2014 REMINDERS for POLITICAL LAW
2015 REMINDERS for POLITICAL LAW
Carlo L. Cruz
SEPARATION OF POWERS - Unless the Constitution provides
otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all
roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the
national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other
appropriation law. Clearly, these post-enactment measures which
govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight
and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties
that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by
virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or
another, authorized to participate in "the various operational
aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and
release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers
principle. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566,
November 19, 2013]
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for
certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and
practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National
Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of
powers, namely: (a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from
the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn
unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings
prior to the end of the fiscal year without complying with the
statutory definition of savings contained in the General
Appropriations Acts; and (b) The cross-border transfers of the
savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other
offices outside the Executive. The Court further DECLARES VOID the
use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by
the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the
revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in
the relevant General Appropriations Acts. [Araullo v. Aquino, G.R.
No. 209287, February 3, 2015]
Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the
Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in
the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category
or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the
Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of
augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In
the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an
expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense
category belongs to Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does
not take away the caveat that only DAP projects found in the
appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally
accumulated savings. [Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February
3, 2015]Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive
Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines.
Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim against the Government
of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the
Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question
the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive
Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department,
either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign
relations with Japan in a certain manner. [Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, August 13, 2014]
Checks and Balances The Presidents disapproval of a bill,
commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act.
[Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, 62 Phil. 912,
cited in Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November
19, 2013]DELEGATION OF POWERS the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it
confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. [Belgica v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]
The 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made
by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual
legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability
principle as afore-discussed. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 208566, November 19, 2013]
Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also
raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing
authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual
amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation.
Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects
of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in
effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the
principle of non-delegability. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]
Presidential Pork Barrel - the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used
This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of
Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds
"to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government," remains legally effective and
subsisting the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned
phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used
as it should be used only in accordance with the avowed purpose and
intention of PD 910. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
208566, November 19, 2013]
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance
the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the
second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for
restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to
use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so
determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a
definition of "priority infrastructure development projects" and
hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the
same. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November
19, 2013]
The proviso under Section 9 of the RH Law which states that "any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made
available on the condition that it is not to be used as an
abortifacient" is empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its
expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all
be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in
every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be
used. [Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014]
The issuance of a Barangay Protection Order by the Punong
Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay
Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing
physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to
cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the
Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance
of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws
and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay. Not
violative of the principle of delegation. [Garcia v. Drilon, G. R.
No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352; Tua v. Mangrobang, G.R.
No. 170701, January 22, 2014]
Article I The Archipelago Doctrine - teaches that the outermost
points of our terrestrial domain are to be connected with straight
baselines and all waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as
our internal waters. As internal waters, they are subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Philippines. Archipelagic sealanes
are to be laid on these waters over which foreign ships will have
the right of passage as if they were open seas.
UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour
of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets
the deadline for the filing of application for the extended
continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522
shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints
around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate
their own applicable maritime zones baselines laws are nothing but
statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental
shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based
rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters
(Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article
33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources
in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf
(Article 77). [Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16,
2011]
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea - Territorial Sea - provides
for a uniform breadth of 12 miles from the low-water mark of the
coast. Contiguous Zone - 12 miles from the outer limits of the
territorial sea exercise of protective jurisdiction in a zone of
the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal state
may exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
regulations within its territory or territorial sea. Economic Zone
or Patrimonial Sea - extending 200 miles from the low water mark of
the coastal state all living and non-living resources found therein
belong exclusively to the coastal state. The Continental Shelf
refers to [a] the seabed and the subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside of the territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit, to where the depth of
the subjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of the said areas, and [b] to the seabed and subsoil of
similar areas adjacent to the coasts of the islands. The costal
state has the EXCLUSIVE sovereign right to explore the continental
shelf and to exploit its natural resources, and no one else may do
so without its consent. [Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167,
August 16, 2011]
Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article
I of the Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III
(Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the
body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air
space over it and the submarine areas underneath The imposition of
these passage rights [right of innocent passage and the right of
transit passage through international straits] through archipelagic
waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in
exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as
archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty.
[Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011]
Petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine
territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose
the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits
to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal: SEC. 2. The
baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines
likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined
as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines
consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as
constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and b) Bajo de
Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. [Magallona v. Ermita,
G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011]In the absence of municipal
legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III,
operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea
or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and
conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent
passage is a customary international law, thus automatically
incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can
validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent
passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures from the
international community. The fact that for archipelagic States,
their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent
passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing
vis--vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their
territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of
transit passage through international straits. The imposition of
these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III
was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their
right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as
archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More
importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and
the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity
prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under
UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones,
placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24
nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty,
subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS
III. [Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011]The Open
Seas res communes but a state may exercise jurisdiction on the open
seas over its vessels, over pirates, in the exercise of the right
to visit and search and under the doctrine of hot pursuit. Outer
space, like the open seas, is res communes and NOT susceptible to
discovery and occupation; it is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty. A state is responsible for
whatever injury or damage any object it sends to outer space may
cause.
