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Mats Bergman Productive Signs: Improving the Prospects of
Peirces Rhetoric1
Abstract Studies of C. S. Peirces theory of signs have typically
focused on the sub-disciplines he branded grammar and critic, with
comparably little attention paid to the third semiotic branch, that
is, to the line of inquiry he identified as rhetoric or
methodeutic. However, Peirces elevation of rhetoric to the status
of the highest division of logic should not be ignored; the future
prospects of his sign-theoretical project are arguably closely tied
to the conceptualisation and development of the third branch. This
article traces the development of Peirces rhetoric and explores the
tension between the rhetorical and methodeutic perspectives in his
mature theory of signs, with the aim of preparing the way for a
re-evaluation of the hierarchy of sign-theoretical disciplines. The
article concludes with a sketch for a rhetorical approach to
Peircean sign theory.
KEYWORDS: Charles S. Peirce, Rhetoric, Methodeutic, Grammar,
Anthropomorphism
Introduction
Although Peirce, somewhat modestly, characterised himself as a
pioneer of the
coming science of semiotics,2 there is still much to consider in
his contributions
to and proposals for this line of study. Arguably, we have not
yet caught up with
Peirce in all respects. As new studies of Peirces contributions
emerge, there is a
growing appreciation not only of the part of the system he
completed, but also
of the many possible paths of study he began clearing but did
not fully explore.
One of these proposals, which I feel may not have been assessed
as thoroughly
as it should, is Peirces claim or suggestion that rhetoric is
the highest and most
living branch of logic (c. 1895: CP 2.333). Studies of Peirces
semiotics that is,
1 Paper Presented at the 31
st Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of America, 2006
2 Many Peircean semioticians prefer the name semeiotic, and
dismiss the more common term
semiotics. The validity of this choice and the accompanying
criticism of the word semiotics is debatable (see Deely 2003).
Also, contrary to an oft-repeated claim, Peirce uses semiotics at
least once in his writings. Here, I opt for semiotics, as there is
no need to distinguish Peirces theory from other semiotic points of
view in this context. Semeiotic can be useful as a marker of an
explicitly Peircean approach, to clearly indicate its divergence
from the semiological tradition
stemming from Ferdinand de Saussure.
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his logic in the broad sense have typically focused on the
sub-disciplines he
branded grammar and critic, with comparably little attention
paid to his third
semiotic study, that is, to the line of inquiry he identified as
rhetoric or
methodeutic.
This emphasis is partly understandable in view of the fact that
Peirces
writings on explicitly rhetorical issues tend to be sparse and
mostly
programmatic. Yet, the usual reaction to his proposal has been a
rather half-
hearted acknowledgment, if not outright neglect; the centre of
the Peircean
semioticians interest has primarily been grammar, as displayed
by the attention
to formal relations and the taxonomy of signs. This focus is
unquestionably easily
defended; there is no denying that Peirce himself finds the
organization of sign
types to be one of the major tasks of semiotics. Nor do I mean
to claim that there
would not have been an impressive amount of work, classifiable
as semiotic
rhetoric in Peirces sense, done after his death. Furthermore, if
I am not
mistaken, it is possible to discern a growing, explicit interest
in Peircean rhetoric
at the moment. I have in mind recent efforts by Vincent
Colapietro (2006), James
Liszka (1996; 2000), and Lucia Santaella (1999), for instance.
But in spite of all
this, it would be an exaggeration to proclaim the existence of a
current rhetorical
trend within Peircean semiotics.
In this article, I aim to make a couple of small contributions
to the
discussion of Peirces rhetoric. Mainly, I wish to argue that we
should take
Peirces elevation of rhetoric to the status of the highest
branch of logic very
seriously indeed, not least because it may have significant
consequences for his
semiotic project and its future viability. I wish to review the
relationship between
grammar and rhetoric, and argue that certain changes in Peirces
later semiotics
(which Colapietro [2006] has recently dubbed Peirces rhetorical
turn) calls for
a reconsideration of the hierarchical outlook that
straightforwardly prioritises
grammar over rhetoric.
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Conceptions of Rhetoric
Before considering the role of rhetoric in Peircean semiotics,
it is useful to
consider how Peirce presents it as a part of the hierarchy of
sciences. As so many
questions regarding Peirces semiotic project, his division of
semiotics into three
branches involves many complex questions. Here, matters can be
simplified by
focusing on two different conceptions of the field of the
philosophical study of
signs, connected with his early and late semiotic phases.
