2017 FINAL REPORT - Ziviler Friedensdienst · UNHCR and the Civil Peace Service of GIZ, German Development Cooperation: Kigali. ... Conflict resolution mechanisms for conflicts among

Assessment of Peaceful Coexistence in Mahama Refugee Camp, Rwanda

2017 FINAL REPORT

Coverphoto:

Mahamarefugeecamphostsmorethan54,000Burundianrefugees.Buildingonstronglinksandgrowingintegrationwiththehostcommunityservices,ithasthepotentialtobeamodelsettlementthatsetsthestandardforothercampsinRwandaaswellasinothercountries.

©UNHCR/EugeneSibomana.Communication/PIAssociate.July2017.

Suggestedcitation:

Rubli,Sandra(2017).AssessmentofPeacefulCoexistenceinMahamaRefugeeCamp,Rwanda:2017FinalReport.14September2017.UNHCRandtheCivilPeaceServiceofGIZ,GermanDevelopmentCooperation:Kigali.

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ContentsAcronyms........................................................................................................................................ii

Acknowledgments..........................................................................................................................iii

Executivesummary........................................................................................................................iv

Recommendations.....................................................................................................................v

1. Backgroundoftheassessment....................................................................................................1

Methodology..............................................................................................................................2

2. Findingsonrelationships............................................................................................................3

2.1 Findingsonrelationshipsbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunities.........................................3

Spacesofinteractionbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunities...............................................3Differencesbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunities..............................................................4Differencesintreatmentofmembersofrefugeesandhostcommunities................................4Conclusionsandrecommendations...........................................................................................4

2.2 RelationshipsbetweenrefugeesandMIDIMAR,UNHCRandserviceproviders........................5

3. Findingsonpotentialconflicts....................................................................................................7

3.1 Conflictsamongrefugeesandbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunities.................................7

Partiesinvolvedinconflicts........................................................................................................7Conflictissuesfromthecountryoforigin..................................................................................7Sourcesofpotentialconflicts.....................................................................................................8

3.2 Potentialconflictissueswithorganizationsworkinginthecamp.............................................9

4. Existingconflictresolutionmechanisms....................................................................................10

4.1 Conflictresolutionmechanismsforconflictsamongrefugeesandconflictsbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunities..............................................................................................................10

Formalconflictresolutionmechanisms...................................................................................10Traditionalconflictresolutionmechanisms.............................................................................12Social,religiousorotherinformalconflictresolutionmechanisms.........................................12Somereflectionsontheadequacy,credibilityandlegitimacyofexistingconflictresolutionmechanisms.............................................................................................................................13Conclusionsandrecommendations.........................................................................................15

4.2 Conflictresolutionmechanismsforconflictbetweenrefugeesandserviceproviders...........16

Conclusionsandrecommendations.........................................................................................16

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Methodology..............................................................................................................................2














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Methodology..............................................................................................................................2














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Acronyms

ABER AssociationdesEglisesBaptistesauRwanda/AssociationofBaptist

ChurchesinRwanda

ADRA AdventistDevelopmentandReliefAgency

AHA AfricaHumanitarianAction

ARC AmericanRefugeeCommittee

CNDD-FDD ConseilNationaldelaDéfensedelaDémocratie–ForcesdeDéfensedela

Démocratie

CPS/GIZ CivilPeaceServiceofGIZ

GHDF GlobalHumanitarianDevelopmentFoundation(formerPAJER)

GIZ GermanDevelopmentCooperation

HI HumanityandInclusion(formerlyHandicapInternational)

ICRC InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross/Crescent

ID Identitycard

LAF LegalAidForum

MIDIMAR MinistryofDisasterManagementandRefugees

NFI Non-fooditems

PLAN PlanInternational

PTA ParentandTeacherAssociation

RRC RwandaRedCross

SCI SavetheChildren

SGBV Sexualandgender-basedviolence

UNHCR UNRefugeeAgency

WFP WorldFoodProgramme

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Acknowledgments

Iwouldliketoexpressmygratitudetotheparticipantsinthisassessment:theBurundianrefugeeswhocourageouslyandopenlyrespondedtoquestionsthatsometimestoucheduponsensitiveanddifficultsubjects;theRwandansfromhostcommunitieswhosharedtheirviewsonhowthemassiveinfluxofrefugeesintotheirimmediatevicinitychangedtheirlives;andthestafffromrefugeeresponseactorsandserviceproviderswhodevotedtimefromtheirworkingdays.IalsowouldliketothanktherefugeeleadersandleadersofthehostcommunitieswhoenrichedthefindingsbysharingtheirviewsduringtheTownHallMeeting.

Special thanks to the assessors – Aimable Dukuzumuremyi, Frank Furaha, Carine ColombeGirukwishaka,JeanPierreMunyeshyaka,DivinNtwari,CelestinRukeratabaro,NadiaUmuhoza,DianaUmutoni Buramba and Angel Uwera – for their invaluable participation in data collection. Theassessmentbenefittedsignificantlyfromtheirinterviewingskillsandpreviousexperience.

Inaddition, Iamgrateful toMIDIMARforgrantingaccesstotheMahamaRefugeeCamptotalk torefugees,andforsupportfromCampManagerGorethMurebwayireandtheAssistantCampManagersforfacilitatingexchangeswithvariousstakeholdersaswellasforsharingtheirknowledgeaboutthecamp.

IalsowouldliketothanktheUNHCRsub-officeinKireheforlogisticalsupportandmycolleagueswhosupportedtheassessmentfortheirinsightsandtheiravailabilitytodiscussandfollowuponquestions,findingsandadministrativeissues,inparticular,PaulKenya,MikeSandersonandAiméeNiwemfura.Iam deeply grateful for the support of colleagues at the UNHCR office in Kigali who shared theirknowledge throughout the process, in particular, Machtelt de Vriese, Florian Hoepfner, KiyonobuFutori,andMartinaPomeroy.Mythanksalsotocolleagueswhoprovidedcommentsondraftsofthisreportandtothecopyeditor,SusanGuthridge-Gould.

Finally,IwouldliketothanktheRefugeeComponentofCPS/GIZforfinancialsupport.Inparticular,IwouldliketothankMichelMuhirwaandGayaBlomforsharingtheirexperiencesfromthecampsofKigemeandMugombwa regardingpeaceful coexistenceand JeanClaudeMutimukyeyeMiheto foradministrativesupport.

Murakozecyane!

SandraRubli,InternationalPeaceAdvisorUNHCR―CPS/GIZ

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Executivesummary

ThisreportpresentsthefindingsofanassessmentregardingpeacefulcoexistenceinandaroundtheMahama refugee camp inRwanda. Theassessmentexplores variousdynamicsof the relationshipsamong refugees, between refugees and host communities, andwith organizationsworking in thecamp;italsoanalysespotentialrootsofconflictandconflictissues.Thefindingsmaybeusedtoinformefforts to increasepeaceful coexistencebetween various communities and to deliver services in aconflict-sensitive manner. The assessment identifies opportunities and connectors that can bestrengthenedaswellaschallenges,dividersandconflictissuesthatcanbeaddressed.

Relationships between the two communities – Burundian refugees and their Rwandan hostcommunities–appeartobequitegood;bothcommunitiesindicatehavingfriendsintheother,andwouldconsidermarryingapartnerfromtheothercommunity.Around80percentoftherefugeesaswellasaslightmajorityofinterviewedRwandanslivinginvillagesaroundtheMahamacampstatethattherearenogeneraldifferencesbetweenthem;insteadBurundiansandRwandansshareverysimilarcultural traditions, languageandcustoms.Mutuallysupportingeachothercanbeconsideredtobepartofthesecustoms,andmayalsostemfromapositivegeneral feelingofempathyfortheothercommunity, in part linked to the fact that many people living in Rwanda were once refugeesthemselves.

“Dividers” are potential challenges to peaceful coexistence and they are found on the level ofperceivedinequalityorunequaltreatment.Thoughgeneralizedimagesoftheothercommunityarelargely positive, occasional negative personal encounters with an individual member of the othercommunitymayoccuraroundindividualincidentssuchastheftorassault.Suchindividualeventscanresult in mistrust, a feeling of increased insecurity or even violent conflicts. Negative personalencountersareinsomecaseslinkedtoperceivedinequalitiespertainingtodifferencesinentitlementsoraccesstoservices,andcompetitionoverscarceresources.

