09-3583-cv United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff, STEVEN BYERS, WEXTRUST CAPITAL, LLC, WEXTRUST EQUITY PARTNERS, LLC, WEXTRUST DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, WEXTRUST SECURITIES, LLC, AXELA HOSPITALITY, LLC, ELKA SHERESHEVSKY, Defendants, JOSEPH SHERESHEVSKY, Third-Party-Plaintiff, AVROHOM SHERESHEVSKY, HOLMES REVOCABLE TRUST, Intervenors-Defendants, (For Continuation of Caption See Inside Cover) _______________________________ ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BRIEF AND SPECIAL APPENDIX FOR CLAIMANT- APPELLANT MARTIN MALEK THOMAS, ALEXANDER & FORRESTER LLP Attorneys for Claimant-Appellant Martin Malek 14 27 th Avenue Venice, California 90291 (310) 961-2536
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09-3583-cv
United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
STEVEN BYERS, WEXTRUST CAPITAL, LLC, WEXTRUST EQUITY PARTNERS, LLC, WEXTRUST DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC,
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW ..............................................................................21
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CANNOT APPROVE A PLAN TO DISTRIBUTE ASSETS THAT ARE NOT PART OF THE RECEIVERSHIP ESTATE................22
A. The Receiver’s Right to Distribute Assets Is Limited to Assets Owned by the Wextrust Defendants and Their Affiliates..................23
B. The Commodity Pools Are Not Owned by the Wextrust Defendants or Their Affiliates............................................................24
C. None of the Commodity Pools, Their Manager or Investors Were “Wrongdoers” ...........................................................................26
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CANNOT APPROVE A DISTRIBUTION PLAN THAT LIQUIDATES THE RECEIVERSHIP ESTATE .............................28
- ii -
A. The Second Circuit Has Repeatedly Held that District Courts Are Not To Liquidate Assets in a Receivership.................................29
B. The SEC and the Receiver Are Not Permitted to Seek Liquidation.................................................................................30
C. The District Court Incorrectly Dismissed the Second Circuit’s Holdings in Eberhard and American Board of Trade........................32
1. Credit Bancorp I Did Not Overrule the Holdings in Eberhard and American Board of Trade....................................33
2. Credit Bancorp I Is Distinguishable...........................................34
IV. A “PRO RATA” DISTRIBUTION OF THE RECEIVERSHIP ASSETS IS IMPROPER ..............................................................................................35
A. The Commodity Pool Investors Were Not “Similarly Situated” .......35
1. The Commodity Pool Investments Are Not Similar as a Matter of Law .............................................................................36
2. The Investments in the Commodity Pools Had Vastly Different Levels of Risk and Reward than the Other Wextrust Investments. ......................................................37
3. The Commodity Pool Investors and the Defrauded Investors Did Not Give Control Over Their Assets to the Same Entity.................................................................................39
4. The Commodity Pool Investments Did Not Share a “Reasonably Close Resemblance of Facts and Circumstances” with Other Investments ....................................39
5. The Commodity Pool Investors Had a Different Relationship to the Defendants than the Defrauded Investors....................................................................42
6. The Commodity Pool Investors Did Not Understand Their Investments to Be “Part of a Whole” with the Defrauded Investors....................................................................43
B. The Commodity Pool Funds Were Not “Commingled” ....................44
1. The Activity Between the Funds Was Not “Commingling” ......44
a. No Commingling Occurred in the Commodity Pools ........45
b. The Commodity Pool Funds Made Legitimate Loans to Wextrust Entities..................................................46
- iii -
2. These Transactions Are Not Sufficient to Find Commingling In Commodity Pool Funds..........................................................47
a. Minimal, if Any, Commingling Occurred ..........................47
b. The District Court Mistakenly Relied on Cases Involving Far More Commingling than that Present in this Case .............................................................48
C. A Pro Rata Distribution Is Inequitable...............................................49
No. 3:08-CV-0064, 2008 WL 5225851 (D. Conn. Dec. 10, 2008) ......... 36, 39, 43 CFTC v. Probber Int'l Equities Corp.,
504 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y 1981) ..................................................................... 24 City of Philadelphia v. Lieberman,
112 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1940) ...........................................................................49-50 Dirks v. Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis,
105 F.R.D. 125 (D. Minn. 1985) ......................................................................... 25 Eberhard v. Marcu,
No. 08 C 1260, 2008 WL 4534154 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2008)...........................36-39
- vi -
SEC v. Lauer,
No. 03-80612-Civ, 2009 WL 812719 (S.D. Fla. March 26, 2009) ..................... 48 SEC v. Murphy,
626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980) ............................................................................... 46 SEC v. Pittsford Capital Income Partners, LLC,
No. 06 Civ 6353, 2007 WL 2455124 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2007) ...................... 46 SEC v. Sunwest Mgmt, Inc.,
No. 09-6056, 2009 WL 3245879 (D. Or. Oct. 2, 2009) .................................45-48 United States v. Moore,
27 F.3d 969 (4th Cir. 1994) .................................................................................48 United States v. Real Property Located at 13328 & 13324 State Hwy. 75 North,
89 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 1996) ............................................................................48-49 United States v. Ward,
17 C.F.R. § 4.20 ....................................................................................... 10, 25, 37, 39 Other Authorities 19 Moore’s Federal Practice § 202.08 (3d ed. 1999) ..................................................6 Glossary of terms of the CFTC,
The Receiver filed his Plan with the District Court on March 27, 2009 and
the District Court approved it on July 23, 2009. JA at A-1293–A-1339; Special
Appendix (“SPA”) at SPA-1–SPA-44. Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal
on August 20, 2009. JA at A-1763. The approval of a distribution plan (i.e., the
“Distribution Order”) in an SEC action is deemed a “final order” of a United States
District Court. Credit Bancorp II, 297 F.3d at 136 (citing Credit Bancorp I, 290
F.3d at 82 and 19 Moore’s Federal Practice § 202.08, at 202-32 (3d ed.1999)).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Did the District Court err as a matter of law when it approved a plan
of distribution that improperly included Commodity Pool assets in the
receivership?
2. Did the District Court err as a matter of law by approving a plan of
distribution that liquidates the receivership estate?
3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it found that the
Commodity Pool Investors were “similarly situated” to investors in the Wextrust
Defendants and that commingling among the Commodity Pools and the assets of
the Wextrust Defendants was sufficient to justify pro rata distribution of the
receivership assets?