The first recorded appearance of the term semiotic in Peirces
writings
merely states that logic is a species of symbolistic, which in
its turn is a branch
of semiotic, the general science of representations. For the
young Peirce, logic
is not a synonym for the doctrine of signs, but rather the
branch of the semiotics
of symbols that examines the relations of symbolic
representations to their
objects (1865b: W 1:303). He does not pay much attention to the
other parts of
semiotics. We are told that there is a science of copies and a
science of signs,3
which accompany the science of symbols, and that symbolistic is
divided into
grammar, rhetoric, and logic (see fig. 1); but only the logical
part of semiotics is
described in any detail.
2 By signs, Peirce in this context means the kind of
representations later named indices. Copy is an early name for
icon.
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Figure 1. Peirces classification of the sciences in Teleological
Logic (1865b).
Peirces characterisation of the science of representations in
his youthful writings
is rather meagre; it is not possible to form any detailed
conception of its scope
and content. Nonetheless, some general features of the proposed
domain of
inquiry may be discerned. In the first place, Peirces early
attention to the science
of semiotics follows from an endeavour to find a definition of
logic that would
avoid the pitfalls of psychologism (1865c: W 1:308). Thus, it is
evident that the
representations, which the various branches of semiotic study,
are not to be
explicated by an examination of the actual workings of the human
mind.
The unpsychologistic emphasis is a pervasive feature of Peirces
semiotics,
early and late alike. In addition, the trivium of grammar,
logic, and rhetoric can
also be found in his mature sign-theoretical writings. However,
one of the
interesting traits of Peirces first efforts to characterise
semiotic inquiry is that
they indicate that he was not originally all that interested in
the study of all kinds
of signs; rather, what he was looking for in his earliest
classification of semiotics
was a way to delimit the domain of logic, or the study of how
symbols can stand
truthfully for their objects.
Nevertheless, Peirce does offer some attempts to characterise
the tasks of
the different branches of symbolistic in his early writings. In
Teleological Logic,
he asserts that the science of the general conditions to which
every symbol is
subjected in so far as it is related to a logos is General
Grammar, to a language is
General Rhetoric, to an Object is General Logic (1865b: W
1:304). In another
passage from the same period, Peirce describes the task of
rhetoric as that of
investigating the laws of a symbol translating anything (1865a:
W 1:274).
Now, when one turns to Peirces later writings, at least one
major change
in his conception of the semiotic sciences that affects the
scope of rhetoric may
be discerned. The in-between level consisting of the science of
copies, the
science of signs, and symbolistic is removed. In his mature
semiotics, Peirce
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actually divides logic into the three sub-disciplines or
branches of grammar,
critic, and rhetoric or methodeutic.
This is related to the relatively well-known fact that Peirce
changes his
mind about the relationship between semiotics and logic as his
thought
develops. Whereas the young Peirce strives to carve a place for
logic within the
part of semiotics he calls symbolistic, the older Peirce
conceives of logic as
semiotics; and this is to include grammar and rhetoric as well
as logic in the
narrow sense, or critic as Peirce most often calls the second
branch of semiotics.
The term logic is unscientifically by me employed in two
distinct senses.
In its narrower sense, it is the science of the necessary
conditions of the
attainment of truth. In its broader sense, it is the science of
the necessary
laws of thought, or, still better (thought always taking place
by means of
signs), it is general semeiotic. (c. 1897a: CP 1.444)
Peirce now argues that as long as every logical relation is a
semiotic relation
(which he naturally holds it to be), then the deeper
comprehension of logic
requires an understanding of all forms of signs and their
functions. Consequently,
he urges logicians to widen the scope of their research. Peirce
even asserts that
the broader investigation is part of the duties of the logician
(1909a: MS 640.10).
Logic (Semiotic)
Grammar (Syntax) Critic (Logic in Rhetoric / Methodeutic
the Narrow Sense)
Figure 2. Peirces Division of Logic in His Later Philosophy
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There are many motives behind this expansion, some explicitly
states while
others are not, but for our purposes here three reasons are
particularly striking.
