2021 ME 34 Portland Chamber - courts.maine.gov

MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2021ME34Docket: Cum-21-31Argued: May4,2021Decided: July6,2021Panel: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,JJ.,andCLIFFORD,ARJ.

PORTLANDREGIONALCHAMBEROFCOMMERCEetal.

v.

CITYOFPORTLANDetal.MEAD,J.

[¶1] Portland Regional Chamber of Commerce and other entities1

(collectively, the Chamber) appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court

(Cumberland County, Warren, J.) granting summary judgment against the

Chamber on its claims that voter-initiated legislation establishing an

emergencyminimumwageinPortlandviolatestheMaineConstitutionandthe

Portland City Code. Caleb Horton and Mario Roberge-Reyes (Intervenors)

cross-appeal from the court’s determination that the emergency minimum

wageprovisionisnoteffectiveuntilJanuary1,2022.Weaffirmthejudgment.

1TheplaintiffsarePortlandRegionalChamberofCommerce;AllianceforAddictionandMental

HealthServices,Maine;Slab,LLC;Nosh,LLC;GrittyMcDuff’s;andPlayItAgainSports.

2

I.BACKGROUND

[¶2] The pertinent facts are not contested and are drawn from the

summary judgment record. See Oceanic Inn, Inc. v. Sloan’s Cove, LLC,

2016ME34, ¶ 25, 133 A.3d 1021. In July 2020, the required number of

Portland voters submitted to the City of Portland a petition in support of a

direct voters’ initiative to amendPortland’sminimumwageordinance. The

initiative included a section incrementally increasing the regular minimum

wage on an annual basis and a provision (the emergency provision) that

provided for a higher minimum wage—one-and-one-half times the regular

minimumwage—whenthegovernorortheCityofPortlanddeclaresastateof

emergency. On November 3, 2020, the City of Portland held its general

municipalelection,andthevotersapprovedtheinitiative;theCityofPortland

releasedtheamendedofficialresultsonNovember6,2020.SeePortland,Me.,

Code § 33.7 (Nov. 3, 2020). The pertinent portions of the newly passed

legislationread:

(b) MinimumWagerate:

(i) Beginning on January 1, 2022, the regularMinimumWageforallEmployees, including,butnotlimitedto,ServiceEmployees,shallberaisedto$13.00perhour;

(ii) Beginning on January 1, 2023, the regularMinimum

WageforallEmployees, including,butnotlimitedto,

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ServiceEmployees,shallberaisedto$14.00perhour;and

(iii) Beginning on January 1, 2024, the regularMinimumWageforallEmployees, including,butnotlimitedto,ServiceEmployees,shallberaisedto$15.00perhour;and

(iv) OnJanuary1,2025andeachJanuary1stthereafter,the

minimumhourlywagethenineffectmustbeincreasedbytheincrease,ifany,inthecostofliving.Theincreasein the cost of living must be measured by thepercentageincrease,ifany,asofAugustofthepreviousyearoverthelevelasofAugustoftheyearprecedingthat year in the Consumer Price Index for All UrbanConsumers, CPI-U, for the Northeast Region, or itssuccessor index, as published by the United StatesDepartmentofLabor,BureauofLaborStatisticsoritssuccessor agency, with the amount of the minimumwageincreaseroundedtothenearestmultipleof5¢.Ifthestateminimumwageestablishedby26M.R.S.§664is increased inexcessof theminimumwage ineffectunderthisordinanceisincreasedtothesameamount,effectiveonthesamedateastheincreaseinthestateminimumwage,andmustbeincreasedinaccordancewiththisordinancethereafter.

....

(g) Effect of Emergency Proclamation. For work performed duringadeclaredemergency, theeffectiveMinimumWage rateestablishedbythisordinanceshallbecalculatedas1.5 timestheregularminimumwagerateundersubsection(b) above. A declared emergency under this ordinance shall includetheperiodoftimeduringwhich:

(i) A proclamation issued pursuant to Chapter 2,

Sec.2-406,ofthiscodedeclaresanemergencytoexist,

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if such emergency proclamation is geographicallyapplicabletotheEmployee’sworkplace;or

(ii) Aproclamation issuedpursuant to37-BM.R.S. §742

declares an emergency to exist, if such emergencyproclamation is geographically applicable to theEmployee’sworkplace.

Adeclaredemergencyunderthisordinanceshallnotapplytoworkperformed under a teleworking arrangement, as defined under5U.S.C.§6501,allowingtheEmployeetoworkfromhome.