7
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal of the District Court’s order approving a plan of
distribution for a receivership, the “Distribution Order.” The Receiver moved for
approval of his Plan on March 27, 2009, and proposed to include Appellant’s
assets among the distributions. Appellant (and other similarly situated investors)
objected to the Receiver’s Plan. On May 21, 2009, the District Court heard
argument on their objections. On July 23, 2009, the District Court entered the
Distribution Order approving the Receiver’s Plan. SPA at SPA-1–SPA-44. On
August 20, 2009, Martin Malek timely filed his Notice of Appeal. JA at A-1763.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. THE WEXTRUST DEFENDANTS’ REAL ESTATE BUSINESS
Wextrust Capital, LLC was formed in 2003 “with the business purpose to
find investment opportunities, mainly in undervalued real estate assets.” JA at A-
115 (SEC Complaint). Together with the other four Wextrust Defendants,
Wextrust Capital, LLC “solicit[ed] investors . . . and manage[d] the offerings and
investments relating to the purchase of real estate” and real estate-based assets
rights to “diamond mining interests in Africa.” Id.; see also JA at A-252–A-253.
The Wextrust Defendants raised money through the sale of membership
interests in limited liability companies (“LLCs”). The LLCs were to be ownership
8
vehicles for real estate interests such as hotels, commercial offices, residential real
estate, or mining or other land rights. JA at A-115–A-116, A-252–A-253. A
Wextrust Defendant or its affiliate was designated to manage each of the LLCs.
A Wextrust Defendant or an affiliate typically had a membership interest
(i.e., an ownership interest) in an LLC that owned real estate. JA at A-729 (First
Interim Report). In a typical example, a Wextrust Defendant owned a controlling
60% interest of the entity owning the real property and sold to investors its interest
in the remaining 40%. Mar. 18, 2009 Radke Decl. (Dkt. No. 226), Ex. B at 9.
Thus, each real property (and the LLC owning it) was an asset owned and
controlled by a Wextrust Defendant or its affiliate.
The offering documents for the investments in these LLCs represented that
“the proceeds raised from the investors, together with a mortgage loan, will be
used to purchase and operate a specific commercial real estate property.” See JA at
A-116 (SEC Complaint). According to the SEC, however, the Wextrust
Defendants were not using the proceeds of its offerings to purchase and operate
their real estate operations, but to operate a massive ponzi scheme. According to
the SEC, the Wextrust Defendants’ principals had defrauded investors in the real
estate companies, including by “raising money in the various offerings . . . to make
9
unauthorized payments to fund the operations of the Wextrust Entities.” JA at A-
107.
II. APPELLANT’S INVESTMENT: THE “COMMODITY POOLS”
Unrelated to the real estate operations of the Wextrust Defendants were the
operations of four “commodity pool” funds (i.e. the “Commodity Pools”) in which
the Appellant (and other Commodity Pool Investors) invested.2 The Commodity
Pools were vehicles for investors to trade in commodity futures, including energy,
metals, grains and meats, United States currency and foreign exchange, interest
rate related products and global equity indices. JA at A-1071; see also JA at A-
758–A-759 (First Interim Report); JA at A-1005–A-1059 (Commodity Pool
PPMs). The Commodity Pools attracted approximately $17 million in investment.
JA at A-758 (First Interim Report); JA at A-1070.
The only nexus between the Commodity Pools and the Wextrust Defendants
is that an affiliate of the Wextrust Defendants, WCM, acted as the statutory
manager of the Commodity Pools. JA at A-1071. Significantly, the Commodity
2 The four Commodity Pools are WexTrade Diversified Futures Fund I, LLC, WexTrade Diversified Offshore Futures Fund I, Ltd., WexTrade Principal Protected Fund I, LLC, and WexTrade Principal Offshore Fund I, Ltd.
10
Pool investments were different from the Wextrust Defendant real estate
investments in at least three respects:
First, the Commodity Pools were not owned, in whole or in part, by any
Wextrust Defendant or affiliate. By law, the investors in the Commodity Pools
retained exclusive ownership of the assets in the Commodity Pools. Commodity
pools and their managers are strictly regulated and consistent with those
regulations, neither WCM nor any of the Wextrust Defendants could or did have
any ownership interest in the Commodity Pools. Unlike the real estate LLCs, in
which the Wextrust Defendants typically retained 60% ownership interest, Mar.
18, 2009 Radke Decl. (Dkt. No. 226), Ex. B at 9, the funds in those Pools were
never assets of the Wextrust Defendants.
Second, the Commodity Pools did not lose any money from fraud.
Consistent with the requirement that their funds be kept segregated at all times, see
17 C.F.R. § 4.20(a)(1), (c), the Commodity Pool funds were unaffected by frauds
in the Wextrust Defendants’ real estate business. See JA at A-1340. Until the
Receiver withdrew funds for operation of the receivership estate, the monies
invested by Appellant and other Commodity Pool Investors had lost no money to
the frauds of the Wextrust Defendants. Id. Further, the Commodity Pool manager,
WCM, was not named as a Wextrust Defendant, nor was Paul Adrian, WCM’s
11
former principal who was responsible for the day-to-day operations of WCM. JA
at A-106. The Commodity Pools were not victimized by fraud.
Third, the Commodity Pools were not invested in real estate. Unlike the
investments offered by the Wextrust Defendants, the Commodity Pools were
invested in commodities. See JA at A-758–A-759, A-1070–A-1071, A-1340.
Investors in these pools were not tied to risks associated with real property, which
risks materialized in the form of a broad, worldwide collapse in real estate markets.
While the Wextrust Defendants’ assets were substantially depressed by this drop in
value, the Commodity Pools were unaffected.
By the time of the creation of the receivership, the Commodity Pools held
approximately $17.6 million of Malek’s and the Commodity Pool Investors’
money. JA at A-828 n.7.
III. THE RECEIVERSHIP AND ASSET FREEZE ORDER
The paths of the Commodity Pools and the Wextrust Defendants crossed on
August 11, 2008.
On August 11, 2008, the SEC filed its complaint against the five Wextrust
Defendants and their two principals, alleging that money raised for real estate
investment was actually used to fund the Wextrust Defendants’ operations. JA at
A-106–A-142 (SEC Complaint). According to the SEC, for example, the Wextrust
12
Defendants raised $9 million in private placements “to purchase and operate seven
commercial properties” leased to the General Services Administration, which they
did not do, see JA at A-117, A-119 (SEC Complaint); raised $9.3 million in
investments in a real estate LLC formed to a acquire and operate a Crowne Plaza
hotel in Arizona, which was instead used to fund operations of the Wextrust
Defendants, JA at A-120–A-123; and raised $4 nearly million to acquire an interest
in an African company that “own[ed] the exploration and mining rights in a group
of diamond mines,” which it never acquired, JA at A-123–A-124.
