29-Case Studies Africa

8/9/2019 29-Case Studies Africa

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Critical Factors Affecting Success of CBIS:Cases from Africa

By Mayuri Odedra-StraubDept. of Information Systems & Computer ScienceNational University of Singapore

Lower Kent Ridge RoadSingapore 0511

Abstract

There is very little understanding about the key factors which influence success (or failure)of computer-based information systems (CBIS) in organisations, especially those in Africa.Poor infrastructures, lack of foreign exchange to buy spare parts, poor supplier service,

scarce education and training facilities, and therefore lack of skilled personnel,management commitment and cooperation are generally believed to affect success (orfailure). This paper, based on research conducted by the author in a number of publicsector organisations in Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe, shows, using case studies, that it isa combination of factors which play a role in success (or failure), and that it is difficult, andinappropriate, to isolate a few specific factors as being the ones influencing allorganisations in all countries; factors vary from organisation to organisation and fromcountry to country.

Keywords: Computer based information systems, critical success factors, organisations,Africa.

Introduction

Few doubt the significance of information technology (IT) for African economic andsocial development (only sub-Saharan African countries are analyzed here; north Africanstates and South Africa are not considered). IT is widely preached as having the power tonarrow the gap between the developed and the developing countries (DCs), as having thecapabilities which will allow the DCs to "leap-frog" development, and as having thepotential to tackle many development problems. Yet, very few African countries havesucceeded in exploiting this developmental potential. Although no comprehensive surveys

or research has been done to prove the latter, there is extensive under-utilisation (andnon-utilisation) of equipment and failure of major computer-based information system(CBIS) projects (Avgerou & Land, 1992; Moussa & Schware, 1992; Odedra, 1990a,b,1993; Walsham, 1992); signs which may indicate why IT has played little role in Africandevelopment.

There has been substantial growth in the number of computers acquired in the pastfew years, upto 10 per cent annual growth in places such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeriaand Ivory Coast (although, on average, spending on computerisation in 1988 - as apercentage of GDP - was six times higher in industralised countries than in Africa), butmuch of the spread of computers that has taken place has not been need-based.

Hard-selling from manufacturers and vendors, the urge to keep up with the latesttechnology, management self-interests, and pressure from computer professionals haveall contributed to the spread. Many have accepted the technology in a blind-folded mannerand few have questioned its need. No policies or clear strategic buying plans exist which


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clearly identify the needs that are likely to bring overall benefit to the nation, and those thatare possible to achieve within the available resources. Nor is there an environment thatwould promote widespread and effective application of IT.

One can say that there have been many negative consequences inflicted by thistechnology on Africa. Scarce foreign currency has been spent on equipment which isunder-utilised, the dependency on multinational corporations and expatriate personnel hasincreased, and socio-cultural conflicts introduced. Moreover, what Africa has experiencedso far is not IT transfer but "transplantation", the dumping of "boxes" without the necessaryknow-how.

In this paper, computerisation at five public sector organisations in Kenya, Zambiaand Zimbabwe - two banks, an insurance company and two government computer centres- is described and analyzed to illustrate some of the above issues and, most importantly, tomake an attempt at identifying factors which may haveinfluenced success (or failure) ofCBIS in these organisations. Very little work has been done in this area in Africa and we

therefore have little understanding of these factors. The general impression is one ofrelative failure rather than relative success in the implementation of CBIS in DCs. It is notsufficiently clear why some of the technology adopted by DCs has failed to achieve itsintended economic benefits (Waema & Walsham, 1988). Poor infrastructures, lack offoreign exchange to buy spare parts, poor supplier service, scarce education and trainingfacilities, and therefore lack of skilled personnel, management commitment andcooperation, are generally believed to affect success (or failure). However, the casestudies below, from research conducted by the author between 1987 and 1990, show thatit is a combination of several factors which play a role and that it is difficult, andinappropriate, to isolate a specific set of factors as being the one influencing all

organisations in all countries (Odedra, 1990b). Whilst these findings refer to selectedcountries, it is believed that these cases are representative of the difficulties andchallenges encountered in implementing CBIS in other African and developing countries.

The next section analyses some of the existing literature which has identified someof the factors, at both national and organisational level, which are thought to influencesuccess (or failure) of CBIS. The section following this describes the case studies andbriefly analyses them. An overall analysis of the cases is then carried out to identify factorswhich may have influenced success (or failure) of CBIS. Finally, some conclusions andsuggestions for future research are provided.

Factors Influencing Success (or Failure) of CBIS

Before proceeding to look at the five case studies, it is important to examine someof the existing literature and identify key issues which are said to influence success (orfailure) of a CBIS. The literature - based on work done in both the developed and thedeveloping countries - has identified a number of issues which can be broadly categorisedas national and organisational level factors, as below, although there is a great deal ofoverlap between them:


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A. National level factors:

Infrastructure (telecommunications, (Aiyku, 1989; Avgerou & Land, 1992;

education & training facilities) Cane, 1992; Davis, 1992;Moussa & Schware, 1992; Okot-Uma, 1992;Okoye, 1989; Palvia, et al, 1992; Samaranayake,1987; Suwandi, et al, 1989; Walsham, et al, 1988;Wong, 1992)

Governmental policies: (Aiyku, 1989; Gilbert & Motiwalla, 1987;Mody & Dahlman, 1992; Okot-Uma, 1992;Okoye, 1989; Suwandi, et al, 1989;Torres, et al, 1987; Walsham et al, 1988;Wong, 1992)

Socio-cultural: (Aiyku, 1989; Avgerou & Land, 1992;Waema & Walsham, 1988;Walsham, et al, 1988; Walsham, 1989)

Technical (availability of (Moussa & Schware, 1992; Palvia, et al, 1992;suitable equipment): Waema & Walsham, 1988; Walsham, et al, 1988;

Walsham, 1989)

Economic and financial: (Aiyku, 1989; Waema & Walsham, 1988;

Walsham, et al, 1988; Walsham, 1989)

Political: (Keen, 1981; Waema & Walsham, 1988;Walsham, et al, 1988; Walsham, 1989)