Id.§33.7(b),(g).

[¶3] The City of Portland announced that it would not enforce the

emergencyprovisionuntilJanuary1,2022.OnDecember1,2020,theplaintiffs,

allemployerswithemployeesinPortland,filedacomplaintseekingdeclaratory

reliefagainsttheCityofPortlandandJonJennings,inhisofficialcapacityasCity

ManagerofPortland(collectively,theCity). Theyassertedthattheinitiative

wasinvalidundertheMaineConstitutionandthePortlandCityCodeandthat,

if it was valid, it would not take effect until January 1, 2022. Horton and

Roberge-Reyes,employeesattheWholeFoodsstoreinPortland,weregranted

intervenor status as defendants and cross-plaintiffs; they filed a cross-claim

seeking declaratory relief establishing the effective date of the emergency

provision as December 6, 2020, and injunctive relief compelling the City to

enforceit.

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[¶4]TheChambermovedforsummaryjudgmentonitscomplaint.The

SuperiorCourt concluded that the emergencyprovisionwas validly enacted

pursuanttotheMaineConstitutionandthePortlandCityCode.Itdetermined

thatthehomeruleprovisionintheConstitution, inconjunctionwithstatute,

grantedmunicipalitiesgreaterlegislativeauthorityandthereforeexpandedthe

scopeofdirectinitiatives.Accordingly,itgrantedsummaryjudgmentagainst

the Chamber on its validity claims. The court then determined that the

language of the emergency provision was unambiguous and established an

effectivedateofJanuary1,2022.ItdismissedIntervenors’cross-claims.

[¶5]TheChambertimelyappealedfromthejudgmentdeclaringthatthe

emergencyprovisionwasvalid, and Intervenors timely cross-appealed from

the determination that the emergency provision becomes effective on

January1,2022.See14M.R.S.§1851(2021);M.R.App.P.2B(c)(1).Wegranted

expeditedconsiderationofthisappeal.

II.DISCUSSION

A. Validity

[¶6]TheChamberarguesthattheemergencyprovisionwasnotvalidly

enactedundertheMaineConstitutionandthePortlandCityCodebecausethe

initiativeisnotlimitedtoexclusivelymunicipalaffairs.Itassertsthatthehome

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ruleprovisionoftheConstitutionisirrelevantbecauseitgivesgreaterpower

tomunicipalitiesaspoliticalsubdivisionsoftheStatebutdoesnotexpandthe

scopeofdirectvoters’initiatives.TheCitydefendsthevalidityoftheinitiative.

1. TheMaineConstitution

[¶7]Onappealfromasummaryjudgmentdecision,“wereviewdenovo

thetrialcourt’sinterpretationandapplicationoftherelevantstatutesandlegal

concepts.”Belangerv.Yorke,2020ME24,¶13,226A.3d215(quotationmarks

omitted).Wereviewconstitutionalinterpretationissuesdenovo.Bouchardv.

Dep’tofPub.Safety,2015ME50,¶8,115A.3d92.“Constitutionalprovisions

areaccordedaliberalinterpretationinordertocarryouttheirbroadpurpose,

becausetheyareexpectedto lastovertimeandarecumbersometoamend.”

Allenv.Quinn,459A.2d1098,1102(Me.1983).“[T]heconstitutionalvalidity

of a citizen initiative is evaluated under the ordinary rules of statutory

construction.” League ofWomen Voters v. Sec’y of State, 683A.2d 769, 771

(Me.1996). Accordingly, such laws “carr[y] a heavy presumption of

constitutionality.”Id.

[¶8] Last year we reiterated the purpose and breadth of the direct

initiativepower:

Thebroadpurposeofthedirectinitiativeistheencouragementofparticipatory democracy. By [Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18] the

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people, as sovereign, have retaken unto themselves legislativepower, and that constitutional provision must be liberallyconstrued to facilitate, rather than to handicap, the people’sexerciseoftheirsovereignpowertolegislate.Section18cannotbesaidmerelytopermitthedirectinitiativeoflegislationuponcertainconditions.Rather,itreservestothepeopletherighttolegislatebydirectinitiativeiftheconstitutionalconditionsaresatisfied.

Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Sec’y of State, 2020ME 109, ¶ 15, 237 A.3d 882

(alterations and quotation marks omitted); see League of Women Voters,

683A.2dat771;seealsoOpinionoftheJustices,275A.2d800,803(Me.1971).

