25115536

Group Wrongs and Guilt FeelingsAuthor(s): Margaret GilbertSource: The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1997), pp. 65-84Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115536 .

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MARGARET GILBERT

GROUP WRONGS AND GUILT FEELINGS*

(Received and accepted 21 September 1995)

ABSTRACT. Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted

badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands

group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for

the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that

often occurs. In so arguing I sketch the plural subject account of groups, group intentions

and group actions: for a group to intend (in the relevant sense) is for its members to be

jointly committed to intend that such-and-such as a body. Individual group members need

not be directly involved in the formation of the intention in order to participate in such a

joint commitment. The core concept of joint commitment is in an important way holistic, not being reducible to a set of personal commitments over which each party holds sway.

Parties to a group intention so understood can reasonably see the resulting action as "ours"

as opposed to "theirs" and thus appropriately respond to the action's badness with a feeling of guilt, even when they themselves are morally innocent in the matter. I label the feeling in question a feeling of "membership guilt." A number of standard philosophical claims

about the nature of guilt feelings are thrown into question by my argument.

KEY WORDS: collective action, collective responsibility, groups, group action, group

intention, group membership

INTRODUCTION

Suppose a certain person, Jane, belongs to a group which has acted in

a blameworthy manner. Because her group has acted in this way, Jane

experiences a feeling of guilt. Can Jane's feeling of guilt be justified? Can it be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly?1

* Previous versions of this material have been presented as part of an invited talk to

members of the Philosophy Program, The Graduate Center of the City University of New

York, March 3, 1995 (title: "The Concept of a Group and Some Problems in Political

Philosophy"), and at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst (October 13,1995), and the

University of Connecticut (November 8, 1995), and at Columbia University (November 9, 1995). I am grateful for the probing comments I received on these occasions, and to D.

Baxter, A. Corlett, and F. Feldman for further discussion. This article represents the initial

stages of an investigation of its topic. Further comments would be welcomed. 1 In what follows, when I speak of a group acting badly I should be taken to mean

"in a blameworthy manner," culpably. The same goes for my references to a group's

"wrongdoing."

The Journal of Ethics 1: 65-84, 1997.

? 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.



66 MARGARET GILBERT

It may be thought that it cannot.2 This is suggested by several common claims about the proper basis for guilt feelings and about what it is to feel guilt.3 A feeling of guilt, it has been said, is appropriate only in relation to one's own actions.4 One can, after all, bear guilt only for one's

own wrongdoing.5 To feel guilt is to afflict oneself.6 How could it be

appropriate to do this on account of one's group's bad action? Might one

not be personally guiltless in the matter? In this paper I sketch an argument to the effect that it can be appropriate

to feel guilt because one's group has acted badly, even if one is personally

guiltless in the matter. The argument will put in question a number of

standard assumptions about guilt feelings. The argument invokes a particular understanding of what a group and

a group's action are. It therefore concerns cases that are assumed to meet

specified conditions. I do not argue for any judgements on actual groups or particular people. The validity of such judgements depends on concrete

historical facts, and the determination of any such facts goes beyond the

scope of this paper. The paper has two main sections. The first section sketches the account

of groups and group actions that my argument will invoke. I turn to the

question of group wrongs and guilt feelings in the second section.

I. GROUPS AS PLURAL SUBJECTS

1. Plural Subjects

The term "group," even as applied to human populations, is susceptible of

many different interpretations. Any discussion of the appropriateness of

feeling guilt for a group's action should therefore make clear the sense of

"group" or type of group with which it will be concerned.

2 See, for instance, L. May, Sharing Responsibility (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1992), pp. 298-402; R J. Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cam

bridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 244. 3 One feels guilt over something. That is what I mean by "the proper basis for guilt." 4

See R. J. Wallace, op. cit., p. 66, note 22, "Guilt is appropriate to one's own violations

[of moral obligation]" (my emphasis); G. Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of

Self-Assessment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 91, "feelings of guilt... cannot arise

from the deeds or omissions of others." 5

Cf. Taylor, loc. cit.: "Guilt itself cannot be vicarious"; J. Feinberg (on the state of

bearing guilt) "... there can be no such thing as vicarious guilt," "Collective Responsi

bility," reprinted in L. May and S. Hoffman (eds.), Collective Responsibility (Savage, MD:

Rowman and Littlefield, 1991), p. 60, emphasis Feinberg's. 6

See P. Greenspan, Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 171 and elsewhere.



GROUP WRONGS AND GUILT FEELINGS 67

My argument will concern groups understood as plural subjects. I

believe that this is a standard everyday understanding of the term "group,"

though I shall not argue for that here.7 In this section I briefly explain what I mean by a "plural subject."8

In order for a number of people to constitute a plural subject, it is

both necessary and sufficient for them to be jointly committed to doing something as a body. "Doing something" is here understood very broadly.

Having a certain belief or accepting a certain principle, for instance, will

both constitute "doing something" in the relevant sense. Those who are

jointly committed to believe that such-and-such as a body constitute a

plural subject of the belief that such-and-such, and so on.9

What do I have in mind when I speak of a joint commitment? The basic

idea is this. A joint commitment is not a "sum" or aggregate of commit

ments - it is not, for instance, my commitment plus your commitment.

Rather, it is the commitment "of" you and me. It is the commitment of

"us."10 An important aspect of a joint commitment is that it can only be

rescinded jointly.

Suppose that you and I are jointly committed, one with the other, to do

something as a body. We are then, indeed, both committed. Our "individual

commitments," however, are understood to flow from a joint commitment.

