2AC Blocks to Japan

2ac Blox Dartmouth 2010

12AC Blocks- Japan Aff

2AC Blocks- Japan Aff............................................1

AT: Disads2AC Hege DA [1/6].................................................11AR Heg Unsustainable Extension.........................81AR Russia China Extension...................................91AR Proliferation Turn Extension.........................101AR Offshore Balancing Extension......................11

2AC Re-arm Bad Disad [1/3]................................121AR Ext. to Japan Rearming Now........................151AR Ext. to Japan will never rearm.......................161AR Ext. to Japan rearming leads to deterrence....171 AR Ext. to No Possibility of War in East Asia...181AR Ext. to Impact Turn: Japan rearm causes stability 201AR Ext. to Case Outweighs.................................21

2AC Appeasement DA [1/2].................................221AR EXT: Japanese Appeasement........................24

2AC Compensation DA.........................................251AR Compensation DA.........................................26

2AC CMR [1/5].....................................................27

2AC Cap and Trade [1/2]......................................321AR extensions Plan Unpopular............................34

2AC Jobs Bill [Link Turn] [1/2]............................35

2AC Jobs Bill [Impact Turn].................................37

2AC Kan Credibility [1/2].....................................381AR Kan Credibility [1/2].....................................40

2AC Iran Redeployment DA [1/2]........................42

AT: Kritiks2AC Security [1/3].................................................441AR Security K Extensions...................................47

2AC Gender K [1/2]..............................................481AR Gender K Extension......................................50

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2AT: Counterplans

2AC Pass Kan Financial Reform CP.....................51

2AC DOD CP [1/3]...............................................52

2AC X-O CP [1/2].................................................55

2AC Kick the US out CP [1/2]..............................57

2AC Kick Out Counterplan [1/2]..........................59

2AC Consult NATO CP [1/3]................................611AR Consult NATO CP [1/3]................................64

2AC: Consult Japan CP [1/2]................................67

2AC Consult Japan NB- Alliance..........................692AC AT: Consult Japan NB (Sino-Russia)...........70

1AR Consult Japan Extensions..............................72

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32AC Hege DA [1/6]

1. Collapse is inevitable – regional powers are filling in.Feffer 2009 [John, co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus, “US Hegemony Slips into History,” Asia Times, September 12, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KI12Ak01.html]

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new period of unipolar American power. In this country, liberals and conservatives alike celebrated the triumph of market democracies under the leadership of the United States. The Bill Clinton administration attempted to consolidate America's geoeconomic power. The George W Bush administration attempted to consolidate America's military and geopolitical power.

And today, the Barack Obama administration surveys the wreckage of these efforts to preserve a unipolar world. The global economy is in deep recession and the United States is drowning under the costs of maintaining its post-Cold War empire. Thechaos in Iraq and Afghanistan stands testament to the failures of our military pretensions. Terence Edward Paupp, in his new book The Future of Global Relations, traces the downward trajectory of US power and forecasts a very different future for the international community. In the first half of his book, which tackles international relations theory as well as real-world examples, Paupp describes

the decline of US hegemony. The US has persuaded other countries to do its bidding not so much through naked imperial force as through the indirect application of economic, political and military force. Our friends and allies, in other words, believe that they are acting in their own interests when they support the US .

Moreover, by setting the terms of the global economy and by maintaining the largest military in the world, the US can exert control over countries with which it has only the barest of relations.

The American hegemon, Paupp argues, has been losing its legitimacy - and thus its power - for some time. The crisis in casino capitalism, the inability of the US military to subdue the Taliban in Afghanistan and insurgents in Iraq and the declining legitimacy of the institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization) through which the US has exerted hegemonic power have all contributed to a hollowing out of unipolarism (in much the same way that outsourcing has eroded US manufacturing). Rising regions are Paupp's key to the future. Regional economic organizations (such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN), regional

security organizations (such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization), hybrid regional formations (such as the European Union), and regional powers such as China, India, and Brazil have all challenged Washington's preeminence . "As American hegemony declines," he writes, "there shall be a corresponding rise in South-South regional alliances that will constitute, de facto, a new counter-hegemonic alliance against the US Global Empire." This is not a new thesis, as Paupp himself admits. The Bandung conference that launched the Non-Aligned Movement in 1955 and the efforts of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the 1970s to launch a NewInternational Economic Order both articulated a future of

South-South cooperation. Two principal factors distinguish the current era, however. For one, human rights movements around the world have constrained the actions of rights-abusing states, both within their borders and transnationally. And second, social movements have become a powerful participant in international affairs, with efforts like the World Social Forum applying the state-centric concepts of Bandung and UNCTAD at a grassroots level. Don't expect an easy transition to this new world of rising regions, Paupp warns. Hegemons do not enthusiastically give up their privileges. And the experience of the Non-Aligned Movement, UNCTAD, and even the World Social Forum suggests that the future may well be just as contentious as the Pax Americana of the Cold War period.

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http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KI12Ak01.html


42AC Heg DA [2/6]

2. Predominance spurs a Russia-China military alliance that ends in nuclear extinctionRoberts 07 Senior Research Fellow @ the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, William E. Simon Chairin Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Paul Craig“US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance,”http://www.lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts218.html)This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgkyzstan, and Kazakstan are participating. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about US hegemony. Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers, read by Russians and Chinese, about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills, like Bush and Cheney, for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration’s unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously. As the US has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts, it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict, the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Neocons are people who desire war, but know nothing about it. Thus, the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. However, US administrations after Reagan’s have broken the agreements and understandings. The US gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia’s borders. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of V. Putin. These are gratuitous acts of aggression. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development, not to their militaries. Yet, both are being forced by America’s aggressive posture to revamp their militaries. Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the US, Russia, and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach. In a mere 6.5 years the Bush regime has destroyed the world’s good will toward the US. Today, America’s influence in the world is limited to its payments of tens of millions of dollars to bribed heads of foreign governments, such as Egypt’s and Pakistan’s. The Bush regime even thinks that as it has bought and paid for Musharraf, he will stand aside and permit Bush to make air strikes inside Pakistan. Is Bush blind to the danger that he will cause an Islamic revolution within Pakistan that will depose the US puppet and present the Middle East with an Islamic state armed with nuclear weapons? Considering the instabilities and dangers that abound, the aggressive posture of the Bush regime goes far beyond recklessness. The Bush regime is the most irresponsibly aggressive regime the world has seen since Hitler’s.

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http://www.lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts218.html


52AC Heg DA [3/6]

3. Heg causes war with IranLayne 07 Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute(Chris, The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, , p. 76-77Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire, the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown . The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Washington’s policy, as President George W. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is “intolerable.” Beyond nuclear weapons, however, there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation . Chief among these is Iraq . Recently, Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis, concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. In a real sense, however, Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. These are reflected in current U.S. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action; determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East; and gaining U.S. dominance over that region. In this respect, it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy . The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct.

4. ExtinctionHirsch 06 Professor of Physics at the University of California(Jorge, [“Nuking Iran,” ZNet, April 10)

Iran is likely to respond to any US attack using its considerable missile arsenal against US forces in Iraq and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf. Israel may attempt to stay out of the conflict, it is not clear whether Iran would target Israel in a retaliatory strike but it is certainly possible. If the US attack includes nuclear weapons use against Iranian facilities, as I believe is very likely, rather than deterring Iran it will cause a much more violent response. Iranian military forces and militias are likely to storm into southern Iraq and the US may be forced to use nuclear weapons against them, causing large scale casualties and inflaming the Muslim world. There could be popular uprisings in other countries in the region like Pakistan, and of course a Shiite uprising in Iraq against American occupiers. Finally I would like to discuss the grave consequences to America and the world if the US uses nuclear weapons against Iran. First, the likelihood of terrorist attacks against Americans both on American soil and abroad will be enormously enhanced after these events. And terrorist's attempts to get hold of "loose nukes" and use them against Americans will be enormously incentivized after the US used nuclear weapons against Iran. Second, it will destroy America's position as the leader of the free world. The rest of the world rightly recognizes that nuclear weapons are qualitatively different from all other weapons, and that there is no sharp distinction between small and large nuclear weapons, or between nuclear weapons targeting facilities versus those targeting armies or civilians. It will not condone the breaking of the nuclear taboo in an unprovoked war of aggression against a non-nuclear country, and the US will become a pariah state. Third, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will cease to exist, and many of its 182 non-nuclear-weapon-country signatories will strive to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent to an attack by a nuclear nation. With no longer a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, any regional conflict may go nuclear and expand into global nuclear war. Nuclear weapons are million-fold more powerful than any other weapon, and the existing nuclear arsenals can obliterate humanity many times over. In the past, global conflicts terminated when one side prevailed. In the next global conflict we will all be gone before anybody has prevailed .

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62AC Heg DA [4/6]

Heg cause prolif – multipolarity will solve itWeber et al 07 Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley (Steven with Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, and Ely Ratner, Ph.D. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center, [“How Globalization Went Bad,” Foreign Policy, Issue 158, January/February,)Axiom 3 is a story about the preferred strategies of the weak. It's a basic insight of international relations that states try to balance power. They protect themselves by joining groups that can hold a hegemonic threat at bay. But what if there is no viable group to join? In today's unipolar world, every nation from Venezuela to North Korea is looking for a way to constrain American power. But in the unipolar world, it's harder for states to join together to do that. So they turn to other means. They play a different game. Hamas, Iran, Somalia, North Korea, and Venezuela are not going to become allies anytime soon. Each is better off finding other ways to make life more difficult for Washington. Going nuclear is one way. Counterfeiting U.S. currency is another. Raising uncertainty about oil supplies is perhaps the most obvious method of all. Here's the important downside of unipolar globalization. In a world with multiple great powers, many of these threats would be less troublesome. The relatively weak states would have a choice among potential partners with which to ally, enhancing their influence. Without that more attractive choice, facilitating the dark side of globalization becomes the most effective means of constraining American power. SHARING GLOBALIZATION'S BURDEN The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There's effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much of this analysis is overblown. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesn't matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang, and many other capitals, including Beijing, the bottom line is simple: The U.S. military could, with conventional force, end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. conventional military power. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Before 1989, states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union's nuclear umbrella for protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Today, it is fast becoming a necessity . North Korea is the clearest example. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear armed communist neighbors, it was officially at war with its southern neighbor, and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.S. troops on its border. But, for 40 years, North Korea didn't seek nuclear weapons. It didn't need to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Within five years of the Soviet collapse, however, Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Korea's founder, Kim II Sung, barely flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clinton's administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. That brinkmanship paid off. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power, and Kim's son rules the country with an iron fist. America's conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Saddam Hussein's great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters, great powers could split the job of policing proliferation, and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases . It's often forgotten now that, during the Cold War, the only state 'with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one— nuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldn't permit it. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the Russians are aiding Iran's nuclear ambitions. When push comes to shove, nonproliferation today is almost entirely America's burden.

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7

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82AC Heg DA [5/6]

Proliferation leads to nuclear warUtgoff 02, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses., Survival, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 85–102 “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions” In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations .

7. Refusing to allow the rise of new powers fails and ensures great power conflict – abandoning a strategy of hegemony would force smaller powers to take care of regional problems Schwarz and Layne 02 Editor of the Atlantic, Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute [Benjamin and Christopher “A New Grand Strategy” Atlantic Monthly, January 1st]

The rise of new great powers is inevitable, and America's very primacy accelerates this process. If Washington continues to follow an adult-supervision strategy, which treats its "allies" as irresponsible adolescents and China and Russia as future enemies to be suppressed, its relations with these emerging great powers will be increasingly dangerous, as they coalesce against what they perceive as an American threat. But that is not even the worst conceivable outcome. What if a sullen and resentful China were to align itself with Islamic fundamentalist groups? Such a situation is hardly beyond the realm of possibility; partners form alliances not because they are friends, or because they have common values, but because they fear someone else more than they fear each other. A strategy of preponderance is burdensome, Sisyphean, and profoundly risky. It is therefore time for U.S. policymakers to adopt a very different grand strategy: one that might be called offshore balancing. Rather than fear multipolarity, this strategy embraces it. It recognizes that instability – caused by the rise and fall of great powers, great-power rivalries, and messy regional conflicts – is a geopolitical fact of life. Offshore balancing accepts that the United States cannot prevent the rise of new great powers, either within the present American sphere (the European Union, Germany, Japan) or outside it (China, a resurgent Russia). Instead of exhausting its resources and drawing criticism or worse by keeping these entities weak, the United States would allow them to develop their militaries to provide for their own national and regional security. Among themselves, then, these states would maintain power balances, check the rise of overly ambitious global and regional powers, and stabilize Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. It would naturally be in their interests to do so. It's always safest and cheapest to get others to stabilize the turbulent regions of the globe. Historically, however, this has seldom been an option, because if one lives in a dangerous neighborhood, one must be prepared to protect oneself from troublemakers rather than relying on someone else to do so. In fact, the only two great powers in modern history that successfully devolved onto others the responsibility for maintaining regional stability are Britain during its great-power heyday (1700-1914) and the United States (until 1945). They were able to do so because they had moats – a narrow one for England, and two very big ones for the United States – that kept predatory Eurasian great powers at bay. As offshore balancers, Britain and the United States reaped enormous strategic dividends. While they were shielded from threatening states by geography, London and Washington could afford to maintain militaries smaller than those of Continental powers, and concentrate instead on getting rich. Often they could stay out of Europe's turmoil entirely, gaining in strength as other great powers fought debilitating wars. And even in wartime offshore balancers have enjoyed advantages that Continental powers have not. Instead of sending big armies to fight costly Continental wars, Britain, for instance, relied on its navy to blockade those states bidding for mastery of Europe and on its financial power to underwrite coalitions against them, and stuck its allies with the greater part of the blood price of defeating those powers that aspired to dominate the Continent. The United States, of course, followed a similar strategy during World War II. From 1940 to 1944 it confined its role in the European war to providing economic assistance and munitions to the Soviet Union and Britain and – after entering the war, in December of 1941 – to relatively low-cost strategic air

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http://www.independent.org/

http://www.independent.org/

http://www.independent.org/research/copal/


92AC Heg DA [6/6]

bombardment of Germany, and peripheral land campaigns in North Africa and Italy. The United States was more than happy to delay the invasion of Europe until June of 1944. By then the Red Army – which inflicted about 88 percent of the Wehrmacht's casualties throughout the war – had mortally weakened Germany, but at a staggering cost. Taken together, the experiences of Britain and America highlight the central feature of the offshore balancing strategy: it allows for burden shifting, rather than burden sharing. Offshore balancers can afford to be bystanders in the opening stages of conflict. Because the security of others is most immediately at risk, an offshore balancer can be confident that those others will attempt to defend themselves. Often they will do so expeditiously, obviating the offshore balancer's intervention. If, on the other hand, a predominant power seems to be winning, an offshore balancer can intervene decisively to forestall its victory (as Britain did against Philip II, Louis XIV, and Napoleon). And if the offshore balancer must intervene, the state aspiring to dominance will already have been at least somewhat bloodied, and thus not as formidable as it was for those who had the geopolitical misfortune to constitute the first line of defense. The same dynamics apply – or would, if the United States gave them a chance – in regional conflicts, although not quite as dramatically. Great powers that border restive neighbors, or that are economically dependent on unstable regions, have a much larger interest than does the United States in policing those areas. Most regional power balances (the relative positions of, say, Hungary and Romania, or of one sub-Saharan state and another) need not concern the United States. America must intervene only to prevent a single power from dominating a strategically crucial area – and then only if the efforts of great powers with a larger stake in that region have failed to redress the imbalance. So for an offshore balancing strategy to work, the world must be multipolar, that is, there must be several other great powers, and major regional powers as well, onto which the United States can shift the burden of maintaining stability in various parts of the world. For America the most important grand-strategic issue is what relations it will have with these new great powers. In fostering a multipolar world – in which the foreign and national-security policies of the emerging great powers will be largely devoted to their rivalries with one another and to quelling and containing regional instability – an offshore balancing strategy is, of course, opportunistic and self-serving. But it also exercises restraint and shows geopolitical respect. By abandoning the "preponderance" strategy's extravagant objectives, the United States can minimize the risks of open confrontation with the new great powers.

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101AR Heg Unsustainable Extension

Hege is not sustainable in the status quo for 3 reasons1. Economic- the US economy is in shambles right now, and China and Russia have booming economies leading to balancing of the US and continued use of the military to gain power create a more fragile system2. China, India, and Brazil- are gaining power in their respective region because the US form power is not supported by the people there 3. Human rights- the US has a horrible record on human rights which is creating social movements against the United States in favor of developing states.

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111AR Russia China Extension

Heg causes the rise of a Russia-China alliance – the Roberts evidence is fantastic – it indicates that increasing hegemony causes increasing military cooperation between Russia & China because they think the US will exert their military superiority and attack them.

The impact outweighs –

A. Magnitude – Russia, China, and the US have the 3 biggest stockpiles in the world – thousands of nukes would be unleashed – and Roberts says it would cause “hegemony of the cockroach.”

B. Probability – the US can’t even occupy the country of Iraq let alone contain the Russian and Chinese armies – this proves we would have to resort to using nuclear weapons – escalating to extinction.

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121AR Proliferation Turn Extension

Weber says unipolarity increases the incentive for proliferation cuz it inevitably leaves some countries out of the order – they revert to the logic of self

Weber gives 2 reasons that multipolarity solves First - it allows dividing up the workload and collaboration to create a tougher police force on proliferation Second – it reduces the incentive for proliferation because multiple great powers gives lesser nations a choice with who to ally – giving them a lot more leverage and decreasing fear and reversion to self help

The impact of horizontal prolif outweighs –

A. Magnitude – Increasing prolif causes states to initiate preemptive wars before their enemies can retaliate with WMD – there will be shootouts with nuclear weapons that cause extinction.

B. Time Frame – escalation would be quick – it only takes one act of violence for countries to engage in retaliatory exchanges because it’s ingrained in human nature.

Plus, rogue states are a self-fulfilling prophecy – states proliferate because they are afraid of the US.Layne 07 Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute[Christopher “American Empire: A Debate” (p 133)]

Long before Saddam Hussein came down the pike, “regime change” has been a favored tool of American foreign policy. Here, however, U.S. grand strategy tends to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, because it causes states that might not otherwise have done so to become threats. That is, Wilsonianism causes the United States to be more, not less, insecure than it would be if its external ambitions were modest. When, by asserting the universal applicability of its own ideology, the United States challenges the legitimacy of other regimes – by labeling them as outposts of tyranny or members of an axis of evil – the effect is to increase those states’ sense of isolation and vulnerability. With good reason, such states fear that their survival could be at risk. Iran is a good example. Given that states – and regimes – are highly motivated to survive, it’s no surprise that others respond to American policy by adopting strategies that give them a chance to do so – like acquir ing WMD capabilities and supporting terrorism . One thing is for sure: because of its Wilsonian foundations, the American Empire is a recipe for confrontation and antagonism with “others.”

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131AR Offshore Balancing Extension

Abandoning hegemony is the only way to avoid great power conflicts – attempting to prevent the rise of other nations provokes conflict and fails to prevent their rise. Accepting the rise of other powers would force the US into an offshore balancing strategy – that’s Layne and Schwarz

This solves all of their heg impacts –

A. Transition conflicts – transition of power towards other powers is already occurring, it’s a question of how the US deals with it. A collapse of hegemony would force regional powers to take care of conflicts in their region to prevent them from escalating – it’s in their interest to prevent regional conflicts that would threaten their power. They don’t do so now because they think the US will clean up the mess for them

B. Great power war – continuing a strategy of primacy makes great power war inevitable – nations such as China will seek to counteract US power and will ally with other nations and transnational groups that fear US power. In a multipolar world, other nations would defend themselves against rising powers, ensuring that they don’t threaten great powers

C. Regional instability – nations currently have no incentive to prevent regional conflicts because the US has said they’d do it for them – withdrawal would force them to deal with regional issues before they become a problem

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142AC Re-arm Bad Disad [1/3]

1. Your disadvantage is non-unique; Japan re-arming is already occurring without our plan.John Feffer, Co-Editor of Foreign Policy in Focus, 2008 (“Asia’s Hidden Arms Race,” AlterNet, 2/16/2008, http://www.alternet.org/story/77225/?page=1, 7/6/2010)

Japan was once incapable of bombing other countries largely because its air force didn't have an in-air refueling capability. Thanks to Boeing,

however, the first KC-767 tanker aircraft will arrive in Japan later this year, providing government officials, who occasionally assert the country's right to launch preemptive strikes, with the means to do so . This is not happy news for Japan's neighbors, who retain vivid memories of the 1930s and 1940s, when its military went on an imperial rampage throughout the

region. Tokyo already has among the best air forces and naval fighting forces in the world , trailing only the

United States. But leading Japanese officials have displayed an even larger appetite. Some Japanese politicians are lobbying to amend the peace constitution or even scrap it entirely , while sending military spending skyrocketing. To promote these ideas, they use the thin rationale that Japan should be participating regularly in "international peacekeeping missions." The Japanese

Defense Agency -- their Pentagon -- which was upgraded to ministry level last year, wants more goodies like an aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarines, and long-range missiles . A light aircraft carrier , which the government has

coyly labeled a "destroyer," will be ready in 2009. The subs and missiles, however, will have to wait. So, too, will Tokyo's attempt to take a quantum leap forward in air-fighting capabilities by importing advanced U.S. F-22 stealth planes. Concerned about releasing latest-generation technology to the outside world, Congress scotched this deal at the last moment in August 2007.