The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity [BJE] is not merely an expanded
version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the
national government being fundamentally different from that of the
ARMM. Indeed, the BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,ARTICLE
II - generally not a source of enforceable rights EXCEPT the
Incorporation Clause and Section 28 on the policy of public
disclosure duty to disclose [which presents a SPLENDID SYMMETRY to
Article III, Section 7 on the Right to Information].The
Constitution now describes the Philippines as not only a republican
but also a democratic State. NOTE provisions on initiative on
national legislation [Article VI (32)] and initiative on amendment
of the Constitution. [Article VII (2)]. - Besides, the 1987
Constitution accords to the citizens a greater participation in the
affairs of government. Indeed, it provides for people's initiative,
the right to information on matters of public concern (including
the right to know the state of health of their President), as well
as the right to file cases questioning the factual bases for the
suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpusor declaration
of martial law. These provisions enlarge the peoples right in the
political as well as the judicial field. It grants them the right
to interfere in the affairs of government and challenge any act
tending to prejudice their interest. [Petitioner Organizations v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012] - SEE
also Article II [23] The State shall encourage non-governmental,
community based, or sectoral organizations that provide the welfare
of the nation. Article X [14] The President shall provide for
regional development councils xxx composed of local government
officials, and representatives from non-governmental organizations
xxx Article X [18] The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. x x x. Article XII [9] The Congress may
establish an independent economic and planning agency headed by the
President, which shall, after consultations with the xxx various
private sectors xxx Article XIII [15] The State shall respect the
role of independent peoples organizations. Article XIII [16] The
right of the people and their organizations to effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and
economic decision-making shall not be abridged. Article XVI [12]
The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President
on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority
of the members of which shall come from the communities.
Whatever good is done by the government is attributed to the
State but every harm inflicted on the people is imputed not to the
State but to the government alone. Such injury may justify the
replacement of the government by revolution, theoretically at the
behest of the State, in a development known as direct State
action.
Parens Patriae guardian of the rights of the people Offensive
language (low value expressions) in television may be regulated or
even banned for the sake of the children. Justification parens
patriae. [Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009] A
belligerent occupation would have no effect on the continued
effectivity of the law on treason. Accordingly, political laws,
like the Constitution, were merely suspended, subject to revival
under the jus postliminium upon the end of the occupation.
Suspension of political laws affects only the civilians, and not
the soldiers or enemies in arms. [Ruffy v. Chief of Staff] Also
does not apply to treason [Laurel v. Misa]. Non-political laws,
like the Civil Code, remain effective, unless changed by the
belligerent occupant. Judicial decisions, such as a conviction for
defamation, shall remain valid even after a belligerent occupation,
except those of a political complexion.
Right to Self-Determination right to freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and
cultural development. Internal self-determination a peoples pursuit
of its political, economic, social and cultural development within
the framework of an existing state. External self-determination -
the establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free
association or integration with an independent State or the
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a
people. The peoples right to self-determination should not,
however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of
secession. [The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R.
No. 183591, October 14, 2008]
Distinguish the Incorporation Clause or Doctrine of
Incorporation from the Doctrine of Transformation accepted rules of
international law must first be enacted into legislation. [Note
both doctrines are applicable in our jurisdiction. There is
transformation when the Senate gives its concurrence to
treaties.]
Tax treaties are entered into "to reconcile the national fiscal
legislations of the contracting parties and, in turn, help the
taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxations in two different
jurisdictions." Thus, laws and issuances must ensure that the
reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties
entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose additional requirements
that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under
international agreements. [Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 188550, August 19,
2013]
A zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human
being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of
conception, that is, upon fertilization. [Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
204819, April 8, 2014]
Thus, the word primarily in Section 3.0I(a and G) of the RH-IRR
should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0I(a
and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that
have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively open
the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. To repeat
and emphasize, in all cases, the principle of no abortion embodied
in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld. [Imbong v.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014]
Education - the academic freedom accorded to institutions of
higher learning gives them the right to decide for themselves their
aims and objectives and how best to attain them. They are given the
exclusive discretion to determine who can and cannot study in them,
as well as to whom they can confer the honor and distinction of
being their graduates. This necessarily includes the prerogative to
establish requirements for graduation, such as the completion of a
thesis, and the manner by which this shall be accomplished by their
students. The courts may not interfere with their exercise of
discretion unless there is a clear showing that they have
arbitrarily and capriciously exercised their judgment. [Calawag v.
University of the Philippines Visayas, G.R. No. 207412, August 7,
2013]
Political Dynasties Section 26 (of Article II) is not
self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by
law." since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes
the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must
defer from ruling on this issue. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]
ARTICLE VI The commencement of the terms and the regular
election of legislators may be changed by law. An increase in their
salaries shall take effect after the expiration of the full term of
all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase.
