11:30-13:30, Jun 16 0 THE UNIVERSITY OF YORK 2017 CONFERENCE ON ECONOMI DESIGN PROGRAMME
1
Organisers and Committee
Main Organiser: Zaifu Yang
Programme Committee: Chair: Zaifu Yang Co-Chairs: Yuan Ju and Paul Schweinzer Committee Members:
Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Tommy Andersson Peter Biro Anna Bogomolnain Tilman Börgers Eric Budish Bo Chen Yan Chen Youngsub Chun Kim-Sau Chung Federico Echenique Lars Ehlers Eytek Erdil Pierre Fleckinger Alex Gershkov Claus-Jochen Haake John Hatfield Jean-Jacques Herings Johannes Hörner Sergei Izmalkov Bettina Klaus Fuhito Kojima Stephan Lauermann Qingmin Liu Jingfeng Lu Jinpeng Ma David Manlove Debasis Mishra Hervé Moulin Michael Ostrovsky Hans Peters Michael Schwarz Arunava Sen Roberto Serrano Shigehiro Serizawa Jay Sethuraman Luigi Siciliani Jacco Thijssen William Thomson Walter Trockel Utku Ünver
Local Organisers: Mauro Bambi Anindya Bhattacharya Annette Johnson Alan Krause Andrew Pickering Makoto Shimoji
2
Contents
Instruction and Advice 3
Lunches and Social Events 4
Programme Overview 5
Keynote Addresses 6
Parallel Session Overview 7
Day 1 Parallel Sessions 09:00-11:00, Wed 14th Jun 2017 10
Day 1 Parallel Sessions 11:30-13:30, Wed 14th Jun 2017 12
Day 1 Parallel Sessions 16:00-18:00, Wed 14th Jun 2017 14
Day 2 Parallel Sessions 09:00-11:00, Thu 15th Jun 2017 16
Day 2 Parallel Sessions 11:30-13:30, Thu 15th Jun 2017 18
Day 3 Parallel Sessions 09:00-11:00, Fri 16th Jun 2017 20
Day 3 Parallel Sessions 11:30-13:30, Fri 16th Jun 2017 22
Day 3 Parallel Sessions 16:00-18:00, Fri 16th Jun 2017 24
Emergency Calls 26
Acknowledgements 27
3
Instruction and Advice
All keynote addresses and all parallel sessions will be held at the Law
and Management Building (LMB), Campus East, University of York.
In each parallel session, the last speaker should chair all but her/his
own presentation, while the first speaker should chair the last
speaker’s presentation. Each presentation is 30 minutes long and
should be strictly observed.
For your presentation, you need to upload your PDF or PPT file to the
local system and cannot use your own laptop for presentation.
In all lecture rooms, no food or drinking except water is allowed.
During lunch, tea and coffee, the welcome reception and the gala
dinner time, every participant is kindly requested to wear the
conference badge.
There are frequent buses such as Nos 56 and 66 from the city centre
and railway station to the University of York campus (West and East)
during the day. It is about 3.1 miles between York Railway Station and
Campus East and takes 20 minutes by bus and 70 minutes by walking.
You should keep your belongings at a safe place and be vigilant on
any suspicious person or object.
If you are allergic to certain food or drinking, you should take all
reasonable precautions to protect yourself.
4
Lunches and Social Events
Lunches (13:30—14:30), tea, coffee and biscuits (11:00—11:30,
15:30—16:00) will be provided at the Atrium, LMB, June 14-16,
2017.
The welcome reception (18:15—19:00) and the gala dinner (19:00-
21:00) will be held at the Principal York Hotel, Thu 15th June 2017.
The hotel is next to York Railway Station. You could arrive there by
yourself by bus or on foot.
You will be given a gala dinner table number when you receive this
brochure. You are kindly requested to find your place (name) card
on your assigned dinner table.
The tickets for visiting York Minster can be repeatedly used for one
year starting from 9th June 2017 when they are issued.
