2016 08-16 ctp update and assessment

AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

August 16, 2016

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. The loss of ISIS’s Libyan stronghold in Sirte will not eliminate the group’s threat to European targets. ISIS may already have plans to conduct attacks in Italy.

2. A U.S.-supported Somali special forces raid may have killed al Shabaab emir Ahmad Umar. The pace of operations to degrade al Shabaab’s leadership may not be rapid enough to disrupt al Shabaab’s activities.

3. AQAP’s withdrawal from population centers in southern Yemen is a short-term setback that preserves the group’s capabilities.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

al Qaeda NetworkAL QAEDA EMIR AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI CALLED ON MUSLIMS TO FOLLOW AL QAEDA’S LEAD AND DISMISSED

EFFORTS TO EFFECT CHANGE THROUGH THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. AL QAEDA EMIR AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI CRITICIZED THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND

SUBMITTING TO THE REGULATION OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT IN AN AUGUST 13 STATEMENT RELEASED BY AL SAHAB MEDIA FOUNDATION. ZAWAHIRI’S STATEMENT FOLLOWS A SERIES OF AL QAEDA LEADERSHIP STATEMENTS CRITIQUING THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND AL SHAM’S (ISIS) ACTIONS. ZAWAHIRI SAID THAT THE ARAB SPRING FAILED IN EGYPT, TUNISIA, AND YEMEN. BUT THAT “VICTORY” IS NEAR FOR JIHADISTS IN SYRIA. ZAWAHIRI’S SUPPORT FOR THE SYRIAN JIHAD INDICATES THAT NEWLY ANNOUNCED SYRIAN GROUP, JABHAT FATAH AL SHAM, CONTINUES TO PURSUE AL QAEDA’S OBJECTIVES. THE LEADER OF AL QAEDA’S

SYRIAN AFFILIATE JABHAT AL NUSRA ANNOUNCED THE END OF HIS GROUP’S OPERATIONS AND THE CREATION OF JABHAT FATAH AL SHAM, WHICH DOES NOT HAVE FORMAL TIES TO AL QAEDA. ZAWAHIRI ALSO

NOTED THAT LIBYA’S FATE IS UNDETERMINED, INDICATING THAT THE AL QAEDA NETWORK MAY SUPPORT SALAFI-JIHADI MILITIAS CURRENTLY FIGHTING IN EASTERN LIBYA.

THE TEHRIK-E-TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP) IS PRIORITIZING ITS OBJECTIVES IN PAKISTAN OVER THOSE IN KASHMIR. TTP LEADERS BELIEVE THAT WAGING JIHAD IN KASHMIR BEFORE COMPLETING THEIR GOALS IN

PAKISTAN WOULD LEAVE THEM VULNERABLE TO AN “ATTACK FROM BEHIND” FROM PAKISTANI FORCES. THE TTP PUBLISHED THE STRATEGY IN AN AUGUST 10 TELEGRAM POST. THE STATEMENT ALSO EULOGIZED AL

QAEDA COMMANDER ILYAS KASHMIRI, WHO WAS KILLED IN JUNE 2011.

JAMATUL AHRAR, A TTP SPLINTER GROUP, CONTINUED A PATTERN OF ATTACKS OUTSIDE GUIDANCE ISSUED BY THE TTP AND AL QAEDA. SUSPECTED JAMATUL AHRAR MILITANTS DETONATED A REMOTE-CONTROLLED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE TARGETING A SHARI’A COURT JUDGE IN QUETTA, WESTERN PAKISTAN, ON

AUGUST 11. ISIS-AFFILIATED AL BAYAN RADIO NEWS CLAIMED ON AUGUST 12 THAT ISIS CONDUCTED THE ATTACK. JAMATUL AHRAR LEADER OMAR KHALID KHORASANI DENIED CONNECTIONS TO AL QAEDA OR ISIS.

KHORASANI ALSO STATED THAT JAMATUL AHRAR HAD NO INTERESTS OUTSIDE OF PAKISTAN.

Outlook: The al Qaeda network will support the new Syrian group, Jabhat Fatah al Sham, in its fight against the Assad regime.

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PoliticalThe al Houthi-Saleh alliance is attempting to delegitimize Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government through unilateral political actions. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance swore in eight members of its newly created Supreme Political Council. UN-led peace talks remain suspended and are scheduled to resume in September.

Outlook: Peace talks will not resume as scheduled. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance will continue to establish a new government based in Sana’a.