Qualifications - Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 requiring candidates for
senator to be certified illegal-drug free unconstitutional list of
constitutional qualifications exclusive, may not be enlarged by
Congress. [Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R.
No. 157870, November 3, 2008]
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship from
running for local elective positions. There is likewise no doubt
that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a
citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a
passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the
person named therein as its national. It is unquestioned that
Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired
American citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of
Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American
citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his
American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six
times. If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the
efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his American citizenship when
he subsequently used his U.S. passport Allowing the subsequent use
of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do
so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of
taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality. The
dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man
without a country". On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found
Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say
that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely
points out is that he also possessed another citizenship at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy. [Macquiling v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, July 2, 2013]
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must
have a dwelling place where one resides no matter how modest and
regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of land does
not make it ones residence. The fact that the residential structure
where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on
the lot she purchased means that she has not yet established actual
and physical residence in the barangay xxx A temporary stay in a
strangers house cannot amount to residence Approval of voter
registration does not presuppose six-month residency in the place
prior to registration. [Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 193314, June 25, 2013] The critical issue, however, pertains to
Osmeas bodily presence in Toledo City and the declaration he made
in his COC on this point. The petitioners claim that Osmea was only
seen in Toledo City in the month of September 2012 to conduct
political meetings. They also stress that the dilapidated property
in Ibo, Toledo City is not even owned by Osmea, and is not in
keeping with the latters stature a former Senator and a member of a
political clan The law does not require a person to be in his home
twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the
residency requirement. In Fernandez v. House Electoral Tribunal, we
ruled that the "fact that a few barangay health workers attested
that they had failed to see petitioner whenever they allegedly made
the rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no moment, especially
considering that there were witnesses (including petitioner's
neighbors in Villa de Toledo) that were in turn presented by
petitioner to prove that he was actually a resident of Villa de
Toledo, in the address he stated in his COC. x x x It may be that
whenever these health workers do their rounds petitioner was out of
the house to attend to his own employment or business." Similarly,
the fact that Osmea has no registered property under his name does
not belie his actual residence in Toledo City because property
ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates
for local election. It is enough that he should live in the
locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative.
To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative
indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only
the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement.
In Perez v. COMELEC, we sustained the COMELEC when it considered as
evidence tending to establish a candidates domicile of choice the
mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment by a candidate
in the same province where he ran for the position of governor
Osmeas actual physical presence in Toledo City is established not
only by the presence of a place (Ibo, Toledo City, house and lot)
he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons
in Toledo City. Osmeas substantial and real interest in
establishing his domicile of choice in Toledo City is also
sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional
property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration and
headquarters, but also his participation in the communitys
socio-civic and political activities. Osmea has been proclaimed
winner in the electoral contest and has therefore the mandate of
the electorate Before his transfer of residence, Osmea already had
intimate knowledge of Toledo City, particularly of the whole 3rd
legislative district that he represented for one term. Thus, he
manifests a significant level of knowledge of and sensitivity to
the needs of the said community. Moreover, Osmea won the mayoralty
position as the choice of the people of Toledo City. [Jalover v. de
la Pena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014]
The prescriptive period under the HRET Rules [for the
institution of election contests] does not apply to
disqualification cases based on citizenship. Being a continuing
requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it
may still question the same at any time, the prescriptive period
notwithstanding.BUT it is the State, through its representatives
designated by statute that may question the illegally or invalidly
procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may
be raised by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizens descendant. [Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.
178831-32, April 1, 2009]
Party-List Representatives - The COMELEC cannot issue
implementing rules and regulations that provide an additional
ground - when the nomination is withdrawn by the party - for the
substitution of a party-list nominee. RA 7941 lists only 3 grounds
death, disability and withdrawal by the nominee himself. [Lokin v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 180443, June 22, 2010]
A party-list nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within
the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new
sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six
months before the elections. [Amores v. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June
29, 2010]
For every four district representatives, there shall be one
party-list representative. There is no need for legislation to
create an additional party-list seat whenever four additional
legislative districts are created by law.Section 5(2), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution automatically creates such additional
party-list seat.[BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8,
2009]
The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not
mandatory. Four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list
election system:[1] Twenty percent of the total number of the
membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of
seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is
automatically one party-list seat for every four existing
legislative districts. [2] Garnering two percent of the total votes
cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list
organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in
a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two
percent of the total party-list votes. [3] The additional seats,
that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed
seats, shall be distributed to the party-list
organizationsincluding those that received less than two percent of
the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats
is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and
physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list
seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in
a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step
procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified
in this Resolution. (Two-Step Procedure - The percentage of votes
garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the
number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total
number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps
in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is
multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the
difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the
two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage
and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share
in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list
seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats
are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38
seats in the second round of seat allocation.) [4] The three-seat
cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the
Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list
system. [BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009]
Parameters for party-list registration: 1. Three different
groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations,
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. 2. National parties or
organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector. 3. Political parties can
participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative
district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate
in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing
is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition. 4. Sectoral parties or
organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or
lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that
their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political
constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth. 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented
must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties
or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined
political constituencies, either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties
or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations. 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified. [Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013]
There is no arguing that the COMELEC Resolution dated January 5,
2010 granting LPGMAs registration has since become final. Such
finality, however, pertains only to the Resolution itself and not
to the accreditation of LPGMA as a party-list organization The
Resolution did not create in LPGMAs favor a perpetual and
indefeasible right to its accreditation as a party-list
organization. Neither did it grant finality and indefeasibility to
the factual findings of the COMELEC on the qualifications of the
group. Both the accreditation and the facts substantiating the same
can be reviewed and revoked at any time by the COMELEC, motu
propio, or upon the instance of any interested party thru a
complaint for cancellation, as set forth in Section 6 of R.A. No.