Generally, sourcesofpotentialconflict in theMahamarefugeecampmanifest themselves in theft,includingillegalwoodcuttingortheftofcrops;conflictsaroundthedistributionoffoodandnon-fooditems(NFI);aggressivebehaviourduetodrugconsumptionorunemployment;andfamilyconflicts,including extra-marital relationships, domestic violence and intimate partner violence (IPV). Theseconflictsmayresult innegativecopingstrategiessuchassurvivalsexandprostitutionor inthreats,harassmentandbeatingsandmay lead togeneralizedmistrust and fears thatextendsbeyond theaffectedindividuals.

Severalconflictresolutionstructuresexistinthecamp,includingtheGovernmentcampmanagement,UNHCRwhichplaysacoordinatingrole,otherserviceproviders(mainlyotherUNagenciesandnon-governmental partners), the RwandanNational Police, and refugee leaders. Refugeesmay turn totheseentitiesinordertoresolveaconflictwithanotherrefugee,ahostcommunitymemberorevenwithanorganizationworkinginthecamp.However,solvingsuchconflictsisnottheprimaryroleofmostorganizations(withtheexceptionofthecampmanagementandthepolice),andtheserolesandresponsibilitiesneedtobemoreclearlydefinedandcommunicated.

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RefugeesinMahamaperceivetherelationshipsbetweenthemselvesandtheorganizationsworkinginthe campasgood; refugeesgenerally feelwell-treated in termsof kindness,being listened toandcommunication.Amajoritysaytheyareabletogivefeedbackandprovidesuggestions.Conflictissuesrelated to refugee response actors concern perceptions of quality of services, denial of services,unequal treatment when receiving services or an insufficient quantity of services. Thus, with theexceptionofthequantityofavailableservices,themainconflictissuesarelinkedtothemodalitiesofservicedelivery.

Recommendations

ThefollowingrecommendationsareinformedbytheassumptionthatBurundianrefugeesmostlikelywillnotbeabletosafelyandvoluntarilyreturntotheircountryoforigininthenearfutureduetotheprevailing situation of insecurity, as well as by the premise of a long-term strategy of seeking“alternativestocamps”.1

Generalrecommendations

• Avoid the creation of parallel structures i.e. structures established either only forRwandans, or only for refugees. Emphasis should beplacedon integrationof services,facilities, structures, etc. for both refugees and host communities, including aligningservicesinthecampwithalready-existingRwandanstructuressuchtheAbunzimediatorsat the local administration level in Rwanda, which is similar to the Bashingantahe inBurundi.

• All interventions and projects should empower and engage refugees and hostcommunitiestobeactiveparticipantsinpromotingpeace,inlivingtheirliveswithmoreindependence and dignity, and with a view to decrease dependency over time onhumanitariananddevelopmentorganizations.

Strengthenrelationshipsbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunities

• Allprojectsoractivities, suchas reforestationandcommunityworks includingmonthly“umuganda” (mandatory community service) should whenever possible systematicallytarget and include both refugees and host communities together, in order to increaseopportunitiestomeetmembersfromtheothercommunity,promotepositiveencountersandenhancemutualsupport,andencouragelinksandasenseofcommunityfortheentirepopulationoftherefugeehostingarea.

• Joint awareness-raising or educational activities outside or inside the camp or jointexchange and learning processes (based on the positive perceptions on diversity) canincreaseinteractionsandeventuallyresultinmoretrustandempathy,inparticularifsuchactivitiescontainelementsofpeaceeducation.

1UNHCRbelievesthatcampsshouldbetheexceptionandonlyatemporarymeasureinresponsetoforceddisplacement.Thepossiblealternativesarediverseandaffectedbyfactorssuchasculture,legislationandnationalpolicies.Refugeesmightrent,ownoroccupyinformallylandandhousing,ortheymayhaveprivatehousingarrangements.SeetheUNHCRPolicyonAlternativestoCamps(22July2014).

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• Planning should consider the implementation of a long-term strategy that includes atransformationofexistingcampsintomixedvillagesorsettlements,andanintegrationofrefugeesandhostcommunitiesusingthesameservices.Inthelongrun,therefugeecampshouldbecomemoreaccessible(e.g.throughmarkets,jointactivities,useoffacilitiesinthe camp, etc.) for Rwandans living in the surrounding villages. Host populations arealready proven2to benefit from the presence of a refugee camp in their immediateneighborhood through, for example, increased business opportunities and improvedinfrastructure.Aspartofthelong-termstrategy,makeallservices(insideandoutsidethecamp)accessibleforall–withoutdistinguishingbetweenmembersoftherefugeesandhost communities. This includes access to schools, markets, health services, healthinsurance(MutuelledeSanté)anddocumentsandcertificatessuchasIDcards—buildingonintegrationstepsalreadytakeninlinewiththeGovernmentofRwandaCommitmentsmade at the 2016 Leaders‘ Summit on Refugees convened by U.S. President BarackObama.3Moreintegratedandequalaccesstoservicescanalleviateperceivedinequalitiesandunequaltreatmentandpromoteandfosterpeacefulcoexistence.

• In linewith the2030DevelopmentAgendaandprincipleofbridging thehumanitarian-development divide, projects should target refugee hosting areas, rather than specificprojects targeting either the camp, or the surrounding villages. Refugee hosting areasshouldbetargetedtoensurethatallpeopleintheareabenefitfromservicesinamoreequalmannerinordertoimprovelivelihoodconditionsforall.Waterprovisiontothehostcommunitiesisanexamplethatcanbeextendedtootherservicessuchaselectricityorother sources of energy (e.g. firewood and solar lamps); roads and transport systems;productionoffood(e.g.seeds,farmingtoolsandfertilizers);andsports,socialandculturalfacilities for youth. And complementarily, projects designed to ensure basic life-savingservices to refugees, such as water treatment and distribution systems, can throughpartnershipwithdevelopmentactorsbeextendedtothevicinityhostcommunity.

Addresspotentialconflictsamongrefugeesandbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunities

• Investintrust-buildingandaccompaniedexchangesbetweendifferentgroupstoalleviatefeelings of insecurity, increase trust between different groups and eventually enhancepeacefulcoexistence.Groupsmayincluderefugeesfromdifferentregionsororigins,youthandotherrefugees,refugeesandmembersofhostcommunities.

2Economicimpactofrefugees,J.EdwardTaylor,MateuszJ.Filipski,MohamadAlloush,AnubhabGupta,RubenIrvinRojasValdes,andErnestoGonzalez-Estrada,PNASJuly5,2016.113(27)7449-7453;publishedaheadofprintJune20,2016.https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1604566113,EditedbyPrabhuL.Pingali,CornellUniversity,Ithaca,NY,andapprovedMay12,2016(receivedforreviewMarch18,2016),summaryavailableathttp://www.pnas.org/content/113/27/7449.SeealsoConsideringthebenefitsofhostingrefugees:EvidenceofrefugeecampsinfluencinglocallabormarketactivityandeconomicwelfareinRwanda,CraigLoschmann,ÖzgeBilgilib&MelissaSiegela,MaastrichtGraduateSchoolofGovernance|UNU-MERIT,MaastrichtUniversityUtrechtUniversity,summaryavailableathttps://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/LOSCHMANN%20et%20al_paper.pdf.3See“CommitmentsofRwandaattheLeaders’SummitonRefugees”availableathttp://www.unhcr.org/rw/12219-commitments-rwanda-leaders-summit-refugees.html.

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• Buildcapacitiesforpeacefulconflicttransformation.Developskillsaroundmediationandfacilitation, non-violent communication, alternatives to violence, peace education andconflict-sensitivejournalismandincreaseleadershipskills.Thisallowspeopletoaddressminor(interpersonal)conflictsduringtheirstayinthecamp,butequallyimportantlywillbeextremelybeneficialwhenrefugeesreturntoBurundioneday,wheretheycouldapplytheir skills and continue to be “peace agents” or “peace ambassadors” as they arerebuildingtheirhomecountry.4

• Setupregular(andinstitutionalized)forainordertodirectlydiscussconflictissuesandtofind common and consensual solutions. This may include dialogues between actorsinvolved in provision of security and solving conflicts, peace clubs and other peaceeducationopportunities.Suchforashouldbesuretoincludeperceiveddrugabusersandothersviewedas“troublemakers”.

• Establish a camp mediation structure modeled on the Abunzi (Rwandan) andBashingantahe(Burundian)structures.Itislikelythatmanyconflictissuesinthecampandwithhostcommunitiescanberesolvedthroughmediatoryapproaches.5Thiswouldalsodiminishthecaseloadofthepoliceorburdenonotherorganizationsworkinginthecampwhicharenotalwaysbestplacedtoresolveconflictissueswhicharise.

• Tosupportamediationstructure,conductathoroughconflict-sensitivityordo-no-harmanalysis.Also,conductoutreachmeasurestoraiseawarenessandensurethatrefugeesconsidermediatorsascredible, legitimateandaccessible(inparticular forpersonswithspecialneeds)andwilleventuallyturntothemtoresolveconflicts.