5
Programme Overview
Day 1: Wed 14th June 2017
1 Parallel Sessions 09:00-11:00
2 Parallel Sessions 11:30-13:30
Keynote Address 14:30-15:30
3 Parallel Sessions 16:00-18:00
Day 2: Thu 15th June 2017
4 Parallel Sessions 09:00-11:00
5 Parallel Sessions 11:30-13:30
Keynote Address 14:30-15:30
Gala Dinner 19:00-21:00
Day 3: Fri 16th June, 2017
6 Parallel Sessions 09:00-11:00
7 Parallel Sessions 11:30-13:30
Keynote Address 14:30-15:30
8 Parallel Sessions 16:00-18:00
6
Keynote Addresses
Wed 14th Jun 2017; 14:30—15:30 Place: LMB/30X
Paul Kleindorfer Lecture
Sanjeev Goyal (University of Cambridge)
Title: The Strategy of Conquest
Chair: Lars Ehlers, Universite de Montreal
Thu 15th Jun 2017; 14:30—15:30 Place: LMB/30X
Leo Hurwicz Lecture
Philip Reny (University of Chicago)
Title: Sequential Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of
Signals and Actions
Chair: Zaifu Yang, University of York
Fri 16th Jun 2017; 14:30—15:30 Place: LMB/30X
Murat Sertel Lecture
Parag Pathak (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Title: Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New
Orleans' OneApp
Chair: Utku Ünver, Boston College
7
Parallel Session Overview: Day 1
Parallel Sessions 1 (09:00-11:00, Wed 14th Jun 2017)
Auction 1, LMB/030
Matching 1, LMB/2XA
Voting and Election 1, LMB /031
Contests, LMB/36X
Cooperation and Coalitional Behaviour 1,
LMB/37X
Bargaining 1, LMB/2XB
Parallel Sessions 2 (11:30-13:30, Wed 14th Jun 2017)
Auction 2, LMB/030
Matching 2, LMB/031
Refugee Assignment and Diversity, LMB/36X
Growth and Development, LMB/37X
Networks and Matching, LMB/38X
Information, Communication, Disclosure 1,
LMB/008
Parallel Sessions 3 (16:00-18:00, Wed 14th Jun 2017)
Trading Processes and Markets 1, LMB/030
Implementation, LMB/36X
Information, Communication, Disclosure 2,
LMB/031
Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 1, LMB/37X
Division and Provision Rules, LMB/2XA
Domain Restrictions, LMB/2XB
8
Parallel Session Overview: Day 2
Parallel Sessions 4 (09:00-11:00, Thu 15th Jun 2017)
Auction 3, LMB/030 Bargaining 2, LMB/031
Division, Claim and Related Problems, LMB/36X
Trading Processes and Markets 2, LMB/37X
Information and Contracts 1, LMB/2XA
Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 2, LMB/2XB
Parallel Sessions 5 (11:30-13:30, Thu 15th Jun 2017)
Voting and Election 2, LMB/2XA Organ Exchange and Related Topics, LMB/36X
Trading Processes and Markets 3, LMB/37X
Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 3, LMB/030
Allocation Rules and Auction, LMB/031
Allocation and Assignment 1, LMB/2XB
9
Parallel Session Overview: Day 3
Parallel Sessions 6 (09:00-11:00, Fri 16th Jun 2017)
Teams and Organisations, LMB/36X
Allocation and Assignment 2, LMB/030
Implementation and Mechanisms,
LMB/37X
Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 4, LMB/031
Cooperation and Coalitional Behaviour 2, LMB/2XA
School Choice and Assignment 1, LMB/2XB
Parallel Sessions 7 (11:30-13:30, Fri 16th Jun 2017)
Allocation and Assignment 3, LMB/2XA
Experiments and Empirics 1, LMB/2XB
School Choice and Assignment 2, LMB/030
Coordination, Timing and Investment,
LMB/36X
College, School Admission and Related Topics,
LMB/37X
Rules and Mechanisms, LMB/031
Parallel Sessions 8 (16:00-18:00, Fri 16th Jun 2017)
Information and Contracts 2, LMB/2XA
Contest, Implementation and Identification,
LMB/36X
Experiments and Empirics 2, LMB/030
Choice, Contract and Matching, LMB/37X
Trading Processes and Markets 4, LMB/031
09:00-11:00, Jun 14
10
Parallel Sessions 1 (09:00-11:00, Jun 14) Day 1
Auction 1 LMB/030
Nicolas Fugger, Centre for European Economic Research. Exploiting
Uncertainty about the Number of Competitors in Procurement Auctions.