7941. [Dayao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193643]
There are two kinds of congressmen elected from legislative
districts and those elected through the party-list system. Once
elected, the party-list representative has the same rights,
privileges and duties as the district representative. They are also
subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of
three consecutive terms. The consistent judicial holding is that
the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of
party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of
office. [Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010]
No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a
vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office." Under
Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC is
entrusted with the function to "register, after sufficient
publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which,
in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government." In fulfilling this function, the COMELEC is
duty-bound to review the grant of registration to parties,
organizations, or coalitions already registered in order to ensure
the latters continuous adherence to the requirements prescribed by
law and the relevant rulings of this Court relative to their
qualifications and eligibility to participate in party-list
elections. The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the
retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 on the
ground of the impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS vested right. Be that
as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly provided
for its retroactive application, the Court finds that the COMELEC
En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and
accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS. The reason for this is that the
ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing
agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not
implemented Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not
actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR
CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and
arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. [Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013]
Under Section 4 of RA No. 7941, a party-list group already
registered "need not register anew" for purposes of every
subsequent election, but only needs to file a manifestation of
intent to participate with the COMELEC. [COCOFED v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013; Alliance for
Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 206987, September 10, 2013]
The fact that COCOFED did not obtain sufficient number of votes
in the elections does not affect the issue of the validity of the
COMELECs registration. [COCOFED v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 207026, August 6, 2013]
A party is not allowed to simply refuse to submit a list
containing "not less than five nominees" and consider the
deficiency as a waiver on its part. [COCOFED v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013; Alliance for
Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 206987, September 10, 2013]
Sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no
longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e.
proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause
of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector evidence showing a track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors is only required from
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually belong to
the sector represented by their party or organization. [Abang
Lingkod Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206952,
October 22, 2013]
Legislative Districts Gerrymandering is a term employed to
describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived
as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power.The law
clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number
of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of
registered voters therein. [Herrera v. COMELECInhibitions -
allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation a matter before another office of government renders
them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office
insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional
oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF
Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar
nature are deemed as unconstitutional. [Belgica v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]
Legislative power - appropriation, taxation, expropriation - not
exclusive to Congress initiative and referendum may be exercised
directly by the people RA 6735 includes the power to amend or
repeal laws.The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise
of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny - to determine economy and efficiency of the
operation of government activities; investigation under Section 21;
and supervision (or legislative veto) which connotes a continuing
and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee
regarding executive operations in a given administrative area.
While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry
into past executive branch actions in order to influence future
executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows
Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making
authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated
authority. xxx. The requirement that the implementing rules of a
law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for their
effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of
bicameralism and the rule on presentment.The power to grant
immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative prerogative
springs from its authority to define and prescribe punishment for
crimes. [Quarto v. the Honorable Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, G.R. No.
169042, October 5, 2011]
The supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054 [Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
provides: Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this
Organic Act may be re-amended or revised by the Congress of the
Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the
House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.] is
unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot
pass irrepealable laws. [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012]
We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected
in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the
2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because
a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution the
term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3)
years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by
holdover by Congress If it will be claimed that the holdover period
is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is
for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for
the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is
constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what
it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively
extend the term of the incumbents Congress cannot also create a new
term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the
new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and
an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment
power of the President. [Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978,
October 13, 2005; Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011]
The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly
franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive
in character. [Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution]
Non-legislative powers of Congress canvass of presidential
elections [VII, 5]; declaration of existence of a state of war
[VII, 23 (2)]; resolution of conflicts between the President and a
majority of his Cabinet regarding his ability to discharge his
functions [VII, 11] confirmation of amnesties [VII, 19], and of
presidential appointments [VII, 16]; amendment or revision of the
Constitution [XVII]; and impeachment [XI].