[¶9] Webeginwith somehistorical context for this case. Effective in

1909,theMaineConstitutionwasamendedtoshiftsomelegislativepowerfrom

theLegislaturetothepeople.SeeFarrisv.Goss,143Me.227,230,60A.2d908

(1948); Const. Res. 1907, ch. 121, approved in 1908. Pursuant to the

amendment, a sufficient number of citizens may directly propose a law by

petitiontotheLegislature,andifitisnotenacted,theLegislaturemustsubmit

thelawtothepeople. Me.Const.art. IV,pt.3,§18. TheMaineConstitution

further provides that this power of direct initiativemay be extended to the

votersofmunicipalities:

Thecitycouncilofanycitymayestablishthedirectinitiativeandpeople’svetofortheelectorsofsuchcityinregardtoitsmunicipalaffairs,providedthattheordinanceestablishingandprovidingthemethodofexercisingsuchdirectinitiativeandpeople’svetoshallnottakeeffectuntilratifiedbyvoteofamajorityoftheelectorsofsaid city, voting thereon at a municipal election. Provided,

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however,thattheLegislaturemayatanytimeprovideauniformmethod for the exercise of the initiative and referendum inmunicipalaffairs.

Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§21.

[¶10] Pursuant to this authority, the Portland City Council enacted a

direct initiative ordinance in 1950. See Portland, Me., Code § 9-36

(May7,1991);seealsoLaFleurv.Frost,146Me.270,272,80A.2d407(1951)

(discussing the passage of the ordinance in 1950). In relevant part, the

ordinanceprovidesthatvotersmaypetitionthecitycounciltosubmittoavote

“anyproposedordinancedealingwithlegislativemattersonmunicipalaffairs.”

Portland,Me.,Code§9-36(a).

[¶11]In1969,theMaineConstitutionwasamendedtoaddthehomerule

provision:“Theinhabitantsofanymunicipalityshallhavethepowertoalter

and amend their charters on all matters, not prohibited by Constitution or

generallaw,whicharelocalandmunicipalincharacter.TheLegislatureshall

prescribetheprocedurebywhichthemunicipalitymaysoact.”Me.Const.art.

VIII,pt.2,§1;seeConst.Res.1969,ch.29,passed in1969. Thisauthority is

manifestedinstatute:“Anymunicipality,bytheadoption,amendmentorrepeal

of ordinances or bylaws, may exercise any power or function which the

Legislaturehaspowertoconferuponit,whichisnotdeniedeitherexpresslyor

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by clear implication, and exercise any power or function granted to the

municipalitybytheConstitutionofMaine,generallaworcharter.”30-AM.R.S.

§3001(2021).2

[¶12] Turning now to this case, we examine two cases that were

discussedatlengthinargumentsandintheSuperiorCourt’sorder:Burkettv.

Youngs, 135 Me. 459, 199 A. 619 (1938), and Albert v. Town of Fairfield,

597A.2d1353(Me.1991).InBurkett,weconcludedthataresolvepassedby

theBangorCityCounciladdressingappropriationsforschoolfundingwasnot

subjecttoreferendumbecausesomeoftheappropriationswererequiredby

state law, and thus the resolve was not a local affair. 135 Me. at 461-67,

199A.619. InAlbert,we concluded that amunicipal referendumwas valid

whereFairfieldvotersrejectedtheTownCouncil’sdecisiontoacceptastreet

asatownway.597A.2dat1354-55.

[¶13] Bothcasesaredistinguishablefromthefactsandcircumstances

presented in thematterpendingbeforeus. Burkettwasdecidedbefore the

home rule provision was added to Maine’s constitution in 1969, and

furthermore,inthatcase,adirectandpatentconflictexistedbetweenastate

2Title30-AM.R.S.§3001(2021),thecurrentmunicipalhomerulestatute,wasoriginallycodified

at30M.R.S.A. §1917 (Supp.1970); theoriginal statutewas repealedand replaced in1987. SeeP.L.1969, ch. 563 (effectiveMay 9, 1970); P.L. 1987, ch. 737, §§ 2, 106 (effectiveMar. 1, 1989)(codifiedassubsequentlyamendedat30-AM.R.S.§3001).

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fundingmandateandthevoters’initiative,thustakingtheinitiativeoutsidethe

purviewof themunicipal direct initiative authority. See 135Me. at 463-66,

199A.619;Const.Res.1969,ch.29,passedin1969.Albertisdistinguishable

because, in that case, the Legislature had, by statute, expressly granted the

discretionarypowertoacceptatownwaytoamunicipality.597A.2dat1355.