2. You have no link: Japan will never re-arm because of its constitution.Preble 1991 (Christopher A. Preble, independent defense analyst)(March 14, 1991 “U.S.-Japanese Security Relations: Adjusting to change” CATO institute http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-007.html)

Latent American and East Asian fears of a resurgent Japan should be calmed by the commitment of the Japanese to their constitution and the underlying democratic values. There is no reason to believe that the domestic political forces that currently handcuff Japanese military policy would collapse and be superseded by rampant imperialism of the kind that was practiced in the 1930s . To the contrary, that domestic pressure will ensure that the use of military power is restricted to the resolution of specific foreign policy conflicts that have substantial connections with important Japanese interests. Japan may play a more active role in world affairs, but it will probably do so with relative caution and prudence.

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3. You have no internal link – Even if Japan rearmed it would cause deterrence not proliferation.Rogers 06 (Mike Rogers, writer for LewRockwell, has written more than 150 articles, from http://www.lewrockwell.com/rogers/rogers-arch.html, written on March 14th, 2006)

The choice is clear: the only way Japan can be come a normal country, treated as an equal by her Pacific neighbors, is to walk along the very same road her neighbors do . It would be a wonderful thing if every nation in the world would have a constitution that renounced military force and prohibited a standing army; it would be fantastic if war were abolished forever, but that is not the way things are. Japanese pacifists will blast me for stating this opinion, but as I have written about many times, the Japanese are, in many ways, very romanticist. It is a lovely and artful, heartwarming way to be, but unfortunately it is not the way the world works.

Would a remilitarized Japan , free of US control, become more neighborly with China and Korea ? Considering economic trends and business ties, one would hope and strongly suspect so. But, either way, in order to investigate those possibilities, Japan must escape from the grasp of the US.

Japan’s goal should be to rid herself of US occupation and control. After that, in order to maintain peace, Japan will have to negotiate with her Asian neighbors on an equal footing in an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect. Unfortunately, because of the way things are done, to do so will require Japan to change her pacifist constitution more in line with the way everyone else does things. In order for Japan to become friendlier with her Asia n sisters, she will once again have to support a military , like a normal country. It is fact-of- life. It is unfortunate that Japan must support a military to do so. It is most fortunate if doing so allows her to return to her Asian family .

4. You have no impact: nuclear war is impossible in East Asia because East Asian countries are already establishing a regional order.Honghua 10 (Men Honghua, F Chair Professor and Deputy Director of the Center of International Strategic Studies, Party School of CPC Central Committee, “East Asian Order Formation and Sino-Japanese Relations”)

The convergence and institutionalization of common interests can provide a workable way to build a constructive East Asian regional order. East Asia has a long history of attempts to establish order in the region. Today, East Asian countries embrace both globalization and regionalization, and they are beginning to think more seriously about the future regional order framework. Regional integration and its spillover effects, China’s comprehensive and peaceful rise, Japan’s political pursuit of a greater role in both regional and world arenas, ASEAN’s influence, and the United States’ strategic adjustments in the region are the main dynamics in East Asian order formation. These dynamics in turn determine not only the openness of the regional order but also the processes and roadmap for continued order building. East Asia has established or participates in useful institutional frameworks at subregional, regional, and super-regional levels, all of which advance common interest convergence and institutionalization.

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http://www.lewrockwell.com/rogers/rogers-arch.html



5. Even if Japan re-armed, the result would be stabilization, not nuclear war.Lam 95 (Thi Lam, General in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam; written 10/27/1995 “Why a Remilitarized Japan is Crucial for Asia-Pacific Stability” http://www.pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/columns/pacific-pulse/951027-japan.html)

Public clamor in Japan for the U.S. military to get out of Okinawa has heightened fears that Japan may be contemplating its own remilitarization. Ironically, the best hope for stability in the economically booming Asia-Pacific lies in Japan's rearmament -- both militarily and morally. PNS analyst Thi Lam served as a general in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and is the author of "Autopsy: The Death of South Vietnam (1985)"Public outrage over the rape of an Okinawa school girl by a United States serviceman may finally push the Japanese towards remilitarization, ending 50 years of "splendid isolation" under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Despite nascent Asian fears of renewed Japanese expansionism, Japan's remilitarization would greatly enhance the security

6. Our case outweighs your impact because we have proven that Japan rearming prevents proliferation and therefore negates your nuclear war impact.

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17

1AR Ext. to Japan Rearming Now

1. Japan has already begun to purchase serious weaponry and politicians are trying to amend the constitution to bolster up Japan’s defensive and offensive capabilities – that’s Feffer 8

2. Japan is rearming and setting goals for overseas aggression.BBC 2009 (“North Korean paper criticizes Japan's "military expansion" moves” BBC, January 13. http://www.lexisnexis.com.lexproxy.minlib.net/us/lnlib/auth/checkbrowser.do?rand=0.10745211289154322&cookieState=0&ipcounter=1&bhcp=1,, 6/25/2010 LexisNexis)

It was reported by NHK of Japan recently that the Japanese government set a goal of modifying the present "defence planning guidelines" till the end of this year under the pretence of coping with the changed situation in the surrounding areas. The said guidelines are nothing but documents for overseas aggression and military planning as they deal with the military strategic and tactical issues of realizing Japan's ambition for overseas expansion by making it possible for it to acquire the status of a military power and turning the "Self-Defence Forces" (SDF)

into the world's first class armed forces, says Nodong Sinmun Tuesday in a signed commentary. It goes on: The Japanese reactionaries are busy examining a plan to modify the said guidelines, stepping up the moves for the SDF's dispatch overseas, modernizing arms and equipment and boosting the capability to undertake a war independently. These facts go to prove that they are pushing forward the preparations for overseas aggression in real earnest. Japan has already secured a legal mechanism for hurling the SDF into military operations overseas. What remains to be done is to round off the capability for carrying out overseas military operations independently. The "defence planning guidelines" published in 1976 in the era of the Cold War were mainly aimed at containing the former Soviet Union under the umbrella of the US but the guidelines revised in 1995 were designed to invade the DPRK and its surrounding countries as the Cold War was over. The guidelines were again modified in 2004 for the purpose of stepping up the SDF's overseas military operations and boosting its capability so that it might support the US in its "war on terrorism". Japan's plan to modify the above-said guidelines again this year goes to prove that the Japanese reactionaries, emboldened by the dispatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean, etc. under the pretext of "cooperating with the US in its war on terrorism," are making desperate efforts to round off the conditions and capability for overseas military expansion . This is, however, nothing but a pipe-dream. The Japanese reactionaries would be well advised not to forget that their frantic moves for overseas military expansion will only lead them to the same miserable destruction as the Japanese imperialists suffered for perpetrating aggression and war in the past. Japan had better stop its militarist chariot from rushing headlong into the said operation, though belatedly.

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18

1AR Ext. to Japan will never rearm

1. Japan will never rearm because of its democratic values and its constitution prevents it from doing so – that’s Preble 91

2. Japanese have rejected nuclear rearmament, despite capability, due to historical bombings Bakanic 08 (Elizabeth D. Bakanic Department of Homeland Security Graduate Fellow for Science and Technology, 6/9/08, “The end of Japan's nuclear taboo” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-end-of-japans-nuclear-taboo)Ever since the August 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese people have possessed a strong aversion to the idea of nuclear weapons. Public discussion of developing nuclear weapons has been practically nonexistent, and politicians have been chastised for mentioning the topic: As recently as 1999, Japan's vice defense minister resigned after receiving overwhelming criticism for suggesting that Japan should arm itself with nuclear weapons. And despite mastering the complete nuclear fuel cycle--thus, possessing the necessary nuclear technology and expertise to develop nuclear weapons--and maintaining complicated relationships with growing and unstable neighbors such as China, Tokyo has rejected even considering nuclear weapons. More largely, this "nuclear allergy" has existed alongside a rather pacifist society that has highly constrained itself militarily and politically following World War II.

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19

1AR Ext. to Japan rearming leads to deterrence

1. A remilitarized Japan would cause stability in East Asia because Japan would be able to reconnect with its Asian roots – that’s Rogers 6

2. Japan rearm is just and improves global relations, decreases terrorKurlantzick 2, Washington Monthly, July-August, 2002 by Joshua KurlantzickPerhaps most important, Washington can emphasize that by having a more normal military, Japan would only be taking its place as a modern, peace-loving democracy. Indeed, having Japan operate alongside the United States, Britain, Germany, and other nations in a long-running war on terror or other conflict would demonstrate that membership in an "Axis of Good" of industrial democracies that attempt to improve global relations is not limited to Western countries. In an era where symbols matter immensely to a hyper-connected global audience, and the United States receives withering criticism for acting unilaterally, involving Japan more closely in American military and diplomatic planning, while remaining sensitive to Asian memories of WWII, would blunt foreign opposition to U.S. global strategy.

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http://findarticles.com/p/search/?qa=Joshua%20Kurlantzick

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/is_2002_July-August/

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/


20

1 AR Ext. to No Possibility of War in East Asia

1. East Asia has begun to establish a framework for a peaceful, stable environment by recognizing common economic and political interests – that’s Honghua 10.

2. The international system prevents war—economic, military, and ideological trends have changed. Christopher Fettweiss, April prof security studies – naval war college, Comparative Strategy 22.2 April 2003 p 109-129

Mackinder can be forgiven for failing to anticipate the titanic changes in the fundamental nature of the international system much more readily than can his successors. Indeed, Mackinder and his contemporaries a century ago would hardly recognize the rules by which the world is run today—most significantly, unlike their era, ours is one in which the danger of major war has been removed, where World War III is, in Michael Mandelbaum’s words, “somewhere between impossible and unlikely.”25 Geopolitical and geo-strategic analysis has not yet come to terms with what may be the central, most significant trend of international politics: great power war, major war of the kind that pit the strongest states against each other, is now obsolete.26 John Mueller has been the most visible, but by no means the only, analyst arguing that the chances of a World War III emerging in the next century are next to nil.27 Mueller and his contemporaries cite three major arguments supporting this revolutionary, and clearly controversial, claim.First, and most obviously, modern military technology has made major war too expensive to contemplate. As John Keegan has argued, it is hard to see how nuclear war could be considered “an extension of politics by other means”—at the very least, nuclear weapons remove the possibility of victory from the calculations of the would-be aggressor.28 Their value as leverage in diplomacy has not been dramatic, at least in the last few decades, because nuclear threats are not credible in the kind of disagreements that arise between modern great powers. It is unlikely that a game of nuclear “chicken” would lead to the outbreak of a major war. Others have argued that, while nuclear weapons surely make war an irrational exercise, the destructive power of modern conventional weapons make today’s great powers shy away from direct conflict.29 The world wars dramatically reinforced Angell’s warnings, and today no one is eager to repeat those experiences, especially now that the casualty levels among both soldiers and civilians would be even higher. Second, the shift from the industrial to the information age that seems to be gradually occurring in many advanced societies has been accompanied by a new definition of power, and a new system of incentives which all but remove the possibility that major war could ever be a cost-efficient exercise. The rapid economic evolution that is sweeping much of the world, encapsulated in the “globalization” metaphor so fashionable in the media and business communities, has been accompanied by an evolution in the way national wealth is accumulated.30 For millennia, territory was the main object of war because it was directly related to national prestige and power. As early as 1986 Richard Rosecrance recognized that “two worlds of international relations” were emerging, divided over the question of the utility of territorial conquest.31 The intervening years have served only to strengthen the argument that the major industrial powers, quite unlike their less-developed neighbors, seem to have reached the revolutionary conclusion that territory is not directly related to their national wealth and prestige. For these states, wealth and power are more likely to derive from an increase in economic, rather than military, reach. National wealth and prestige, and therefore power, are no longer directly related to territorial control.32 The economic incentives for war are therefore not as clear as they once may have been. Increasingly, it seems that the most powerful states pursue prosperity rather than power. In Edward Luttwak’s terminology, geopolitics is slowly being replaced by “geoeconomics,” where “the methods of commerce are displacing military methods—with disposable capital in lieu of firepower, civilian innovation in lieu of military–technical advancement, and market penetration in lieu of garrisons and bases.”33 Just as advances in weaponry have increased the cost of fighting, a socioeconomic evolution has reduced the rewards that a major war could possibly bring. Angell’s major error was one that has been repeated over and over again in the social sciences ever since—he overestimated the “rationality” of humanity. Angell recognized earlier than most that the industrialization of military technology and economic interdependence assured that the costs of a European war would certainly outweigh any potential benefits, but he was not able to convince his contemporaries who were not ready to give up the institution of war. The idea of war was still appealing—the normativecost/benefit analysis still tilted in the favor of fighting, and that proved to be the more important factor. Today, there is reason to believe that this normative calculation may have changed. After the war, Angell noted that the only things that could have prevented the war were “surrendering of certain dominations, a recasting of patriotic ideals, a revolution of ideas.”34 The third and final argument of Angell’s successors is that today such a revolution of ideas has occurred, that a normative evolution has caused a shift in the rules that govern state interaction. The revolutionary potential of ideas should not be underestimated. Beliefs, ideologies, and ideas are often, as Dahl notes, “a major independent variable,” which we ignore at our

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21peril.35 “Ideas,” added John Mueller, are very often forces themselves, not flotsam on the tide of broader social or economic patterns . . . it does not seem wise in this area to ignore phenomena that cannot be easily measured, treated with crisp precision, or probed with deductive panache.36 The heart of this argument is the “moral progress” that has “brought a change in attitudes about international war” among the great powers of the world,37 creating for the first time, “an almost universal sense that the deliberate launching of a war can no longer be justified.”38 At times leaders of the past were compelled by the masses to defend the national honor, but today popular pressures push for peaceful resolutions to disputes between industrialized states. This normative shift has rendered war between great powers “subrationally unthinkable,” removed from the set of options for policy makers, just as dueling is no longer a part of the set of options for the same classes for which it was once central to the concept of masculinity and honor. As Mueller explained, Dueling, a form of violence famed and fabled for centuries, is avoided not merely because it has ceased to seem ‘necessary’, but because it has sunk from thought as a viable, conscious possibility. You can’t fight a duel if the idea of doing so never occurs to you or your opponent.39 By extension, states cannot fight wars if doing so does not occur to them or to their opponent. As Angell discovered, the fact that major war was futile was not enough to bring about its end—people had to believe that it was futile. Angell’s successors suggest that such a belief now exists in the industrial (and postindustrial) states of the world, and this “autonomous power of ideas,” to borrow Francis Fukuyama’s term, has brought about the end of major, great power war.40

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221AR Ext. to Impact Turn: Japan rearm causes stability

1. Japan’s remilitarization will serve as a deterrent, thus preventing potential war in East Asia – that’s Lam 95

2. Japan rearm key to creating peace across the worldKurlantzick 02 (Joshua Kurlantzick, covers Asian economics and US politics for Washington Monthly Company. Copyright Gale Group of Thomson Corporation Company. From the article Axis of Good: the case for remilitarizing Japan in 2002)But the idea that old adversaries can collaborate has obvious precedents around the world. The most recent evidence is the emerging alliance between Russia and the United States. For the last half century, Americans, Japanese, and Asians in general have shared an operational understanding that Japan was a special case: The one former military power that couldn't really ever be trusted with weapons again. Whatever the justice of that initial assumption, it's become outdated. It's time for a fresh look at Japanese rearmament and a fresh conclusion that the Japanese can best advance the cause of peace not as pacifists but as responsible soldiers.

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231AR Ext. to Case Outweighs

1. Once again, because we have proven that Japan rearming leads to stability not war, thus preventing your impact, our case outweighs your impact.

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242AC Appeasement DA [1/2]

1. Non-Unique- Troops are currently being withdrawn from Japan and the impact has yet to occur.

2. No link- Withdrawing US troops from Japan does not trigger China to become the head of East Asian power because US-China relations are strong now through the economy and they would not put that at risk.

3. China US relations strong- benefit each otherXinhua, 6/24/10http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-06/24/content_10013225_2.htm

"There are so many opportunities for trade to benefit both China and the United States," Locke said at a Senate Finance Committee hearing.

"I have seen those benefits first hand over the last 20 years, as Commerce Secretary, as an attorney in private practice, and as the governor of Washington State, where I helped double exports to China during my tenure."

According to Locke, thanks to strong Chinese demand growth and recovery in prices of agricultural products, now the US exports to China are growing faster than overall US exports."We should neither underestimate the importance of the China market nor the potential it holds for American exporters who tap into it."

During the same hearing, Ron Kirk, the US trade representative, also hailed the opportunities provided by the China's growing economy.

"Thanks to China's strong recovery from the global recession, we have seen double digit growth in a variety of export

sectors, ranging from high-end manufactured goods and chemical products to agricultural goods like soybeans," said Kirk.

US goods and services exports to China totaled 85 billion dollars in 2009, and China is the US third largest export marke

4. No internal link- Withdrawing troops from Japan is not related to China becoming the super power of East Asia because China isn’t interested in Japan. They are not interested because Japan isn’t actually on the East Asia continent so they would be no help to China.

5. No impact- China will NEVER become the super power of East Asia because it won’t overcome Japan’s defense

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252AC Appeasement DA [2/2]

6. U.S. troops reduction doesn’t put Japan at risk of attackBandow 1998 (Dough Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. Special assistant to President Reagan)(January 6, 1998 “Cold War is Over So Trim the Military”, Originally from the LA Times http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5971)

Congress should sharply cut, not increase, defense spending. With the end of the Cold War, America faces no serious conventional threats. An invasion from outer space is about as likely as a war involving the U.S. homeland.Nor need Washington continue protecting its populous and prosperous allies. They are fully capable of responding to the ever-diminishing threats facing them. For instance, Britain, Germany and France spend more on the military than does Russia; Europe could take over responsibility for its own defense. Surely South Korea, with a gross domestic product running 24 times that of North Korea, is able to protect itself. Why should U.S. Marines be based in Japan, the world's second-ranking economic power, which no longer faces significant military danger? Washington should start bringing home and demobilizing troops from overseas and shrinking the rest of its forces accordingly.

7. Withdrawing troops from Japan will make it less likely for China to become the East Asia super power because Japan will become stronger and rearm without the US troops there and they will be able to keep China in check.

8. Case out weighs, our case solves for the impact, we solve for Japanese defense and our plan helps provide them with stronger security

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261AR EXT: Japanese Appeasement

Non- Unique- 1. US troops are being withdrawn now and the impact has not occurred2. The impact will never occur because China is not capable of becoming the head of east Asia

China Paper Tiger- despite claims, China is not the next superpowerMichael Sheridan, The Sunday Times, 12/28/08

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5402443.eceYet the reality is that China is a poor agricultural country. It may have the world’s fourth biggest economy but its population of 1.3 billion means that in terms of wealth per capita it does not even rank in the top 100 nations. China’s rivers and lakes are ruined. Its air is poisonous. The one-child policy means that by mid-century it will face a crisis as fewer workers support more than 300m old people. The leadership is stale, the party split by factions and the armed forces are untested except by repression. This is not the next superpower. It is a paper tiger.The American mandarins like to claim that China is too inscrutable and dangerous to offend. It isn’t. All the democracies have to do is to speak out consistently and in public for Chinese democrats, to support political prisoners and to refuse to break ranks when the regime tries to single out this or that country for punishment. The Chinese people will be watching.

No Link-1. Withdrawing troops from Japan does not cause them to want to become the East Asian head

because they respect their relationship with the US which is good now, ext. Xinhua card from 2ac2. Also, US and China benefit each other greatly, it is obvious to everyone that the vast majority of

goods in the United States comes from China, the US needs China for its goods and China needs the US to sell its goods, it’s a win, win, on both sides.