Availability of skilled (Cane, 1992; Moussa & Schware, 1992;personnel: Palvia, et al, 1992; Walsham, et al, 1988; Walsham,

1989)

Current state of knowledge: (Walsham, et al, 1988; Walsham, 1989)

Obsolescence of computing (Palvia et al, 1992)hardware and software:

B. Organisational level factors:

Socio-cultural: (Avgerou & Land, 1992; Davis, 1992;Mohan, et al, 1990; Romm et al., 1991;Walsham, et al, 1988; Walsham, 1989)

Structure, norms, and decision (Avgerou & Land, 1992;making: Gurbaxani & Whang, 1991;

Walsham et al, 1988)


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Information technology (Mohan, et al, 1990; Palvia, et al, 1992)infrastructure:

Political: (Keen, 1981; Walsham et al, 1988;Walsham, 1989)

Education and Training: (Avgerou & Land, 1992; Medsker & Medsker, 1987;Moussa & Schware, 1992)

Management support (Cane, 1992; Mody & Dahlman, 1992;and commitment: Moussa & Schware, 1992; Samek, 1986)

IS development approach: (Moussa & Schware, 1992; Paddock, 1986)

Planning: (Mody & Dahlman, 1992;Moussa & Schware, 1992)

Strategies: (Mohan, et al, 1990)

Size of the organisation: (Gurbaxani & Whang, 1991)

Skilled Personnel: (Sanwal, 1989)

Funding: (Moussa & Schware, 1992)

Technology and (Moussa & Schware, 1992)information changes:

We can see from the above that there is a great deal of connection between the variousfactors. For instance, the availability of skilled personnel is related to the availability ofeducation and training facilities nationally. Although the literature analyzed above is in noway complete, it shows that different authors have identified various and varying factors asbeing ones which influence success (or failure) of CBIS. If we concentrate on the literaturefrom the DCs (all except Case, Gurbaxani & Whang, Keen, Medsker & Medsker, andPaddok), it would appear that political, economical, social, technical, and infrastructure

related factors play a more prominent role at the national level, and "human factors" at theorganisational level. This latter issue is more apparent when we examine some of theexisting case studies in the area, as below:

C. Factors apparent from Case Studies

Management support (Bhatnagar, 1989; Galliers, 1987;and commitment: Han & Render, 1988; Mohan, et al., 1990;

Moussa & Schware, 1992; Patel, 1987;Pawar, 1991; Peat Marwick, 1989; Rab, 1989;Tan, et al, 1992)


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Skilled personnel: (Lorchirachoonkul, et al, 1987; Madon, 1991;Patel, 1987; Rab, 1989; Sanday, 1989;Tan, et al, 1992; Tikasingh, et al, 1989;

Wong, 1992)

User participation: (Bhatnagar, 1991; Han & Render, 1989;Madon, 1992; Rodrigues, et al, 1989;Yusof, et al, 1987)

Political: (Grover, et al, 1988; Jain & Raghuram, 1992;Madon, 1992; Rodrigues & Waema, 1992)

Socio-cultural: (Ayiku, 1989; Madon, 1992; Robey, at al, 1990;

Rodrigues & Waema, 1992)

Staff motivation: (Bhatnagar, 1991; Madon, 1992;Samaranayake, 1987)

Awareness of the potential (Bhatnagar, 1989; Madon, 1991;of IT: Moussa & Schware, 1992;

Tikasingh, et al, 1989)

Interest groups: (Madon, 1992; Patel, 1987; Smith & McKeen, 1992)

Process of computerisation: (Bhatnagar, 1989; Robey, at al, 1990;Samaranayake, 1987)

Planning: (Bhatnagar, 1989 & 1991; Quarshie, 1990;Tan, et al, 1992)

Availability of data: (Madon, 1992; Moussa & Schware, 1992;Samaranayake, 1987)

Education and Training: (Bhatnagar, 1989; N'Jie, 1989; Patel, 1987)

Self interest: (Grover, et al, 1988; Madon, 1992)

Support & maintenance of (Madon, 1991; Moussa & Schware, 1992)equipment:

IS development approach: (Walsham, 1992)

Role of consultants: (Moussa & Schware, 1992)

Management turnover: (Moussa & Schware, 1992)

Site preparation: (Moussa & Schware, 1992)


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Organisation's absorptive capacity: (Moussa & Schware, 1992)

From the above, human factors - user participation, management support and

commitment, skilled personnel - appear to be more prominent in the respectiveorganisations (only the cases of Galliers, Grover, Peat Marwick, and Smith & McKeen arefrom the developed world). However, as the literature surveyed is in no way complete, itmay be premature to reach such conclusions as yet. (The problem with most case studiesis that each author writes a case with an aim of identifying particular factors. This makesidentification of other factors difficult.)

Some of the factors identified above from the case studies are more specific innature, while other factors are more organisational and national in nature. These factorshelp highlight some of the issues which have influenced CBIS utilisation. We are no waynear highlighting or "pin-pointing" a group of factors which would appear to influencesuccess (or failure) of CBIS in organisations. In fact, what is more apparent is that maybe

some of these factors are unique to an organisation or a nation (for example, role ofconsultants, site preparation, etc), and maybe some problems are more universal (forexample, role of management). Moussa and Schware's recent work on Africa - one of thevery few detailed pieces of work done on Africa and which is more relevant to this paper -also makes this observation (1992). From their analysis of 76 World Bank projects inAfrica, they identified 5 "core" factors which influence success of CBIS in Africa: (i)institutional weaknesses; (ii) human resources; (iii) funding; (iv) the local environment; and(v) technology and information changes. These issues will be refered to again later in thepaper.

Before we examine the five case studies to see if any of the above issues are

apparent in the organisations, it would be right to provide a brief introduction to the"national infrastructure" in the three countries under review. National and organisationalissues are directly or indirectly related to each other, as well as the social, economic andpolitical conditions in the country. Governments influence the use of IT by either approvingof the technology, and in-turn investing in the necessary infrastructure to cater for it, ordisapproving of the technology and enforcing restrictions on its importation and use.Although the governments of Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe do not disapprove of thetechnology openly any longer, they have enforced certain restrictions on its importationand utilisation due to lack of funds to import the equipment (most HW and SW isimported). All three countries depend heavily on foreign assistance to acquire thetechnology and develop the infrastructure.

