Social Responsibility and Ethics: Clarifying the Concepts Author(s): Josie Fisher Source: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Jul., 2004), pp. 391-400 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25123269 . Accessed: 09/07/2013 11:33 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Business Ethics. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 121.54.54.59 on Tue, 9 Jul 2013 11:33:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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Social Responsibility and Ethics: Clarifying the ConceptsAuthor(s): Josie FisherSource: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Jul., 2004), pp. 391-400Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25123269 .
Accessed: 09/07/2013 11:33
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Business Ethics.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 121.54.54.59 on Tue, 9 Jul 2013 11:33:51 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
profits while complying with the "rules of the game". On this view, firms have a moral duty to maximise
profits and by pursuing their own self-interest they will thereby maximise overaU economic welfare
(Shaw and Barry, 2001). Of course the rules of the
game need to be clarified and a quote from Fried
man's article, first pubUshed in 1970, is often cited
... there is one and only one social responsibiUty of
business - to use its resources and engage in activities
designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within
the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open
and free competition without deception or fraud
(2000, p. 12).
However within this seminal article, which it is
claimed denies that business has broad social
responsibilities, there is another for the most part
ignored explication of the "rules of the game". Friedman (2000, p. 9) claims a corporate executive's
responsibility is to "... conduct the business in
accordance with [his/her employer's] desires, which
generaUy will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in
ethical custom" (emphasis added). Levitt, writing in
1958, put it this way: "[i]n the end business has only two responsibilities
? to obey the elementary canons
of face-to-face civiUty (honesty, good faith, and so
on) and to seek material gain" (quoted in Shaw and
Barry, 2001, p. 204). While profit maximisation without constraint has
never been seriously advocated, the classical view is
that business is required to meet the moral mini
mum, that is, comply with the rules of the game as
determined by society. Despite first appearances, this
account of the social responsibility of business re
quires compUance with society's ethical norms, so it
cannot correctly be claimed that social responsibiUty and ethics are unrelated concepts.
Social responsibility has various dimensions one of which is
ethics
The fourth, and most widely supported view, is that
there are four dimensions of corporate social
responsibiUty: economic, legal, ethical and philan
thropic. Carroll's "Pyramid of Corporate Social
Responsibility" (1991, p. 42) is widely cited (see, for
example, the following business ethics texts: Kitson
and Campbell, 1996; Ferrell et al., 2000; Trevino
and Nelson, 1991). This pyramid places economic
responsibilities at the foundation and moving up the
pyramid are legal, ethical and philanthropic respon sibilities. Society requires business to discharge its
economic and legal responsibilities, it expects busi
ness to fulfil its ethical responsibilities and it desires
that business meet its philanthropic responsibilities
(Ferrell et al., 2000). Interestingly, Boatright (2000) also includes this account of social responsibility in
addition to his claim that ethics has to do with the
actions of employees while social responsibility has
to do with the consequences of business activity. This view of the relationship between social
responsibility and ethics is consistent with the ap
proach taken by many business ethics texts. The
focus of these texts is predominantly on the rela
tionship between businesses and their stakeholders, both within the organisation and outside it
(including the natural environment and society).
Epstein (1987, p. 104) claims that social responsi
bility "... relates primarily to achieving outcomes
from organizational decisions concerning specific issues or problems which (by some normative stan
dard) have beneficial rather than adverse effects upon
pertinent corporate stakeholders".
This view is also found in some management texts. For example, according to Samson and Daft
(2003, p. 147) "[e]thics deals with internal values
that are a part of corporate culture and shapes decisions concerning social responsibility with re
spect to the external environment". Carroll's pyra
mid is included in this text.
Having identified this as the most common view
of the relationship between ethics and social
responsibility, it is nonetheless important to be aware
of the other ways the relationship has been charac
terised. In the following section I consider social
responsibility in more detail before turning to ethics.