• Definetherolesandresponsibilitiesofexistingandnewly-establishedconflictresolutionactors.Thiswillhelptoavoidconfusionandpotential roleconflictsbetweenmediatorsandrefugeeleaders.Embedtheserolesinanoverallconflictresolutionsystemthatwillclarifythehierarchicalrelationstothepoliceandcourts.Createareferralsystemlinkingdifferentconflictissuestoappropriatestructures,e.g.buildingoncommunitymobilizersandtheLegalAidForum(LAF)whichissupportingintherefugeeresponsetoensurelegalassistanceandaccesstojustice.

Recommendationsregardingserviceprovision

• Developcommunityradio,campmagazinesandotherexistingcommunicationschannelsto facilitate provision of information on complex topics such as promotion of peaceeducation–notonly forannouncementsonthedateof fooddistribution, forexample.Include communitymobilizers from various organizations and refugees engaged in theparticular fields of interests such as journalists, nurses and doctors, businessentrepreneursandteachers.Recognizeandstrengthenexistingcapacitiesandknowledge.

4Theterm“peaceambassador”isusedintheKigemerefugeecamptodescribepersonswhodevelopandshareconflictresolutionskills.5Domesticviolence,intimatepartnerviolence,andsexualandgender-basedviolenceandothercrimesarenotaddressedthroughmediation.

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• Ensurethatstaffoforganizationsworkinginthecamp,employedrefugeesandcontractedcompaniesstrictlyrespectthecodesofconduct inordertoavoidconflicts linkedtothemodalitiesofdeliveringservices.Thisincludesensuringthatthereareadequatemeasuresforrefugeestocomplainandprovidefeedback,trainingregularlyandbroadlyoncodeofconduct and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, accountability to affectedpopulations,anti-fraudmeasures,etc.

• Use conflict-sensitivity or do-no-harm analysis when reviewing projects. This includesreflections on power imbalances, unintended negative effects, and implicit messagesconveyedthroughproject-relatedcommunicationandactivities.Thiscanhelptopreventand address potential conflicts between refugees and service providers, in particulararoundallegationsofbribes,favouritismordiscrimination.

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1. Backgroundoftheassessment

The Civil Peace Service of the GIZ (CPS/GIZ) has worked in Rwanda with local partners in peaceeducation, psychosocial support and conflict-sensitive media projects since 2001. The aim of theprogrammeistostrengthenpeacebyempoweringpeopleinRwandaandtheGreatLakesRegiontolivetogetherinconstructiveharmony.TheRefugeeComponentofCPS/GIZpromotessocialcohesionandpeacefulcoexistencebothwithinandoutsiderefugeecamps,withrefugeesandhostcommunities,inparticularbyempoweringyouth. Since2015,muchof thisworkhas focusedonKigeme refugeecamp,which is hosting close to 20,000 refugees from theDemocratic Republic of Congo. In 2017,CPS/GIZextendeditsprojectsandactivitiestothecampinMahama,inresponsetothemassiveinfluxofBurundianswhofledtoRwanda(andothercountries)duetoelection-relatedviolencethateruptedinMarch2015.

AnassessmentwasinitiatedinMahamainordertoinformthedevelopmentofprojectsandactivitiesthat respond to the needs of refugees and members of their host communities. CPS/GIZ incollaboration with UNHCR conducted the assessment to explore the relationships and map thedynamicsamongrefugeesandbetweenrefugees,hostcommunitiesandserviceprovidersinordertoidentifypotentialrisksforconflict.Theassessmentidentifiedexistingformalandinformalstructuresandinitiativestoaddressconflictsanddisagreement.

Thisreportoftheassessmentservesto:

• Informthefurtherdevelopmentoftheprotectionsectorstrategy6regardingaspectsofpeacefulcoexistenceaswellasinclusionandintegrationofrefugeesinhostcommunities;

• Provideananalysisofpotential conflict issuesanddynamics thatconstituteabasis for theextensionoftheRefugeeComponentofCPS/GIZintheMahamarefugeecamp;

• Capture baseline data for monitoring and evaluating the peaceful coexistence project inMahama,whichiscarriedoutbytheRefugeeComponentofCPS/GIZ.

CPS/GIZ has sound experience in conducting conflict analysis or assessments of potential conflictsusingvariousmethodsandtools includingsystemicconflictanalysis;positions, interestsandneedsanalysis; and connectors and dividers analysis. CPS/GIZ adopts a broad understanding of the term“conflict”thatgoesbeyondphysicalviolenceorviolentconflicttoalsoincludedisagreements,tensionsand problems as well as structural violence (i.e. discriminatory or exclusionary practices andstructures).

CPS/GIZ takes a conflict transformation perspective. Conflicts are an integral part of our lives andinteractions because people have different understandings, interests, needs and wishes that maycontradictoroppose,thuswhichareconflicting.However,theimportantpointishowpeopledealwithandaddresssuchconflictingunderstandings,interests,needsandwishesinordertoguaranteethatareasofpotential conflictdonot result in violent confrontation, actionandbehaviour,but canbeaccommodatedorresolved inanon-violentway.Anunderstandingofthediversity inopinionsand

6UNHCRandtheGovernmentofRwandaaredevelopingaMulti-YearMulti-PartnerProtectionandSolutionsStrategy.

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perceptionscanbeconstructiveandenrichingasitprovidesthegroundforfindingnewandcreativesolutionsthatarebeneficialforall.

Methodology

The assessment adopted a mixed-method design consisting of a representative survey with 394refugeerespondentsfromthecamp;51interviewswithpersonslivinginthevillagesofMuniniandKabeza(MuniniCell),Rugarama(RugaramaCell),Buhaga(MwogaCell)andCyanika(MwogaCell);andsemi-structured interviews with cell authorities, teachers and school administrators andrepresentativesofserviceproviders.

394refugeesrespondedtothesurveyquestionnaire51hostcommunitymembersprovidedinterviews

Due to time constraints, the author could not talk to representatives of all service providersimplementingprojectsintheMahamarefugeecamp.Inadditiontoformalinterviews,informationwasgathered from informal conversations with representatives from MIDIMAR and colleagues fromUNHCRaswellasfromdeskresearchandexistingreportsanddocuments.TheanalysispresentedinthisreporthasbeenenrichedthroughthefeedbackcollectedduringthepresentationofpreliminaryfindingsataTownHallMeetingwithrefugeeleadersandrepresentativesofMIDIMAR,UNHCRandimplementingpartners.

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PRESENTATIONOFFINDINGS

2. Findingsonrelationships

2.1 Findingsonrelationshipsbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunities

Peacefulcoexistenceamongrefugeesandbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunitiescanbethreatenedor complicated through general animosities, including generalized images or stereotypes of the“others”. Incontrast,personalcontacts, includingfriendshiporpositivepersonalencountersat themarketorschool,generallyincreasepeacefulcoexistence.Intheassessment,refugeesaswellashostcommunity respondents were asked questions about their relationships with the other group,includingperceptions,attitudesandbehaviours.

Spacesofinteractionbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunities

Generalanimositiesandstereotypestowardsparticulargroupsaremorelikelytodevelopwhentherearenodirectinteractionsorplacestomeetwith“others”.Thisleavesroomforrumour,hearsayandstereotypes–allunsubstantiatedassumptions.SpaceswheredirectinteractionstakeplacebetweenrefugeesandhostcommunitieswereidentifiedbytheassessmentinandaroundtheMahamacamp.

Interactions between refugees and Rwandans mainly take place around the market, church andworkplace.Cultural, socialandsportsactivities insideoroutsidethecamp,suchas footballgames,weddingsordance clubs,donot seem tobeaplacewhere frequent (social) interactionsbetweenrefugeesandRwandanshappen.Asaplaceofinteraction,noRwandanrespondentsmentioneventsandonly8percentofrefugeesmentionactivitiesandeventsinsideoroutsidethecamp.

Friendship, romantic relationships and mutual support are good indicators for assessment ofinteractions and relationships between members of different groups. Both refugees and hostcommunityrespondentswereaskedwhethertheyhavefriendswholiveoutsideorinsidethecamp,whethertheywouldconsidermarryingapartnerfromtheothercommunity(ifnotyetmarried)andwhethertheyhavereceivedsupportfromorgivensupporttomembersoftheothercommunity.

Regardingfriendship,75percentofrefugeessaythattheyhavefriendswholiveinthevillagesoutsidethecamp,and64percentofrespondentsfromthehostcommunitiessaythattheyhavefriendswholiveinthecamp.Bothgroups(96percentofrefugeesand84percentofinterviewedRwandans)wishtohavemorecontactsandfriendsamongtheothergroup.

