotary-wing), PSYOP and civil affairs(CA) units of the Active component (AC)and Reserve component (RC);
• US Navy. Naval special warfare (NSW)units to include sea-air-land teams(SEALs), SEAL delivery vehicle teams,special boat units, and patrol coastal shipsof the AC and RC; and
• US Air Force. SOA (fixed- and rotary-wing), special tactics teams, PSYOP, andFID units of the AC and RC.
d. In accordance with title 10 United StatesCode (USC) section 167, additional units orforces may be designated as SOF by theSecretary of Defense.
e. Other units capable of conducting orsupporting SO. Designated SOF areprincipally structured to be the force of choicefor SO under most circumstances. However,under certain circumstances, conventionalforces may be capable of conducting a
US ARMY’S ALAMO SCOUTS IN WORLD WAR II
Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, commanding the 6th Army, recognizedthe recurring need for deep reconnaissance against operational targets toprecede his attacks against Japanese positions in the Southwest Pacific. TheAlamo Scouts took carefully selected people and gave them extensive trainingfor these operations. In all, the Scouts conducted more than 100 missions,providing a great deal of intelligence with the loss of no personnel to enemyaction.
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specific special operation. Although notdesignated as SOF, these forces receiveenhanced training and equipment to supportor conduct SO on a mission-specific basis.These forces include:
• Designated Navy surface, subsurface,and aviation elements;
• Designated Air Force airlift, strike, andtanker elements; and
• Designated Fleet Marine Force units andforward-deployed Marine air-groundtask forces such as Marine expeditionaryunits (special operations capable).
2. Characteristics of SOF
a. The demands of SO require forceswith attributes that distinguish them fromconventional forces. Commanders must befamiliar with these characteristics to ensurethat missions selected for SOF are compatiblewith their capabilities.
• Most SOF personnel undergo carefulselection processes or mission-specifictraining beyond basic military skills toachieve entry-level SO skills. Theseprograms make unlikely any rapidreplacement or generation of personnelor capabilities.
• SOF are composed of mature andexperienced personnel, many of whom
maintain a high level of competency inmore than one military specialty.
• Selected SOF are regionally oriented foremployment; cross-cultural communicationsskills are a routine part of their training.
b. SOF are not a substitute forconventional forces, but a necessaryadjunct to existing conventionalcapabilities. Depending upon requirements,SOF can operate independently or inconjunction with conventional forces. SOFcan complement and reinforce conventionalforces so that they can achieve an objectivethat might not otherwise be attainable. Thespecial skills and low visibility capabilitiesinherent in SOF also provide an adaptablemilitary response in situations or crisesrequiring tailored, precise focused use of force(See Figure II-1).
SECTION B. SPECIALOPERATIONS MISSIONS
3. SO Principal Missions
Pursuant to 10 USC 164, 10 USC 167, andthe Unified Command Plan, eight activitieshave been designated as principal SOmissions for SOF. Pursuant to CJCSI3210.01, “Joint Information Warfare Policy,”and Commander in Chief, United StatesSpecial Operations Command (USCINCSOC)directive, information operations (IO) has
UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAMS
During World War II, the US Navy also recognized that it had a recurringrequirement for operational reconnaissance to determine both the suitabilityand the level of fortification of beaches being considered for amphibiousassaults. No existing force could provide this information so the Navy createdUDTs to carry out these missions. The UDTs conducted reconnaissancemissions in support of every amphibious operation, from the January 1944landing at Kwajelein during Operations FLINTLOCK until the end of the war.
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been designated as the ninth principal SOmission for SOF. SOF are organized,trained, and equipped specifically toaccomplish the nine principal missionsshown in Figure II-2.
a. Direct Action (DA)
• Short-duration strikes and othersmall-scale offensive actions by SOFor special operations capable units toseize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflictdamage on designated personnel ormateriel. In the conduct of theseoperations, SOF or special operationscapable units may employ raid, ambush,or direct assault tactics; emplace minesand other munitions; conduct standoffattacks by fire from air, ground, ormaritime platforms; provide terminalguidance for precision-guided munitions;conduct independent sabotage; andconduct anti-ship operations.
• Activities falling within the DAmission include the following.
•• Raids, Ambushes, and DirectAssaults — operations designed toachieve specific, well-defined and oftentime-sensitive results of strategic oroperational significance. Theyfrequently occur beyond the reach oftactical weapon systems and selectivestrike capabilities of conventional forces.Such operations typically involve anattack on critical targets such as theinterdiction of lines of communications(LOCs) or other target systems; thelocation, capture, or recovery ofdesignated personnel or material; or theseizure, destruction, or neutralization ofenemy facilities in support ofconventional forces or in advance of theirarrival.
•• Standoff Attacks — attacks byweapon systems or IO capabilities.Standoff attacks can be conducted byair, maritime, or by ground platformsor units. When the target can besufficiently damaged or destroyedwithout the commitment of close-combat
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES TRUTHS
CompetentSOF cannot be created
after emergenciesarise
Quality is betterthan quantity
Humans are moreimportant than
hardware
SOF cannot be massproduced
Figure II-1. Special Operations Forces Truths
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forces, these attacks can be performed asindependent actions.
•• Terminal Guidance Operations —operations are conducted to directmunitions at designated targets.
•• Recovery Operations — operationsto locate, recover, and restore personnelor material held captive, isolated, orthreatened in areas sensitive, denied, orcontested to friendly control. SOrecovery missions are oftencharacterized by detailed planning,rehearsal, and thorough intelligenceanalysis. These operations employunconventional tactics, techniques,clandestine search, indigenous assistance,and the frequent use of ground combatelements.
•• Precision Destruction Operations— operations against targets whereminimal collateral damage is acceptable,requiring highly sophisticated and/ortimed detonation of specific amounts ofexplosives emplaced in exact locationsto accomplish mission objectives.Precision destruction operations areconducted against targets whereprecision-guided munitions cannotguarantee first strike success or when thecontents of the facility must be destroyedwithout damage to the facility.
•• Anti-Surface Warfare — operationsconducted against enemy surface targets,including combatants.
•• Amphibious Warfare — operationslaunched from the sea by naval and
SPECIAL OPERATIONS PRINCIPAL MISSIONS
DirectAction
CombattingTerrorism
ForeignInternalDefenseUnconventional
Warfare
SpecialReconnaissance
PsychologicalOperations
CivilAffairs
Counterproliferationof Weapons of Mass
DestructionInformationOperations
PRINCIPALMISSIONS
Figure II-2. Special Operations Principal Missions
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landing forces against a hostile orpotentially hostile shore. They includepreassault cover and diversionaryoperations, naval gunfire support, initialand/or terminal guidance for landingcraft, surf observation, obstacleclearance, and other advance forceoperations.
•• Mine Warfare — the strategic andoperational use of mines and theircountermeasures. Operations includeoffensive and defensive mine laying,detection of enemy minefields, anddetection and neutralization of very-shallow water mines.
b. Special Reconnaissance (SR)
• Reconnaissance and surveillance actionsconducted by SOF to obtain or verify ,by visual observation or other collectionmethods, information concerning thecapabilities, intentions, and activities ofan actual or potential enemy or to securedata concerning the meteorological,hyd rograph ic , o r geograph iccharacteristics of a particular area. It
includes target acquisition, areaassessment , and pos ts t r i kereconnaissance.
• Even with today’s sophisticated long-range sensors and overhead platforms,some information can be obtained onlyby human intelligence resources in thetarget area. SOF’s highly developedcapability to get in and out of hostile ordenied areas and to communicate overlong distances makes SR feasibleagainst operational and strategictargets in both urban and ruralenvironments that are beyond the rangeof conventional reconnaissance forces.SR includes the following.
•• Environmental Reconnaissance —operations conducted to collect andreport critical hydrographic, geological,and meteorological information .
•• Armed Reconnaissance — locatingand attacking targets of opportunity,i.e., enemy materiel, personnel, andfacilities, in assigned general areas oralong assigned ground communication
Special operations forces have a highly developed capabilityto get in and out of hostile or denied areas.
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routes. Armed reconnaissance is notconducted for the purpose of attackingspecific identified targets.
•• Coastal Patrol and Interdiction —area denial, interdiction, support, andintelligence operations in coastal regions.Its objective is to halt or limit theenemy’s warfighting capability bydenying movement of vital resourcesover coastal and riverine LOCs. Seawardperimeter and harbor security and escortduties are typical support operations.Coastal patrol and interdiction may be astand-alone mission or may support otherfleet and joint efforts such as riverine,amphibious assault, blockade, andcounterdrug operations.
•• Target and Threat Assessment —operations conducted to detect, identify,locate, and assess a target to permiteffective employment of weapons or thesurvey of a target to measure the resultsof a conventional or nuclear, biological,and chemical strike.
•• Poststrike Reconnaissance —missions undertaken for the purpose ofgathering information used to measureresults of a strike.
c. Foreign Internal Defense
• Participation by civilian and militaryagencies of a government in any of theaction programs taken by anothergovernment to free and protect its societyfrom subversion, lawlessness, andinsurgency.
• SOF’s primary contribution in thisinteragency activity is to organize, train,advise, and assist HN military andparamilitary forces. The goal is toenable these forces to maintain the HN’sinternal stability , to counter subversionand violence in their country, and to
address the causes of instability. Internalstability forms the shield behind which anation-building campaign can succeed.Successful FID missions can lead tooperational or strategic successes for USforeign policy. FID activities include thefollowing.
•• Aiding and Assisting HN Military— operations to train HN militaryindividuals and units in basic infantry andmaritime skills, provide advice andassistance to military leaders, and providetraining on tactics, techniques, andprocedures required to protect the HNfrom subversion, lawlessness, andinsurgency, and develop indigenousindividual, leader, and organizationalskills.
•• Providing Population Security —supervision of tactical operationsconducted by HN military units toneutralize and destroy insurgent threats,isolate insurgents from the civilpopulation, and protect the civilpopulation. As a subset of FID,designated SOF units may also trainselect HN forces to performcounterterrorist missions.
(For more details on FID, see Joint Pub 3-07.1,“Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures forForeign Internal Defense (FID).”)
d. Unconventional Warfare
• A broad spectrum of military andparamilitary operations, normally oflong duration, predominantly conductedby indigenous or surrogate forces whoare organized, trained, equipped,supported, and directed in varyingdegrees by an external source. It includesguerrilla warfare and other directoffensive low-visibility, covert, orclandestine operations, as well as theindirect activities of subversion,
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sabotage, intelligence activities, andevasion and escape (E&E).
• SOF support strategic and operationalgoals with the capability to advise, assist,organize, train, and equip indigenousforces and resistance movements.Working in local languages, SOF assistindigenous forces with training,intelligence, communications, PSYOPoperations, civic action projects, andmedical support. These activities caneither be conducted in support ofconventional forces — acting as a forcemultiplier in an integrated theatercampaign — or as part of a stand-aloneunconventional operation. UW includesthe following.
•• Guerrilla Warfare — military andparamilitary operations conducted byirregular, predominately indigenousforces in enemy-held or hostile territory.It is the overt military aspect of aninsurgency or other armed resistancemovement. Guerrilla forces primarilyemploy raid and ambush tactics againstenemy vulnerabilities.
•• Subversion — activity designed toundermine the military, economic,psychological, or political strength or
morale of a regime or nation. Theclandestine nature of subversion dictatesthat the underground elements performthe bulk of the activity.
•• Sabotage — an act or acts withintent to injure , interfere with, orobstruct the national defense of a countryby willfully injuring or destroying, orattempting to injure or destroy, anynational defense or war material,premises, or utilities, to include humanand natural resources. Sabotageselectively disrupts, destroys, orneutralizes hostile capabilities with aminimum expenditure of manpower andmateriel.