This means that they have certain special properties. First, our "individual commitments" are interdependent. Neither can

exist on its own. They exist only as part of the joint commitment. Thus, in

this two-person case, my individual commitment cannot antedate yours,

7 In my book On Social Facts I argue that the term "social group" is standardly under

stood in this way. I shall not repeat the argument here. I take it that the term "group" is

often used as short for "social group" interpreted in the way in question. See M. Gilbert, On Social Facts (London: Routledge, 1989; second printing, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), especially Chap. 4.

8 The material on plural subjects that follows here draws on On Social Facts and a

number of related articles. Many of these can be found in a forthcoming essay collection,

M. Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996). Some more specific references are given in later notes.

9 I have discussed plural subjects of belief in a number of places including On Social Facts, Chap. 5, "Modelling Collective Belief," 1987, Synthese, and, most recently,

"Remarks on Collective Belief," in F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993). The articles are

to be reprinted, with some amendments, in Living Together. In On Social Facts, Chap. 6,1

argue that social conventions are jointly accepted principles with the form of a simple fiat, in other words, those with a convention are jointly committed to accept as a body some

simple fiat (373ff.). 10

For more on the first person plural pronoun see below in the text.



68 MARGARET GILBERT

nor can it cease to exist unless yours does. The same is true mutatis

mutandis for your individual commitment.1 ]

Second, I cannot unilaterally rescind my "individual commitment" and

you cannot unilaterally rescind yours. What has to be rescinded is the joint

commitment, and that can only be rescinded jointly. The fact that joint commitments can only be rescinded jointly brings out

an important aspect of our joint commitment. Each of us is in an important sense bound to the other. Each is subject to a commitment he (or she) does

not "own" and from which he cannot release himself.12

As the above discussion indicates, there is an ineradicable holism in the notion of a joint commitment, a sense in which my "part" and your "part" cannot be separated out. There is, in consequence, a certain holism built

into the notion of a group understood as a plural subject. When I say that my argument will concern groups understood as plural

subjects, I mean that I shall take any plural subject to constitute a group, and vice versa. Thus our participation in a joint commitment makes us

group members. Those who are jointly committed to believe something as a body, or to accept a certain principle as a body, and so on: these are

thereby members of a group.

2. Large Populations as Plural Subjects

How are joint commitments formed? As I understand it, what is needed is

(roughly) that the parties express to one another their individual readiness

to be jointly committed in a certain way. To be less rough, one should

add that these mutual expressions are "common knowledge" between the

parties, in something like the sense introduced by David Lewis.13

11 I take it that there must be at least two parties to a joint commitment, and there can

be more than two. In every case, insofar as one is committed through a joint commitment,

one's "individual commitment" cannot exist on its own (this is the "interdependence"

property). If there are just two potential parties to a given joint commitment, neither can

be committed through the joint commitment unless the other is. Hence the "individual commitments" must both arise, and cease, simultaneously. The situation with respect to

other cases requires more discussion, and I shall not attempt any pronouncements on this

score here. 12

I argue in a number of places, relatedly, that joint commitments involve obligations

in an important and distinctive sense of "obligation." See, for instance, "Agreements,

Coercion, and Obligation," Ethics, 1993, reprinted in Living Together. 13 D.K. Lewis, Convention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969). Precisely

how to define "common knowledge" is somewhat moot. According to one now standard

definition, it is common knowledge that p in some population P, if and only if everyone in P

knows that/?, everyone in P knows that everyone in P knows that/?, and so on (ad infinitum).

I discuss a somewhat different proposal in On Social Facts, Chap. 4, pp. 188-195.




Consider first a simple case involving two people who are face to face.

Jack may say "Would you like to dance?" and Cindy may answer "Yes!"

Or Jack may beckon to Cindy, and she may come forward to meet him. It

is understood that when the relevant expressions of readiness have been

given on both sides, the joint commitment is in place. Jack and Cindy are

jointly committed to dancing together. Could a joint commitment that "spans" a large population be formed?

This question is pertinent in the present context insofar as wrongs are often

ascribed to large groups, to whole nations, for instance.14

Given a population-wide referendum one can imagine that there could

be grounds for ascribing a joint commitment to the population in question, however large. There would also seem to be more informal mechanisms

whereby a joint commitment spanning a large population can be formed.

In On Social Facts, I argued that there is a central sense of the first

person plural pronoun in which its proper referent is a plural subject.15

Sporadic, early uses of "we" in this sense may be tendentious or initiatory uses.16 Suppose, however, that in a given large population it is common

knowledge that in conversation members of that population regularly and

spontaneously speak of "we" and "us" and "our" in referring to the popu lation. Suppose, for example, that they regularly and spontaneously refer

to "our leader, Clovis." I suggest that this comes close to establishing the

existence of something like a joint commitment to grant Clovis authority over us.

Phrases such as "our leader" could, of course, be used to mean some

thing other than "that person we are jointly committed to granting authority over us" or the like. In some mouths, perhaps, "our leader" could mean

"that person whom we habitually follow," for instance.