96percentofrefugeesand84percentofinterviewedRwandanssaytheywishtohavemorecontactsandfriendsamongtheothergroup

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Mutual supportbetweenpeople living in thecampandthose inneighboringvillages isevident:50percentoftherefugeeshavesupportedRwandansand44percenthavealsoreceivedsupportfromRwandans, primarily from Rwandans living in neighboring villages (76 percent). In the hostcommunities,82percentofrespondentshavesupportedrefugeesand25percenthavealsoreceivedsupportfromrefugees.

Differencesbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunities

RegardingdifferencesbetweenBurundianrefugeesandRwandansofthehostcommunities,around80percentofrefugeeslivinginthecampaswellasaslightmajorityofrespondentslivinginthevillagesaroundthecampsaythattherearenodifferences.Refugeeswhoseedifferencesdescribetheminterms of respect towards others (18 percent), living conditions (18 percent), sense of family (15percent),workingattitudes(13percent),sociability(8percent),professionalskills(7percent),foreignlanguageskills(5percent)andpersonalexperiencesduetotheflightorviolentconflict(5percent).Refugees also cite differences in culture andwith regards towomen’s empowerment and genderequality aswell as the ageofmarriage. Rwandanswho seedifferencesdescribe them in termsofbehaviours by refugees, including aggressive behaviour due to excessive alcohol consumption,language,women’sempowermentandageofmarriageandotherfactors.

Differencesintreatmentofmembersofrefugeesandhostcommunities

Unequaltreatmentconstitutesapotentialdividerorcauseofconflict.RefugeesandRwandanslivingin the neighboring villageswere askedwhether they feel equally treated. Refugeesmainly see anunequal treatment when it comes to salaries: 73 percent believe refugees receive lower salariescomparedwithmembersoftheRwandanhostcommunities;likewise,25percentofhostcommunityrespondentssharethisperception.Unequaltreatmentinemploymentandjobopportunitiesispresentbothinsidethecampandoutsidethecamp,accordingto46and48percentofrefugees,respectively.Whiletherespondentswerespecificallyaskedaboutthereasonsbehindtheunequaltreatment,somesaytheylackdocumentsrequiredforemploymentandothersnotethatRwandanswouldalwaysbetheemployerswhilerefugeeswould“only”betheemployees.Unequaltreatmentisdescribedby48percentoftherefugeesregardingofficialdocuments,inparticularadriver’slicense,andotherissuessuch as the costly procedures to obtain diploma equivalency and the lack of a national ID; only 8percent of the Rwandan respondents consider the treatment unequal. The national ID is oftenrequested in order to access certain services (outside the camp) or to be considered by someemployers.

73percentofrefugeesbelievetheyreceivelowersalariescomparedwithmembersoftheRwandanhostcommunities

Conclusionsandrecommendations

Relationships between refugees and members of host communities are generally quite smooth;BurundianrefugeesandRwandanslivinginthevillagesaroundthecampspeakthesamelanguageandhaveverysimilartraditions,includingindanceandmusic.Moreover,bothcommunitiesarewillingto

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mutuallysupporteachother,whichcanbeconsideredtobepartoflocalcustoms,butcanalsostemfromageneralfeelingofempathytowardstheothercommunity.

Thesegoodrelationshipsprovideanexcellentopportunityor“connector”tobefurtherstrengthened.Activitiesmightincludejointprojectsthatincludebothcommunitiessuchasplantingtreestogetherorjointcommunityworks.Whenintervieweesvaluediversitypositively(e.g.seeingthepotentialforlearningfromothersandnotasasourceofconflict),thiscouldbeusedasabasisforactivitiesdesignedto further strengthen interactionsand social cohesion.Bothcommunities couldparticipate in jointawareness-raisingandeducationalactivitiesinsideoroutsidethecamp.Jointexchangeandlearningprocesses(basedonthepositiveperceptionsondiversity)couldbearranged.Suchactivitieswouldincreaseopportunitiestomeetpeoplefromtheothercommunity,increaseinteractionandeventuallyresultinmoretrustandempathy,inparticularifsuchactivitiesandprojectscontainelementsofpeaceeducation.

“Dividers”thatposepotentialchallengesforpeacefulcoexistencearefoundonthelevelofperceivedinequality or unequal treatment; they are not linked to generalized negative images of the othercommunity.Negativepersonalencounterswithamemberoftheothercommunitysometimesoccursuchencountersaroundthetheftofcropsorfirewoodorphysicalviolence(beatings)andcanresultinmistrust,afeelingofincreasedinsecurityandevenviolentconflict.

Perceived inequalities and negative personal encounters seem to be caused by differences inentitlementsoraccesstoservicesaswellastocompetitionoverscareresources.Thisstraincanbealleviated by making accessible all services (inside and outside the camp) for all people, withoutdistinguishingbetweenmembersoftherefugeesandhostcommunities.Effortsshouldcontinuetoreduceunequaltreatmentonthestructurallevel,includingforexampleequivalencyofdocumentsandcertificates, access to the Rwandan health system or health insurance (Mutuelle de Santé), andreducingoreliminatingtherestrictionsrefugeesfacewhenseekingtomovefreelyoutofthecamp.Particular attention should be paid to salaries, livelihood opportunities and development projects,whichshouldbeequallyaccessibleandbeneficialforrefugeesandhostcommunitiesalikeinordertonotunintentionallycreateorstrengthenapotentialdivider.

2.2 RelationshipsbetweenrefugeesandMIDIMAR,UNHCRandserviceproviders

Thissectionwillprovideacloserlookintorelationshipsbetweenrefugeesandorganizationsworkinginthecampinordertoidentifyopportunitiesandpotentialchallenges.Dailyencountersbetweenthestaffoforganizationsworkinginthecampandrefugeesshapetheirrelationshipsandhaveanimpactontheprovisionofservices.Misunderstandings, tensionsorevenconflictscanarise froma lackofinformation regarding available services and the requirements specifyingwho is entitled toobtainthem.

Duetotimeconstraints,interviewscouldnotbeconductedwithallserviceproviders.Forthisreason,thefollowingsectiondepictstheviewsandperceptionsofrefugeesregardingtheirrelationshipswithMIDIMAR,UNHCRandimplementingpartners.

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Misunderstandings,tensionsorevenconflictsarisefromalackofinformationaboutservicesandwhoisentitledtoobtainthem.

Refugees inMahama camp perceive the relationships between themselves and the organizationsworkinginthecampasgood;refugeesgenerallyfeelwell-treatedintermsofkindness,beinglistenedto and communication. It is important that staff of these organizations, employed refugees andcontractedcompaniescontinuetostrictlyfollowtheircodesofconduct,includingrespectingrefugees,showingcompassionandgrantingenoughtimeduringencounters.Thewaythesepeopleapproachrefugeescanbestrengthenedbyapplyingcommunicationskillsreflectingprinciplesofnon-violenceandpeaceeducation.Conductingaconflict-sensitivityordo-no-harmanalysiscouldidentifypotentialunintendednegativeeffects.Forexample,hiringrefugeescanunintentionallyleadtothecreationorreinforcement of power imbalances, as refugee workers thenmay havemore income than otherrefugees.

Communicationandinformationareveryimportantelementsinthepreventionofconflicts,tensionsandmisunderstandings aswell as in empowerment of rights holders and beneficiaries. Additionalcommunication and information channels between service providers and refugees in theMahamacampshouldbeconsidered,inparticularfortopicsthataremorecomplexthanannouncementsabouteventsanddates (e.g. fordistributionof foodornon-food items).Acommunity radiostation7oracampmagazinewouldhelpprovidemoredetailedinformation,increaseeducationonparticularissuessuchaspeaceeducationandWASH,andhelpraiseawarenessonspecifictopics.Tobuilduponexistingcapacitiesandknowledge,includecommunitymobilizersfromvariousorganizationsandrefugeeswhohaveexpertise in theparticular fieldsof interests,suchas journalists,nursesanddoctors,businessentrepreneursandteachers.Furthercapacitybuilding,suchasconflict-sensitivejournalismorpeaceeducation,wouldbebeneficialwhenrefugeesreturntoBurundioneday,wheretheycouldapplytheirskillsandcontinuetobepeaceagentsorpeaceambassadors.

Thefactthatrefugeesreceiveassistanceaswellasthe(realorperceived)lackofavailabilityoftheseservicesforhostcommunitiesrepresentsapotentialcauseforconflict.Whenconceivingservicesforrefugees,includinglivelihoodprojects,theneedsofhostcommunitiesshouldbeincludedandprojectswithbeneficiariesofbothrefugeesandhostcommunitiesshouldbedesigned.Thiswouldcontributetoenhancingpeacefulcoexistencebetweenrefugeesandhostcommunitiesbyaddressingthedividerorpotentialcauseofconflictthat isconstitutedbytheprovisionofassistancefromwhichonlyonegroupcanbenefit.