•• Support to E&E Networks — anactivity that assists military personneland other selected persons to: move froman enemy-held, hostile, or sensitive areato areas under friendly control; avoidcapture if unable to return to an area offriendly control; and, once captured,escape.
e. Combatting Terrorism (CBT)
• Actions, including antiterrorism (AT)(defensive measures taken to reducevulnerability to terrorist acts) and
FID SUPPORT TO EL SALVADOR
During the brutal civil war (1979-1991) in El Salvador small contingents ofspecial forces and other special operations forces (SOF) worked face-to-facewith El Salvadoran counterparts under austere conditions and the constantthreat of death or injury to help lay the groundwork for the defeat of thecommunist Farabundo Marti Liberation Front and for the subsequent signingof peace accords in February 1992. SOF were, in fact, so successful in earningthe respect of government forces and rebels alike that the rebel leadershipinsisted that SOF play a major role in 1991 in the disarmament anddemobilization of the combatants during the “peace phase” which ended thewar. Special forces and other SOF working in a foreign internal defense rolethus helped achieve a major US foreign policy success and made a significantcontribution to peace in Latin America.
SOURCE: Multiple Sources
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counterterrorism (CT) (offensivemeasures taken to prevent, deter, andrespond to terrorism), taken to opposeterrorism throughout the entire threatspectrum.
• SOF’s role in CT is to preclude,preempt, and resolve terroristincidents. When directed by the NCAor the appropriate combatant commander,designated units may conduct or supportCT missions that include hostage rescue,recovery of sensitive materiel fromterrorist organizations, and attack ofterrorist infrastructure. AT includes thoseactivities that are designed to protectpeople and facilities from terrorist andother attacks to their security. Whenrequested by the Services or othergovernment agencies, SOF providestraining and advice on reducingvulnerability to terrorism and otherhostile threats. When directed, SOF canaugment existing security forces toprotect important persons and events.CBT activities include the following.
•• Recovery of Hostages or SensitiveMateriel from Terrorist Organizations— operations conducted to securehostages and/or sensitive materiel fromterrorist control, requiring speed, shock,surprise, and violent action. The safetyof the hostages and preventingdestruction of the sensitive materiel isan essential mission requirement.
•• Attack of Terrorist Infrastructure— preemptive strikes conducted againstterrorist organizations with the objectiveof destroying, disorganizing, ordisarming terrorist organizations beforethey can strike targets of national interest.
•• Reduction of Vulnerability toTerrorism — response to requests fromthe Services and other governmentagencies for training and advice on how
to reduce vulnerability to terrorism andother hostile threats. This also includesevaluation of the adequacy of existingphysical security systems and defensiveactivities conducted to ensure thephysical security of important persons.
(For more details on AT, see Joint Pub 3-07.2,“Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures forAntiterrorism.”)
f. Psychological Operations
• Planned operations to convey selectedinformation and indicators to foreignaudiences to influence their emotions,motives, objective reasoning, andultimately the behavior of foreigngovernments, organizations, groups, andindividuals. The purpose of PSYOP isto induce or reinforce foreign attitudesand behaviors favorable to theoriginator’s objectives.
• As a force multiplier, PSYOP is one ofthe most effective weapons availableto a commander. It can reducecasualties on both sides by reducing themorale and combat effectiveness of theenemy, creating dissidence anddisaffection within their ranks,encouraging surrenders or defections, orpromoting resistance or inducing withina civilian populace a lack of support fora hostile regime.
• Each geographic combatant commanderis responsible for conducting PSYOPprograms in peacetime. Such effortsare designed to create a favorable imageof the friendly government, of the UnitedStates, and of the Armed Forces of theUnited States; encourage support fordemocratic institutions, human rights,regional stability, and counterdrugactivities; and assist a HN in explainingand publicizing humanitarian and civicaction projects to local citizens. Used
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effectively as part of an integrated theatercampaign or global strategy, PSYOP canreduce the probability of conflict,reduce the damage if conflict does occur,and speed the transition to normality inthe postconflict phase.
• SOF conduct PSYOP at the strategic,operational, and tactical levels. Takingadvantage of their language and cultureskills, indepth knowledge of the region,and understanding of interagencyoperations, SOF units provide thegeographic combatant commander witha broad range of PSYOP capabilities tobe employed independently or in supportof a larger theater campaign. Thesecapabilities include the following.
•• Developing, Producing andDisseminating Programs — PSYOPunits design, develop, produce, anddisseminate programs that supporttactical, operational, and strategic goals.PSYOP products may contain generalinformation, safety warnings such asmine awareness, surrender appeals andinstructions, or appeals for public supportof an upcoming or ongoing operation(e.g., noncombatant evacuationoperation). PSYOP planners choose theproduct, action, or combination thereofmost likely to influence the targetaudience. These products may include:(1) Printed material such as handbills,leaflets, posters, and even comic booksin native language promoting US and HNactivities; (2) Radio and/or TVbroadcasts ranging from commercialsand public service announcements todocumentaries and news broadcasts,which can be delivered by either groundbased or airborne means; and (3)Loudspeaker broadcasts disseminatinggeneral information such as the locationof food distribution points and medicalattention, requests for host government
support, surrender appeals, orharassment.
•• Coordinating and DirectingPSYOP Programs — PSYOP supportnational policy goals with programsdeveloped for and approved by higherauthority. PSYOP personnel coordinatePSYOP efforts with the chain ofcommand to ensure the credibility andeffectiveness of the program.
•• Producing PSYOP Studies andEstimates — PSYOP personnel produceand maintain PSYOP studies andestimates for the joint force commander.They advise supported commanders onthe psychological impacts of their coursesof action (COAs). They identify theenemy PSYOP effort and thesusceptibilities of friendly forces.
•• Providing Support to HNAssistance Operations — During civil-military operations, PSYOP personnelmay work with CA or conventional unitsto promote civic action projects either byor in support of the host government.
(For more detailed discussion of PSYOP, seeJoint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for JointPsychological Operations.”)
g. Civil Affairs
• The activities of a commander thatestablish, maintain, influence orexploit relations between militaryforces and civil authorities, bothgovernmental and nongovernmental, andthe civilian population in a friendly,neutral, or hostile area of operations inorder to facilitate military operations andconsolidate operational objectives. CAmay include performance by militaryforces of activities and functionsnormally the responsibility of local
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government. These activities may occurprior to, during, or subsequent to othermilitary actions. They may also occur,if directed, in the absence of othermilitary operations.
• Prior to hostilities and in peacetime, CAunits may help a nation create or improveits own infrastructure, thereby precludinggrievances from flaring into war. Duringhostilities, the primary role of CA is toensure that civilians do not interferewith operations. The secondary roleis protecting and caring for civiliansin a combat zone and assisting thecommander in fulfilling his legal andmoral obligations to the civilianpopulation.
• CA operations include providing adviceand assistance, as shown in Figure II-3.
(For more detailed discussion of CA, see JointPub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”)
h. Counterproliferation (CP) ofWeapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
• CP refers to actions taken to seize, destroy,render safe, capture, or recover WMD. Themajor objectives of DOD CP policy are toprevent the acquisition of WMD andmissile capabilities, (i.e., “preventivedefense”); roll back proliferation where ithas occurred; deter the use of WMD andtheir delivery systems; and adapt USmilitary forces and planning to operateagainst the threats posed by WMD and theirdelivery systems.
• The continued spread of WMDtechnology can foster regional unrest andprovide terrorist organizations with newand potent weapons. SOF provideunique capabilities to monitor andsupport DOD CP policy. If directed,SOF can conduct or support DA, SR,
CBT, and IO missions to deter and/orprevent the acquisition or use of WMD,roll back proliferation where it hasoccurred, and operate against the threatsby WMD and their delivery means inorder to defeat them. SOF are tasked withorganizing, training, equipping, andotherwise preparing to conductoperations in support of US Government(USG) CP objectives.
i. Information Operations
• IO involve actions taken to affectadversary information and information
CIVIL AFFAIRSOPERATIONS
Population and resource controlmeasures
Civic action and civil assistance
Foreign Humanitarian Assistanceand/or Disaster Relief
Identification, location, andacquisition of local resources
and facilities
Arranging for host-nationsupport for deployed US forces
Actions to minimize civilianinterference with military
operations
Managing dislocated civilianpopulations
Figure II-3. Civil Affairs Operations
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Forces and Missions
systems while defending one’s owninformation and information systems.IO apply across all phases of anoperation and the range of militaryoperations, and at every level of war.Information warfare is IO conductedduring time of crisis or conflict(including war) to achieve or promotespecific objectives over a specificadversary or adversaries. Defensive IOactivities are conducted on a continuousbasis and are an inherent part of forceemployment across the range of militaryoperations. IO may involve complexlegal and policy issues requiring carefulreview and national-level coordinationand approval.
• The following SO missions support IO:DA, SR, PSYOP, CA, and FID. The everincreasing requirement for SOF toparticipate in MOOTW is based uponinherent capabilities that may beemployed in peacetime to deter a crisis,control crisis escalation, project power,or promote peace. An adversary’s nodes,links, human factors, weapon systems,and data are particularly lucrative targets,capable of being affected through the useof lethal and nonlethal applications ofcoordinated SOF IO capabilities.
(For more details on IO, see Joint Pub 3-13,“Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.”)
4. Special OperationsCollateral Activities
SOF’s principal missions are enduring andwill change infrequently; however, SOF’scollateral activities will shift more readilybecause of the changing internationalenvironment. SOF are not manned, trained,and equipped for collateral activities. SOFconduct collateral activities using the inherentcapabilities resident in the primary missions.SOF frequently conduct the following sevencollateral activities (Figure II-4).
a. Coalition Support. Coalition supportimproves the interaction of coalitionpartners and US military forces. It includestraining coalition partners on tactics andtechniques, assisting with communicationsinterface to integrate them into the coalitioncommand and intelligence structure, andestablishing liaison to coordinate for combatsupport and combat service support. SOFteams assigned to coalition units often providethe JFC with an accurate evaluation of thecapabilities, location, and activities ofcoalition forces, thus facilitating JFC C2. Thisactivity was first employed during OperationsDESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM,and has been critical in subsequentmultinational operations. Past success inthese operations in assisting and integratingcoalition units into multinational militaryoperations has made it likely that coalition
SPECIALOPERATIONSCOLLATERAL
ACTIVITIES
Coalition Support
Combat Search and Rescue
Counterdrug Activities
Countermine Activities
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
Security Assistance
Special Activities
Figure II-4. Special OperationsCollateral Activities
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support will become an important aspect offuture multinational operations.
b. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).CSAR involves a specific task performed byrescue forces to effect the recovery ofdistressed personnel during war or MOOTW.Joint doctrine states that each Service and theUS Special Operations Command(USSOCOM) are responsible forperforming CSAR for their respectiveforces. SOF maintains an inherent and/ororganic capability to conduct self personnelrecovery and/or CSAR within its core missionforce structure. When CSAR requirementsexceed theater joint CSAR (JCSAR)capabilities, SOF may be directed (on a case-by-case basis) to perform JCSAR missions.However, JCSAR taskings will be conductedat the expense of core SOF mission readinessand/or capabilities. The unique ability of SOFto penetrate hostile defense systems andconduct joint air, ground, or sea operationsdeep within hostile or denied territory at nightor in adverse weather make SOF highlysuited for this mission. Based on thesecapabilities, the JFC may task SOF toparticipate in the Joint Search and RescueCenter.
(For more details on CSAR, see Joint Pub3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search andRescue (CSAR).”)
c. Counterdrug (CD) Activities. CDactivities are active measures taken to detect,monitor, and counter the production,trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. The CDmission is very similar to FID and UWmissions. Using their skills in cross-culturalcommunication, SOF train HN CD forces oncritical skills required to conduct small-unitCD operations. SOF CD activities are insupport of the geographic combatantcommander’s regional CD campaign plan orthe US ambassador’s country-specific CDplan. PSYOP units, as part of the geographic
combatant commander’s overt peacetimePSYOP program, provide tailored CD-specific PSYOP support to regional CDactivities. CA units support US and HNefforts abroad by assisting in the planning,and organizing of CD operations.
(For more details on CD, see Joint Pub 3-07.4,“Joint Counterdrug Operations.”)
d. Countermine (CM) Activities. CMactivities attempt to reduce or eliminatethe threat to noncombatants and friendlymilitary forces posed by mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices. Usingtheir organic engineering and demolitioncapability, SOF teams train HN forces intechniques to locate, recognize, and safelydispose of mines and other explosive devices.PSYOP teams assist HN governments in thedevelopment and execution of publiceducation programs designed to reduce risksto noncombatants through public awarenessof the land mine problem. CA teams workwith the United States and HN governmentrepresentatives to develop a viable andsustainable HN demining and/or mineawareness infrastructure.