Althoughbothcasesarehelpful,neitherestablishedbright-line,authoritative

criteria as amatter of precedent, andneither controls this case. SeeAlbert,

597A.2dat1354-55;Burkett,135Me.at463-67,199A.619.

[¶14] We disagree with the Chamber’s assertion that the home rule

provision is irrelevant to this case. Both thehomeruleanddirect initiative

provisionsarepartofthestructurethatgrantsauthoritytomunicipalitiesand

voterstolegislatewithrespecttomunicipalaffairs.SeeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,

§21;id.art.VIII,pt.2,§1.TheCityfirstgavelegislativeauthoritytothevoters

byenactingitsdirectinitiativeordinance.Portland,Me.,Code§9-36.Afterthe

Cityenactedthatordinance,theStateimbuedmunicipalitieswithmorepowers

by virtue of the home rule provisions. SeeMe. Const. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1;

30-AM.R.S.§3001.Thebroadsweepofthehomeruleprovisiongrantingthe

powerof “[t]he inhabitantsofanymunicipality . . . toalterandamend their

chartersonallmatters,notprohibitedbyConstitutionorgenerallaw”sweeps

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inthepreexistingrightofvoters’directinitiatives.SeeMe.Const.art.VIII,pt.2,

§1.Accordingly,therightsofmunicipalitiestolegislatepursuanttothehome

rule provisions are coextensive with the rights of the voters under direct

initiatives.

[¶15] TheChambercorrectlypointsout that thehomeruleprovision

providesauthoritytomunicipalitiesaspoliticalsubdivisionsoftheState.See

Me.Const.art.VIII,pt.2,§1;30-AM.R.S.§3001.And,indeed,astheChamber

argues,individualelectorsarenotpoliticalsubdivisions.Aswehaveexplained,

however, it is the relationship between the home rule and direct initiative

provisions thatgiveselectors theauthority to legislate in this instance. The

homeruleprovisionof theMaineConstitutiongrants legislativeauthorityto

municipalitieswithrespecttomunicipalaffairs.SeeMe.Const.art.VIII,pt.2,

§1.Priortotheenactmentofthehomeruleprovision,municipalitieshadthe

preexisting constitutional authority to empower their voters to legislate by

directinitiative.SeeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§21.Ourdecisiontodaydoesnot

purporttocharacterizeindividualsaspoliticalsubdivisions.Buttheyneednot

be inordertoexercisetheir legislativeauthorityasestablishedintheMaine

Constitution.

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[¶16]Thehomeruleprovisionexpresslylimitswhatmunicipalitiesmay

legislateconcerningtomatters“notprohibitedbyConstitutionorgenerallaw.”

Me.Const.art.VIII,pt.2,§1.IninstanceswheretheLegislaturehasspecifically

providedthatparticularsubjectmattersarethesoleprovinceoftheState,they

arethenclearlyoutsidethescopeofthehomeruleprovisionbecausetheyare

“prohibitedbyConstitutionorgenerallaw.”Id.Theremayalsobeinstances,

however, where the Legislature has impliedly occupied the field in specific

subject areas. See30-AM.R.S. § 3001. Given their fact-specific nature, such

instancesmustbeevaluatedonacase-by-casebasisbyexaminingthelanguage

oftheordinanceandanystatutesenactedbytheLegislature.

[¶17] Theconstitutionalgrant toelectorsof thepower to legislateby

direct initiative and by people’s veto uses the language “in regard to its

municipalaffairs”tolimitthescopeofthesubjectmatterofadirectinitiative,

Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§21,butthislanguagedoesnotprohibitvotersfrom

enacting a direct initiative to increase minimum wages beyond that set by

statute. The local minimum wage is among the issues encompassed by

municipal legislative authority because that authority has not been denied

expresslyorimplicitlybytheConstitutionorgenerallaw.SeeMe.Const.art.

VIII, pt. 2, § 1; 30-A M.R.S. §3001; 26 M.R.S. §664 (2021) (establishing

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statewideminimumwage). Indeed,thePortlandCityCodepresentlyreflects

thisunderstanding.SeePortland,Me.,Code§33.1(Jan.1,2016)(“[T]opromote

thehealth,safetyandwelfareofitscitizensandpursuanttoandconsistentwith

26 M.R.S. §664, the City Council of the City of Portland, Maine hereby

establishesthefollowingminimumwageordinanceapplicabletoallEmployers

andEmployeeswithintheCityofPortland.”).

