2ndsetofdigest

CHOICE OF FORUMSWEET LINES, INC. VS. TEVES

G.R. No. L-37750, May 19, 1978

FACTS:

Private respondents Atty. Tandog and Tiro, a contractors bought tickets for Voyage at the branch office of petitioner, a shipping company transporting inter-island passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City. Respondents were to board petitioner's vessel bound for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. Upon learning that the vessel was not proceeding to Bohol, since many passengers were bound for Surigao, private respondents per advice, went to the branch office for proper relocation to another vessel. Because the said vessel was already filled to capacity, they were forced to agree "to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard." Private respondents alleged that they were, during the trip," "exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits," and that the tickets they bought at Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not honored and they were constrained to pay for other tickets. In view thereof, private respondents sued petitioner for damages and for breach of contract of carriage before Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. This motion was premised on the condition printed at the back of the tickets, Condition No. 14, which reads: It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions arising out of the conditions and provisions of this ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu. The motion was denied hence the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the petitioner's passage tickets purchased by private respondents, which limits the venue of actions arising from the contract of carriage to theCourt of First Instance of Cebu is valid and enforceable?

HELD:

No. Considered in the light of circumstances prevailing in the inter-island shipping industry in the country today, We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the following reasons first, under circumstances obligation in the inter-island shipping industry, it is not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of the passage tickets, on which Condition No. 14 is Printed in fine letters, and second, Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature, since the same will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers located in different places of the country who, under Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner has branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in the instant case, will not cause inconvenience to, much less prejudice, petitioner.

HSBC vs. SHERMAN

G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989

Choice-of-forum clause, Jurisdiction and Venue

Parties can stipulate as to their choice of venue. But if the stipulation is not restrictive, itshall be treated as merely permissive and will not bar the other party from airing the casein a different forum which has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply PTE, Ltd. (Company), a company incorporated n Singapore, applied with and was granted by the Singapore Branch of HSBC an over draft facility. To secure the overdraft facility, private respondents who were directors of the Company executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favour of HSBC, which provides that:

This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee x x x.

However, when the Company failed to pay its obligation, HSBC filed this action with the Philippine courts. In a Motion to Dismiss, the private respondents raised the abovementioned provision of the Joint and Several Guarantee. The trial court affirmed the plaintiffs but CA reversed, citing said provision as basis.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the clause in question did not operate to divest the Philippine courts of jurisdiction.

While it is true that the transaction took place in Singaporean setting and that the Joint and Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause, the very essence of due process dictates that the stipulation that [t]his guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee be liberally construed. One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem,quasi in rem, or in personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Indeed, as pointed-out by petitioner BANK at the outset, the instant case presents a very odd situation. In the ordinary habits of life, anyone would be disinclined to litigate before a foreign tribunal, with more reason as a defendant. However, in this case, private respondents are Philippine residents (a fact which was not disputed by them) who would rather face a complaint against them before a foreign court and in the process incur considerable expenses, not to mention inconvenience, than to have a Philippine court try and resolve the case. Private respondents' stance is hardly comprehensible, unless their ultimate intent is to evade, or at least delay, the payment of a just obligation. The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass private respondents. The parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over persons and things within its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of other States, and foreign military units stationed in or marching through State territory with the permission of the latter's authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them.

CHOICE OF LAWBELLIS VS. BELLIS

G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.

6 years prior Amos Bellis death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate childrens successional rights

RULING:

Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the Texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.

Tayag vs. Benguet Consolidated

Facts:

Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen, residing in the U.S.A., died in New York leaving 33,002 shares of stock in Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Her domicillary administrator is County Trust Company of New York. Her ancillary administrator in the Philippines is Renato D. Tayag. The ancillary administrator petitioned the trial court to order Benguet Consolidated, Inc. to surrender the Certificates of Stock to the ancillary administrator for the settlement of the deceased's estate and to satisfy the claims of local creditors against the estate of Ms. Perkins. BCI refused to surrender the certificates, claiming that CTC is in possession of the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Courts in the Philippines have control over property owned by a non-citizen?

Held:

Yes. Philippine courts have control. It is indisputable - the power of the ancillary administrator to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Such a power is inherent in his duty to settle her estate and satisfy the claims of local creditors. It is a general rule universally recognized that administration, whether principal or ancillary, certainly extends to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted the corollary being that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state or country.