Lack of funds has also meant that the infrastructure, especially education andtraining facilities and telecommunications links - necessary to support the technology -have not been developed. In general, telecommunications networks and services all overAfrica are grossly inadequate in terms of unmet demand, low penetration nationwide, andpoor quality and reliability of service (Moussa & Schware, 1992). All three countries face asevere problem in the education and training area. The lack of education and trainingfacilities has hindered the development of skills through the learning process, and meantthat only a limited number of people can have access to them. This has led to scarcity ofcomputer skilled personnel to utilise the existing systems. Only Zimbabwe offers a degreecourse in computer science; diploma courses are available in Kenya and Zambia. Anumber of private training centres exist in these countries, which try to meet some of thedemand, but few are catering to the needs of senior personnel and management. Althoughcomputers were first installed in these countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s, theiruse is not as widespread as in the developed countries. This has meant that computer


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literacy and awareness at a national level is minimal. Some of these problems will beapparent in the case studies below.

Case StudiesBelow, five case studies - an insurance company and a bank from Zambia, a bank

and a government IS department from Kenya, and a government computer centre inZimbabwe - are presented and a brief analysis is undertaken at the end of each case;more details on these cases can be found in Odedra 1990b. To preserve the identity of theorganisations, no names will be mentioned, including those of people who revealed someof the information, to avoid prosecution.

Case A: An Insurance CompanyA sole insurance company operating in Zambia, with over 2 million clients in 1989,

introduced its first computer, an IBM System 3, in 1978 when it became difficult to process

data manually. The company soon realised that this machine could not cope with theworkload and further expansion was considered. In 1979, a computer steering committeewas formed to direct computerisation in the company. The committee encountereddifficulty in forming an IS strategy without a corporate plan. Therefore, in late 1979, acorporate planning division was set up to formulate the corporate plan. The steeringcommittee, largely under the direction of an expatriate consultant, developed the ISstrategy in 1984.

In late 1986, two more IBM machines, an IBM System 36 and IBM 4361 at a cost ofUS$700,000, were acquired with the aim of moving away from batch processing to on-linesystems. Two machines were bought, one each for the company's two sites, with the

intention of linking them. Lack of foreign exchange to acquire more equipment, however,meant that applications development was hampered and the machine at the two sitescould not be linked, largely due to the overall poor telecommunications infrastructure in thecountry.

IBM, the supplier, lacked skilled computer personnel who could train or undertakemaintenance for the company. Some staff from the insurance company were sent abroadfor training, as such facilities were lacking locally. After successful training, unfortunately,such skilled personnel were immediately lost to the private sector where salaries andcareer paths were better. The lack of skilled computer personnel at the company,therefore, hindered the computerisation process to a large extent. The averageemployment was two years. In 1990, the company only had half the required computer

staff; there were over 60 computer vacancies at the time, including those at seniorpositions. The machines were underutilised as problems were encountered in operatingand developing applications in-house.

Despite the lack of computer skilled staff, the company decided to become the firstorganisation in the country to write applications in-house using the SSADM (StructuredSystems Analysis and Design Methodology), and make use of a wide variety of softwarepackages and languages. The company thought it would be cheaper to write theapplications in-house than to buy a software package which would require customisationanyway. By late 1989, only half of the applications had been developed, largely with thehelp of expatriates who had been with the company until mid-1989.

The management was supportive of the computerisation process but lacked thenecessary computer awareness for decision making. Many also lacked businessexperience having been given their positions for reasons other than business skills. Theonly computer literate person in the computer committee was the head of the computer


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centre. His task was to explain technical issues to other members although he did notalways succeed since he had no right to "teach" management. By force of cultural norms,the managers are supposed to know everything and make the decision themselves. Until

1987, a management awareness seminar was conducted once a year by the head of thecomputer centre. However, by 1988, it became difficult for him to give a seminar and talkof the problems with the project as management blamed his incompetence for all theproblems. Outsiders were therefore recruited to conduct the seminar.

It appeared from the IS strategy developed that the consultant, who played a majorrole in forming the strategy, had little knowledge about the local environment. Many of theorganisational, social, cultural and financial problems of the country were not taken intoaccount when preparing the strategy. The strategy was very ambitious, considering thelocal circumstances, and difficult to meet in many organisations. The managementnevertheless gave a go ahead to such a strategy. They under-estimated the task ofteaching people SSADM skills and developing the applications in-house. They either did

not care, their job positions being secure, or were unaware of the consequences of adifferent decision.

In 1989, top management decided to recruit a group of managers to undertakedifferent tasks related to computerisation, to improve the functioning of the computercentre, and to meet the IS strategy of the company. The management hoped the various"task leaders" would help achieve the set goals. However, by 1991, many of the postswere still vacant.

Case AnalysisThe insurance company faced some of the most common problems faced by many

organisations in Africa: lack of skilled personnel, lack of foreign currency to importequipment, and poor telecommunications infrastructure. Since the country lacks thenecessary education and training facilities, there is lack of computer skilled personnelnationally. The insurance company, therefore, had problems recruiting and retaining localpersonnel - expatriates were becoming too expensive to hire. However, their problemswere further aggravated by the organisation choosing to use a systems developmentmethodology which was not only far too complicated and time consuming but in whichskills were lacking. Skills in SSADM are scarce everywhere and the situation is worse inZambia. Skilled managerial staff are even harder to find. Yet, the management had anillusion that an increase in management personnel at the computer centre would solvesome of the problems. But even if these posts are filled, it is difficult to say what role they

will be able to play when the skills needed are those at the systems development level.The availability of foreign exchange was also a hindrance to the computerisation process.The organisation had the necessary funds but had to wait for its foreign exchangeallocation to import more equipment. The poor telecommunications infrastructure in thecountry did not help either.

