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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
This document was developed and written by the contributing nations and internationalorganizations of the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) 2013-14. It
does not necessarily reflect the official views or opinions of any single nation or organization,
but is intended as recommendation for national / international organizational consideration.
Reproduction of this document is authorized for personal and non-commercial use only,
provided that all copies retain the author attribution as specified below. The use of this
work for commercial purposes is prohibited; its translation into other languages and
adaptation / modification requires prior written permission.
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VII. EDUCATION AND TRAINING ................................................................................................................... 55
A. Q UALIFICATION OF THE HEAD OF COMMUNICATION ........................................................................................... 55 B. Q UALIFICATION OF THE INFORMATION ANALYSTS ............................................................................................... 55 C. Q UALIFICATION OF THE INFORMATION PLANNERS .............................................................................................. 56 D. INTEGRATION OF COMMUNICATION IN LEADERSHIP AND STAFF DEVELOPMENT ...................................................... .. 56
VIII. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................... 57
ANNEX A – INFORMATION STRATEGY FORMAT ............................................................................................ A-1
ANNEX B – NARRATIVE (EXAMPLE) ............................................................................................................... B-1
ANNEX C – INFORMATION OBJECTIVES (EXAMPLES) ..................................................................................... C-1
ANNEX D – COMMUNICATION PLANNING.....................................................................................................D-1
LEXICON AND REFERENCES................................................................................................................ LEXICON-1
PART 1 – ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................. ....................................................... LEXICON-1 PART 2 – GLOSSARY ..................................................... ................................................................. ........... LEXICON-4 PART 3 – BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................... ................................. LEXICON-5
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Information Strategy Development ....................................................................................... 13
Figure 2: Information Objectives – A Different Layer to Strategic Objectives ...................................... 14
Figure 3: Roles of the Head of Communication .................................................................................... 17
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PREFACE AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Context & Scope
Recent developments in the international security environment demonstrate the power of
communication: messages and perceptions become predominant of military engagements and
impact the behaviour of people. Orchestrated activities carry messages and have a crucial effect on
public opinions, decision-making processes, and domestic support to missions. This has finally led to
conceptual ideas on integrated communication and communication management – an approach to
adequately respond to and shape developments in the Information Environment.
The Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) 2013-14 Focus Area "Strategic
Communication in Combined Operational Access – Information Activities and Emerging
Communication Practices" culminates capability development activities in a multinational contextongoing since 2003. Starting with Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E), more and
more practical experiences and lessons learned from operations have been incorporated and finally
led to a set of best practices recommended for immediate implementation.
Implementation of proposed solutions to operational challenges is actually the key problem: many
concepts have been written on communication issues; policy and doctrine was developed; but very
little actually came into practical existence. This concept proposes detailed modifications to
processes, organisational structures and tools/techniques currently used for the management of
communication at the military operational level.
Although the theme of MCDC 2013-14 is "Combined Operational Access", the recommendations
made in this concept shall be considered for all scenario settings and operation/mission types wherea joint 4* military HQ and force is deployed.
Customers
This concept paper should inter alia attract the attention of communication managers and
practitioners, Joint Force commanders, and military operational-level HQ staff.
It should also be shared and discussed with civilian counterparts of the above involved in mandating,
planning and execution of crisis response missions/operations in order to facilitate integration and a
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Challenge
Every action sends messages through perception and interpretation of others. Therefore,
communication is powerful and many actors effectively exploit its potential in order to achieve their
objectives. The concerted and aligned use of words and deeds is essential for reaching own goals.
Although all this is evident, we are often focused on traditional actions, misunderstandcommunication as only media activity, and consequently overlook the power of communication as a
force multiplier.
Solutions
This concept proposes solutions in order to overcome current deficiencies with a focus on a deployed
Joint Force at the operational-level of command.
Operations should be Narrative-driven, based on an Information Strategy that provides strategic-
political guidance.
Current Strategic Communication (StratCom) policy and doctrine should, where applicable, take on
the idea of integrated communication.StratCom Advisors at the appropriate levels should assume the role of a Head of Communication
(HoC), empowered to provide direction and guidance in addition to coordination and advice.
Information Analysts and Information Planners should be introduced as new staff capabilities, fully
integrated in the Intelligence and Plans divisions.
A Communication Coordination Board should be established as the HoC's tool for communication
management, involving a core of communication capabilities and functions and fully integrated in the
joint coordination process.
Finally, communication planning should be fully integrated with operations planning. Communication
guidance should be nested in the Operations Plan and a Communication Plan should be produced as
an excerpt for the purpose of information sharing with external actors.
In a nutshell, this concept presents a model for integrated communication management at the
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I. INTRODUCTION
A.
BackgroundWithin the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) 2013-14 this concept continues
previous work and results from the Multinational Experiment (MNE) series and the Multinational
Information Operations Experiment (MNIOE) project. Specific source documents are:
MNE 5 / MNIOE ANALYTICAL CONCEPT "DEVELOPMENT OF A MULTINATIONAL INFORMATION STRATEGY"
V1.0 (31 OCTOBER 2008)
MNE 6 FRAMEWORK CONCEPT "INTEGRATED COMMUNICATION IN MULTINATIONAL COALITION OPERATIONS
WITHIN A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH" V1.0 (22 OCTOBER 2010)
The MNE 5 concept was developed and validated through MNIOE Workshops 14-17 (and additional
two Tiger Team Workshops), MNIOE Limited Objective Experiments (LOEs) 3A and 3B, and the MNE 5
Major Integrating Event, Phases 1 and 2, during the September 2007 to October 2008 timeframe.The MNE 6 concept was developed and validated through MNE 6 Strategic Communication
(StratCom) Workshops 1-5, one MNE 6 Integrating Workshop and one Expert Seminar on "Non-
Compliance and Strategic Communication" (StratCom LOE) during the March 2009 to October 2010
timeframe. The conceptual approach was also discussed at the 2009 NATO CD&E Conference in a
sub-session / workshop on NATO's StratCom experimentation program.