Philippe Gillen, University of Cologne. Preferences and Decision Support
in Competitive Bidding.
Olga Gorelkina, University of Liverpool. Precluding Collusion in the Vickrey
Auction.
Oleg Baranov, University of Colorado at Boulder. Efficient Dynamic Auction
for Private Valuations
Matching 1 LMB/2XA
Takashi Akahoshi, Waseda University. Sharing Properties with the Core in
Matching Problems: von Neumann-Morgenstern Pairwise Stability.
Albin Erlanson, Stockholm School of Economics. Organizing Time Banks:
Lessons from Matching Markets.
Francis X. Flanagan, Wake Forest University. Manipulation of Stable
Matching Mechanisms: Polarization of Interests Revisited.
Dinko Dimitrov, Saarland University. Gender Consistent Resolving Rules in
Marriage Problems.
Voting and Elections 1 LMB/031
Swarnendu Chatterjee, Maastricht University. Frequency Based Analysis of
Voting Rules.
Hayrullah Dindar, Istanbul Bilgi University. Party-List Proportional
Representation in Partisan Politics: A New Voting Paradox.
Yoko Kawada, Keio University. Consistent Representation and Electoral
Systems.
Anke Gerber, Universität Hamburg. A Shut Mouth Catches No Flies:
Consideration of Issues and Voting.
09:00-11:00, Jun 14
11
Contests LMB/36X
Toomas Hinnosaar, Collegio Carlo Alberto. Dynamic Common-Value
Contests.
Arijit Sen, Indian Institute of Management at Calcutta. Contests with Foot-
Soldiers.
Marco Serena, Universidad Carlos III and Max Planck Institute for Tax Law
and Public Finance. Sequential Contests Revisited.
John Howard, London School of Economics. Silent Duels and the Optimal
Design of Research Contests.
Cooperation and Coalitional Behaviour 1 LMB/37X
Francisco Llerena Garrés, Rovira i Virgili University. Consistency
Distinguishes the (Weighted) Shapley Value, the (Weighted) Surplus Division
Solution and the Prenucleolus, co-authored by Pedro Calleja, Universitat de
Barcelona.
Chih-Chun Yang, Academia Sinica (Taipei). Subjective Coalition-Proof
Equilibrium.
Anna Khmelnitskaya, Saint-Petersburg State University. Centrality
Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games.
Walter Trockel, Istanbul Bilgi University and Bielefeld University.
Competitive Payoffs in Coalitional Games.
Bargaining 1 LMB/2XB
Deepal Basak, Indian School of Business. Transparency and Delay in
Bargaining.
Simon Hoof, Paderborn University. The Recursive Bargaining Solution for
NTU Differential Games.
Chiu Yu Ko, National University of Singapore. Decentralized One-to-Many
Bargaining.
Claus-Jochen Haake, University of Paderborn. On the Decomposability of the
Nash Bargaining Solution: An Approach to Labour Markets.
11:30-13:30, Jun 14
12
Parallel Sessions 2 (11:30-13:30, Jun 14) Day 1
Auction 2 LMB/030
Cedric Wasser, University of Bonn. Optimal Favouritism in All-Pay Auctions
and Lottery Contests.