Theprovisionofwatertohostcommunitiesbytherefugeecampisapositiveexampleofabenefitsharedbyeveryone.Developmentprojectscanfocusonservicesthathavebeenidentifiedaslackingin the host communities as well as the camp, such as electricity or other sources of energy (e.g.firewoodandsolarlamps);roadsandtransportsystems;productionoffood(e.g.seeds,farmingtoolsand fertilizers); and sports, social or cultural facilities, in particular for youth. Such regionaldevelopmentprojectstargetthecampandsurroundingvillagesinanequalmannerandwouldfurtherstrengthensomeof theopportunitiesaffordedbyhavingacamp inMahamathathostcommunity

7ThegeographicdispositionoftheMahamarefugeecampisfavourabletotheinstallationofacommunityradiostation.

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members have identified, such as progress, businesses and infrastructure. Eventually, this wouldimprovelivelihoodconditionsfortheregion.Thiswouldalsocontributetotheintegrationofrefugeesintohostcommunitiesaswellasatransformationofexistingcampsintomixedvillagesorsettlementsintheframeworkofthe“alternativestocamps”policy.

3. Findingsonpotentialconflicts

Researchinthepasthastendedtocategorizerefugeesandhostcommunitiesasmonolithicgroups;incontrast,currentresearchemphasizestheimportanceofnotonlypayingattentiontothedynamicsbetween refugees and host communities but also to considering intra-relationships in bothcommunities. 8 This means that interpersonal and inter-group animosities that can manifestthemselvesinconflicts,tensionsanddisagreementsneedtobeconsidered.Someoftheissuesmightbespecifictothecontextofrefugeecamps,suchassuddenlylivinginatightandcloseneighbourhoodwithpeoplewhowerenotknownbefore.Someanimositiesreflectthoseprevalentinthecountryoforigin,asJacobsuggests:“Peoplebringwiththemtheconflictsthatexistintheirnativecountries[…]theydon’tleavethembehindattheborder”.9

3.1 Conflictsamongrefugeesandbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunities

Partiesinvolvedinconflicts

Whenaskedaboutconflicts theyhaveobserved,bothmaleand femalerespondents identifymanyconflictsbetweenneighboursaswell asbetweenhusbandsandwives. In thecamp,manypersonsshareahouseandthehousesarelocatedincloseproximity;personswholivephysicallyclosetoeachotherhavemoreinteraction,someofwhichmaybeconflictive.Atthetimeoftheassessment,manyrefugeeslivedincommunalhangars,whichwereovercrowdedandcharacterizedbyalackofprivacyandpromiscuity,however todayall refugees live in family shelters. Some respondents specify thatconflictsbetweenneighboursaremore frequentbetween refugeeswho still live in thehangarsorbetweenneighbours coming fromdifferent regions inBurundi.Moreover, they aremore frequentduring thedistributionof foodorNFI,andareoftencausedby theft. Somerespondentsnote thatconflictsbetweenhusbandsandwivesmayhappenafterfooddistribution,assomespousesmaysellfood tobuyalcohol.Alcohol isalsomentionedasacauseof conflictbetweenhusbandsandwivesbeyondthecontextofdistribution,aswellasextra-maritalrelationships.Similarexplanationsaregivenforconflictsbetweenparentsandchildren.Inaddition,refusaltogotoschool,eitherbytheparentsorthechildren,constitutesanothersourceofconflict.

Conflictissuesfromthecountryoforigin

8Yamazaki,Nobuko(2013):AResearchonCo-existenceandConflictsamongRefugeesandtheirHostPopulations:ACaseStudyofNorthwestUganda.9SimonJacoboftheCentralCouncilforOrientalChristians(ZOCD)inGermany,citedin:Breitenbach,Dagmar(2015): ‘Refugeesdon’t leave theirconflictsbehind’,DeutscheWelle.Availableat:http://p.dw.com/p/1Gen8(accessed22August2018).

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Thesurveyaskedwhetherrefugeesobservethesameconflictsthattheyobservedwhentheywerestill inBurundi,inordertodetermineifrefugeesbringtheconflictstheyexperiencedintheirhomecountriestothehostcountry:40percentofrefugeesobservethesameoldconflictsinthecampastheyobservedorevenexperiencedinBurundi.MostoftherespondentsmentionconflictsspecifictoBurundi (their country of origin), though a fewmention classical causes of conflicts such as extra-maritalrelationships,drugabuse,divergentreligiousbeliefsorconflictsbetweenhusbandandwivesorparentsandchildren.Amongtherefugeeswhoobservethesameoldconflicts inthecampas inBurundi,halfsaythat“differentplacesoforigin”isatthebaseofsuchconflicts.Thisalsomanifestsatschoolbetweenstudentsfromdifferentregions.ThemajorityofrefugeesinMahamacomefromoneof two regions: theprovinceofKirundo innorthernBurundior theprovinceofBujumburaMairie,whichincludesthecapitalcityofBujumbura.Regionalconflictsmainlymanifestthemselvesbetweenthesetwogroupsandareoftenbasedongeneralizedascriptionofstatementsaroundwhoisa“real”refugee10,responsibilitiesofthecurrentsituation11,economicdisparities12orfavouritism13.Someofthesegeneralizedascriptionstopersonsareinaccurate(e.g.therewasnoresettlementprogrammefortherefugeesintheMahamacamp).Thesegeneralizedimagesofwholegroups,whethertheyarebasedonfactsornot,arepotentialcausesofinter-groupconflicts.

Sourcesofpotentialconflicts

Generally,sourcesofpotentialconflictsincludeperceivedinjustices,inequalities(includingfavouritismand bribes), scare resources (including competition over assistance) or generalized mistrust andanimositiesagainstothergroups.IntheMahamacamp,conflictsarisearoundtheft,includingillegalwood cutting or theft of crops, distribution of food and NFI, aggressive behaviour due to drugconsumptionorunemployment,andarangeoffamilyconflictsincludingextra-maritalrelationshipsanddomesticviolenceorintimatepartnerviolence.Conflictsmayresultinresortingtonegativecopingstrategiessuchassurvivalsex14andprostitutionorinthreats,harassmentandbeatings;conflictsalsoleadtomistrustandfearsasinthecaseofconflictsbetweendifferentregionsororigin.

Sincetheoveralllevelofactualphysicalsecurityinthecampappearstobegood,withsecurityensuredbytheGovernment,measurestoincreasepeacefulcoexistenceshouldfocusonaddressingtherootcausesofconflicts,anddealdirectlywiththedividersorchallengesthathavebeenmentioned.Forexample, in regular fora such as dialogues, peace clubs, round tables and other institutionalizedforums,stakeholderscandiscusspotentialconflictissues,identifyconnectorsandopportunitiestobestrengthened,andworktogethertofindconsensusonmutualsolutions.Theseforamustbeinclusive;thus, also perceived “troublemakers” such as drug users should be included. At the same time,implement measures to address the perceptions and feelings of fear or insecurity, such as trust

10TheperceptionisthatpersonsfromKirundowouldonlyhavefledbecauseofhungerandnotpoliticalissues,whileonlypersonsfromBujumburaMairiewouldbe“real”refugees.11TheperceptionisthatpersonsfromBujumburaMairiewouldhavecausedthesocio-politicalcrisisinBurundithatforcedtherefugeestoleavetheircountry,whilepersonsfromKirundowouldhavestoppedtheresettlementprogramme(whichdidnotexist).12TheperceptionisthatpersonsfromBujumburawouldhavecometothecampwithoutanything,whilepersonsfromKirundowouldhavearrivedwithalotofthings.13Theperceptionisthatrefugeeswouldgetajobaccordingtotheirregionoforiginandthatrefugeeleaderswouldfavourpersonswhoarefromthesameregionastheyare.Also,thatonlypersonsfromKirundowouldhavereceivedmoneyfromoneserviceprovider.14Survivalsexissexinexchangeformoney,goods,servicesoranyotheradvantages.

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buildingandaccompaniedexchangesbetweendifferentgroups(e.g.refugeesfromdifferentregionsororigins,youthandother refugees, refugeesandhostcommunities).Thiswouldenhancemutualunderstanding,empathyandsupportamongcommunities,differentgroupsandneighbours,therebyeventuallyincreasingthefeelingofsafetyandpeace.