Nature of Congress - Congress is not a continuing body.Electoral
Tribunals - The resolution of electoral contests as essentially an
exercise of judicial power At the higher levels city, provincial,
and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial exclusive and
original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of
Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not,
strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts
of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election
contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power,
because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section
2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI
(for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.
Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election
contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review via
a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party if there is a
showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618,
November 23, 2010 and June 7, 2011]
Electoral Tribunals shall be the sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective Members. To be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (a) a valid proclamation, (b) a proper oath, and (c)
assumption of office. A proper oath is one taken before the Speaker
of the House of Representatives in open session, consistent with
the provisions of Section 6 of Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of
the House of Representatives. [Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264,
June 25, 2013]
Considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member
of the House of Representatives, as she has in fact taken her oath
and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is
now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar the issues
concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting
proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall
under the scope of the terms "election" and "returns" as
above-stated and hence, properly fall under the HRETs sole
jurisdiction. [Tanada v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
207199-200, October 22, 2013]
The term "election" refers to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns"
refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the
winners, including questions concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns;
and "qualifications" refers to matters that could be raised in a
quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his
disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his CoC.Commission
on Appointments - shall rule by a majority of all its Members The
President may not be compelled to submit his acting appointments to
the CA for confirmation. [Pimentel v. Ermita] Ad interim
appointments, which are permanent appointments [Matibag v.
Benipayo], shall remain effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the adjournment of the next
special or regular session of Congress. [Guevarra v. Inocentes] In
a special session, the Congress may consider general legislation or
only such subjects as the President may designate. In a regular
session, the power of the Congress is not circumscribed except by
limitations imposed by organic law. [Araneta v. Dinglasan]
Legislative Inquiries - Section21relatesto the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information
that may be used for legislation. On the other hand, Section 22
pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight
function.The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct
of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules
of procedure. New session requires a new publication of rule,
unless said rules would provide that they shall continue to be
effective unless changed by a subsequent Congress. [Garcillano v.
House of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008]
Executive privilege with respect to the privilege for diplomatic
negotiations may be invoked not only against citizens demands for
information, but also in the context of legislative
investigations.[AKBAYAN v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008]
The subject of a legislative inquiry is a political question. [De
la Paz v. Senate, G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009]
Appropriations - an item of appropriation as "an indivisible sum
of money dedicated to a stated purpose." An "item" is indivisible
because the amount cannot be divided for any purpose other than the
specific purpose stated in the item. [Footnote 211, Belgica v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] An item of
an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is
a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of
law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
A General Appropriations Act contains an estimate of revenues
and funding sources, which are usually (1) taxes, (2) capital
revenues (like proceeds from the sales of assets), (3) grants, (4)
extraordinary income (like dividends of government corporations)
and (5) borrowings. Unprogrammed funds arise or exist when the
estimated revenues are exceeded by actual receipts, e.g.,
unexpected large dividends from government institutions like the
Social Security System and Government Service Insurance System.
Savings occur when estimated expenditures are not spent, e.g. (a)
the PAPs (projects, activities or programs) for which the
appropriation had been authorized was completed, finally
discontinued, or abandoned; or (b) there were vacant positions and
leaves of absence without pay; or (c) the required or planned
targets, programs and services were realized at a lesser cost
because of the implementation of measures resulting in improved
systems and efficiencies. The act or practice of transferring funds
prior to the end of the fiscal year, which did not meet any of
those three instances, is unconstitutional. [Araullo v. Aquino,
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014]
An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision
of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money
and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose the 2013
PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation
under the said constitutional provision precisely because it
contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system
of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations
are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they
are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they
occur outside the law the real appropriation made under the 2013
PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire
PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the
individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of
the law. .. the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an
"appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only
authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of
the non-delegability principle. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]
Enrolled Bills - That the provision was a product of amendments
introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not
detract from its validityThis Court has subscribed to the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a
provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it
originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted by
the bicameral conference committee of both Houses. [Central Bank
Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004]
Log-rolling legislation - refers to the process in which several
provisions supported by an individual legislator or minority of
legislators are combined into a single piece of legislation
supported by a majority of legislators on a quid pro quo basis: no
one provision may command majority support, but the total package
will. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November
19, 2013]
Instances when vote needs to be recorded at the request of 1/5
[16, 4], vote on third reading [26, 2], overriding vote in case of
veto [27, 1], HR impeachment vote [XI, 3, 3].
Presidential certification [economic emergency] does away with
the requirements of three readings on separate days and
distribution of final copies three days before enactment.
[Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance]
Note Article VII, Section 10 simultaneous vacancies in the
offices of the President and the Vice-President - The bill calling
such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2,
Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law
upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. No special
election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen
months before the date of the next presidential election.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule a
textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that
both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth Considering the close intimacy between
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to
the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human
development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason
to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public
as to the contents of the assailed legislation. [Imbong v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014]
Although not provided for in the Constitution, Congress has
established the so-called Conference Committee, composed of
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives,
which is a mechanism for compromising differences between their
respective versions of a bill or joint resolution. It has been
ruled that it is within the power of a conference committee to
include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found
either in the House bill or in the Senate bill and whatever changes
may be agreed upon by the Conference Committee need not undergo
another three readings in the Senate and the House of
Representatives. [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance]
Partial veto general rule approve entirely or disapprove in
toto, except with respect to appropriations bills.In contrast, what
beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely
provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of
funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type
necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to
be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must
still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it
cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a
"specific appropriation of money and hence, without a proper
line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the
President would then be faced with the predicament of either
vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes
wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so
as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. [Belgica v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]For the
President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows
that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the
veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains
to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts
of the appropriation or of the bill." Further, it is significant to
point out that an item of appropriation must be an item
characterized by singular correspondence meaning an allocation of a
specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose,
otherwise known as a "line-item." [Belgica v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]
Power of Taxation - Since building permit fees are not charges
on property, they are not impositions from which petitioner is
exempt. [Angeles University Foundation v. City of Angeles, G.R. No.
189999, June 27, 2012]
Double taxation - petitioner should not have been subjected to
taxes under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code for the fourth
quarter of 2001, considering that it had already been paying local
business tax under Section 14 of the same ordinance. [Swedish Match
Philippines, Inc. v. The Treasurer of the City of Manila, G.R. No.
181277, July 3, 2013]
Inititatives Any proposal to enact laws or approve or reject any
act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress shall be valid
only if ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than forty-five days but not later
than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on
Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
ARTICLE VII The President is granted Ordinance Powers under
Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code
of 1987) and may issue any of the following: xxx Sec. 2. Executive
Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in
executive orders. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the
President which relate to particular aspect of governmental
operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall
be promulgated in administrative orders. Sec. 4. Proclamations.
Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which
the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend,
shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of
an executive order. Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. Acts of the
President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or
temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or
office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. Acts of the President on matters
relating to internal administration, which the President desires to
bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies,
bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or
compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars. Sec. 7.
General or Special Orders. Acts and commands of the President in
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.
The President may not invoke Section 17 of Article XII, which
would authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without authority from
Congress. BUT the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency; however, without legislation, he has no power to take
over privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest. [David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3,
2006]
A verbal pronouncement to the effect that E.O. No. 304 is
suspended should not have been given weight. An executive order is
valid when it is not contrary to the law or Constitution.We have
held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has
the force and effect of law.Executive Power - Clearly, the
abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a
division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the
prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated
legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to
E.O. 292. [Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs Investigative and Adjudication Division, G.R. No.
196425, July 24, 2012]
As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility
to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the
more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
violence Executive Privilege - The Presidents executive privilege
covers all presidential communications. [AKBAYAN v. Aquino, G.R.
No. 170516, July 16, 2008] However, the privilege accorded to
presidential communications is not absolute, one significant
qualification being that the Executive cannot, any more than the
other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality
privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations
by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal
wrongdoing. Executive privilege, which includes conversations and
correspondence between the President and the public official
covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No.
95367, May 23, 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No.
133250, July 9. 002); military, diplomatic and other national
security matters which in the interest of national security should
not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995;
Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, December 9, 1998); information between inter-government
agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,
G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998); discussion in close-door
Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998); and matters
affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002), MAY BE INVOKED
against this legislative power. BUT note that executive officials
are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment.A claim
of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to
disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted, and not
merely implied.In light of this highly exceptional nature of the
privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President
the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the
Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which
case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is By
order of the President, which means that he personally consulted
with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be
wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In
other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to
exercise such power. [3] That a type of information is recognized
as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be
considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the
validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked
is not only whether the requested information falls within one of
the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should
be honored in a given procedural setting.[1] Secrecy of
negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the
constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor
of the freedom of access to information.[Peoples Movement for Press
Freedom (PMPF) v. ManglapusPresidential Communications Privilege
applies to decision-making of the President; rooted in the
constitutional principle of separation of power and the Presidents
unique constitutional role. The elements of presidential
communications privilege are - 1) The protected communication must
relate to a quintessentialand non-delegable presidential power.
2)The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity
with the President. The presidential communications privilege
remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains
important evidence and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.Deliberative
Process Privilege applies to decision-making of executive
officials; based on common law privilege.
Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential
communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety,
and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as
pre-deliberative onesPower of Appointment - In Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, [G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991,
194 SCRA 317] this Court explained that the prohibition contained
in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply
to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary function of said
official's office.
