2015-07-29 CTP Update and Assessment

AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT July 29, 2015

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. “Operation Golden Arrow,” supported by an Arab coalition, may be stalling in its offensive against the al Houthis after initial successes in regaining control of Aden city.

2. Al Shabaab lost two strongholds in southern Somalia that may limit its ability to support operations in Kenya. The loss is territorial, however, as al Shabaab fighters moved into the countryside.

3. Iranian officials assuaged domestic concerns that UNSC Resolution 2231 endorsing the P5+1 and Iran’s final nuclear agreement infringes upon Iran’s weapons capabilities.

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ASSESSMENT:

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al Qaeda NetworkThe U.S. continues to degrade the leadership within the al Qaeda network. A U.S. airstrike killed al Qaeda operative Abu Khalil al Sudani in Paktika province in Afghanistan on July 11. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter described Sudani as a senior member of al Qaeda’s shura council and noted he had been directly linked to plots against the United States, as well as operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Sudani was a close associate of al Qaeda’s leadership and the location of his death is an indicator of al Qaeda’s continued presence in eastern Afghanistan.

The al Qaeda network continues to remain cohesive despite persistent rumors of defections to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS).

Outlook: The strategy of degrading al Qaeda leadership has been ineffective in the long term.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesThe affiliation of armed militants who carried out attacks in Punjab, India, that killed seven people are not known. The three militants first attacked a civilian bus, before storming a police station in Dinanagar and engaging in a 12 hour gunfight with the police and Indian security forces. Indian police also successfully removed five bombs placed by the militants on a railway track. Some Indian officials, including the Minister of Home Affairs, alleged that Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is responsible for the attacks. India has been on high alert, with extra security deployed along the India-Pakistan border after the attacks. Pakistan was quick to condemn the attacks.

The Pakistani military has begun to phase out its anti-militancy operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the offensive against militancy in North Waziristan is now in its final phase.

Outlook: India is likely to point towards Pakistani involvement in the Punjab attacks, while Pakistan will deny any connection to the militants.

AL QAEDA

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PoliticalFormer president Ali Abdullah Saleh may be prepared to withdraw support for the al Houthis in exchange for future guarantees. Saleh met with UAE, UK, and U.S. officials over the past week. The loss of Saleh’s support would significantly weaken the al Houthi movement and may make al Houthi leaders more willing to make concessions in political negotiations. Saudi Arabia announced a five-day humanitarian ceasefire, but al Houthi leaders stated they had not been notified and rejected it.

Outlook: The al Houthi movement is probably seeking to maintain control over territory as a point of leverage in future negotiations, but would need to recalculate should Saleh withdraw support.

SecurityForces operating under the Saudi Arabian-led “Operation Golden Arrow” continued to advance northward from Aden, though at a slower pace. Forces secured areas north of Aden, but have not recaptured al Anad military base in Lahij governorate from the al Houthis, despite multiple attempts. The stated campaign objectives include liberating Abyan, Lahij, and Taiz governorates from al Houthi control.

Outlook: It remains unclear how much territory anti-al Houthi forces will be able to regain as the al Houthis appear determined to hold on to the territory they currently control.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP appears to be resuming disruptive attacks against al Houthi targets in Lahij governorate following the start of Operation Golden Arrow. The group also continues to operate against the al Houthis in al Bayda, Abyan, and Hadramawt governorates. Residents of al Mukalla, Hadramawt, under AQAP control, have attempted to negotiate the group’s withdrawal from the port city. ISIS-linked groups reported activities in Hadramawt, Aden, and al Byada.

Outlook: AQAP will likely seek to establish itself as an elite fighting force by fighting alongside local popular resistance forces.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF

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1) 27 JUL: Al Houthi militants shelled the al Tawal region of Saudi Arabia. 2) 22 JUL: Operation Golden Arrow forcesadvanced on al Anad Airbase. 3) 21 JUL: ISIS Wilayat Sana’a claimed a VBIED attack on a mosque in the al Jifra region of Sana’a City. 4) 21 JUL: Popular resistance forces retook the headquarters of the ruling party, the General People’s Congress, in Taiz.