(For more details on CM, see Joint Pub 3-15,“Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, andMine Warfare.”)
e. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.FHA involves programs conducted to relieveor reduce the results of natural or manmadedisasters or other endemic conditions suchas human pain, disease, hunger, or privationthat might present a serious threat to life orthat can result in great damage to or loss ofproperty. FHA provided by US forces islimited in scope and duration; the assistanceprovided is designed to supplement orcomplement the efforts of the HN civilauthorities or agencies that may have theprimary responsibility for providing FHA.SOF units are well-suited to perform FHA
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activities in remote areas because of theirrapid deployability, regional orientation,organic communications, and ability tosustain operations under adverseenvironmental conditions. SOF can assess theneeds of an area quickly and communicatethis assessment to a JFC or ambassador toassist in designing a plan to alleviate suffering.In support of FHA, CA is particularlyimportant in organizing civilianinfrastructure ; PSYOP is integral tofostering popular support. Participation inFHA requires significant interagencycoordination.
(For more details on FHA, see Joint Pub 3-07.6,“Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures forForeign Humanitarian Assistance.”)
f. Security Assistance (SA). SA consists ofgroups of programs authorized by the ForeignAssistance Act of 1961 (as amended) and theArms Export Control Act of 1976 (as amended),or other related statutes by which the UnitedStates provides defense articles, military training,and other defense-related services, by grant, loan,credit, or cash sales in furtherance of nationalpolicies and objectives. The primary SOF rolein SA is to provide MTTs and other forms oftraining assistance. Personnel conducting SAare prohibited by law from performingcombatant duties. SOF are particularly effectivein SA because they use the same regionalorientation, communications, mobility, andexpertise developed for FID and UW missions.SA is a particularly valued mission becauseSOF train themselves in skills useful in
operations other than war while they train orotherwise assist foreign military forces.
g. Special Activities. Special activitiesare actions conducted abroad in supportof national foreign policy objectives; theseactivities are planned and executed so thatthe role of the USG is not apparent oracknowledged publicly. SOF may performany of their primary missions during specialactivities, subject to the limitations imposedby Executive Order 12333. Special activitiesrequire a Presidential f inding andCongressional oversight.
5. The Primacy of the Mission
SOF may be tasked to perform missionsfor which they are either the best suitedamong available forces or the only forceavailable. When assigned a mission by acontrolling headquarters, that missionbecomes the mission and the focus of theassigned unit, even if it is not a primarymission or a common collateral activity.Under these circumstances, SOF providethe tasking commander with a candidassessment of its capabilities, limitations,and risks associated with employment innontraditional missions. When tasked todo these missions, SOF execute with thesame professionalism demanded of primarymissions. In an ideal world, SOF wouldbe used only in operations for which theyare specifically trained and equipped. Inreality, circumstances often dictate the useof SOF for other missions.
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OPERATIONS RESTORE DEMOCRACY AND MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY
The utility of special operations forces (SOF) in a changing national securityenvironment is seen clearly in Operations RESTORE DEMOCRACY andMAINTAIN DEMOCRACY in Haiti. SOF were an integral part of the US effort torestore order to Haiti, even before the commitment of ground forces. Fourmonths prior to the US military intervention that implemented the restorationto power of President Jean Bertrand Aristide, SOF’s new and versatile PatrolCoastal (PC) class ships joined the fleet in enforcing United Nation’s tradesanctions.
Twelve weeks prior to the peaceful arrival of US troops, Air Force SpecialOperations Command (AFSOC) EC-130E “Commando Solo” psychologicaloperations broadcast aircraft were used effectively to broadcast daily 4-hourprograms designed to reduce the volume of refugees leaving the country andto help increase support for the return of President Aristide. In the final weekspreceding the United States’s efforts, AFSOC aircraft also airdropped 8.4million leaflets over towns across Haiti.
The US Atlantic Command’s theater Special Operations Command establisheda training camp in Puerto Rico for the international police monitors andmultinational force contingents. US Army special forces provided coalitionsupport teams to these contingents.
SOF had primary responsibility for invasion plans, with a significant numberof SOF units operating from a variety of bases — in the United States, at aforward staging base at Guantanamo, Cuba, and from the aircraft carrierAmerica . These units would have conducted forcible-entry operations tofacilitate the follow-on introduction of conventional forces. Once the need foruse of force was obviated, and peaceful occupation was underway, French-and Creole-speaking special forces teams were dispatched throughout theisland to help create the conditions necessary for the reintroduction of civilianrule. These small teams operated in more than 730 towns and villages, helpingthe population create local police, judiciary, and civil government structuresto establish law and order and promote stability.
In addition to special forces troops, civil affairs personnel were instrumentalin helping the Haitians establish a civil infrastructure. Reserve componentcivil affairs personnel were called to active duty to provide critical expertise,including duty as executive level ministerial advisors.
To support these lightly armed forces, other SOF units — including AFSOCAC-130 Spectre gunships and US Army Rangers — provided rapid reactionforces that deterred military or paramilitary challenges to the restoration effort.
SOURCE: Multiple Sources
CHAPTER IIIORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL
III-1
1. General
a. SOF may be assigned to eitherUSCINCSOC or a geographic combatantcommander. Operational control (OPCON)of SOF may be exercised by a variety ofcommanders at all levels within a joint force.Normally, C2 of a special operations force isexercised by SOF. Regardless, commandersexercising command authority over SOFshould:
• Provide for a clear and unambiguouschain of command;
• Avoid frequent transfer of OPCON ofSOF between commanders;
• Provide for sufficient staff experience andexpertise to plan, conduct, and supportthe operations;
• Integrate SOF in the planning process;and
• Match mission capabilities with missionrequirements.
b. SOF are most effective when fullyintegrated into the overall campaign plan(war or MOOTW). Given the ability of SOFto operate (1) unilaterally, (2) independentlyas part of the overall campaign, or (3) insupport of a conventional commander,effective integration is dependent on a robustC2 structure. Successful execution of SOrequire centralized, responsive, andunambiguous C2. The limited window of
“The qualities which commonly make an army formidable are long habits ofregularity, great exactness of discipline, and great confidence in thecommander.”
Samuel Johnson, 1709-1784
opportunity normally associated with themajority of SOF missions as well as thesensitive nature of many of these missionsrequire a C2 structure that is, above all,responsive to the needs of the operational unit.SOF C2 may be tailored for a specificmission or operation.
c. The Secretary of Defense designatescombatant command (command authority)(COCOM) through the “Forces for Unifiedand Specified Command” document. Unlessotherwise directed by the Secretary ofDefense, all SOF based in the continentalUnited States are under the COCOM ofUSCINCSOC. SOF assigned to a theater areunder the COCOM of the geographiccombatant commander. The geographiccombatant commander may exercise thisauthority through the commander of asubordinate joint force, Service componentcommand, or functional componentcommand.
d. In that SOF can be assigned to variouscommanders within the joint force, liaisonbetween all components of the joint force andSOF, wherever assigned, is vital to fratricideprevention and the effective employmentof SOF.
2. Assignment of SOF
a. SOF in the United States. Unlessotherwise directed by the Secretary ofDefense, all SOF based in the UnitedStates are assigned to USCINCSOC.USCINCSOC exercises COCOM over those
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forces through Service componentcommanders, functional componentcommanders, or its subordinate unifiedcommand.
• As a supporting commander,USCINCSOC provides SOF to thecommanders of other combatantcommands for operational employment.As directed by the Secretary of Defense,USCINCSOC normally transfers forcesto a supported geographic combatantcommander. When this transfer will bepermanent, the forces will be reassignedwith the gaining combatant commanderexercising COCOM over the reassignedforces. When this transfer will betemporary, the forces will be attached tothe gaining combatant command with thegeographic combatant commandernormally exercising OPCON over theattached forces.
• In certain situations, the NCA may directUSCINCSOC to plan and conduct a SOas the supported commander. The NCA,however, could choose to exerciseOPCON directly over SOF for aparticular operation without anyintervening levels of command,depending upon the urgency or politicalsensitivity of the mission.
b. SOF in Theater. SOF assigned to atheater are under COCOM of the geographiccombatant commander. The geographiccombatant commander normally exercisesCOCOM of all assigned and OPCON of allattached SOF through the theater specialoperations command (SOC). However, thegeographic combatant commander maychoose to exercise COCOM of SOF throughother subordinate commanders. To aid unityof effort, the gaining commander shouldassume joint operational reportingresponsibilities for assigned SOF (SeeFigure III-1).
c. SOF under non-US command. Whendirected by the NCA through the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), geographiccombatant commanders may place SOF unitsunder the OPCON of a non-US combinedforces commander. In such instances,OPCON of operational US SOF units wouldbe exercised by a US commander within thecombined command structure.
3. Command and Control ofSOF in Theater
Normally, C2 of SOF should be executedwithin the SOF chain of command. C2 ofPSYOP and CA forces, based on their uniquerole in the theater, are discussed separatelyfrom C2 of other SOF (see paragraph 5 ofthis chapter). The identification of a C2organizational structure for SOF shoulddepend upon specific objectives, securityrequirements, and the operationalenvironment. C2 of SOF is executed throughone or more of the following.
a. Theater SOC. To provide the necessaryunity of command, each geographiccombatant commander has established asubunified command to serve as thefunctional SO component for the theater.The theater SOC performs broad continuousmissions uniquely suited to SOF capabilitiesthat are of strategic and operationalimportance to the geographic combatantcommander. The theater SOC normallyexercises OPCON of all assigned and attachedSOF in theater. The theater SOCcommander has two principal roles.
• Theater SO Advisor. The theater SOCcommander advises the geographiccombatant commander and the othercomponent commanders on the properemployment of SOF. The theater SOCcommander may develop specificrecommendations on assignment of SOFin theater and opportunities for SOF to
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support the overall theater campaignplan. The theater SOC commander maybe dual-hatted as a special staff officer inthe theater staff. In this case, the SOCcommander may appoint a deputy asrepresentative to the theater staff forroutine day-to-day staff matters.
• Joint Force Special OperationsComponent Commander (JFSOCC).When the geographic combatantcommander designates a JFC, the theaterSOC may be designated as the JFSOCC.
b. SOF Operational C2
• JFSOCC. The JFSOCC (or joint specialoperations task force [JSOTF]commander, if established) is thecommander within a JTF responsible formaking recommendations on the proper
employment of SOF, planning andcoordinating SO, or accomplishing suchoperational missions as may be assigned.The JFSOCC will normally be thecommander with the preponderance ofSOF and the requisite C2 capabilities.
• Joint Special Operations Task Force.At the recommendation of the theaterSOC commander, the JFC may establisha JSOTF. A JSOTF is a temporaryjoint SOF headquarters established tocontrol SOF of more than one Servicein a specific theater of operations orto accomplish a specific mission.Establishment of a JSOTF is appropriatewhen SOF C2 requirements exceed thecapabilities of the theater SOC staff. AJSOTF is normally formed aroundelements from the theater SOC or anexisting SOF unit with augmentation
THEATER-LEVEL SOFCOMMAND AND CONTROL
NCA
USCINCSOC
Strategic andOperational DirectionAdministration andSupportCombatant Command(command authority)Operational Control
AFSOFARSOFAFFORARFORCJCSJTFMARFOR
Air Force Special Operations ForcesArmy Special Operations ForcesAir Force ForcesArmy ForcesChairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffJoint Task ForceMarine Forces
NAVFORNAVSOFNCANSWSOCUSCINCSOC
Navy ForcesNaval Special Operations ForcesNational Command AuthoritiesNaval Special WarfareSpecial Operations CommandCommander in Chief, US Special Operations Command
ARFOR AFFOR NAVFOR MARFOR SOC JTF*(When Activated)
NAVSOF AFSOF ARSOF
CJCS
Geographic CombatantCommander
NAVSOF(NSW-afloat)
Figure III-1. Theater-Level SOF Command and Control
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from other Service SOF. A JSOTF mayalso be specifically established as a jointorganization and deployed as a completepackage from outside of the theater. Thetheater SOC commander may form aJSOTF and then pass tactical control(TACON) to a Service or functionalcomponent requiring SOF support.When a JSOTF is formed and augmentedby one or more foreign units thedesignation becomes Combined JointSpecial Operations Task Force.