Within MCDC 2013-14 – during the June 2013 to May 2014 timeframe – the conceptual approach
was discussed at 3 Tiger Team Workshops, StratCom Focus Area Workshops 1-4, and at the margins
of the 2013 NATO CD&E Conference (StratCom Static Display & Audience Engagement).
Finally, a StratCom LOE was integrated in the exercise CPX/CAX VIKING 14 (VK14) in April 2014.
Findings from this experiment are comprehensively captured in this document. Further details can be
A comprehensive analysis of current and future communication-related operational challenges and
capability gaps is contained in:
MCDC 2013-14 STRATCOM FOCUS AREA "BASELINE ASSESSMENT REPORT" V0.6 (07 OCTOBER 2013)
Coalitions in multinational crisis management operations require versatile, agile capabilities to
project combined forces into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish
their mission. Relevant scenarios and operation/mission types range from low-intensity operationsthat assist populations, groups or individuals – such as Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
or Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) – to high-intensity combat operations against
a broad spectrum of adversaries – from global competitors to belligerent regional powers to
networked violent extremist organizations. Access operations may also involve situations, in which
there are no specific adversaries but where operations take place in highly unstable areas where
little or no governmental or societal authority exists, aside from armed civil populations and criminal
groups.
Multinational force projection in this operational spectrum will almost always include the early
conduct of Information Activities and operations in space and cyberspace, since freedom of action in
those dimensions is increasingly important to all joint and combined operations. Coalition partners,
therefore, need to be able to develop and issue timely, relevant and feasible communication
guidance; implement communication plans in a consistent, transparent and flexible manner; take
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emerging communication practices and technology into account; and gain enhanced situation
awareness in the Information Environment1.
Today's military operations are challenged with a fragmentation of communication capabilities and
insufficient integration of communication with operations planning, resulting in fragmented
Information Activities by multinational partners, insufficiently harmonised for achieving objectives inthe Information Environment that support common strategic objectives. In the last 10-15 years the
multinational community of communication practitioners struggled for overcoming this challenge by
introducing coordination mechanisms. For instance, the military Information Operations (Info Ops)
function and later StratCom were designed to provide an analysis, advice, coordination and oversight
capacity for selected capabilities at various levels.
However, sole coordination of capabilities and actions remains more a cure to the symptom than it
constitutes a solution to the underlying problem. In addition, there is still a lack of consideration of
the comprehensive scope of non-media activities that may help to create desired effects in the
Information Environment.
C.
Conceptual ApproachThe MCDC 2013-14 Focus Area "Strategic Communication in Combined Operational Access –
Information Activities and Emerging Communication Practices" presents a complementary approach
to StratCom and other existing communication capabilities and functions: rather than proposing a
sharp break with organisational structures, processes or skills from the past, MCDC encourages
'incremental change' – a modification / improvement of existing configurations that builds upon the
existing structures, processes and skills, not necessarily suggesting their replacement.2
This approach is based on two fundamental ideas:
(1) Awareness and perception are at the heart of all human communication. All actions bear
information content – "One cannot not communicate!" 3
–, and actions speak louder than words.
Therefore, should be implemented to guide all analysis, planning, execution andA NEW MIND-SET
assessment of operations from a communication perspective. The aim is that the Joint Force
becomes aware of and appropriately considers the 'body language' of operations and their
Information Effects. It is proposed to adopt best practices from civilian business corporations, e.g., in
the area of Integrated Marketing Communication4, and incorporate them in an operational context
across all civil and military dimensions.
(2) High-level, should promote a corporate identity and image ofTOP-DOWN COMMUNICATION GUIDANCE
a coalition, and integrate multinational Information Activities through Information Objectives derived
from a shared mission Narrative and deliberate Information Effects. The concept proposes a common
understanding of the required structure and contents of an Information Strategy and successional
communication planning outputs. The management of communication capabilities and functionsconcentrates on the operationalization of the strategic Narrative and Information Objectives, and the
required contributions to operations planning.
As such, this document presents a business model5 for integrated communication – i.e., enhanced
StratCom – at the military operational level.
1 The 'Information Environment' is the virtual and physical space, in which information is received, processed
and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information systems. [MNE 6 Framework Concept
v1.0 (2010)]2 [Cf. Osborne/Brown (2005)]
3 [Watzlawick/Beavin/Jackson (1967)]
4
[Cf. Mulder (2007); Schultz/Kitchen (2000)]5 A 'business model' describes the rationale of how an organization creates, delivers, and captures value in
economic, social, cultural or other contexts. The term used for a broad range of informal and formal
descriptions to represent core aspects of a business, including purpose, business process, target customers,
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all areas of activity – and thus, the actual operational context becomes less relevant for the essential
elements of the MCDC StratCom Focus Area approach.
F. Customers
Primary customers of this concept are in nationalCOMMUNICATION PRACTITIONERS AND SENIOR LEADERSand multinational, coalition and alliance military organisations to include (but not limited to):
military-strategic level communication managers and practitioners;
the Command Group of a military operational-level HQ;
members of the HQ Advisory Group / Special Staff of a military operational-level HQ;
the Chief of Staff, his deputy and assistants of a military operational-level HQ;
practitioners of PA, Info Ops and other communication disciplines at all levels;
J2 Intelligence (INTEL) staff of a military operational-level HQ;
J3 Operations staff of a military operational-level HQ;
J5 Plans staff of a military operational-level HQ;
J9 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) staff of a military operational-level HQ.
The concept may also inform civilian counterparts of the above involved in mandating, planning and
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III. INFORMATION STRATEGY
A.
PurposeAn Information Strategy outlines the interagency and multinational approach to crisis/conflict
prevention and resolution in the Information Environment. It constitutes mission-specific strategic
and political guidance for all mission-related, multi-agency activity of coalition partners or alliance
members across all levers of power.
An Information Strategy prompts leadership at all levels to understand how activities will be / should
be perceived by key audiences, ensuring alignment with overarching strategic objectives. It shall be
used as guidance to fully integrate communication in operations planning.
B. Scope
The development of an Information Strategy informs strategic planning and, vice versa, is integratedwith and guided by the development of strategic plans and objectives. The first version of an
Information Strategy should be ready and approved by the political authorities prior to strategic
operations/mission planning is concluded to ensure that strategic planning appropriately considers
effects in the Information Environment. On the other hand, development of an Information Strategy
needs to await the approval of strategic objectives for integration with Information Objectives.
Figure 1: Information Strategy Development
Figure 1 shows a generic example of the analysis and planning process that leads to a multinational
Information Strategy. The process of developing an Information Strategy may start even before a
mandate is agreed on. On the other hand, the strategic Narrative needs to refer to the mandate and,
therefore, an Information Strategy cannot be formally issued prior to the mandate. Thus, the
mandating process may inform the development of the strategic Narrative.
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It takes into account available national and multinational assessments of the crisis situation, and
builds on relevant political agreements and strategic planning directives. In order to meet situation
requirements in theatre as well as consider possible adjustments to the mandate and mission, an
Information Strategy must be periodically reviewed – in line with strategic plan review.
The scope of required guidance from the strategic-political level demands that an InformationStrategy be produced as an internal document in the first place, with no pro-active external
distribution. However, in order to meet the principles of transparency, credibility and authenticity, it
should only contain unclassified information and should be written in a way that it could be shared
with partners and public disclosure would not jeopardise mission accomplishment. An unclassified,
sharable Information Strategy is the ideal situation. However, there may be instances that require
classified content in order to conform to operational security and/or maintain diplomatic options.
C. Required Content
The core element of an Information Strategy is the – the statement of identity, cause andNARRATIVE
intent around which people can unite. It provides the overall concept ("Leitbild") and guiding theme
("Leitmotiv") for an organisation and its mission, and supports the development of a corporate
identity and corporate image. The pursuit of a corporate idea is a prerequisite for integrating words
and deeds, and thus creating desired effects. In order to achieve this corporate idea, the Narrative
should – in simple language: easy to remember, easy to understand, and easy to communicate –
provide answers to three fundamental questions: (1) Who are we / where are we coming from? (2)
What benefits are we bringing to whom? and (3) Where are we going to / what is next?8 The
strategic Narrative of an Information Strategy builds on the organisational or institutional Narrative
of the related standing organisation, such as the NATO alliance, and directly refers to the mission
mandate, for instance a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). It is by nature a mission Narrative
to support a specific set of operations and provide consistency in messaging over time.
With , an Information Strategy should offer a clear description of the desiredINFORMATION OBJECTIVESconditions to be created in the Information Environment linked to the Narrative and strategic
objectives. As the Information Factor is relevant for all activity and because the Information
Environment is an integral part of the operational environment, Information Objectives cannot be
isolated from strategic objectives nor be considered strategic objectives themselves. Information
Objectives propose a different layer for looking at desired system states and must be fully integrated
and supportive to strategic objectives (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Information Objectives – A Different Layer to Strategic Objectives
8 NATO StratCom suggests: (1) Why are NATO forces engaged? (2) What are NATO's objectives? and (3) What
would transition and termination look like? [NATO AJP-5(E) (2013), Para 0107.l]
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IV. HEAD OF COMMUNICATION This chapter introduces the Head of Communication (HoC) and his staff as functions and capabilities
to a Joint Force HQ in order to enhance the traditional StratCom function
9
beyond its doctrinalcoordination role.
A. Roles and Responsibilities
The Head of Communication (HoC) the senior leadership in all aspects of integratedASSISTS
communication. He communication guidance with strategic authorities and allCOORDINATES DIRECTS
internal and external communication processes of the Joint Force at the operational level on behalf
of the commander. The HoC communication efforts with neighbouring commands andCOORDINATES
other organisations and stakeholders in theatre, and respective communication efforts ofGUIDES
subordinate commands.
Figure 3: Roles of the Head of Communication
The role of the HoC is multinational by nature, as he should be representing the coordinated
functional expertise on the Information Environment of participating nations and organisations – not
any national perspective, be it that of his own country or that of the lead nation.
The HoC should be appointed by the Strategic Commander, in close consultation with the designated
Joint Force Commander, to act as the Joint Force's principal assistant on all communication issues. He
then oversees and directs all Information Activities at his level and guides planning, execution and
assessment of Joint Force activity from a communication perspective. He also directs and guides the
Joint Force's spokesperson at the operational level.10
Detailed responsibilities of the HoC include:
9 In NATO, StratCom is defined as a process. The HoC would then become the process manager.
10
If a HoC is not installed, PA practitioners are in the best position to manage the integrated communicationprocess because within the scope of their task they should be involved in every facet of the organisation.
The Chief, Public Affairs (CPA) would then act as the entry point for superior communication guidance and
Single Point of Contact (SPOC) for coordinating communication issues at subordinate levels.
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with superior and mission partner communication leads;LIAISE
expert advice in the decision-making process;INTEGRATE
communication planning;LEAD
the group effort of distinct staff functions and capabilities;MODERATE
with relevant stakeholders, horizontally and vertically;NETWORK
corporate identity campaigns, including training and education efforts.MANAGE
The HoC should be granted the authority to assign tasks and require consultation between the
agencies involved (organisations or commands and their representatives) for all issues related to
Joint Force communication. Within his responsibility for integrating internal and external
communication processes the HoC should also be authorised to directly address all members of the
Joint Force HQ. Using relevant working groups, boards, centres and cells, and their meetings in the
HQ's staff routine / battle rhythm for coordination with communication capabilities and functions,
the HoC should be equipped with coordinating authority.11
In order to cope with these responsibilities, the HoC should be supported by a team of assistants anda staff organisation capable to perform basic communication management
12 tasks. This concept will
later introduce the Communication Coordination Board as the HoC's tool for communication
management in a Joint Force HQ (see Section VI.C).
B. Military Communication Management Tasks
For the implementation of an integrated and corporate approach to communication at a military
operational-level HQ, a set of management tasks needs to be performed by different staff elements.
The HoC will have to tie all these together in order to achieve the added value that is expected from
the implementation of this concept.
1.
Command and Control
Communication is a leadership function to support unity of effort of the Joint Force. Those involved
in communication management should be authorised to issue direction and guidance to
communication capabilities and functions, as required to promote their integration with operations
analysis, planning, execution and assessment. The commanders are the supreme communicators and
champions of integrated communication of the Joint Force.
2. Analysis of the Information Environment
Situation awareness is the prerequisite for understanding the Information Environment. It enables
the identification of action requirements, opportunities and risks, and provides the baseline for the
assessment of effects. Analysis of the Information Environment is a cross-dimensional,
transdisciplinary and continuous task, which needs to be performed by a highly qualified staff.
Analysis results must be translated and operationalized in order to benefit communication
capabilities and functions as well as operations planners, operators, and – finally – the commander.
11 Within the scope of the HoC's coordinating authority it is important to understand who the appropriate
problem-solving authorities are once an issue needs to be referred to someone else for decision. This may
not necessarily always be the direct superior at the operational level, but could, e.g., involve the strategic
authorities as well as a Component Commander in case of tactical urgency or functional responsibility
(principle of 'subsidiarity').12
The term 'communication management' is used here in the broadest sense to include planning, approvaland implementation of communication guidance. It corresponds with the terms 'operational design' and
'operational management' introduced in NATO's Allied Joint Doctrine to embrace analysis, planning,
execution and assessment [NATO AJP-01(D) (2010), Para 0525 and 526].
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3. Effects Development
The development of Information Effects in support of operational objectives and, in particular,
Information Objectives is a key task that collectively involves analysts, planners and operators. It
must be based on a profound understanding of the Information Environment, the mandate and
mission objectives, as well as the available capabilities able to create respective effects. Thedevelopment of effects in the Information Environment needs to be guided from a commander's
perspective and fully integrated with the development of operational effects.
4. Contribution to Targeting
All actions, lethal and non-lethal, have an effect on the Information Environment, either in a positive
manner, in closing the say-do gap, or negatively by contradicting the Joint Force's message to
audiences within and outside the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Negative effects from such things as
collateral damage, and especially civilian casualties, have the potential to do significant damage to
support for the Joint Force's mission. For this reason, the potential effect of actions should be taken
into consideration from the outset of the joint targeting cycle. Information Analysts and Planners, as
well as Info Ops and PA staffs should be included at every level of the targeting process.13
5. Activity Planning
Planning of Information Activities is an original task and competence of capabilities that are able to
create Information Effects themselves. Planning may be guided by the HoC and advised by
communication functions (such as Info Ops); the ultimate responsibility, however, to decide on the
concrete employment of means and assets rests with the force capabilities that are cognizant,
trained and equipped for their specific scope of activities.
6. Coordination
Coordination is a key task and main responsibility of the HoC to promote the integration ofcommunication in all aspects of operations planning, execution and assessment. Therefore, the HoC
needs to manage the appropriate involvement of all communication capabilities and functions in the
Joint Force HQ staff routine.
Effective and efficient communication requires harmonisation and synchronisation of Information
Activities. Furthermore, activities designed to create Information Effects need to be coordinated with
other force activities and manoeuvre operations that – through human perception – affect the
Information Environment as well. The Info-Ops-led Information Activities Coordination Board (IACB)14
is considered the best suitable forum for this task.
7. Direct Communication
Direct communication promotes the principles of transparency, credibility and authenticity.
Therefore, opportunities to directly address internal and external audiences should be sought and
planned for whenever and wherever possible. In principle, the personal commitment of the senior
leadership is the preferred option. Because communication managers are communicators at the
same time, the HQ's communication capabilities and functions need to act carefully synchronized to
convey the right messages to their colleagues and counterparts.
8. Media Communication
Larger audiences can be best reached by using media channels with wider reach. The Joint Force
disposes of own media capabilities (such as PA and Psychological Operations, PSYOPS) and may also
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employ public or commercial media – e.g., by contracting, buying news time and newspaper inserts;
by giving selected information at compulsory media opportunities; or through embedded journalists.
Once released into the public domain, the original information is no longer under Joint Force control.
Therefore, in order to sustain the principles of transparency, credibility and authenticity, media
outlets need to be coordinated and documented.
9. Assessment of Effects
Driving and shaping Joint Force communication requires dynamic and prompt measurement of
effectiveness in order to design and appropriately adjust Information Effects and Activities. This task
needs to be closely linked to the continuous analysis of the Information Environment, which provides
the baseline for change assessment, and to effects development and activity planning.
10. Education and Training
Integration of communication in all plans and activities, and advancing the new mind-set towards
awareness and perception of the Information Environment, requires the assistance of
communication experts during staff processes and working routines as well as generalcommunication training for all (which constitutes a communication management function itself).
Internal leadership and staff development programs should enhance the accountability of all
members of the Joint Force as communicators, promote the mission Narrative, evolve the corporate
identity and image of the Joint Force, and in turn contribute to overall mission success. It is the
Commander's responsibility to ensure that properly trained personnel are empowered through
training and education opportunities in order to facilitate these requirements (see Chapter VII).
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The inter alia is responsible for Information Management (IM) and, therefore, has aDIRECTOR OF STAFF
key role in ensuring an effective flow of information in support of all staff activities and
communication management.
The assist cooperation and information exchange between the JFC, higher command,LIAISON OFFICERS
adjacent units, the Host Nation (HN), troops contributing nations, International Organisations (IOs)involved in the operation, and supporting forces / commands assigned to the JFC.
The support the Commander by communicating accurate information in aPUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS
timely manner in order to improve public awareness and understanding of the operation and the
Joint Force's mission, thereby enhancing their credibility. The media are PA's primary communication
means. PA also contributes to analysis and assessment of the Information Environment.
The provides expertise on local languages, customs, religion, art, symbols, etc.CULTURAL ADVISOR
relevant to the Joint Force operation. He offers a conduit to better understand foreign societies and
communicate effectively. The CULAD supports the targeting process and contributes to analysis and
assessment of the Information Environment. He also contributes to cross-cultural awareness and,
through cultural knowledge education and foreign language training, enhanced interculturalcommunicative competence of the Joint Force.
The division is responsible for the provision of accurate, timely and relevantJ2 INTELLIGENCE
intelligence to meet the JFC's operational and security requirements, and maintain situation
awareness. J2 supports the targeting process and contributes to analysis and assessment of the
Information Environment.
The division acts as the focal point through which the Commander directs the conductJ3 OPERATIONS
of an operation, ensuring unity of effort and the most effective use of resources. J3 assesses the
status and capabilities of assigned forces, specifies tasks for subordinate units based on the OPLAN,
and leads campaign synchronisation. J3 – with J2 and J5 – manages the targeting process and
contributes to analysis and assessment of the Information Environment.
The staff is the J3's tool for effects development and activity planningINFORMATION OPERATIONS
regarding the Information Environment. Info Ops is a staff function to analyse, plan, assess and
integrate Information Activities to create desired Information Effects. The Info Ops staff is also the
HoC’s tool for coordinating contributions of communication capabilities and functions – at the Joint
Force HQ and from subordinate commands – to the operations planning process.
The division leads the planning for future operations and coordinates these efforts withinJ5 PLANS
the Joint Force HQ and with higher, subordinate and adjacent commands and civil authorities. J5
supports activity planning and the assessment of the Information Environment.
The division is responsible for civil-military liaison activities andJ9 CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION
advising the Commander on the implications of all activities undertaken that concern the relations
between the armed forces, local governments, civil population, IOs, NGOs, and other agencies of the
countries where the Joint Force is deployed, employed and supported. When performing its liaison
function, J9 becomes an important communication agent to directly convey Joint Force messages
and contribute to the assessment of the Information Environment.
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2. Options for Establishing the Head of Communication Function
This Section describes and discusses several possibilities for establishing the HoC function at an
operational-level Joint Force HQ. The three dimensions analysed for this purpose are:
of HoC postsNUMBER
of HoC postsPOSITIONING
of the HoC to Information Analysts and PlannersRELATIONSHIP
Furthermore, options were selected based on an assessment of their practicality and feasibility, and
regarding their potential contribution to the MCDC conceptual approach, i.e., some theoretical
options were discarded upfront and not further explicated. These unrealistic and/or undesired
options inter alia are:
Having only one civilian HoC (without a military Deputy): In a military HQ organisation the
provision of direction and guidance – to the operational HQ staff and to the tactical /
Component Command levels – can unlikely be performed by a person without substantial
military competence, and experience in and understanding of military Command and Control
(C2) mechanisms. Furthermore, the subjective take of some soldiery on the role of civilians in
directing the force should be considered.
The HoC as Deputy Commander (DCOM): The additional HoC post/function can only provide
substantial added value if the incumbent is able to fully concentrate on communication
management. Therefore, he must be relieved from any administrative C2 and general staff
advisory burden. Also – and maybe even more important – a DCOM HoC could negatively
affect the awareness of communication as a leadership responsibility, i.e., promote the idea
of the Commander having his Deputy deal with communication and care less himself.
The HoC as a member of a J-Division: This positioning would contradict the approach to
promote communication as a leadership function and would disable the HoC's assistance and
advisory role to the commander. Furthermore, his responsibility for providing direction andguidance to the staff and subordinate commands would be hampered, and his integrating
function in relation to, for instance, the division heads and the HQ Advisory Group (including
PA) be undermined.
Information Analysts and/or Information Planners as members of the HQ Advisory Group:
These capabilities must not be de-linked from neither of their primary customers, which
clearly are the HoC, the Info Ops staff, and the J2 INTEL and J5 Plans Divisions. However, they
cannot report to all at the same time and contribute their work to all at the same level of
quality. Therefore, it is suggested to assign them to either one of their primary customers
and not pool them for general assistance in the HQ Advisory Group.
a)
One or Two HoC Posts
This Section discusses options for equipping the HoC function in a military HQ organisation. The
options that consider a second post for a Deputy HoC basically introduce a civilian post for the HoC
function in a military HQ and are based on a differentiation of roles of civilian and military
incumbents, not on the workload of the HoC or his 24 hrs availability to the Commander and his
staff 18
. In principle, a civilian HoC (regardless of leading or Deputy) would take care of coordination
and dialogue with civilian stakeholders and mission partners, whereas a military HoC would primarily
deal with HQ internal tasks and guidance to subordinate commands.
18
In all options, the HoC would be supported by an appropriate number of assistants and a staff organisationto perform basic communication management tasks. In assisting the Commander to lead the
communication process of the Joint Force, the HoC would consequently follow the Commander's battle
rhythm, and thus his availability for decision-making would be ensured.
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The integrated and corporate approach to communication further suggests that an INFORMATION
– developed at the earliest stage of crisis response planning as strategic-political guidanceSTRATEGY
for activities to affect the Information Environment – be considered as additional planning guidance
at the operational level. The Information Strategy initially serves to complement the Strategic
Planning Directive (SPD) and the strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and would be further
developed and updated during the subsequent planning process and the conduct of operations, as
required by changes in the mandate, mission or situation. See Chapter III.
An Information Strategy contains , which support strategic objectives byINFORMATION OBJECTIVES
providing the focused view on the Information Environment . Information Objectives will later be
translated into at all levels. Information Effects at the operational-level willINFORMATION EFFECTS
support the achievement of operational objectives and correlate with operational effects.
Operational-level Information Effects equal operational effects in the Operation Plan (OPLAN),
concentrating expressively on desired changes in the Information Environment. The term
Information Effect, however, is proposed to be retained for two reasons: first, to clearly indicate the
operating direction of the effect; second, to anchor the requirement to translate (strategic)
Information Objectives into (operational) effects. Information Effects may also be developed fromother strategic, operational and tactical objectives, as appropriate.
This Chapter discusses implications of principles of multinational operations and planning for
integrated and corporate communication in order to focus the attention of communication
practitioners involved in communication planning; takes NATO's Operations Planning Process (OPP)
as an example for multinational operations planning22
; examines the OPP for required contributions
from a communication perspective; outlines the proposed participation of the key staff elements for
communication management (from Section IV.C.1.b) in the OPP; and presents options for capturing
communication contributions in planning products.
B.
Principles
1. Principles of Joint and Multinational Operations
The fundamental principles of joint and multinational operations23
guide operations planning and
hence the respective contributions from a communication perspective.
a) Definition of Objectives
Joint multinational operations must be focused towards clearly defined and commonly understood
objectives that contribute to the achievement of the desired end-state.
Information Objectives must be phrased to support strategic objectives and provide a focus on the
Information Environment. The Narrative supports the building of a corporate identity of the Joint
Force and enables a widespread understanding of its mandate and mission.
b) Unity of Purpose
Multinational operations depend on cooperation and coordination to realize maximum combined
effect.
Alignment of words and deeds to achieve a common end state is the overall goal of all operations.
Communication advice must, therefore, be provided to operations planning from the early beginning
of the process. The Information Environment must be considered throughout effects development,
activity planning and conduct of operations.
22
Although related NATO doctrine is intended primarily for use by NATO forces, it could also be applied tooperations conducted in other formats, such as NATO-led coalition operations or operations with NATO in a
supporting or participatory role. [NATO AJP-5(E) (2013), Para 0113.c and 0121]23
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k) Simplicity
Simple plans and clear orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion.
l) Multinationality
Command of multinational forces demands an attitude of mind that is not only international, but also
able to understand differing national perspectives and how they relate to the common purpose.
Cross-cultural awareness and intercultural communicative competence both have an internal and
external dimension.
2. Principles of Operations Planning
The principles for operations planning24
reflect the challenges for both civilian and military actors
involved in planning for operations in a complex and uncertain security environment. They need to
be considered for planning contributions from a communication perspective.
a) Coherence
Every plan must positively contribute towards the accomplishment of the approved strategic
objectives for addressing the crisis.
Information Effects developed at the operational level must support the achievement of Information
Objectives. Information Objectives must be clearly related to strategic objectives.
b) Comprehensive Understanding of the Environment
Achieving the desired strategic outcomes must be understood at all echelons during planning and
conduct of operations.
Understanding the Information Environment is a prerequisite for purposeful effects development,
activity planning and assessment of effects.
c) Mutual Respect, Trust, Transparency and Understanding
Operations planning in support of the Joint Force's contribution to a comprehensive approach shouldallow collaboration and cooperation across multinational and national bodies, among civil and
military actors, and with other relevant actors and local authorities.
Communication planning should always consider the 'end-user perspective', i.e., how own messages
be understood by intended and unintended audiences in a specific operational context. The
Narrative and its operationalization will be key for promoting the principles of transparency,
credibility and authenticity.
d) Consultation and Compatible Planning
Mutually supportive, compatible, and wherever possible, concerted and harmonised planning is
fundamental for success of a comprehensive approach.
Civilian mission partners need to be involved in communication planning as much as possible, andcommunication planning products need to be prepared in a way that enables appropriate
information exchange.
e) Efficient Use of Resources
Decision-makers should be made aware of the risk of not adequately resourcing an operation.
Planners must allow both military and non-military contributions to focus on and leverage their core
competencies within the international response to a crisis.
Communication planning needs to provide constant feedback to the higher command and identify
potential resources at all levels for creating Information Effects. The application of the principles of
subsidiarity and empowerment will support the employment of communication means where they
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f) Flexibility and Adaptability
Planning should accommodate an expanding set of circumstances, allowing due consideration for
likely costs evaluated against benefits gained. Planning should be flexible enough to adjust to
evolving political guidance, civil and military advice needed to facilitate collaborative planning and
adapt to political requirements during a crisis.
Analysis and assessment of the Information Environment is a continuous and essential task to detect
changes and trends that require the attention of communication practitioners. Modified strategic-
political communication guidance must be forwarded to subordinate levels without filtering and as
quickly as possible.
C. Process Integration with Operations Planning
1. Contributions to the Operational-Level Planning Process 25
This section outlines the required contributions to the Operational-Level Planning Process (OLPP)
from a communication perspective and identifies the appropriate participation of communication
managers and practitioners (including the leadership) of an operational Joint Force HQ. See Annex D – Communication Planning for a detailed description and visualisation of the interrelated
communication planning process.
a) Initiation of the Operational-Level Planning Process (OLPP Step 1)
: Understand the strategic situation and the nature of the problem, as well as the proposedPURPOSE
end state and strategic objectives; and contribute operational advice to the Strategic Commander on
his military response options and assess the operational-level viability of these options.
: Initial operational estimate, warning orders to subordinate commands and the documentPRODUCTS
containing the JFC's operational advice.
:COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES AND PARTICIPATION
Command and Control: The Commander provides operational advice to the strategic level,
including input to the development of the Information Strategy (if it is not already available).
He provides initial guidance to the Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) and authorises
the HoC to directly coordinate with communication managers and practitioners at the
strategic level. The HoC assists and advises the Commander. He also directs HQ staff
elements (communication capabilities and functions) to prepare communication input to
operations planning, and provides guidance to subordinate commands, i.e., he initiates the
communication planning process. For this purpose, the Information Strategy (once available)
needs to be emphasised and conveyed to the HQ staff and subordinate commands.
Furthermore, the HoC prepares lines to take for Joint Force HQ's face-to-face and media
communication activities.
Analysis of the Information Environment: The Information Analysts continue and focus their
analysis on the identified crisis situation. They contribute to the strategic assessment and
provide analysis results to the HoC and the JOPG, as required. Analysis results will feed into
the JFC's operational advice to the Strategic Commander.
Coordination: On behalf of the Commander, the HoC contacts strategic-level communication
managers and practitioners, as well as appropriate counterparts from multinational partners,
including civilian organisations, in order to establish working relationships amongst relevant
Points of Contact (POCs). The HoC coordinates with the CPA what lines to take for
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Direct Communication: The HoC advises, assists and prepares the Commander for meetings
with external stakeholders. The Commander uses lines to take when talking to his
counterparts and representatives of other agencies and organisations.
Media Communication: Media attitudes may reflect or influence public opinion and
ultimately will influence, positively or negatively, popular and political support of Joint Force
activities, and eventual mission success26
. The CPA, based on direction by the HoC, responds
to media enquiries and develops programs to inform the public about the Joint Force's role in
crisis management.
Education and Training: On behalf of the Commander, the HoC continues internal
communication programs to enhance the accountability of all members of the Joint Force as
communicators, promote the mission Narrative, and evolve the corporate identity and image
of the Joint Force.
COMMUNICATION PLANNING OUTPUTS:
Initial estimate of the Information Environment (as part of the initial operational estimate)
with conclusions to inform the JFC's operational advice to the Strategic Commander and his
initial guidance to the JOPG.
Liaison and coordination template for interaction27
of the HoC with other actors.
Lines to take for external communication.
Updated training/education plan for internal communication programs.
b) Problem and Mission Analysis (OLPP Step 2)
: Analyse the crisis situation in depth; determine precisely the operational problem that mustPURPOSE
be solved and the specific operational conditions that must be achieved.
: The operational design; planning guidance for the Joint Force HQ staff; and thePRODUCTS
operational planning directive to subordinate commands, including the Commander's initial intentand his guidance for Course of Action (COA) development and selection (initial COA selection
criteria).
:COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES AND PARTICIPATION
Command and Control: The Commander considers the essence of the Information Strategy
to become part of his initial statement of intent. Advised by the HoC, the Commander
provides direction and guidance to his staff and subordinate commands to further detail and
operationalise the strategic-political provisions contained in the Information Strategy and the
Strategic Planning Guidance. As a key activity of this planning step, the HoC and
communication capabilities and functions, as appropriate, will develop the operational-level
Narrative, coordinate it with the JOPG, and submit it to the Strategic Commander for
approval. The HoC will also advise the Commander and planning staff to consider potential
effects in the Information Environment to become a COA selection criterion.