Social responsibility
While corporate social performance is receiving
increasing attention, especially in management
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Uterature, I have confined my discussion to social
responsib?ity. This is because a clear understanding of the social responsib?ity of business is necessary before turning to the question of how weU a par ticular business has met its social obUgations, that is, an assessment of its social performance.
The concept of social responsib?ity is ambiguous. De George (1999) has identified four different ways the term is used: First, when a corporation is de
scribed as being sociaUy responsible this can mean
simply that it meets its legal obUgations. Second, when a corporation is described as being sociaUy
responsible it sometimes means that, in addition to
meeting its legal obUgations, the organisation also
fulfils its social obUgations. The important point about these two uses of the term is that they refer to
the level of commitment that particular organisations do, in fact, demonstrate, thus these uses are
descriptive. The possible levels of commitment have been
represented in management texts as a continuum
that, at one extreme, identifies resistance to social
demands, then a defensive or social obUgation ap
proach (the organisation meets its economic and
legal responsibilities), foUowed by accommodation
or a social response approach (in addition to meeting its economic and legal responsibilities, the organi sation also fulfils society's ethical expectations) and, at the other extreme, a proactive, social contribution
approach (see, for example, Davidson and Griffin, 2000 and Schermerhorn, 2002 (discussed above), and Samson and Daft, 2003). A sim?ar scale is
adopted by Black and Porter (1999): defenders, ac
commodates, reactors and anticipators. Robbins
et al. (2000) identify four stages of social responsi
b?ity based on the stakeholders to whom the orga nisation sees itself as having a responsib?ity. At stage one management is responsible only to stockholders, at stage two
employees are added, at stage three
stakeholders in the specific environment (e.g. cus
tomers and suppUers) are included, and at stage four
society as a whole is added.
The term social responsibility is also used to stand
for the obUgations themselves ? either those imposed
by society, or those assumed by a particular organi sation (whether or not these reflect society's con
cerns). These are the third and fourth uses identified
by De George (1999). Since these are obUgations
that ought to be fulfilled (according to society or the
particular organisation) this indicates a normative use
of the term.
The claim that businesses do have a social
responsibility, that they ought to act in certain ways and refrain from acting in other ways is not new, it
has been discussed in the literature for over 50 years
(Carroll, 1999). Social responsibility, used this way, refers to the obligations businesses have toward
society. So far this is uncontroversial, however, there
is debate about how content can be given to the
concept.
A major reason for there being no consensus
about the social responsibilities of business is that
there is no general agreement about the purpose of
business nor who has legitimate claims on it. One
way the debate about the requirements of social
responsibility has been framed is in terms of two
competing views of the role of business in society: the classical (or free market view, or narrow view) and the socioeconomic view (or broader view) (see, for example, Kitson and Campbell, 1996; Robbins
et al., 2000; Schermerhorn, 2002). According to the
former view, attributed to Friedman and Levitt, the
only social responsibility of business is to maximise
profits. It was pointed out above, however, that this
is a misrepresentation. Profit maximisation is con
strained by the "rules of the game", which require
compliance with the law and other social norms.
Thus, the "rules of the game" identify the social
responsibilities of business. According to Friedman
(2000) these are to engage in open and free com
petition without deception and fraud, and to con
form with the norms of society. Levitt is less specific, however, he identifies the responsibility of business to act honestly, in good faith "and so on" (cited in
Shaw and Barry, 2001, p. 204). This view might more accurately be identified as the minimalist ap
proach to social responsibility. Business has a social
responsibility to do what is demanded by society and no more.
The socioeconomic view offers a broader account
of social responsibility. According to this view, business has obligations that go beyond pursuing
profits and include protecting and improving society
(see, for example, Robbins et al., 2000; Shaw and
Barry, 2001). "The concept of corporate social
responsibility is often expressed as the voluntary
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purely economic and legal responsibilities of business
firms" (Boatright, 2000, p. 340). Boatright goes on
to say that by implication businesses must be wilUng "... to
forgo a certain measure of profit in order to
achieve noneconomic ends" (p. 340). According to
FerreU et al. (2000) a business that is sociaUy
responsible wiU maximise the positive effects it has
on society and minimise the negative effects. Writ
ing in 1975, Backman identified some examples of
corporate social responsib?ity: "Employment of
minority groups, reduction in poUution, greater
participation in programs to improve the commu
nity, improved medical care, improved industrial
health and safety" (cited in CarroU, 1999, p. 279). What level of social responsib?ity is expected?