One interesting thing to notice at this organisation was that IS strategies and longterm planning do not seem to help much in countries where such plans depend on theavailability of foreign exchange and personnel among other things. The internalorganisation of the company was well planned with a corporate planning division and acomputer steering committee but their effectiveness cannot be predicted under thefinancial and personnel constraints. The corporate plan, which was prepared after the ISdevelopment strategy was in the pipeline, was constantly changed to suit thecircumstances and this made it difficult to follow. Such plans can be helpful as a guide butare difficult to adhere to under constraints faced by many African organisations. However,


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even in organisations where some constraints are not hindrances to implementation, suchstrategies and plans are hardly adhered to and money is often wasted on hiringconsultants to develop them. The usefulness of such plans is, therefore, controversial.

Case B: A National BankThis bank in Zambia holds thousands of accounts, including those of the

government and the personal accounts of the leader of the country. The need for efficientlymanaged accounts was, therefore, great since these accounts may be used to "monitor"the overall economic situation of the country. The bank was managed by a large numberof civil servants, many having been with the bank for over twenty years. Against thisbackground, computers were introduced in some departments to help with dataprocessing. The banking office first introduced Epsom microcomputers which were onlyable to perform certain operations. The system was ineffective overall since the datastored was usually out of date. When competitors started automating, the bank decided tocomputerise all its banking activities by acquiring larger machines.

Consultants were hired to carry out a feasibility study and suggest a system whichshould be bought. They suggested NCR machines which were used by most financialinstitutions. However, their recommendations were not followed. The problemsencountered by the banking office were not examined to see if there was anything thebank could learn from their computerisation experience. The management, through lack ofcomputer literacy and awareness, personal motives, or maybe due to colonial links,decided to buy four ICL System 25's in mid 1980's for each of its banking activities;decision makers, with no technical background, had attended ICL System 25demonstrations abroad, at ICL's expense. No air-conditioned room was prepared for themachines and neither were skilled computer personnel recruited to operate the equipment

when the machines arrived. Within two years, the machines were moved to three differentlocations. The first computer manager was hired two years after the machines had arrived!It was hoped that these machines could be linked into a network so that all the

different sectors of the bank could share data. However, this was not possible when themachines arrived. ICL supplied machines which could not be linked and which were faulty,and provided a software package for which no local customisation skills existed. Moreover,they had highly under quoted the price of the machines. The banking office, because ofthe weaknesses in the Epsom system, resisted introduction of the ICL machines. On top ofall these problems, the supplier insisted the bank hire a project manager recommended bythem. The expatriate manager knew nothing about the banking environment or thesoftware package he had to customise and manage. He spent two years customising part

of the package. By late 1989, only one of the four machines was being used. The bankhad less than half the computer staff needed at the time. The staff turn-over was high andmost of those who were hired when the machines arrived had already left.

In general, the benefits of computerisation were not realised at the bank. Some ofthe top managers who made the decision to acquire the equipment have either left thebank, or they acquired the machines because they were personally gaining from them (apercentage in foreign exchange to keep), and no longer cared what happened to themachines. Decision making was also made difficult because of the large number ofofficials in the hierarchy with little computer literacy and awareness. Changes in theleadership, which was frequent, also affected the operation at all levels. A person madeplans to initiate a project, and just before implementation, he would be moved to a differentpost, or resign. The new person came in and started from scratch. The general managerfor projects, who was in charge of the computer project, did not pay full attention to eventsin the data centre and never demanded to know what was happening. It was well known at


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the bank that he did not know much about the technology and therefore did not like todiscuss the project with anyone.

Case AnalysisIt appears that there was lack of awareness at management level with regards to

what the computers were capable of doing and lack of organisation regardingresponsibilities. This could be largely due to their lack of computer awareness or literacy.They either had no idea or did not care about the consequences of buying hardware whichmay have not been suitable for the bank or of not having found air-conditioned room tostore the equipment and skilled personnel to use the machines. Overall, the bank had nostrategic focus as to where it should heading and this was reflected in their attitude toacquire and use computers. There was very little commitment to improve things at thebank. Management's own concern appeared to be in securing their own personalpositions; the future of the back was not important. Even the general manager of projects

at the bank, who had the responsibility of the computerisation project, did not care whetherthe machines were being used or not.

The supplier, knowing the weaknesses in the bank, appears to have takenadvantage of the situation. They supplied equipment which was faulty and could not belinked; decentralisation of operations and sharing of data between the differentdepartments was not going to be possible. Their support was very poor and requests werenot always met on time. They insisted the bank hire one of their consultants, who wasprobably not one of the most suitable for the job, to manage the project. This, together withthe general lack of computer skilled personnel in the organisation further aggravated thesituation.

Case C: A Commercial BankThis bank is the largest commercial bank in Kenya and contributes highly to

economic development. It was financially well established and was the second mostprofitable bank in the country by 1990. It controlled 50 per cent of the banking outlets andhad over 64 full time branches in 38 districts by 1989. The bank had been using ICLcomputers since 1968.

By early 1980's, the existing ICL computers could not cope with the increase inworkload created by the growth in customers over the past 10-15 years. Moreover, ICL didnot provide much support for the existing equipment and had been manipulatingmaintenance contracts and exploiting the technological ignorance of the bank's personnel.

The risks involved in physically transferring documents from the bank's different sites tothe head office were also increasing; documents were being lost or stolen, or vehiclesbreaking down. Other banks were computerising and competition was growing. Thecountry's economy had improved and the political opinion about computers had changed.All this led to the bank's decision to expand its computer use to link-up all the branchesusing a network. None of the potential users at the branches were consulted.

The chairman of the bank decided to update the bank's computing facilities in early1984. The information processing division manager assigned to look into the computerneeds of the bank suggested upgrading to another ICL machine. The chairman rejectedthis as the manager did not produce strong reasons as to why ICL machines should bebought. The manager, who was British, resigned. A year later, the chairman formed acomputer strategy committee, of senior managers, which was supposed to produce astrategy outlining the bank's computer needs for the next ten years. This committeeproduced a statement of requirements instead and suggested the bank buys IBM, NCR


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and Olivetti equipment. This was again rejected by the chairman who instead asked themto produce a terms of reference document. This was ready at the end of 1986. But thechairman did not approve of it either, and instead hired a technical consultant, not known

to anyone at the bank, who had no banking experience and knew little about the country. Ithad been realised that the committee members lacked technical skills, that the originalterms of reference were not good enough, that the committee members could not defendtheir strategy and that since the capital involved was so high, an independent assessmentwas necessary.