Security• Hadi government forces are seeking a decisive military victory over the al Houthi-Saleh alliance after peace talks failed

to yield a political agreement. Coalition-backed government forces renewed assaults on Sana’a and Taiz. Hadi-allied fighters secured positions in Nihm district, northeast of Sana’a, in an effort to secure the main road into the capital. Hadi government forces seized contested areas in eastern Taiz city. Al Houthi-Saleh forces continue to launch attacks on southern Saudi Arabia as part of a campaign likely intended to induce the Saudi government into direct negotiations with the alliance.

Outlook: Neither the Sana’a nor the Taiz operation will produce a decisive victory that will end the war.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP is withdrawing from population centers in southern Yemen in the face of coalition-backed counterterrorism operations, but these losses will be temporary setbacks. AQAP draws its strength from a relationship with local Sunni populations, not control of territory. Hadi government forces, backed by Saudi-coalition airstrikes, seized Azzan, Shabwah governorate on August 9, and Zinjibar, al Shaqra and Ja’ar, Abyan governorate on August 14. AQAP militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) targeting Hadi government troops in Shaqra on August 15. Police forces arrested suspected AQAP members in Aden on August 11 and August 15.

Outlook: AQAP may attempt to disrupt counterterrorism operations in Abyan, but will not fight to reclaim the towns. AQAP will continue to assassinate officials in Aden in an effort to destabilize the Hadi government.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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1) 09 AUG: The Saudi-led coalition resumed airstrikes on Sana’a city.2) 11 AUG: Al Houthi-Saleh forces attacked Saudi military positions outside Najran city. 3) 14 AUG: Hadi government forces seized Zinjibar and Ja’ar from AQAP in Abyan.4) 15 AUG: A Saudi-led coalition airstrike hit a Doctors Without Borders-run hospital in Abs district, Hajjah.5) 15 AUG: AQAP detonated a SVBIED targeting Hadi forces in Shaqra, Abyan.

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PoliticalSomali officials are attempting to remove clan dynamics from national politics. The National Leadership Forum (NLF), a body charged with developing rules for the upcoming elections, announced that individuals elected to parliament must join a political party by October 2018. The system used to assign representation in the upcoming elections relies on clans for organization.

Outlook: Clan politics will play a significant role in the 2016 elections and will continue to dominate Somali politics despite structural political changes.

Security Somali special forces supported by U.S. advisors continued to target al Shabaab leadership. U.S.-backed Somali troops may have killed al Shabaab emir Ahmad Umar and spokesman Abdul Aziz Abu Mus’ab in operations near Sakow town in Middle Jubba region on August 10 and 13. The August 10 operation killed three militants, whose identities remain unconfirmed. U.S. forces also assisted Somali operators in a successful raid on al Shabaab positions in Awdheegle town in Lower Shabelle region on July 25.

Outlook: U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations will continue to eliminate al Shabaab leaders, but the pace of the operations may only generate a limited impact on the larger insurgent network.

Al Shabaab The death of al Shabaab emir Ahmad Umar, if confirmed, would challenge the group’s cohesiveness and coordination in the short term. Ahmad Umar suppressed pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) sentiment within al Shabaab. Umar also used harsh tactics to repress dissent, internal divisions, and generational infighting in the group. Umar’s death could lead to discord and a temporary decrease in al Shabaab’s operational tempo, but it would not degrade al Shabaab in the long term.

Outlook: A senior member of al Shabaab’s Shura Council would replace Umar as emir.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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HoA SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 09 AUG -15 AUG

1) 10 AUG: Warplanes struck al Shabaab positions near Jilib town, Middle Jubba region.2) 10 AUG: U.S. SOF advised Somali SOF in a raid targeting al Shabaab militants in Sakow town, Middle Jubba region.3) 11 AUG: Al Shabaab militants ambushed SNA and AMISOM forces near Hudur town, Bakool region.4) 14 AUG: Somali security forces interdicted a SVBIED bound for Bakara Market, Mogadishu.

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PoliticalThe UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is growing weaker. Protesters throughout Libya demonstrated against the GNA’s foreign counterterrorism partners and called for the nullification of the December 2015 Libyan Political Agreement that established the GNA. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Gen. Khalifa Haftar and his international backers seek to solidify his power against the GNA and its allies by expanding military rule in eastern and southern Libya. Gen. Haftar replaced the civilian mayor of Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, with a military governor on August 12.