Alex Suzdaltsev, Stanford University. Distributionally Robust Pricing in
Auctions.
Xiaogang Che, Durham University. Deposit Requirements in Auctions:
Theory and Empirical Evidence.
Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong, University of Bristol. On the Core of Auctions
with Externalities: Stability and Fairness.
Matching 2 LMB/031
Gaoji Hu, National University of Singapore. Resource-Consuming Deferred
Acceptance.
Shashwat Khare, Maastricht University. Stability in Matching with Couples
Having Non-Responsive Preferences.
Irene Yuan Lo, Columbia University. Information Acquisition Costs of
Matching Markets.
Vincent Iehle, Universite Paris-Dauphine. Timely Matching.
Refugee Assignment and Diversity LMB/36X
Philip Grech, ETH Zurich. Undesired Properties of the European
Commission’s Refugee Distribution Key.
Alex Teytelboym, University of Oxford. Refugee Resettlement, co-authored
by David Delacretaz, University of Melbourne.
Chia-Ling Hsu, Kyushu University. Promoting Diversity of Talents: A Market
Design Approach.
Tommy Andersson, Lund University. Assigning Refugees to Landlords in
Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings.
11:30-13:30, Jun 14
13
Growth and Development LMB/37X
Rong Zhang, Chongqing University. A Growth Model with Welfare Effect, co-
authored by Zaifu Yang, University of York.
Agnieszka Lipieta, Cracow University of Economics. Schumpeterian Evolution
as the Composition of Adjustment Processes, co-authored by Artur Lipieta,
Cracow University of Economics.
Sharanya Basu Roy, University College Cork. Ganga Action Plan (GAP): The
Challenge of Regulatory Quality.
Sayantan Ghosh Dastidar, University of Derby. Impact of Remittances on
Economic Growth in Developing Countries: The Role of Openness.
Networks and Matching LMB/38X
Benjamin Sperisen, Tulane University. Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative
Matching to Play a Dynamic Game.
Spiros Bougheas, University of Nottingham. Contagion in Stable Networks
Sonal Yadav, University of Padua. Matching with Homophily
Jean-Jacques Herings, Maastricht University. An Axiomatization of the
Proportional Rule in Financial Networks.
Information, Communication, Disclosure 1 LMB/008
Matthias Dahm, University of Nottingham. The Enforcement of Mandatory
Disclosure Rules.
Stefan Terstiege, Maastricht University. Disclosure Regulation.
Sergey Stepanov, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
Reputation Concerns and Information Aggregation.
Yangbo Song, The Chinese University of Hong Kong at Shenzhen. Dynamic
R&D Competition under Uncertainty and Strategic Disclosure
16:00-18:00, Jun 14
14
Parallel Sessions 3 (16:00-18:00, Jun 14) Day 1
Trading Processes and Markets 1 LMB/030 Ayse Yazici, Durham University. A Closer Look at Incentives in Senior Level Random Matching Markets. Emiliya Lazarova, University of East Anglia. A Look Upstream: Market Restructuring, Risk, Procurement Contracts and Efficiency. Yu Zhou, Osaka University. Minimum Price Walrasian Equilibrium for General Preferences: Serial Vickrey Algorithms. Jordi Massó, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility of Truth-telling in Stable Mechanisms in Monotonic Matching Markets. Implementation LMB/36X Michele Lombardi, University of Glasgow. Sequential Implementation without Commitment. Boaz Zik, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Implementation with Interdependent Payoffs. Ritesh Jain, Ohio State University. Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences. Naoki Yoshihara, University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization. Information, Communication, Disclosure 2 LMB/031 Qinggong Wu, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Coarse Communication and Institution Design. Claudia Herresthal, University of Cambridge. Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence. Avi Lichtig, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Enemy of My Enemy is (Better than) My Friend. Angel Hernando-Veciana, Universidad Carlos III. Cheap Talk and Strategic Rounding in LIBOR Submissions.