[¶18] Thefactthatanordinancethat isotherwisedirectedtomatters

within the geographical confines of themunicipalitymay affect nonresident

individualsorentitieswhohaveemploymentorbusinessinterestswithinthe

municipality does not mean that it loses its characterization as “local and

municipal.” The key inquiry is whether the ordinance provision is

fundamentallylocalorstatewideinitsscope.SeeMe.Const.art.VIII,pt.2,§1;

30-AM.R.S.§3001;Sch.Comm.ofTownofYorkv.TownofYork,626A.2d935,

939(Me.1993). Weconclude that the initiativeat issuewith itsemergency

multiplier provision, found in Portland City Code § 33.7(g), falls into the

categoryoflocalormunicipalaffairsandwasvalidlyenactedpursuanttothe

MaineConstitution.

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2. PortlandCityCode

[¶19] We review “legal issues concerning the interpretation of the

[Portland]CityCode...denovoforerrorsoflaw.”FriendsofCong.SquarePark

v.CityofPortland,2014ME63,¶7,91A.3d601.PursuanttotheCityCode,

Portlandvotersmaypetitionthecitycounciltosubmittoavote“anyproposed

ordinancedealingwithlegislativemattersonmunicipalaffairs.”Portland,Me.,

Code§9-36(a).

[¶20]AswiththeChamber’sconstitutionalargument,itsargumentthat

theemergencyprovisiondoesnotrelateto“municipalaffairs”asprovidedin

the Portland City Code fails. Although Portland’s original direct initiative

ordinancewasadoptedbeforethehomeruleprovisions,seeLaFleur,146Me.

at272,80A.2d407;Const.Res.1969,ch.29,passedin1969,themeaningand

scopeof“municipalaffairs”intheordinancehasevolvedalongsidetherelated

law,includingtheadoptionofthehomeruleprovision.See,e.g.,Me.Const.art.

VIII, pt. 2, § 1; 30-AM.R.S. §3001;Sch. Comm. of Townof York, 626A.2d at

938-39. As we have explained with respect to the Maine Constitution, the

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emergencyprovisionhererelatestomunicipalaffairs. Therefore, it likewise

doesnotrunafoulofPortland’sdirectinitiativeordinance.3

[¶21] Moreover, theordinance that empowersPortlandelectorswith

directinitiativeauthorityisapredominantlyproceduralprovision;itexplains

how a petition for a direct initiative is to be filed.4 See Portland, Me.,

3 ChamberofCommerceasserted in theSuperiorCourt that theemergencyprovisiondidnot

relate to“legislativematters”assetout inPortland’sCityCode,seePortland,Me.,Code§9-36(a)(May7,1991),butithasabandonedthatargumentonappeal.4ThetextofPortlandCityCode§9-36reads: Sec.9-36.Howinvoked. (a) Ingeneral.Thesubmissiontothevoteofthepeopleofanyproposed

ordinance dealing with legislative matters on municipal affairs or of any such ordinanceenactedbythecitycouncilandwhichhasnotyetgoneintoeffect,maybe accomplished by the presentation of a petition therefor to the city council in the manner hereinafter provided and signed by at least one thousand five hundred (1,500)voters.Thesubmissionofaproposedordinance,oramendmentorrepeal,in wholeorinpart,ofanordinancealreadyineffectshallbehereinafterreferredtoas the direct initiation of legislation or “initiative.” The submission of a petition to overrideanyordinancepassedbythecitycouncilbutwhichhasnotyetgoneinto effectshallbehereinafterreferredtoasthe“people’sveto.” (b) Applicability. Neither this article, nor ordinances dealing with

appropriations,taxlevy,orwithwagesorhoursofcityemployeesshallbesubjectto theinitiativeand“people’sveto”referendumprovisionshereinestablished. (c) Petitionprocedure.Anyten(10)registeredvotersofthecitymayfile

withthecityclerkanaffidavitstating:

(1) That the ten (10) registered voters will constitute the petitioners’ committee;

(2) Thenamesandaddressesoftheten(10)registeredvoters;

(3) Theaddresstowhichallnoticestothecommitteearetobesent;and

(4) Thattheten(10)registeredvoterswillcirculatethepetitionandfile itinproperform.