The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices,
as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the
office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation,
words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in
Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To hold an office means to
possess or occupy the same, or to be in possession and
administration,The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of
Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General
was unconstitutional and void for being in violation of the
constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution It is equally remarkable, therefore, that Agras
designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex
officio capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to
concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one
office being the consequence of holding the other. [Funa v. Agra,
G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013]A de facto officer is one who
derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in
possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color
of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an
appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent
is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto
officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure
officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are
interested therein are concerned. In order to be clear, therefore,
the Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de facto
Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later
designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he
was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office.
This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity of
the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority
emanates from the State. Agras official actions covered by this
clarification extend to but are not limited to the promulgation of
resolutions on petitions for review filed in the Department of
Justice, and the issuance of department orders, memoranda and
circulars relative to the prosecution of criminal cases. [Funa v.
Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013]Assuming that Gaite was a
de facto officer of the Office of the President after his
appointment to the Securities and Exchange Commission, any decision
he renders during this time is presumed to be valid, binding, and
effective. [Espiritu v. del Rosario, G.R. No. 204964, October 15,
2014]Section 15 [of Article VII, on prohibited or midnight
appointments] does not apply to the Judiciary. Under the
Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the
President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of them
within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. [De
Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G. R. No. 191002, March 17,
2010]
Confirmation is required only for the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution. [Sarmiento v. Mison] Commissioner of Human
Rights not subject to confirmation; not included in the first
sentence. [Bautista v. Salonga] NLRC commissioners do not require
confirmation. [Calderon v. Carale] Constitutional Commissioners
require confirmation. Members of the Judiciary do not require
confirmation, only JBC nomination. Judicial and Bar Council
[regular members] require confirmation. Ombudsman and Deputy
Ombudsmen do not require confirmation, just JBC nomination. The
Vice-President, when appointed to the Cabinet, requires no
confirmation.
Now that the Philippine Coast Guard is under the DOTC and no
longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers
of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher
for that matter, do not require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. [Soriano III v. Lista, G.R. 153881, March 24,
2003]Given that the President derives his power to appoint OICs in
the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the
classification of presidential appointments covered by the second
sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the
Presidents appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional
basis. [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 196271, February 28, 2012]
The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in
granting the President the power to appoint OICs in elective
positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution,
which merely grants the President the power of supervision over
autonomous regions There is no incompatibility between the
Presidents power of supervision over local governments and
autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within
the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs Once the
President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor,
Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly,
these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced
by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in
this provision even hints that the President has the power to
recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners
fears in this regard are more apparent than real. [Datu Michael
Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February
28, 2012]
The power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153, to appoint
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to the
power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) to the
President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional
Legislative Assembly (then called the Sangguniang Pampook).
[Section 35. Filling of vacancy. - Pending an election to fill a
vacancy arising from any cause in the Sangguniang Pampook, the
vacancy shall be filled by the President, upon recommendation of
the Sangguniang Pampook: Provided, That the appointee shall come
from the same province or sector of the member being replaced.]
[Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No.
196271, February 28, 2012]
Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes
the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise
specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where
an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office
involved. [Cabiling v. Pabualan, G.R. Nos. L-21764 and L-21765, May
31, 1965, 14 SCRA 274]
Generally, the purpose for staggering the term of office is to
minimize the appointing authoritys opportunity to appoint a
majority of the members of a collegial body. It also intended to
ensure the continuity of the body and its policies. A staggered
term of office, however, is not a statutory prohibition, direct or
indirect, against the issuance of acting or temporary appointment.
It does not negate the authority to issue acting or temporary
appointments that the Administrative Code grants. [General v. Urro,
G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011]
The President is without any power to remove elected officials,
since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as
expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the
Local Government Code. [Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.]; Sangguniang
Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v. Martinez, G.R. No. 170626, March
3, 2008]The authority of the CSC is only to determine whether or
not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the
appropriate eligibility, nothing else. [Lopez v. Civil Service
Commission]
The CSC may not approve as temporary an appointment designated
as permanent by the appointing authority. [Luego v. Civil Service
Commission]
The CSC classified the position of Graft Investigation Officer
III as belonging to the Career Executive Service; appointee to the
position required to acquire CES eligibility [CES officers, under
the Administrative Code, are appointed by the President]. Ombudsman
challenges the classification, saying that it impairs his
appointment prerogative as guaranteed under the Constitution. SC:
classification would result in absurdity [a] it would vest in the
President the power to appoint an employee of the Ombudsman, in
violation of the Constitution, or [b] it would include in the CES a
position not occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the
Administrative Code. The CSC may not classify a position [Graft
Investigation Officer III of the Office of the Ombudsman] as
belonging to the Career Executive Service and require an appointee
thereto to acquire CES eligibility, because CES officers are
appointed by the President. This derogates the appointing power of
the Ombudsman. A CES appointment not effected by the President is
contrary to the provisions of the Administrative Code. [Office of
the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, 451 SCRA 570]
An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the
Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office.
The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the
time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term.