Sethi claims that social responsibiUty can be defined
as "... bringing corporate behaviour up to a level
where it is congruent with the prevaiUng social
norms, values, and expectations" (quoted in Boat
right, 2000, p. 340). Social responsib?ity encom
passes those expectations society has of
organisations (economic, legal, ethical and discre
tionary) at a given point in time. They are "... the
behaviours and norms that society expects business
to foUow (CarroU, 1999, p. 283)". Society expects businesses to make a profit and obey the law and, in addition, to behave in certain ways and conform
to the ethical norms of society. These behaviours
and practices go beyond the requirements of the
law, and seem to be constantly expanding (CarroU,
1999). The focus of the socioeconomic view is on
how society beUeves business ought to behave, therefore it is a normative view. Society identifies
what business firms are expected to do beyond
making a profit, and this varies over time and is
becoming more demanding (De George's third use
of the term). De George (1999, p. 208) sounds a
warning about the level of social responsib?ity business can reasonably be expected to bear:
If as a society we decide that corporations should be
forced to rebu?d the inner city, should not be aUowed
to close down unprofitable plants, or should be made
to train the hard-core unemployed, these demands
should be thought through, discussed in the political forum, and then clearly legislated. They are contro
versial social demands and should not be confused with
what is moraUy required.
The reason society can make demands on business
is because business functions by public consent and
its purpose is to serve society (see for, example, Carroll, 1999; Grace and Cohen, 1998; Robbins
et al., 2000). "We can expect organisations to be
socially responsible because that is part of the con
tract out of which they were created, a condition of
the permission that society granted that they exist in
the first place" (Kitson and Campbell, 1996, p. 98). Since society does expect business firms to demon
strate genuine social responsibility, and stakeholder
expectations receive a lot of public attention, there
are prudential reasons for businesses to take seriously their social responsibility.
Since the 1960s it has been claimed that social
responsibility and long-term profits are not
incompatible, however, it was Drucker writing in
1984 who claimed he was proposing a "new idea" - that being socially responsible could be converted
into business opportunities (Carroll, 1999). Studies
on the relationship between social responsibility and financial performance are, however, ambiguous
(Robbins et al., 2000). In examples where there is
both good financial and social performance it is
unclear whether good social performance leads to
increased financial performance, or if good financial
performance provides the resources to fund good social performance. In contrast, there is evidence
that there is a link between social irresponsibility and negative stock market returns (Trevino and
Nelson, 1999).
According to an alternative view,
[t]o qualify as
socially responsible corporate action, a
business expenditure or activity must be one for which
the marginal returns to the corporation are less than
the returns available from some alternative expendi
ture, must be purely voluntary, and must be an actual
corporate expenditure rather than a conduit for indi
vidual largesse (Carroll, 1999, p. 276).
This is consistent with Boatright's (2000) claim, identified above, that a business should be prepared to sacrifice some profit in order to promote non
economic goals. Of course, this view does not rule
out the possibility of good financial performance, rather it claims that maximum economic returns
have not been achieved because of the focus on
social performance.
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represent diverse opinions about social responsib?ity. The former suggests that being sociaUy responsible can be made to serve the economic interests of the
business, while the latter claims that it is only when
economic interests are sacrificed that an action or
decision counts as being sociaUy responsible. The above discussion draws attention to the var
ious ways ?
descriptive and normative ?
the term
social responsibility is employed in the literature. It is
easy to see how these different uses can cause readers
unfamiUar with these various concepts to become
confused.