People do more than use pronouns, however. They talk to one another

about the matters of the day, they make clear what they consider appro

priate behavior and what not. The detail of conversations throughout the

population can confirm the plural subject interpretation of "our leader" and

the like, both for observers, and the participants themselves.17

Someone who accepts that, in a given population, the plural subject

interpretation is the correct one, may object that, nonetheless, people may

14 There is some discussion of the case of large group plural subjecthood in On Social

Facts, pp. 212-213, and elsewhere. The subject merits more discussion than I gave there

or can give here. 15

See Chap. 4, Sec. 3; also Chap. 7, Sec. 2. 16

On such uses see On Social Facts, p. 178. 17

The last two paragraphs were prompted by comments from A. Kuflik on the version of

my paper "Reconsidering the * Actual Contract' Theory of Political Obligation" presented

at the New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association Conference, April 22,1995.



70 MARGARET GILBERT

have been more or less brainwashed into talking about "our leader" in the

sense in question, pressured into using this language by parents, teachers,

and peers. How can such talk go so far as to express one's readiness to be

party to a joint commitment, and, indeed, be the basis for one's participation in a joint commitment itself?18

Precisely how particular people come to refer to a leader as "ours" or a

particular group as "we," in the relevant sense, is one question. What they mean and what they achieve when they do so refer, is another. I suggest that

we should not deny that their use expresses the relevant type of readiness

to be party to a joint commitment, just because it was arrived at under

pressure. One need not, then, deny to them the ability to create a joint commitment.19

3. The Action of a Group

What is it for a group - understood as a plural subject

- to perform an

action? This is a large question, and I cannot hope to do it justice here. The remarks that follow will, I hope, suffice for present purposes.

Consider first the case of an individual human being, Rose, who is

travelling to Atlanta. She is performing an action, the action of travelling to Atlanta. What does this amount to? A first stab at an answer might run as follows: Rose intends to travel to Atlanta, and her current behavior

(boarding this particular plane, and so on) is guided by this intention. Let

us focus on these two elements: an intention and behavior guided by that

intention.

Two or more people can constitute the plural subject of an intention.

They can, in other words, be jointly committed to intend as a body to do

such-and-such. Rose and Lily may be jointly committed to intend as a body to meet in Atlanta. They then constitute the plural subject of an intention

to meet in Atlanta.

18 Cf. V. Medina, Social Contract Theories (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield,

1990), p. 139: "Even to acquiesce and not openly challenge the authority of the state is not sufficient to generate political obligations, since our acquiescence can be a matter of habit,

intimidation, or simply apathy." 19

On the question whether pressure and, indeed, coercion, precludes joint commitment

see "Agreements, Coercion, and Obligation." 20

Clearly, I am not attempting a complete discussion of what it is for an individual human

being to perform an action. I aim only to show that if we take an individual to be performing an action (more or less) when that individual's behavior is guided by an intention, then

groups can fulfill analogous conditions: the behavior of the group's members can be guided by the group's intention, as opposed to the personal intentions of the individual members.




I take it that when people refer to "our" intention they standardly refer to

the intention of a plural subject, namely "us."21 Suppose, then, that guided

by their intention, Lily boards an Atlanta-bound plane in New York, and

Rose boards an Atlanta-bound plane in San Francisco. I suggest that at

something like this point, we could say that the group comprising Lily and Rose is travelling to Atlanta.

To be guided by a group intention is, in effect, to be guided by a specific joint commitment, the commitment to intend as a body to such-and-such.

Lily boards an Atlanta-bound plane because, along with Rose, she is party to a joint commitment to intend as a body to meet in Atlanta. The same is

true of Rose, mutatis mutandis.

Two or more people may, then, constitute the plural subject of an

intention, and each one's behavior may then be guided by that intention, so that the intention be carried out. When something like these conditions

are fulfilled, it seems appropriate to say that a group is acting. In the case just envisaged each of the group's members is directly

involved in the creation of the group's intention and each one is required for its implementation. Neither of these features appears to be necessary for group action.

The members of a population may be jointly committed to authoriz

ing some one member or group of members to form intentions or make

decisions for them, perhaps in certain specified circumstances or subject to special conditions. A mechanism is then in place for the formation of

a group intention without the direct involvement of all group members.

Some members may not even know of the existence of a given group intention.

A group's intention need not require the action of all members for its

fulfillment. The group's intention may be achievable through the action

of some small portion of the population. Those authorized to form an

21 The account I would give of "our" intention (sometimes referred to as shared or joint intention) is not, therefore, a "summative" account: our intention to do such-and-such is

neither wholly or in part constituted by an aggregate or "sum" of closely corresponding

personal intentions, one for each of the people concerned. I argue for my non-summative

account in "Shared Intention" (1993ms), invited contribution to a symposium on "Shared or Joint Intention," American Philosophical Association Meetings, Pacific Division, San

Francisco, March 25,1993. Cf. M. Bratman, "Shared Intention," Ethics 104 (1993), pp. 97

113.1 take Bratman and myself to have the same analysandum in mind, a certain standard

sense of "our intention." According to Bratman, it is a logically necessary condition of our

intending to paint the house together that each of us personally intends that we paint the

house together. Thus for Bratman "our intention to do such-and-such" is in part a "sum"

of closely corresponding personal intentions. For discussion and criticism of a number of summative views of shared, joint or (what I call) collective belief see On Social Facts,

Chap. 5, and elsewhere.



72 MARGARET GILBERT

intention for the group may also be authorized to see to it that it is carried out, giving orders as necessary to various people and groups within the

main group. Relatively few people need be directly involved altogether. Thus we can have a situation in which it seems appropriate to say that a

group did such-and-such even though many members did not know of any relevant group intention and few were involved in carrying the intention

out.