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalTensions between residents of the Lower Shabelle and Bakool regions and African Union peacekeeping forces stationed in the regions flared when the troops killed civilians. Marka residents protested after Burundian AMISOM troops reportedly killed at least 11 civilians in the town on July 21, an event that AMISOM has refuted. Separately, Ethiopian troops are accused of killing over 80 civilians in the Bakool region during an operation targeting al Shabaab members.

Outlook: Civilians will continue to condemn forces friendly with the Somali government as those forces sustain attacks on civilians during operations targeting al Shabaab. Tensions between the two groups may prove harmful to Somalia’s federalization process.

Security Al Shabaab militants and AMISOM troops continued to clash in the Gedo and Bay regions as AMISOM’s “Operation Jubba Corridor” progressed. AMISOM seized several towns in the regions from al Shabaab between July 17 and July 24, including the group’s major strongholds of Bardhere and Dinsoor. Al Shabaab has reportedly recovered at least eleven towns in the Bay region and one in the Gedo region from AMISOM personnel.

Outlook: Al Shabaab militants and AMISOM troops are likely to continue to clash as AMISOM moves forward with their ongoing operation, especially as they continue to hold Bardhere and Dinsoor.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab continued to conduct asymmetrical attacks in Mogadishu. The group assassinated two government officials, including a Somali MP, in separate drive-by shootings on July 25. Separately, the group claimed credit for the July 26 suicide car bombing at the Jazeera Palace Hotel, which houses several foreign missions, that killed at least 13 people. The group’s spokesman released a statement warning of future attacks in Mogadishu following the Jazeera Palace Hotel attack.

Outlook: Al Shabaab is likely to sustain asymmetrical attacks in Mogadishu as it loses portions of its stronghold in the Gedo and Bay regions to AMISOM and Ethiopian troops.

HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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1) 21 JUL: Residents protested after Burundi AMISOM troops killed 13 civilians in Marka, Lower Shabelle region.2) 22 JUL: AMISOM troops captured Bardhere, Gedo region, from al Shabaab militants.3) 24 JUL: AMISOM troops captured Dinsoor, Bay region, from al Shabaab militants.4) 26 JUL: Al Shabaab detonated an SVBIED targeting the Jazeera Palace Hotel in Mogadishu.

GULF OF ADEN

HORN OF AFRICA

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PoliticalThe General National Congress (GNC) continues to maintain its silence on both the political and security negotiations and it remains unclear when the GNC will announce its next steps. In the south, the collapse of Tebu-Zwai and Tebu-Tuareg tribal negotiations threatened to undermine the newfound unity that developed out of the Sakhirat dialogue.

Outlook: The process to collect unity government leadership suggestions will proceed in the background and will remain confidential. The GNC will find itself under increasing pressure to compromise on demands and join the process.

SecurityThe LNA continues to make progress in its various operations throughout Benghazi. New LNA operations in Sabri and around the University of Benghazi combined with recent reinforcements, may signal a change in the balance of power between the LNA and Ansar al Sharia. In the south, repeated Tebu-Zwai and Tebu-Tuareg clashes have destabilized tribal relations and trust in ceasefire arrangements.

Outlook: The LNA will continue to focus on completing its Benghazi mission above all other priorities, which will also suppress the chance of direct offensive operations from the remaining militant holdouts in the short term. In the south, the Tebu-affiliated clashes will slowly recede as local populations grow increasingly bold and demonstrate against the violence.

Ansar al Sharia Libya and ISIS in LibyaAnsar al Sharia and ISIS forces in Benghazi face an increasingly restrictive operating environment with the LNA’s most recent wave of reinforcements. The isolation from supply routes has forced each group to assume a purely defensive posture. Outside of Derna, the remaining ISIS forces are trapped between the al Qaeda-linked MSCD and LNA forces with few remaining options as well. ISIS Wilayat Barqa is firmly in a losing position. At the same time, ISIS forces in Sirte welcomed six Iraqi ISIS military leaders to the city.

Outlook: Besieged ISIS Wilayat Barqa militants will attempt to break through the line held by LNA and al Qaeda-linked MSCD units in Fatahia, Derna, to join with ISIS-linked forces in Sirte.

LIBYAWEST AFRICA

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AQIM AQIM continued to escalate its operations and recruitment in Algeria. AQIM carried out an attack on Algerian military barracks near its mountain strongholds in northeastern Algeria. This is its second significant attack in two weeks on Algerian forces, showing an intention to increase attacks after a period of silence. Separately, a splinter group from AQIM calling itself Sarayat al Ghuraba’a pledged allegiance to ISIS from Constantine, Algeria. The pledge highlights a recent trend of ISIS pursuing AQIM fighters.

Outlook: While AQIM will look to defend its northern sanctuaries through preemptive attacks on Algerian forces, ISIS will continue its efforts to poach AQIM fighters in order to expand its operational capacity and networks.

Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)Tunisian authorities continued their aggressive pursuit of terrorists. The Tunisian government passed a new counter-terrorism law that expands the definition of terrorism and implements a possible death penalty for convicted terrorists. Tunisian forces continued to make mass arrests around the country, which resulted in over ninety detentions and several weapons seizures.

Outlook: Tunisia’s new counter-terrorism law will make it easier for security forces to arrest citizens on terrorism charges, which may increase both the number of detentions and the amount of opposition from civilians.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) Small-scale attacks continued throughout Mali despite aggressive operations targeting militants. The Malian Army arrested 15 militants in an operation near the Ivory Coast border. Shelling also hit a MINUSMA camp, and militants attacked a Malian Army convoy in northern Mali. Separately, al Murabitoun released its first statement since the U.S. targeted Mokhtar Belmokhtar in an airstrike in June. The statement reaffirmed the group’s allegiance to al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri and Belmokhtar’s role as the leader of al Murabitoun.

Outlook: Militants may concentrate their attacks in northern and central Mali as Malian security forces conduct aggressive operations in southern Mali.

MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST

AFRICA

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1) 21 JUL: Misratan patrols engaged ISIS scouting units outside of Abu Qurayn, Libya. 2) 21 - 25 JUL: Tebu and Tuareg ceasefire ended and clashes resumed in Sebha, Libya.3) 26 JUL: MSCD forces reportedly killed Abu Abdullah al Dernawi and two other ISIS militants outside of Fatahia, Derna, Libya.4) 27 JUL: Members of the Abu Obeida militia and the Mobile Forces Brigade, both components of Libya Dawn, opened fire on one another in Tripoli.

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST

AFRICA1) 22 - 25 JUL: Moroccan authorities dismantled an ISIS cell in Tangiers, Morocco.2) 22 - 27 JUL: Tunisian authorities arrested 30 suspected terrorists and seized explosives in Bizerte, Tunisia.3) 26 JUL: AQIM militants attacked an Algerian Army barracks near Batna, Algeria. 4) 27 JUL: Tunisian authorities dismantled an ISIS cell in Mahdia, Tunisia.

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST

AFRICA1) 21 JUL: The Malian army arrested 15 suspected militants in a sweeping operation outside of Fakola. The troops also seized weapons, explosives, and vehicles.2) 21 JUL: Militants attacked a Malian Army convoy outside of Gao.3) 24 JUL: Shelling hit a MINUSMA camp in Aguelhok.4) 27 JUL: Militants attacked a Malian Army convoy in Timbuktu.

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ASSESSMENT:

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Nuclear TalksFollowing the UN Security Council (UNSC)’s July 20 adoption of Resolution 2231 endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed by the P5+1 and Iran, regime officials assuaged domestic concerns that the resolution, especially Section 3 of Annex B, infringes upon Iran’s weapons capabilities. Section 3 states that “Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology,” for as long as eight years. Officials downplayed the significance of Section 3 of Annex B; Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stressed that Section 3 of Annex B is “non-binding.” Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran’s testing of intermediate-range missiles would “at maximum [be]…considered a violation of the resolution,” and not of the JCPOA.

Outlook: The regime will continue to push back against any perceived limitations on its ballistic missile-related activity.

Economy Regime officials stressed that in the post-nuclear deal economic environment, Iran will continue to eschew foreign imports. Avoiding foreign imports remains a key component of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s resistance economy doctrine, a plan to strengthen the Iranian economy and make it resistant to any future Western sanctions and global financial crises. Planning and Strategic Supervision Deputy to the President Mohammad Bagher Nobakht stated that the government seeks foreign investment and will not “focus on imports,” while Deputy Economy Minister Mohammad Parizi stated that the transition of Iran’s economy into “the resistance economy will continue with greater care” when sanctions are removed.

Outlook: The regime will use the resistance economy doctrine to frame economic policy in the post-deal period.

IRAN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN

21 JUL: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated that "[Possessing] ballistic missiles doesn’t violate the JCPOA…it is a violation of a paragraph in the annex of the [UNSC] Resolution 2231 which is non-binding."

21 JUL: Supreme Leader’s Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati stated that “Iran will continue to construct missiles.”

21 JUL: Planning and Strategic Supervision Deputy to the President Mohammad Bagher Nobakht stated that the government seeks foreign investment and will not “focus on imports.”

22 JUL: Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated, “The arms embargo will end in a span of five years…The S-300 [surface-to-air missile system] is not included in these restrictions and is outside the sphere of the IAEA.”

22 JUL: Deputy Economy Minister Mohammad Parizi stated that the transition of Iran’s economy into “the resistance economy will continue with greater care” when sanctions are removed.

23 JUL: A member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team said Foreign Minister Javad Zarif actively defended IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani in the nuclear negotiations.

23 JUL: Managing Editor of news outlet Kayhan Hossein Shariatmadari criticized the nuclear agreement for allowing access to military sites and limitations on weapon capabilities.

23 JUL: A group of professors from various Iranian universities sent a letter to President Hassan Rouhani describing UNSC Resolution 2231 as “blemishing the independence, the security, and the national interests of the country.”

24 JUL: Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Head Ali Akbar Salehi stated there is no separate agreement with the IAEA over the Parchin military installation.

24 JUL: Armed Forces General Staff Headquarters Basij Affairs and Defense Culture Deputy IRGC Brig. Gen. Massoud Jazayeri stated, “Iran’s new generation missiles are ready to confront and deal with any aggressor.”

26 JUL: President Hassan Rouhani declared, “We do not differentiate between Shi’as and Sunnis” during a speech in Kurdistan province.

26 JUL: Central Bank of Iran (CBI) Head Valiollah Seif stated that Iran has $29 billion in frozen assets.27 JUL: Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated, “Testing missiles does not violate” the JCPOA. 27 JUL: AEOI Head Ali Akbar Salehi announced that the manner of implementing IAEA investigations will be

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21 JUL – 27 JUL 2015

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ACRONYMSAtomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)

Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)

Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)

Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)

Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)

Libyan National Army (LNA)

Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)

National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)

The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

North Waziristan (NWA)

Pakistani Military (PakMil)

Possible military dimensions (PMD)

Somalia National Army (SNA)

South Waziristan (SWA)

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda [email protected] (202) 888-6576

Alexis Knutsenal Qaeda [email protected] (202) 888-6570

Paul BucalaIran [email protected](202) 888-6573

Heather Malacariaprogram [email protected](202) 888-6575

Marie DonovanIran [email protected](202) 888-6572

Mehrdad MoarefianIran [email protected](202) 888-6574

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. [email protected] (202) 888-6569