16:00-18:00, Jun 14
15
Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 1 LMB/37X Inácio Bó, Berlin Social Science Centre. Consistent Hiring by Rankings and Rules. Sumiyo Nishiguchi, Tokyo University of Science. Dynamic Social Choice for Disambiguation of Pronouns. Jens Gudmundsson, University of Copenhagen. Ranking Individuals on the Basis of Collaborations. Hans Peters, University of Maastricht. Effectivity and Power. Division and Provision Rules LMB/2XA Katharina Huesmann, University of Cologne. Public Provision of Scarce Resources when Preferences Are Non-Linear. Ryusuke Shinohara, Hosei University. Self-Representation Equilibria and Cost-Matching Grants with the Lindahl Price in Interregional Bargaining over Public Projects María Gómez-Rúa, Universidade de Vigo. A New Solution for Allocating the Costs of Cleaning a River: Fairness versus Incentive Compatibility. Min-hung Tsay and Chun-Hsien Yeh, National Chung Cheng University and Academia Sinica at Taipei. Relations among the Central Rules in Bankruptcy Problems: A Strategic Justification Perspective. Domain Restrictions LMB/2XB Peng Liu, Singapore Management University. Strategy-Proofness of the Probabilistic Serial Rule on Sequentially Dichotomous Domains. Panos Protopapas, University of Lausanne. On Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness: Median-Voting over Intervals. Hirofumi Yamamura, Hokusei Gakuen University. On Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness: A Full Characterization. Anup Pramanik, Osaka University. On Strategy-Proof Social Choice between Two Alternatives.
09:00-11:00, Jun 15
16
Parallel Sessions 4 (09:00-11:00, Jun 15) Day 2
Auctions 3 LMB/030
Peter Katuscak, RWTH Aachen University. How to Boost Revenues in First-
Price Auctions? The Magic of Disclosing Only Winning Bids from Past
Auctions.
Helene Mass, University of Cologne. Endogenous Worst-Case Beliefs in First-
Price Auctions.
Noriaki Okamoto, Keio University. An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for
Multiple Objects: Comments.
Ella Segev, Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Heterogeneous Risk/Loss
Aversion in Complete Information All-pay Auctions.
Bargaining 2 LMB/031
Xu Lang, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics.
Characterization of The Minimal Norm Solution in Bargaining with
Incomplete Information.
Soumendu Sarkar, TERI University. Bargaining for Land Acquisition:
Competition and Contiguity.
Oriol Tejada, ETH Zurich. Divide the Dollar and Conquer More: Sequential
Bargaining and Risk Aversion.
Shiran Rachmilevitch, University of Haifa. Bargaining with Periodic
Participation Costs.
Division, Claim and Related Problems LMB/36X
Ricardo Martinez, Universidad de Granada. The Problem of Dividing a
Budget among Several Districts.
Anna Bogomolnaia, University of Glasgow. Competitive Division of a Mixed
Manna.
Ryan Tierney, University of Montreal. Gale’s Flat Tax.
William Thomson, University of Rochester. New Properties of Rules to
Adjudicate Conflicting Claims.
09:00-11:00, Jun 15
17
Trading Processes and Markets 2 LMB/37X
Acelya Altuntas, University of Rochester. Trading Probabilities in Cycles.
Renaud Foucart, Humboldt University. Metasearch and Market
Concentration.
Yuan Ju, University of York. The English Housing Market Mechanism.
Kim-Sau Chung, Chinese University of Hongkong. Selling to Consumers with
Intransitive Indifference.
Information and Contracts 1 LMB/2XA
Vital Gretschko, Centre for European Economic Research. Contract Design
with Limited Commitment.
Menghan Xu, Xiamen University. Debt Contract with Limited Enforcement.
Colin Negenborn, Humboldt University. Lemons versus Collusion.