Firstly, it is clear that Peirces mature conception of logic as
semiotics entails that
grammar, critic, and rhetoric are not to be restricted to the
study of symbols
that is, to habitual or conventional signs. They are to be
concerned iconic and
indexical representations as well (1909b: SS 118). Secondly, the
logician should
not restrict him- or herself to the representation of objects,
as the young Peirce
proposed. In fact, logic traditionally deals with such things as
definition and
signification, which are more matters of the interpretant than
the object in
Peirces view (1909b: SS 118). As we have seen, already in his
early studies,
Peirce suggests that rhetoric is particularly focused on the
interpretant; in the
later phase, the realisation that many of the tasks of the
logician are more
matters of sign-interpretant relations than of sign-object
relations become a
reason to expand the scope of logic to include rhetoric.
Finally, in an almost
pragmatic spirit Peirce states that the extension is needed for
linguistic and
rhetorical applications (1904a: MS 693.188-190). This indicates
that one reason
for facilitating productive connections between logic and other
pursuits. Perhaps
it is not so odd, after all, that Peirce, the staunch defender
of an unpsychological
conception of logic, suggests that the borderline between logic
and psychology
need not be so strictly drawn when we come to rhetoric, the
third branch (c.
1902: CP 2.107).
Rhetoric vs. Methodeutic
So far, our examination of changes in Peirces philosophy has
suggested that the
importance of rhetoric grows when we move from the early logical
writings to
the mature conception of logic as semeiotic. However, there are
two features
of his thought that seem to limit the scope and prospects of
semiotic rhetoric.
Firstly, Peirce apparently wishes to find a more clearly defined
and delimited
function for the third branch as methodology. Secondly, his
continued allegiance
to a certain hierarchical vision of the sciences may hinder an
appreciation to the
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dual position of the rhetorical domain as the starting point as
well as the
concluding field of semiotic studies.
In his later writings, Peirce first employs the term rhetoric,
and defines it
as the study of the necessary conditions of the transmission of
meaning by signs
from mind to mind, and from one state of mind to another (c.
1896: CP 1.444).
The task of rhetoric is to ascertain the laws by which in every
scientific
intelligence one sign gives birth to another, and especially one
thought brings
forth another (c. 1897b: CP 2.229). As such, the emphasis of
rhetoric would
naturally be on interpretation and other semiotic effects. This
conception does
not seem to differ radically from that presented in Peirces
early writings, apart
from the significant divergence in scope noted above.
However, approximately in 1902, the focus of the third
sub-discipline of
semiotics begins to turn toward methodological matters,
something that is
reflected in Peirces new preferred name, methodeutic (see Peirce
1906: CP
4.9). The occurrence of this shift can be seen quite concretely
in Minute Logic,
where the two terms still co-exist, albeit somewhat uneasily.4
About a year later,
the matter appears settled. From there on, the third
sub-discipline is
predominantly defined in terms of the principles of the
production of valuable
courses of research and exposition (1903a: EP 2:272).
Thus, it would appear that Peirce has replaced rhetoric with the
better-
defined methodeutic, at the same time restricting its scope to
the study of
effective methods. Some scholars have drawn this very
conclusion; for instance,
according to Santaella (1999: 380), the third branch of
semiotics develops from a
narrow to a broad sense. However, at roughly the same time as
this
transformation takes place, Peirce also continues to write on
rhetoric, and even
proposes a quite intricate scheme of various rhetorical studies
in Ideas, Stray or
Stolen, about Scientific Writing (1904b). In this context,
Peirce defines the third
branch of semiotics as the science of the essential conditions
under which a sign
3 In one variant of the text, Peirce explicitly states that he
prefers "Speculative Rhetoric" over
"Methodeutic" or "Methodology"; but in other drafts, methodeutic
is used.
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may determine an interpretant sign of itself and of whatever it
signifies, or may,
as a sign, bring about a physical result (1904b: EP 2:326).
In Ideas, Stray or Stolen Peirce suggests that rhetoric could be
divided
into the rhetoric of art, the rhetoric of persuasion, and the
rhetoric of science
(see Peirce 1904b: EP 2:329). This, in turn, could be
interpreted to imply that
methodeutic is a part of rhetoric, namely the rhetoric of
science.
Some reconstructive work seems to be needed. Joseph Ransdell
enumerates three principal functions of the third semiotic
discipline; it can be
conceived variously as the general methodology of inquiry, as a
theory about
how beliefs are established when truth is sought, or as a theory
about the
representational process considered as an autonomous
interpretant-generating
process (Ransdell 1997: 19). The autonomy claim is somewhat
controversial,
but if we speak more broadly about a theory of interpretant
generation and
communication, then Ransdells summary should be acceptable to
all parties.