Since no explicit corporate strategy existed, the hired consultant formed acommittee which would be involved in developing the corporate strategy. This committeewas approved by the general manager of the bank but the chairman rejected it as itsuperseded the committee he had already formed. He therefore formed a differentcommittee altogether. The new committee needed to know the bank's strategic objectivesbefore they could start formulating a computer strategy. To find this out, they interviewed

management on the future plans for the bank, its priorities and its mission. The results ofthese interviews showed that there were marked differences about the objectives of thebank at different levels of the hierarchy and also that there was no clear picture of where itshould be heading. The consultant continued to develop the IS strategy despite thesedisagreements.

The next stage was to establish information requirements of the banking operationsby interviewing present and potential users but here again problems were encountered.Most managers and users lacked the knowledge about the potential use of computers andresisted their introduction. The information collected was therefore not comprehensiveenough. But the consultant formulated a strategy based on this. Some senior management

approved the strategy whilst others rejected it. With support from the chairman, a tenderwas put out for computers. Only the consultant was to carry out the evaluation of thetender documents; various individuals objected to this. In the meantime, the chairmancontinued to visit vendor sites abroad to view what was available and to look for fundingfor the project. In late 1989, he decided to buy an IBM machine for the head office andNCR computers for the regional offices (Waema & Walsham, 1990).

Case AnalysisThe events which led to the formation of the IS strategy and the acquisition of new

machines at the bank are typical of many organisations in Africa and some of the conflictin the hierarchy may also exist in more advanced countries. The inheritance of a monopoly

equipment supplier, the lack of technical skills and computer literate managers (despite thebank having used computers since 1968), the history of previous attempts to form an ISstrategy, the lack of strategic focus and the lack of integration of the IS function into themainstream of the bank's business led to the delay in IS strategy formation (took fouryears, 1984-1988, to form the strategy) and in turn the acquisition of the machines.

As is typical of many organisations in Africa, the management was highlyhierarchical at the bank. It consisted of non-technical people who did not directly resist thecomputer technology but delayed the introduction process by having conflicts anddisagreeing with each other. The management had no idea as to where the bank shouldbe heading in the future and therefore resisted the formation of a corporate strategy as thismight have forced them to think about it and make decisions. The organisational problemsencountered in simply formulating a strategy and choosing a machine were so numerousthat there may be many more to come in making effective use of the technology (fewattempts were being made to recruit new skilled staff or train existing ones). The work


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carried out by the different committees and the consultant appears to have contributedlittle to the chairman's decision to buy the IBM and NCR systems.

Case D: I.S. Department in a MinistryComputerisation at this IS department in Kenya started with microcomputers

donated to the ministry in early 1983. The microcomputers were used initially forword-processing to prepare the district development plans before their use was extendedto prepare the national budget. Their use was resisted by various government officials butthe development plans were developed successfully and the opinion about the machineschanged slightly. In May 1984, the government was donated some Kaypro machines. Atthe same time, the government requested USAID (United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment) to help them acquire a number of IBM microcomputers to be used for thebudget production.

In 1985, USAID accepted the ministry's request and contracted consultants to

assist in the installation, applications development, training, maintenance, and efforts torationalise the budget using microcomputer-based management information systems. Thebudget production process at the ministry had usually been chaotic. Finance officers usedhand calculators to add the many figures in the budget. A great deal of time wasconsumed in calculating and recalculating to obtain accurate figures. The documents hadto be re-typed several times. People had to work 12 hours or more a day to balance thefigures, and budget officers often slept at the government printing press during the finaldays.

Despite these problems, most finance and budget officers did not support theintroduction of microcomputers into the budget production process. One exception was

that microcomputers would facilitate the mechanics of producing the budget and wouldreduce the amount of time budget officers had to spend proof-reading and correctingbudget documents, helping them to deliver the budget on time. Another anticipated impactwas on the substance of the budget allocation process. Usually, budget supply officersarbitrarily cut the ministry budget submissions and gave them only a brief opportunity tolook over the results before the budget was printed. As a result, allocations often failed toreflect the priorities of each ministry. Sometimes the cuts impaired projects or theministry's basic operations. Without the use of microcomputers, it was clear that existingproblems at the ministry were likely to intensify.

Despite some objections, the budget production using computers proceeded. Butwith time, it became clear that there were serious problems related to human rather than

technical factors. Most important was the resistance to microcomputers by many budgetsupply officers who were reluctant to change the way they had prepared the budget in thepast. The main problem was the officers inadequate understanding of microcomputeroperations. Initially there were plans to hold information-cum-training sessions for theofficers but top ministry officials decided that the budget officers would inevitably opposethe new system, and that microcomputer training for those officers would be a wastedeffort. They felt that the officers would eventually support the new system as its benefitsbecame clear. Despite these problems, the 1986 budget was produced and ready aheadof schedule; the budget was presented to the Parliament earlier than ever before in thehistory of the country. It was acclaimed for its accuracy and timeliness by the politicalestablishment. The success of this project is thought to have changed the government'sperception of IT, and the use of microcomputers in other application areas wasencouraged.

The ministry had serious problems, however, in recruiting and retaining skilled


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personnel. For instance, a programmer who had then just graduated from university waschosen to become the deputy head of the department, and a programmer from aneighbouring country acted as a consultant, advisor, trainer and programmer. Neither of

these men had the skills and experience to manage such a project. The expatriateconsultants, therefore, played a big role in the introduction of microcomputers at theministry. The problems for which the donated computers could be used were largelyperceived by the consultants and advisors who were computer literate. They not onlymanaged the project but programmed and documented the applications and gaveinstructions. The government computer centre had the necessary skills but they wereagainst the ministry making use of microcomputers. They did not want competition and,therefore, resisted the introduction, not allowing any of their experienced personnel to helpout.