Many conflicts can be addressed through mediation or other approaches of peaceful conflicttransformation, including facilitation, non-violent communication, alternatives to violence, peaceeducation and by increasing leadership skills.Mediation is generally conducted bymediatorswhofacilitate conflict parties to work together to identify the problems, find interests and needsunderneath the expressed opinions, and come upwith joint solutions.Mediatorsmay also adviseconflict parties to evaluate andpresent their caseswith regard to amorearbitrated solution (e.g.shuttlemediationormediation support)or induce trust-buildingmeasureandapply techniques torestorerelationships.15Thus,amediatoryapproachcanaddresssomeoftheprevailingconflictissuesinthecontextoftheMahamacamp,andalsomoregenerallycontributetopeacefulcoexistence.

3.2 Potentialconflictissueswithorganizationsworkinginthecamp

The survey examined potential conflict issues between organizations working in the camp andrefugees.Duetotimeconstraints, interviewscouldnotbeconductedwithallserviceproviders.Forthisreason,thefollowingsectiondepictstheviewsandperceptionsofrefugees.

Themainconflictissuesbetweenorganizationsworkinginthecampandrefugeesconcernthequalityofservices,denialofservices,unequaltreatmentwhenreceivingservicesoraninsufficientquantityofservices.Withtheexceptionofthequantityofservicesavailable,themainconflictissuesarelinkedtothemodalitiesofservicedelivery;thus, it is importantthatcodesofconductarestrictlyrespected,whichcanonlybeensuredifallactorsinthecampareregularlyrefreshedonthecodeofconduct,accountability,preventionofsexualabuseandexploitation,andanti-fraudmeasures.

The assessment’s finding underscore the crucial importance of good communication, in particularwhenexplainingwhyparticularservicesaregiventospecificgroupsofrefugeesorwhycertainservicesarenolongeravailable.Inregardtothefundsforstartingabusiness,onerefugee16said“theyhavetotelluswhy”certain refugees receivemoneyandothersnot. Inorder topreventconflictsbetweenrefugees and organizations working in the camp, the organizations should reflect on how theirinterventions, in particular the modalities of delivering services, might be perceived by theirbeneficiariesandotherrefugees.Itisimportanttomakesurethatthesame(small)groupofrefugeesdoesnotalwaysbenefitfromthesameprogramme;rather,thereshouldbearotationsothateveryonecanbenefitovertime.17

All interventions and new projects should undergo a conflict-sensitivity or do-no-harm analysis,includingreflectionsontheselectionofbeneficiaries.Suchanalysishelpsplannerstobeawareofa)thepotentialunintendednegativeimpactsonpeacefulcoexistenceinsideandoutsidethecamp;b)potentialreinforcementofexistingpowerimbalances;andc)iftheyaresendinganyimplicit(hidden)

15Seeforexample:www.mediate.com/articles/zumeta.cfmorwww.keepoutofcourt.com/mediation-styles(accessed14September2017).16Refugee,campMahama,July2017.17CommentfromUNHCRcolleague.

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messagesthroughtheircommunication.Thefindingsofrigorousdo-no-harmanalysisprovidethebasisfor takingappropriatemeasuresoradjustments, suchasexplaining (again) therequirements tobeconsideredforservices;ultimately,thiswillcontributetothepreventionofconflicts.

4. Existingconflictresolutionmechanisms

Conflicts (understood broadly to include disagreements, tensions, divergent understandings andproblems)arean integralpartofour lives.Theaimofconflict transformation, includingenhancingpeaceful coexistence, is not to have aworldwithout any conflicts. Rather, conflict transformationfocusesonsolvingconflictissuesinanon-violentwayandaddressingtheunderlyingcausesofconflictso that they do not provide the grounds for physical, verbal and structural violence. Against thisbackground,intervieweesfrombothhostandrefugeecommunitieswereaskedtowhomtheywouldturninacaseofconflictinordertoresolveit.Theiranswerspointtoexistingformalaswellasinformalconflictresolutionmechanismsthatexistonthepolitical,social,culturalandreligiouslevels.

4.1 Conflictresolutionmechanismsforconflictsamongrefugeesandconflictsbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunities

Inacaseofconflictwithanotherrefugeeorhostcommunitymember,76percentoftheinterviewedrefugeeswouldturntoMIDIMAR,70percenttoUNHCRand70percenttootherserviceprovidersinordertoresolvetheconflict.TheywouldconsultMIDIMAR,UNHCRandotherserviceprovidersforthesametypesofconflicts,includingthoserelatedtothedistributionoffoodandNFI;assistanceforrefugees;woodcuttinganddeforestation(collectingfirewood)18;lackofrespectforpublicorprivateproperty(vandalism);unemploymentandcompetitionforjobs.

Morethan70percentofrefugeeswouldturntoMIDIMAR,UNHCRandotherserviceproviderstoresolveaconflictwitharefugeeorhostcommunitymember.

Organizations working in the camp are considered by refugees to be adequate actors in conflictresolution–despitethefactthattheseorganizationsarenotexplicitmechanismstodealwithconflict.Refugeesturntothemtoresolveconflictissuesthatariseinthecontextoflivinginthecamporwhichare linked to the work and responsibilities of these organizations. This provides quite favourablegroundfortheorganizationsworkinginthecamptotakeupamediator’sroletojointlyseeksolutions.

Formalconflictresolutionmechanisms

18InadditiontoMIDIMAR,UNHCRandserviceproviders,12percentoftherefugeeswouldalsoturntothepolicetosolveproblemsrelatedtowoodcuttinganddeforestation,whichincludecollectingfirewood.Forconflictsaroundvandalismofpublicorprivateproperty,8percentofrefugeeswouldturntothepolice.

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Among refugees interviewed in the assessment, 73 percent say they would turn to the RwandanNationalPoliceforspecificcasesofconflict:casesrelatedtotheft(57percent);aggressivebehaviorduetodrugabuse(44percent);domesticviolence,intimatepartnerviolenceandsexualandgender-based violence (42 percent); debts and loans (35 percent), polygamy and additional extra-maritalrelationships(27percent); limited livelihoodopportunities (20percent);survivalsexorprostitution(19percent);woodcutting,deforestationandcollectingfirewood(12percent);anddisturbancesbyothers’behaviourincludingnoisefrombarsorthelackofprivacy(11percent).Someoftheseconflictissuesimplyacriminalact(e.g.physicalharm,theftorquestionsrelatedtocivilstatus).However,thelargenumberofissuesforwhichrefugeesturntothepolicealsosuggeststhattheyaretrustedandviewedascompetentinresolvingtheseconflictissues.

73percentofrefugeeswouldturntotheRwandanNationalPolicetoresolvespecificcasesofconflict,includingtheftandaggressivebehaviour

AmongRwandanslivingintheneighboringvillages,71percentofthoseinterviewedsaytheywouldaddress themselves first to the police to resolve a conflict with a refugee, and 27 percent wouldaddressthelocalauthoritiesatthecellordistrictlevel.ItseemsthattheydonotconsiderMIDIMARasaconflict resolutionmechanism,despite theGovernment’sguidance in2016 that“anydisputesarising between refugees and local residents shall be resolved by the camp management incollaborationwithlocalauthorities”.19However,somerespondentsexplainthatthepoliceorthelocalauthorities informandreport thecases toMIDIMARandUNHCR.Otherexistingconflict resolutionstructuresavailabletoRwandansinhostcommunities,suchastheAbunzi,RwandanCourtsorlocalauthorities,would not be in charge of solving caseswhere refugees are involved. Some Rwandanrespondents(18percent)saytheirproblemswithrefugeesarenotsolvedortheydonotreceiveanyfeedbackaboutthecasestheyreport.

RelativelyfewrefugeesconsiderRwandancourtsorcellanddistrictauthoritiesasstructurestoresolveconflicts among refugees or between refugees andhost communities; less than 30 percent of theinterviewedrefugeeswouldturntoRwandancourtsorcellanddistrictauthoritiesinacaseofconflict;ofthisnumber,theywoulddosoforaggressivebehaviourduetodrugabuse(13percent)andtheft(11percent).RwandanCourtsaretheninthmost-oftenmentionedstructuretowhichrefugeeswouldturnincaseofaggressivebehaviourduetodrugabuseortheft.Refugeesciteseveralreasonsfornotaddressingthecourts,namelyrefugeesfeelthattheyarenotallowedtodoso,thatthesestructurescannot help themor that the courts are not in charge of solving conflicts. However, 2 percent ofrefugeessaythattheyshouldactuallygotothecourts,whichmaysuggestthatmanyrefugeesarenotawarethattheycanaddressaconflictissuetotheRwandanjusticesystem.