• The JFSOCC (or JSOTF commander)will control assigned SOF as well asany conventional forces provided by theJFC in support of specific missions. The
JFSOCC or JSOTF commanderexercises C2 of assigned SOF through anumber of organizations (See FigureIII-2). They include the following.
•• Joint Special Operations AirComponent Commander (JSOACC).The JSOACC is the commander withinthe JFSOCC (or JSOTF) staff responsiblefor planning and executing joint specialair operations and for coordinating anddeconflicting such operations withconventional, non-SO air activities. TheJSOACC normally will be thecommander with the preponderance ofassets and/or greatest ability to plan,coordinate, allocate, task, control, and
SOF SUBORDINATE JOINTFORCE C2 AND LIAISON
JFC
SOLEMEF
XXXXXXNSWTU
CORPS
SOCCE
SOCCE
*When designated
Air ForceComponent(JFACC)*
NavyComponent JCMOTF* Marine
Component
AFSOFARSOFJFCJFSOCC
JPOTFJCMOTF
NAVSOFNSWTGNSWTUSOCCE
SOLE
Air Force ForcesArmy ForcesJoint Force CommanderJoint Force Special Operations Component
CommanderJoint Psychological Operations Task ForceJoint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
Naval Special Warfare ForcesNaval Special Warfare Task GroupNaval Special Warfare Task UnitSpecial Operations Command andControl Element
Special Operations Liaison Element
ArmyComponentJFSOCC JPOTF*
AFSOF(JSOACC)*
AFSOF
NSWTG
NAVSOF
ARSOTF
ARSOF
Operational ControlLiaison
Figure III-2. SOF Subordinate Joint Force C2 and Liaison
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Organization and Command and Control
support the assigned joint SOA assets.The JSOACC may be subordinate to theJFSOCC (or JSOTF commander) or toany non-SO component or directlysubordinate to the JFC.
•• Naval Special Warfare Task Group(NSWTG) and/or Naval SpecialWarfare Task Unit (NSWTU). NavalSOF assigned to the JFSOCC or JSOTF(or Navy component commander) arenormally under the C2 of an NSWTG orNSWTU. The NSWTG plans, conducts,and supports SO in support of fleetcommanders and JFSOCCs (or JSOTFcommanders). The NSWTU is asubordinate unit of a NSWTG.
•• Special Operations Command andControl Element (SOCCE). TheSOCCE is the focal point for thesynchronization of SOF activities withland and maritime operations. TheSOCCE is normally employed whenSOF conducts operations in conjunctionwith a conventional force. It collocateswith the command element of thesupported commander and performs C2or liaison functions directed by theJFSOCC (or JSOTF commander). TheSOCCE can also receive SOFoperational, intelligence, and targetacquisition reports directly fromdeployed SOF elements and providethem to the supported componentheadquarters.
c. Other Component Commanders of aJoint Force. SOF may be under the OPCONor TACON or in support of Service orfunctional component commanders. Specificcommand arrangements should be determinedby the nature of the mission and the objectivesto be accomplished. (e.g., NSW forcesassigned in support of Navy component and/or fleet commander). The most importantconsideration is to maintain as intact the
SOF chain of command so the gainingcommander can have available appropriatelevels of command and control for theassigned or attached SOF forces.Commanders at all levels should ensure thatSOF are employed within existingcapabilities and that support arrangementsallow for administrative and SOF-peculiarlogistic requirements.
The assignment of SOF air assets is anexample of the geographic combatantcommander’s direction for SOF employmentand command relationships. To assurecentralized control and decentralizedexecution to all SOF-assigned missions, theJFC may designate that all SOF air assetsremain under the OPCON of the JFSOCC.The JFSOCC may pass TACON of availableSOF air assets to the joint force air componentcommander (JFACC) or other componentcommanders when appropriate. Regardless ofSOF aviation C2 arrangements, SOF aviationoperations must be closely coordinated withthe JFACC in order to ensure airspacedeconfliction, flight safety, and operationssecurity (OPSEC).
4. SOF Support to USAmbassadors
a. Requests for SOF may also be initiatedby an embassy’s country team. The specificrequest may originate with theambassador, defense attaché, or militaryassistance group commander. The requestsare passed to the geographic combatantcommander for determination of theappropriate response.
b. If the forces are available in theater fromtheater-assigned forces, and there are norestrictions on their employment (e.g.,counterdrug operations), the request can beapproved by the theater SOC commander. Ifthere are insufficient forces available intheater, the geographic combatant commander
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will request that the Secretary of Defenseapprove a deployment order for USSOCOMforces through the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. The Joint Staff will ensurethat the proper interagency coordinationis completed. Once the request has beenapproved (following coordination by allconcerned — State Department, Office of theSecretary of Defense, USSOCOM, and thegeographic combatant commander in whosetheater the deployment will take place),specific SOF units or individuals aredeployed.
c. With few exceptions, SOF deployed tosupport ambassadors or country teams willbe under the OPCON of the geographiccombatant commander upon entering thetheater. The geographic combatantcommander will normally exercise OPCONthrough the US military assistance advisorygroup commander or the chief of the in-country security assistance organization, whokeeps the ambassador informed of plans andactivities during the deployment. Under nocircumstances will SOF operate in ageographic combatant commander’s area ofresponsibility, or in an ambassador’s country,without their prior notification andapproval.
5. C2 of PSYOP and CA Forces
Although designated as SOF, PSYOP andCA C2 relationships are structured to supportboth SO and conventional forces.
a. The broad range of PSYOP activities,conducted across the strategic, operational,and tactical levels with the requirement to fullyintegrate with interagency activities as wellas with conventional forces mandates thatPSYOP relationships be distinct from otherSO forces. The focus of PSYOP is broaderthan just those activities conducted by thetheater SOC, and its C2 must be such that itallows for direct access to the JFC and fullintegration at all levels. C2 of PSYOP forcesis normally executed by the establishment ofa joint psychological operations task forcedirectly under the JFC. (For further discussionof C2 for PSYOP forces, see Joint Pub 3-53,“Doctrine for Joint PsychologicalOperations.”)
b. CA forces also directly support theoverall campaign of the geographiccombatant commander. CA forces may beemployed during peacetime and duringpreconflict, conflict, and postconflict stagesof an operation. CA forces must also be able
SOF may be requested to support US ambassadors or country teams.
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to fully integrate with interagency activitiesand conventional forces. Effective integrationwith local and HN authorities as well as PVOsand NGOs requires a C2 structure that isdirectly linked to the JFC. CA forces arenormally attached to supported units. (Forfurther discussion of C2 for CA forces, seeJoint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint CivilAffairs.”)
6. SOF Deconfliction andCoordination
a. Deconfliction and coordination withconventional forces are always criticalconcerns for SOF commanders. SOF areoften employed in advance of conventionaloperations. Effective coordination is vitalin the transition from advance operationsinvolving SOF to follow-on operations andto ensure that the timing and tempo of theoverall campaign is maintained.
b. For operations somewhat limited inscope and duration, the JFC may establish ajoint special operations area (JSOA). AJSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace,defined by a JFC who has geographicresponsibilities, for use by a JFSOCC (orJSOTF) for the conduct of SO. JFCs mayuse a JSOA to delineate and facilitatesimultaneous conventional and specialoperations in the same general operationalarea. When a JSOA is designated, theJFSOCC (or JSOTF) is the supportedcommander within the designated JSOA.
c. While establishment of a designatedJSOA for SOF to conduct independentoperations assists in the ease of control of SOand the prevention of fratricide, the JFCshould always evaluate the value ofisolating SOF against the greater benefit ofintegrating SOF into the overall campaignplan.
7. SOF Liaison Elements
a. To fully integrate with conventionaloperations, SOF must maintain effectiveliaison with all components of the jointforce that may impact the conduct of SOFactivities. To support this effort, SOF providea variety of liaison officers (LNOs) rangingfrom individual SOF liaisons to small cells ofjoint SOF personnel supporting the JFC,Service, and functional componentcommanders. SOF LNOs, wherever located,are responsible for coordination,synchronization, and deconfliction of SOFmissions in the component’s operational area.
b. SOF LNOs ensure the timelyexchange of necessary operational andsupport information both to aid missionexecution and preclude fratricide, duplicationof effort, disruption of ongoing operations, orloss of intelligence sources. SOF LNOs mayassist in the coordination of fire support,overflight, aerial refueling, targeting,deception, PSYOP, CA, and other theater-operational issues based on ongoing andprojected SOF missions. These efforts arecrucial to maintaining the geographiccombatant commander’s unity of effort,coordination of limited resources and assets,and the campaign tempo.
c. SOF C2 organizations such as aNSWTG and/or NSWTU or SOCCE may actas (or provide) LNOs for SOF with theirrespective Service components. Additionally,the following elements are specificallyorganized to provide SOF liaison within thejoint organization.
• Special Operations Liaison Element(SOLE). The JFSOCC provides aSOLE to the JFACC (or appropriateService component air C2 facility) tocoordinate and synchronize SOF air and
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surface operations within the joint airoperations center (JAOC). The SOLEchief, serving as the JFSOCC’srepresentative to the JFACC, placesLNOs throughout the JAOC staff. TheSOLE coordinates, integrates, anddeconflicts all SOF air and surfaceactivities through the JFACC’s airtasking order and airspace control order.
• Special Operations CoordinationElement (SOCOORD). TheSOCOORD serves as the primaryadvisor to an Army corps or Marineexpeditionary force (MEF) commanderwith regard to SOF integration,capabilities, and limitations. TheSOCOORD is the functional staffelement of the corps (or MEF) G3. Withaugmentation, it can function as the J-3
SOD if the corps (or MEF) is establishedas a JTF.
8. Summary
As identified in this chapter, variousorganizational structures may beestablished for employment of SOF.Certain arrangements might be morecommonly used during war or extendedoperations, while others may be bettersuited for peacetime or contingencies ofrelatively short duration. However, thechoice of organization for employmentof SOF should depend upon specificobjectives, security requirements, and theoperational environment. C2 of SOF isnormally exercised by SOF. SOF willprovide the appropriate liaison to facilitateintegration at all levels of the joint force.
CHAPTER IVPLANNING FOR JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS
IV-1
1. General
SOF are involved in all three types ofplanning processes for joint operations:campaign, deliberate, and crisis action.Experience has repeatedly demonstrated thatSOF planners must be involved throughoutthe planning process and that bringing SOFin early to the process can significantlyimprove the SOF contribution to the overalloperation. Given the small size of SOFoperational units and the type of missionsnormally conducted, detailed planning mustbe conducted by those who will execute themission.
2. SOF in the StrategicPlanning Process
a. SOF capabilities should be taken intoconsideration in the development ofnational security strategy and nationalmilitary strategy. SOF offer the NCA a setof uniquely trained and equipped (andregionally oriented, if necessary) forces thatcan be tailored to execute a range of overtand low-visibility activities designed tocontain or resolve crises. In peacetime, SOFsupport national security policy by providinga capability to prevent or deter aggressionand acts of intimidation or terrorism that mayhinder US military, political, economic, orsocial interests or security. Along withUSSOCOM, geographic combatantcommanders should ensure that SOF arereflected in the development of the Defense
“Be audacious and cunning in your plans, firm and persevering in theirexecution, determined to find a glorious end.”
Clausewitz
Planning Guidance and other nationalstrategic documents.
b. SOF capabilities and apportionmentis outlined in the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCPapportions resources to combatantcommanders based on military capabilitiesresulting from completed program and budgetactions. SOF force apportionment togeographic combatant commanders forcontingency planning is contained in CJCSI3110.06, “Special Operations Supplementalto Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1996.”USSOCOM identifies specific units to beallocated to the combatant commanders’ jointoperation plans (OPLANs).
3. SOF Support to MobilizationPlanning
The Services are charged with maintainingreserve forces and preparing for the expansionof capabilities in time of war. As part of thatresponsibility, the Services prepare detailedmobilization plans containing theidentification of the actual forces. Uponrecommendation from the other combatantcommanders, USSOCOM must ensure thatSOF RC forces are properly reflected inthese plans. This is particularly critical inthose mission areas where a significantpercentage of the force is in the RC (e.g., CA,PSYOP). Early recognition of the need forreserve forces is the key to effectivemobilization planning.