No Impact- 1. China will NEVER be able to become the East Asian head because Japan will rearm and defend

itself. Ext. Bandow 2ac card 2. Also, after Japan rearms they will become stronger and be able to keep China in check from doing

anything outrageous

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272AC Compensation DA

1. Non-Unique- Compensation is inevitable, there are more contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, more likely to compensate there

2. No link- There aren’t many contractors in Japan, even if there were they wouldn’t need to be compensated because they have no interest in what the US has to offer as compensation

3. No internal link- Non of their cards specifically mentions Japan, even if they did Japan would not accept compensation from the US because they would feel like the owed us later

4. No impact- The US won’t need to compensate Japan because the Japanese government will be happy that we are withdrawing.

Hashimoto, Mochizuki, and Takara 05 (Akikazu Hashimoto, PhD Professor National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Japan; Mike Mochizuki, PhD Director Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University Japan-US Relations Chair; and Kurayoshi Takara, Master’s degree, Professor of History at University of Ryukyus, Japan, previously member of advisory board to Okinawa Governor Keiichi Inamine. March 25th, 2005; from the book The Okinawa Question and the U.S.-Japan Alliance page VI of the Preface)

Given its location next to a crowded section of the city of Ginowan, the air station has posed a great danger to Okinawan citizens thereby risking Japanese public support for hosting U.S. military bases. On August 13, 2004, the kind of accident that everyone feared actually happened. A large CH-53D helicopter from Futenma Air Station crashed and burst into flames on the campus of Okinawa International University, which is adjacent to the base. This accident clearly proved the danger of Futenma Air Station and further damaged the Okinawan residents’ feelings toward the American bases. If a student or resident had been killed, the resulting ill will toward the bases could not have been alleviated and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance would have suffered irreparable damage. Instead of being relieved that such a tragedy did not occur, we have to regard this accident as a serious warning message to expedite the return of Futenma and the reduction of the U.S. military bases and forces in Okinawa. The delay in the construction of the replacement facility has not been the only problem. There has been much dissatisfaction in Japan with the way the U.S. military handled the August 2004 helicopter crash, causing a rapid increase in the public’s calls for fundamental revision of the Status of Forces Agreement. In addition, Okinawans viewed the U.S. military’s cordoning off a section of the university as a serious infringement on the rights of Okinawa International University. For the safety of residents , it is the duty of the Japanese government to try to eliminate the dangers involved with Futenma as soon as possible. The United States must also ensure the safe use of its bases and realize the problems involved to successfully carry out its military transformation. The American intention is to strengthen the functions of its bases in Japan, Okinawan but unless there is a quick solution to the Futenma issue and guarantee of safety for the Okinawan residents, the U.S. will not be able to smoothly implement this information. But as this report repeatedly emphasizes, in addressing the concerns and welfare of Okinawa, we must also consider the overall strategic interests and thinking of Japan and the United States and the vexing regional security issues regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and China-Taiwan relations.

5. Turn- They say that since we are withdrawing troops from Japan we have to compensate contractors, but in reality this is completely untrue, withdrawal of troops would make Japan not want compensation from us because they would be happy that we are gone

6. Case outweighs- We solve for extinction and loss of biodiversity which is basically the end of evolution and the death of the world

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281AR Compensation DA

1. No link- A. There aren’t many contractors in Japan , and even if there were they would not want

compensation because Japan is happy that the US is leaving, ext. Takura 5’ 2ac card saying that Japan wants us out.

B. Also, Japan would not want compensation from us because if they take it then in the future they would feel the need to repay us in some way

2. Non- unique-A. Compensation is inevitableB. there are more contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, more likely to compensate there because the

US has done more damage there

3. No impact-A. Compensation has been going on for a while and the impact has yet to happenB. The impact will not happen because Japan would not want the compensation in the first place

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292AC CMR [1/5]

1. No backlash - the military will follow orders even if they disagree with themAckerman 8 [Spencer, The Washington Independent, 11/13, “Productive Obama-Military Relationship Possible,” http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible]

Some members of the military community are more sanguine. Several say that if they disagree with the decision, they respect Obama’s authority to make it.“In the end, we are not self-employed. And after the military leadership provides its best military advice, it is up to the policy-makers to make the decision and for the military to execute those decisions,” said a senior Army officer recently back from Iraq, who requested anonymity because he is still on active duty. “Now, if those in the military do not like the decision, they have two choices. One, salute smartly and execute the missions given them to the best of their ability. Or, the other, leave the military if they do not feel they can faithfully execute their missions. That is one way the military does get to vote in an all-volunteer force.”Moss agreed. “The military will just follow the order,” he said. “The great majority of Americans want U.S. forces out of Iraq. This is part of the reason Obama was sent to the White House.”

2. CMR is Resilient – Gates and high ranking Generals will respect any Obama decision and shield it from opposition.Schake, fellow at the Hoover Institution and holds the Distinguished Chair in International Security Studies at the United States Military Academy, 9-4-‘9 (Kori, “So far so good for civil military relations under Obama,” Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/04/so_far_so_good_for_civil_military_relations_under_obama)

Crucial to Feingold's argument is that the Afghan people resent our military involvement. Both McChrystal, and now Gates, are persuaded that is not true. They argue that how we operate in Afghanistan will determine Afghan support to a much greater degree than the size of the force. Gates for the first time yesterday signaled his support for further force increases on that basis, indicating he will not be a political firewall for the White House if McChrystal and Mullen advocate politically uncomfortable increases.Afghanistan was always going to be a central national security issue, because President Obama had campaigned and carried over into governance his argument that it was the "right" war and negligently under-resourced during the Bush administration. Even with domestic anti-war sentiment on the rise and a potential rebellion by Congressional Democrats against funding the Afghan mission, Obama is seemingly trapped into supporting the military commander's troop requests. Hard to imagine the Houdini contortion that lets him sustain his claim that his predecessor neglected the most important war and then refuse troops to a commander who you put into position and who is supported by a well-respected Defense Secretary.Yet the President may -- and perhaps should -- do exactly that, and for reasons that are laudable in our system of civil-military relations. The American way of organizing for warfare has distinct responsibilities for the leading military and civilian participants. To work up the ladder, it's the military commander's job to survey the requirements for success and make recommendations. It's the job of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate the military judgment of that strategy and resourcing, advising the Secretary and the President on its soundness and other possible courses of military action. It's the Secretary of Defense's job to figure out how to provide those resources from a limited pool of people and equipment, to identify and manage the risk it creates for other operations and objectives (e.g., Iraq, managing China's rise, deterring North Korea, etc). It is the Commander in Chief's job to establish the war's objectives and determine whether they merit the resources it would require to be successful. He may determine the objectives are too costly in themselves, or that achieving them would distract too much effort from other national priorities, or that we do not have the necessary partners in the Karzai government to achieve our objectives.

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

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http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible


302AC CMR [2/5]

CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

It should go without saying that it is not the National Security Advisor's job to intimidate military commanders into dialing down their requests to politically comfortable levels, although that is what Jim Jones is reported to have done when visiting Afghanistan during the McChrystal review. Such politicization of military advice ought to be especially noxious to someone who'd been both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and a Combatant Commander. When the Bob Woodward article recounting Jones' attempted manipulation as published, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen commendably defended McChrystal's independence. It is also curious that the one person invisible in this debate, as in the debate about relieving General McKiernan, is the CENTCOM commander, General Petraeus.But beneficially and importantly for our country, policy debates over the war in Afghanistan indicate that the system of civil-military relations is clearly working as designed. We owe much to Gates, Mullen, and McChrystal for shielding the process from politicization and providing military advice the President needs to make decisions only he can make.

2. Afghanistan is already destroying CMR.Haddick 9/4 [Robert, managing editor of Small Wars Journal, This Week at War: McChrystal Plays Defense, SEPTEMBER 4, 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/04/this_week_at_war_mcchrystal_plays_defense]

Gen. Stanley McChrystal's report on the situation in Afghanistan is likely to strain relations between the Obama administration and the uniformed military. The arrival of McChrystal's report in Washington is likely to spark its own low-level war of finger-pointing and blame-shifting between civilian policymakers in the White House and McChrystal's staff and defenders in the Pentagon. This strain in civil-military relations could last through the duration of the U.S. military's involvement in Afghanistan and beyond.McChrystal's report is supposedly secret, but anonymous staffers have already revealed its themes to the Washington Post. The goal of these staffers is to protect McChrystal and the uniformed military against White House officials they likely don't trust. These staffers have evidently concluded that they need to leak first in order to establish their position and put White House staffers on the defensive. The first task for McChrystal's report (and its leaking defenders) was to show how President Barack Obama's supposedly limited war aims actually result in broad, expensive, and open-ended goals for Afghanistan: Although the assessment, which runs more than 20 pages, has not been released, officials familiar with the report have said it represents a hard look at the challenges involved in implementing Obama's strategy for Afghanistan. The administration has narrowly defined its goal as defeating al-Qaeda and other extremist groups and denying them sanctuary, but that in turn requires a sweeping counterinsurgency campaign aimed at protecting the Afghan population, establishing good governance and rebuilding the economy. McChrystal's report has thus shifted responsibility over to the White House to either the rally the country and the Congress around a big nation-building campaign or to explicitly scale back the desired war aims. Next, according to the Washington Post, McChrystal's report lists numerous obstacles that could prevent success, barriers that are outside of the U.S. military's control: For instance, McChrystal thinks a greater push by civilian officials is vital to shore up local Afghan governments and to combat corruption, officials said. He is emphatic that the results of the recent Afghan presidential election be viewed as legitimate, but is also realistic in acknowledging that the goals of the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the coalition are not always as closely aligned as they could be, they said. Separately, officials said, McChrystal's assessment finds that U.S. and other NATO forces must adopt a less risk-averse culture, leaving bases and armored vehicles to pursue insurgents on foot in a way that minimizes Afghan civilian deaths. In others words, McChrystal is saying, don't hold me responsible for success if Karzai's election is a fraud, civilian officials don't show up, or European soldiers are not allowed to patrol.The report illustrates the basic struggle between civilian policymakers and military commanders. Each side looks to the other to solve its problems. The White House staff is hoping that McChrystal will deliver a clear, high-probability war-winning strategy, a strategy that would reduce Afghanistan as an issue of concern. McChrystal, like all field commanders, wants his political masters to give him a realistic and


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measurable objective, with the resources needed to accomplish it. McChrystal's report implies a pessimistic outlook for U.S. success in Afghanistan. If he and his staff had an optimistic view about the Afghan challenge, there would have been no need to be so diligent about clarifying responsibility for what comes next. In the case of success, all would share the glory. McChrystal's report is a preemptive defense against blame and recrimination. That does not bode well for either the U.S. mission in Afghanistan or for civil-military relations.

3. CMR clashes won’t escalateRichard H. Kohn, Professor of History of Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, World Affairs Winter ‘8, “Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations” http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html

However it begins, a clash between the next administration and the armed forces need not metastasize into a full-blown crisis. Military leaders should start to consider how they will react to civilian demands, and which of their traditions they will choose. Will they acquiesce after due advice and consultation, as the Constitution and our tradition of civilian control suggests? Or will they resist, employing techniques borne of decades of inside-the-beltway maneuvering? Will they confine dissent to the appropriate channels? Or will they go public, enlisting their allies in Congress, industry, and veterans groups? Will they collaborate with their new civilian superiors? Or will they work to thwart every recommendation harmful to their service? Much will depend on the capacity of military leaders to establish a workable relationship with their civilian superiors and to embrace their own tradition of professionalism.Civilians have equal obligations. Will they tackle thorny defense issues in a serious, nonpartisan way, or will they succumb to their own posturing? Will they box themselves in with their campaign promises? Will they apply Band-Aids to the Pentagon budget, or will they address the more fundamental problem of reorganizing a Cold-War military for an age of asymmetric threats? Will they consider seriously, if not always heed, the counsel of military expertise?A crucial intermediary here will be the next secretary of defense. Someone in the mold of Melvin Laird or James Schlesinger or William Perry will be indispensable—that is, someone knowledgeable and politically skilled who can gain and keep the confidence of the military, Congress, and the president. Whoever wins the job must wear his or her authority without bluster or arrogance, and lead firmly while holding the military to account. Above all, the secretary must act with courtesy, fairness, and decisiveness. A new administration might even ask Robert Gates to stay on; he has presided over the Pentagon with a calming, steady hand after Rumsfeld’s departure. Staffing decisions at less senior levels will be nearly as important. Neither party can afford to populate the Defense Department with politicians on the make, congressional staffers beholden to special interests, or young know-nothings looking to plus-up their résumés. These positions require knowledgeable people from the business community, the federal bureaucracy, and other professions who understand and respect the military but will not be awed by medals and campaign ribbons. The service secretaries have the closest relationship with the military leadership and have a critical say in picking senior leaders for advancement into the key commands and the Joint Chiefs. Finding the right individuals for these slots will be essential. The new secretary of defense would do well to assemble his deputy, under secretaries, and service secretaries into a cohesive executive committee that would formulate an agenda, rethink policy, and oversee its implementation.The next administration should also act quickly to insulate the military leadership from partisan politics. The first act will be, after due consideration, the reappointment of Admiral Mullen as chairman. Then there should be a concerted search within the services for loyal but independent thinkers who understand the American system of civilian control but also know how to be dead honest in their advice . The recent appointment of General James Mattis of the Marines to head Joint Forces Command sends exactly the right message. Whoever

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comes into office in January 2009, in turn, needs to make clear up front that he or she will not hide behind the military, that he or she will not compromise the military’s professional ethos by delivering partisan speeches in front of uniformed audiences or trotting out the brass to market administration policies. Last of all, the new president ought to reach out to the armed forces in their own communities: visiting bases, praising the military with genuine sincerity, addressing veteran’s care, making certain that as troops are withdrawn from Iraq, no blame falls unfairly on them for what follows . The political leadership will have to consult widely about changes, cuts, consolidations, and other modifications to the defense establishment. The next administration will need to establish a precedent for strict civilian control from the outset, all the while spending political capital on national defense and boosting the morale of what will likely be an anxious force. Consistent and vocal praise for military (and public) service would go a long way—easy for a Republican who abandons the demonization of government, difficult for a Democrat accustomed to ignoring or criticizingthe military. Aff Answers

4. Heg sustainable: Benevolent hegemony and no counterbalancingChristopher Layne. Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at Texas A&M. 2009. “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay.” International Security. <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/summary/v034/34.1.layne.html>

In retrospect, U.S. dominance of the unipolar world since the Soviet Union’s collapse seems like a foregone conclusion. Yet, almost from that moment,

there has been a vigorous debate involving both the scholarly and policy communities about the following questions: How long can unipolarity last? Should U.S. grand strategy seek to maintain unipolarity and American hegemony? Will other states attempt to balance against the

United States?5 Some neorealist scholars warned that unipolarity would boomerang against the United States.6 They expected that unipolarity would be transitory. Drawing on balance of power theory and defensive realism, these scholars noted that in international politics there is an almost-ironclad rule that great powers balance—internally or externally, or both—against aspiring

hegemons. They buttressed their forecasts by pointing to the historical record concerning the fates of past contenders

for hegemony: the attempts to gain hegemony in Europe by the Hapsburgs (under Charles V and Philip II), France (under Louis XIV and Napoleon), and Germany (under Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler) were all defeated by the resistance of other great powers. The United States, they argued, would suffer

the same fate by attempting to maintain its post–Cold War hegemony. As events transpired, however, the fate of earlier hegemons has not befallen the United States.7 Whether there has been balancing against U.S. hegemony since 1991 is an intensely debated issue.8 It is

beyond dispute, however, that the United States still enjoys a commanding preponderance of power over its nearest rivals. Drawing on neorealism, hegemonic stability theory, balance of threat theory, and liberal international relations theory, a number of

prominent American international relations theorists have advanced several explanations of why U.S. hegemony has endured for nearly two decades

without any major challenges and have suggested that the United States can prolong its primacy far into the future. “Unipolar stability” realists have argued that the present unipolar distribution of capabilities in America’s favor is insurmountable and that other states will not counterbalance because they receive important security and economic benefits from U.S. hegemony.9 Invoking balance of threat theory, other realists claim that the United States has negated counterhegemonic balancing by adopting accommodative policies that allay others’ fears of American dominance. 10 Liberal international relations theorists and balance of threat realists assert that the United States has been successful because it is a “benevolent” hegemon.11 Other states, they say, will acquiesce to U.S. hegemony if the United States displays self-restraint by exercising its predominance multilaterally through international institutions.12 Moreover, the United States’ “soft power”—the purportedly singular attractiveness of

its political and economic institutions, and its culture—draws other states into Washington’s orbit.

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5. People will oppose military because of Japanese bases presenceWelsch 5/3 (Rose Welsch, Staff Writer, US citizens opposed to US miitary bases in Okinawa, 5/18/10) http://www.tokyoprogressive.org/content/us-citizens-opposed-us-miitary-bases-okinawa

Even though there are some government officials in the U.S. who are strongly pushing for this construction, they don't reflect the will of the American public. Why not? Well, to be honest, because most Americans have never even heard of Futenma or Henoko. Most Americans aren't aware that U.S. Military bases occupy 20% of Okinawa. When U.S. citizens do learn the facts, however, we are appalled. The more we learn the truth, the more we start to feel strongly that we don't want our government to operate an enormous, dangerous base in the middle of a densely populated city—something that would never be allowed in our own country. We start to strongly feel that don't want our government to destroy a vital marine ecosystem in order to create an unnecessary base in our name. And we don't want the voices of local people who have to live with U.S. bases next to them to be ignored in our name. What we DO want is both the Japanese and U.S. Governments to respect local people, halt new military construction anywhere in Okinawa, and close Futenma.

6. CMR low now – Iraq war oppositionCNN 06 (CNN, Poll: Opposition to Iraq war at all-time high, September 25, 2006) http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/08/21/iraq.poll/

Opposition among Americans to the war in Iraq has reached a new high, with only about a third of respondents saying they favor it, according to a poll released Monday. Just 35 percent of 1,033 adults polled say they favor the war in Iraq; 61 percent say they oppose it -- the highest opposition noted in any CNN poll since the conflict began more than three years ago.

7. Military won’t listen to civiliansSarah Sewall, Program Director, National Security and Human Rights, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, JFK School, Harvard, Understanding Collateral Damage Workshop, June 4-5, 2002, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/WebJuneReport.pdf

Even so, representatives of the U.S. armed forces expressed great concern at outsiders second-guessing their actions. In retrospect, it is very easy to raise questions about decisions made in split seconds under life threatening circumstances, they said. Distinguishing between bad luck and error is necessarily a judgment call in their view. In addition, others

pointed out, a criminalized framework for evaluating aspects of compliance with international humanitarian law may well make governments even less willing to provide public information, investigate internally, or admit mistakes.

8. Civilians control are unprofessional and weakens army – lowers heg Desch, Michael C. Civilian Control of the Military : The Changing Security Environment Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8018-6059-8

While civilian control forms the normative standard in almost everysociety outside of military dictatorships, its practice has often beenthe subject of pointed criticism from both uniformed and non-uniformed observers, who object to what they view as the undue"politicization" of military affairs, especially when elected officials orpolitical appointees micromanage the military, rather than giving themilitary general goals and objectives (like "Defeat Country X"), and have the military decide how best to carry those orders out. By placing responsibility for military decision- making in the hands ofnonprofessional civilians , critics argue, the dictates of militarystrategy are subsumed to the political, with the effect of undulyrestricting the fighting capabilities of the nation's armed forces for what should be immaterial or otherwise lower priority concerns

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http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Military_dictatorship

http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Military_dictatorship

http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/08/21/iraq.poll/

http://www.tokyoprogressive.org/content/us-citizens-opposed-us-miitary-bases-okinawa


342AC Cap and Trade [1/2]

1. Utilities-only bill lacks 60 votes—GOP opposition. Aaron Wiener, staff writer, 6-30-2010. [Washington Independent, Utilities-Only Cap May Be Last Hope for Carbon-Pricing Legislation, p. http://washingtonindependent.com/90536/utilities-only-cap-may-be-last-hope-for-carbon-pricing-legislation]

“Some climate bills have featured a sort of Phase Two,” said Marchant Wentworth, deputy le gislative director of the Union of Concerned Scientists, where other sectors are phased in “four, five, six years down the road.”But Wentworth was skeptical that a utilities-only bill would be able to pass a Senate where Republican opposition to climate legislation has grown increasingly intense.“Is there something unique about a utility-only bill that gets you more support in the Senate than a comprehensive bill?” he asked. “Can you get to 60 [votes] on utility-only? No.”

2. Fiat solves the link- means we don’t have to examine the political process that any other bill would go through.

3. Cap and trade will not stimulate the economy- Taxing carbon emissions only makes companies spend more to produce less goods.