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Uponfilingofsaidaffidavitbyten(10)suchvoters,thecityclerkshallhaveseven(7)

calendardaystopreparetheproperpetitionformspursuanttosection9-37below witha copyof the submittedordinanceeitherprintedon thepetitionorattached theretoandshallprovidesuchpetitiontomembersofthepetitioners’committeeand toanyotherregisteredcityvoterwhowishes to circulate it. The petition may be circulatedforsignaturebyregisteredvotersofthecityforeighty(80)calendardays fromtheoriginaldateof issuanceofthepetition,whichdateshallbenotedbythe clerkoneachblankform;provided,however,thatanypetitionforthe“people’sveto” ofanordinancenotineffectmustbefiledwiththecityclerkpriortotheeffectivedate ofsaidordinanceorwithinthirty(30)calendardaysafterpassagebythecitycouncil, whicheverisless.Any“people’sveto”petitionnotsofiledisvoid.Allprovisionsas tothefilingandtheformofpetitionsinthisarticle,otherthantheaforementioned timeframe,shallapplytobothinitiativeand“people’sveto”petitions. (d) Filingofpetition.Thepetitionmustbereturnedtothecityclerkfor

filingbycloseofbusinesswithineighty(80)calendardaysfromthedateofissuance thereof. IftheeightiethdayisaSaturday,Sundayorholiday,saidpetitionshallbe filedbythecloseofbusinessofthenextimmediatebusinessday.Allpetitionforms not so submitted are void. The petition forms shall be assembled as one (1) instrument, with each page numbered, attached to a written statement from the petitioners’committeestatingthenumberofpetition formsbeing filed. Theclerk shallcertifythedateoffilingandthenumberofformsreturned. (e) Verificationofpetition.

(1) Withinfifteen(15)calendardaysafterthepetitionisfiled,theclerk shall complete a certificate as to its sufficiency, specifying, if it is insufficient,theparticularswhichrenderitdefective.Theclerkshall promptlysendacopyofthecertificatetothepetitioners’committee bycertifiedmail,returnreceiptrequested,orbyhand-delivery,and shallfileacopywiththecitycouncil.

(2) A petition certified insufficient may be amended once, if the petitioners’committeefilesawrittennoticeofintentiontoamendit withtheclerkwithineight(8)calendardaysaftermailingbycertified mail, return receipt requested, or hand-delivery of the copy of the clerk’scertificate.Withinten(10)calendardaysafterthisnoticeof intentionisfiled,thepetitioners’committeemayfileasupplementary petitiontocorrecttechnicaldeficienciesintheoriginalwhichshall,in form and content, comply with the requirements for an original petitionbutwhichshallnotcontainadditionalsignaturesofvoters.

(3) Withinfive(5)calendardaysafterasupplementarypetitionisfiled, theclerkshallcompleteandfileacertificateastoitssufficiencyinthe mannerprovidedforinanoriginalpetition.

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Code§9-36. Subsection a imbues voters with legislative authority, and

subsectionsc through faddresshowadirect initiativemaybeachieved. Id.

§9-36(a),(c)-(f).Theremainingsubsectionspecificallyexcludesmattersthat

are not subject to direct initiative. Id. § 9-36(b). Consequently, the direct

initiativeordinance—exceptwithrespect tosubsectionb—merely facilitates

thesubstantivelawthatexistsandthatmayevolveseparateandapartfromthe

procedure.Insum,thetopicsonwhichmunicipalitieshavetheprerogativeto

legislatehaveevolved,andtheproceduresestablishedbyPortlandCityCode

§9-36arenotlimitedtothetopicsexistingatthetimeofitspromulgation.

(4) Anypetitionfinallydeterminedtobe insufficient isvoid. Theclerk shall stamp the petition void and seal and retain it in themanner requiredforsecretballots.

(5) Theclerk’sdecisionastothesufficiencyofthepetitionsshallbeafinal determination,reviewableasprovidedbylaw.

(f) Hearing. At its firstregularmeetingafterreceiptofareport thata

petition is sufficient and has at least one thousand five hundred (1,500) valid signaturesoftheregisteredvotersofthecity,thecitycouncilshallsetadateforpublic hearing, which hearing shall be held within thirty (30) calendar days thereafter. Noticeofthehearingshallbepublishedinanewspaperhavinggeneralcirculationin thecityatleastten(10)calendardayspriortothehearingandshallcontainthetext ofthepetition.Asprovidedbysection9-39,thecitycouncilshalltakethenecessary steps to submit to the voters of the city the ordinance proposed in the petition; providedthat,inthecaseofthe“people’sveto”referendum,theentirerepealbythe citycounciloftheordinancesoughttobereferredand,inthecaseoftheinitiative,the passagebythecitycouncilofthedesiredordinanceshallputanendtoallproceedings underthepetition.