Having introduced the plural subject account of groups, I want to set

it aside for the time being, and to consider some questions that arise

pretheoretically.

n. GUILT FEELINGS AND GROUP WRONGS

1. Some Cases

Can it be appropriate to feel guilt because one's group has acted badly? That is, can one's group's action by itself justify a feeling of guilt? A

variety of possible cases can help to sharpen the question. In each of the following situations, my group has acted badly but it may

seem that I, for one, cannot be justified in feeling guilt as a result.

1)1 knew of the action and attempted to prevent or curtail it. I did as

much as I could reasonably be expected to do, given my situation and

capacities.221 may have organized a large public protest against the action.

I may have participated in such a protest. Unable to participate, I may have spoken warmly of the protest, encouraged others to go on it, loudly condemned the action, and so on. Unable to move or speak, but knowing of the action, I may have condemned it roundly in my heart.23 Can it be

appropriate for me to feel guilt about the group's action?

2) Though a member of the group when it performed the action, I did

not learn of the action until it was too late to do anything to prevent or

curtail it. I am in no way culpable for my lack of information about the

action at the time it occurred.24 Had I learnt of the action in time to do

22 Precisely what a given person could "reasonably have been expected to do" in a given

case may not be clear. This may be the occasion of serious moral debate. In what follows I

shall simply take it that there are some relatively clear cases of doing what one reasonably could have been expected to do in the circumstances.

23 Perhaps this does not count as "doing everything I could to prevent the action," since

it is not clear that unexpressed condemnation goes any way to prevent the action. On the

other hand, in these special circumstances this is as far as I can go towards preventing the

action. Condemnation is the first step to deliberate preventive action. 24

This point added in response to a conversation with D. Luban, October 1995. Precisely when and why some ignorance is culpable is a matter of some delicacy into which I make




something, I would have tried to prevent it. I would have done as much as I could reasonably have been expected to do. Perhaps I would have

succeeded in preventing the action. Can it be appropriate for me to feel

guilt about the group's action?25

Now it seems that people do feel guilt over their group's actions even

in circumstances such as these.26 If this is so, that is in itself a reason for

considering whether some basis can be found for the feeling. At the same

time, it may be tempting to write it off as irrational, as going too far.27

The feeling of guilt has been characterized as a form of negative self

assessment, and as suggesting that reparative action may be appropriate.28 It may already incorporate an element of self-punishment?9

Even this relatively thin characterization of the feeling of guilt suggests the problem.30 The people in question here appear to be personally blame

less with respect to their group's action: they tried as best they could to

prevent it, they knew nothing of it, and so on. Let us assume, indeed, that

we can amplify their position further: they are blameless in the matter of

being and remaining group members at the time in question. How, then, could the action of the group justify a negative self-assessment or, if feeling

no attempt to enter here. Evidently people sometimes experience guilt because they ignored

signs that something bad was going on. 25

The simple ignorance of one's country's wrongful act may seem to be sufficient

rebuttal, already, of the appropriateness of feeling guilt in its regard. The case in the text

will, if anything, be even more persuasive. 26 Cf. J. G. Gray, "The Stains of War," in R.W. Smith (ed.), Guilt: Man and Society (Gar

den City, New York: Anchor Books, 1971), pp. 291-293; J. Horton, Political Obligation (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1992), p. 153; P. Greenspan, op. cit., p. 162. Greenspan gives the example of "white American guilt about slavery or guilt

felt for various other misdeeds that occurred before the birth of those who felt guilty." I shall not here consider the case of guilt over "misdeeds" of one's group which occurred

before one was a member. The story here may be at least somewhat different -

though

perhaps not wholly different - from that of those who were group members at the time the

misdeed occurred. 27 As I read K. Jaspers in his fine, probing essay The Question of German Guilt, he

feels that this is so. He writes that"... in a way which is rationally not conceivable, which

is even rationally refutable, I feel co-responsible for what Germans do and have done

_As a philosopher I now seem to have strayed completely into the realm of feeling and to have abandoned conception", tr. E.B. Ashton (New York: Capricorn Books, 1947),

pp. 80-81. My argument in Sections 4 and following suggest that he may, after all, not have "abandonedconception" or strayed from what is rationally conceivable. I hope to treat

Jaspers's work more directly and in greater length in another place. 28

Taylor, op. cit, pp. 91 and 93. 29

As proposed by Greenspan, op. cit., p. 171 and elsewhere. 30 "Thin" in part because it does not go so far as to say that a feeling of guilt over a

blameworthy act presumes that the act is one's own.



74 MARGARET GILBERT

guilt comes to that, a form of self-punishment? In a word, why should they tell themselves off? How could that be appropriate?

2. Larry May on "Metaphysical" Guilt

In a recent discussion of a person's relationship to his group's wrongs, Larry

May alludes to what, using Karl Jaspers's phrase, he calls "metaphysical"

guilt. Like Jaspers, he contrasts this with "moral" guilt.31 As May understands it, the distinction between metaphysical and moral

guilt is intended to distinguish between a form of guilt which presupposes moral responsibility for an act (moral guilt) and a form of guilt which does not presuppose moral responsibility in relation to that act (metaphysical

guilt). Metaphysical guilt is distinct from moral guilt but involves what

May refers to as "moral taint." Could the guilt feelings at issue here be

appropriate responses to metaphysical guilt in May's sense, as opposed to

moral guilt? May would, I think, deny this. He writes: "As I will understand it in

this chapter, metaphysical guilt arises out of ... the fact that each person is at least somewhat implicated in what any member of the group does."32

Metaphysical guilt as May understands it is not, however, "merely based

on group membership. Rather it arises from the fact that a person did not

but could have (and should have) responded differently_"33 In order to avoid metaphysical guilt, it is both necessary and sufficient

for group members to "disassociate" themselves from their group's action.