According to the SEC, the millions of dollars raised to purchase and manage
office buildings, hotels, and residential properties were instead diverted to the
Wextrust Defendants. More specifically, the proceeds of these offerings were used
by the Wextrust Defendants as part of a ponzi scheme “to pay prior investors in
unrelated offerings and to make unauthorized payments to fund the operations of
the Wextrust [Defendants].” JA at A-107 (SEC Complaint).
Based on its complaint, the SEC also requested the appointment of a receiver
over the Wextrust Defendants to “preserve the status quo” while managing the
Wextrust Defendants, prevent any dissipation of the assets that would ultimately be
returned to “victims,” bring the Wextrust Defendants into compliance with the law,
and, if necessary, to “place [the] hopelessly insolvent entities in bankruptcy to
13
effect their liquidation.” JA at A-197–A-198 (SEC Memorandum in Support of
Application for Emergency Relief).
The District Court granted the SEC’s request on that same day and named
Appellee as the Receiver of the Wextrust Defendants. It its order, JA at A-143–A-
147 (“Receiver Order”), the District Court assigned the Receiver broad
management rights over the Wextrust Defendants and was specifically charged
with “determin[ing] whether the [Wextrust Defendants] should undertake
bankruptcy filings.” JA at A-144; see also JA at A-145.
Also on the same day, and again on application of the SEC, the District
Court issued an order freezing the assets of the Wextrust Defendants (i.e., the
“Asset Freeze Order”). The Asset Freeze Order compelled a host of persons to
“hold and retain . . . and otherwise prevent . . . disposal of any assets . . . of, held
by, or under the direct or indirect control of the Defendants.” JA at A-157. The
Asset Freeze Order also sought to freeze assets of entities associated or affiliated
with the Wextrust Entities or entities under their control including “those entities
listed in Exhibit A.” Id. Because they were managed by WCM, Exhibit A
included the Commodity Pools.
The Asset Freeze Order worked in conjunction with the Receiver Order,
which authorized the Receiver to take “immediate possession and control of all of
14
the assets and the property of the [Wextrust Defendants] and all entities they
control or in which they have an ownership interest including, but not limited to,
those entities listed on Exhibit A,” JA at A-145 (Receiver Order), to serve the
SEC’s and the District Court’s stated goal of “preserving the status quo.” JA at A-
144. Between the Receiver’s taking control of these assets and all persons
receiving the Asset Freeze Order being directed to maintain them, the Receiver
(and the SEC) would be permitted time to investigate the fraud at the Wextrust
Defendants, determine the nature and extent of the fraud, and make a decision as to
whether the defendant entities should be put into bankruptcy.
Consistent with the Asset Freeze Order, the Receiver froze the assets in the
Commodity Pools, transferred them to their own fiduciary account and
discontinued the commodities trading associated with the accounts. JA at A-1071,
A-1340, A-1465. By this time, the $17 million originally invested in the
Commodity Pools had grown to $17.6 million. JA at A-828 n.7, A-1070. The
Receiver’s transfer was consistent with the Asset Freeze Order directing the
Receiver to “preserve the status quo” pending its investigation.
IV. THE RECEIVER’S INVESTIGATION
Over the next seven months, in addition to “marshal[ing] the assets of the
receivership estate,” the Receiver managed and investigated the financial condition
15
of the Wextrust Defendants. JA at A-1299 (Distribution Plan). With respect to the
Commodity Pools, his investigation yielded two immutable conclusions. First, that
the Commodity Pools were unaffected by any fraud; and second, that the $17.6
million from the Commodity Pools were the only meaningful source of funds
available to pay the professional fees of the Receiver and his firm.
A. The Commodity Pools Were Unaffected By Any Fraud
No one expected the Commodity Pools—or any person investing, owning or
managing them—to have been involved in the Wextrust Defendants’ fraud.
Nowhere in the SEC’s complaint is there any reference to the Commodity Pools,
nor any reference to their manager, WCM. JA at A-106–A-142 (SEC Complaint).
Paul Adrian, the person responsible for managing on WCM’s behalf, is not
mentioned in the SEC’s complaint and is not alleged to have played any part in the
fraud. Id. No investor in the Commodity Pools is alleged to have been a victim of
the fraud.
The Receiver’s investigation found no differently. Over the course of five
interim reports, the Receiver nowhere mentions any criminal activity resulting in a
loss among any of the Commodity Pools. See JA at A-717–A-820, A-1157–A-
The reasons for this rule were recognized in Probber, where the district
court found that it would be “unfair and arbitrary” for a creditor’s assets to be
included in the receivership where the asset was not owned by one of the
defendants at the time the receivership began. 504 F. Supp. at 1162-63. The court
likewise found that inclusion of the property in the receivership estate would result
in a “windfall and unjust enrichment” of the other creditors “whose plight … was
attributable to their having placed unwarranted trust” in the defendants. Id.
B. The Commodity Pools Are Not Owned by the Wextrust Defendants or Their Affiliates
The Wextrust Defendants did not own the Commodity Pool assets.
25
By law, the Commodity Pools were wholly separate from WCM, and had no
direct relationship with the Wextrust Defendants. A commodity pool operator like
WCM “must operate its pool as an entity cognizable as a legal entity separate from
that of the pool operator” and may not “commingle the property of any pool that it
operates or that it intends to operate with the property of any other person.” 17
C.F.R. § 4.20(a)(1), (c).
Further, and most critically, WCM, the fraud-free Commodity Pool
manager, was, as a matter of law, not permitted to own any part of the Commodity
Pools. Id. Accordingly, WCM did not own the Commodity Pools, it merely had
the ability to make investment decisions for the Commodity Pools—the
Commodity Pool Investors retained ownership of their assets in the Commodity
Pools. JA at A-1069–A-1071.
Consistent with this statutory scheme, the law has consistently recognized
commodity pools to be the property of individual investors. See, e.g., Dirks v.
Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, 105 F.R.D. 125, 135 (D. Minn. 1985)
(“[P]ools were not assets of the corporations, but were property of individual
investors.”). Fleming, 922 F.2d at 25 (“[T]he funds allegedly mismanaged by the
[futures commission merchant] in accounts established by [the fraudster] belonged
entirely to investors, not to [the corporation].”).
26
By order of the District Court, the Receiver was appointed to “[t]ake and
retain immediate possession and control of all of the assets and property of the
[Wextrust Defendants] and all entities they control or in which they have an
ownership interest.” JA at A-145 (Receiver Order) (emphasis added). These
assets included the $17.6 million in the Commodity Pools, which was immediately
frozen and forwarded to the Receiver’s designated account. JA at A-1071.
That Order, however, and the possession it permitted was “temporary” and
pending investigation, and the Receiver should have sought the release of any
assets his investigation demonstrated were not the property of the Wextrust
Defendants. Despite the fact that the only evidence is that Commodity Pools were
not the assets of any Wextrust Defendant—in stark contrast to the real estate that is
owned by Wextrust Defendants or their affiliates—the Receiver never sought the
release of the $17.6 million from the receivership estate.
C. None of the Commodity Pools, Their Manager or Investors Were “Wrongdoers”
The only “exception” to the requirement of ownership for inclusion of an
asset in a receivership estate—a “requirement” that has barely required judicial
explication—is where an asset is controlled by a “wrongdoer.” Where a
controlling party has acted wrongfully in a manner that impacts an asset, courts
27
have permitted a receiver consistent with 15 U.S.C. §78u—the statute by which
receivers are given power over the assets of a receivership—to marshal those
assets and determine an equitable plan of return.
In contrast, where there is no proof of wrongdoing, there is no reason to
include non-party assets in a receivership since “[n]othing in the statute or case law
suggests that 15 U.S.C. §78u(d) or (e) authorizes a court to freeze the assets of a
non-party, one against whom no wrongdoing is alleged.” SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d
403, 413-14 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Black, 163 F.3d at 196.
Here, passing whether WCM “controlled” the Commodity Pools,3 there has
been no allegation that any of the Commodity Pool Investors were involved in any
of the wrongdoing perpetrated by the Wextrust Defendants. See JA at A-106–A-
142, A-204–A-242 (SEC Complaints); see also JA at A-1340. Moreover, the
Commodity Pool manager, WCM, was not named as a Wextrust Defendant, and
neither was Paul Adrian, WCM’s former principal who was responsible for the
day-to-day operations of WCM.
3 In fact, the Commodity Pool investors retained control over their assets in the Commodity Pools. The Commodity Pools had the ability to fire WCM, the commodity pool operator, with a 75% vote of the members. JA at A-483. Absent court order, the investors could replace WCM in their sole discretion. The ability to dismiss the manager places ultimate control with the investors, not WCM.
28
Without even an allegation that there was wrongdoing in the Commodity
Pools or WCM that depleted those assets, the Receiver has no authority to
permanently seize and then distribute the assets of the Commodity Pools—and pay
his own fees—because these Commodity Pools were not receivership assets.
Black, 163 F.3d at 196; Cherif, 933 F.2d at 413-14.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CANNOT APPROVE A DISTRIBUTION PLAN THAT LIQUIDATES THE RECEIVERSHIP ESTATE
The Receiver was never intended to liquidate the Wextrust Defendants’
receivership estate. The SEC’s request was for a receiver to investigate and, if
necessary, to “place [the] hopelessly insolvent entities in bankruptcy to effect their
liquidation.” JA at A-197–A-198 (SEC Memorandum in Support of Application
for Emergency Relief). Accordingly, the District Court’s appointment was made
expressly with the understanding that the Receiver would “determine whether the
[Wextrust Defendants] should undertake bankruptcy filings.” JA at A-144; see
also JA at A-145.
Contrary to both the application and the order installing him, the Receiver
proposes to liquidate the assets of the Wextrust Defendants. In so doing, the
Receiver exceeds the intent of the SEC and of the District Court—initially at
29
least—and ignores the repeated counsel of this Second Circuit that liquidation is
the province of bankruptcy courts.
A. The Second Circuit Has Repeatedly Held that District Courts Are Not to Liquidate Assets in a Receivership
The Second Circuit has made clear that district courts are not to liquidate the
assets in a receivership. See Eberhard, 530 F.3d at 132 (“[R]eceivership should
not be used as an alternative to bankruptcy”); American Board of Trade, Inc., 830
F.2d at 436, 438 (“[O]n several other occasions we repeated our view that equity
receiverships should not be used to effect the liquidation of defendants in actions
brought under the securities laws.”); Lankenau v. Coggeshall & Hicks, 350 F.2d
61, 63 (2d Cir. 1965) (“Receiverships ancillary to SEC actions . . . should not be
continued, in a case involving insolvency, beyond the point necessary to get the
estate into the proper forum for liquidation—the bankruptcy court.”).
The reason that the Second Circuit has held that bankruptcy courts are the
proper forum for liquidation is because bankruptcy courts have the necessary
experience and resources to liquidate entities, as well as the guidance of the
bankruptcy code. American Board of Trade, 830 F.2d at 438; Lankenau, 350 F.2d
at 63. District Courts, on the other hand, are not set up to resolve liquidation
proceedings. Id. at 437-38 (noting that “the functions undertaken by the district
30
court in this case demonstrate the wisdom of not using a receivership as a
substitute for bankruptcy”).
Notwithstanding the repeated admonition of this Court, liquidation is exactly
what is being attempted with the Plan in this case. See Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d at
171 & n.5; SPA at SPA-9. The Plan provides for the distribution of all of the
assets of the receivership, effectively liquidating the all of the Wextrust Defendants
and their affiliates and the Commodity Pools along with them. Id.; JA at A-1293–
A-1339 (Distribution Plan). Indeed, the District Court itself recognized that the
Distribution Plan “is effectively a liquidation.” Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 171 n.5;
SPA at SPA-9. Because a District Court cannot liquidate a receivership, the
Distribution Plan in this case should not have been approved. Eberhard, 530 F.3d
at 132; American Board of Trade, 830 F.2d at 436, 438.
B. The SEC and the Receiver Are Not Permitted to Seek Liquidation
The Plan was approved on application of the Receiver with the assistance
and consent of the SEC. Even the offering of the Plan, however, was in
contravention of this Court’s mandates since the SEC and the Receiver had a
31
responsibility to inform the District Court that it could not embark on a liquidation
of the receivership estate.4 American Board of Trade, 830 F.2d at 438.