[Fetalino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191890, December 04,
2012]
In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7, the
Court resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as
petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting
disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy Ombudsman,
in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
However, by another vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to maintain the
validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is
concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the
Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the
latter enjoys under the Constitution. WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on the
dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but
is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to conduct an
administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible
administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III
under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
[Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, January 28,
2014, Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration]
Power of control - if a certain power or authority is vested by
law upon the Department Secretary, then such power or authority may
be exercised directly by the President, who exercises supervision
and control over the departments. [Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil.
328]Memorandum Circular No. 58,But the doctrine of qualified
political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of
Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves
the appointees of the President to the Cabinet Such Cabinet members
sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason
of their office or function, not because of their direct
appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the
law, not the President, that sat them in the Board. [Trade and
Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v.
Manalang-Demigillo]Such "executive control" is not absolute. The
definition of the structure of the executive branch of government,
and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and
supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may
be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial
decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate procedure as in
the instant case. Appeals are remedial in nature; hence,
constitutionally subject to this Courts rulemaking power. The Rules
of Procedure was issued by the Court pursuant to Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules concerning the procedure in all courts.
Parenthetically, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly
recognizes an exception to the remedy of appeal to the Office of
the President from the decisions of executive departments and
agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a decision or order issued by a
department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the
President when there is a special law that provides for a different
mode of appeal. In the instant case, the enabling law of respondent
BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly allows for immediate judicial relief
from the decision of respondent BOI involving petitioners
application for an ITH. E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and
should prevail over A.O. No. 18. In this case, a special law, RA
7394, likewise expressly provided for immediate judicial relief
from decisions of the DTI Secretary by filing a petition for
certiorari with the "proper court." Hence, private respondent
should have elevated the case directly to the CA through a petition
for certiorari. [Moran v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 192957,
September 29, 2014]Faithful Execution of Laws - The Presidents
discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists
should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully
execute the relevant laws. [Almario v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 189028, July 16, 2013]
The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the
duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. [Section 17,
Article VII] [Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010]
Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of
those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are
appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict
petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court
of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43.[Santos v. Go,
G.R. No. 156081, October 19, 2005]
Commander-in-Chief - Pursuant to the doctrine of command
responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the
AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioners rights
to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist
to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be
imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise
necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary
investigations required under the rules. The Court also stresses
that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in
concurrence with the presidents incumbency. [Rodriguez v. Macapagal
Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011, citing Estrada v.
Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA
452]
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and
the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense
jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation
or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on
its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution
reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper
suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise
its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.
Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the
Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in
as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress
before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
[Fortun v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012]
In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines [89
Phil, 246 (1951)], this Court ruled that a court-martial case is a
criminal case and the General Court Martial is a "court" akin to
any other courts. In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of
the Philippine Army, 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold that the
word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a
Court-Martial; what we held is that the words "inferior courts"
used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law
or rules of court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts
in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the
Constitution, do not refer to Courts-Martial or Military Courts.
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered
by a court-martial must be approved by the reviewing authority
before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or
affect the character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of
the Court of First Instance imposing death penalty must also be
approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed. [Garcia v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012]
The power to confirm a sentence of the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, includes the power to approve or disapprove the
entire or any part of the sentence given by the court martial.
[Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012]
Pardoning Power - criminal and administrative remedies for
violation of conditional pardon are not mutually exclusive and may
be successively availed of by the President for the punishment of
the conditional pardon. recommitment/criminal prosecution for
violation of conditional pardon/criminal prosecution for new
offense if violation of the condition constitutes a separate
criminal offense. [Culanag v. Director of Prisons]
A conditional pardonee committed usurpation of public functions.
New case dismissed for lack of witnesses. President ordered his
commitment. SC sustained saying mere commission, not conviction
required for recommitment. [Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol
, affirmed in Sumulong v. Gonzales]The Pardon included a preambular
clause which read: WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office. Former
President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point
of this controversy The pardoning power of the President cannot be
limited by legislative action. A close scrutiny of the text of the
pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties
are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the
executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned
which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed,
which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that
attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence,
even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it
is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua The third preambular clause
of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional
Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause
of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or
office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against
the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage
and to seek public elective office have been restored This is
especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a
condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the
term "civil and political rights" as being restored. Jurisprudence
educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it
is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons
for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas."
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly
speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the
statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an
integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not
by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make
its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
[Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015]
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their
treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which
one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended,
by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and
abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged,
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely
as though he had committed no offense. x x x Pardon is granted by
the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take
no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief
Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice. x x x [Magdalo Para
sa Pagbabago, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012]
Treaties - The power to ratify treaties is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate.The President
may not be compelled to submit a treaty to the Senate for
concurrence. [Pimentel v. Executive Secretary] Executive Agreements
do not require the concurrence of the Senate for their validity. An
executive agreement may not amend a treaty. [Adolfo v. CFI of
Zambales]
The Contract Agreement xxx between Northrail and CNMEG does not
partake of