What would be sufficient for the relevant type of disassociation?

Doing what one could reasonably be expected to do to prevent the action

would certainly count as sufficient in May's view.34 Were one powerless to

do anything, even speak out, merely condemning the action in one's heart

would also be sufficient.35 May writes:

31 L. May, Sharing Responsibility. Page references that follow will be to the excerpt from this book in L. May and S. Hoffman (eds.), Collective Responsibility: Five Decades

of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991). I shall not discuss the relationship of May's notion of metaphysical guilt to that found in

Jaspers's essay. As I understand Jaspers, metaphysical guilt in his sense has to do with

human solidarity as opposed to membership in particular human groups such as families,

and would not appropriately be invoked to explain the kind of case at issue here. Jaspers's notion of "political guilt" may be closer to our topic. On the other hand, it appears not to

involve a group's wrongdoing so much as its vanquished status. I shall not pursue Jasper's

discussion further here. 32

May and Hoffman, p. 240. 33 Ibid. 34

Cf. op. cit., p. 241. 35

Op. cit., p. 247.




By condemning or disavowing what one's community has done, one changes that part of

one's self which is based on how one chooses to regard oneself. Such changes disassociate

oneself from one's fellow group members and diminish one's shared responsibility for what those others have done.36

Shortly after this May claims that it is not appropriate to feel guilt when one has (appropriately) distanced oneself from one's group.37

What, though, of the fact that - as May allows - people may experience

a feeling of guilt in relation to their group's act even after the kind of

disassociation from the act to which he refers? Is there some way of

showing that this feeling is or could be appropriate, and hence to respect the response of the people concerned?

There is no need to deny the possibility of guilt feelings which are

irrational or ill-founded. Insofar as irrationality and ill-foundedness are

flaws, however, respect for a response and the people who have it demands

that we search quite seriously for an account that avoids irrationality.

3. The Appeal to Identification

In this context some authors appeal to what they refer to as "identification"

with one's group.38 I am not sure that the bare appeal to "identification"

advances our understanding of the phenomenon we are considering, or

adequately addresses our concern about its appropriateness. In discussions of guilt it is standard to assume that, as Gabriele Taylor

writes, "feelings of guilt... cannot arise from the deeds or omissions of

others."39 Given that this is so - and I shall not dispute it here - to feel

guilt in relation to the acts of one's country is already in some sense to

identify with one's country. More tentatively, it is to reject the idea that

one's country is something other than oneself.

The question immediately arising from the reference to "identification"

is this: how is the relevant identification possible? How could identifica tion be intelligible, let alone appropriate? Louis XIV notoriously claimed

"L'Etat, cfest moi." Whatever precisely he had in mind, most citizens

would not claim that, literally speaking, their country is no more than

"me." What, then, is at issue here? When is the relevant way of perceiving one's relation to one's country

- identification - legitimate? Can we go

beyond the metaphor of identification to a more precise account of what is - or may be -

going on?40

36 Ibid. 37

Op. cit., p. 247, second full paragraph. 38

See, for instance, Horton, op. cit., pp. 15Iff. 39

Taylor, loc. cit. 40

J. Feinberg cites "solidarity" as a "necessary condition of the vicarious emotions" (he

refers to pride and shame), "Collective Responsibility," p. 65. Feinberg gives a complex



76 MARGARET GILBERT

4. The Intuitive Picture

At a simple intuitive level, first, there is a difference between accepting that "They did it" and accepting that "We did it." I am not one of them,

but I am "one of us." I cannot detach myself from "us" while I regard "us"

precisely as "us."

The intuitive picture goes further than this, somewhat as follows. If I am

one of us, and we did something, / am part of what did it. More precisely, I am part of the agent that did it, part of the subject of the action. Whereas

/ am the subject of my action, I am part of the subject of our action. In my

capacity as a member of "us," I am on a par with every other member.

If we did this bad thing, as opposed to this or that person doing it, we

may bear moral guilt with respect to the doing of it.41 If we bear guilt, the guilt in question is, precisely, ours. Not mine, nor mine and yours, but

ours, ours together. Perhaps then it may be referred to as collective guilt. This guilt will be participated in, or shared, by all of us, in our capacity as members of "us."

Given this picture, different members can still bear different degrees of

personal guilt in relation to what they understand to be "our" act. Some

members might have done all they could to stop it, others may have been

blamelessly ignorant of it, whereas some may have put all their efforts into

its performance. It is clear enough where the personal guilt lies when this

is so.

5. Plural Subject Theory and the Intuitive Picture

According to the intuitive picture, if we did something bad, and bear moral

guilt for our bad action, each one of us shares in the guilt as a member. It

would seem that, if this is right, it can be appropriate for someone to feel

guilt over, say, his country's starting a particular war when - by hypothesis

- he was personally blameless in relation to this act of war-making. If the

intuitive picture has this consequence, can it have any validity?

account of what he calls "solidarity" (p. 62). Some elements of this (for instance "sharing a common cooperative purpose") have some affinity with the background conditions I

describe in the text below. See also his brief allusion to "the plural possessive 'our'," p. 63.