The lack of computer awareness and literacy at management level led them to belargely against computer introductions early on. Over the years, the resistance lessened,

with computer awareness growing in the government and with the success of a fewprojects. However, the management made little effort to institutionalise the projects andimprove the infrastructure to make technology transfer successful. The department wasstill treated by some officials as a "USAID department". Very little decision making wasbased on the output from the machines, largely as there were few incentives to do so.Automation represented a threat, as previously, a great deal of autonomous authority wasused for decision making.

The most important objectives of the budget production was to strengthen thefinancial and planning information systems of the ministry. There were two budgetproduction goals. One was to facilitate the physical production of the budget by improving

the speed and accuracy of calculations, permitting corrections to be made more easily,and eliminating many of the routine proofreading and retyping tasks. This goal wasachieved with the introduction of microcomputers.

The second goal was to improve the substance of budget allocations. Timeconstraints usually forced budget officers to cut ministry budget submissions with littleinformation from ministries about project priorities and requisite resources. With thecomputer system, the early completion of the budget gave officers considerably more timeto analyze the financial issues reflected in the budget but although they did some routinechecks to ensure that ministry submissions were within their ceilings, they conductedvirtually no substantive analysis. Nor did they spend more time conferring with theministries. Readier access to information merely meant that the officers made the same

decision more quickly than they would have made without the use of the computer system.

Case AnalysisIn this project, management systems and structures, rather than technical issues

emerged as being key to determining the response to microcomputer adoption in theministry. One of the problems was the lack of communication between the budget officersand the computer staff, and among the computer professionals themselves; no formalmeetings or discussions were held to discuss what was happening and where they shouldbe heading. The computer staff thought the officers were going to reject the systemanyway and it was not worth their while speaking to them.


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Another related problem was the lack of involvement, and training, of the officersfrom early on. Such involvement may have solved part of the resistance problem. Another

problem was that roles and responsibilities of all those involved in the project were verysuperficial. Management roles and responsibilities often changed during the projectlife-cycle and this caused tension. The project has been managed by people with widelydifferent backgrounds which has had contrary effects on personnel involved.

The power structure in the organisation also affected the initial use ofmicrocomputers. Those with power over resources, budget officers, were critical of theeffective use and adoption of microcomputers. Since many important decisions in theministry were commonly made on basis other than financial data, computer based financialsystems would change the system they were used to. There was also lack of formalincentives for them to conduct analysis. The ministry's formal systems offered no positiveincentive for learning to use the microcomputers or analyzing the information they provide.

Nor were there any sanctions for failing to do so. As a result, the lack of incentivesobstructed the use of computers to improve decision-making among the professional staff.

Management was initially opposed to the use of the microcomputers for a numberof reasons which made the successful use of the machines difficult. Computers werepolitically sensitive at the time because important Kenyan politicians and civil servantsbelieved that computers would displace workers and that they were too sophisticated.When the political opinion about the technology changed, after the successful completionof the budget, the machines were more readily acceptable.

The experience of the IS department again points to the lack of computer literacyand awareness at all levels in the organisation. No attempt was made to familiarise users

of the potential of computers. The department had little success in recruiting skilledcomputer personnel from outside. Therefore, their dependency on the consultants hadincreased over the years. Moreover, the consultants were a third party and they thereforehad the power to communicate with senior management and users; a civil servant lowerdown in the hierarchy would not have been able do so. The consultants, many of whomhad been with the department for 7-8 years, had succeeded in helping automate thebudget process and had developed a few other financial applications but the skillstransferred to their local counterparts had been minimal.

Case E: A Government Computer CentreThis government computer centre undertakes data processing activities for all

government ministries and departments in Zimbabwe. In 1989, it served over thirtydepartments and processed over a hundred computer applications. The centre's effectiveand efficient functioning was therefore very important as many of the applicationsprocessed influenced the everyday operations of the government. The centre introducedits first computer, an ICT, in 1962 for data processing. This was replaced in 1972 by anNCR machine which was upgraded by another NCR machine in 1982. In the same year, asister organisation, which later merged with the computer centre, acquired a Data Generalmachine and also received a donation of Perkin Elmer (Concurrent) machines; machineswhich could not be locally serviced or maintained. All these machines were incompatibleand therefore worked in isolation undertaking different tasks. Most of the workload wascarried out on the NCR machine whilst the others ran on average one application each. By1989, the centre alone had over US$10 million worth of equipment. All other governmentministries and departments together had over 200 machines of various sizes and of 14different makes/brands!


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By mid-1980s, the centre was facing severe shortage of skilled personnel and themanagement decided to solve the problem of underutilisation of the existing equipment,the non-compatibility of the systems and the lack of personnel, by introducing a system

which would standardise everything and where fewer programming skills would berequired. The management wanted to acquire packages wherever possible and phase outthe use of NCR machines by transferring all the existing applications to a new system.

As a formality, a computer committee was formed to look into the acquisition of themachines; most members had little or no computer literacy or awareness. Thesecommittee members attended vendor presentations and made decisions largely based oninstincts rather than expertise. A senior programmer was recruited to prepare therequirements specification document. The users he interviewed had little knowledge ofwhat their true needs were, largely because of their lack of computer awareness. Theirmanual systems were also in a mess. Based on these poor user requirements, theprogrammer formulated a requirements specification document which the centre submitted

with the tender.In 1986, management decided to buy six Data General machines - two MV20,000

super minis and four MV2000 minicomputers. This caused a great deal of controversy inthe ministry as some users would have preferred NCR machines again; NCR machineswere then being used by the centre. It appeared that some senior management hadalready made up their minds, before the tender was put out, about which vendor to selectand did not care about much else. The management was accused of taking bribes fromone of the two suppliers involved (NCR and Data General). The director of the sisterorganisation, which by then had merged with the centre, resigned and later became themarketing manager for NCR; one of the bidders.