Anindya Bhattacharya, University of York. Local Institutional Structure and
Clientelistic Access to Employment: A Model for Less-Developed Rural
Economies.
Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 2 LMB/2XB
Remzi Sanver, Universite Paris-Dauphine. Evalutionwise Strategy-Proofness.
Bo Chen, University of Warwick. Who Should Cast the Casting Vote? Using
Sequential Voting to Amalgamate Information, co-authored by Steve Alpern,
University of Warwick.
Ata Atay, University of Barcelona. Multi-Sided Assignment Games with m-
Partite Graphs.
Shurojit Chatterji, Singapore Management University. Random Social Choice
Functions on Multidimensional Domains.
11:30-13:30, Jun 15
18
Parallel Sessions 5 (11:30-13:30, Jun 15) Day 2
Voting and Elections 2 LMB/2XA
Jean Lainé, LIRSA-CNAM. Manipulation by Vote Pairing in Single-Winner
Large Elections.
Dmitriy Vorobyev, Ural Federal University. Information Disclosure in
Elections with Sequential Costly Participation.
Matias Nunez, Universite Paris-Dauphine. Truth-Revealing Voting Rules for
Large Populations.
Ming Li, Concordia University. Optimal Majority Rule in Referenda.
Organ Exchange and Related Topics LMB/36X
Jörgen Kratz, Lund University. Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group
Barrier.
Yao Cheng, University of York. Efficient Kidney Exchange with Dichotomous
Preferences.
Francisco Robles, University of Barcelona. Axioms for the Minimum
Walrasian Equilibrium in Assignment Problems with Unitary Demands
Utku Unver, Boston College. Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Liver
Exchange.
Trading Processes and Markets 3 LMB/37X
Maciej Kotowski, Harvard University. Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange.
Radoslav Raykov, Bank of Canada. Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized
Two-Sided Markets with Weak Preferences.
Jinpeng Ma, Rutgers University. Convergence of Averaging Price Processes
under the Centralized Walrasian Auction and the Decentralized Double
Auction.
Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland. Market design and FCC incentive
auction.
11:30-13:30, Jun 15
19
Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 3 LMB/030
Patrick Harless, University of Glasgow. Solidarity in Social Choice: A Robust
Impossibility and a New Compromise Family.
Ville Korpela, Turku School of Economics. Social Choice Theory: A Neglected
Path to Possibility.
Norihito Sakamoto, Tokyo University of Science. A Class of Equity Criteria
Based on Dominance Principle and Individual Preferences: A New Concept of
Economic Equity.
Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University. A Rawlsian Approach to the
Queueing Problem.
Allocation Rules and Auction LMB/031
Daniel Z. Li, Durham University. Optimal Sequential Search Auctions with a
Deadline.
Abdul Quadir, Birla Institute of Technology and Science. Weak Envy-freeness
for Equals in Multi-Unit Auctions.
Shigehiro Serizawa, Osaka University. Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue
Maximization with no Wastage.
John A. Weymark, Vanderbilt of Economics, USA. Dominant Strategy
Implementability, Zero Length Cycles, and Affine Maximizers.
Allocation and Assignment 1 LMB/2XB
Peter Troyan, University of Virginia. Efficient and Essentially Stable
Assignments.
Jingyi Xue, Singapore Management University. Equal Quantiles Rules in
Resource Allocation with Uncertain Demands.
Kiyong Yun, Seoul National University. Characterizations of the Probabilistic
Serial Rule for the Simple Random Assignment Problem.
Huaxia Zeng, Lingnan (University) College. Random Assignments on
Preference Domains with a Tier Structure.
09:00-11:00, Jun 16
20
Parallel Sessions 6 (09:00-11:00, Jun 16) Day 3
Teams and Organizations LMB/36X
Alberto Vesperoni, Alpen-Adria-Universitat. A Team Theory of Strategic
Agglomeration.
Endre Csoka, Afred Renyi Institute of Mathematics. Efficient Teamwork.