It is not clear that Feinberg would allow that guilt, as opposed to shame, is a possible

"vicarious emotion." I shall not attempt here any close comparison of my views with

Feinberg's. 41

"We may bear moral guilt_"I take it that according to the intuitive picture we do

bear moral guilt for our bad actions in some circumstances. This does not mean that we

will always do so. It could be that if we were forced to act badly, for instance, this would

preclude our bearing moral guilt for the our bad action. Or perhaps we did not and could not have been expected to believe that what we were doing was wrong.




I referred earlier to the view that in a central sense - or standard use -

the first person plural pronoun refers to a plural subject. To say that "We

did it," given this usage, is to say that "I am the member of a plural subject which did'it'."

Now "We did it" could have other construals. Sometimes it could have

a "distributive" use, where it means "We all did it." Perhaps it could even

be used to mean "Some of our number did it." What I want to argue is that

the intuitive picture need not be rejected if we interpret the references in it

to "what we did" in terms of plural subject theory.42 Consider that, if one's group membership is a matter of participation

in plural subjecthood, then one is oneself, as an individual, genuinely involved in tfie group (as one understands). This understanding comes

from one's understanding of the nature of joint commitment.

Joint commitment produces an involvement which is "deep" in two

ways. First, one is personally affected in a "deep," psychological way.

Second, this joint commitment is foundational for a group's actions: it

underpins these actions as it does the group itself. It is true that many have

contributed to this foundation, but to say that is not to deny one's own

contribution.

To say that "We made war on Country X" when one sees "us" as

a continuing plural subject of which one is a member, is to understand

something like this: "I and other residents of this geographical area were

jointly committed to intend as a body to make war on Country X, and this, our intention, was carried out accordingly by appropriate persons_" One might add: "The action in question is no more any other member's

than it is mine: it is ours, period." But suppose I did all I could reasonably be expected to do to prevent

our going to war? Suppose, for instance, I organized a large protest march?

Would the act of war still properly be said to be "ours, period" where I am

one of us, on a par, qua member, with all the rest?

I take the question to amount to this: would a personal protest against the intended war somehow free me from the joint commitment to intend

the war as a body? Would it somehow do away with my participation in

the joint commitment?

Let us consider what I am supposed to do, given that we intend to make

war on Country X. Does this mean that I am required personally to approve this war-making? That seems implausible, if only because approval and

disapproval, like belief, are not clearly within our voluntary control.

42 Should it be rejected otherwise? I shall neither explore nor pronounce upon that issue

here.



78 MARGARET GILBERT

If the requirements imposed by the joint commitment do not go that far, am I perhaps required not to express any disapproval I may feel? There is

reason to think that this, too, is not a requirement. More precisely, there

is reason to think that I can express my personal disapproval of the war

without violating the joint commitment.

We have at our disposal avowals of the following form: "Personally, I

disapprove of our going to war" or "In my personal opinion, our going to

war is a bad thing." Avowals of this sort, in particular, can be argued not

to run counter to the joint commitment to which I am party. The qualifiers

"Personally," "In my personal opinion," and the like appear to put the

avowal in a space not covered by that commitment: my personal space, so

to speak. I am expressly not speaking qua group member here, but in my own voice.

There is reason to suppose, then, that generally speaking I can express

my personal disapproval, even my personal revulsion towards our act,

without putting in question my participation in the relevant joint commit

ment. Something similar appears to be true of some of the more active

forms of opposition to the group's act, such as organizing a protest march

against the act. These may be - and be understood to be - expressions of

one's personal attitudes.43

A joint act, like a protest march, may be understood as an expression of the attitude of a subgroup within the larger group. Such a statement as

"In the view of this assembly, the country is wrong to embark on such

a war" indicates that in their capacity as members of this assembly, as

opposed to their capacity as members of the society as a whole, or, indeed, their personal capacity, these people oppose the war. A variety of forms of

personal reaction and protest, then, appear not to go against the terms of

the joint commitment under discussion.

Suppose now that all I could reasonably be expected to do was make

some personal protest that does not violate our joint commitment to intend

as a body to go to war, and that I made that protest. I could still accept the "participation" argument to the effect that we started the war. Insofar

as this was a culpable act on our part, I can then accept that we did wrong and that we bear guilt for our action.44

43 It is possible, of course, that in some groups a rule of the group may forbid the expres

sion of personal disapproval of the group's actions. According to the present argument, such

a rule would be needed to supplement the understandings implicit in the joint commitment

underlying the intention of a plural subject: it is not implicitly present. I discuss group conventions and rules in On Social Facts, Chap. 6, and an essay "On Social Rules: Some

Problems for Hart's Account and a New Proposal" (ms). 44 I shall not attempt to explore here the conditions under which it is appropriate to

ascribe guilt or blameworthiness to a group in relation to a given action of the group. The




It seems, then, that I may be personally blameless in the matter of my

group's act yet have a basis for feeling guilt in relation to that act. That basis is our guilt, in which, as one of us, I share.

I have focussed so far on the question of when one will count as default

ing on a joint commitment, suggesting that one can go quite far by way

of personal or subgroup protest without such default. There is also the

question of what is achieved if one does default on a joint commitment in

which one participates. Does default automatically rid one of the commit

ment? This would not mean that one had unilaterally rescinded it, since

rescension has to be a joint act. Is default a way of doing away with a joint commitment without rescinding it?

It could well be that different things are true for different kinds of joint commitment. One rather subtle possibility could be right for at least some

cases. To use legal jargon, it could be that in some cases at least default

renders a joint commitment not void, but rather voidable at the pleasure of the other parties acting in concert. In other words, they are now in a

position to exclude the one who defaults from their number.