19See:http://midimar.gov.rw/uploads/tx_download/MINISTERIAL_INSTRUCTION_N._02-2016_OF_01-06-2016_DETERMINING_THE_MANAGEMENT_OF_REFUGEES_AND_REFUGEE_CAMPS.pdf

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Lessthan30percentofrefugeeswouldturntoRwandancourtsorlocalauthoritiesinacaseofconflict.

Traditionalconflictresolutionmechanisms

BashingantaheandAbunziareso-call“traditional”conflictresolutionmechanisms.Some59percentofrefugeessaytheywouldturntoBashingantahe,asystempresentinBurundi.Some22percentofrefugeeswouldturntoAbunzi,asystempresentinRwanda.Bothmechanismsworkinaverysimilarway.20Bashingantahe or Abunzi are elected members of the community who listen to all partiesinvolvedinaconflicttofindasolutionthat isrestorative(ratherthanpunishing) innature.21Atthetimeofthisassessment,noAbunzimediatorswerepresentintheMahamacamp,thougharelatedinitiativeisinprogress.22Thismightexplainthelownumber(22percent)ofrefugeeswhowouldturntoAbunzi,sincethesystemisnot(yet)knowntotheBurundianrefugees:70percentoftheinterviewedrefugeesreportthattheydonotknowAbunzi.

70percentofrefugeesdonotknowaboutAbunzi,atraditionalRwandanconflictmediationmechanism.

Social,religiousorotherinformalconflictresolutionmechanisms

Avarietyofsocial,religiousandotherinformalconflictresolutionmechanismsareavailable,thoughuseofcommunitymobilizersorchurchesisrelativelylowcomparedwithformalmechanisms.

Communitymobilizersarechosenbyonly21percentof the refugees to support them in solvingaconflict;ofthisnumber,theydosoincasesoftheft(7percent);domesticviolence,intimatepartnerviolenceorsexualandgender-basedviolence(6percent);aggressivebehaviourduetodrugabuse(6percent); or limited livelihood opportunities (6 percent). Considering these findings, communitymobilizersdonotplayasignificantroleinresolvingconflicts.Iftheyplayamoreactiveroleinconflictresolutioninthefuture,itisrecommendedthattheirrolebethoroughlyanalyzedinadvance,includingquestionsofcredibilityandneutrality.

20 On Abunzi, see for example: LAW No37/2016 OF 08/09/2016, determining organization, jurisdiction,competenceandfunctionofAbunzi,publishedintheofficialGazetten37orDeWinnie,RubenandAnne-AëlPohu (2015):Mediation in Rwanda: Conceptions and realities of Abunzi Justice (2011-2014). RCN Justice etDémocratie.OnBashingantahe,seeforexample:Ingelaere,BertandDominikKohlhagen(2012),SituatingSocialImaginaries inTransitional Justice:TheBushingantahe inBurundi, in the International JournalofTransitionalJustice,6,1,pp.40-59.Barancira,Sylvestre(2006):LajusticedeproximitéauBurundi:Réalitésetperspectives.RCNJusticeetDémocratie.Dexter,TracyandPhilippeNtahombaye(2005):TheRoleofInformalJusticeSystemsinFosteringtheRuleofLawinPost-ConflictSituations,CentreforHumanitarianDialogue.21AparticipanttotheTownHallMeetingon12September2017proposedtorecruit(former)BashingantaheasAbunziinthecampgiventheimportanceandrespectthatAbunziandBashingantaheenjoyintheircommunities.22A current initiativeby the LegalAidFoundation (LAF) isbeing carriedout toestablisha conflict resolutionstructureinthecampinthefuturethatlargelycorrespondstothemodelofAbunzi.

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Churchrepresentativesarechosenbyonly22percentoftherefugeestosupporttheminsolvingaconflict;ofthisnumber,theydosoincasesofconflictsregardinglimitedlivelihoodopportunities(48percent);theft(22percent);aggressivebehaviourduetodrugabuse(20percent);conflictsinvolvingfamily members such as polygamy or extra-marital relationships (27 percent), domesticviolence/intimatepartnerviolence(16percent),andconflictswithfamilymembers(5percent).Amongthe22percentofrefugeeswhosaytheywouldturntochurchrepresentatives,somealsomentionthattheywouldturntochurchrepresentatives incaseofreligiousconflictsorwhenconflictpartiesarefromthesamechurch(8percent).Some48percentofrefugeessaytheywouldnotturntochurchrepresentatives.23Considering these results, church representatives seem tobe involved in conflictresolutionforminorconflictsandforthoseinvolvingfamilymembers.Itisrecommendedthatchurchrepresentatives be sensitized about existing mechanisms available to handle cases of domesticviolence,intimatepartnerviolenceandparticularlysexualandgender-basedviolence,inordertorefersurvivorstoappropriateservices.

Somereflectionsontheadequacy,credibilityandlegitimacyofexistingconflictresolutionmechanisms

Theassessmentexploredperceptionsoftheexistingconflictresolutionmechanisms–aretheyviewedasadequate,credibleandlegitimate?Thesefindingspointtoissuesthatshouldbeaddressedwhenstrengtheningexistingmechanismsorestablishingnewones.

Some3percentofrefugeessaythatseveraloftheproposedactors(i.e.UNHCR,MIDIMAR,Rwandancell or district authorities) would be “too high level” to address their conflicts. The roles andresponsibilities, fields of competence and approach to solving conflicts need to be clearlycommunicated to refugees; in otherwords, refugees need to be sensitized about existing conflictresolutionstructures.

Refugeeswhosaythattheywouldnotturntoaparticularconflictresolutionmechanismwereaskedwhytheywouldnotdoso.Acrossallactorsandreasons,thereasonsmostcitedare:“theycannothelpme”,“Iamnotallowed”and“theydon'thaveinfluenceorpowertoresolvemycase(becausetheyonlyissuerecommendationsortheyarenotinchargeofme)”.

Thesefindingscallforaninformationandsensitizationcampaigntoexplainexistingconflictresolutionstructures, inparticular regarding their capacity to resolve specific kindsof conflicts.Thisbecomesevenmorerelevantwhentryingtointegraterefugeesintohostcommunitiesandinthecontextofthe“alternatives to camps” policy.Ultimately, if refugees are to be fully integrated into the Rwandanjudiciarysystem(whichincludescourtsandAbunzi),thevariousstructuresneedtobewell-knownsothatrefugeesutilizethem.Yet24percentofrefugeesstatethatRwandanCourtseithercannothelpthem,orarenotincharge(ofrefugees)orthatrefugeesarenotallowedtoreporttothem.Workisalready underway to develop conflict resolutions mechanisms in the camps based on the Abunzisystem, but thiswould need to be rolled out in all refugee locations and a system for interactionbetweenrefugeeandhostcommunity“abunzi”committeessetup.

23Itshouldbenotedthat27percentoftheinterviewedrefugeesdidnotrespondtothisquestion.

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Lookingmorecloselyatthe“otherreasons”fornotusingcertainmechanisms,analysisshowsthathalfoftherespondentswhoindicate“otherreasons”mentionthatinacaseofaconflicttheyneedfirsttoaddress the issue with the refugee leaders.24If the procedure is that a conflict needs first to beaddressed to the refugee leaders, thismaybea factor in theanswersof thosewhosay “I amnotallowed”toturntoanotherparticularactortoresolveaconflict.Theseresultssuggestthatconflictsarefirstaddressedtorefugeeleadersinthecampandthenmostlikelyreferredbytheleaderstootherconflictresolutionstructures,ifnotdirectlydealtbytheleadersthemselves.However,findingsshowthat refugee leaders are not themost popular choice among thosewho say theywould turn to aparticularstateactor,whichsuggeststhatitmaynotbetruethataconflictneedsfirsttobeaddressedbyrefugeeleaders.Only9percentofallthosewhowouldturntoaparticularactorstatethattheywouldturntorefugeeleaders,whileotheractorsaremorepopular:12percentwouldgotoMIDIMAR,12percentwouldgotothepolice,11percentwouldgotoUNHCR,11percentwouldgotoserviceprovidersand10percentwouldgotoBashingantahe.Further,almosthalfoftherespondentswhosaythattheywouldnotturntotherefugeeleadersexplainthattheycannothelpthem(46percent).

Therolethatrefugeeleadersplayedinconflictresolution,eveniflessthanotheractorsatpresent,mustbetakenintoaccountinordertoavoidroleconfusionorevenconflictsbetweenthemandthenew/otherstructure,asrefugeeleadersinthecampmightfearalossofpowerandinfluence.25Thisisimportantwhen designing or installing new conflict resolutionmechanisms, such as Abunzi in thecamp.Thereasonsgivenaboveareprimarilystructural,buttheassessmentalsoaskedaboutmorefunctionalaspectsofexistingconflictresolutionmechanisms.Thefunctionalaspectswerenotcitedasfrequently.