The Data General machines lay idle for a year while the management searched forsoftware packages. Personnel problems restricted the centre from developing their ownapplications or customising packages; outside help was not sought. It took nearly threeyears to customise half of the applications which required converting. No plans had beenmade as to which applications should receive development priority; no explicit strategiesexisted either. Most of the Data General machines were still underutilised in late 1989;three years after installation. The staff morale was low in making use of these machinesand personnel turn-over high. Staff who had been working on the old machines did not findthe Data General machines appropriate and resisted their use. They would have preferredNCR machines because they were familiar with them and also thought the file transferwould have been easier between the old and the new machines. The skills acquired from

the training courses, given by the suppliers, were lost to the private sector.Management turn-over was very high and this affected everyday operations. There

was either no director to manage the operation or there was one who was unaware of theplans made by the previous management, and therefore started planning all over again.

Case AnalysisThe strategies the management had set out before acquiring the Data General

machines, namely buying packages wherever possible and phasing out the use of NCRmachines by transferring all applications to the new machines, were reasonable but tooambitious. Foreign exchange is required to acquire packages developed abroad; packageswhich may be difficult to customise without the skills. Both skilled personnel and foreignexchange were lacking in the country. It appears from the way the acquisition process washandled that the management had their own interests in buying the Data Generalmachines; whether these machines would have been appropriate for the centre or not, in


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any case, is a separate issue.The case also illustrates the decision making process in organisations in Africa

where decisions are made by those not directly in touch with the technology or those who

have little background and experience to back their decision. Lack of commitment andcomputer awareness was obvious amongst the management when they allowed a tenderto be put out with incomplete user specification. The machines were acquired using weakuser requirements and little planning was done about the applications which neededpriority. The suppliers appear to have taken advantage of the situation by selling sixmachines when the job could have been done on fewer. Staff morale was overall lowwhich affected the use of the machines. They did not find Data General machinesappropriate and felt the centre was paying a high price for them. The wide variety ofequipment the centre used also caused problems in recruiting and retaining staff with therelevant skills, not considering the poor salaries in the government. The high turnover atmanagerial level did not help either. The lack of planning at the government level largely

led to underutilisation of equipment at the centre and in other ministries; most ministrieshad their own equipment and did not need to use the services of the centre any more.Most of the problems, however, appear to have been caused by lack of computer literacyand awareness at all levels in the organisation.

Overall AnalysisIt is difficult to judge from the above five cases whether the systems implemented

were successes or failures, as to some a CBIS may have been a failure but to themanagement it may have been a success. As the depth and detail of each of the cases

differs, such an analysis would be difficult. Moreover, this issue is beyond the scope of thispaper. A number of factors, however, appear to have influenced the introduction andutilisation of CBIS in the organisations studied:

Lack of management support and commitment: Case A, B, C, D, ELack of skilled personnel: Case A, B, D, ERole of consultants: Case B, C, D, EStructure, norms, decision making: Case B, C, D, EUser resistance: Case B, D, ELack of strategic focus, planning: Case B, D, ELack of awareness of potential of IT: Case B, C, D

Management turnover: Case B, D, ELack of user education and training: Case B, DPoor supplier support: Case A, BLack of funds: Case A, ELack of telecommunications infrastructure: Case AInappropriate IS development approach: Case ASite preparation: Case B

It was apparent from the cases that management attitudes, commitment,cooperation, and support towards computerisation, their motives for acquiring a particularbrand of machine and not another, and their computer literacy and awareness played amajor role in the success with which computers were introduced and used byorganisations. Lack of management commitment was also identified as one of the keyfactors in the research conducted Moussa and Schware in 76 organisations in Africa


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(1992). The second major factor which appears to have influenced utilisation was theavailability of skilled computer personnel, and in general computer literacy and awarenessat all levels. Although these two issues had different consequences on different

organisations, they appear to be more prominent than some of other the factors outlinedabove.

The insurance company (case A) lacked computer skilled staff to developapplications in-house using SSADM methodology which led to underutilisation ofequipment and reliance on consultants to develop some of the initial applications. The lackof computer literacy and awareness at the national bank (case B) and suppliermanipulation led to the bank acquiring ICL machines which were inappropriate for theorganisation. At the commercial bank (case C), it took four years to formulate aninformation systems strategy due lack of computer skills and management conflict.The situation was similar at the IS department in the ministry (case D) which also lackedcomputer skills and awareness. Lack of computer skilled personnel and lack of computer

aware management had led the government computer centre (case E) to acquire a widerange of equipment, much of which was underutilised.

The problem of skills shortage is especially evident in the public sector in Africa.Government bureaucracies are slow to recruit, train and/or retain IT personnel, or paythem wages comparable to those in the private sector. This has resulted in very high staffand management turnover in the public sector. The government organisations arecurrently used as a training ground by new graduates who leave for greener pastures assoon as they have acquired sufficient experience. This has put a big strain on the trainingresources available in the public sector. The private sector is benefiting at the expense ofthe government.

Most of the organisations studied were highly hierarchical, managementresponsibility and accountability was totally missing, and there was lack of strategic focusor direction as to where the organisation should be heading. The problem is that many ofthe public sector organisations in Africa are managed by those who may have held theirpositions for many years; positions which they may have secured for reasons other thanbusiness/management skills. Such managers' encounter with computers, at educationalinstitutions or elsewhere, is usually minimal and this has resulted in lack of computerliteracy and awareness. Senior management, therefore, either resists the technology orare not cooperative in the process of automation. For various reasons, few Africans in thepublic sector feel responsible for their actions and even fewer are committed to theirorganisations. The economic situation in these countries and the poor salaries managers

receive has also increased corruption and bribery. Managers appreciate some"sweeteners" from vendors whose equipment they may decide to buy. This has often ledto acquisition of inappropriate equipment which is underutilised. Competition is fierceamong the many suppliers because of the small computer market and they therefore luremanagers into buying equipment by bribing them.