Ethics
Just as there are several ways the term social respon
sibility is employed in the literature, so too are there
ambiguities in the use of the terms ethics and business
ethics. It is not my purpose to argue that any par ticular use is to be preferred, rather, it is to draw
attention to the differing uses and the resulting po tential for confusion. First, I focus on competing views concerning the relationship between ethics
and moraUty, then I turn my attention to ethics and,
finaUy, to business ethics.
Ethics and morality
Some authors make a distinction between moraUty and ethics. For example, Beauchamp and Bowie
(2001) claim that morality refers to the principles or
rules of moral conduct as defined by society. An
analogy is drawn between morality and poUtical constitutions and language. "... [M]orality exists
prior to the acceptance (or rejection) of its standards
by particular individuals. In this respect morality cannot be purely a personal poUcy or code" (p. 1).
Ethical theory, a branch of philosophy, on the other
hand, has to do with reflecting on the nature and
justifications of right and wrong. A similar view is expressed by De George (1999,
P- 19):
Ethics studies morality. Morality is a term used to
cover those practices and activities that are considered
importantly right and wrong; the rules that govern
those activities; and the values that are embedded,
fostered, or pursued by those activities and practices.
The morality of a society is related to its mores, or the
customs that a society or group accepts as being right
and wrong, as well as those laws of a society that add
legal prohibitions and sanctions to many activities
considered to be immoral. Hence, ethics presupposes
the existence of morality, as well as the existence of
moral people who judge right from wrong and gen
erally act in accordance with norms they accept and to
which they and the rest of society hold others.
This notion that morality is the subject of ethical
enquiry is also found in Boatright (2000), Ferrell
et al. (2000), Iannone (1989), and Petrick and Quinn
(2001). It is, however, common for the terms morality and
ethics to be used interchangeably in public debates.
Some authors also use these terms interchangeably without comment, while others do address the issue.
Shaw and Barry (2001) acknowledge that some
philosophers distinguish morality and ethics on the
basis that morality refers to human conduct and
values while ethics is the study of morality. They go on: "[e]thics does, of course, denote an aca
demic subject, but in everyday parlance we inter
change "ethical" and "moral" to describe people we
consider good and actions we consider right. And
we interchange "unethical" and "immoral" to
describe what we consider bad people and
wrong actions. This book follows that cornmon
usage" (p. 4). For Grace and Cohen (1998, p.4),
... there is no reason to make a distinction in meaning
between "ethical" and "moral". There is certainly no
difference in meaning which could be attributed to
their etymological roots. Sometimes some moral phi
losophers or "ethicists" distinguish them from each
other, but not all philosophers do; and those who do
distinguish them from each other do not all distinguish them in the same way... It is recommended here that
the words be considered as synonymous...
While not explicitly stating that the terms morality and ethics are used interchangeably, Trevino and
Nelson (1999, p. 12) define ethics as "... the prin
ciples, norms, and standards of conduct governing an
individual or group" and Schermerhorn (2002, p.
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146) provides a sim?ar definition: "[E]thics can be
defined as the code of moral principles that sets
standards as to what is good or bad, or right or
wrong in one's conduct and thereby guides the
behavior of a person or group".
The different uses of the terms morality and ethics
highUght the need for care when trying to understand
just what particular authors are saying. For example, for those who maintain a distinction there is a sig nificant difference between claiming that some ac
tion is immoral (it contravenes society's accepted
norms) and the claim that some action is unethical
(which could mean that society's norms are found
wanting according to some ethical theory).
Descriptive and normative ethics
Just as the term social responsibility can be employed either in a
descriptive or a normative way, so too can
the term ethics. "Descriptive ethics refers to the
general beUefs, values, attitudes, and standards that, as a matter of fact, guide behavior ... descriptive ethics examines the typical beUefs or values that
determine what is customarily done" (Desjardins and McCaU, 2000, p. 4). Beauchamp and Bowie
(2001, p. 6) define the descriptive approach as the
"[f] actual description and explanation of moral
behaviour and beUefs". This activity is typicaUy carried out by anthropologists, sociologists and his
torians.