Krzysztof Szczygielski, University of Warsaw. Incentives in Self-Regulatory
Organizations.
Paul Schweinzer, Alpen-Adria-Universitat. Optimal Team Composition and
the Apollo Effect
Allocation and Assignment 2 LMB/030
Jinyong Jeong, Boston College. Parking Slot Assignment Problem.
Tomoya Kazumura, Osaka University. Equal Treatment of Equals and
Strategy-Proofness in Object Allocation with Non-Quasilinear Preferences.
Mengling Li, Xiamen University. Pareto Efficient Assignments in the
Generalized Roommates Problem.
Yan Long, New York University. Optimal Strategy-Proof and Budget Balanced
Mechanisms to Assign Multiple Objects.
Implementation and Mechanisms LMB/37X
Makoto Hagiwara, Tokyo Institute of Technology. Ex Post Implementation: A
Full Characterization.
Lukas Block, University of Paderborn. Legislation Effects on Lobby Group
Formation.
Joosung Lee, University of Edinburgh. Mechanisms with Referrals: VCG
Mechanisms and Multilevel Mechanisms.
Tilman Borgers, University of Michigan. Simple Mechanisms.
09:00-11:00, Jun 16
21
Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 4 LMB/031
Andrea Gallice, Università di Torino. Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
through Position Uncertainty
Justin Kruger, Universite Paris-Dauphine. Restricting the Domain Allows for
Weaker Independence.
Laura Kasper, Saarland and Maastricht University. On Condorcet Consistency
and Two Instances of Participation Failure.
Huseyin Yildirim, Duke University. A Capture Theory of Committees.
Cooperation and Coalitional Behaviour 2 LMB/2XA
Oihane Gallo, University of the Basque Country. Rationing Rules and Stable
Coalition Structures.
Mert Kimya, Koc University. Equilibrium Coalitional Behavior.
Seckin Ozbilen, Istanbul Bilgi University. Strong Exchange Stability in Hedonic
Games.
Elena Molis, University of Granada. Random Paths to Stability in Hedonic
Games.
School Choice and Assignment 1 LMB/2XB
Toshiji Kawagoe, Future University Hakodate. The Skipping-down Strategy
and Stability in School Choice Problems with Affirmative Action: Theory and
Experiment.
Lucien Frys, Humboldt University. University Entrance Test and High Schools
Segregation.
Nadja Maraun, University of Paderborn. Boston School Choice Mechanism
and Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with Priorities Depending on Students’
Preferences.
Martin Van der Linden, Vanderbilt University. Manipulability and Tie-
Breaking in Constrained School Choice.
11:30-13:30, Jun 16
22
Parallel Sessions 7 (11:30-13:30, Jun 16) Day 3
Allocation and Assignment 3 LMB/2XA
Marina Nunez Oliver, University of Barcelona. The Dual Assignment Game,
Rational Allocation and Exactness.
Ryosuke Sakai, Osaka University. Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in
Assignment Problem with Discrete Payments.
Josue Alberto Ortega Sandoval, University of Glasgow. Fair Assignments for
Generalized Tennis Problems.
Madhav Raghavan, University of Lausanne. Efficient Pairwise Allocation via
Partner Trading.
Experiments and Empirics 1 LMB/2XB
Angelika Endres, Paderborn University. Network Formation and Disruption –
An Experiment: Are Efficient Networks too Complex?
Siqi Song, University of York. Evidence of Herding Behaviour on eBay
Inventory Listing
Rustamdjan Hakimov, Berlin Social Science Centre. Iterative Versus Standard
Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence
Maria Montero, University of Nottingham. Communication with Partially
Verifiable Information: An Experiment
School Choice and Assignment 2 LMB/030
Christian Basteck, Université Libre de Bruxelles and F.R.S. Cognitive Ability
and Games of School Choice.
Fatma Aslan, Istanbul Bilgi University. Job Mobility of Couples when
Distance Matters.