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4. Theater Strategic andCampaign Planning
a. The geographic combatant commanderfor each theater refines broad national oralliance strategic guidance into a theaterstrategy or campaign plan. This documentprovides guidance for the deployment,employment, and sustainment of assigned andapportioned US forces (including SOF) andthe forces of allied nations to achieve nationaland alliance strategic objectives.
b. The geographic combatant commanderwill describe his concept for SO in the theatercampaign plan (See Figure IV-1).
5. Theater SOC Support to theTheater Campaign
a. The theater SOC participate in thedevelopment of theater campaign plans,OPLANs, and operation plans in concept
format (CONPLANs). These plans translatethe geographic combatant commander’sconcept of SOF employment into a sequenceof integrated SOF activities. The theater SOCmaintains a theater perspective on thecampaign plan and how each componentcommander intends to support that campaign.Based on guidance from the geographiccombatant commander, the theater SOCdevelops a supporting plan to allocate forcesfor operational tasks, including support ofcomponent and subordinate JFCs. The theaterSOC also identifies and anticipates theateroperational and environmental services aswell as intelligence requirements that SOFcould address, and then develops andrecommends pro-active SOF activities thatmight satisfy those requirements.
b. To assist in both planning and executionof SOF missions, the theater SOC mustmaintain liaison elements at appropriatelevels of each major theater subordinate
CAMPAIGN PLAN OBJECTIVES FOR SOF
Provide the concepts for SOF activities and sustainment that will transformnational, alliance, and theater strategic guidance into military objectives
Describe the geographic combatant commander's vision of SOF employment,to include command relationships
Identify requirements for US Special Operations Command and Service componentsto prepare, provide and sustain theater-assigned and augmenting SOF
Identify priority operational, weather, and intelligence requirements that theaterSOF must address
Define interagency coordination requirements
The geographic combatant commander will describe his concept for specialoperations in the theater campaign plan. The campaign plan will:
Figure IV-1. Campaign Plan Objectives for SOF
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Planning for Joint Special Operations
command. This coordination is vital inassisting in the deconfliction of SOF andconventional activities, determining targetselection and apportionment for bothconventional and SOF requirements andaiding in the integration of SOF into theoverall campaign plan.
6. SOF in the Targeting Process
a. As stated above, the theater SOCprovides recommended SOF activities to thecombatant commander in support of thetheater campaign objectives. The JFSOCCmay also identify potential SOF missionsto the JFC to be considered in the jointtargeting process. Once assigned a mission,SOF will plan and execute accordingly.However, to avoid the misapplication of SOF,commanders should evaluate potentialSOF employment for appropriateness,feasibility, and supportability early in theplanning cycle and prior to target assignment.
b. To provide clear guidance tocommanders for planning and executing SO,the following set of operational missioncriteria has evolved from combat experience(See Figure IV-2).
• Is this an appropriate mission forSOF? SOF should be used against thosekey strategic or operational targets thatrequire SOF’s unique skills andcapabilities. If the targets are not ofoperational or strategic importance, thenSOF should not be assigned. SOF shouldnot be used as a substitute for other forces.
• Does this mission support the theatercampaign plan? If the mission does notsupport the JFC’s campaign plan, thenthere are probably more appropriatemissions available for SOF.
• Is this mission operationally feasible?SOF are not structured for attrition orforce-on-force warfare and should not
be assigned missions that are beyondtheir capabilities. Planners must takeinto consideration the vulnerability ofSOF units to larger, more heavily armedor mobile forces, particularly in hostileterritory.
• Are the required resources availableto support the mission? Some SOFmissions require support from otherforces for success. Support involvesaiding, protecting, complementing,and sustaining employed SOF. Supportcan include airlift, intelligence,communications, and logistic support.Even though a target may be vulnerableto SOF, deficiencies in supportabilitymay affect the likelihood for successor may entirely invalidate the feasibilityof employing SOF.
• Does the expected outcome justify therisk? Commanders should recognize thehigh value and limited resources of SOF
SOOPERATIONAL
MISSION CRITERIA
Appropriate mission?
Supports campaign plan?
Operationally feasible?
Required resources available?
Outcome justifies risk?
Figure IV-2. SO OperationalMission Criteria
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and ensure that the benefits ofsuccessful mission execution aremeasurable and in balance with therisks inherent in the mission. Assessmentof risk should take into account not onlythe potential for loss of SOF units andequipment, but also the risk of adverseeffects on US diplomatic and politicalinterests should the mission fail.
c. All commanders should be familiar withthese criteria and apply them to all operationalplanning. If the answer to any of thesequestions is “no,” then the mission should notbe undertaken.
7. SOF Mission Planning
a. Detailed mission planning based onspecific, comprehensive, and currentintelligence is vital to successful execution
of SOF missions and, potentially, the verysurvival of the SOF element. SOF personnelmust have a thorough knowledge of theoperational area, to include geographic,political, social, economic, informational,military, and environmental conditions. Forsome missions, SOF operators must also knowthe language, customs, and ethnic andreligious affiliations and antagonisms of thelocal population that may affect missionexecution. This level of area orientation isbest achieved through previous operationalexperience, MTTs, deployments for trainingin the area or, at a minimum, intensive pre-employment study of the intendedoperational area.
b. SOF missions must be plannedcompletely — insertion, resupply, fire andmaneuver support, extraction — prior tocommitting the force. The nature of thetarget, enemy situation, and environmentalcharacteristics of the operational area willdictate the size and capabilities of theassigned force, the nature of the tacticaloperations, methods of insertion andextraction, length of force exposure, logisticsrequirements, and the size and compositionof the command and support structure.
c. Planners must ensure interoperabilityof SOF with conventional forces that eitherhost or support their activities. This isespecially true during time-critical contingencyoperations. For example, if SOF are operatingfrom naval surface vessels during forced entryoperations, they must be prepared to functioncompatibly with the host vessel in the areas ofweapons, communications equipment, andshipboard logistics.
d. Regardless of the level of securityinvolved, key planners from all disciplines(e .g . , i n te l l i gence , f i re suppor t ,communications, logistics, PSYOP) must beinvolved in all phases of SOF missionplanning.
Commanders should evaluate all SO operationalmission criteria in considering mission advisability.
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Planning for Joint Special Operations
8. Operations Security
a. OPSEC is a process for identifying andmanaging indicators of friendly actions.OPSEC is important to SOF activities becauseit denies an adversary critical information ofintelligence value that might otherwise bededuced from unclassified information,evidence, or observables associated with theplanning and conduct of military activities.When combined with traditional securityprograms, OPSEC enables SOF to achieveessential secrecy. OPSEC is an integral partof all phases of an operation but is especiallyimportant in regards to effective SOFemployment.
b. The need for strict security must bebalanced against the need for coordinatedplanning, execution, and deconfliction ofthese activities with other operations. OPSECcontributes to coordinated planning,execution, and deconfliction by identifyingand then controlling only that informationwhich, in the hands of an adversary, couldenable the enemy to cause the SOF operationto fail.
9. Military Deception
a. Most SOF missions rely on secrecy andsurprise for mission success. However, theexecution of some SOF missions may require,or be enhanced by, deception operations.Such deception initiatives may serve asdiversionary operations to focus enemyattention away from actual targets andobjectives or deny recognition of SOF.
b. SOF may be employed in conductingor supporting military deception operations.Military deception operations that use orsupport SOF should not inadvertentlyheighten the enemy awareness of SOFoperations.
10. Summary
a. To be most effective, SOF must beintegrated into the overall theatercampaign. The theater SOC commander isresponsible for recommending SOF missionsand identifying SOF support requirementsduring the planning process. SOF plannersmust be involved throughout the planningprocess and should be brought in early tofacilitate effective employment of SOF.
b. SOF missions are often high riskoperations, have limited windows ofexecution, and require first time success.Further, the sensitivity of many SOF missionsmay force specific political, legal, time-of-day,geographical, or force size constraints uponthe employed and supporting forces.Commanders must evaluate theappropriateness of SOF for a specific mission,the risk attendant to the SOF unit, and thepotential adverse affect of mission failure.Given the limited size and sustainability ofSOF, adequate support is vital to the successof the mission and must be properlyplanned for — prior to the commitment ofthe force.
c. While some SOF missions (particularlythose in permissive environments) may be less
SOF MILITARY DECEPTION SUPPORT
An example of SOF military deceptions operations in support of theconventional campaign is the placing of explosives on approach beaches inKuwait by SEALs during Operation DESERT STORM as a feint of a Marineamphibious assault. This fake attack was supported by PSYOP leaflets leadingthe Iraqi command structure to believe that the assault was real.
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complex, SOF planners are not excused fromthorough planning of the operation, gainingknowledge of the cultural aspects of theoperational area, and developing a range ofappropriate alternative means toaccomplish the mission should the
operational environment change duringemployment.
d. The keystone of SOF mission planningis that the operational element executing themission MUST plan the mission.
CHAPTER VPREPARATION AND SUPPORT OF JOINT SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES
V-1
1. General
SOF require training, equipment, andsupport that are tailored to specific missionrequirements yet are flexible enough torespond to changing employment parameters.The joint character of SOF also requiressupport arrangements across Service linesand emphasis on the frequently extraordinarysupport required to sustain operations that areoften independent and remote. Further, SOFmust be able to exploit the full range ofavailable national support systems such asthose offered by emerging technologies andspace-based assets.
2. SOF TrainingResponsibilities
SOF require a combination of basicmilitary training and specialized skilltraining to achieve operational proficiency.SOF-specific training includes both individualskill training and extensive unit training toensure maximum readiness. Many SOF skillsare perishable and must be maintainedthroughout an operational deployment.Training responsibilities for SOF areoutlined below.
a. The Services are primarilyresponsible for all basic individual militaryskill training and common professionalmilitary education (PME) for personnelprogrammed for assignment to SOF units.
“Closely allied to the confidence which is due to good leadership is thatwhich is caused by the feeling of being supported.”
Captain Sir Basil Liddell HartThoughts on W ar, 1944
b. USCINCSOC is charged by title 10,USC Section 167 with training assignedforces to meet mission taskings as describedherein and ensure their interoperability withconventional forces as well as other SOF. SO-peculiar individual, continuation, andprofessional training and PME are the directresponsibility of USCINCSOC. Componentcommanders of USSOCOM design andmonitor upgraded and continuation trainingprograms to meet the warfightingrequirements of the geographic combatantcommanders. Joint training of SOF is theshared responsibility of USCINCSOC andthe geographic combatant commanders.
c. Through the theater SOC and incoordination with USCINCSOC,geographic combatant commandersshould articulate SO joint mission-essentialtasks required to support theater campaignplans, OPLANs, and CONPLANs.USCINCSOC will develop and resource theSO-specific training architecture.USSOCOM component commanders thendevelop supporting mission-essential tasks forUSCINCSOC validation and implementtraining programs to meet validatedrequirements.
Geographic combatant commandersconduct joint exercises, some CJCS-sponsored, which are supported andmonitored by USCINCSOC. Such exercisesstress SOF under conditions resembling the
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operational environments in which they willbe tasked. Further, these exercises build andreinforce the regional area orientationrequired to support theater campaign plans.This orientation, including language andcultural familiarity, is labor-intensive and maytake years of preparation for units to reachfull capability.
d. As the operational commanders of in-theater SOF, theater SOC commanders havethe best perspective concerning ongoing andprojected missions for deploying SOF. Theuse of mission letters can greatly assistUSCINCSOC in the execution ofresponsibilities for the preparation foremployment in a specific theater.
Mission letters serve as a formal linkbetween theater missions and the training ofUSCINCSOC-assigned, theater-apportionedSOF. Mission letters should be developed forspecific units designated for deployment tothe theater and provided to the unitcommander in a timely manner to influencethe unit’s predeployment training program.