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B. EffectiveDate

[¶22]Havingconcludedthattheemergencyprovisionintheinitiativeis

valid,wemust also determine its effective date. Intervenors argue that the

effectivedatefornewordinancesestablishedbyordinance,seePortland,Me.,

Code § 9-42 (May7,1991), thirty days from the date of the official results,

appliestotheemergencyprovision,makingtheeffectivedatefallinDecember

2020.Alternatively,theyassertthatifthelanguageisambiguous,thenitshould

be read to establish a December 2020 effective date to comport with the

understandingandexpectationsofthepartiesandvoters.Theyalsoarguethat

weshouldconsider theballotquestiontoconstruetheplain languageof the

emergency provision. The Chamber and the City contend that the plain

language of the emergency provision establishes an effective date of

January1,2022.

[¶23] “Interpretationof [an] [o]rdinance is aquestionof law thatwe

reviewdenovo.” Fitanidesv.CityofSaco,2015ME32,¶13,113A.3d1088.

“Wefirstdetermineifthelanguageoftheordinanceisplainandunambiguous.”

Olsonv.TownofYarmouth,2018ME27,¶16,179A.3d920.Weinterpretthe

ordinanceaccordingly,“unlesstheresultisillogicalorabsurd.”Wawenock,LLC

v.Dep’tofTransp.,2018ME83,¶7,187A.3d609(quotationmarksomitted).

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Languageisambiguouswhenit“canreasonablybeinterpretedinmorethan

oneway.”Id.(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶24] We construe words in an ordinance according to their plain

meaningand“construeundefinedorambiguoustermsreasonablywithregard

toboththeobjectssoughttobeobtainedandtothegeneralstructureofthe

ordinanceasawhole.”Fitanides,2015ME32,¶13,113A.3d1088(quotation

marksomitted).Weseek“togiveeffecttolegislativeintent,andifthemeaning

ofthe[ordinance]isclearonitsface,thenweneednotlookbeyondthewords

themselves.”JadeRealtyCorp.v.TownofEliot,2008ME80,¶7,946A.2d408

(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶25]Here,thelanguageoftheemergencyprovisionisunambiguouson

its face and therefore we need not go beyond the text. See Fitanides,

2015ME32, ¶ 13, 113 A.3d 1088; Jade Realty Corp., 2008 ME 80, ¶ 7,

946A.2d408. The emergency provision in Portland City Code § 33.7(g)

provides the timing of the minimum wage increases by cross-reference to

subsectionb:“theeffectiveMinimumWagerateestablishedbythisordinance

shall be calculated as 1.5 times the regular minimum wage rate under

subsection(b)above.”Subsectionbisfurtherdividedintofoursubsections,the

firstofwhichstates,“BeginningonJanuary1,2022,theregularMinimumWage

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forallEmployees...shallberaisedto$13.00perhour.”Id.§33.7(b)(i).Each

subsequentsubsectionbeginswith the followingyearandraises theregular

minimumwageby$1.00perhour,withanincreasebasedonthecostofliving

aftera$15.00minimumwageisreached.Id.§33.7(b)(ii)-(iv).

[¶26]Thenewlypassedlegislationdoesnotexplicitlystateaneffective

date fortheemergencyprovision. See id.§33.7. Nevertheless, theordinary

meaningofthetextestablishesthatthenewminimumwageratecomesinto

effect on January 1, 2022, and increases incrementally thereafter. See id.

§33.7(b);Fitanides,2015ME32,¶13,113A.3d1088.Becausetheemergency

provision cross-references subsection b to establish the effective minimum

wagerateforcomputingtheemergencyminimumwage,thefirsteffectivedate

is established there. See Portland, Me., Code § 33.7(g). In subsection b,

subsection b(i) appears first, and the text provides that the subsection is

effective as of January 1, 2022. Id. § 33.7(b)(i). Thus, the effective date of

subsectiongisalsoJanuary1,2022. Becausetheemergencyprovisionitself

providesaneffectivedate,PortlandCityCode§9-42doesnotapply.