Taking rhetoric as an umbrella term, Liszka (2000: 470) argues
that
rhetoric as speculative rhetoric (i.e., as an account of the
conditions of
communication and the fixation of belief) and rhetoric as
methodeutic (i.e., as a
systematic procedure for inquiry and for the systematisation of
the sciences) are
reconcilable within scientific rhetoric, which works to
underscore the formal
conditions of inquiry as a practice, including its
presuppositions, purposes,
principles, and procedures. Apart from certain doubts that could
be entertained
concerning the aptness of the term formal conditions in this
context,5 Liszkas
proposal offers a good summary of the scope of Peirces rhetoric.
It retains the
notion that the study of communication is an integral part of
semiotics, while at
the same time paying due heed to the scientific setting of
Peirces project. At any
rate, it seems apposite to retain rhetoric as a broader
category, not least because
of the possibility of pursuing a debate between Peirces
semiotically charged
rhetoric and other conceptions of rhetorical inquiry.
4 Admittedly, Peirce sometimes describes the third logical
science in such terms, but it might be
more appropriate to use theoretical or even speculative rather
than formal to avoid confusions. Moreover, it is advisable not to
read conditions in a strong transcendental sense.
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Anthropomorphic Perspectives and Rhetorical Evidence
The second difficulty facing a re-evaluation of the role of
rhetoric in Peirces
semiotic approach may prove more challenging and controversial.
The
hierarchical point of view that permeates much of Peirces
writings on the
sciences also seems to affect his conception of semiotics;
clearly, he often
suggests the straightforward priority of grammar in relation to
rhetoric, which
can be taken as an indication that the precarious study of
rhetoric should build
on a firmer groundwork of grammar (which builds on more
fundamental studies
such as mathematics and phaneroscopy).
What is problematic about such a perspective? It seems quite
natural that
a grammar of signs would scientifically speaking precede the
study of the use of
signs. Certainly, this is the way the division of labour has
been set up in most
conceptions of syntax and pragmatics, beginning with Charles
Morris (1938) and
Rudolf Carnap (1946), at least. Indeed, from a certain point of
view, grammar is
to be given priority over rhetoric namely, in the sense that
grammatical studies
can provide rhetorical inquiry with concepts and principles.
Yet, it is important to
take this hierarchy in the right spirit: as a heuristic model of
use for furthering
systematic inquiry, but not necessarily as the whole truth of
the matter. A
grammar that operates in a magisterial fashion, producing
elaborate systematic
structures while ignoring all questions of their applicability
(a task for lesser
disciplines), is in danger of turning into a mere glass-bead
game an a priori
pastime for detached intellectuals. In spite of its principled
rigour, such semiotic
constructions can begin to crumble when faced with the question
of upon what
base the edifice is supposed to stand or how to motivate its
abstract forms and
concepts.
With the risk of building up straw men, it could be claimed that
too much
of the semiotics done in a Peircean mould just accepts certain
premises, and
then presents the whole theory as formally as possible, or
quasi-deductively. This
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may limit the broader appeal and possibly even hamper the future
usefulness of
Peirces semiotics.
The alternative path which may be viewed as a rhetorical
approach into
the Peircean science of signs is to place the emphasis on those
parts of Peirces
semiotics in which he not only suggests that the theory is an
abstraction from
actual practices, but also derives central conceptions, such as
object and
interpretant, from ordinary sign use, such as communication
(e.g., Peirce 1907;
cf. Bergman 2003; 2004; 2005).
In his criticism of the Hegelians, Peirce maintains that
philosophers must
not begin by talking of pure ideas, vagabond thoughts that tramp
the public
roads without any human habituation, but must begin with men and
their
conversation (c. 1900: CP 8.112). The point here is not that we
should restrict
ourselves to signs in our minds in a nominalistic spirit, nor
make a sop to
Cerberus, but rather that it is healthy to acknowledge that what
we know of
signs and how they work in the world is based on what we know of
the ways of
such signs that we are most familiar with and signs in
communication seem to
be pre-eminently important in this regard. As Peirce puts the
matter, we ought
not to think that what are signs to us are the only signs; but
we have to judge
signs in general by these (c. 1903: NEM 4:297).