3. Intelligence Support of SOF
a. Timely, detailed, tailored, and fusedall-source intelligence is vital in identifyingrelevant targets, COA development andmission planning and execution. The abilityto interface with theater and nationalintelligence systems and assets is critical forSOF mission success. SOF missionaccomplishment may hinge on target orintelligence updates provided by othergovernment agencies. A JSOTF, whenformed, must have these same interfaces.
b. The nature of many SOF objectivesand tactics require intelligence support thatis frequently more detailed than thatneeded in conventional operations. SOFoften require intelligence to avoid enemyforces, regardless of size or composition, asopposed to information that would allowconventional forces to engage the enemy (SeeFigure V-1).
c. Intelligence support to SOF inMOOTW requires an expanded focus of
Support, both of intelligence and material, is essentialfor successful SO planning.
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Preparation and Support of Joint Special Operations Forces
the standard scope of intelligencefunctions. This is particularly true in FIDoperations. Intelligence must contain aspectsrelated to political, informational, economic,and cultural institutions and relationships aswell as enemy and friendly forces and targetspecific data.
d. SOF missions are particularly sensitiveto HN and enemy collection efforts.Counterintelligence support must also beconsidered in protecting sensitive SOFmissions across the range of militaryoperations. Commanders at all levels shouldbe well informed on the capability andeffectiveness of HN intelligence and securityservices to collect information on SOF unitsand personnel.
e. More specific guidance on intelligencesupport to SOF is provided in Joint Pub3-05.3, “Joint Special Operations OperationalProcedures,” Joint Pub 3-05.5, “Joint Special
Operations Targeting and Mission PlanningProcedures,” and the Joint Pub 2-0 series ofpublications.
4. Meteorological andOceanographic Supportof SOF
Meteorological and oceanographic(METOC) support services are critical tothe success of SOF missions. From initialplanning through execution, environmentalintelligence should be included in thedecision making process. Unique localconditions may expedite a particular COA ormake it impossible. A study of generalclimatology, hydrography, and specificweather forecasts for the operational area mayprovide the commander with the informationnecessary to choose the best windows ofopportunity to execute, support, and sustainspecific operations. Potentially, the executiondecision may turn on exploiting certainadverse weather and METOC conditionsto provide cover for operations while avoidingthose environmental conditions that willhamper operations. However these decisionsoften require finesse and judgment to ensurethat, while the weapons systems are operatingnear their environmental limits, they do notexceed them.
With the increased reliance of the militaryon space capabilities, the SOF commandermust also be kept informed of environmentaleffects on space operations. METOC supportpersonnel can provide information that willallow the SOF commander to plan for thepossibility of the loss of one or more criticalspace-based systems.
5. SOF Logistic Support
The theater SOC commander (or theJFSOCC when a JTF is established)determines logistics requirements for SOFin-theater for the geographic combatant
EXAMPLES OFSOF
INTELLIGENCEREQUIREMENTS
Geographic intelligence:
Target-specific items:
- terrain, cultural, anddemographic factors
- ingress, egress, or cross-country movement analysis
- options for terminal areaand evacuation operations
- graphics- photos- textual elaboration
Figure V-1. Examples of SOFIntelligence Requirements
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commander. Logistic support for SOF unitscan be provided through one or more of thefollowing.
a. Service Support. The logistic supportof SOF units is the responsibility of theirparent Service, except where otherwiseprovided for by support agreements or otherdirectives. This responsibility existsregardless of whether the SOF unit requiringsupport is assigned to the Service component,the SOC or JFSOCC, or a JSOTF. SOFlogistic support includes the sustainment andreplenishment of all classes of supply,maintenance, transportation, facilities, andservices.
b. Joint In-theater Support. Themajority of SOF missions require jointlogistic planning and execution. When thetheater Service component cannot satisfy itsService SOF support requirements, thegeographic combatant commander willdetermine if another Service component cansatisfy the requirement through common orjoint servicing arrangements. Joint logisticarrangements may also be used when normalService support cannot satisfy requirements.SOF of ten requ i re nons tandardarrangements when operating in locationsgeographically separated from establishedtheater Service support infrastructures.Geographic combatant commanders andtheater Service component commanders, incoordination with the theater SOC, areresponsible for ensuring that effective andresponsive SOF support systems aredeveloped and provided.
c. SO-Peculiar Support. SO-peculiarequipment, materials, supplies, and servicesare defined as those items and servicesrequired for SOF mission support forwhich there is no broad conventionalrequirement. Responsibility for developingand acquiring SO-peculiar equipment and foracquiring SO-peculiar materials, supplies, and
services belongs to USCINCSOC. Thissupport will be provided to theater-deployedSOF via USSOCOM Service componentlogistic infrastructures and in coordinationwith theater Service components.
(For additional discussion of SOF logisticsupport, see Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint SpecialOperations Operational Procedures,” and theJoint Pub 4-0 series of publications.)
6. Command, Control,Communications, andComputer Systems Supportof SOF
a. Command, control, communications,and computer (C4) support to SOF mustbe global, secure, and jointly interoperable.It must be flexible so that it can be tailored toany mission, and it must add value to the SOwarrior’s operational capability. C4 systemssupport the full range of SO worldwide.SOF must be able to communicate anywhereand anytime utilizing national capabilities tothe maximum extent possible. The SOFoperational unit must have a variety ofmethods for communicating, reporting, andquerying available resources, regardless ofgeographic location. C4 systems must nevercompromise the SOF operational unit onthe ground, in the air, or at sea.
b. SOF C4 support consists of multipleand varied groups of systems, procedures,personnel, and equipment that operate indiverse manners and at different echelons,from national to unit levels. C4 systems mustsupport discrete as well as collective functions.SOF missions are normally controlled at thelowest level that can accomplish theneeded coordination, although politicalconsiderations may require control at highnational levels. To provide for necessarycontrol, SOF C4 systems must offerseamless connectivity from the lowest to thehighest levels.
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Preparation and Support of Joint Special Operations Forces
c. SOF C4 systems must beinteroperable with each other, withconventional forces, with US nationalresources, and with allies and HNs. Theymust integrate not only with state-of-the-artsystems, but also must be capable ofintegrating with less sophisticated equipmentoften found in less developed nations.
(For more detailed discussion on C4 supportto SOF, see Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint SpecialOperations Operational Procedures,” and theJoint Pub 6-0 series of publications.)
7. PSYOP and CA Supportof SOF
The theater SOC submits requests forPSYOP and CA support to the supportedcommander in chief (CINC), whoconsolidates and validates all requests forPSYOP and CA support and submits them tothe Joint Staff for a deployment order or aspart of an overall OPLAN. PSYOP and CAsupport may be provided to the theater SOCbased on mission requirements, availability,and priorities established by the CINC or JTFcommander. CA and PSYOP supportprovide the SOF commanders and theirindigenous counterparts the ability tomotivate and mobilize crucial segments ofthe population to enhance the probability ofmission success.
(For more detailed discussion of PSYOP andCA support to SOF, see Joint Pub 3-05.3,“Joint Special Operations OperationalProcedures,” Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine forJoint Psychological Operations,” and JointPub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”)
8. Public Affairs Supportof SOF
The political sensitivity of many SO,especially in peacetime, mandates that
thorough and accurate public affairs (PA)guidance be developed during theoperational planning stage and approved foruse in advance of most operations. PAplanning must accurately reflect theobjective of the mission to domesticaudiences consistent with the overall PSYOPeffort, and with strategic and tactical OPSECrequirements. The commander havingoperational authority should developproposed PA guidance that is coordinated withsupporting commands and governmentagencies, as appropriate, prior to forwardingthat guidance to the Assistant Secretary ofDefense (Public Affairs) for approval.
(For further information, see Joint Pub 3-61,“Doctrine for Public Affairs in JointOperations.”)
9. Legal Support of SOF
SOF missions frequently involve a uniqueset of complex issues. There are Federal lawsand Executive Orders, Federal agencypublications and directives, and theater rulesof engagement (ROE) that may affect SOFactivities. These guidelines becomeespecially critical during sensitivepeacetime operations when international anddomestic laws, treaty provisions, and politicalagreements may affect mission planning andexecution. Commanders must seek legalreview during all levels of planning andexecution of SOF missions, to includeplanning of the theater ROE.
10. Space Support of SOF
As space-based support to militaryoperations continues to improve, SOFcommanders and planners must be awareof potential space support for theiroperations and the integration of SOF withspace assets. Current SOF use of space-basedcapabilities are shown in Figure V-2.
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11. Combat Camera Support ofSOF
Combat camera provides still and videodocumentary products that support PSYOPoperations and other special operationsmissions. Many teams supporting SOF arespecially equipped with night vision anddigital image transmission capabilities.Combat camera also provides gun cameraimage processing for theater and national use.Combat camera imagery is used to show allies,adversaries, and civilian populaces the effectsof US operations and to counter enemydisinformation with on-screen or gun cameraevidence.
12. Medical Support of SOF
SOF medical support is characterized byan austere structure and limited number ofmedical personnel with enhanced medicalskills. SOF medical personnel provide
SPACE-BASED SUPPORT TO SOF
Precision navigationand/or geopositioning
Globalcommunications
Global intelligencecollection
Surveillanceand warning
Meteorologicalsupport
Imagery for mapping andtargeting
Figure V-2. Space-Based Support to SOF
emergency treatment and a basic level ofmedical care at the team level. Medicalsupport provided to SOF units in the area ofoperations is planned and conducted by SOFsurgeons and medical personnel. Provisionof medical support beyond this capabilitydepends on the thoroughness of advancedplanning so that the conventional medicalsupport structure umbrella is extended tocover the lack of internal capability or to meetrequirements for additional medical assets(i.e., advanced trauma life support, surgicalintervention, evacuation, and medicallogistics). Certain operations may also requirespecial security requirements, to be put inplace as to not compromise the names of SOFpersonnel upon entry into the conventionalmedical system.
(For additional discussion of SOF medicalsupport, see Joint Pub 4-02, “Doctrine forHealth Services Support in JointOperations.”)
APPENDIX AREFERENCES
A-1
The development of Joint Pub 3-05 is based upon the following primary references:
1. Title 10, United States Code, and as specifically amended by:
a. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
b. Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,as attached to the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1987.
2. DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and its MajorComponents.”
3. Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.”
4. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”
5. Joint Pub 1-01, “Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures Development Program.”
6. Joint Pub 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”
7. Joint Pub 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”
8. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”
9. Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures.”
10. Joint Pub 3-05.5, “Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures.”
11. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”
12. Joint Pub 3-07.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense(FID).”
13. Joint Pub 3-07.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.”
14. Joint Pub 3-07.4, “Joint Counterdrug Operations.”
15. Joint Pub 3-07.6, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign HumanitarianAssistance.”
16. Joint Pub 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.”
17. Joint Pub 3-15, “Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare.”
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Joint Pub 3-05
18. Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).”
19. Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”
20. Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”
21. Joint Pub 3-59, “Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support.”
22. Joint Pub 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.”
23. Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”
24. Joint Pub 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.”
25. Joint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”
26. Joint Pub 6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)Systems Support to Joint Operations.”
27. CJCSI 3110.01B, “Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1996.”
28. CJCSI 3110.05A, “Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the JSCP FY 1996.”
29. CJCSI 3110.06, “Special Operations Supplemental to JSCP FY 1996.”
30. CJCSI 3110.12, “Civil Affairs Supplement to the JSCP.”
31. CJCSI 3210.01 “Joint Information Warfare Policy.”
32. JCSM-71-87, 29 May 1987, “Mission and Functions of the US Special OperationsCommand.”
33. MCM 1196, 17 Jan 96, “Unified Command Plan (UCP).”
APPENDIX BADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
B-1
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theJoint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.
2. Authorship
The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command.The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).
3. Supersession
This publication supersedes Joint Pub 3-05, 28 October 1992, “Doctrine for Joint SpecialOperations.”
4. Change Recommendations
a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:
TO: USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ5//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//
Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.
b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.
c. Record of Changes:
CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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5. Distribution
a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.
b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, DC 20301-7400.
c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”
By Military Services:
Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181
Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896
Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099
Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000
Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001
d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.
GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
GL-1
AC Active componentAT antiterrorism
C2 command and controlC4 command, control, communications, and computersCA civil affairsCBT combatting terrorismCD counterdrugCINC commander in chiefCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCM countermineCOA course of actionCOCOM combatant command (command authority)CONPLAN operation plan in concept formatCP counterproliferationCSAR combat search and rescueCT counterterrorism
DA direct actionDOD Department of Defense
E&E evasion and escape
FHA foreign humanitarian assistanceFID foreign internal defense
HN host nation
IO information operations
JAOC joint air operations centerJCSAR joint combat search and rescueJFACC joint force air component commanderJFC joint force commanderJFSOCC joint force special operations component commanderJSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities PlanJSOA joint special operations areaJSOACC joint special operations air component commanderJSOTF joint special operations task forceJTF joint task force
LNO liaison officerLOC line of communications
MEF Marine expeditionary forceMETOC meteorological and oceanographicMOOTW military operations other than warMTT mobile training team
NCA National Command AuthoritiesNGO nongovernmental organizationNSW naval special warfareNSWTG naval special warfare task groupNSWTU naval special warfare task unit
OPCON operational controlOPLAN operation planOPSEC operations security
PA public affairsPME professional military educationPSYOP psychological operationsPVO private voluntary organization
RC Reserve componentROE rules of engagement
SA security assistanceSEAL sea-air-land teamSO special operationsSOA special operations aviationSOC special operations commandSOCCE special operations command and control elementSOCOORD special operations coordination elementSOF special operations forcesSOLE special operations liaison elementSR special reconnaissance
TACON tactical control
USC United States CodeUSCINCSOC Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations
CommandUSG United States GovernmentUSSOCOM United States Special Operations CommandUW unconventional warfare
WMD weapons of mass destruction
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Joint Pub 3-05
Air Force special operations forces. Thoseactive and reserve component Air Forceforces designated by the Secretary ofDefense that are specifically organized,trained, and equipped to conduct andsupport special operations. Also calledAFSOF. (Joint Pub 1-02)
antiterrorism. Defensive measures used toreduce the vulnerability of individuals andproperty to terrorist acts, to include limitedresponse and containment by local militaryforces. Also called AT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
area assessment. The commander’sprescribed collection of specificinformation that commences uponemployment and is a continuous operation.It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds toprevious intelligence acquired from areastudies and other sources prior toemployment. (Joint Pub 1-02)
area oriented. Personnel or units whoseorganizations, mission, training, andequipping are based on projectedoperational deployment to a specificgeographic or demographic area. (Joint Pub1-02)
Army special operations forces. Thoseactive and reserve component Army forcesdesignated by the Secretary of Defense thatare specifically organized, trained, andequipped to conduct and support specialoperations. Also called ARSOF. (Joint Pub1-02)
campaign plan. A plan for a series of relatedmilitary operations aimed at accomplishinga strategic or operational objective withina given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)
civil administration. An administrationestablished by a foreign government in (1)friendly territory, under an agreement with
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PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
the government of the area concerned, toexercise certain authority normally thefunction of the local government, or (2)hostile territory, occupied by United Statesforces, where a foreign governmentexercises executive, legislative, and judicialauthority until an indigenous civilgovernment can be established. Also calledCA administration. (Joint Pub 1-02)
civil affairs. The activities of a commanderthat establish, maintain, influence, or exploitrelations between military forces and civilauthorities, both governmental andnongovernmental, and the civilian populacein a friendly, neutral, or hostile area ofoperations in order to facilitate militaryoperations and consolidate operationalobjectives. Civil affairs may includeperformance by military forces of activitiesand functions normally the responsibilityof local government. These activities mayoccur prior to, during, or subsequent to othermilitary actions. They may also occur, ifdirected, in the absence of other militaryoperations. (Joint Pub 1-02)
clandestine operation. An operationsponsored or conducted by governmentaldepartments or agencies in such a way asto assure secrecy or concealment. Aclandestine operation differs from a covertoperation in that emphasis is placed onconcealment of the operation rather than onconcealment of identity of sponsor. Inspecial operations, an activity may be bothcovert and clandestine and may focusequally on operational considerations andintelligence-related activities. (Joint Pub1-02)
combatant command (commandauthority). Nontransferable commandauthority established by title 10 (“ArmedForces”), United States Code, section 164,exercised only by commanders of unified
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or specified combatant commands unlessotherwise directed by the President or theSecretary of Defense. Combatantcommand (command authority) cannot bedelegated and is the authority of acombatant commander to perform thosefunctions of command over assigned forcesinvolving organizing and employingcommands and forces, assigning tasks,designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction over all aspects ofmilitary operations, joint training, andlogistics necessary to accomplish themissions assigned to the command.Combatant command (command authority)should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations.Normally this authority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Combatant command(command authority) provides fullauthority to organize and employcommands and forces as the combatantcommander considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatant command(command authority). Also calledCOCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02)
combat search and rescue. A specific taskperformed by rescue forces to effect therecovery of distressed personnel during waror military operations other than war. Alsocalled CSAR. (Joint Pub 1-02)
combatting terrorism. Actions, includingantiterrorism (defensive measures taken toreduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) andcounterterrorism (offensive measures takento prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism)taken to oppose terrorism throughout theentire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02)
combined joint special operations taskforce. A task force composed of specialoperations units from one or more foreign
countries and more than one US MilitaryDepartment formed to carry out a specificspecial operation or prosecute specialoperations in support of a theater campaignor other operations. The combined jointspecial operations task force may haveconventional nonspecial operations unitsassigned or attached to support the conductof specific missions. (This term and itsdefinition is approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)
command and control warfare. Theintegrated use of operations security,military deception, psychologicaloperations, electronic warfare, and physicaldestruction, mutually supported byintelligence, to deny information to,influence, degrade, or destroy adversarycommand and control capabilities, whileprotecting friendly command and controlcapabilities against such actions. Commandand control warfare is an application ofinformation operations in militaryoperations. Also called C2W. C2W is bothoffensive and defensive: a. C2-attack.Prevent effective C2 of adversary forces bydenying information to, influencing,degrading, or destroying the adversary C2system. b. C2-protect. Maintain effectivecommand and control of own forces byturning to friendly advantage or negatingadversary efforts to deny information to,influence, degrade, or destroy the friendlyC2 system. (This term and its definition areprovided for information and are proposedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-13.)
conventional forces. Those forces capableof conducting operations using nonnuclearweapons. (Joint Pub 1-02)
counterdrug. Those active measures takento detect, monitor, and counter theproduction, trafficking, and use of illegaldrugs. Also called CD. (Joint Pub 1-02)
GL-5
Glossary
counterterrorism. Offensive measures takento prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
deception. Those measures designed tomislead the enemy by manipulation,distortion, or falsification of evidence toinduce him to react in a manner prejudicialto his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)
direct action. Short-duration strikes andother small-scale offensive actions byspecial operations forces or specialoperations capable units to seize, destroy,capture, recover, or inflict damage ondesignated personnel or materiel. In theconduct of these operations, specialoperations forces or special operationscapable units may employ raid, ambush,or direct assault tactics; emplace mines andother munitions; conduct standoff attacksby fire from air, ground, or maritimeplatforms; provide terminal guidance forprecision-guided munitions; conductindependent sabotage; and conduct anti-ship operations. Also called DA. (Thisterm and its definition modifies the existingterm and its definition and is approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)
evasion and escape. The procedures andoperations whereby military personnel andother selected individuals are enabled toemerge from an enemy-held or hostile areato areas under friendly control. Also calledE&E. (Joint Pub 1-02)
force multiplier. A capability that, whenadded to and employed by a combat force,significantly increases the combat potentialof that force and thus enhances theprobability of successful missionaccomplishment. (Joint Pub 1-02)
foreign humanitarian assistance. Programsconducted to relieve or reduce the resultsof natural or manmade disasters or other
endemic conditions such as human pain,disease, hunger, or privation that mightpresent a serious threat to life or that canresult in great damage to or loss of property.Foreign humanitarian assistance providedby US forces is limited in scope andduration. The foreign assistance providedis designed to supplement or complementthe efforts of the host nation civil authoritiesor agencies that may have the primaryresponsibility for providing foreignhumanitarian assistance. Foreignhumanitarian assistance operations arethose conducted outside the United States,its territories, and possessions. Also calledFHA. (This term and its definition areincluded for information and are proposedfor inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub3-07.6.)
foreign internal defense. Participation bycivilian and military agencies of agovernment in any of the action programstaken by another government to free andprotect its society from subversion,lawlessness, and insurgency. Also calledFID. (Joint Pub 1-02)
functional component command. Acommand normally, but not necessarily,composed of forces of two or more MilitaryDepartments which may be establishedacross the range of military operations toperform particular operational missions thatmay be of short duration or may extend overa period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)
guerrilla force. A group of irregular,predominantly indigenous personnelorganized along military lines to conductmilitary and paramilitary operations inenemy-held, hostile, or denied territory.(Joint Pub 1-02)
guerrilla warfare. Military and paramilitaryoperations conducted in enemy-held orhostile territory by irregular, predominantlyindigenous forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)
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Joint Pub 3-05
information operations. Actions taken toaffect adversary information andinformation systems while defending one’sown information and information systems.Also called IO. (This term and its definitionare provided for information and areproposed for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-13.)
information warfare. Informationoperations conducted during time of crisisor conflict to achieve or promote specificobjectives over a specific adversary oradversaries. Also called IW. (This termand its definition are provided forinformation and are proposed for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by JointPub 3-13.)