4. More comprehensive studies predict cooling – their studies have substantial measurement errorsHiserodt – Aerospace engineer and president of Controls & Power, Inc – 4/1Ed, A Cooling Trend Toward Global Warming, http://www.thenewamerican.com/tech-mainmenu-30/environment/942

Satellite data from NASA shows no increase in average global temperature since 1998, a year when El Niño caused a worldwide spike having nothing to do with carbon dioxide . Alarmists contend this is just a pause in a continuous rise in temperatures and that it will begin to increase again. Ironically that is the same argument that the warming skeptics have been using for years. There was warming for the first 40 years of the 20th century — until the very time CO2 began to climb significantly — and then came cooling, which sparked concerns in the '70s about a looming Ice Age. Then rising temperatures resumed until 1998 and now we're back on a cooling trend. This fits well with a general planetary warm up, but is in conflict with climate forcing by CO2 that calls for a continuous upward temperature movement.Unfortunately for the alarmists, nothing seems sacred these days. It has long been known that the disintegration of the Soviet Union ended temperature data from large parts of that country, especially Siberia. Without massive re-calculations to exclude temperature readings from these stations during the Soviet era, a significant increase in global temperatures would be seen from the absence of thi`s data during the post-Soviet period. From available literature there is no indication that any meteorological body went to such trouble. But what about the weather data from the United States — the "best in the world"? In his presentation at the International 2009 Conference on Climate Change, 25-year veteran meteorologist Anthony Watts showed alarming data for the global-warming alarmists. But first we should note that the global temperature rise that we are supposed to be concerned over was less than 1°C for the entire 20th century, meaning minor errors in measurements can contribute significantly to an apparent warming trend. Watts was certainly aware of the "urban island" effect that causes cities like Tucson to have temperature increases three times those of surrounding rural measurement stations. But how have reporting stations, "urbanized" by a spreading population, been affected? With 650 volunteers, more than 860 of the National Weather Service's 1,221 climate-monitoring stations were inspected and photographically documented. Of these, 89 percent did not meet the Weather Service's own requirement of being 30 meters away from artificial heating or reflecting sources such as pavements or building

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http://www.thenewamerican.com/tech-mainmenu-30/environment/942


352AC Cap and Trade [2/2]

5. US Citizens Support Closing FutenmaGeneral Board of Church and Society; 4/28/10; Close Okinawa U.S. Marine base; Accessed Online; 6/30/10; http://www.umc-gbcs.org/site/apps/nlnet/content.aspx?c=frLJK2PKLqF&b=5963905&ct=8214817

WASHINGTON, D.C. — The United Methodist General Board of Church & Society is part of a U.S.- Japan coalition demanding closure of the Futenma U.S. Marine Corps base in Okinawa and opposing construction of new bases in Okinawa.The Network for Okinawa has drawn together representatives from peace groups, environmental organizations, faith-based organizations, academia, and think tanks to support these goals. The coalition represents hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizens concerned about democracy and environmental protection in Okinawa. Destroying the environmental and social well-being of an area … is itself like actively waging warfare against nature and human communities. On April 23, the Washington-based coalition sent President Obama and Prime Minister Hatoyama of Japan a letter signed by more than 500 organizations demanding the immediate closure of Futenma and the cancellation of plans to relocate it to Henoko Bay . “Destroying the environmental and social well-being of an area, even in the name of 'national or global security,' is itself like actively waging warfare against nature and human communities,” explained Network for Okinawa member, Peter Galvin, conservation director at the Center of Biological Diversity. On April 25, members of the network rallied in front of the Japanese Embassy here. They demonstrated to demand immediate closure of Futenma and to oppose new military base construction at any site in Okinawa, including the island of Tokunoshima, a small northern island in the Ryukyu archipelago historically a part of Okinawa.) The U.S. demonstration was in solidarity with more than 90,000 Okinawans who marched on the same date. The network and its Tokyo-based affiliated coalition, the Japan-U.S. Citizens for Okinawa Network (JUCON) placed a full-page ad this week in the Washington Post. JUCON (http://jucon.exblog.jp/) is a coalition of Okinawa and Japan-based non-governmental organizations, citizens groups, journalists and individuals. “The Washington Post ad will draw attention to this critical issue. It will put pressure on both Washington and Tokyo to do the right thing: respect the democratic desires of the Okinawan people and the fragile environment of this beautiful island,” said John Feffer, spokesperson for Network for Okinawa. The Network for Okinawa, which is sponsored by the Institute for Policy Studies, has established a website ClosetheBase.org. A petition you can sign in support is on the website, as it’s the organization’s “Solidarity Statement.” Members of the network include American Conservative Defense Alliance, American Friends Service Committee, Center for Biological Diversity, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Greenpeace, Institute for Policy Studies, Just Foreign Policy, Pax Christi USA, The United Methodist Church, Veterans for Peace, and Women for Genuine Security.

6. Case outweighs.a. Magnitude-b. Time frame- c. Probability- This is the most important way to examine impact analysis, they could say

aliens landing on earth would wreak havoc and cause extinction, but impacts of {insert specific advantage impacts here} are actually real world and probable.if there’s even a 1% more of a chance that our mpacts are going to happen, you vote aff.

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361AR extensions Plan Unpopular

1. Extend that utilities-only bill won’t pass- the GOP blocks it. That wiener. It specidfies that the bill lacks 60 votes.This is a reason why, even if we do affect Cap and Trade getting passed, the impacts are inevitable, because the GOP opposes the bill, so it will never be passed anyways.

2. Extend that US citizens support closing Futenma. That’s our general board of church and society evidence. US citizens want democracy for Japan and over 500 orginizations demand that troops be sent home.

3. Futemna Withdrawal is popular – empirics proveDanann 6/2 (Sharon Danann, Staff Writer, Huge protests demand U.S. leave Okinawa air base) http://www.workers.org/2010/world/okinawa_0617/

Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama had promised before taking office last year that he would make the Pentagon close a U.S. Marine base on Okinawa called the Futenma Air Station. It got him a lot of votes, especially in Okinawa, a group of islands occupied by the U.S. after World War II but “reverted” to Japan in 1972. Once Hatoyama was elected, however, the U.S. government put heavy pressure on him to go back on his pledge to the Japanese people. Hatoyama finally caved in April and agreed to keep the Futenma base.

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http://www.workers.org/2010/world/okinawa_0617/


372AC Jobs Bill [Link Turn] [1/2]

1. Unemployment extensions unlikely to go throughDeborah Tracy (writer for the Daily World, 7/4/10, http://www.thedailyworld.com/articles/2010/07/04/local_news/doc4c302a1f5fbcc511812301.txt)Holidays continue to pass, but the American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010 hasn’t. Three times since Memorial Day, Senate Democrats have submitted different versions of the legislation. As the Senate goes into the July 4 break, the bill has not yet received the required number of votes for passage. And, many Capitol observers aren’t optimistic about its chances to pass before the August recess. The stalling of this bill in the Senate — for eight weeks and counting — means more than 1.2 million Americans who have been out of work for six months or longer will lose their unemployment benefits, and that figure will rise to 2 million by July 10, several days before the senators return from their holiday break.

2. No jobs bill—Democrats not on board. Jake Sherman, staff writer, 7-3-2010. [Politico, Dems in a jam as economy slows, http://fredericksburg.com/News/Web/politico?p_id=2342]President Barack Obama and the Democrats head into the summer campaign season with the economy slowing, unemployment flirting with double-digits — and few options for a quick fix. Obama’s economic stimulus plan is winding down, right when Democrats need it most. And a big new jobs bill? Forget it. House Democrats had to battle this week just to pass a bill to prevent teachers from being laid off, over the objections of 15 mostly conservative House Democrats and even Obama, who threatened a veto over how the House planned to pay for it.

3. No spillover- no law maker has decided to vote against a bill because he voted for a bill he did not want to

4. US Citizens Support Closing FutenmaGeneral Board of Church and Society; 4/28/10; Close Okinawa U.S. Marine base; Accessed Online; 6/30/10; http://www.umc-gbcs.org/site/apps/nlnet/content.aspx?c=frLJK2PKLqF&b=5963905&ct=8214817WASHINGTON, D.C. — The United Methodist General Board of Church & Society is part of a U.S.-Japan coalition demanding closure of the Futenma U.S. Marine Corps base in Okinawa and opposing construction of new bases in Okinawa.The Network for Okinawa has drawn together representatives from peace groups, environmental organizations, faith-based organizations, academia, and think

tanks to support these goals. The coalition represents hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizens concerned about democracy and environmental protection in Okinawa. Destroying the environmental and social well-being of an area … is itself like actively waging warfare

against nature and human communities. On April 23, the Washington-based coalition sent President Obama and Prime Minister Hatoyama of Japan a letter signed by more than 500 organizations demanding the immediate closure of Futenm a and the cancellation of plans to relocate it to Henoko Bay. “Destroying the environmental and social well-being of an area, even in the name of 'national or global security,' is itself like actively waging warfare against nature and human communities,” explained Network for Okinawa member, Peter Galvin, conservation director at the Center of Biological Diversity. On April 25, members of the network rallied in front of the Japanese Embassy here. They demonstrated to demand immediate closure of Futenma and to oppose new military base construction at any site in Okinawa, including the island of Tokunoshima, a small northern island in the Ryukyu archipelago historically a part of Okinawa.) The U.S. demonstration was in solidarity with more than 90,000 Okinawans who marched on the same date. The network and its Tokyo-based affiliated coalition, the Japan-U.S. Citizens for Okinawa Network (JUCON) placed a full-page ad this week in the Washington Post. JUCON (http://jucon.exblog.jp/) is a coalition of Okinawa and Japan-based non-governmental organizations, citizens groups, journalists and individuals. “The Washington Post ad will draw attention to this critical issue. It will put pressure on both Washington and Tokyo to do the right thing: respect the democratic desires of the Okinawan people and the fragile environment of this beautiful island,” said John Feffer, spokesperson for Network for Okinawa. The Network for Okinawa, which is sponsored by the Institute for Policy Studies, has established a website ClosetheBase.org. A petition you can sign in support is on the website, as it’s the organization’s “Solidarity Statement.” Members of the network include American Conservative Defense Alliance, American Friends Service Committee, Center for Biological Diversity, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Greenpeace, Institute for Policy Studies, Just Foreign Policy, Pax Christi USA, The United Methodist Church, Veterans for Peace, and Women for Genuine Security.

5. FIAT solves the link- we get to FIAT that the plan passes, and we define FIAT as a unanimous passage of the bill making it look like a huge win for Obama giving him the political capital he needs to pass the jobs bill.

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382AC Jobs Bill [Link Turn] [2/2]

6. Winners win – Star this card. It’ll blow their face offRACHMAN 10 – 12 – 09 Financial Times chief foreign affairs commentator[Gideon Rachman, Obama must start punching harder, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/940c78c8-b763-11de-9812-00144feab49a.html?nclick_check=1]Just five years ago, Barack Obama was still a local politician in Illinois, preparing for a run for the US Senate. His office wall in Chicago at the time was decorated with the

famous picture of Muhammad Ali standing over Sonny Liston, after knocking him out in a heavyweight title fight. Ali famously boasted that he could “float like a butterfly and sting like a bee.” But now that Mr Obama is president, he seems to float like a butterfly – and sting like one as well. The notion that Mr Obama is a weak leader is now spreading in ways that are

dangerous to his presidency. The fact that he won the Nobel Peace Prize last Friday will not change this impression. Peace is all very well. But Mr Obama now needs to pick a fight in public – and win it with a clean knock-out. In truth, the Norwegians did the US president no favours by giving him the peace prize after less than a year in office. The award will only embellish a portrait of the president that has been painted in ever more vivid colours by his political enemies. The right argues that Mr Obama is a man who has been wildly applauded and promoted for not doing terribly much. Now the Nobel committee seems to be making their point for them. The rightwing assault on the president is based around a number of slogans that are hammered home with damaging frequency: Obama the false Messiah; Obama, the president who apologises for America; Obama, the man who is more loved abroad than at home; Obama,

the man who never gets anything done; Obama the hesitant; Obama the weak. Of course, this is the kind of stuff that was always going to be hurled at a liberal, Democratic president by the Republicans. The danger for Mr Obama is that you are beginning to hear echoes of these charges from people who should be the president’s natural supporters. One leading European politician warns that Mr Obama is looking weak on the Middle East: “If he says to the Israelis ‘no more settlements’, there have got to be no more settlements.” And yet it is the White House, not the Israeli government, that has backed down. Even before the Nobel announcement, liberal American columnists were sounding increasingly sceptical about the man they once supported with such enthusiasm.

Richard Cohen wrote in the Washington Post that the president “inspires a lot of affection but not a lot of awe. It is the latter , though , that matters most in international affair s where the greatest and most gut-wrenching tests await Obama”. Now Saturday Night Live – the slayer of Sarah Palin – has turned its fire on President Obama, portraying him a do-nothing president. How has this impression built up? The promise of bold changes of policy

on the Middle East and Iran – without much to show for it – has not helped. The public agonising over policy towards Afghanistan has been damaging. The slow pace of progress on healthcare has hurt . Even the president’s strengths can begin to look like weaknesses. His eloquence from a public platform has begun to contrast nastily with his failure to get things done behind the scenes. I winced when I heard him proclaim from the dais at the United Nations that “speeches alone will not solve our problems”. This, from a man who was due to give three high-profile speeches in 24 hours in New York. I winced again, when Muammer Gaddafi of Libya told the UN that he would be happy “if Obama can stay forever as the president”. Obviously, the gloom can be overdone. Mr Obama has been dealt a very difficult hand. He arrived in office when the entire global financial system was still shaking. The American economy remains in deep trouble. The president inherited two wars that were going badly and a deep well of international resentment towards the US. The Nobel committee’s decision was silly, but it reflected something real – the global sense of relief that the US now has a thoughtful, articulate president, who has some empathy for the world outside America. Mr Obama’s conservative critics might deride him as “Hamlet” because of his indecision over Afghanistan. But President Hamlet is still preferable to President George W. Bush. At

least Mr Obama makes decisions with his head, rather than his gut. It is worth remembering that the presidency of Bill Clinton also got off to a very rocky start. Mr Clinton failed over healthcare, blundered around over gays in the military (an issue that President Obama is now

revisiting) and suffered military debacles in Somalia and Haiti. And yet he went on to be a successful president. Mr Obama has not yet suffered setbacks comparable to the early Clinton years – and he still has plenty of time to turn things around. But momentum matters. The president badly needs a quick victory or a lucky break. He also needs to show that, at least sometimes, he can inspire fear as well as affection. Mr Obama can charm the birds off the trees. He can inspire crowds in Berlin and committees in Oslo. But – sad to say – he also needs to show that he can pack a punch.

7. Double dip recession won’t happenBusinessWeek 7/2 (Rebecca Christie, Carol Massar, 7/2/10, " White House's Romer Sees No Sign of a Double-Dip Recession ", http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-02/white-house-s-romer-sees-no-sign-of-a-double-dip-recession.html)July 2 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. economy doesn't show signs that it will relapse into another recession , said Christina Romer, President Barack Obama's chief economist. “We certainly do not see any sign of that in the data,” said Romer, who chairs the White House's Council of Economic Advisers, in an interview on Bloomberg Television today. “We're anticipating moderate growth.” The U.S. economy lost 125,000 workers in June while adding 83,000 private-sector jobs, according to Labor Department data released earlier today. Private employers hired fewer workers than forecast, and overall payrolls fell because of a drop in federal census workers. “It's not good enough but it is very much in the direction of slow steady expansion,” Romer said. She said Obama would keep “plugging away” to encourage Congress to approve extended unemployment benefits and aid for small business and local governments.

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39

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402AC Jobs Bill [Impact Turn]

1. No jobs bill—Democrats not on board. Jake Sherman, staff writer, 7-3-2010. [Politico, Dems in a jam as economy slows, http://fredericksburg.com/News/Web/politico?p_id=2342]

President Barack Obama and the Democrats head into the summer campaign season with the economy slowing, unemployment flirting with double-digits — and few options for a quick fix.Obama’s economic stimulus plan is winding down, right when Democrats need it most. And a big new jobs bill?Forget it. House Democrats had to battle this week just to pass a bill to prevent teachers from being laid off, over the objections of 15 mostly conservative House Democrats and even Obam a , who threatened a veto over how the House planned to pay for it.

2. Fiat solves the link, it’s a tool we use so we can pretend to ignore the political process.

3. No internal link, even the great depression didn’t lead to the extinction of the

4. No impact- Double dip recession won’t happenBusinessWeek 7/2 (Rebecca Christie, Carol Massar, 7/2/10, " White House's Romer Sees No Sign of a Double-Dip Recession ", http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-02/white-house-s-romer-sees-no-sign-of-a-double-dip-recession.html)

July 2 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. economy doesn't show signs that it will relapse into another recession , said Christina Romer, President Barack Obama's chief economist. “We certainly do not see any sign of that in the data,” said Romer, who chairs the White House's Council of Economic Advisers, in an interview on Bloomberg Television today. “We're anticipating moderate growth.” The U.S. economy lost 125,000 workers in June while adding 83,000 private-sector jobs, according to Labor Department data released earlier today . Private employers hired fewer workers than forecast, and overall payrolls fell because of a drop in federal census workers. “It's not good enough but it is very much in the direction of slow steady expansion , ” Romer said. She said Obama would keep “plugging away” to encourage Congress to approve extended unemployment benefits and aid for small business and local governments.

5. TURN: Jobs Bill causes a decline in the economy.Michael Tanner, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “Rethinking Jobless Benefits” 6-25-10, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11915

Yet, a closer look reveals that extending unemployment benefits may do more harm than good. First, of course, there is the cost — and the fact that we don't have the money to pay that cost. Extending unemployment benefits will cost $47 billion. While that seems trivial compared with, say, a new $2 trillion health care program, it is a steady stream of these expenditures that adds up to a $13 trillion national debt. The money Congress borrows to spend on unemployment benefits today will have to be paid back by taxing workers and employers down the road. This slows economic growth and leads to fewer jobs in the future. Therefore, whatever help we give workers today comes at the expense of workers tomorrow. While old-fashioned Keynesian economists believe that extending unemployment benefits helps stimulate demand by pumping money into the economy, research by MIT's Jonathan Gruber and others suggests

that only a portion of unemployment benefits goes to consumption. In fact, a Heritage Foundation study concluded that unemployment benefits add only a few cents to economic growth for every dollar spent. Virtually any other use of that money would provide more bang for the buck. But perhaps most important, extending unemployment benefits may be bad for workers in the here and now. A large body of economic evidence suggests that extending unemployment benefits increases unemployment and keeps people out of work longer. This is because workers are less likely to look for work, or accept less-than-ideal jobs, as long as they are protected from the full consequences of being unemployed. That is not to say that anyone is getting rich off unemployment, or that unemployed people are lazy. But it is simple human nature that people are a little less motivated as long as a check is coming in.

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412AC Kan Credibility [1/2]

1. Financial reform at the top of Kan’s agendaReuters 6/21/2010(“Tax hikes spur growth, end deflation says Japan PM advisor” http://www.cnbc.com/id/37816614)

Kan, 63, who has made fiscal reform a top priority since taking office this month, has cited a possible doubling of the sales tax to 10 percent to curb Japan's debt, which is twice the size of its GDP, the worst in the developed world. Ono became acquainted with Kan a decade ago and has advised him on economic policy in earnest since taking up the job at the Cabinet Office in

February. Ono, 59, said the income and inheritance tax rates also need to be raised so the rich shoulder more of the tax burden.

2. Kan needs to pass popular policies to pass fiscal reform. Linda Sieg, director of a team of reporters responsible for covering politics, diplomacy, social and security policies, former Chief Economics Correspondent, Japan, 7/9/2010 (“SCENARIOS-Japan DPJ may stumble in vote, fiscal reform at risk,” http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTOE66803U20100709, 7/10/2010)

Voter support for the Democrats has rebounded dramatically since Kan took over from his unpopular predecessor, Yukio

Hatoyama, improving the party's chances in the upper house poll. The Democrats will stay in power regardless of the

outcome next month given their huge majority in the lower house, but need to control the upper house to pass legislation easily. The opposition Liberal Democrats are proposing that Japan's sales tax -- low by global standards -- be raised to around 10 percent. Some economists say it should be as high as 20 percent. A 1 percentage point increase in the sales tax would boost revenues by about 2.5 trillion yen, according to Seiji Shiraishi, chief economist for Japan at HSBC Securities. The DPJ's Ishii said the government would not raise the sales tax before the next election for parliament's lower house, which must be held by late 2013 but could come sooner. Some strategists welcomed the Democrats' policy shift, likely to be reflected in a government fiscal reform plan to be unveiled on June 22, as a breakthrough. But others were sceptical. "Tax hikes often don't proceed as planned. Expectations towards fiscal restructuring are there because a new prime minister came into office, but such expectations may be dented once tax hike plans run into difficulties," said Koichi Ono, senior strategist at Daiwa Securities Capital Markets. The Democrats vowed to seek an early end to deflation through cooperation between the government and the Bank of Japan. They also pledged to do their best to keep fresh government government bond issuance in the fiscal year starting next April from exceeding the "level for fiscal 2010". But they did not specify the level of a Japanese government bonds (JGBs) cap, which might worry bond market investors. "Our basic stance is to compile (next fiscal year's) budget while keeping new JGB issuance from topping the amount planned in the initial budget (for this fiscal year)," said Goshi Hosono, acting secretary general of the party. But he added that the economy was a "living thing" and the government might need to act flexibly. The government planned to issue new JGBs worth 44.3 trillion yen

($485 billion) in its initial budget for the current fiscal year, but that could change. The rebound in voter support for the DPJ since pragmatist Kan

took over means the party now has a shot at winning an outright majority in the upper house , the DPJ's Ishii said.