This suggestion may raise an eyebrow or two. A formalistic
semiotician,
who embraces Peirces un-psychologistic programme, might find
this contention
perilous; almost inevitably, it will lead to an anthropomorphic
conception of
semiotics. That is, the properties of certain human signs are
taken to be
characteristics of all signs, without any logical guarantee of
the validity of the
generalisation. Adherents of biosemiotics (or more radical
variants of universal
semiotics) may be equally appalled by this unexpected emphasis
on the human
sphere. At the other end of the scale, humanistic thinkers could
fault Peirce for
expanding the boundaries of semiotics beyond its proper human
habitat, that is,
for not being anthropocentric enough.
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Peirces reply to such worries is worth quoting:
If I were to attach a definite meaning to anthropomorphism, I
should
think it stood to reason that a man could not have any idea that
was not
anthropomorphic, and that it was simply to repeat the error of
Kant to
attempt to escape anthropomorphism. At the same time, I am
confident a
man can pretty well understand the thoughts of his horse, his
jocose
parrot, and his canary-bird, so full of espiglerie; and though
his
representation of those thoughts must, I suppose, be more or
less falsified
by anthropomorphism, yet that there is a good deal more truth
than falsity
in them, and more than if he were to attempt the impossible task
of
eliminating anthropomorphism, I am for the present sufficiently
convinced.
(c. 1906: NEM 4:313)
In other words, the attempt to escape anthropomorphism will lead
to the
postulation of things-in-themselves, beyond human reach. Peirce,
who so
vehemently opposes psychologism in logic, surprisingly concludes
that we can
know only the human aspect of the universe (1911: SS 141). In
Pragmatism
(MS 291), Peirce claims that man is so completely hemmed in by
the bounds of
his possible practical experience, his mind is so restricted to
being the instrument
of his needs, that he cannot, in the least, mean anything that
transcends those
limits (c. 1905: CP 5.536). This human-centred stance (as we
might say for a lack
of a better term) does not lead to an absolute separation
between the fields of
human mind and nature.
Furthermore, in a suggestive passage, Peirce indicates that
grammar needs
to employ so-called rhetorical evidence that is, inferences
drawn from our
commonplace experiences of assertions. This evidential base is
formally
imperfect. Yet, it does not only provide the initial material
for the inquiry, but
also constitutes the testing ground for the systematically
developed analysis (c.
1895: CP 2.333). All this fits nicely with Peirces oft-repeated
claim that
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philosophy ought to be based on common, everyday experience; in
this dynamic
field, from which all semiotic abstractions emerge, ordinary
communicative
exchanges in all their complexity are the most full-blooded
semiotic
phenomena available.
This indicates that grammar must, in certain respects, lean on
rhetorical
considerations which, in turn, suggests that the relationship
between grammar
and rhetoric is not to be construed as a straightforward
hierarchy, in which
grammarians, oblivious to the interests and worries of
rhetoricians, pursue their
studies in an a priori manner, eventually handing over
principles and concepts to
the lower order. The picture that begins to emerge is more
multifaceted,
involving a continuous give and take between the two modes of
semiotic inquiry,
and perhaps casting some doubt on the validity of pure semiotic
grammar (if
such a thing is even conceivable).
Even so, the reassessment of the relationship between the
semiotic
disciplines should be performed with care. While the proposal
calls for a partial
overturn of old priorities, it is nonetheless not a call for an
unstructured
discipline without distinctions and divisions of labour. There
is certainly the
danger that we might end up in a situation in which grammar and
rhetoric
support each other, like two drunken sailors (1903b: CP 8.167).
The challenge
here is to find a reasonable balance, which not only avoids a
vicious circle but
also provides the whole project of Peircean grammar with a
rhetorical
motivation.
Nor does all this mean that we should simply turn the tables and
proclaim
the dominance of rhetoric, somewhat like the renaissance
humanists or some
20th century proponents of rhetoric have wanted to do. On the
contrary, it is
possible to retain grammar as a quasi-formal doctrine of signs.
The only thing
that the emphasis on the rhetorical approach necessitates is a
healthy check on
formalistic tendencies. That is, it acts as a reminder of the
fact that even the
most elegant and well-ordered semiotic concepts, classifications
and theories are
abstractions from sign use, and not least that they must also
stand the
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pragmatic test of possible application in rhetorical studies.
From one point of
view albeit an admittedly narrow and incomplete one rhetoric is
the
beginning and end of semiotics; grammar is a means for improving
our rhetorical
practices, that is, our habits of communication and methodeutic
of inquiry.
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