The Second Circuit has admonished the SEC that it should not even attempt
liquidations in District Court and that it is the SEC’s burden to bring that fact to the
District Court’s attention:
We now state, however, that in actions of the present kind brought in the future by the SEC, we expect counsel for the agency, as an officer of the court and as part of his or her individual professional responsibility, to bring our views, as stated in this and other decisions, to the attention of the district court before the court embarks on a liquidation through an equity receivership.
American Board of Trade, 830 F.2d at 438.
Moreover, the Receiver was fully aware that its responsibility, if the
Wextrust Defendants were insolvent, was not to prolong its duties as receiver, but
to put the company in bankruptcy. In fact, in its First Fee Application, the
Receiver acknowledged that his charge from the District Court was to “determine
if the Wextrust [Defendants] and Affiliates should undertake a bankruptcy filing.”
JA at A-825. Subsequent fee applications acknowledged the same goal, see JA at
4 The District Court, in fact, also placed this onus on the SEC and the Receiver. In the Order Appointing Temporary Receiver, the District Court charged the Receiver with determining whether the “Wextrust [Defendants] and all entities they control or in which they have an ownership interest should undertake a bankruptcy filing.” JA at A-145 (Receiver Order).
32
A-1208, A-1250, A-1604, A-1672, including a fee application filed just one month
ago. JA at A-1873.
The SEC and the Receiver in this case ignored their responsibilities under
Second Circuit law and the Receiver Order. Rather than informing the District
Court that this case belonged in bankruptcy court, the Receiver presented a Plan
that liquidated the Wextrust Defendants and the Commodity Pools. Byers, 637 F.
Supp. 2d at 171 & n.5; JA at A-1293–A-1339 (Distribution Plan). The SEC and
the Receiver cannot be rewarded for ignoring this Court’s repeated instructions and
the admonitions addressed specifically to them.
C. The District Court Incorrectly Dismissed the Second Circuit’s Holdings in Eberhard and American Board of Trade
Notwithstanding this Court’s clear instructions, the District Court incorrectly
found that it could liquidate the receivership estate in this case.5 Byers, 637 F.
Supp. 2d at 176; SPA at SPA-21. In so holding, the District Court relied on Credit
Bancorp I and dismissed this Court’s holdings in Eberhard and American Board of
Trade. Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 174-76; SPA at SPA-17–SPA-21. That reliance
was misplaced.
5 The District Court did, however, note that it was a “close [decision] that gives me pause.” Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 175; SPA at SPA-19.
33
1. Credit Bancorp I Did Not Overrule the Holdings in Eberhard and American Board of Trade
The District Court, in relying on Credit Bancorp I, held that that case “cast
serious doubt” on the holding of American Board of Trade. Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d
at 176; SPA at SPA-20. In fact, not only did the Second Circuit not back away
from its warnings in American Board of Trade but it reiterated those warnings in
Eberhard, six years after Credit Bancorp I was decided.
In Credit Bancorp I, Judge Sweet noted the American Board of Trade
“admonition” that “an equity receivership should not be employed as a substitute
for a bankruptcy proceeding to effectuate the liquidation of the defendant firm.”
SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., No. 99 CIV 11395, 2000 WL 1752979, at *27
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2000). Judge Sweet found, however, without diminishing that
holding, that the Credit Bancorp I facts differed because they involved only a
“partial” distribution under the plan and none of the victims wished to initiate
bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at *27-28.
That the Second Circuit did not mean to back away from American Board of
Trade is plain from its recent decision in Eberhard in which—eight years after
Credit Bancorp I was decided—the Court reiterated that receiverships do not have
the power to liquidate estates. Eberhard, 530 F.3d at 132. The District Court
34
acknowledged that it failed to follow the more recent Eberhard in approving the
liquidation of the receivership estate. Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 176 n.11; SPA at
SPA-20. It did so improperly.
2. Credit Bancorp I Is Distinguishable
Neither of the circumstances distinguishing Credit Bancorp I—a partial
liquidation and absence of victims seeking bankruptcy—is present here.
This case involves a total liquidation of the assets of the Wextrust
Defendants and the Commodity Pools. Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 171 & n.5; SPA
at SPA-9; JA at A-1299 (Distribution Plan). It does not involve a partial
distribution but a complete dismantling of a real estate business run aground by
substantial market forces.
In addition, unlike Credit Bancorp I’s creditors, none of whom wished to
initiate bankruptcy proceedings, this case involves creditors who have actively
advocated for it, see Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 176 (noting the position of “a
number of creditors” that the District Court did not have authority to approve a
liquidation plan); SPA at SPA-20, and if fact moved for permission to enter the
Wextrust Defendants into bankruptcy involuntarily. See JA at A-869, A-948–A-
962.
35
IV. A “PRO RATA” DISTRIBUTION OF THE RECEIVERSHIP ASSETS IS IMPROPER
No distribution of the Appellants’ assets is proper because they are not
assets of the receivership. For many of the same reasons, a “pro rata” distribution
to any party investing in any of the Wextrust Defendants’ enterprises—in which
each investor receives “a ratable share of his or her gross investment” regardless of
whether they invested in a fraud or not, JA at A-1305 (Distribution Plan)—is
unjust and improper.
Because, as here, pro rata distributions can create significant inequities
among the investors, in the Second Circuit, pro rata distributions are only
permitted where (1) the investors are “similarly situated” with respect to their
relationship to the defrauders and (2) where commingling has occurred. See Credit
Bancorp I, 290 F.3d at 88-89. Neither condition was met here, and the Plan’s pro
rata distribution is thus improper.
A. The Commodity Pool Investors Were Not “Similarly Situated”
Investors are similarly situated where (a) the investments are similar are as a
matter of law, (b) the investments share a “reasonably close resemblance of facts
and circumstances,” (c) the investments have common levels of risk and reward,
(d) the investors give control over their assets to the same entities, (e) the investors
36
have similar relationships to the defendant, and (f) the investors understand that
they share a common fate. See, e.g., Credit Bancorp I, 290 F.3d at 88-89; Lizardo
v. Denny’s, Inc., 270 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2001); CFTC v. Rolando, No. 3:08-CV-
0064, 2008 WL 5225851, at *3-4 (D. Conn. Dec. 10, 2008); SEC v. Enterprise
Trust Co., No. 08 C 1260, 2008 WL 4534154 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2008); CFTC v.