Suppose now that in a particular case my doing what I can reasonably be expected to do to prevent a group wrong does count as defaulting on

the relevant joint commitment. If the commitment is now voidable rather

than void, then, unless others take action, I am not yet "out of the group," and my feeling guilt over subsequent group wrongs appears to have an

appropriate basis.

6. Self and Others Versus Group

Confusion as to the possibility of appropriately feeling guilt for the acts of one's group could be generated by the common claim that feelings of guilt "cannot arise from the deeds or omissions of others." This may suggest that guilt must arise from one's own actions (another common claim). For

the obvious contrast to "others" is "self."45

The contrast between "self" and "others," however, does not exhaust

the possible objects of our reactive emotions, as might be thought - with

one's group located on the "other" side. Even taking "group" quite widely, one is part of one's own group. In the case of groups as plural subjects,

however, one is integrated with the others in one's group in a special way.

intuitive picture assumes that there are such conditions, and for present purposes I shall not

question this. 45

Similarly, "altruism" (roughly, concern for "others") finds its natural contrast in

"egoism" (roughly, concern for "self). For thoughts on this contrast which parallel those

in the following paragraphs, see M. Gilbert, "Me, You, and Us: Distinguishing 'Egoism,'

'Altruism,' and 'Groupism'," in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17(4) (December 1994),

pp. 621-22.



80 MARGARET GILBERT

One's fellow group members, though individually other than oneself, create together with oneself a single joint commitment which functions as

a motivating force for all.46 It creates the conditions of appropriateness of the term "we" which refers to self and others only insofar as they are

joined together through the medium of a single -

supra-individual -

thing, a joint commitment.

Reaction to the deeds of one's group is thus not best characterized as

reaction to self, as reaction to others, or as even to self plus others, but

rather as reaction to a distinct and distinctive entity - the plural subject

- with a sui generis relation to both self and others. A feeling of guilt that arises out of one's group's bad action relates neither to one's own

wrongdoing nor to that of "others."

If this is right, can feeling guilt be characterized quite generally as

involving negative .^//-assessment or se/f-punishment? In the case on

which I am focussing the feeling of guilt would most appropriately be

expressed not by the words "I am guilty" but by the words "We are guilty." If it involves negative self-assessment or punishment of a sort, it involves

negative assessment or punishment of the self-as-group-member or of the

group-insofar-as-it-exists-in-my-person, rather than of me personally.47 To

give this kind of guilt feeling a special name we might call it a feeling of

"membership guilt." I have just argued, in effect, that certain widely held views, "truisms"

even, about guilt feelings are either false or misleading as usually stated.

The truisms concern both the proper basis or object for guilt feeling -

what one must feel guilty about- and what the feeling of guilt amounts to.

These truisms are "[Moral] Guilt is only appropriate to one's own moral

violations," "Guilt is an emotion of negative ^//-assessment," and "Guilt

involves ^//-punishment." I have not challenged the claim that guilt feelings "cannot arise from

the deeds or omissions of others" insofar as one's group's action is not best

seen as either one's own action or as the action of "others." Nor have I

challenged the claim that "Guilt itself cannot be vicarious" insofar as this

is understood to mean that one cannot bear guilt for another's wrongdoing. But can one bear guilt for the wrongdoing of any person or thing other

than oneself? Can one bear guilt as a result of one's group's wrongdoing?

46 Here I consciously echo J J. Rousseau's reference to people uniting so that "their

forces are directed by means of a single moving power and made to act in concert." The

passage in question has been translated rather variously. Here I quote from - and echo - the

translation of D.A. Cress, On the Social Contract (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983), p. 23. 47

Punishment-of-oneself-as-a-member may be an example of something which

inevitably has a "double effect," one of which (^//-affliction) is not intended.




This leads to an important point about who bears the guilt when the guilt is collective.

7. Collective Guilt Is Not a "Sum"

According to the intuitive picture, there is such a thing as collective guilt. This is the guilt of the group. According to the intuitive picture, if there is collective guilt it will be shared by members of the collective in question in their capacity as group members.

My suggestion on behalf of the intuitive picture is that if groups are

understood to be plural subjects, and the guilt of a particular group has

been established, then it makes sense to say ? as the intuitive picture has it

- that each member shares or participates in this guilt in his or her capacity as a group member.

But what is it to share in collective guilt in one's capacity as a member?

As I understand it, this is not in itself to bear guilt as an individual person: it is not to bear personal guilt.

Let me explain. Collective guilt is not a kind of "sum" involving the

personal guilt of many individuals. First, it is not built up of guilt indepen dently accrued by particular members. A group can accrue guilt without

all or most members being personally guilty. It may even be possible for

a group to accrue guilt though none of the individual members are per

sonally guilty. Second, the guilt of a group cannot be broken down into

guilt personally born by its members. If we think of all the members of a

guilty group as bearing "membership guilt," we have to understand that

membership guilt is not personal guilt. It neither derives from personal

guilt nor results in it. In other words, sharing in collective guilt is not a

matter of bearing personal guilt. But how are we to understand such sharing? We might put things this

way: members share equally in collective guilt, but they do not have equal shares. Nor do they have unequal shares. In short, there is no way of

breaking collective guilt down into quantifiable shares.

In case this situation seems hard to grasp, the following humdrum

analogy bears some similarity to it. Two people may be said to "share

equally" in their joint bank account - it is, after all, a joint account - but

it is not clear that it makes sense to say that they have "equal shares" or,

indeed, "unequal shares."48

48 Possibly my thought of this example was influenced by J. Feinberg's reference to joint

bank accounts, op. cit., p. 63.