insurgency. An organized movement aimedat the overthrow of a constitutedgovernment through use of subversion andarmed conflict. (Joint Pub 1-02)
joint force air component commander. Thejoint force air component commanderderives authority from the joint forcecommander who has the authority toexercise operational control, assignmissions, direct coordination amongsubordinate commanders, redirect andorganize forces to ensure unity of effort inthe accomplishment of the overall mission.The joint force commander will normallydesignate a joint force air componentcommander. The joint force air componentcommander’s responsibilities will beassigned by the joint force commander(normally these would include, but not belimited to, planning, coordination,allocation and tasking based on the jointforce commander’s apportionmentdecision). Using the joint forcecommander’s guidance and authority, andin coordination with other Servicecomponent commanders and other assignedor supporting commanders, the joint forceair component commander will
recommend to the joint force commanderapportionment of air sorties to variousmissions or geographic areas. Also calledJFACC. (Joint Pub 1-02)
joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)or operational control over a joint force.Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)
joint force special operations componentcommander. The commander within aunified command, subordinate unifiedcommand, or joint task force responsibleto the establishing commander for makingrecommendations on the properemployment of special operations forcesand assets, planning and coordinatingspecial operations, or accomplishing suchoperational missions as may be assigned.The joint force special operationscomponent commander is given theauthority necessary to accomplish missionsand tasks assigned by the establishingcommander. The joint force specialoperations component commander willnormally be the commander with thepreponderance of special operations forcesand the requisite command and controlcapabilities. Also called JFSOCC. (JointPub 1-02)
joint psychological operations task force.A joint special operations task forcecomposed of headquarters and operationalassets. The joint psychological operationstask force assists the joint force commanderin developing strategic, operational, andtactical psychological operation plans for atheater campaign or other operations. Thejoint psychological operations task forcemay have conventional or specialoperations psychological units assigned orattached to support the joint task forcecommander. Also called JPOTF. (This
GL-7
Glossary
term and its definition is approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)
joint special operations area. A restrictedarea of land, sea, and airspace assigned bya joint force commander to the commanderof a joint special operations force to conductspecial operations activities. Thecommander of joint special operationsforces may further assign a specific area orsector within the joint special operationsarea to a subordinate commander formission execution. The scope and durationof the special operations forces’ mission,friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence thenumber, composition, and sequencing ofspecial operations forces deployed into ajoint special operations area. It may belimited in size to accommodate a discretedirect action mission or may be extensiveenough to allow a continuing broad rangeof unconventional warfare operations. Alsocalled JSOA. (Joint Pub 1-02)
joint special operations task force. A jointtask force composed of special operationsunits from more than one Service, formedto carry out a specific special operation orprosecute special operations in support ofa theater campaign or other operations. Thejoint special operations task force may haveconventional nonspecial operations unitsassigned or attached to support the conductof specific missions. Also called JSOTF.(Joint Pub 1-02)
Marine expeditionary unit (specialoperations capable). A forward deployed,embarked US Marine Corps unit withenhanced capability to conduct specialoperations. The Marine expeditionary unit(special operations capable) is orientedtoward amphibious raids, at night, underlimited visibility, while employingemission control procedures. The Marine
expeditionary unit (special operationscapable) is not a Secretary of Defensedesignated special operations force but,when directed by the National CommandAuthorities and/or by the theatercommander, may conduct hostage recoveryor other special operations under in extremiscircumstances when designated specialoperations forces are not available. Alsocalled MEU(SOC). (Joint Pub 1-02)
military operations other than war.Operations that encompass the use ofmilitary capabilities across the range ofmilitary operations short of war. Thesemilitary actions can be applied tocomplement any combination of the otherinstruments of national power and occurbefore, during, and after war. Also calledMOOTW. (Joint Pub 1-02)
mobile training team. A team consisting ofone or more US military or civilianpersonnel sent on temporary duty, often toa foreign nation, to give instruction. Themission of the team is to train indigenouspersonnel to operate, maintain, and employweapons and support systems, or to developa self-training capability in a particular skill.The National Command Authorities maydirect a team to train either military orcivilian indigenous personnel, dependingupon host nation requests. Also calledMTT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
multinational force. A force composed ofmilitary elements of nations who haveformed a temporary alliance for somespecific purpose. (This term and definitionis approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)
multinational operations. A collective termto describe military actions conducted byforces of two or more nations, typicallyorganized within the structure of a coalitionor alliance. (Joint Pub 1-02)
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Joint Pub 3-05
National Command Authorities. ThePresident and the Secretary of Defense ortheir duly deputized alternates orsuccessors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub1-02)
national security. A collective termencompassing both national defense andforeign relations of the United States.Specifically, the condition provided by: a.a military or defense advantage over anyforeign nation or group of nations, or b. afavorable foreign relations position, or c. adefense posture capable of successfullyresisting hostile or destructive action fromwithin or without, overt or covert. (JointPub 1-02)
naval special warfare. A designated navalwarfare specialty which conductsoperations in the coastal, riverine, andmaritime environments. Naval specialwarfare emphasizes small, flexible, mobileunits operating under, on, and from the sea.These operations are characterized bystealth, speed, and precise, violentapplication of force. Also called NSW.(This term and its definition modifies theexisting term and its definition and isapproved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)
operational control. Transferable commandauthority that may be exercised bycommanders at any echelon at or below thelevel of combatant command. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatant command(command authority). Operational controlmay be delegated and is the authority toperform those functions of command oversubordinate forces involving organizing andemploying commands and forces, assigningtasks, designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction necessary toaccomplish the mission. Operationalcontrol includes authoritative directionover all aspects of military operations andjoint training necessary to accomplish
missions assigned to the command.Operational control should be exercisedthrough the commanders of subordinateorganizations. Normally this authority isexercised through subordinate joint forcecommanders and Service and/or functionalcomponent commanders. Operationalcontrol normally provides full authority toorganize commands and forces and toemploy those forces as the commander inoperational control considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions.Operational control does not, in and ofitself, include authoritative direction forlogistics or matters of administration,discipline, internal organization, or unittraining. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub1-02)
operational environment. A composite ofthe conditions, circumstances, andinfluences that affect the employment ofmilitary forces and bear on the decisions ofthe unit commander. Some examples are:a. permissive environment — operationalenvironment in which host country militaryand law enforcement agencies have controland the intent and capability to assistoperations that a unit intends to conduct; b.uncertain environment — operationalenvironment in which host-governmentforces, whether opposed to or receptive tooperations that a unit intends to conduct,do not have totally effective control of theterritory and population in the intended areaof operations; and c. hostile environment— operational environment in which hostileforces have control and the intent andcapability to effectively oppose or react tothe operations a unit intends to conduct.(Joint Pub 1-02)
operations security. A process of identifyingcritical information and subsequentlyanalyzing friendly actions attendant tomilitary operations and other activities to:a. identify those actions that can beobserved by adversary intelligence systems;
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Glossary
b. determine indicators hostile intelligencesystems might obtain that could beinterpreted or pieced together to derivecritical information in time to be useful toadversaries; and c select and executemeasures that eliminate or reduce to anacceptable level the vulnerabilities offriendly actions to adversary exploitation.Also called OPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)
paramilitary forces. Forces or groups whichare distinct from the regular armed forcesof any country, but resembling them inorganization, equipment, training, ormission. (Joint Pub 1-02)
psychological operations. Plannedoperations to convey selected informationand indicators to foreign audiences toinfluence their emotions, motives, objectivereasoning, and ultimately the behavior offoreign governments, organizations,groups, and individuals. The purpose ofpsychological operations is to induce orreinforce foreign attitudes and behaviorfavorable to the originator’s objectives.Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)
raid. An operation, usually small scale,involving a swift penetration of hostileterritory to secure information, confuse theenemy, or to destroy installations. It endswith a planned withdrawal upon completionof the assigned mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)
Rangers. Rapidly deployable airborne lightinfantry organized and trained to conducthighly complex joint direct action operationsin coordination with or in support of otherspecial operations units of all Services.Rangers also can execute direct actionoperations in support of conventionalnonspecial operations missions conducted bya combatant commander and can operate asconventional light infantry when properlyaugmented with other elements of combinedarms. (Joint Pub 1-02)
sabotage. An act or acts with intent to injure,interfere with, or obstruct the national defenseof a country by willfully injuring or destroying,or attempting to injure or destroy, any nationaldefense or war material, premises or utilities,to include human and natural resources.(Joint Pub 1-02)
sea-air-land team. A naval force speciallyorganized, trained, and equipped to conductspecial operations in maritime, littoral andriverine environments. Also called SEALteam. (Joint Pub 1-02)
security assistance. Group of programsauthorized by the Foreign Assistance Actof 1961, as amended, and the Arms ExportControl Act of 1976, as amended, or otherrelated statutes by which the United Statesprovides defense articles, military training,and other defense-related services, bygrant, loan, credit, or cash sales infurtherance of national policies andobjectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)
special activities. Activities conducted insupport of national foreign policy objectiveswhich are planned and executed so that therole of the US Government is not apparentor acknowledged publicly. They are alsofunctions in support of such activities butare not intended to influence United Statespolitical processes, public opinion, policies,or media and do not include diplomaticactivities or the collection and productionof intelligence or related support functions.(Joint Pub 1-02)
special boat unit. Those US Navy forcesorganized, trained, and equipped toconduct or support naval special warfare,riverine warfare, coastal patrol andinterdiction, and joint special operationswith patrol boats or other combatant craftdesigned primarily for special operationssupport. Also called SBU. (Joint Pub1-02)
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Glossary
Joint Pub 3-05
special forces. US Army forces organized,trained, and equipped specifically toconduct special operations. Special forceshave five primary missions:unconventional warfare, foreign internaldefense, direct action, specialreconnaissance and counterterrorism.Counterterrorism is a special mission forspecially organized, trained, and equippedspecial forces units designated in theatercontingency plans. Also called SF. (JointPub 1-02)
special operations. Operations conductedby specially organized, trained, andequipped military and paramilitary forcesto achieve military, political, economic, orinformational objectives by unconventionalmilitary means in hostile, denied, orpolitically sensitive areas. These operationsare conducted across the full range ofmilitary operations, independently or incoordination with operations ofconventional, non-special operationsforces. Political-military considerationsfrequently shape special operations,requiring clandestine, covert, or lowvisibility techniques and oversight at thenational level. Special operations differfrom conventional operations in degree ofphysical and political risk, operationaltechniques, mode of employment,independence from friendly support, anddependence on detailed operationalintelligence and indigenous assets. Alsocalled SO. (This term and its definitionmodifies the existing term and its definitionand is approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)
special operations command. A subordinateunified or other joint command establishedby a joint force commander to plan,coordinate, conduct and support jointspecial operations within the joint forcecommander’s assigned operational area.Also called SOC. (This term and itsdefinition modifies the existing term and
its definition and is approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)
special operations forces. Those active andreserve component forces of the MilitaryServices designated by the Secretary ofDefense and specifically organized, trained,and equipped to conduct and support specialoperations. Also called SOF. (Joint Pub1-02)
special operations liaison element. Aspecial operations liaison team providedby the joint force special operationscomponent commander to the joint forceair component commander (if designated)to coordinate, deconflict, and integratespecial operations air and surfaceoperations with conventional air. Alsocalled SOLE. (This term and its definitionis approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)
special operations-peculiar. Equipment,material, supplies, and services required forspecial operations mission support forwhich there is no broad conventional forcerequirement. This includes standard itemsused by other DOD forces but modified forspecial operations forces (SOF); itemsinitially designed for, or used by, SOF untiladapted for use as Service-common byother DOD forces; and items approved bythe Commander in Chief, US SpecialOperations Command (USCINCSOC) ascritically urgent for the immediateaccomplishment of a special operationsmission but not normally procured byUSCINCSOC. Also called SO-peculiar.(This term and its definition modifies theexisting term and its definition and isapproved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)
special reconnaissance. Reconnaissanceand surveillance actions conducted byspecial operations forces to obtain or verify,by visual observation or other collection
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Glossary
methods, information concerning thecapabilities, intentions, and activities of anactual or potential enemy or to secure dataconcerning the meteorological,hydrographic, or geographic characteristicsof a particular area. It includes targetacquisition, area assessment, and post-strikereconnaissance. Also called SR. (Joint Pub1-02)
special tactics team. An Air Force teamcomposed primarily of special operationscombat control and pararescue personnel.The team supports joint special operationsby selecting, surveying, and establishingassault zones; providing assault zoneterminal guidance and air traffic control;conducting direct action missions;providing medical care and evacuation; and,coordinating, planning and conducting air,ground, and naval fire support operations.(Joint Pub 1-02)
subversion. Action designed to underminethe military, economic, psychological, orpolitical strength or morale of a regime. Seealso unconventional warfare. (Joint Pub1-02)
tactical control. Command authority overassigned or attached forces or commands,or military capability or forces madeavailable for tasking, that is limited to thedetailed and, usually, local direction andcontrol of movements or maneuversnecessary to accomplish missions or tasksassigned. Tactical control is inherent inoperational control. Tactical control maybe delegated to, and exercised at any level
at or below the level of combatantcommand. Also called TACON. (JointPub 1-02)
terrorism. The calculated use of violence orthreat of violence to inculcate fear; intendedto coerce or intimidate governments orsocieties in the pursuit of goals that aregenerally political, religious, or ideological.(Joint Pub 1-02)
unconventional warfare. A broad spectrumof military and paramilitary operations,normally of long duration, predominantlyconducted by indigenous or surrogateforces who are organized, trained,equipped, supported and directed in varyingdegrees by an external source. It includesguerrilla warfare, and other direct offensive,low visibility, covert, or clandestineoperations, as well as the indirect activitiesof subversion, sabotage, intelligenceactivities, and evasion and escape. Alsocalled UW. (Joint Pub 1-02)
weapons of mass destruction. In armscontrol usage, weapons that are capable ofa high order of destruction and/or of beingused in such a manner as to destroy largenumbers of people. Can be nuclear,chemical, biological, and radiologicalweapons, but excludes the means oftransporting or propelling the weaponwhere such means is a separable anddivisible part of the weapon. Also calledWMD. (This term and its definitionmodifies the existing term and its definitionand is approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02)
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Joint Pub 3-05
Intentionally Blank
Assess-ments/
Revision
CJCSApproval
TwoDrafts
ProgramDirective
ProjectProposal
J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS
Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts
J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate
STEP #2Program Directive
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The CINCS receive the puband begin to assess it duringuse
18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each pub and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions
No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub isrevised
STEP #5Assessments/Revision
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ENHANCEDJOINT
WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY
Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void
J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs
J-7 initiates Program Directive
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STEP #1Project Proposal
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications. Thediagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:
Joint Pub 3-05 Operations
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JOINT PUB 1-0 JOINT PUB 2-0 JOINT PUB 3-0
PERSONNEL
JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0
LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS
JOINTDOCTRINE
PUBLICATION
Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff
Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS
Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication
STEP #4CJCS Approval
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Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub
PRA develops two draft pubs
PRA staffs each draft with CINCS,Services, and Joint Staff
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STEP #3Two Drafts
JOINT PUB 1
JOINTWARFARE
JOINT PUB 0-2
UNAAF
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