Umut Dur, North Carolina State University. Competitive Equilibrium in
School Assignment.
Peter Biro, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Efficiency and Fair Access in
Kindergarten Allocation Policy Design.
11:30-13:30, Jun 16
23
Coordination, Timing and Investment LMB/36X
Huanhuan Zheng, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Coordinated Trading
and Market Efficiency.
Chun-Ting Chen, National Taiwan University. Coordination in Social
Networks: Communication by Actions.
Tomomi Miyazaki, Kobe University. Public Investment and Stock Prices: The
Case of Japan.
Jacco Thijssen, University of York. On Quality Standards and the Timing of
Pharmaceutical Investment.
College, School Admission and Related Topics LMB/37X
Eun Jeong Heo, Vanderbilt University. Financial Aids in College Admissions:
Need-Based versus Merit-Based.
Mustafa Oguz Afacan, Sabanci University. Graduate Admission with Financial
Support.
Josep Izquierdo, Universitat de Barcelona. Core Incentives Properties in Joint
Investment Problems.
Lars Ehlers, Universite de Montreal. (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice.
Rules and Mechanisms LMB/031
Yuta Nakamura, Keio University. Dispute Mediation Mechanisms.
İpek Özkal Sanver, Istanbul Bilgi University. Compromise Rules Revisited.
Justus Winkelmann, University of Bonn. A Ranking Mechanism for Coupled
Binary Decision Problems.
Bettina Klaus, University of Lausanne. A Characterization of Serial
Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices.
16:00-18:00, Jun 16
24
Parallel Sessions 8 (16:00-18:00, Jun 16) Day 3
Information and Contracts 2 LMB/2XA
Alexandros Rigos, Lund University. A Beauty Contest with Flexible
Information Acquisition.
Thomas Schacherer, Humboldt-University. Long-Term Contracting with
Unequal Discounting.
Xinyi Xu, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Existence of Optimal
Deterministic Contracts in Moral Hazard Problems.
Karol Flores-Szwagrzak, University of Southern Demark. Co-Authorship and
the Measurement of Individual Productivity.
Experiments and Empirics 2 LMB/030
Oktay Sürücü, Bielefeld University. Asymmetric Dominance Effect with
Multiple Decoys.
Zhen Lei, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics. Does More
Corruption Generate Less Resistance? An Experimental Study.
Karl Robert Jandoc, University of the Philippines-Diliman. An Experimental
Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions.
Alex Possajennikov, University of Nottingham. The Choice of Voting Rules
under a Veil of Ignorance: Experimental Evidence.
Trading Processes and Markets 4 LMB/031
Vincent Meisner, Technical University Berlin. Competing for Strategic
Buyers.
Dimitris Voliotis, University of Piraeus. The Dark Side of Trading: A Strategic
Model.
Bernhard Kasberger, University of Vienna. Welfare in the Auction After-
Market.
16:00-18:00, Jun 16
25
Contest, Implementation and Identification LMB/36X
Wonki Jo Cho, Korea University. Identifying Groups in a Boolean Algebra.
Zhewei Wang, Shandao University. Optimal Multi-Dimensional Rank-Order
Contest.
Mehmet Barlo, Sabanci University. Behavioural Implementation under
Incomplete Information.
Choice, Contract and Matching LMB/37X
Li Chen, University of Gothenburg. Time-Constrained School Choice.
Rongzhu Ke, Chinese University of Hong Kong. A General Solution Method
for Moral Hazard Problem.
Sean Horan, University of Montreal. How to ``Reveal’’ Hidden Substitutes.
26
Emergency Calls
999 is the official emergency number in the UK. You should call this
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27
Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge all financial and administrative support from
the Department of Economics and Centre for Mechanism and Institution
Design, University of York. We wish to thank Jo Swaffield for her never-
failing support, Vin McDermott for his generous help, and Annette
Johnson for her excellent assistance.