[¶27] We reject Intervenors’ argument that Portland City Code

§33.7(b)(iv)supportsaneffectivedatefortheimpositionofthenewminimum

wage provisions in December 2020. That subsection begins: “On

21

January1,2025 and each January 1st thereafter, theminimum hourlywage

thenineffectmustbeincreasedbytheincrease,ifany,inthecostofliving.”Id.

§33.7(b)(iv). It then provides that if the stateminimumwage is increased

abovethe localminimumwage ineffectundertheordinance, “theminimum

wageunderthisordinance is increasedtothesameamount,effectiveonthe

samedateastheincreaseinthestateminimumwage.”Id.Themostnatural

reading of this subsection—particularly considering the newly passed

legislation’s structure establishing annual, chronological increases, see

Fitanides,2015ME32,¶13,113A.3d1088—isthatitdoesnotprovidefora

local minimum wage beginning in December 2020, and there is no local

minimum wage until subsection b(i) comes into effect because the newly

passedlegislationrepealedthepreviouslocalminimumwage.

[¶28]Furthermore,theordinaryuseof“thereafter”inthefirstsentence

conveys that theprecedingsubsectionsmust takeeffect firstgiventhat they

appear chronologically. See Portland, Me., Code § 33.7(b)(iv). After that

sentence, subsection b(iv) provides that the state minimumwage will take

effectifitishigher.Seeid.Thisschedulemostnaturallymeansthatsubsection

b(iv)isnotyetineffect,andtherefore,itcannotbethesourceofaneffective

datebeforethefirsteffectivedateofJanuary1,2022,insubsectionb(i). See

22

Fitanides,2015ME32,¶13,113A.3d1088.Thisresultisneitherillogicalnor

absurd,seeWawenock,LLC,2018ME83,¶7,187A.3d609,becausethereare

valid reasons for delaying application of the emergency provision.5

NotwithstandingIntervenors’insistencethatweconsidertheballotquestionin

interpreting theordinance,wedonotexamineanyextrinsicevidence in the

absenceof textualambiguity, and there isno suchambiguityhere. See Jade

Realty Corp., 2008 ME 80, ¶ 7, 946 A.2d 408. Accordingly, the emergency

provisioniseffectiveasofthedatesetinPortlandCityCode§33.7(b)(i),which

isJanuary1,2022.

Theentryis:

Judgmentaffirmed. JohnJ.Aromando,Esq.(orally),JamesR.Erwin,Esq.,JoshuaD.Dunlap,Esq.,andSara A. Murphy, Esq., Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, for appellants PortlandRegional Chamber of Commerce; Alliance for Addiction and Mental HealthServices,Maine;Slab,LLC;Nosh,LLC;GrittyMcDuff’s;andPlayItAgainSportsShelbyH.Leighton,Esq.(orally),ValerieZ.Wicks,Esq.,andDavidG.Webbert,Esq., Johnson, Webbert & Garvan, LLP, Augusta, for cross-appellants CalebHortonandMarioRoberge-ReyesDawnM.Harmon,Esq.,andJasonCaron,Esq.(orally),PerkinsThompson,P.A.,Portland,forappelleesCityofPortlandandJonJennings

5Forexample,Portland’sminimumwagechapterprovidesasoneofitspurposesthat“phasingin

thewageincreaseovertimewillallowbusinessestoadjustandresultinreasonableannualincreasesinexpenses.”Portland,Me.,Code§33.1(Jan.1,2016).

23

Kasia S. Park, Esq., Jeana M. McCormick, Esq., and Sara P. Cressey, Esq.,Drummond Woodsum, Portland, for amicus curiae Maine Association forCommunityServiceProvidersBenjaminK.Grant,Esq.,McTeagueHigbee,Topsham, foramici curiaeMaineAFL-CIO, Maine Center for Economic Policy, The Proper Cup, Maine StateBuilding & Construction Trades Council, Southern Maine Workers’ Center,PeopleFirstPortland,MaineSmallBusinessCoalition,andPortlandHuntandAlpineClubJohn R. Brautigam, Esq., John R. Brautigam, Esq., LLC, Falmouth; BenjaminGaines,Esq.,GainesLaw,LLC,Portland;andZacharyL.Heiden,Esq.,andEmmaE.Bond,Esq.,AmericanCivilLibertiesUnionofMaineFoundation,Portland,foramicicuriaeAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionofMaineFoundationandLeagueofWomenVotersofMaineGerald F. Petruccelli, Esq., Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow, LLP, Portland, foramicuscurieMaineStateChamberofCommerceCumberlandCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberCV-2020-518FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY