2015-07-01 CTP Update and Assessment

AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT July 1, 2015

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati indicated that an upcoming trilateral meeting between Iran, Iraq, and Syria will strengthen the "resistance front" against the U.S. and its regional allies.

2. ISIS’s influence and strength may be growing in North Africa. It claimed the terrorist attack on a beach resort in Sousse, Tunisia, that killed 38 people.

3. ISIS is conducting a VBIED campaign against the al Houthis in Sana’a designed to drive the conflict toward sectarian war in Yemen.

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ASSESSMENT:

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al Qaeda NetworkThere are indicators that al Qaeda groups are attempting to consolidate and unify their efforts in face of the challenge from the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is now part of an al Qaeda-linked council composed of representatives from four groups operating in the Sahel and the Maghreb. The council’s establishment follows an effort to coordinate local activities in Libya and also a rapid expansion of support for ISIS in North Africa. It is not clear whether al Qaeda will respond to the three ISIS attacks in Tunisia, Kuwait, and France on June 26. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, has not matched ISIS’s spectacular attacks there. Instead, it has focused on embedding within the population and expanding its influence in Yemen’s east.

Outlook: The al Qaeda network will probably continue to consolidate as it combats the allure of the Islamic State. It is unlikely that affiliates and core leaders will defect to supporting the Islamic State, though the loss of associate groups will reduce al Qaeda’s overall network.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesIt appears as if both the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIS Wilayat Khorasan are trying to exert their influence in the troubled Kurram Agency. Both claimed credit for an attack on a checkpoint in Kurram Agency, which killed two soldiers and injured two others. It is not clear as to which group perpetrated the attack.

Pakistani military continued Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the offensive against militancy, with airstrikes in Khyber Agency. The final phase of the operation is set to launch in Shawal Valley in mid-July.

Outlook: The Pakistani government will continue Operation Zarb-e-Azb with its final phase set to launch in July.

AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:

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PoliticalYemeni stakeholders continue to seek a political solution to the ongoing crisis. UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed has departed for Kuwait and will visit both Riyadh and Sana’a in the coming weeks, but his efforts may only result in limited success on a preliminary agreement. Yemeni Foreign Minister Riyadh Yassin stated that representatives of Hadi’s government will be meeting with members of the U.S., British, Belgian, German, and Russian governments to build international support for the full implementation of UNSCR 2216. The Sultanate of Oman hosted talks between al Houthis and southern Yemeni leaders to negotiate a local ceasefire in the south.

Outlook: A political solution will not be reached until the al Houthis and Hadi’s government give ground on stated red lines. A localized ceasefire is more likely, though may be a challenge as groups seek to hold their positions for political negotiations.

SecurityThe al Houthi movement appears to be struggling to maintain control of territory. Local popular resistance forces retook parts of Rada’a district in al Bayda on June 27.  Additionally, continued clashes have forced the al Houthis to retreat partially to the al Ajma and al Wathba areas of al Bayda governorate. The al Houthi movement continues to conduct low-level attacks along the Saudi Arabian-Yemeni border, including an attack in Jizan province, Saudi Arabia, on June 23.

Outlook: Strong local resistance may continue to push back the al Houthis from some territory in south-central Yemen. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP is fighting the al Houthis along the front lines in al Bayda, Shabwah, and Ma’rib governorates. Its insurgent force, Ansar al Sharia, claimed multiple attacks in Rada’a district in al Bayda and in the Bayhan area of Shabwah, where there are also active popular resistance forces. ISIS Wilayat Sana’a is conducting a VBIED campaign against the al Houthis in Sana’a. ISIS claimed a June 29 VBIED attack in the city as part of this campaign. ISIS Wilayat Sana’a also claimed a June 24 IED targeting the al Houthi-controlled Saba News headquarters and a June 28 IED targeting an al Houthi convoy in Aya area of Sana’a.

Outlook: ISIS Wilayat Sana’a will continue to use VBIEDs to hit al Houthi targets in Yemen’s capital. AQAP’s main effort in Yemen will continue to be supporting the local fights against the al Houthis, particularly in al Bayda and Shabwah.

YEMENGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF

ADEN

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1) 22 JUN: ISIS Wilayat Sana’a militants detonated a VBIED in front of al Houthi controlled Saba News headquarters in Sana’a.2) 27 JUN: Popular Resistance fighters liberate al Zawb area from al Houthis in Rada’a, al Bayda.3) 28 JUN: Popular Resistance repelled an al Houthi attack in Sirwah, Ma’rib. 4) 29 JUN: ISIS Wilayat Sana’a militants detonated a VBIED near a military hospital in Sana’a.

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ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalModerate Islamist group Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) remains unlikely to sign an agreement for the new state of Galmudug, despite attempts by federal and local officials to reconcile with the group. ASWJ announced that it would soon introduce an Islamic court to Dhusamareb, which it has held since June 7, and that they would hold their own version of the central state building conference the group left on June 10.

Outlook: Tensions between the newly formed Galmudug Parliament and outlying groups in the central state region will continue to escalate, especially as ASWJ institutes Islamic law in Dhusamareb. Al Shabaab is likely to use these tensions to the group’s advantage as it advances on Mogadishu.

Security National security forces have continued to increase their presence throughout the Horn of Africa in hopes of retaining the status quo as it remains likely that al Shabaab will attempt additional high-profile attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. Ugandan police warned residents of intelligence pointing to a possible attack by the group in Kampala. Somali police launched an operation in Afgoi, Lower Shabelle region, which led to the arrests of dozens of suspected al Shabaab militants.

Outlook: Regional security forces will continue to be on high alert as al Shabaab continues to conduct large-scale attacks and high-profile assassinations during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab is likely attempting to force foreign support for the Somali Federal Government to withdraw as the 2016 deadline for federalization approaches. Al Shabaab claimed two high-profile attacks in Somalia and is believed to be behind multiple shootings throughout the country as part of the group’s Ramadan campaign. The group detonated an SVBIED targeting Emirati officials in Mogadishu and attacked an African Union Mission in Somalia base in the Lower Shabelle region, both of which resulted in heavy causalities.

Outlook: Al Shabaab’s campaign of high profile attacks within close proximity to Mogadishu is likely to proceed as Ramadan continues, especially as security forces increase their presence in the region.

HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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1) 24 JUN: Al Shabaab detonated an SBVIED targeting Emirati officials in Mogadishu.2) 26 JUN: Al Shabaab attacked an AMISOM base in Lego, Lower Shabelle region, resulting in the deaths of 50 Burundi troops.3) 26 JUN: Al Shabaab beheaded a Somali official kidnapped during the group’s Lego attack.4) 28 JUN: Al Shabaab executed three accused of being CIA spies in Sakow, Middle Jubba region.

GULF OF ADEN

HORN OF AFRICA

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PoliticalInternal diplomatic efforts, under the stewardship of the UN and UNSMIL Envoy Bernardino Leon, have made marginal progress in resolving the Libyan political crisis. Representatives from the Libyan General National Congress (GNC) and internationally-backed House of Representatives (HoR) agreed to sign draft 5 of the Libyan Political Accord, despite disagreements.

Outlook: The hyper-partisan atmosphere in the talks in Sakhirat, Morocco has made negotiations difficult, resulting in a brief suspension of activity this week . An inclusive reconciliation agreement would enable Libya’s partisan armed forces to combine their dwindling resources in order to stabilize and rebuild with a focus on tackling ISIS’ s proxy forces on the coast.

SecurityLNA forces established a foothold outside of Derna in preparation to reintegrate Derna into the HoR sphere of influence. However, the unexpected détente with the Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD) ended with the MSCD’s June 28 ambush of auxiliary LNA forces at Ain Mara. Misrata initiated a new air campaign on Sirte, potentially without the permission of Libya Dawn coalition leaders.

Outlook: The LNA will forego attempts at soft-power negotiation with Derna and will open a new front of combat to eliminate all Islamist resistance forces under the influence of the MSCD.

Ansar al Sharia Libya and ISIS in LibyaAnsar al Sharia forces remained relatively inactive in Derna and Benghazi, following the June 14 USAF airstrike and the June 10 MSCD offensive against both ISIS and Ansar al Sharia forces. Ansar al Sharia has restricted its activities to IEDs and indirect engagements in both Derna and Benghazi. ISIS also retreated from its offensive posture following the failed LNA outpost raid in Fatahia on 20 JUN and refocused on asymmetric warfare in Derna using mortar fire.

Outlook: ISIS and Ansar al Sharia will struggle to regain their positions in Derna, Libya, after their ousting. Both groups will focus on acquiring territory instead of direct engagements with the LNA or Libya Dawn as they reorganize and rebuild their force strength.

LIBYAWEST AFRICA

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AQIM AQIM appears to be adopting new strategies in order to combat ISIS’s expanding influence in West Africa. The newly established “Shura Council of al Qaeda Africa,” which will probably help coordinate activities, is comprised of four groups: AQIM, al Murabitoun, al Qaeda Sirte, and the Qaqaa ibn ‘Amr battalion. This consolidation is likely an attempt to balance ISIS gains in the region. AQIM also released a high-quality, English-language video of two hostages, a style similar to ISIS multimedia and divergent from AQIM’s traditional formatting.

Outlook: AQIM will continue to consolidate against ISIS in order to compete for support. It may seek to conduct attacks against government or military targets to prove its continued relevance and to compete for recruits.

Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)ISIS demonstrated its strength in the region by conducting the deadliest terrorist attack in Tunisia’s history at a resort in Sousse, Tunisia. The attack left 38 dead and 37 wounded, most of whom were foreign tourists. ISIS previously made threats against foreigners in Tunisia. The terrorist was radicalized through the internet and in frequent visits to a Salafi mosque, two popular ISIS recruiting grounds due to a relative lack of surveillance by state authorities.

Outlook: The Sousse attack may signal the beginning of an ISIS Ramadan campaign to create instability. Tunisia's tourism sector will suffer significantly, especially after the March Bardo attack. A security crackdown may also invite retaliation.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) Groups related to Ansar al Din continue to escalate attacks in Mali. Ansar al Din claimed an attack on a military camp in Nara, Mali and the Ansar al Din-linked Massina Liberation Movement may be behind an attack on Fakola, Mali. Militants held the town for several hours before the Malian army secured it. This is the second attack linked to Massina militants in the past two weeks.

Outlook: Ansar al Din and related groups are likely to continue attacks in southern Mali, launching raids from bordering countries. The Massina Liberation Movement is becoming a more prominent subgroup of Ansar al Din and is likely to continue regular attacks in order to solidify its position.

MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST

AFRICA

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1) 24 JUN: ISIS-affiliated forces in Sirte advanced into Zamzam, Libya, and occupied it without any resistance.2) 24 JUN: An unidentified UAV targeted and destroyed an Ansar al Sharia ammunition warehouse IVO Ajdabiyah, Libya.3) 28 JUN: MSCD militants ambushed LNA support forces IVO Ain Mara, Ras al Hilal, Libya, killing an estimated 30 LNA soldiers.

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST

AFRICA1) 23-24 JUN: Tunisian authorities dismantled two terrorists cells in Kef, Tunisia.2) 25-28 JUN: Algerian forces killed 3 militants during a three-day operation near Ain Defla, west of Algiers.3) 26 JUN: Terrorists carried out a deadly attack in Sousse, Tunisia, killing 38 and wounding 37. The majority of the victims were foreign tourists. ISIS later claimed credit for the operation.

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST

AFRICA1) 25 JUN: French soldiers discovered two militant camps outside of Gao, Mali, on the Nigerien border. 2) 27 JUN: Ansar al Din militants killed 3 soldiers in an attack on a military camp in Nara, Mali.3) 28 JUN: Massina Liberation Movement militants took control of the town of Fakola, Mali for several hours.

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ASSESSMENT:

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Nuclear TalksForeign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif claimed that if the nuclear talks do not produce a final deal “it won’t be the end of the world.” On June 24, Planning and Strategic Supervision Deputy to the President Mohammad Bagher Nobakht stated that Iran would accept an extension to the negotiation deadline if it led to a “good deal.” Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi warned that excessive demands would prevent a deal, and Salehi added that a “good deal” would not terminate or slow nuclear activities. On June 29, Zarif returned to Tehran as part of a “planned” visit. Zarif stated that he would be back in Vienna for the June 30 deadline.

Outlook: These statements suggest that the regime is preparing its domestic audience for an extension of the June 30 deadline.

Regional Developments and DiplomacyLaw Enforcement Forces (LEF) Commander Hossein Ashtari announced that the LEF is prepared to increase cooperation with Syria during a June 22 meeting with Syrian Interior Minister Mohammad Ibrahim al Shaar. While meeting with al Shaar on June 23, the Supreme Leader’s Foreign Policy Advisor, Ali Akbar Velayati, referred to the upcoming trilateral meeting between Iran, Iraq, and Syria in Baghdad as a “major development.” Iranian Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli announced that these “three countries, which are alongside one another in the ‘resistance front against Israel,’…are fighting terrorism, violence, and extremism.”

Outlook: The upcoming meeting is likely about a regional strategy vis-à-vis ISIS. Iran will continue to support Iraq and Syria as a means to protect its own borders against ISIS.

IRAN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN

23 JUNE – 30 JUNE 2015

23 JUN: Supreme Leader Khamenei discussed the resistance economy and outlined several red lines in the nuclear negotiations.

23 JUN: Expert-level nuclear talks continued in Vienna, Austria.

23 JUN: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif told The New Yorker that if the nuclear talks do not produce a final deal, "it won't be the end of the world."

23 JUN: Malta Freeport, a large international port on the island of Malta, “has renewed its contracts” with Hafiz Darya Shipping Company (HDS) in anticipation that sanctions against Iran will be lifted “later this year.”

23 JUN: Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Ashtari announced that the LEF is prepared to increase cooperation with Syria.

23 JUN: President Rouhani stated that Iran’s “approach to foreign policy is constructive engagement,” during a meeting with the Supreme Leader and senior government officials.

24 JUN: National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi reaffirmed Tehran’s support for Syria “both in times of hardship and success.”

24 JUN: Ambassador to Russia Mehdi Sanaei met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov in Moscow to discuss preparations for the BRICS and SCO summits.

24 JUN: Funeral processions were held in Mashhad for five Iranian fighters killed in Syria. 

24 JUN: Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi al Modarresi reportedly traveled to Iran in order to meet with Supreme Leader Khamenei.

25 JUN: President Rouhani stressed the need for moderation in Iran and the region during an iftar (fast breaking) with clerics.

25 JUN: Defense Minister IRGC Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan announced the appointment of several individuals to senior positions in the Defense Ministry.

27 JUN: President Rouhani praised the armed forces and declared that Iran will continue to support oppressed people in the region.

28 JUN: Supreme Leader Khamenei called for “independence and non-impressionability” in the judicial system.

28 JUN: IRGC Brig. Gen. Gholam Reza Jalali claimed that Saudi Arabia has evolved from a “regional rival” to a “proxy threat.”

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ACRONYMSAtomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)

Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)

Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)

Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)

Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)

Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)

Libyan National Army (LNA)

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)

Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)

The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

North Waziristan (NWA)

Pakistani Military (PakMil)

Possible military dimensions (PMD)

Somalia National Army (SNA)

South Waziristan (SWA)

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda [email protected] (202) 888-6576

Alexis Knutsenal Qaeda [email protected] (202) 888-6570

Paul BucalaIran [email protected](202) 888-6573

Heather Malacariaprogram [email protected](202) 888-6575

Marie DonovanIran [email protected](202) 888-6572

Mehrdad MoarefianIran [email protected](202) 888-6574

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. [email protected] (202) 888-6569