Outlook: Haftar’s consolidation of power will spark conflict with rival factions and prevent the GNA from gaining authority in eastern Libya.

SecurityThe LNA is mobilizing against the GNA-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) for control of oil terminals in eastern Libya. The LNA’s military governor for eastern Libya announced that the LNA intends to seize and protect the Zueitina, al Sidra, and Ras Lanuf terminals. The PFG currently controls these sites.

Outlook: The LNA will attack Zueitina and may ignite a larger conflict with the PFG over eastern Libya’s oil.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS in Libya retains the capability to attack beyond Libya’s borders despite the imminent loss of Sirte. GNA-allied militias captured ISIS’s primary remaining stronghold in the city. ISIS in Libya may plan to attack Italy from Libya and may have ties to a cell in Milan according to documents discovered in Sirte. Tunisian and Algerian forces have increased border security as ISIS militants flee the failing Sirte into the southern desert and across borders. The United States continued to conduct airstrikes as parts of its 30-day campaign against ISIS in Sirte that began on August 1.

Outlook: ISIS militants who fled into southwestern Libya will likely establish a safe haven from which they will attack northern Libya and neighboring countries.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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LIBYA SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 09 AUG - 15 AUG

1) 14 AUG: The Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade attacked the GNA’s intelligence headquarters in Tripoli.2) 10 AUG: GNA-allied Misratan forces seized ISIS’s headquarters in Sirte.3) 13 AUG: The LNA moved two battalions into the town of Zueitina, close to the PFG-controlled Zueitina oil terminal.4) 11 AUG: French special forces aiding the LNA withdrew from Benghazi.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)Algerian security forces cleared militant safe havens and interdicted arms caches in eastern Algeria and in southern Algeria

near the Malian border. AQIM maintains support zones in these regions. Outlook: AQIM may carry out small-scale attacks to defend its safe havens in Algeria. Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)Tunisia is cracking down on cross-border smuggling, citing the threat of ISIS militants fleeing Sirte and attempting to enter

Tunisia. Tunisian authorities arrested more than 10 smugglers with suspected links to ISIS this week.

Outlook: Crackdowns on the smuggling trade will limit the mobility of ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Tunisia in the short term, but they may drive Salafi-jihadi recruitment in the country’s impoverished interior regions in the long term.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)The UN peacekeeping force, MINUSMA, has been unable to prevent the outbreak of renewed violence in northern Mali,

despite a recently strengthened mandate. GATIA, a pro-government militia, defended territory north of Kidal from an advance by a coalition of ex-separatist Tuareg groups. The groups fought three times this month for control of Kidal and its environs. Peace talks are ongoing in Bamako, Mali’s capital.

Abubakar Shekau’s faction of Boko Haram is using propaganda to underscore its strength in a power struggle against the former Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi. ISIS named Barnawi as the governor of its West African affiliate in place of Shekau on August 3. Shekau’s faction released a video showing a number of schoolgirls that Boko Haram kidnapped from Chibok, Nigeria in April 2014.The video shows the bodies of some girls, allegedly killed by Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) airstrikes, to rally support for Shekau and incite backlash against the MNJTF and the Nigerian government.

Outlook: GATIA may launch an offensive to retake Kidal after securing the city’s environs this week.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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3 21) 10 AUG: Tunisian security forces dismantled a suspected terrorist cell in Sidi Ali Ben Aoun, Tunisia.2) 12 AUG: Tunisian security forces arrested a suspected militant in Tunis, Tunisia.3) 15 AUG: The Algerian army destroyed a weapons cache in Sidi Ali Bounab, Algeria. 4) 15 AUG: Tunisian security forces arrested five smugglers with suspected Salafi-jihadi ties in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia.

MAGHREB SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 09 AUG - 15 AUG

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SAHEL SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 09 AUG- 15 AUG

1) 10 AUG: A coalition of ex-separatist groups (CMA) clashed with a pro-government militia (GATIA) north of Kidal, Mali.2) 10 AUG: Ansar al Din executed five Malian soldiers near Tenenkou, Mali.3) 12 AUG: Algerian security forces destroyed an arms cache in Tamanrasset, Algeria. 4) 13 AUG: Militants assassinated a commander of a pro-government militia in Timbuktu, Mali.

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch [email protected] (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran [email protected](202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran [email protected](202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram [email protected](202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda [email protected](202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran [email protected](202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

[email protected] (202) 888-6569