Far from the “close call” imagined by the District Court, Byers, 637 F. Supp.
2d at 180; SPA at SPA-30, none of these factors suggest the Commodity Pool
Investors were “similarly situated” with the investors in the Wextrust Defendants’
defrauded real estate entities (the “Defrauded Investors.”).
1. The Commodity Pool Investments Are Not Similar as a Matter of Law
The Commodity Pool investments differ from those made by Defrauded
Investors as a matter of law. By law the Commodity Pool assets—assets not of
WCM but of the individual pools themselves—must be separate and distinct from
assets of WCM and separate and distinct from assets of any of the Wextrust
Defendants.
In addition, as a commodity pool Manager WCM “must operate its pool as
an entity cognizable as a legal entity separate from that of the pool operator” and
37
may not “commingle the property of any pool that it operates or that it intends to
operate with the property of any other person.” 17 C.F.R. § 4.20(a)(1), (c). Thus,
WCM, the commodity pool operator, was an entity separate from the Commodity
Pools, each of which was set up as its own entity and maintained accounts in its
own name and WCM had no ownership rights to the Commodity Pool assets.
2. The Investments in the Commodity Pools Had Vastly Different Levels of Risk and Reward than the Other Wextrust Investments.
The investments of the Commodity Pool Investors and the Defrauded
Investors were also distinguishable because the two types of investments had
vastly different levels of risk and reward. Enterprise Trust, 2008 WL 4534154, at
*4-5.
The Commodity Pool Investors chose to enter a highly regulated
investment—a commodity pool—which placed investments in commodities such
as energy and metals. JA at A-1071. In contrast, the Defrauded Investors invested
in real estate, a highly speculative investment disclosed to them to be subject to the
“substantial negative effect” of competitive forces in real estate.6 Mar. 18, 2009
6 WDF Fund and WDOF Fund were marketed as vehicles for speculating in exchange traded futures and options contracts, as well as spot foreign currency markets JA at A-758. The WPP Fund and WPO Fund were marketed as lower-risk
38
Radke Decl. (Dkt. No. 226), Exh. B at 38; see also, e.g., A-1452, A-1720, A-1340.
These differences in risk levels are essential to any comparison among
investors. Enterprise Trust, 2008 WL 4534154, at *4-5. In Enterprise Trust, the
district court approved a distribution plan that acknowledged the different levels of
investor risk associated with the various investments and paid investors based on
those different levels of risk rather than on a pro rata basis. Id. at *2-5. The Court
found that “[t]o regard these two classes of account holders as remotely equal to
each other is inequitable.” Id. at *4-5.
As in Enterprise Trust, the Commodity Pool Investors and the Defrauded
Investors assumed different levels of risk and, in fact, the risks taken by the
Defrauded Investors were realized. See JA at A-1452 (noting that the real estate
was purchased at “the height of the commercial real estate boom, and the fair
market value of these properties had fallen substantially”); JA at A-1720 (noting
that the values of the real estate properties had “fallen substantially … primarily as
a result of the collapse of the United States real estate market.”). The Commodity
methods of speculating in commodities, based on a purported principal protection component, pursuant to which a portion of the proceeds of the offerings were to be invested in United States government securities and investment grade securities. JA at A-758–A-759.
39
Pools, in contrast, were unaffected by the real estate crash and did not lose their
value. See JA at A-828 n.7, A-1071, A-1340.
As the court acknowledged in Enterprise Trust, given how greatly the
Commodity Pool investments differed from the real estate investments, it was
inequitable to approve a pro rata distribution among them in this case.
3. The Commodity Pool Investors and the Defrauded Investors Did Not Give Control Over Their Assets to the Same Entity
The Commodity Pool Investors did not relinquish full control of their assets
to a wrongdoer—that is what the Defrauded Investors did. JA at A-483, A-739–A-
758, A-1069–A-1071. Instead, the Commodity Pool Investors chose to invest in
heavily regulated investments that were not owned by the Wextrust Defendants
and through which the Commodity Pool Investors could retain ownership of their
investments. JA at A-1069–A-1071; see also 17 C.F.R. § 4.20(a)(1), (c). Since the
investors gave control over their investments to different entities, they were not
similarly situated. See Rolando, 2008 WL 5225851, at *3-4 (finding investors
similarly situated where they all ceded control of their assets to same defendant).
4. The Commodity Pool Investments Did Not Share a “Reasonably Close Resemblance of Facts and Circumstances” with Other Investments
40
The facts and circumstances surrounding the Commodity Pool Investments
and the other Wextrust investments were completely different. See Lizardo, 270
F.3d at 101 (finding that entities are similarly situated only if there is a “reasonably
close resemblance of facts and circumstances”). Malek (along with the other
investors in the Commodity Pools) did not purchase shares or an ownership
interest in a real estate investment like the Defrauded Investors. Rather, the
Commodity Pool Investors pooled their money together in a unique investment
vehicle—a commodity pool, and granted WCM authority to manage the company
and make trading decisions. See, e.g., JA at A-1005– A-1006, A-1018–A-1019, A-
1030–A-1031, A-1044–A-1045, A-1069–A-1071.
A commodity pool is an “investment trust, syndicate, or similar form of
enterprise operated for the purpose of trading commodity futures or option
contracts,” which is “typically thought of as an enterprise engaged in the business
of investing the collective or ‘pooled’ funds of multiple participants in trading
commodity futures or options, where participants share in profits and losses on a
pro rata basis.” See CFTC Glossary, at http://www.cftc.gov/educationcenter
/glossary/glossary_co.html. These particular investments were vehicles for
speculating in exchange traded futures and options contracts, as well as spot
foreign currency markets, and for speculating in commodities, based on a
41
purported principal protection component, pursuant to which a portion of the
proceeds of the offerings were to be invested in United States government
securities and investment grade securities. JA at A-758–A-759 (First Interim
Report).
The assets of the Commodity Pools were maintained at Fortis, a futures
commission merchant, and other entities, separate and apart from any Wextrust
Entity. JA at 1071; see also 7 U.S.C. §1a(20). The Commodity Pools were not
owned by Wextrust, and no Wextrust Defendant was affiliated with these
Commodity Pools. JA at A-998–A-999, A-1069–A-1071. No fraud occurred in
the Commodity Pools. JA at A-1340.
By contrast, the Defrauded Investors invested their assets in various
Wextrust Entities in which a massive fraud occurred. JA at A-743–A-758 (First
Interim Report). These investments were in limited liability companies that held
title to real estate or other specific property. JA at A-252–A-253, A-743–A-758.