Justice Malcolm: it is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedents last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs

Pakistan International Airlines vs. Ople

190 SCRA, September 28, 1990

FACTS:

Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIA), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila 2 separate contracts of employment, with private respondents Farrales and Mamasig. The contracts provide that PIA reserves the right to terminate the agreement at anytime by giving the employee notice in writing one month in advance. There is a provision in the said contracts that it shall be construed and governed under the laws of Pakistan and only courts in Karachi shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under the agreement.

Respondents commenced training in Pakistan and began discharging their job function as flight attendants. After roughly 1 year and 4 months after the execution of the contract the respondents received separate letters advising them that they would be terminated after a month.

Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Minister of Labor and Employment. PIA claimed that respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of "personal effects"; and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned to advise respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the services of respondents were terminated pursuant to the employment contract.

RD Estrella ruled in favor of the respondents. The Order stated that private respondents had attained the status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of continued service and that the dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the Ministry, was illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages. On appeal, Deputy Minister of the Ministry adopted the findings and facts of the RD.

PIA filed a petition for certiorari and one of the contentions is that pursuant to the contract agreement, the laws of Pakistan shall be applicable and that the courts of Karachi shall have the jurisdiction over the said matter.

Issue:

Whether or not the Ministry of Labor and Employment have jurisdiction over the said matter.

Ruling:

PIA cannot take refuge in its employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement "only [in] courts of Karachi, Pakistan". The first clause cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Philippine labor laws and regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee relationship between petitioner PIA and private respondents. We have already pointed out that relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause specifying the Karachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement of disputes between the contracting parties. Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive contacts between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship between the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and residents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, f the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.

Zalamea vs Court of Appeals and Transworld Airlines Inc.

November 18, 1993

Facts:

The spouses Cesar and Zuthira Zalamea together with their daughter Liana purchased 3 tickets in Manila through the agent of Transworld Airlines for a flight from New York to Los Angeles. The tickets of the spouses were bought at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare. Their tickets were all confirmed reservations.

On the date of their flight, the family was put on wait-listed despite having able to check in within an hour before their flight and their tickets reconfirmed. The airlines said that all the seats were already taken by earlier passengers. Liana was put no. 13 in the wait-listed list while the spouses were on no. 34 showing a party of two. Only the first 22 passengers in the wait listed list were allowed to board and take the flight. As a result, Cezar was allowed to board because he was holding his daughters ticket while the other two zalameas were left behind in New York. It was later found out that those who paid the full fare tickets were given priority while those discounted were put on wait-listed despite their reconfirmed status.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines they filed in the RTC of Makati an action for breach of contract of air carriage. The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.

However on appeal in the Court of Appeals, the decision of the RTC was reversed citing that damages is only allowed when there is fraud or bad faith on the part of the airline company. The CA further reasoned that overbooking is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Hence there was no bad faith or fraud on the part of the airlines.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme court.

Issues:

Whether it was proper for the CA to take judicial notice the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board without the respondent alleging and proving such code as provided in the Rules of Court? No.

Whether the Philippine or the US law should govern. Philippine law?

Ruling:

No. The respondents should still allege and prove such code by the civil aeronautics board of United States in order for the court to take judicial notice. They cannot merely rely on statement of the customer service agent of the airlines in her deposition. As a rule, foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

The Philippine law should apply in the case at bar because of the principle of lex loci contractus. The principle provides that it is the law of the state where the airline ticket was bought that shall be applied by the courts in case of actions against the foreign airline companies. In this case the Philippine law shall apply and the existing jurisprudence provides that overbooking amounts to bad faith on the part of the airline company. Hence damages are in order.

Cadalin v. POEA Administrator

G.R. No. L-104776

Facts:

Cadalin et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Intl Builders Co. (AIBC), a domestic recruitment corporation, for employment in Bahrain to work for Brown & Root Intl Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Texas. Plaintiff instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims arising from the unexpired portion of their employment contract, which was prematurely terminated. They worked in Bahrain for BRII and they filed the suit after 1 yr. from the termination of their employment contract.As provided by Article 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law of the Private Sector of Bahrain: a claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of 1 year from the date of the expiry of the contract, it appears that their suit has prescribed.

Plaintiff contends that the prescription period should be 10years as provided by Article 1144 of the Civil Code as their claim arise from a violation of a contract.

The POEA Administrator holds that the 10 year period of prescription should be applied but the NLRC provides a different view asserting that Art 291 of the Labor Code of the Phil. with a 3 years prescription period should be applied. The Solicitor General expressed his personal point of view that the 1 yr period provided by the Amiri Decree should be applied.

Issue:

Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law?

Held:

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.

However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A borrowing statute directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides: If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.

In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex propio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claims obnoxious to the forums public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

The court ruled that the prescription period applicable to the case should be Art 291 of the Labor Code of the Phil. with a 3 years prescription period since the claim arose from labor employment.

United Airlines Inc. v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 124110

Facts:

Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila, three Visit the U.S.A. tickets from himself, his wife and his minor son, Mychal, to visit the cities of Washington DC, Chicago and Los Angeles. All All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines. Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport, Aniceto changed their itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words: Check-in-required. They were then set to leave but were denied boarding because the flight was overbooked.

The CA ruled that private respondents failure to comply with the check-in requirement will not defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with applying the laws of the USA, relying on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales of the USA.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA?

Held:

No. According to the doctrine of lex loci contractus, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation shall govern. This has been said to be the rule even though the place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to be performed. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Therefore, although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioners agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in D.C., however, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. CA and PNCCG.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001

Facts:

Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.

Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.

Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the nonpayment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass; Project.

The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the private respondent. Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint before RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.

Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or enforcement since on in face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Subsequently, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counter claims and therein raised the grounds it brought up in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply filed, the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent by its voluntary submission the courts jurisdiction through its appointed counsel. Furthermore, private respondents counsel waived any and all objections to the High Courts jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.

In due time, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing petitioners complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to the Malaysian Court judgment?

Ruling:

YES. Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.

In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.

In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. Petitioners sole witness, testified to the effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in Malaysia; that he was connected with Skrine and Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by his client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of summons were served on March 17, 1983 at the registered office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a financial planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia operations; that upon the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional appearance for private respondent questioning the regularity of the service of the writ of summons but subsequently withdrew the same when it realized that the writ was properly served; that because private respondent failed to file a statement of defense within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary judgment and submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its claim; that the matter was then heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where private respondent was represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these proceedings is the judgment sought to be enforced.

In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner also offered the documentary evidence to support their claim.

Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove otherwise. However, private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment.

Grace Garcia aka Grace Garcia-Recio vs Rederick Recio

GR No. 138322 October 2, 2001

Facts:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

Respondent became an Australian citizen. Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.

Petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriagein the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.

About five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

Issue:

Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven and;

Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

Ruling:

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appeared to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

The Court could not conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.Neither did it grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, the Court ruled that the most judicious course was to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

CORPUZvs.STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City.

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree.

ISSUE:Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree

HELD:

Petition was GRANTED. RTC Decision was REVERSED.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdictionWe qualify our above conclusion i.e.,that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC.In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Raytheon international vs Rouzie

Facts:

Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.Rouzie secured a service contract with the Philippines for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows. Rouzie filed a suit before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor ofRouzie. Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed Rouzies complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Rouzie instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court. In its Answer,petitioner alleged that it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also disclosed that per the written agreement between Rouzie and BMSI and RUST, is only a "Special Sales Representative Agreement," were the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action andforum non conveniensand prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Hearing Based on Affirmative Defenses and for Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of the complaint on grounds offorum non conveniensand failure to state a cause of action. The RTC denied petitioners omnibus motion. The principle offorum non convenienswas inapplicable because the trial court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals however it was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari. Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens?

Ruling:

No, the court ruled that the on the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and theres, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed. Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine offorum non convenien That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court Under the doctrine offorum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.Petitioners averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over and the parties involved. Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle offorum non conveniensrequires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance.

MINIMUM CONTRACTHSBC vs. SHERMAN

G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989

Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Vs. Sherman

FACTS:

Eastern Book Supply Service PTE Ltd. (referred as COMPANY), a company incorporated in Singapore applied and was granted by the Singapore branch of HSBC an overdraft facility in the maximum amount of 200,000 Singaporean dollars, which was increased to 375,000 Singaporean dollars with interest of 3% over HSBCs prime rate. Payable monthly on amount due under said overdraft facility. The directors (Sherman and Lowe among others) of the COMPANY executed a joint and several guarantee, wherein the directors agreed to pay jointly and severally on demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to HSBC under the overdraft facility, in favor of HSBC as security for the repayment of the COMPANY of the sums advanced by HSBC. It is stated under the joint and several guarantee that all rights, obligation and liabilities that may arise under the guarantee may be construed and determined under or in accordance with the law of Singapore. ..Courts of Singapore will have jurisdiction over all dispute arising from this guarantee...

The COMPANY failed to pay its obligations. Thus, HSBC demanded payment from the directors in conformity with the joint and several guarantee. The directors failed to pay, HSBC filed a complaint in accordance with the guarantee before the RTC of Quezon City. The directors filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the defendant, but it was denied by the RTC. The directors filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction and/or prayer for a restraining order which the CA granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit?

HELD:

Philippine courts have jurisdiction. While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and that the Joint and Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause, the very essence of due process dictates that the stipulation that "[t]his guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee" be liberally construed. One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in remquasi in remorin personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice (J. Salonga, Private International Law, 1981, p. 46). Indeed, as pointed-out by petitioner BANK at the outset, the instant case presents a very odd situation. In the ordinary habits of life, anyone would be disinclined to litigate before a foreign tribunal, with more reason as a defendant. However, in this case, private respondents are Philippine residents (a fact which was not disputed by them) who would rather face a complaint against them before a foreign court and in the process incur considerable expenses, not to mention inconvenience, than to have a Philippine court try and resolve the case. Private respondents' stance is hardly comprehensible, unless their ultimate intent is to evade, or at least delay, the payment of a just obligation.

The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass private respondents.

However, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the principle offorum non conveniens depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.Saudi Arabian Airlines Vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

SAUDIA hired Milagros Morada as a flight attendant for its airline based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While in a lay-over in Indonesia, Morada went with two other fellow crew members, Allah and Thamer, to a disco dance. Because it was almost morning when they went back to their hotel, they agreed to have breakfast in Thamers room. Upon arriving, Allah left, and Thamer attempted to rape Morada. Fortunately, a roomboy heard Moradas cries for help and rescued her. The Indonesian police arrested Thamer and Allah.

When Morada went back to Jeddah, SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the incident. They requested her to go back to Indonesia to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah, but she refused to cooperate. SAUDIA barred Morada from its Jakarta flights. Eventually, through the intercession of Saudi Arabian government, Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah. They were again put to service by SAUDIA. SAUDIA transferred Morada to Manila thereafter. Two years later, thinking that the Jakarta incident was already behind her, SAUDIA requested Morada to see Mr. Meniewy, chief legal officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah. Upon meeting him, she was brought to the police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Meniewy simply stood by as the police officer put pressure on her to make a statement to drop the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police returned her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.

One and a half year later, Morada was once again summoned to Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy. When she did, a certain khalid of SAUDIA bought her to Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document in Arabic, as this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. But instead, it was a notice to appear before the court. Morada then went back to Manila. Shortly afterwards, SAUDIA asked Morada to report to Jeddah and see Meniewy, Morada went after receiving assurance from SAUDIAs Manila manager that such investigation was routinary and posted no danger to her. She was taken to the same court wherein she was interrogated by a Saudi judge about the Jakarta Incident. After one hour, they let her go. When Morada was about to take the plane to Manila, she was stopped by a SAUDIA officer, he took away her passport and ordered her to stay in Jeddah until further notice. She was taken back to the same court and to her astonishment, the judge rendered a decision against her for 5 months imprisonment and 286 lashes as she was found guilty of adultery, going to disco, dancing and listening to music in violation of Islamic laws and socializing with male crews.

She seeked helped from SAUDIA but was denied assistance. The prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Upon her return to Manila, SAUDIA terminated her from service without her being informed of the cause. Morada filed a case for damages against SAUDIA and its country manager. SAUDIA filed an omnibus motion to dismiss stating among others that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case and the claim or demand has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished. The Trial court and the Court of appeals rendered a decision in favor of Morada.

ISSUE:

Whether the Courts of the Philippines has jurisdiction to try the case which involves a foreign element?

HELD:

Yes, weighing the relative claims of the parties, the courta quofound it best to hear the case in the Philippines.Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections.That would have causeda fundamental unfairness to her.Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties.The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein.By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motionspraying for the dismissal of Moradas Amended Complaint.SAUDIA also filed an Answer InEx Abundante Cautelamdated February 20, 1995.What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises.Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial courts jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.

As to the Choice of law applicable to the case where a foreign element is involved, it is important to note that one of the circumstance for the determination of applicable law is the place where an act has been done, thelocus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed.Thelex loci actusis particularly important in contracts and torts. Considering that the complaint in the courtaquois one involving torts, the connecting factor or point of contact could be the place or places where the tortious conduct orlex loci actusoccurred.And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as asitusof the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place).This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here.According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, act with justice, give her her due and observe honesty and good faith.Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed.That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment.For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the fatality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent).All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as thesitusof the alleged tort.KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., vs MINORU KITAMURAG.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007 FACTS:Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the contract.Hasegawa, Nippons general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project.Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamarus contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.Nippons contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamarus ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.ISSUE:Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance & damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the most significant relationship rule, or forum non conveniens.HELD:NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the minimum contacts for one do not always provide the necessary significant contacts for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.In this case, only the 1st phase is at issuejurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance & damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raiseas grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the most significant relationship rule. The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed. It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the state of the most significant relationship rule, to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.Further, Nippons premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or States. The courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.

JURISDICTION OVER PERSONPHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs. CA et al.

G.R. No. 103493June 19, 1997FACTS:

Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC), secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.

In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private respondent Daic, assumed Ducats obligation under an Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendors Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A., while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.

As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amount covered by the note became due and demandable. Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.

While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment against private respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in the Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more than its true value.

Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.

The trial court granted Ducats MTD, stating that the evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non conveniens, even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.

Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens.

The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S. court?

HELD:

CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati

NO While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, 50 provides:

Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata.

Second. Nor is the trial courts refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under the principle of forum non conveniens:

First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense.Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance.VICENTA PANTALEON vs. HONORATO ASUNCION

G.R. No. L-13141, May 22, 1959

FACTS:

This is an appeal, taken by defendant Honorato Asuncion from an order denying a petition for relief from an order declaring him in default and a judgment by default.

On June 12, 1953, plaintiff, Vicenta Pantaleon, instituted this action, in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, to recover from said Asuncion, the sum of P2,000.00, with interest thereon, in addition to attorneys fees. The summons originally issued was returned by the sheriff of Nueva Ecija unserved, with the statement that, according to reliable information, Asuncion was residing in B-24 Tala Estate, Caloocan, Rizal. An alias summons was issued, therefore, for service in the place last mentioned. However, the provincial sheriff of Rizal returned it unserved, with information that Asuncion had left the Tala Estate since February 18, 1952, and that diligent efforts to locate him proved to no avail. On plaintiffs motion, the court ordered, on March 9, 1955, that defendant be summoned by publication, and the summons was published on March 21 and 28, and April 4, 1955, in the Examiner, said to be a newspaper of general circulation in Nueva Ecija. Having failed to appear or answer the complaint within the period stated in the summons, defendant was, by an order dated July 12, 1955, declared in default. Subsequently, or on September 8, 1955, after a hearing held in the absence of the defendant and without notice to him, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and against said defendant, for the sum of P2,300.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate, from October 28, 1948, and costs.

About forty-six (46) days later, or on October 24, 1955, the defendant filed a petition for relief from said order of July 12, 1955, and from said judgment, dated September 8, 1955, and upon the ground of mistake and excusable negligence. Annexed to said petition were defendants affidavit and his verified answer. In the affidavit, Asuncion stated that, on September 26, 1955, at 34 Pitimine Street, San Francisco delMonteQuezon City, which is his residence, he received notice of a registered letter at the Post Office in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, his old family residence; that he proceeded immediately to the latter municipality to claim said letter, which he received on September 28, 1955; that the letter contained copy of said order of July 12, 1955, and of the judgment of September 8, 1955, much to his surprise, for he had not been summoned or notified of the hearing of this case; that had copy of the summons and of the order for its publication been sent to him by mail, as provided in Rule 7, section 21, of the Rules of Court said summons and order would have reached him, as the judgment herein had; and that his failure to appear before the court is excusable it being due to the mistake of the authorities concerned in not complying with the provisions of said section. Upon denial of said petition for relief, defendant perfected his present appeal, which is predicated upon the theory that the aforementioned summons by publication had not been made in conformity with the Rules of Court.

Plaintiff alleges, however, that the provision applicable to the case at bar is not this section 21, but section 16, of Rule 7, of the Rules of Court, which provides: Whenever the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever the address of a defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effect upon him by publication in such places and for such times as the court may order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the service of summons by publication is valid

HELD:

No. It is urged by the plaintiff that the requirement, in said section 21, of an affidavit showing that copy of the summons and of the order for its publication had been sent by mail to defendants last known address, refers to the extraterritorial service of summons, provided for in section 17 of said Rule 7, pursuant to which:

When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by registered mail; or by publication in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by ordinary mail to the last known address of the defendant; or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.

Said section 21, however, is unqualified. It prescribes the proof of service by publication, regardless of whether the defendant is a resident of the Philippines or not. Section 16 must be read in relation to section 21, which complements it. Then, too, we conceive of no reason, and plaintiff has suggested none, why copy of the summons and of the order for its publication should be mailed to non-resident defendants, but not to resident defendants. We can not even say that defendant herein, who, according to the return of the Sheriff of Nueva Ecija, was reportedly residing in Rizal where he, in fact (San Francisco delMonteand Quezon City used to be part of Rizal), was residing could reasonably be expected to read the summons published in a newspaper said to be a general circulation in Nueva Ecija.

Considering that strict compliance with the terms of the statute is necessary to confer jurisdiction through service by publication, the conclusion is inescapable that the lower court had no authority whatsoever to issue the order of July 12, 1955, declaring the defendant in default and to render the decision of September 8, 1955, and that both are null and void ad initio.

Apart from the foregoing, it is a well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictlyin personam, like the one at bar, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendant.

Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and, when the proceeding is strictlyin personambrought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process.

Lastly, from the viewpoint of substantial justice and equity, we are of the opinion that defendants petition for relief should have been granted. To begin with, it was filed well within the periods provided in the Rules of Court. Secondly, and, this is more important, defendants verified answer, which was attached to said petition, contains allegations which, if true, constitute a good defense.

Santos vs. PNOC Exploration Corporation G.R. No. 170943; September 23, 2008

FACTS:

Respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaintfor a sum of money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be collected was the petitioners unpaidbalanceof thecar loanadvanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.

Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondents motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent causedthe publicationof the summons in Remate, a newspaperof general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted theaffidavitof publication and theaffidavit of service of respondents employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons byregisteredmail to petitioners last known address.

Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despitethe publicationof summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence.

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer, alleging that theaffidavitof service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by theclerk of court. Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution with theclerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.

Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari but failed and even sustained thetrial courtsdecision and ordered the former to pay the amount plus legal interest and cost of suit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not there is lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner due to improper service of summons.

(2) Whether or not the rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in personam.

(3) Whether or not theaffidavitof service of the copy of the summons should have been prepared by theclerk of courtand not respondents messenger.

HELD:

(1) Section 14, Rule 14 provides that in any action wherethe defendantis designated as an unknown owner or the like or when his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligentinquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in anewspaperof general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order. Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect the service of summons upon him by publication in anewspaperof general circulation. Thus, petitioner was proper served with summons by publication and that there is jurisdiction over his person.

(2) Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam and claims that substituted service may be availed of only in an action in rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable but this has been changed, it now applies to any action. The present rule expressly states that it applies in any action wherethe defendantis designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligentinquiry. Hence, the petitioners contention that thecomplaintfiled against him is not covered by the said rule because the action for recovery of sum of money is an action in personam is not applicable anymore.

(3) The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons byregisteredmail to defendants last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by anaffidavitshowing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage for prepaid, directed tothe defendantbyregisteredmail to his last known address. The rules, however, do not require that theaffidavitof complementary service be executed by theclerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service byregisteredmail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.

JURISDICTION OVER RESBanco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca

G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the actionRULING:

The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.

IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, vs.ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, EUGENE ARTHUR PERKINS, and BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY,

G.R. No. 46631 November 16, 1939

FACTS:

Respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for payment of dividends on shares of stock registered in his name and for recognition of his right to control and dispose of his shares to the exclusion of others. The company alleged in its answer that the withholding of the payment of the dividends and the non-recognition of Respondents right for control and disposal of the shares was due to claims made by Petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins and one George H. Engelhard. Hence, the trial court ordered that the complaint be amended to include Idonah Slade Perkins and George H. Engelhard, and that they be impleaded in the case. Upon order of the court, summons by publication were thereafter served upon Idonah Perkins and Engelhard, both of whom are non-r