82 MARGARET GILBERT

8. A Harsh Doctrine?

If we allow that mere membership in a group can be enough to involve one

in guilt, whatever one does while remaining a member, is this not simply too harsh a doctrine?

One aspect of the matter which could help to spark such a question is that one's membership itself may not be a voluntary matter. This question

may seem particularly apposite if we are considering families or whole

societies.

Assume we have a large and enduring plural subject, a society, if you will. Presumably, many of the members had little real option about becom

ing members. They were "born into" the society, and pressured into mem

bership by family, teachers, and peers. Again, it may be that few members

have the means to leave the society. Perhaps this could be brought about

by ceasing to be the residents of a particular territory. They may simply be too poor to travel the required distance.49

Is it not harsh, then, to suppose quite generally that such people share

in the guilt of their group simply by being members? For many, their

membership was in a sense forced upon them and is now in a sense

inalienable, Sartre has said that there are two ways a soldier mobilized in a war could

"always get out of it": "by suicide or desertion; these ultimate possibles are those which must always be present for us_" Not everyone has the

option of suicide. Many patients in psychiatric hospitals, for instance, are

carefully monitored so that they cannot easily kill themselves. And some

people lack the physical capacity to do so even if no one interferes. In any case, it certainly seems a little harsh if the perennial option of suicide is

put forward as the reason why citizens generally "deserve" a war (as Sartre

puts it) or "deserve" to share the guilt in a war.

I have not been arguing for the conclusion that members "deserve"

the special guilt of membership, simply that they accrue it. Suicide can, I

suppose, rid them of it, insofar as it rids them of membership itself. But

they do not accrue it because they had the option of suicide, or any other

option. They accrue it because they are members.

One can accrue membership guilt while being morally blameless at the

personal level. But we social creatures exist, if you like, at more than one

level.

49 I have in mind the possibility that one is committed qua resident in a particular part of the world, so that leaving that place would bring one's commitment to an end without

one's fellows having to agree to a rescension of the joint commitment. On the topic of the

"alienablity" of membership see also the text, above.




We are group-forming creatures and our groups may act badly. If my

group acts badly that means that I and my fellow members have some guilt to share. I'm not sure that that's a harsh doctrine. Perhaps, though, it is

a tragic doctrine, incorporating a tragic truth. There has to be something

tragic about group membership, if it can afflict people with a kind of guilt even though they are personally innocent.

In spite of this disturbing thought, the feeling of guilt over a collective action can play a very positive role. Since feeling guilt is unpleasant, and

may have an inherently punishing character, it is liable to move one who

feels it to act, and to act in an appropriate way. This will not (necessarily) be the personal undertaking of reparative action (such action may not be

appropriate or feasible). In many cases, it will lead to political action, to

attempting to stop the group action if it is in process, or to encouraging the

group as a whole to do what it can for its victims. Collective guilt perceived as such by individual members can be the stimulus to improvement in group action and the moral quality of group life.

A less grim aspect of the argument of this paper is that it can apparently make sense to feel not only guilt, but pride, on behalf of what one's group has done, whatever one's precise role in the generation of the admirable

action. As guilt is unpleasant, so pride is pleasant. Even someone of few

achievements can legitimately (according to this argument) feel pride in the achievements of the relevant group.50 Insofar as people have more

concern to avoid pain than to find pleasure, the tendency of the literature

has been to focus on collective wrongs and their relation to individual

guilt rather than on collective achievements and their relation to individual

pride. But these appear to be but two sides of the same coin.

CONCLUSION

I started with the question, "Can it be appropriate to feel guilt just in case one's group has acted badly?" Many people apparently feel guilt in such

cases, though we would judge them to be personally blameless. This can

seem quite puzzling if we accept some prevalent understandings about

guilt feelings. I have argued that a feeling of guilt can be an appropriate response for the

member of a plural subject that bears guilt. My argument challenges some

prevalent understandings about feelings of guilt. It implies that something other than one's own wrongdoing is a proper basis for a feeling of guilt. It

50 Pride often concerns the achievements of those "representing" the group, and guilt

may also. I will not be exploring this aspect of the question of collective guilt or glory here.



84 MARGARET GILBERT

implies, further, that insofar as feeling guilt involves a negative assessment

or intentional punishment of something, it need not involve a negative assessment or intentional punishment of the self as such.

If a plural subject acts badly and bears guilt for its action, then a

member of the plural subject can appropriately feel guilt over the action.51

That this is so does not touch the question of anyone's personal guilt or

blameworthiness with respect to the action in question. The guilt it makes

sense to feel is guilt of the group. It is guilt in which one shares - but does

not own.

Philosophy Department

University of Connecticut

Storrs XT 06269 USA

51 I do not go so far as to say that a member should feel guilt in such a case. Probably this is not true in general. If the wrong in question is very minor, for instance, a feeling of

guilt may not be called for because the wrong is too trivial (I owe this example to J. Raz, in

discussion at Columbia University). In other cases there may be a sense it which it is called for. This may not amount to its being the case that members should feel guilt then, that it

is some sort of requirement that they do. I am not entirely sure what the requirement that

someone feel guilt in some context would amount to. In any case, if the wrong is great a

feeling of membership guilt is not ruled out on the grounds of having an improper object, and is appropriate in the sense that one's group has indeed acted very badly.



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