Some of the other factors outlined above, such as the role of consultants, userresistance, lack of potential of IT, lack of strategic focus and planning are all related to lackof computer literacy and awareness in organisations, whereas as other factors such asmanagement turnover and the structures, norms, decision making, etc. are more to dowith the organisational structure. For instance, the lack of knowledge about what IS can dofor their business and lack of integration of the IS function into the mainstream businesswere both a result of lack of computer literacy and awareness at senior levels in manyorganisations. The dependency on foreign consultants is also due to lack of skills at thelocal level, as seen in most of the cases. In Africa, successful implementation of


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computers often depends on the performance of outside consultants (Moussa andSchware, 1992). Their performance, however, also depends on other organisational andnational factors and one cannot blame them for all the unsuccessful projects in Africa.

Moussa and Schware's research also identifies some of the above factors, namely, lack ofstrategic focus or planning, management turnover, poor supplier support, funding, and sitepreparation, as influencing success of a project.

Although, apart from case A and E, no direct reference is made to the fundingsituation in the cases, all five organisations faced problems with funds, especially theavailability of foreign currency to import hardware and software, and to hire consultants.The insurance company did not have the funds to buy further equipment and softwarepackages, the chairman of the bank in Kenya went around looking for funds for thecomputerisation project, and the IS department had to depend on donor agencies for itsmicrocomputers.

From the five cases studied, we see that apart from the bank in Kenya (case C),

which took 4 years to develop its IS strategy, and the insurance company (case A), noneof the other organisations had any plans or strategies as such. Work done by Moussa andSchware also shows that a large percentage of the 76 projects they reviewed had seriousplanning problems (1992). They found that many organisations had rushed into projectswithout sufficient planning. However, the case of the insurance company (case A) showsthat IS planning on its own is not always effective when such plans cannot be put intoaction due to other factors beyond the organisation's control. This is not to say thatorganisation's should not plan, planning is very important and may lead to a success of aproject, but to emphasise that all plans should take national and organisational factors intoaccount to make them implementable.

We can see that some of the factors listed above from the five case studies havealso been identified by other authors, as outlined in earlier. Apart from the national andorganisational level factors, there is a great deal of overlap between some factorsidentified above and those identified in other authors' case studies. As the national andorganisational infrastructure varies from case to case, and country to country, we can seethat some factors are a hindrance to successful application of CBIS in certainorganisations and not other. For example, poor telecommunications infrastructure inZambia resulted in the insurance company (case A) having problems in making use oftheir computers whilst at the bank (case B) this problem was not as yet apparent. Again,lack of user training, supplier support, funds, etc. were a problem in some organisationsbut not in other. We can deduct from this that maybe each organisation is unique and,

apart from management support and commitment and the availability of skilled personnel,in other words the human factors, all other factors influencing introduction and utilisation ofCBIS vary from organisation to organisation, let alone country to country, and that it is acombination of factors and no single group of factors which influence success (or failure).

However, it should be noted that all these factors are highly inter-related to eachother and one would have an impact on the other. The national level factors are going toinfluence those at the organisational level and vice versa. Also that the availability ofskilled computer personnel is not going to solve all the problems unless managementcommitment exists and also other factors are supportive. The existing situation wouldimprove if management support and commitment and skilled personnel existed but only ifit is supported by other national and organisational conditions. For instance, at the bank inKenya (case C), even if management support and commitment improves and the bankmanages to recruit skilled personnel, the goal of linking up all the 64 branches, somelocated in remote parts of the country, may not be fulfilled if the telecommunications


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infrastructure does not support it.

Conclusions and further research

The case studies, which included important organisations such as national banksand government computer centres, showed that management commitment and support,and the availability of skilled computer personnel influenced the success with whichcomputers were introduced and utilised by public sector organisations in Africa. Althoughthese two factors were much more prominent than other factors in all the five casesstudied, this is not to say that all CBIS's introduced in Africa would be successes if thesetwo factors were present. These two factors would certainly play a major role but there areother national and organisational level factors which also play a role in the success (orfailure) of CBIS. In other words, it is a combination of factors which influence success (orfailure) and no particular group of factors. Factors vary from organisation to organisationand country to country.

However, someof the existing problems of underutilisation of equipment, due tolack of skilled personnel, the problem of "misinvestment" due to lack of computer literacyand awareness at management level, the supplier manipulation, dependency of foreignconsultants, etc. can be solved by an intelligent development of human resources.Education and training facilities need to be improved and increased in number so thatmore people can gain computer literacy and awareness at all levels. Such facilities shouldbe geared not just for the training of computer professionals but also for the training of themanagers, the users, and the policy makers. Such computer awareness is necessary sothat an effort can be made to improve the infrastructure that is required for successfultransfer and utilisation.

Finances are scarce in Africa and one cannot afford to waste them in acquiringequipment which is going to be underutilised because of lack of skilled personnel. Thegovernments, as well as the private sector, have to take the initiative of making educationand training one of its development priorities, and invest in human resource development.Personnel have to be trained if they are to absorb skills, they have to be given incentivesto work, their working conditions have to be improved and their salaries raised toreasonable level to reduce the brain drain to the private sector and, last but not least,personnel have to be made to feel part of the organisation by involving them in thedecision making process.

The potential of further research in the area of information systems andcomputerisation in DCs is great. Work presented in this paper has highlighted a number of

areas in which further research is required. National and organisational conditions in DCsare very different to those found in the developed world and, therefore, it is ofteninappropriate to apply existing experiences and research from the developed nations.There is an urgent need for further IS research in DCs, done from the DCs' perspective.There is certainly a need for further research to identify factors which may influencesuccess (or failure) of CBIS in DCs; to identify factors which may be unique to a nation ora region. There is a also a need for more detailed case studies from DCs which focus notjust on the technical issues but also on the social, organisational and political dimensions.


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Biography

After completing her PhD on the "Transfer of Information Technology to DevelopingCountries" at the London School of Economics in 1990, Mayuri Odedra-Straub worked asa consultant with the Management Development Programme of the CommonwealthSecretariat. In early 1991, she joined IDG to help launch a new computer magazine forAfrica - PC World Africa. She worked as an editor and research associate for themagazine until June 1992 when she moved to Singapore to join Dept. of InformationSystems and Computer Science at the National University of Singapore, where shelectures in information systems.

29-Case Studies Africa

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