Timeanddistancearecitedby20percentofrefugeesasreasonsfornotturningtoaparticularactororactors.Theissueofbeingtoofarawaysuggestsatechnicalsolutionsuchasdecentralizedofficesorsupportfortransport,especiallyforpersonswithdisabilities,toreachRwandanCourts,districtandcellauthoritiesorUNHCRstaff.

Amongallthereasonscitedfornotturningtoaparticularactor,5percentconcernthelegitimacyofanactor(biased,nottrustworthy,linkedtopoliticsnotkeepinformationconfidential).About8percentdonotturntooneorseveralactorsbecausetheyconsiderthemtobebiased,nottrustworthy,linkedto politics or not keeping information confidential. This finding raises issues of credibility andlegitimacyregardingtheconflictresolutionmechanismsinquestion.Trust,neutrality,objectivityandcredibilityarekeyaspectsforthesuccessofconflictresolution.Forthisreason,theanalysislooksmorecloselyatthefindingthoughtheycomefromonly8percentoftheinterviewedrefugees.Comparingthedifferentactorsproposedintheassessment,issuesofobjectivity,trust,credibilityandlegitimacyaremostquestionedforrefugeeleaders,followedbycommunityleaders(18percentofthosewhodonot turn to refugee leaders cite these reasons for not doing so and 10 percent for communitymobilizers).Also,28percentoftheserespondentsmentionthattheywouldnotdosobecauserefugeeleaders are biased. In addition, weak leadership (leaders who do not fulfill their role or attendmeetings) or leaders’ committees that do not function well are mentioned by refugee leaders

24Thecampisstructuredintodifferentquartiersandvillages.Eachlevelhasrefugeeleaders.Inthispaper“refugeeleaders”referstothosewithintheMahamarefugeecamp.25Seealso:DeWinnie,RubenandAnne-AëlPohu (2015):Mediation inRwanda:ConceptionsandrealitiesofAbunziJustice(2011-2014).RCNJusticeetDémocratie.

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themselves.26Refugee leaders in the campplay an important role in conflict resolution, and somerefugees consider them as the first to be addressed in a case of conflict (as discussed above).Interventionsshould focuson increasingtrust,neutrality,objectivityandcredibilitysothatrefugeeleaderscanfulfiltheirimportantroleinresolvingconflicts.Finally,1percentoftherespondentswouldnotturntoaparticularactordueitsapproachtoresolvingconflicts(e.g.punishmentandfining).


AvarietyofconflictresolutionstructuresexistinsideandoutsidetheMahamarefugeecampandareavailable to members of the refugee and host communities. A clarification of each actor’s role,competenciesandresponsibilitieswithregardstoconflictresolutionshouldbecarriedout,andthisinformation should be explained and communicated to refugees. The risk is that, lacking clearinformation,refugeesmightaddressthemselvestostructuresthatarenotadequateforsolvingtheirissues. Some structures may even resolve conflicts in a non-peaceful way, as when thieves are“punished”bybeatingswithnodueprocess.Thismightcausefrustrationandangerorevenleadtoviolent conflicts. The clarification of roles is also very important for the accountability of conflictresolutionstructures.

Potentially,mostof theprevailing conflicts in thecamporwithhost communities canbe resolvedthroughmediatoryapproaches.27Manyconflictscouldbesettledthroughmediation,whichwouldalsodiminish the case load of the police and other organizations working in the camp. A mediationstructureshouldbesetupalongthelinesofacampAbunziorBashingantahe.This(new)mediationstructure in the campmust be alignedwith already-existing Rwandan structures in order to avoiddoublestructures.Overtime,thiswillsupportimplementationofthe“alternativestocamps”policy.A(new)mediationstructureinthecampshouldbewell-definedwithclearrolesandresponsibilitiesandembeddedinanoverallconflictresolutionsystem,withclearhierarchicalrelationstootheractorssuchaspoliceandcourts.Thereshouldbepossibilitiesforappeals,andareferralsystemfordifferentconflictissuestoadequatestructures(e.g.buildingupandcollaboratingwithcommunitymobilizersandtheLegalAidForum).

Toestablishandintroducea(new)mediationstructureinthecamp,athoroughconflict-sensitivityordo-no-harm analysis should be conducted in order to avoid potential role conflicts (e.g. betweenmediators and refugee leaders) and to ensure that refugees will consider mediators as credible,legitimateandaccessible, inparticular forpersonswith specialneeds.Outreachmeasures to raiseawarenessshouldbedesignedandimplemented.

Finally, it seems that a jointmechanism toaddresspotential conflict issuesbetween refugees andmembersofhostcommunitiesislacking.Inordertoestablishsuchamechanism,othercampsmightprovide inspiration. In the Kigeme camp, for example, refugee leaders, local authorities,representatives of MIDIMAR, Abunzi and other mediators meet in monthly “peace dialogues” todiscussissuesofconcerntobothrefugeesandhostcommunitiesinordertofindjointsolutions.28Suchajointconflictresolutionforummaybecomeparticularlyrelevanttothe“alternativestocamps”policyasoneofthefirstaspectsofintegratingrefugeesintohostcommunities.

26ThisfindingisfromtheTownHallMeetingon12September2017.27Domesticviolence,intimatepartnerviolence,SGBVandothercrimesarenotaddressedthroughmediation.28ThisprojecthasbeensupportedbyapartnerofCPS/GIZ.

2017 Final Report

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4.2 Conflictresolutionmechanismsforconflictbetweenrefugeesandserviceproviders

Howdorefugeesresolveaconflictwithanorganizationworkinginthecamp?RefugeessaytheywouldturntoMIDIMAR(79percent),UNHCR(79percent),directlytotheserviceproviderwhoisinvolvedintheconflict(68percent),tootherserviceproviderswhoarenotinvolvedintheconflict(64percent),torefugeeleaders(57percent)andtofamilyandfriends(50percent)inordertoresolveconflictswithaserviceprovider.

Forconflictsbetweenrefugeesandserviceproviders,76percentdonot turn to representativesofchurches, 67percent toRwandanCourts, 64percent toRwandan cell or district authorities, or 52percenttocommunitymobilizers.SeveralreasonsfornotturningtooneoftheRwandanstructuresaregiven,includingthatthesestructurescannothelpthem(citedby31percentofrefugeesforlocalauthoritiesandby15percentforRwandancourts)orthattheydonothavetheinfluenceorarenotincharge of refugees (cited by 21 percent for local authorities and 9 percent for Rwandan courts).Moreover,13percentoftheinterviewedrefugeessaythatthesestructuresaretoofarawaytoreachthem. Regarding community mobilizers, 65 percent of refugees who do not turn to communitymobilizerssaythattheycannothelpthemand42percentsaytheydonothavethenecessaryinfluencetoresolveaconflictwithaserviceprovider.29Overall,thereasonscitedmostforallstructuresarethataparticularactorisnotabletohelprefugeestoresolveconflictswithserviceproviders(citedby58percentofallrefugeesforoneorseveralactors)orthataparticularactordoesnothavethenecessaryinfluenceorisnotinchargeofsolvingsuchaconflict(citedby23percentforoneorseveralactors).


Thefindingsonserviceproviderslargelycorrespondtothefindingsregardingtheresolutionofconflictsamongrefugeesorbetweenmembersofrefugeesandhostcommunities.Thispresentsanopportunitytodesigncomprehensiveconflictresolutionmechanismsthatcouldalsoensureresolutionforconflictsinvolvinghostcommunitymembersororganizationsworkinginthecamp.

With regard toconflictpreventionwithserviceproviders,existing feedbackmechanismsshouldbeused to identifypotential conflict issuesbetweenrefugeesandorganizationsworking in thecamp.Thesemechanismsincludeindividualcounselingsessions,complaintorsuggestionboxes,anddirectcommunicationchannelssuchastheUNHCRphonenumberore-mailaddress([email protected]).Inclusionoftheopinions,perceptionsandsuggestionsofrefugeesindecisionsthatmayaffecttheirliveswillservetoaddressandavoidpotentialconflicts.Theimportanceofserviceprovidersdevelopingand finding solutions togetherwith refugeeswas emphasized in discussions during the TownHallMeetingon12September2017.

29For representativesof churches, thequestionwhy refugeeswouldnot turn to themwasnot asked in thesurvey.

2017 Final Report

2017 Final Report

Notes

2017 FINAL REPORT - Ziviler Friedensdienst · UNHCR and the Civil Peace Service of GIZ, German Development Cooperation: Kigali. ... Conflict resolution mechanisms for conflicts among

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