"If a vote were held now, we'd get around 50 seats or so, but over the next month, if we appeal as the ruling party with proper policies and fight in the districts, attaining an outright majority is not impossible," he said. The party needs to win 60 of the 121 seats up for grabs in the 242-member chamber to take a majority without relying on current or new coalition partners to pass bills smoothly . (Additional reporting by Stanley White, Yoko Kubota and Shinichi Saoshiro; Writing by Linda Sieg; Editing by Nick Macfie)

3. US bases are hated by the Japanese public, that’s Hashimoto et al 5.

4. Kan’s financial reform package stimulates the seven main areas needed to solve the economy and deflation, that’s Wall Street Journal June 18.

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422AC Kan Credibility [2/2]

5. Kan is the right man to restore political credibility to the DPJ and pass their financial reformTobias Harris, a PhD candidate in political science at MIT, 6/3/2010; http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/03/japan-the-virtues-of-kan/print/

Kan has said fairly little over the years about foreign policy and Japan’s relations with the US and its neighbors. To the extent that he has talked about foreign policy, for instance on previous occasions that he led the DPJ, his views have been virtually at the center in terms of the spectrum of opinion within the DPJ. He as acknowledged the importance of the alliance and the US forward presence on multiple occasions, but when Koizumi was prime minister, he criticized the government for its slavish subservience to the US and for not balancing the US-Japan relationship with the other ‘pillars’ of Japanese foreign policy, multilateral cooperation at the UN and bilateral and multilateral relations within Asia. He isn’t exactly dovish, but he’s no hawk either. Accordingly, I would not be surprised if Okada Katsuya either stays on as foreign minister or

continues to play an important foreign policy role in another capacity. However, the details of Kan’s policy beliefs may be less important at this juncture than his biography. Given that he is a conviction politician, given his ministerial experience (something that Hatoyama lacked), and given his emphasis on open politics, Kan may be the right man to restore public trust in the DPJ-led government and lead his party to a respectable showing in next month’s upper house election. The central task for the Hatoyama government was the restore public faith in government after years of LDP

misrule. The central task for a Kan government would be to restore public faith in government after years of

LDP misrule — and nine months of Hatoyama misrule. If the public does not trust the government, it is difficult to see how Japan will escape its economic stagnation. As I’ve said before, if the public cannot trust the government to be honest about its intentions and forthright about how public money is spent, no government will be in a position to ask for something like a consumption tax increase. Kan certainly has

the right biography for this purpose — and having been a cabinet minister before, he should be more capable of managing the cabinet than Hatoyama was, avoiding the self-inflicted wounds that ultimately destroyed the Hatoyama government.

6. Sales tax good – necessary to deal with public debt and social security costs. Reuters 6/21/2010 (“Voters Divided as Japan PM eyes sales tax hike,” News Daily, http://www.newsdaily.com/stories/tre65k01u-us-japan-politics/, 7/7/2010)

Kan, who has advocated a "Third Way" economic strategy that would use increased tax revenue to spur new demand, stressed he was not

focusing on fiscal reform at the expense of growth. "I do not think that it is good if we merely rebuild fiscal conditions. For instance, if we raise the sales tax and use that to repay debt, that is a deflation policy," Kan said. "Instead, integrally implementing these three goals -- realizing growth, making social security stronger and rebuilding fiscal conditions -- would set the course to bring back a vigorous Japan." An adviser to Kan, Osaka University Professor Yoshiyasu Ono, told Reuters Japan should raise the sales tax and other taxes "substantially" from next year to create jobs and beat deflation, rather than seek more monetary easing. Debate on raising the sales tax, one of the lowest among major economies, has long been politically touchy. The last consumption tax increase, in 1997, was blamed by some for triggering

a recession that led to a long period of deflation. But many economists say an increase is unavoidable to deal with Japan's soaring public debt and fund the rising social security costs of a fast-aging population.

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431AR Kan Credibility [1/2]

1. Since taking office, Kan has made fiscal reform his number one priority, that’s Reuters 6/21.

And, Kan and the Japanese Government Bonds are making an increase in sales tax realistic.Reuters 6/22/2010 (“JGBs rise on stock fall, fiscal reform hopes,” http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTOE65L06D20100622, 7/10/2010)

In a sharp turnaround from his predecessor, new Prime Minister Naoto Kan has made fiscal reform a top priority ahead of a July 11 upper house election, vowing to consider doubling the 5 percent sales tax in a few years . "A hike

in consumption tax was politically taboo in the past. Now it is becoming more realistic. That's one reason behind JGBs' firmness," said Katsutoshi Inadome, fixed income strategist at Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley Securities.

And, Kan pushes tax hikes.Yuka Hayashi, reporter for The Wall Street Journal, and Takashi Nakamichi, writer for Dow Jones Newswires 6/24/2010; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704853404575323722651849494.html?KEYWORDS=Japan+fiscal+financial

Japan's new finance minister said he will push to increase taxes on high earners , not just to raise revenue but to narrow the country's income inequality. "I believe we are at a stage where a little bit of egalitarian thinking… should guide our tax policy," Yoshihiko Noda said Wednesday in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. "In that sense, our tax reform will be designed with an eye toward restoring its

income-redistribution function." While Prime Minister Naoto Kan and his aides have talked openly about raising the consumption tax, Mr. Noda's

added focus on income taxes suggests a more ambitious revenue-raising package is in the works . Earlier this year when he was finance minister, Mr. Kan endorsed a higher income tax. But Mr. Noda's comments were the first such public remarks from a top leader of the Kan administration. "Japan used to derive its strength from its deep and broad middle class, but unfortunately, the income gap has grown and so many people have been left behind," said the 52-year-old minister, alluding to widely cited data showing some growing pay disparities between households. "Restoring the middle class is key to rebuilding Japan's strength." Mr. Noda didn't discuss the specific timing or rate he was considering, but

said the government's tax panel will accelerate discussions on a broad tax-reform plan after parliamentary elections scheduled for July 11. The minister's comment comes as Mr. Kan's Democratic Party of Japan gears up for

the elections with a pledge to reduce the government's massive debts to avoid falling into a Greek-style debt crisis. Surprising voters, Mr. Kan said last week the nation's broad sales tax will be doubled from the current 5% , though it may take " two, three year or maybe longer" until the increase is implemented.

2. The DPJ has the lower house, but needs 10 more seats in the upper house in order to pass fiscal reform smoothly. To do this, they need to get rid of the US Okinawa base to gain credibility for Kan, that’s Sieg 7/9, Takara 5, and Kyodo News 6/11.

3. US bases are hated by the Japanese public because of helicopter crashes and rape, that’s Hashimoto et al 5.

And, Failure to kick the Americans out was political suicide for former Prime Minister Hatoyama.Etpako, 6/2. (Larisa Etpako, 6-2-10. “Japan seeks political stability after another prime minster resigns.” PBS News Hour,http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/06/japans-prime-minister-resigns.html)

Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama quit Wednesday after eight months in office, amid a campaign-funding scandal

and backlash from his decision not to relocate a U.S. Marine air base off Okinawa island .

Hatoyama's approval ratings plunged after he decided to uphold an agreement with the United States to keep the U.S. Marine Air Station Futenma on Okinawa, though move it to a different part of the island, outraging local residents there. His decision to step aside -- ahead of parliamentary elections on July 11 -- is viewed as an attempt to try to help his Democratic Party's chances at the polls

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http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/06/japans-prime-minister-resigns.html


441AR Kan Credibility [2/2]

And, Okinawans are angry with Kan’s pledge to let the Americans move their base to the top part of the island.BBC News 6-23-10, (“Japanese PM Apologizes from US Bases in Okinawa,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/asia_pacific/10388 407.stm)

Mr Kan was on his official first visit to Okinawa to mark 65 years since the end of a bloody World War II battle. His predecessor Yukio Hatoyama resigned earlier this month over the poor handling of a row over the relocation of the Futenma airbase. Mr Kan has assured US President Barack Obama he will relocate the base to the north of the island as agreed. His pledge comes despite anger from locals who have staged mass protests, demanding that it be moved off Okinawa

entirely. Islanders have been angered by incidents involving US troops based there, including the 1995 rape of a 12-year-old Japanese girl and a helicopter crash in 2004. Other complaints have focused on noise levels and objections to the US military use of Japanese land . Japan-US relations "On behalf of all of our people, I apologise for the burden," Mr Kan said, but added that it was integral to the "peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region." "I promise to seriously try all the more to reduce Okinawa's burden related to the US bases and eliminate the associated dangers."

4. Kan’s financial reform package stimulates the seven main areas needed to solve the economy and deflation, that’s Wall Street Journal June 18.

5. Based on his ministerial experience and his emphasis of open politics, Kan is the right man to restore credibility to the DPJ and pass fiscal reform, that’s Harris 6/3.

6. The sales tax is key to saving the public debt and social security. Even if it prolongs the recession a little bit, it saves the recession from becoming a depression.

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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/asia_pacific/10388


452AC Iran Redeployment DA [1/2]

1. U.S. Military Won’t Use Ground Forces Intervene in IranKennedy, Associated Press, 4-21

(Alex, “Military strike against Iran not an option yet, U.S. official says” http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/798485--military-strike-against-iran-not-an-option-yet-u-s-official-says)

The U.S. has ruled out a military strike against Iran's nuclear program any time soon, hoping instead negotiations and United Nations sanctions will prevent the Middle East nation from developing nuclear weapons, a top U.S. defence department official said Wednesday."Military force is an option of last resort," Undersecretary of Defence for Policy Michele Flournoy said during a press briefing in Singapore. "It's off the table in the near term."The U.S. and its allies fear Tehran is using its nuclear program to build arms. Iran denies the charges, and says its program only aims to generate electricity."Right now the focus is a combination of engagement and pressure in the form of sanctions," Flournoy said. "We have not seen Iran engage productively in response."Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was quoted Wednesday by Iran's state media saying the country won't give in to U.S. pressure. Iran's elite Revolutionary Guard is preparing to hold large-scale military manoeuvres in the strategic Strait of Hormuz."We've said time and again that we are not after weapons of mass destruction but the Iranian nation won't give in to such threats and will bring those threatening it to their knees," Khamenei said.Iran has rejected a 2009 UN-backed plan that offered nuclear fuel rods to Tehran in exchange for Iran's stock of lower-level enriched uranium. The swap would curb Tehran's capacity to make a nuclear bomb.But Iran has proposed variations on the deal, and Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said Tuesday that a fuel agreement could be a chance to boost trust with the West.Earlier this week, he said Iran wants direct talks about the deal with all the U.N. Security Council members, except one with which it would have indirect talks — a reference to the United States, which with Tehran has no relations.The U.S. is lobbying heavily in the Security Council for sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program.

2. No link – An attack on Iran would be an airstrike, will happen even with out extra troops.

3. Preemptive strikes are the only way to avoid nuclear war. They’d devastate Iranian nuclear development.

Leven 04 (Sam; University of Virginia, Cavalier Daily University Wire l/n)

If this doesn't work, however (and history has shown that sanctions often don't work), then other options must be examined. The American military is now overextended and overcommitted, so American military action in Iran would not be wise. However, what may be the wise course would be for the United States to step out of the way and allow Israel to make a preemptive airstrike to take out Iranian nuclear facilities. This kind of an attack would not unprecedented. In 1981, intelligence reports showed Iraq developing a nuclear facility in the western part of the country. Israel decided the threat of a nuclear Iraq was too great to ignore, and launched a preemptive strike on the site. The strike on Iraq was nearly universally condemned at the time. However, 10 years later, following the end of the First Gulf War, inspections discovered that Iraq was as few as six months away from having nuclear weapons, and American government officials began to say that had Israel not conducted the strike in 1981, Iraq would almost definitely have had nuclear weapons when it invaded Kuwait, creating results that would have been disastrous. While Iran's nuclear facilities are more spread out than Iraq's were in 1981, an Israeli strike would still be able to hit almost all, if not all, of the sites. The result would set Iran's nuclear development back to a point that it will no longer pose a significant nuclear threat to the rest of the Middle East. While there would likely be terrorist response to such action, the devastation of a terrorist response will be nothing compared to the devastation of these same terrorists getting hold of Iranian nuclear weapons. Iran itself will not militarily respond as its own military is simply too weak to compete with an Israeli military that has consistently shown itself to be the most powerful in the Middle East, and the Iranian government is pragmatic enough to understand the futility of such a response. While there would be a lot of shouting, and this action is certainly undesirable, an Israeli strike on Iran may very well prove to be the only way to save the Middle East from a true disaster involving nuclear weapons. That is, if the United States is willing to let it happen.

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462AC Iran Redeployment DA [2/2]

4. Construction of bases in Afghanistan to begin, just the beginning of a shift on US troops from Iraq to Afghanistan

Tony Perry, journalist for The Los Angeles Times, February 14, 2009, http://latimes.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2009/02/post.html

More indication that Iraq is the past and Afghanistan is the future for the U.S. military. Seabees who have been attached to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in Anbar province in Iraq have redeployed to Afghanistan to work with U.S. and NATO troops. The Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7 from Gulfport, Miss., will build bases for a troop buildup in southern Afghanistan. First order of business: to build a 430-acre forward operating base in Helmand province. The Seabees, said Lt. Cmdr. James Brown, are ideal for the Afghanistan mission. They know how to not only build but to build in hostile areas."

5. If troops were deployed to Iran they would come from Iraq not Japan

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472AC Security [1/3]

1. The neg must defend the status quo or a competitive policy option – Critical frameworks change the entire focus of the debate and destroy the entirety of the 1AC. Allowing the aff to have the choice of frameworks solves back their education arguments.

2. Perm do both (optional)Perm solves- rejection is counterproductive, only the perm is able to de-securitizeOle Waever,senior researcher for Peace and Conflcit Reaserch, 1996, On security, ed Ronie D. Lipschutz, pg. 56-7 http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz13.html. An agenda of minimizing security in this sense cannot be based on a classical critical approach to security, whereby the concept is critiqued and then thrown away or redefined according to the wishes of the analyst. The essential operation can only be touched by faithfully working with the classical meaning of the concept and what is already inherent in it. The language game of security is, in other words, a jus necessitatis for threatened elites, and this it must remain. Such an affirmative reading, not at all aimed at rejecting the concept, may be a more serious challenge to the established discourse than a critical one, for it recognizes that a conservative approach to security is an intrinsic element in the logic of both our national and international political organizing principles. By taking seriously this "unfounded" concept of security, it is possible to raise a new agenda of security and politics. This further implies moving from a positive to a negative agenda, in the sense that the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization can never be captured so long as we proceed along the normal critical track that assumes security to be a positive value to be maximized.

3. Rejecting doesn’t solve for existing governmental discourse. At best it only prevents future discourse which means security rhetoric exists in the world of the alternative and it doesn’t solve because the impacts are inevitable. Evan Branden Montgomery, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 2006, p. 151-2 “Breaking out of the Security Dilema: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty.” Defensive realism's main observations indicate that hard-line policies often lead to self-defeating and avoidable consequences. If so, then conciliatory policies should have the opposite effect. Several scholars have elaborated this intuitive logic. Drawing on rational-choice deterrence theory, 3 cooperation theory, 4 and Charles Osgood's GRIT strategy, 5 they argue that benign states can reveal their motives, reassure potential adversaries, and avoid unnecessary conflict with costly signals—actions that greedy actors would be unwilling to take. In particular, by engaging in arms control agreements or unilateral force reductions, a security seeker can adopt a more defensive military posture and demonstrate its preference for maintaining rather than challenging the status quo. This argument generates an obvious puzzle, however: If states can reduce uncertainty by altering their military posture, why has this form of reassurance been both uncommon and unsuccessful ? Few states, for example, have adopted defensive weapons to de-escalate an arms race or demonstrate their intentions, 7 and repeated efforts to restrain the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union either failed or produced strategically negligible agreements tha t, at least until its final years, "proved incapable of moderating the superpower rivalry in any deep or permanent way." How can scholars and policymakers understand why states often avoid military reassurance, when they choose to undertake it, why it fails, and when it can succeed? In 1906 Britain tried to prevent a further escalation of its naval race with Germany by decreasing the number of battleships it planned to construct, but this gesture was unreciprocated and the competition continued. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union substantially reduced its conventional forces, yet the United States did not view these reductions as proof of benign motives.

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http://muse.jhu.edu.ezp1.harvard.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2montgomery.html#FOOT7%23FOOT7





482AC Security K [2/3]

4. Turn: The neg stereotypes policy – The USFG productively uses Representations to End Foreign Interference – This is substantially more productive than their criticismMorten Valbjørn, PhD in the Department of Political Science @ Aarhus, ‘4 [Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict, “Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” p. 65-6]

The reason why the problems concerning Blindness to the Self is also relevant in this connection is not due to any lack of awareness of the representer's place in representations of Otherness. Rather, the problem is to be found in the manner in which this issue is addressed. The thorough self-consciousness associated with the relational conception of culture is thus brought about by means of a radical constructivism, which, at least in its most outspoken versions, seems to replace a possibly naïve subject/object separation by an almost solipsistic subjectivism equivalent to Wight's "subject = fi" formula in

the above. This radical constructivism is quite evident among IR's "dissident thoughts" and can also be recognized in statements by Said such as: "Orientalism responded more to the culture that produced it than to its putative object, which was also produced by the West" (1995: 22). However, first does it make sense to perceive representation as part of either a construction of identities or of some kind of subtle performance of power, and, second, is it really possible to represent the Other at one's own discretion? With regard to the first question, the almost unambiguously negative and rather monolithic depiction of "Western" representations of the Middle East that can to be found among proponents of the relational conception of culture seems to some extent to be based on a rather problematic stereotyping , far from the more balanced accounts by, for instance, Rodinson (1974, 1987). By presenting the orientalist scholarship in a very stereotyped and caricatured way, Said, for instance, almost ends up doing to the orientalists what he accuses orientalist scholarship of having done to Middle Eastern societies (Brimnes, 2000). Furthermore, it is anything but obvious that representations produced as part of the performance of power must necessarily be regarded as unreliable and without value as such. Halliday, among others, criticized this understanding and argued that the relationship between the origin and the validity of a discovery is more ambiguous than one might think: "the very fact of trying to subjugate a country would to some degree involve producing an accurate picture of it" (1995: 213). Regarding the second question, advocates of the relational conception of culture easily leave the impression that the way the Other is represented almost exclusively depends on the representer while the represented appears more or less as an empty and passive object onto which all kinds of conceivable fantasies and ideas can be projected. However, Bhabha, for instance, suggested that instead of regarding the representation of Otherness as a "hegemonic monologue" where the Other is a passive object on which all thinkable fantasies and conceptions can be projected-such as it sometimes seems to he the case in the works of, for example, Said and Campbell-we might rather think of it as a hybrid dialogue, though seldom equal nor without power plays (Bhabha, 1997; Keyman, 1997; Brimnes, 2000). Furthermore, the representation of Otherness has often had far more ambiguous effects than what this approach's advocates usually would acknowledge. Sadiq al-Azm, for example, coined therefore the notion of "Orientalism in reverse." Here, the classic essentialist and problematic Orient /Occident discourse allegedly used to legitimize imperialism is reversed and applied to the struggle for an end of foreign interference. In the Middle Eastern context, this is visible in Arab Nationalism, as well as among radical Islamist movements, in which the criticism of foreign (in)direct influence is often based on the argument of an allegedly unique Islamic or Arab culture (Azm, 2000). When advocates of the relational conception of culture seek to counter the prevailing lack of selfconsciousness within the universalist IR mainstream, as well as among proponents of the essentialist conception, it thus seems that they unintentionally have turned into what most of all appears as a narcissist self-centeredness. Apparently they lack enough concern for how the representation of Otherness is not only about the representer's projections, desires, fantasies, and so on. This kind of (over)reaction also seems to influence their ability to relate to Otherness in a more substantial way.

5. Perm do the plan and the actions as a focal point of resistance for the alternative. No mindset change of the public has ever worked unless it was anchored in the political sphere

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492AC Security K [3/3]

6. Our security discourse doesn’t affect policies. There’s a gap between public discourse and policy making. Elites will always make calculations based on powerMearsheimer 01 (John Mearsheimer, Professor at University of Chicago, 2001, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Page 25)Because Americans dislike realpolitik, public discourse about foreign policy in the United States is usually couched in the language of liberalism. Hence the pronouncements of the policy elites are heavily flavored with optimism and moralism. American academics are especially good at promoting liberal thinking in the marketplace of ideas. Behind closed doors, however, the elites who make national security policy speak the language of power, not that of principle, and the United States acts in the international system according to the dictates of realist logic. In essence, a discernable gap separates public rhetoric from the actual conduct of American foreign policy.

7. Perm do the plan in the mindset of the alternative

8. Security is good - Security Means Human Emancipation not Mere Survival - Providing Safety Create Opportunities For FlourishingKen Booth, Prof. of IR @ Wales, ‘5 [Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 22]The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity, as a life determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to that extent their life choices and chances are taken awa y; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats - whether these are the lack of food for one’s children or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is that a degree of security creates life possibilities. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in people’s lives. This allows for individual and collective human becoming - the capacity to have some choice about living differently - consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusions follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, security is synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore more than mere animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the possibility to explore human becoming , As an instrumental value, security is sought because it frees people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a level of security - and security is always relative - gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to chose to be or become , other than merely survival as human biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological

9. No link- removing troops does not mean that we are securitizing the threat we are in the mindset they are attacking.

10. Case outweighs Timeframe-Probability Magnitude

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501AR Security K Extensions

2AC 3- The alternative doesn’t stop government discourse of security because it will inevitably lead to self-defeating consequences. Empirically states that try to reduce their military posturing get dominated by states that refuse to engage in such rejection- that creates a greater security threat turning the alternative

2AC 4- By trying to remove ourselves from such discourse of security we inevitably stereotype policy- only the USFG can end such interference because the individual will always link back to their own criticisms. Securitizing threats is much more productive to engage in because it avoids the circular logic of critiquing security.

2AC 5- This is the focal point perm- we do the plan without the mindset of the alternative and then we evaluate it after the action has taken place. In doing so we can finally understand how that action was connected to the mindset they are attacking- by doing this we anchor the change into the political sphere and are able to gain more support for the alternative. This solves better because we move it out of a small two person resistance and onto the national stage where all future policies can be done in the mindset of the alternative. None of their offense of why the perms are bad link to this permutation because we do the Kritik fully, but we gain better solvency by critically focusing on what happened to the aff, which is acting like bait.

2AC 8- Security creates the possibility for humans to be set free from the bonds of death- refusing to securitize threats binds people into a world or nothingness and destroys the safety of life. Only in the safety can people further the meaning of life.

2AC 10- Case outweighs

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512AC Gender K [1/2]

1. The neg must defend the status quo or a competitive policy option – Critical frameworks change the entire focus of the debate and destroy the entirety of the 1AC. Allowing the aff to have the choice of frameworks solves back their education arguments.

2. Perm do both

3. K doesn’t turn the Case- Gender is not the root cause of war Cockburn 10, Cynthia Department of Sociology, The City University London, UK b Centre for the Study of Women andGender, University of Warwick, UK (2010) 'Gender Relations as Causal in Militarization and War', International Feminist Journal of Politics, 12: 2, 139 — 157Second, war-fighting between two armies is only the tip of the iceberg, as it were, of an underlying, less immediate, set of institutions and relationships that can be understood as systemic. The author most often credited for the term ‘war system’ is

Betty Reardon. In her text Sexism and the War System she employs the term to refer to society in its entirety, ‘our competitive social order, which is based on authoritarian principles, assumes unequal value among and between human beings, and is held in place by coercive force’ (Reardon 1996: 10) While this accurately describes many modern societies, the women’s organizations I have studied, in so far as I have come to understand their analysis, do not in the main share Betty Reardon’s reduction of this social order to nothing other than a gender order. Few , I believe, would follow her in a belief that ‘patriarchy . . . invented and maintains war to hold in place the social order it spawned ’ (Reardon 1996: 12). Looking at war from close quarters these women activists see all too clearly that other forces are at work in addition to gender.

4. Perm do the plan and the actions as a focal point of resistance for the alternative. No mindset change of the public has ever worked unless it was anchored in the political sphere

5. No alt solvency - masculinised IR is the effect of gender in societyHooper, teacher of Gender politics and IR, lecturer at University of West England, 01[Charlotte, Manly States:Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics Columbia University Press, New York. p12-3]To mention just a few of these connections: international relations is a world of traditionally masculine pursuits —in which women have been, and by and large continue to be, invisible (Enloe 1990; Halliday 1991; Peterson and Runyan 1993, 1988). The focus on war, diplomacy, states, statesmen, and high-level economic negotiations has overwhelmingly represented the lives and identities of men. This is because of the institutionalization of gender differences in society at large and the consequent paucity of women in high offic e . Between 1970 and 1990, for example, women worldwide represented under 5 percent of heads of state, cabinet ministers, senior national policymakers, and senior persons in intergovernmental organizations (Peterson and Runyan 1993, 6). States have historically been oppressive to women, who have often been denied full citizenship. Rights and duties of citizenship have depended on the bearing of arms, a duty by and large confined to men (Stiehm 1982). Men form not only the decision makers, but also the law enforcers, backed by the threat of violen ce (Enloe 1987). In fact, masculine violence has become thoroughly embedded, institutionalized, and legitimized in the modern state (Connell 1990). Meanwhile, the rhetoric of nationalism has been found to be heavily gendered (Parker et al 1992), with national identity often being articulated through control over women (Kandiyoti 1992). Although many women have been active in national-liberation movements, nonetheless, nationalism has been found to have “a special affinity for male society [which] legitimizes the dominance of men over women ” (Steans 1998, 69).

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522AC Gender K [2/2]

6. Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

7. Turn- the alternative creates division between genders which destroys the world of the alternative Marysia Zalewski, Reader in the Centre for Women’s Studies, and Jane Parpart, professor of Gender Studiesat University of Dalhousie, 98 [The 'Man' Question in International Relations, Westview Press, Boulder, p76]

Central though this binary conception of gender is to much of Western thought, it presents an illusory dichotomous opposition between genders that obscures important distinctions within masculinity and femininity. Interestingly enough, once the idea of fractures within Western conceptions of masculinity and femininity is accepted, the division between what is masculine and what is feminine tends to be less clear . Fractures within masculinity have played a crucial part in defining the relationships between the two orthodox paradigms in IR: namely realism and liberal internationalism. The division of orthodox IR into two different masculine camps has led to a competition between two aspiring hegemonic masculinities over which is more masculine (real and objective) and which should be regarded as inferior and feminine (subjective and normative).

8. Perm do the plan in the mindset of the alternative- if the plan can result in the alternative then you vote aff because vague alternatives are abusive and destroy education and is a voter for fairness and education (rephrase)

9. Making individual security and autonomy the highest priority turns autonomy into anelement of masculine superiorityMona Harrington, Program Director of the MIT Workplace Center, “What Exactly Is Wrong with the LiberalState as an Agent of Change?” Gendered States ed. V. Spike Peterson, 1992 p. 69

In other words, liberalism, by making individual autonomy its highest value , by relying on contract as its primary process, and by not recognizing unchosen, group-based systemic inequalities among members of a society, sets in motion, perpetuates, and legitimizes a social Darwinist order within states and among states . And it is possible that the impetus (or an important part of it) behind this order is a childrearing dynamic that cultivates personal autonomy as a dominating element of masculinity, lending a crucial emotional push to a politics of separation . Thus, for its feminist critics, the liberal state is virtually fixed in a posture of competition and incipient violence. With autonomy at its heart, its behavior must be marked by boundedness, suspicion, hostility, and efforts to control whatever forces might threaten the sovereign self.

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53

1AR Gender K Extension 2AC 3- Gender is not the root cause behind war- even if gender plays a role there are other things such as poverty, proliferation, the economy, agriculture, water, and so on that play larger roles. Attacking gender as the only reason behind war is stating that the tip of an iceberg is all that is there.

2AC 4- This is the focal point perm- we do the plan without the mindset of the alternative and then we evaluate it after the action has taken place. In doing so we can finally understand how that action was connected to the mindset they are attacking- by doing this we anchor the change into the political sphere and are able to gain more support for the alternative. This solves better because we move it out of a small two person resistance and onto the national stage where all future policies can be done in the mindset of the alternative. None of their offense of why the perms are bad link to this permutation because we do the Kritik fully, but we gain better solvency by critically focusing on what happened to the aff, which is acting like bait.

2AC 7- Their alternative tries to split up what is and what is not gendered creating a world of more gender in the world of alternative. The alternative creates a world of hegemonic competition between the two sides causing more and more wars turning the Kritik altogether.

2AC 9- Constructing the world of the alternative by making security and autonomy the highest priority turns them into tools for the masculine to use in making themselves superior because it relies on creating contracts that decides for the unchosen group of people. Choosing for them creates a weaker group and a masculine group turning the alternative.

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542AC Pass Kan Financial Reform CP

1. Perm do both

2. Solvency deficits-A. The CP can’t solve the global instability advantage- troop withdrawal key to a reduction in US Japan relations solving for Chinese and Russian aggression. B. Agenda- getting Kan more political capital to ensure that the environment; health care; trade and business with other Asian countries; tourism and revitalization of regional economies; science and technology; job training and employment opportunities can pass. C. Watered down- cross apply their watered down evidence- right now in the status quo the CP will pass a bill that is too weak to solve the economy turning the CP

3. International FIAT Bada. Not reciprocal – we only get the USFG, and the neg is allowed the entire world.b. Infinitely regressive – the neg is able to choose whatever country they want, we can’t predict whatever they’re going to say. c. Unfair Research burden– aff has to research 193 countries while the neg researches the USFG not fair because the burden is so much greater on the aff. d. Predictability – aff can’t predict what the neg will say because they have so much to choose from, makes it too hard to win the counterplan.e. Jurisdiction- real world policy makers only have the power to implement policies within their jurisdiction. (int’l actions not in your jurisdiction)f. Voter for fairness and education.

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552AC DOD CP [1/3]

1. Perm do both, remove the base through BRAC

2. Plan not key-Department of Defense will do everything necessary to stay in power.

Serwiech, 08 (Tom, State Department, December “DOD controls U.S. government” http://www.darkgovernment.com/news/dod-controls-us-government)

As military officers sought to take over the role played by civilian development experts abroad, Pentagon bureaucrats quietly populated the National Security Council and the State Department with their own personnel (some civilians, some consultants, some retired officers, some officers on "detail" from the Pentagon) to ensure that the Defense Department could keep an eye on its rival agencies. Vice President Cheney, himself a former secretary of defense, and his good friend Rumsfeld ensured the success of this seeding effort by some fairly forceful means. At least twice, I saw Cheney staffers show up unannounced at State Department meetings, and I heard other State Department officials grumble about this habit. The Rumsfeld officials could play hardball, sometimes even leaking to the press the results of classified meetings that did not go their way in order to get the decisions reversed. After I got wind of the Pentagon's dislike for the approved interagency anti-drug strategy for Afghanistan, details of the plan quickly wound up in the hands of foreign countries sympathetic to the Pentagon view. I've heard other, similarly troubling stories about leaks of classified information to the press.

3. Agents Counter plans Bad

A. Bad Education – Debating who should do it rather than should it be done

B. They use part of the USFG - takes Topical Ground

C. There is 15 federal departments – unpredictable actors

D Voter for fairness and education

4. The Plan is the CP, The USFG referred to in the plantext is the DOD thus the counterplan is not competitive

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http://www.dark/


562AC DOD CP [2/3]

5. Robert Gates is corrupt and trying to control the armyScarborough 7/8 (Rowan Scarborough, staff writer, Gates to the Military, 7/8/10) http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=37942

Defense Secretary Robert Gates is consolidating his power over who can speak and what they can say. The casualty will be candor about the wars America fights. Gates sent a memo last week ordering officers and officials not to talk to the press unless his personal staff approves. That was chilling enough. But Gates has sent other shut-up signals that leave the impression he wants his voice, and his message alone , to represent the Pentagon. The most onerous was a far-reaching gag-order he had top and mid-level officials sign during internal deliberations on the 2010 defense budget. With the threat of firings hanging over their heads, it essentially shut up the world's largest office building. The wide-ranging gag-order put off-limits for public discussion any "pre-decisional or otherwise, concerning the administration's deliberation of the nature and amounts of the President's budget for fiscal 2010, and any supplemental budget request submitted during the current fiscal year." Republicans, including Rep. Randy Forbes of Virginia, saw the silencing as a way for Gates to restrict information to Congress . "Can I expect a candid answer from a senior military official when I ask them about the process used to establish priorities, either now or after the president's detailed budget is released to the public?" Forbes and five other GOPers asked Gates in a letter. "Members of Congress deserve candid answers from senior military officers that are not suppressed or censored -- either directly, or implicitly via culture of regulations that muzzle their independent professional judgment." The gag-ordered stated, "I recognize that a significant factor in the successful and proper preparation and completion of the President's budget is the strict confidentiality that must be observed by all government participants in the planning, programming, and budgeting process, and that a failure to comply with these confidentiality requirements may compromise the administration's ability to formulate and submit its budget." Gates has cast his shadow in other ways. Four four-star generals have been fired on his watch. He fired Gen. T. Michael Moseley, the Air Force chief of staff, supposedly for weak controls over the nuclear arsenal. But Moseley allies suspect it was because the fighter pilot had emerged as the most outspoken Joint Chiefs members, one who was willing to push-back against Gates' air-power vision which included scuttling production of the vaunted F-22 stealth fighter. Gates fired Marine Corps Gen. Peter Pace, a big proponent of the war on terror and traditional values, by not giving him the customary second two-year term as Joint Chiefs chairman. He fired Gen. David McKiernan, the top commander in Afghanistan, then saw his replacement, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, fired by President Obama for indiscreet remarks to Rolling Stone

6. Gates will coup with powerBoyle 10 (Francis A. Boyle, Staff Writer, Gates threatens Obama with US Military Coup, 1/26/10) http://www.afterdowningstreet.org/node/49568

Obviously, Gates is sending a threat to Obama and the civilian “leadership” in America : You risk a military coup if you do not do exactly what we in the Pentagon tell you to do. This is no idle threat. And it can happen here in America. Just remember the plutocratic sponsored military coup attempt against President Franklin Roosevelt that was thwarted by retired Marine Corps General Smedley Butler under similar economic and political conditions. If it had succeeded that anti-FDR coup would have established a fascist dictatorship in America. I am not comparing Obama to FDR by any means. But the historical parallels should be obvious to everyone. And remember that Bush’s General Tommy Franks publicly stated that in the event of another major terrorist attack on America, the American people would demand that the military shut the civilian government down. In other words, Gen. Franks too publicly threatened a military coup against this Republic’s democratically elected civilian leadership.

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http://www.afterdowningstreet.org/node/49568

http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=37942

http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=37942


572AC DOD CP [3/3]

7. A coup is the single greatest threat to democracyHein Goemans and Nikolay Marinov 2008 (prof at Univ of Rochester NY and prof at Yale) "What Happened to the Coup d'Etat? International Responses to the Seizure of Executive Power" Page 4 http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/7/9/5/pages267958/p267958-4.php

Second, by now it is relatively well known that the dramatic expansion of democratic countries in the world in the course of the “third wave” of democratization has been accompanied by a steady drop in the average per capita income of the countries constituting the democratic club. Given earlier work on democratization and development, one would expect, at first blush, that new democracies will be unstable and prone to failure. Our work on coups suggests why representative institutions have survived ‘better than expected’ in conditions where they would otherwise have faltered. By one count, 3 out of every 4 failures of democracy between 1960 and 2001 resulted from a successful coup d’etat. 9 This makes coups the biggest single danger to democracy. To the extent that they have altered the calculus of coup-plotters, international reactions have contributed in an important way to the stability of otherwise fragile democracies. This finding contributes to the literature on the role of international factors for the emergence and survival of democracy

8. A U.S. Military Coup causes extinction, loss of world constitutions, terrorism, kills heg and nuclear warBacevich, Dulap, Kohn, Luttwak 06(A.J. Bacevich, Charles J., Jr. Dunlap, Richard H. Kohn, and Edward N. Luttwa, Military thinkers American coup d'etat:Military thinkers discuss the unthinkable, April 06) http://current.com/1d4js4c

LUTTWAK: Such a scenario would probably play out through a multi-stage transformation . After all, take any group of nice people on a trip; if five bad things happen to them in a row, they will end up as cannibals. How many adverse events are needed before a political system, arguably the most firmly rooted constitutional system in the history of the world, becomes uprooted? How many September 11ths, on what scale? How much panic, what kind of leadership? All of us can say that it is foolish to talk of a coup in the United States, but any of us could design a scenario by which a coup becomes possible.DUNLAP: If there were a massive attack by a nuclear weapon, or by some other weapon of mass destruction, the immediate crisis might require the use of the armed forces. But obviously there are plans for those scenarios, and if they're executed, then control would be maintained under the Constitution.

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http://current.com/1d4js4c

http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/7/9/5/pages267958/p267958-4.php


582AC X-O CP [1/2]

1. Perm do both

2. Executive Orders bypass all separation of powers, destroying the Constitution.Branum, Associate for Fulbright & Jaworski, 02Tara Branum, Associate for Fulbright & Jaworski, “President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America,” LexisNexus.com, 02

Congressmen and private citizens besiege the President with demands [*58] that action be taken on various issues. n273 To make matters worse, once a president has signed an executive order, he often makes it impossible for a subsequent administration to undo his action without enduring the political fallout of such a reversal. For instance, President Clinton issued a slew of executive orders on environmental issues in the weeks before he left office. n274 Many were controversial and the need for the policies he instituted was debatable. n275 Nevertheless, President Bush found himself unable to reverse the orders without invoking the ire of environmentalists across the country. n276 A policy became law by the action of one man without the healthy debate and discussion in Congress intended by the Framers. Subsequent presidents undo this policy and send the matter to Congress for such debate only at their own peril. This is not the way it is supposed to be.

3. Strong constitution needed to prevent on the fly decisions risking nuclear warHemesath, J.D./M.S.F.S. Georgetown, 2k(J.D./M.S.F.S. Georgetown University Law Center, School of Foreign Service, 2001; B.A. University of California at Los Angeles, 1996.88 Geo. L. J. 2473. Lexis Nexis Academic)

Politically, nuclear weapons wield such powerful and unique symbolic effects n70 that a decision regarding their offensive use--outside the context of a declared war or defensive maneuver--may fall under the ambit of congressional control as an act tantamount to a declaration of war. n71 Such political consequences may place the nuclear decision beyond mere tactical strategy intended for the judgement of the Commander in Chief alone. Professor Louis Henkin believes that Congress has the authority to decide the essential character of a war, and specifically, whether the conflict should be escalated to a nuclear level or not. n72 President Lyndon Johnson admitted that the decision to go nuclear is a "political decision of the highest order." n73 That nuclear engagement connotes a political decision, as opposed to a mere choice of weaponry, may place the nuclear decision beyond the scope of military decisions

normally reserved for the President alone. Regardless, proponents of the Executive position insist that nuclear weapons [*2484] are not constitutionally unique. n74 In support of their claim, nothing in the text of the Constitution indicates a special classification for particularly destructive weaponry, nor does the Constitution allow the Congress to override the President's choice of weapons. n75 Decisions regarding the type of weapons used in war are considered tactical--of a type supposed to be well within the scope of the Commander in Chief's power. n76 Furthermore, no congressional law or judicial decision has drawn an instructive distinction between nuclear and conventional weaponry. n77 Such a distinction would require artificial constructions distinguishing weapons systems that, despite differences of magnitude and technology, are basically designed to do the same thing. However, the lack of textual references to nuclear weapons in the Constitution does not adequately resolve the question of nuclear war authority. Although nuclear weapons as weapons are indistinguishable in literal constitutional terms, their uniquely pernicious and lingering effects may nevertheless define their offensive use as a quintessential act of war and thus constitutionally place them within the sphere of congressional war power via the War Powers Clause. As critics have noted, there currently exists no source of constitutional authority or judicial reasoning that would resolve this debate in favor of either side. n78

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592AC X-O [2/2]

4. The Supreme Court will Strike down the XOCooper, Professor for the University of Vermont, 02Phillip, Professor at the University of Vermont, “By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action,” p. 77

Despite the apparent deference by the judiciary to the president's orders, this chapter has plainly demonstrated any number of instances in which the White House has lost in court. Executive orders, both legal and illegal, can expose officials to liability. It is an old argument, developed long before the battle over the so-called Nuremberg defense, that illegal orders do not insulate a public official from liability for his or her actions. The classic example harks back to Little v. Barreme 13 1 during the Washington administration. Even legal orders can expose the government to liability. Though the federal courts have often upheld dramatic actions taken by the president during difficult periods, they have not been hesitant to support claims against the government later. The many cases that were brought involving the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency

5. Agents Counter plans BadA. Bad Education – Debating who should do it rather than should it be done

B. They use part of the USFG - takes Topical Ground

C. There is 15 federal departments – unpredictable actors

D Voter for fairness and education

6. The Plan is the president enacting it thus it is not competitive

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602AC Kick the US out CP [1/2]

1. Perm do both- have Japan demand the US leave and the US comply

2. International FIAT Bad a. Not reciprocal – we only get the USFG, and the neg is allowed the entire world.b. Infinitely regressive – the neg is able to choose whatever country they want, we can’t predict whatever they’re going to say. c. Unfair Research burden– aff has to research 193 countries while the neg researches the USFG not fair because the burden is so much greater on the aff. d. Predictability – aff can’t predict what the neg will say because they have so much to choose from, makes it too hard to win the counterplan.e. Jurisdiction- real world policy makers only have the power to implement policies within their jurisdiction. (int’l actions not in your jurisdiction)f. Voter for fairness and education.

3. Their solvency evidence says that we should foster an equal relationship between the US and Japan, while the net benefit says the opposite

4. The Japan Press Weekly is power tagged and just bad- the evidence says that if Japan demands the US leave then it will not be subservient to the US, the beginning of the card says that nations that have kicked the US out before still have a strong relationship with the US

5. LETS QUOTE THEIR OWN CARD- THIS IS THE Atanassova-Cornelis 10 The situation is different in the post-Koizumi era, however. Arguably to avoid marginalization as US-China relations continued to move in a positive direction,

(If you don’t read the global instability advantage- read this) 6. The US-Japan alliance prevents East Asian conflictMichael Mochizuki, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings, September 1996, JapanQuarterly p. 21In the context of East Asia, how closely Japan is in step with the United States will be an important factor in the calculations of potential aggressors. Any sign that these two powers are at odds during a crisis might tempt the provocative state to escalate tensions. This will increase the possibility of miscalculation and war. In other words, the odds of a peaceful resolution of crises will be greater when the United States and Japan stand together.

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612AC Kick the US out CP [2/2]

7. Conflict in East Asia triggers goes nuclearJonathan S. Landay, national security and intelligence correspondent, March 10, 2000, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, “Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts,” p. LexisFew if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster .” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia _ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources _ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

(If you read the instability advantage)6. We solve the internal link to the scenario- they are literally rereading out 1AC advantage- the aff says that troop removal sends the signal to Japan that we don’t like them anymore and that kills realtions- that’s DiFilippo 02.

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622AC Kick Out Counterplan [1/2]

1. Perm - have Japan ask the US to leave and the US to agree to it, this solves back the CP because Japan will be perceived as strong enough to kick the US out, and the resulting removal will hurt relations enough to trigger the net benefit.

2. Perm - do the CP- the counterplan and the plan are the same except for the affect on US-Japanese relations. First, the US leaves, then the Prime Minister gets credit for kicking the US out, then there are no more US weapons in Japan.

3. Doesn’t solve Japanese politics - the counterplan tells the US troops to drop everything and leave, this causes the troops to leave behind weaponry, causing loose nukes all over Japan. This guts Kan Credibility because he will be allowing his citizens to be playing with the same weapons that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

4. Doesn’t solve Japanese politics – Okinawa base issue will still derail his popularity, that’s Kyodo News.

5. Doesn’t solve heg, makes US look weak, and weak control over the military dooms hegemony and ensures failed operationsGregory Foster, professor at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, In These Times, August, 2007

Beyond the foregoing, the U.S. military almost invariably precipitates rather than prevents crisis; feeds perceptions abroad of American arrogance and hypocrisy, while undermining U.S. credibility and legitimacy;

threatens, in single-mindedly providing for the common defense, other important dimensions of security (liberty, justice, the general welfare); and permits itself to be an instrument for the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. In short, it is strategically dysfunctional. Add to this the following, and it is indeed a recipe for crisis:

consistently unsound strategic advice from senior military leaders; strategically inept civilian officials, executive and legislative, who have turned the hallowed principle of civilian control into civilian subjugation; a civically apathetic public that has acceded to uncompromising military demands for secrecy and failed to responsibly oversee the military’s overseers; an uncritical press that has declined to exact transparency and accountability from the military and its overseers; a weak, fragmented civil society, typified by a largely

moribund anti-war movement; and a military-industrial complex whose overweening influence on policymakers and policies has fed

militarism and corruption. Given this state of affairs, no longer can we, the people, give a free pass to a military institution that expects unconditional appreciation, unequivocal support, unquestioning trust, unlimited discretionary license and the absence of “meddling” by “amateurs.” Nor can we blindly trust those who profess to oversee the military on our behalf. The strategic price for doing so is one we cannot afford.

6. Doesn’t solve rearm bad, causes imperialism and China freak out.

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632AC Kick out CP [2/2]

7. Doesn’t solve rearm good, Japan kicking the US out would not be a loss of credibility, won’t cause rearm, that’s Sakurade 97.

8. Doesn’t solve global instability, Japan kicking out the US makes Japan look strong enough to fight China and Russia, destroys relations.Chungang Ilbo 2009 (“South Korean daily urges North to stop 'toying with missile,’” BBC, http://www.lexisnexis.com.lexproxy.minlib.net/us/lnlib/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9386679243&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9386679246&cisb=22_T9386679245&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=3, 5/20/10 LexisNexis)

Japan's enhancement of its military capacity will inevitably stimulate China and Russia as well as us. North Korea's missile will come back at it like a boomerang. An armament race will certainly put a burden on strong countries. But it will be a calamity to us and North Korea, because we have no chance of winning the armament race of strong countries. North Korea's missile blocks an opportunity for Northeast Asian countries to prosper together in peace.

9. Doesn’t solve oppression, Japan kicking out the US does not solve the feeling of being oppressed by the US and the Japanese government.

10. Doesn’t solve environment or the dugong, the US will just move to Guam and pollute the environment there.

11. International Fiat bad a. infinitely regressive – there are hundreds of countries the aff would have to be prepared for, destroys depth education and groundb. object fiat – if the neg can fiat that countries around the world can kick us out, they can fiat they won’t go to war, or that they won’t proliferate, destroying real world educationc. theory is a voter for fairness and education

12. Turn - The CP alone will trigger a massive nuclear strike by the US because we lease the land and if they violate the contract then the US would be angry.

13. Net benefit non unique – relations have been bad since WW2.

14. We access net benefit – we end the security agreement and the alliance by withdrawing troops, that’s Sakurade 97.

15. No net benefit - International courts will roll back the counterplan, relations don’t collapse over night they take time, and the whole time they will still be talking to one another, and even if it triggers the impact then the perm still solves.

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642AC Consult NATO CP [1/3]

1. Perm.- do the plan and consult NATO, but act even if NATO does not support.

2. The U.S. does not need NATO support to act- The U.S. needs to be able to act singly if need be (even if NATO says no to the U.S. withdrawal plan). Peters 93(1993, D., Thesaurus Acroasium on the Institute of Public international Law and International Relations of Thessaloniki, “Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management the Role of NATO”, Vol. XXIV, http://www.luisedruke.com/luise/book_thess/peters_529_540.pdf, DW)Mutual assistance treaties and treaties of guarantee containing binding clauses committing countries to take certain actions have proven to be too inflexible to efficiently cope with changing political challenges and were eventually responsible for

forcing countries into WW I. Thus, the modern alliance is no longer the classical alliance of rigid treaty formulations, rather the alliance of identical and complementary interests whose efficiency is determined more through the congruence of interests than through Treaty duties. As far as the relationship of NATO members to the UN is concerned Article 7 ensures that the rights and duties of member states in the context of the UN Charter are not touched. At the same time Article 8 guarantees that international involvement of NATO members will not interfere with their duties in the context of the NATO Treaty.

3. Perm do the plan and consult on all other issues

4. Even if Obama acts unilaterally now, he is not killing relations with NATO, as U.S. NATO relations are too strong to be broken. Taipai Times 09(4/2/09, Taipei Times, “US, Europe prepare to mark NATO’s 60th anniversary”, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2009/04/02/2003439965 , DW) The US and European nations together mark the 60th anniversary of NATO this week, but it is unclear whether all share the global ambitions for the world’s biggest military alliance. “The US is re-engaging with Europe and Europe is re- engaging with the US,” a US official at NATO said, ahead of the two-day summit starting tomorrow on the banks of the Rhine River marking the border between France and Germany. Francois Heisbourg, from the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, said: “[US] President Barack Obama’s administration wants to show a cooperative face to the world, notably with its usual European partners.” While much of the goodwill, from both sides of the Atlantic, has come since Obama won US elections in November, some, like Belgian strategy expert Joseph Henrotin, believe that relations have been improving for some time. “The real change in the United States as far as Europe is concerned dates back to the second mandate of [former US president] George W. Bush,” he said. Bush’s decision to launch war on Iraq in 2003 created huge divisions at NATO and amongst Europeans themselves, but in recent years “there has been an attitude [in Washington] that we cannot get by without the Europeans,” he said. This vision, though, contradicts the attitude of US neo-conservatives, who had long felt that many European nations were out of their league. Jeremy Shapiro, a researcher at the Brookings Institution, believes that Europe “is still a strategic player,” when it comes to deciding how and when force should be projected when needed. “It’s the view across the political spectrum that the US is not likely to find more effective and reliable partners in the world. And that is not going to change in the foreseeable future,” he said. NATO accounts for around 75 percent of the world’s military spending. But for the Euro-Atlantic partnership to continue a real mission is needed, 19 years after the Cold War. Even taking into account routinely tense relations with Russia, no direct military threat weighs on the European continent. One NATO officer said the alliance makes complete sense to Washington. “While the Europeans are looking for a guarantee of military [security] from the United States, the Americans are coming to look for political support from Europe for their undertakings , ” he said. “Because it operates based on unanimity, NATO is rather a millstone for the Americans,” he said. “But they stay to transform it into a global alliance meant to control states with bad intentions, while winning respect from Russia and, in the long term, to curb China.”

5. Wittes and Goldsmith ’09 card is too vague- doesn’t talk about how not consulting on one more issue will break US-NATO relations. There is no brink to the argument.

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6. NATO will say no to U.S. proposal. Hook 08-contributor to the International Studies Review journal (December 2008, Steven, “Review: Falling out: The United States in the Global Community”, International Studies Review, Vol. 10 No. 4, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121520292/PDFSTART, BD)This European discontent is the subject of Giovanna Dell’Orto’s provocative book, The Hidden Hand of the American Dream. Her central argument is that the United States has long been admired by Europeans as an ‘‘imagined community’’ that is more ‘‘a concept than a country.’’ Specifically, the United States has been historically perceived in Europe as a ‘‘land of plenty of opportunity that beckons people of goodwill everywhere’’ (p. 7). But this exceptionalist view was ruptured on two occasions: during the Spanish American War and during the Bush administration’s war on terror. In both cases, she finds, self-serving and aggressive US actions contradicted the government’s moralistic rhetoric. As a result, many Europeans were forced to abandon their perception of the United States as a benign hegemon . The disillusion that resulted was short-lived in the first case, as the United States regained its lofty reputation during the world wars. It is too early to tell how long the latest crisis of European confidence will last.

7. Consult CPs illegit a. Counter Interpretation: negative cannot run a consult argument because it does not solve predictability and topic specific education:b. There is an infinite amount if things the neg. could consult with, making it infinitely regressive, which the aff. cannot predict.c. Consult arguments are bad for debate because you don’t focus on “topic specific education.” Focus is drawn on topics outside the resolution, like whether NATO says yes when consulted.

On the Net Benefit: 1. TURN – NATO is overburdened – consulting will kill the allianceKober 09 – Research Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Cato Institute graduate of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and received his Ph.D.

from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. (Winter/Spring 09, Stanley, Global Dialogue, “NATO: The End of the Permanent Alliance”, http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=449, MEF)As if all these problems were not enough, NATO members now face the worst financial crisis since the alliance’s inception . Countries that were not meeting NATO’s target of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence before are certainly not going to meet it in the future. The implications for NATO have been underlined by its operational commander, General John Craddock. “They’re expecting to be asked to do more,” he told a press briefing in Washington in January 2009, referring to US allies. “I think it’s going to be harder for them to do it because of decreasing defense budgets .”18 Precisely. NATO’s problem has been the enunciation of strategy and the assumption of commitments without any reference to capability. That is what is so unreal about the discussion of Georgian membership. Imagine that Georgia had been a member of NATO. What could the alliance have done to defend it against the Russian attack? Georgia borders Russia and is far away from the United States and the other NATO members, who have their hands full elsewhere. Even as NATO faces an existential crisis in Afghanistan, there are calls for it to return to the traditional mission of defending its members. “Nobody will be asking for a wholesale strategic rethink that reduces Nato’s commitment to Afghanistan,” an anonymous senior NATO official told the Financial Times. “But some states may be looking to strike a new balance between Nato’s current focus on expeditionary operations and the need to defend Nato territory.”19 But how will a new balance be struck? There are only two ways: increasing resources and devoting them to the traditional mission, or redirecting resources from “out of area” missions to the traditional one. Which will it be? Increasing resources seems near impossible in these times of financial stringency. But if resources are redirected, what happens to the “out of area” missions? What, specifically, happens to Afghanistan? “Many [NATO members] have defence budgets that are so low, and coalition governments that are so precarious, that they cannot provide the quantity or type of forces needed for this kind of fight,” US defence secretary Robert Gates has lamented.20 That is the situation now. It will not improve if further missions are added. Indeed, it is apparent that NATO is already overburdened.

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2. China Turn- the CP causes NATO overreach which causes conflict with China – other issues stabilize the allianceHeisbourg 06 [Francois, special adviser at the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, Paris, “Why Nato needs to be less ambitious,” Financial Times, 11/22/06, lexis]Yet it is as clear that Nato is no longer a pivot of US strategy, as demonstrated by its marginal treatment in America's latest quadrennial defense review. Indeed, the word "Nato" is all too often, in American political and media parlance, a euphemism for the phrase "the European allies" - which is not saying quite the same thing. Nato's expansion may be reaching the limits beyond which it would become a force of regional instability rather than one of stabilization: Ukraine is literally split down the middle over the issue of entry to the Nato alliance. Going "out of area", as in Afghanistan, has helped keep Nato in business but in the process the alliance has become an a la carte multilateral institution. The Atlantic alliance has also ceased to be the principal point of US-European consultation on the key strategic issues of our times: the rise of China, the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea and the fate of the crisis-ridden Middle East are dealt with mainly outside the Nato framework. In itself, this reduction of Nato's place in the overall scheme of strategic affairs should not be a big concern for those who live and work beyond the confines of the Nato bureaucracy. After all, Nato is immensely and uniquely useful in fostering interoperability between the military forces of its members, which is key to forming effective coalitions of forces. In a world in which the mission determines the coalition, this ability is more important than ever. Similarly, Nato remains key in ensuring that the partner states of eastern Europe press on with reform of their security sectors. Unfortunately, Nato is not sticking to its core competencies. In a quest to carve a greater role for itself and demonstrate global relevance, the alliance is running the risk of overreaching itself in strategic and political terms, with potentially dangerous consequences. In the run-up to Riga, there has been much talk of a "Nato-bis", or second version, of a privileged partnership between Nato and hopefully like-minded states in the Asia-Pacific region such as Japan and Australia. The wisdom of this is questionable, to put it mildly, given its potential for needless friction with a rising China. The push for a Nato-bis is probably not intended to foster a "west against the rest" alignment in east Asia; but that could be its inadvertent effect. Nato should not be acting like a solution in search of a problem.

3. Conflict with China results in nuclear holocaust Chalmers Johnson, Former Professor of Poly Sci @ Berkeley, Former Chairman of the Department and Chair of the Center for Chinese Studies, 5-14-01, The Nation, n19v272 p. 20, L/NChina is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor . More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China's sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China's borders have virtually no deterrent effect.

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671AR Consult NATO CP [1/3]

Extend 2nd Argument: The U.S. does not need NATO support to act- The U.S. needs to be able to act singly if need be (even if NATO says no to the U.S. withdrawal plan). Veto power crushes U.S. leadership.Carroll 09–(James FF, Notes & Comments Editor of Emory International Law Review, J.D. with Honors from Emory University School of Law, “Back to the Future: Redefining the Foreign Investment and National Security Act's Conception of National Security”, Emory International Law Review, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167, Lexis)n221. See Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., 9/11 is Over, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2007, § 4, at 12. This does not mean , however, that foreign countries should hold a veto over U.S. foreign or domestic policies, particularly policies that are not directly related to their national survival. Allowing foreign countries or international institutions to veto or modify unrelated U.S. policies would make a mockery of our foreign policy and destroy the credibility of American leadership. International cooperation does not require making our policy subservient to the whims of other nations . See generally The Allies and Arms Control (F.O. Hampson et al. eds., 1992). See also Khalilzad, supra note 177.

Extend 4th Argument: Obama should remain unilateral because it shows initiative and independence, that would not be seen otherwise. Kaufman, 10-is a Professor of Political Science at University of New Jersey(2/1/10, Robert, The Foreign Policy Initiative, “The Perils of President Obama’s National Security Policy”, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/node/15511) THSix precepts of moral democratic realism emerged from my reading of the lessons of diplomatic history. First, the danger of war and strife will always loom large because of irredeemable human imperfection itself. The anarchical system of international politics, where there is no monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, compounds the danger. Power is thus the pivotal, inescapable dimension of international relations. The vindication of American self-interest depends mainly on the clarity, credibility, and capability of American power . Coalitions of the willing can supplement, but never substitute, for American power. Multilateral institutions in general, and the United Nations in particular, can inhibit the necessary exercise of American power, if we are unwise enough to let them. Second, the greatest dangers to the United States typically arise not from vigilance or the arrogance of American power, but from unpreparedness or an excessive reluctance to fight. So American statesmen ought to strive for what Churchill calls “overwhelming power.” Third, unlike what I call “unrealistic realism,” which I associate with Colin Powell, James Baker III, and Brent Scowcroft, moral democratic realism treats regime type as a variable for identifying opportunities and dangers in American foreign policy. All regimes do not behave alike. Some are more aggressive; others are more peaceful. There is a vital moral and practical distinction between totalitarian regimes animated by messianic ideologies on the one hand, and stable liberal democracies, on the other hand. The difference between Nazi Germany and a stable, liberal, democratic West Germany puts this vital distinction in high relief. Fourth, moral democratic realism dictates that American foreign policy must adhere closely to the imperatives of geopolitics. There is no objective reason why the United States should not remain the world’s dominant power for a long time to come. As Charles Krauthammer incisively puts it, “decline is a choice” for the United States, not an inevitability. For all nations, however, resources are finite; thus, the United States must give priority to defending and extending the democratic zone of peace in East Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. These are the major power centers in the world, where the absence of liberty could prove most perilous. Fifth, the cardinal virtue of Prudence should inform when, how, and for what purpose the United States employs military force. St. Thomas Aquinas defines Prudence as choosing ends and means that are morally and practically correct. Clear, firm, credible commitments can deter the risk of war and the cost of war when even the best deterrent sometimes fails. Sometimes as well, using force sooner—even preemptively—can save much blood, toil, tears, and sweat later. Sixth, moral democratic realism rejects utopianism and moral nihilism. Judeo-Christian morality refracted through the lens of Prudence ought to serve as the guide for evaluating relative degrees of moral and geopolitical evil. The greatest of American leaders have always recognized that the United States must wage war and peace in a way consistent with the values of American society and the principles of well-ordered liberty. As Ronald Reagan’s Administration put it in National Security Directive 75, which laid out President Reagan’s monumentally successful strategy for winning the Cold War, “US policy must have an ideological thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of the US and western values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade unions, free


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enterprise, and political democracy…” The United States is not a perfect nation, but it is an exceptional nation; indeed, the United States is the indispensible one. These six principles serve as my point of departure to explain the peril of President Obama’s foreign and national security policy. Start with President Obama’s vision of the world and his role in it, which make him the antithesis of President Reagan. President Obama believes he is an extraordinary leader of an ordinary, badly flawed nation. Reagan believed he was an ordinary man privileged to lead an extraordinary nation. Obama is totally wrong; Ronald Reagan is half right. For Ronald Reagan was also an extraordinary leader. Today’s Republican party should champion Ronald Reagan’s legacy unabashedly, adapting it to the changing circumstances of the 21st century. President Obama’s actions and rhetoric before and since becoming President put him at the leftward end of the Democratic party’s New Politics wing that has dominated the party’s foreign policy thinking since the riotous Chicago Democratic convention of 1968. Repudiating the Cold War liberalism of Harry Truman, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Henry “Scoop” Jackson, the New Politics wing of the party typically has considered our enemies abroad less dangerous that what Senator J. William Fulbright famously and fatuously calls “the arrogance of American power.” This liberal guilt about the so-called arrogance of American power impelled President Obama to return to Great Britain the bust of Winston Churchill that British Prime Minister Tony Blair loaned to George W. Bush—an overt repudiation of Churchill’s legacy of vigilance that President Bush sought to emulate. This liberal guilt about the so-called arrogance of American power pervades President Obama’s landmark foreign policy speeches. Speaking in Cairo and later to the UN General Assembly, President Obama apologized profusely for a catalogue of American sins—a few real, many more exaggerated and most imagined. When asked about American exceptionalism at a G-20 meeting in Strasbourg, President Obama dismissed the notion. No American President other than Jimmy Carter would have believed or said anything like that. In his Cairo speech, Obama placed greater blame for our troubles in the Middle East on a decent and democratic Israeli ally than on the region’s culture of despotism, the fanatical eliminationist Iranian regime, or a Palestinian entity bent on eradicating the Jewish States. President Obama’s Cairo and UN speeches are not the exception—they are emblematic: President Obama’s default position is to blame America first; conciliate America’s enemies; and pressure or ignore America’s friends in Europe, the Middle East, East Asia, and Latin America. The President’s defenders, and even some of his critics, have celebrated his speech accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, where the President acknowledged that evil does exist in the world and that sometimes the use of force is necessary, morally and practically; yet the preponderance of his words and deeds belie the President’s atypically hardheaded and pro-American rhetoric. President Obama’s decision not to attend the 20th anniversary celebration of the fall of the Berlin Wall underscored his organic discomfort with the idea of American greatness and goodness. Appallingly, President Obama made it a priority to fly to Cairo to conciliate Middle Eastern dictators. Appallingly, President Obama made it a priority to fly to Europe for the trivial and parochial purpose of pleading Chicago’s case to host the Olympics. Yet, appallingly, President Obama spurned an event that symbolized the triumph of freedom over a malevolent evil empire that posed an existential threat to freedom. The Obama Administration has embraced the three worst features of liberal multilateralism while abandoning its admirable commitment to promoting stable liberal democracy when possible and prudent. First, the Obama Administration has great confidence in the efficacy of multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, as arbiters of international legitimacy; this is a triumph of hope over experience. Second, the Obama Administration has deep aversion to wielding the hard elements of power, such as military power, in pursuit of traditional concrete geopolitical conceptions of the national interest. Third, the Obama Administration radiates a zealous faith in the aptitude of soft power, such as the appeal of American culture, to tame the animosity of America’s enemies.

Extend 5th argument: The neg’s evidence of brink should not be considered when judging as their Wittes and Goldsmith ’09 card does not support their claims. You should prefer our evidence that not consulting NATO on this policy would not break U.S- NATO ties.

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Extend 6th argument: NATO will say no to U.S. proposal- NATO doesn’t rubber-stamp American initiatives anymoreKolko 03–Historian of Modern Warfare (August 1, Gabriel, Journal of Contemporary Asia)

The crisis in NATO was both overdue and inevitable, the result of a decisive American reorientation, and the time and ostensible reason for it was far less important than the underlying reason it occurred: the U.S.' growing realization after the early 1990s that while NATO was militarily a growing liability it still remained a political asset. The United Nations and Security Council were strained in ways that proved decisive but the U.S. never assigned the UN the same crucial role as it did its alliance in Europe. The Iraq war was the final step in NATO's demise. Today, NATO's original raison d'etre for imposing American hegemony--which was to prevent the major European nations from pursuing independent foreign policies--is now the core of the controversy that is now raging. Washington cannot sustain this grandiose objective because a reunited Germany is far too powerful to be treated as it was a half-century ago, and Germany has its own interests in the Middle East and Asia to protect. Germany and France's independence was reinforced by wholly inept American propaganda on the relationship of Iraq to Al-Qaeda (from which the CIA and British MI6 openly distanced themselves), overwhelming antiwar public opinion in most nations, and a great deal of opposition within the U. S. establishment and many senior American officers to the war with Iraq. The furious American response to Germany, France, and Belgium's refusal, under article 4 of the NATO treaty, to protect Turkey from an Iraqi counterattack because that would prejudge the Security Council's decision on war and peace was only a contrived reason for confronting fundamental issues that have simmered for years. The dispute was far more about symbolism than substance, and the point was made: some NATO members refuse d to allow the organization to serve as a rubber stamp for American policy , whatever it may be. War in Iraq forced the issue to a head, compelling major NATO members and Russia to resist Washington's leadership. Whether such a split was inevitable is now moot--it happened.

Extend 7th Argument: Consult CPs Illegit.a. Counter Interpretation: negative cannot run a consult argument. It is still not predictable because there could be an infinite amount of consultations; therefore, specific education is not being completed.b. There is an infinite amount if things the neg. could consult with, making it infinitely regressive, which the aff. cannot predict. c. Consult arguments are bad for debate because you don’t focus on “topic specific education.” Focus is drawn on topics outside the resolution, like whether NATO says yes when consulted.

Extend Net Benefit Argument:NATO is already overburdened. They do not have time to be concerned with American foreign policy. Therefore, consulting them would just make them mad and kill the NATO- U.S. alliance.Consulting NATO would lead to a grave impact in the form of conflict with China. This is because China will not appreciate China’s overreaching tendencies. As a result, nuclear war will occur which outweighs a simple consultation.

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702AC: Consult Japan CP [1/2]

1. Japan will say no- they want the bases BBC News 5/4/10 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8658901.stm?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter) The island is home to over half the 47,000 American troops based in Japan. Mr Hatoyama, speaking on his first visit to Okinawa since becoming prime minister, said maintaining the base in some form was needed for national security, under Japan's post-war military alliance with the US. "I really feel sorry as I visit here today that I must ask for the Okinawan people's understanding that part of the base operations would have to stay," he said. He called on the Japanese people to be "willing to share the burden, because the bases are necessary for national security".

2. Perm- Do the plan and consult Japan

3. Consultation counterplans are illegit – a. Conditional fiat – we don’t know whether the neg will defend “yes” or “no” which reduces our

ability to generate offense which justifies severance permsb. Timeframe fiat – the counterplan implements the plan later than the affirmative which allows them

to spike out of disad links by delaying – makes timeframe perms reciprocalc. Voting issue for fairness, predictability and ground

4. Consultation spurs inter-branch conflictDavid Newsom, Professor of Diplomacy @ the University of Virgina, 1992, The Allies and Arms Control, Edited by Hampson, Von Riekhoff and Roper, p. 282

The reluctance of an administration to consult fully with the Congress explains further the hesitation of U.S. presidents to lay alternatives before allies that have not similarly been presented to the Congress. Washington policymakers proceed on the assumption – whether always correct or not – that consultations, whether with allies or with the Congress, will leak. Reports of discussions of policy alternatives with allies that have not similarly been presented to the congress can cause serious executive-legislative tensions.

5. Inter-branch conflict cripples US foreign policy – turning the net benefitLinda S. Jamison, Deputy Director of Governmental Relations @ CSIS, Spring 1993, Executive-Legislative Relations after the Cold War, Washington Quarterly, v.16, n.2, p. 189

Indeed there are very few domestic issues that do not have strong international implications, and likewise there are numerous transnational issues in which all nations have a stake. Environmental degradation , the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, population control, migration, international narcotics trafficking, the spread of AIDS, and the deterioration of the human condition in the less developed world are circumstances affecting all corners of the globe . Neither political isolation nor policy bifurcation is an option for the United States. Global circumstances have drastically changed with the end of the Cold War and the political and policy conditions that sustained bipartisan consensus are not applicable to the post-war era. The formulation of a new foreign policy must be grounded in broad-based principles that reflect domestic economic, political and social concerns while providing practical solutions to new situations. Toward a cooperative US Foreign Policy for the 1990s: If the federal government is to meet the new international policy challenges of the post-cold war era, institutional dissension caused by partisan competition and executive-legislative friction must give way to a new way of business. Policy flexibility must be the watchword of the 1990s in the foreign policy domain if the United States is to have any hope of securing its interests in the uncertain years ahead. One former policymaker, noting the historical tendency of the United States to make fixed “attachments,” has argued that a changing world dictates policy flexibility, where practical solutions can be developed on principles of broad-based policy objectives (Fulbright 1979). Flexibility , however, will not be possible without interbranch cooperation. The end of the Cold War and the new single-party control of the White House and Congress provide a unique opportunity to reestablish foreign policy cooperation. Reconfiguring post cold war objectives requires comprehension of the remarkable transformations in world affairs and demands an intense political dialogue that goes beyond the executive branch (Mann 1990, 28-29).

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712AC: Consult Japan CP [2/2]

6. Consultations take a long time to do- nations like to think about something before they do it. If they rubber stamp it that means it won’t solve the net benefit because it is not meaningful to them, while they wait people are dying and the CP can’t solve the impacts of economic collapse and death in that time

7. Consultation kills hegemonyDole, Former Vice President, 1995 (Foreign Affairs, Spring)The United States, as the only global power, must lead. Europe—as individual stats or as a collective cannot. China, Russia, India, Brazil, and Japan are important

regional powers, and some may be potential regional threats. But only the United States can lead on the full range of political, diplomatic, economic and military issues confronting the world . Leadership does not consist of positing questions for international deba te: leadership consists of proposing and achieving solutions. The American attempt in May 1993 to discuss lifting the Bosnian arms embargo with NATO allies, for example, was simply wrong: It was a discussion, not a U.S. initiative, and was readily perceived by the Europeans as a half-hearted attempt lacking President Clinton’s commitment. By comparison, if President Bush had followed a similar course after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saddam Hussein would still be in Kuwait today—if not in Saudi Arabia—and he would very possibly be armed with nuclear weapons. Leadership is also saying what you mean, meaning what you say, and sticking to it. That includes a willingness to use American force when required. To state that North Korea “cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb” and then one year later sign an agreement that ignores the issue of the existing arsenal is confusing to the American people and to our allies. To threaten to withdraw most-favored-nation trading status from China because of human rights violations and then to extend such status months later—despite no change in Chinese human rights practices—makes the world wonder why the linkage was made in the first place. To introduce a resolution in the U.N. Security Council to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina, while top administration officials claim the war is over and the Serbs have won, severs and link between the worlds of U.S. policymakers and their deeds.

8. US hegemony is critical to prevent apolarity and multiple nuclear warsNiall Ferguson, Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution @ Stanford, July/August 2004, “A World without Power”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2579&page=3, ACC: 9.16.04, p. onlineThe worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners , while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony —its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier— its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power . Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity—a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

9. Perm do the plan and consult on all other issues too- solves best because we ensure we solve the net benefit by consulting on all other issues

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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2579&page=3


722AC Consult Japan NB- Alliance

1. The alliance card is HORRIBLEa. It’s from 1997 talking about how we have to consult Japan before it’s too lateb. Lets quote the card “Because support for U.S. military operations beyond Japan would provoke such intense domestic controversy, Tokyo appeared to prefer not to be consulted”

2. Security alliance boosts tensions making Sino-Japanese conflict inevitableThe International Herald Tribune March 3, 2005Perhaps it is time that Asian countries expressed concern about the rising temperature in the East China Sea. Animosity between China and Japan has deep historical roots, but until recently the assumption was that the heat of cooperative economic activity was warding off the chill of mutual suspicion. This seems not to be the case in the wake of a sharp war of words over disputed territorial claims in hydrocarbon-bearing waters between the two countries and now, more alarmingly, over the sensitive issue of Taiwan. Add to this suggestions that Washington is using the widening rift between China and Japan to bolster its security alliance with Tokyo and possibly to contain China's growing economic and military clout, and you have a recipe for cold war in a region that was supposed to be charting a course for greater cooperation and integration. When Japan's minister of foreign affairs, Nobutaka Machimura, and its minister of defense, Yoshinori Ohno, met their American counterparts in Washington in mid-February, the temperature of the China-Japan relationship plunged still further. The joint statement hammered out between Japan and the United States mentioned a number of common strategic objectives, among them maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing reacted furiously, calling the joint statement a threat to China's sovereignty. While some Asian governments may initially welcome this development as a move by Washington to check and contain China's rise, over the longer term they may regret a reinvigorated U.S.-Japan alliance aimed at Chin a. With China's currency set to appreciate in value, China's economy will become an even more crucial component of regional prosperity. What then can the rest of Asia do? Certainly not sit on the sidelines and wait for two of Asia's major powers to drift toward confrontation.

3. Impact timeframe is impossibly long- the DA relies on Japan getting mad because we don’t consult them and the result would be nuclearization. The card doesn’t assume the NPT, UN sanctions, and other negotiations.

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732AC AT: Consult Japan NB (Sino-Russia)

1. Empirically, the Alliance does a terrible job of safeguarding regional securityDiFilippo, Sociology Prof, @ Lincoln U, 2002 p. 13(Anthony, The Challenges of the US-Japan Military Arrangement)One thing that has not changed about the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the fifty years that it has existed is that it is supposed to have maintained regional stability. If stability is defined as a state where war or the high-level threat of war does not exist, then the alliance has not been terribly effective. Although the Soviet Union never attacked Japan during the Cold War, other serious destabilizing forces have appeared despite the continued existence of the bilateral alliance . The Korean War, which began in June 1950, did not end after the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951 nor after the accord went into effect in 1952. The alliance did not prevent China from developing nuclear weapons -hardly a stabilizing event in the region. The U. S.-Japan alliance did not prevent or end the Vietnam War. More recently, the U.S.-Japan security alliance did not stop the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ( North Korea) from beginning a nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s, thwart Pyongyang's missile development efforts, or discourage it from launching a projectile over Japan without prior notice in August 1998. With the bilateral alliance in effect for decades. China went ahead with nuclear testing in 1995 to assure that its nuclear arsenal was capable of neutralizing the threats it perceives from the other nuclear powers.

2. Japanese and US posturing in the security framework are unsettling China- they signal a plot to contain and constrain Chinese policy- increases the risk of miscalculation and warThe National Interest 2005As the alliance is recast, Japanese and U.S. policymakers need to consider how best to reassure a nervous Beijing that a reinvigorated Japan, working in close cooperation with the United States in Asia, is not a threat to

China. This will be no easy task because of the widespread view in Chinese policy and military circles that Tokyo's strategic shift foreshadows a more assertive and possibly adversarial Japan. Of course, there is nothing new or surprising in this reaction, as Sino-Japanese rivalry has deep historical roots. It is manifest today in Chinese anxieties about Japan's support for Taiwan and BMD and resentment over legacy issues, notably

Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japanese war dead but in Chinese eyes is a symbol of the country's imperial past. Until recently, these anxieties have been moderated by Japan's constitution and Beijing's recognition that the U.S. alliance has prevented a revival of Japanese military power. But as Japan breaks free from its constitutional shackles and the Red Sun makes its reappearance across the globe on the uniforms and flags of a reconstituted military, Chinese strategists are drawing conclusions that are troubling for future Sino-Japanese relations. Among them is the belief that Japan wants to be a military as well as an economic power; that it is moving from a preoccupation with self-defense to accepting the broader alliance objectives of collective self-defense; that it is developing the capability to intervene militarily in the region; that the Koizumi government is playing up the North Korean threat so that it can break the constitutional taboo on collective self-defense; and that it is concealing its real strategic intentions by using peacekeeping and the War on Terror to desensitize the region to an expanded military presence. Mirroring their neighbor's concerns, Japan is distinctly uneasy about recent double-digit increases in Chinese military spending, the acquisition of advanced fighter aircraft and naval vessels from Russia, the rapid pace of defense modernization, and the build-up of China's missile inventory. Such apprehensions are understandable. China's recently purchased advanced Kilo-class submarines can interdict the main maritime trade routes that are crucial to Japan's economic survival. Since 2000, there has been a dramatic rise in the frequency of Chinese naval incursions into Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Tokyo is particularly concerned about Chinese hydrographic surveys and oil drilling near the EEZ, as well as what appear to be intelligence-gathering operations by Chinese submarines, dramatically illustrated in November 2004 by the highly publicized incursion of a Han-class nuclear-powered submarine into Japanese waters near Okinawa. Tensions have already flared over a number of unresolved territorial disputes at sea, notably the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in Chinese), which are

located near rich deposits of oil and natural gas in the underlying sea bed. So far, these have been confined to polemical exchanges between Tokyo and Beijing and symbolic protests by Chinese activists . But the potential for miscalculation will increase as an energy-hungry China steps up its oil-exploration activities in the seas around the Senkakus and Japan responds by augmenting its maritime patrols and surveillance of the region. Already there are signs that for the first time the Koizumi government will allow Japanese oil companies to drill in a disputed area of the East China Sea, which would inevitably inflame anti-Japanese sentiment in China. A critical issue for Japan is how a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would play out. In the event of hostilities, there is little doubt that the United States would expect Japan to provide intelligence and rear-area support for the U.S. carrier groups that would be dispatched to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack. This would expose the SDF to a Chinese counterstrike and risk drawing Japan into direct combat with China

for the first time since World War II, the consequences of which would be incalculable for both countries. Thus, paradoxically, mutual mistrust is growing in parallel with deepening economic interdependence. The challenge for Japan is managing relations with China so that bilateral tensions do not lead to open conflict or spill over and infect the wider region. This will require a much higher level of trust between the two Asian powers than has been evident to date and a willingness to consider new mechanisms for mediating and preventing disputes so that major crises can be averted. Unfortunately, with the notable exception of the Six Party Talks on North Korea, neither Japan nor the United States has given sufficient priority to including China in strategies for mitigating existing conflicts and preventing new ones from arising.

On the contrary, the impression has been created in Beijing that closer U.S.-Japanese security cooperation is premised on containing China and diluting its military power. Missile defense is illustrative, as is the developing trilateral security dialogue (TSD) between the United States, Japan and Australia, which was established in 2001 at the U.S.-Australian ministerial talks in Canberra. From Beijing's perspective, the TSD looks suspiciously like the first step on the road to forming a new security bloc in Asia aimed at containing China. While Chinese fears that the TSD could evolve into an Asian-style NATO are misplaced and China should not be

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74permitted to exercise a veto over U.S.-Japanese security cooperation, it makes no sense to antagonize Beijing by further institutionalizing the TSD and transforming it into a clubby, de facto trilateral alliance. A far better approach would be to create a security mechanism that allows China to discuss northeast Asia's many intractable security problems directly with Japan and the United States.

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751AR Consult Japan Extensions

2AC 1- Japan will say no to the consultation- they desperately need the base for security purposes. Even though the people of Japan may hate the base their security comes before anything else.

2AC 2- The perm solves by doing the plan and asking nations about how they feel about it- we do not link to the net benefit because even if they say no to removal of troops we still leave some of them there to continue to protect their security

2AC 4 and 5- Consultation will leak to the congress creating tensions between the two branches. If such friction occurs it would be impossible for the US to have an effective foreign policy. Lack of unison on foreign policy turns the net benefit- there is no negotiation in a world absent foreign policy

2AC 6- consultations take time- star this argument- instant yes doesn’t solve the alliance because it gives off the perception that the issue is not large enough to affect US-Japan relations, and if they don’t respond quickly then the impacts of the 1AC are triggered. Japan US relations don’t matter in a world where we are all dead. Chinese and Russian aggression has been going on since the Cold War- there is no brink to it.

2AC 7 and 8- Consulting on issues makes the US look weak because we are not willing to make a decision on our own. Decisive action is critical to maintaining US dominance in the region, and it has also been the reason China and Russia have not gotten too aggressive. Absent hege the world will be set ablaze

2AC 9- Perm do the plan and consult on all other issues- they have no evidence on why this one time is key to maintaining the relationship- consulting on all other issues allows for Japan to take time and deliver a well thought out decision. This solves the net benefits better because we consult more than once- all of their evidence states that just consulting is key.

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2AC Blocks to Japan

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