All of these investments were offered by Wextrust. JA at A-742–A-758 (First
42
Interim Report). None of these types of investments are governed by the
commodities laws.7
5. The Commodity Pool Investors Had a Different Relationship to the Defendants than the Defrauded Investors
The Commodity Pool Investors had a significantly different relationship to
the Wextrust Defendants than the Defrauded Investors. Again, the Defrauded
Investors invested directly with Wextrust entities that owned the real estate assets.
By contrast the Commodity Pool Investors invested in commodity pools that were
merely managed by WCM, a subsidiary of a Wextrust Defendant, and retained
ownership of the Commodity Pool assets. JA at A-999, A-1069–A-1071. The
Commodity Pool Investors and the Defrauded Investors were not similarly situated
in their relationship to Wextrust. Credit Bancorp I, 290 F.3d at 88-89 (requiring
that investors be similarly situated “with respect to their relationship to the
defrauders”).
7 The Receiver has argued that all investors’ circumstances were “similar” on account of a National Futures Association (“NFA”) complaint filed against WCM and Paul Adrian. In contrast to the SEC complaint filed against the Wextrust Defendants alleging a massive ponzi scheme defrauding investors out of millions of dollars under false pretenses, however, the NFA complaint alleges regulatory violations relating to “registration of associated persons” and failure to supervise. See JA at A-1497.
43
6. The Commodity Pool Investors Did Not Understand Their Investments to Be “Part of a Whole” with the Defrauded Investors
The Commodity Pool Investors did not consider themselves “part of a
whole” with the other Wextrust investors and had no reason to believe they “shared
a common fortune or fate” with those investors. See Eustace, 2008 WL 471574, at
*8; Rolando, 2008 WL 5225851, at *4. The Commodity Pool investments and the
other Wextrust investments involved different investment products, which were
not made from the same pool of assets and which were not jointly marketed. JA at
A-996, A-1069–A-1071, A-1340. In fact, as the Commodity Pool investments had
to be kept separate from other investments—as a matter of law, the Commodity
Pool Investors had no reason to believe that their investments would share
anything at all with the other Wextrust investments. Since the Commodity Pool
Investments and the other Wextrust investments were not “part of a whole” and the
investors had no reason to believe they “shared a common fate,” they were not
situated where they were offered joint marketing materials for their investments
and where the investors believed that their assets would all be rolled into the same
pool of assets); Rolando, 2008 WL 5225851, at *4 (finding investors similarly
44
situated where the defendant made clear that he would be making investment
decisions for the group as a whole).
B. The Commodity Pool Funds Were Not “Commingled”
To justify including the $17.6 million invested by the Commodity Pool
Investors—funds invested in entities over which the Receiver had no authority—
the Receiver also argued that the $17.6 million had been sufficiently
“commingled” with the fraudulent funds to justify their inclusion in the
receivership estate. The Commodity Pool assets, however, were minimally, if at
all, commingled, and their inclusion in the receivership estate was improper. The
District Court abused its discretion in finding that the Commodity Pool assets were
sufficiently commingled with the fraudulent assets to justify a pro rata
distribution.8
1. The Activity Between the Funds Was Not “Commingling”
The transactions the Receiver relied on to justify his pro rata distribution of
the receivership assets did not constitute commingling. Commingling exists where
funds are used on a pure “availability” and “cash flow needs basis” without regard
8 The District Court acknowledged that the level of commingling necessary to warrant a pro rata distribution of assets is unclear. Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (“the law does not appear to require more than that”) (emphasis added); SPA at SPA-26.
45
to the source or intended use of the funds and without the knowledge or consent of
affected investors or creditors. SEC v. Sunwest Mgmt, Inc., No. 09-6056, 2009 WL
3245879, at *5-7 (D. Or. Oct. 2, 2009). That is not what happened here.
a. No Commingling Occurred in the Commodity Pools
The Commodity Pool assets were separate assets that were not commingled
with the assets of the Wextrust Defendants. The assets of the Commodity Pools
were used for their intended purpose—to serve as margin for commodities trading,
and were not part of the ponzi scheme that is at the core of the SEC’s action herein.
JA at A-106–A-142 (SEC Complaint); JA at A-1069–A-1071, A-1340. There is no
evidence that WCM, which managed the commodity pools, commingled funds.
Once the assets were placed in the commodity pools, the Wextrust Defendants no
longer had access to them, and no commingling could occur.
To support his allegations that commingling occurred, the Receiver ignores
the fact that the alleged commingling occurred before the funds were ever invested
in the Commodity Pools. JA at A-1976–A-1079, A-1081–A-1082. For instance,
the Receiver relies on a transaction involving Mr. Costa whereby he requested that
some of his Wextrust investments be sold and the proceeds transferred to a
Commodity Pool investment. JA at A-1076–A-1077. To redeem Mr. Costa, the
Wextrust principals fraudulently used funds from other Wextrust accounts. Id.
46
Thus, it was Wextrust—in order to release the assets that Mr. Costas requested—
that commingled funds, not WCM or the Commodity Pools.
b. The Commodity Pool Funds Made Legitimate Loans to Wextrust Entities
The Receiver’s other allegations of commingling in the Commodity Pools
involve legitimate loans between the Commodity Pools and Wextrust Capital, one
of the Wextrust Defendants. See JA at A-1080; JA at A-928. The WDF Fund
made three loans to Wextrust Capital, all of which were paid in full by August 14,
2007. JA at A-928. Valid loans—particularly where the investors had knowledge
of the transaction—do not constitute commingling. Sunwest, 2009 WL 3245879,
at *6-8; see also SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming
judgment in part because the issuer did not disclose that it was “commingling the
funds from the various partnerships”); SEC v. Pittsford Capital Income Partners,
L.L.C., No. 06 Civ 6353, 2007 WL 2455124, at *11-12 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2007)
(defendants made material omissions by “never disclos[ing] that the separate bank
accounts . . . had been closed and all funds commingled into one single account” in
contravention of stated prohibition on commingling).