Normative ethics (sometimes also referred to as
moral phUosophy) in contrast to describing the val
ues, beUefs and norms that influence actual behav
iour, evaluates behaviour by appealing to standards
or norms that are independent of custom. "Rather
than describing the actual beUefs, values, and atti
tudes, normative ethics prescribes what we should
beUeve or value. The difference between descriptive and normative ethics, therefore, is the difference
between what is and what ought to be" (Desjardins and McCaU 2000, p. 5 itaUcs in original). Beau
champ and Bowie (2001, pp. 6?7) make the same
point: "[n]ormative moral ph?osophy aims at
determining what ought to be done, which needs to
be distinguished from what is, in fact, practiced". Iannone (1989) distinguishes three uses of the
term ethics: First, personal ethics (or morals) are
individuals' beliefs and assumptions about what is
right and wrong, good and bad. Second, social or
group ethics are the beliefs and assumptions about
right and wrong, good and bad held by a particular
group. In these two uses, ethics are something that a
person or a group has. Third, the term ethics refers to
an activity; it involves critical inquiry into ethical
issues. The first two uses are connected to descrip tive ethics, while the third is connected to normative
ethics.
Davidson and Griffin (2000, p. 114) define ethics
as "[a]n individual's personal beliefs regarding what is right and wrong or good and bad". They claim that what constitutes ethical behaviour
can vary from person to person, however, it will
usually be behaviour that is consistent with widely
accepted social norms. This definition relates to the
first two uses of the term ethics as identified by Iannone.
Schermerhorn (2002, pp. 146-147) provides a
similar definition:
For our purposes, ethics can be defined as the code of
moral principles that sets standards of good or bad,
right or wrong, in one's conduct and thereby guides
the behaviour of a person or group. Ethics provide
principles that guide behaviour and help people make
moral choices among alternative courses of action. In
practice, ethical behaviour is what is accepted as
"good" and "right" as opposed to "bad" or "wrong"
in the context of a governing moral code.
The way Davidson and Griffin, and Schermer
horn define the term ethics implies that the standards
of right and wrong, and good and bad can be known
by identifying the beliefs and values of a particular
person or group. This use of the term ethics connects
with descriptive ethics. If, however, it is claimed that
people ought to act in accordance with these ac
cepted beliefs and values, then it becomes a nor
mative view that implicitly endorses ethical
relativism. Ethical relativism is a contested theory
according to which an action is right if it is accepted
by the relevant person or group (see for example
Beauchamp and Bowie, 2001). Boatright (2000, p.
9), in contrast, claims that "[m]oral rules should not
be accepted merely because they are a part of the
prevailing morality." Ethics, on his view, is con
cerned with a critical examination of the rules of
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social responsibility and ethics can be explained, at least
in part, by inconsistencies in the way the two terms
are employed and defined in both the management and business ethics literature. The above analysis identifies the different ways the relationship between
social responsibility and ethics has been represented, it draws attention to the distinction between
descriptive and normative uses of these two terms, and the contrasting views regarding the connection
between morality and ethics are identified. Wh?e
this analysis does not solve any difficult substantive
questions, it does provide conceptual clarity as a
necessary first step towards facilitating students'
critical engagement with the substantive issues.
One practical step teachers of business ethics
could take to address any confusion would be to
provide an overview of the different uses and
meanings of the terms social responsibility and ethics in
an introductory lecture, and clearly identify the focus
of the business ethics course they wiU be teaching.
Throughout the semester there would also be
opportunities to make expUcit particular uses and
meanings of the terms, and draw attention to the
implications of using a term in one way rather than
another. To illustrate the differences, part of a
practical session could be devoted to identifying and
discussing different uses and meanings in a selection
of excerpts from various readings. In addition to
addressing any confusion about the terms, such an
approach would provide students with insights into
the subject that would not otherwise be possible.
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