47
2. These Transactions Are Not Sufficient to Find Commingling in Commodity Pool Funds
Even if this Court finds that the transactions described above involved
commingling between the Commodity Pool funds and the Wextrust Defendants,
these isolated transactions are not sufficient to justify a pro rata distribution
because only minimal commingling occurred. Cf. Sunwest, 2009 WL 3245879, at
*5-8; United States v. Ward, 197 F.3d 1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 1999); SEC v. Better
Life Club of America, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 167, 179-81 (D.D.C. 1998); Eustace, 2008
WL 471574 at *7.
a. Minimal, if Any, Commingling Occurred
Minimal, if any, commingling occurred between the assets in the
Commodity Pool funds and the assets under the control of the Wextrust
Defendants. At most, the Receiver demonstrated that a handful of instances in
which the Wextrust Defendants removed cash—to the Commodity Pool funds. JA
at A-1079–A-1080. Significantly, the lines between the Commodity Pool funds
and the Wextrust Defendants were clear—and respected—and there is no evidence
that the money flowed back and forth between the Commodity Pools and the
Wextrust Entities without regard to the source or the intended use of the funds.
See Eustace, 2008 WL 471574 at *7; Sunwest, 2009 WL 3245879, at *5-7. Such
48
minimal commingling is not sufficient to justify a pro rata distribution of assets.
See Sunwest, 2009 WL 3245879, at *8 (noting the “extensive” commingling).
b. The District Court Mistakenly Relied on Cases Involving Far More Commingling than that Present in this Case
Indeed, all of the cases relied upon by the District Court make clear that far
more commingling than occurred here is necessary to include the Commodity
Pools in the receivership estate for pro rata distribution. For example, the facts
differ substantially between this case and SEC v. Lauer, No. 03-80612-Civ, 2009
WL 812719 (S.D. Fla. March 26, 2009), a case the District Court found
“particularly instructive.” See Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 177-78; SPA at SPA-24–
SPA-25. In Lauer, the court held that “untainted funds” “no longer exist[ed]” and
because all of the assets were tainted by fraud, the Lauer court did not perform an
analysis of the level of commingling necessary. Lauer, 2009 WL 812719, at *4-5
(“This is not a case of mere commingling of tainted and untainted funds in an
account.”). There is no such finding here with respect to the Commodity Pools.
Similarly, Ward involved extensive commingling such that the “illicitly-acquired
funds and the legitimately-acquired funds …. [could] not be distinguished from
each other.” Ward, 197 F.3d at 1083 (quoting United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d
969, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1994)). Also distinguishable is United States v. Real
49
Property Located at 13328 & 13324 State Hwy. 75 North, 89 F.3d 551 (9th Cir.
1996), another case relied on by the District Court, which involved an “admittedly”
commingled account. Id. at 553. Here, there is no such admission. Better Life
Club, also relied on by the District Court, involved legitimate and fraudulently
obtained funds which were “freely co-mingled,” where defendants “helped
themselves” to the accounts at issue. 995 F. Supp. at 179-81. The level of
commingling—if any—in this case is far less than that present in Better Life Club.
Finally, in Eustace, the court found that there had been a “blurring of the
distinction between the Receivership Funds.” 2008 WL 471574, at *7. No such
“blurring” occurred here.
C. A Pro Rata Distribution Is Inequitable
The assets in this case should be returned to the Commodity Pool Investors,
not distributed pro rata because the case law permits the return of identifiable
assets to particular victims. See, e.g., Black, 163 F.3d at 196-97 (affirming return
of assets as the court lacked power over the assets because there was no proof that
the funds were assets of defendant or that investors were wrongdoers); City of
Philadelphia v. Lieberman, 112 F.2d 424, 426 (3d Cir. 1940) (ordering return of
assets placed in trust account beyond control of the insolvent). As the Second
Circuit recognized in Credit Bancorp, “[i]n those case the reason the assets were
50
returned was … because the assets had somehow been segregated in the manner of
true trust accounts and/or had never been placed in the defrauder’s control.” 290
F.3d at 89-90.
The Commodity Pool assets here were segregated from the other Wextrust
assets in commodity pools, which are akin to trusts. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.10(d)(1)
(defining commodity pool as an “investment trust”). “It is settled that a receiver of
an insolvent corporation is not entitled to possession of securities lawfully held in
trust.” Lieberman, 112 F.2d at 426; Black, 163 F.3d at 196. Therefore, since
commodity pools are akin to trusts, the Receiver was not entitled to possession of
the Commodity Pool assets.
In addition, the assets in the commodity pool were never placed in the
defrauder’s control. Rather, they were managed by Paul Adrian at WCM, who has
not been accused of any wrongdoing, and the investors retained ultimate control
over their investments. See JA at A-483, A-1069–A-1071.
Since the Commodity Pool assets were segregated from the Wextrust assets
in accounts akin to trusts and were never placed in the defrauder’s control, the
proper distribution in this case was one where the assets were returned to
Commodity Pool Investors. Credit Bancorp I, 290 F.3d at 89-90.
51
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the District Court’s
Order of July 23, 2009 approving the Distribution Plan, and remand this cause to
the District Court for release of the Commodity Pool assets to the Commodity Pool
Investors.
Dated: November 16, 2009 Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS ALEXANDER & FORRESTER LLP
By: Emily Alexander 14 27th Avenue Venice, California 90291 Telephone: (310) 961-2536 Facsimile: (310) 526-6852
Attorney for Appellant Martin Malek
52
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a) This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) because:
This brief contains 10,778 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted
by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
I make this representation based upon the word count generated by the word
processing software used to prepare this brief. The font used for the brief is Times
New Roman in 14-point type.
Counsel for Appellant
Dated: November 16, 2009
SPECIAL APPENDIX
i
SPECIAL APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
Opinion of the Honorable Denny Chin, dated July 23, 2009, Appealed From............................... SPA-1
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STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK
) ) )
ss.:
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY OVERNIGHT EXPRESS MAIL
I, , being duly sworn, depose and say that deponent is not a party to the action, is over 18 years of age and resides at the address shown above or at
On November 16, 2009 deponent served the within: Brief and Special Appendix for Claimant-Appellant Martin Malek
upon: JOHN WARREN DEWEY & LEBOEUF LLP 1101 New York Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20005-4213 [email protected] Attorneys for Receiver-Appellee
Timothy J. Coleman
DAVID LISITZA U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 100 F Street NE Washington, DC 20548 [email protected]
the address(es) designated by said attorney(s) for that purpose by depositing 2 true copy(ies) of same, enclosed in a postpaid properly addressed wrapper in a Post Office Official Overnight Express Mail Depository, under the exclusive custody and care of the United States Postal Service, within the State of New York and electronically by email. Sworn to before me on November 16, 2009