Analysis of the Information Environment: Led by the HoC, the POLAD, Information Analysts,
PAO, J2 INTEL and the Info Ops staff will analyse the strategic-political assessments from a
communication perspective and relate it to the operational level and the assigned JOA. They
assist the development of a sound common understanding of the mission-specific elements
of the Information Environment.
Coordination: The HoC contacts strategic-level communication managers and practitioners in
order to confirm the appropriate operational-level interpretation of strategic-political
26 [Based on: NATO SHAPE, COPD v2.0 (2013), Page 4-21, Footnote 28]
27 "Interaction" might involve: coordination, cooperation, collaboration, consultation, exchange of
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guidance regarding the Information Environment and seek clarification and additional
guidance, as appropriate.
Direct and Media Communication: Continued from previous step. Internal and external
communication needs to be continued throughout the planning process (and conduct of
operations) in order to support situation awareness, transparency, and freedom of
information.
Education and Training: Continued from previous step. Throughout the planning process (and
conduct of operations) the Joint Force needs to gain, maintain and further develop situation
awareness, a common understanding of the importance of communication, and a corporate
identity in order to promote the Joint Forces' synergy and effectiveness.
COMMUNICATION PLANNING OUTPUTS:
Refined estimate of the Information Environment (in support of the development of the
operational design and a sound common understanding of the mission-specific elements of
the Information Environment).
A proposed phrasing that highlights communication (as a task) and/or the Information
Environment (and the intended effects in it) in the Commander’s intent statement.
The approved operational-level, mission-specific Narrative (as part of the planning guidance
and directive).
Proposed themes, themes to avoid, and audiences to address (as part of the planning
guidance and directive).
Proposed initial COA selection criteria related to the Information Environment.
Lines to take for external communication.
Updated training/education plan for internal communication programs.
c)
Courses of Action Development (OLPP Step 3): Develop a set of tentative COAs
28, all of which will accomplish the mission effectively inPURPOSE
accordance with the Commander's intent (this may be a collaborative planning effort between
strategic and operational-level planners to produce coherent broad COAs for each level in order to
preserve a common context during the further development steps).
: Tentative COAs and the Commander's guidance for the refinement of COAs (refined COAPRODUCTS
selection criteria).
:COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES AND PARTICIPATION
Command and Control: Within the scope of the Information Strategy and the approved
operational-level Narrative, the HoC and communication capabilities and functions, as
appropriate, contribute to the development of tentative COAs in order to incorporatecommunication (as a task) and/or the Information Environment (and the intended effects in
it), as required, to reflect the Commander’s intent. Based on advice by the HoC, the
Commander carries on his attitude towards communication (as stated in his intent) when
providing guidance for COA refinement.
Analysis of the Information Environment: Lead by the HoC, the POLAD, Information Analysts,
PAO, J2 INTEL and the Info Ops staff will continue to analyse the Information Environment
and assist the further development of a common understanding of its mission-specific
elements.
28
COAs should answer the following questions: (1) When does the operation begin and/or when must it becompleted for the required conditions be established? (2) Who will conduct the operation? (3) What
military operations are considered? (4) Where will they be performed? (5) Why is the operation
conducted? (6) How will the operation be conducted? [NATO SHAPE, COPD v2.0 (2013), Page 4-67]
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Coordination: The HoC, in close coordination with the POLAD, contacts strategic-level
communication managers and practitioners in order to directly harmonise communication
input to COA development.
Direct Communication: Continued from previous step.
Media Communication: Continued from previous step. Education and Training: Continued from previous step.
COMMUNICATION PLANNING OUTPUTS:
Refined estimate of the Information Environment (in support of the development of
tentative COAs).
COA refinement guidance that reflects the Commander’s intent regarding communication /
the Information Environment.
Proposed refined COA selection criteria related to the Information Environment.
Lines to take for external communication.
Updated training/education plan for internal communication programs.
d) Courses of Action Analysis (OLPP Step 4)
: Refine and analyse the COAs received from the Commander's guidance on tentative COAsPURPOSE
(this will partly be a collaborative planning effort between the operational and tactical-level planners
to produce coordinated COAs for each level).
: A series of COAs derived from comprehensive, logical, cross-functional evaluation andPRODUCTS
synchronisation (war gaming) ready for comparison and validation; COA evaluation criteria29
; a draft
synchronization matrix (to be refined during plan development and later on included in the OPLAN).
:COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES AND PARTICIPATION
Command and Control: The HoC, in close coordination with the COS and J3 Operations,directs the involvement of representatives of subordinate commands and Joint Force HQ
staff elements (communication capabilities and functions) in the war gaming process.
Analysis of the Information Environment: Continued from previous step. In addition, in this
step the Information Analysts will contribute their expertise to the development of COA
evaluation criteria.
Coordination: The HoC will ensure appropriate participation of communication capabilities
and functions in the war gaming process and coordinate their input to meet the
requirements of a realistic representation of the Information Environment. The Info Ops staff
actually conduct this coordination effort, as directed by the HoC. The LNOs represent their
sending organisations / agencies; they should, upon request of the HoC, place an additional
focus on the Information Environment and the particular role of their organisations /
agencies in it30
. The Info Ops staff will also contribute their expertise to the development of
the synchronization matrix.
Direct Communication: Continued from previous step.
Media Communication: Continued from previous step.
Education and Training: Continued from previous step.
29 Derived from the principles of joint and multinational operations at Section V.B.1.
30 The same applies to the Joint Force HQ,s LNOs to other organisations / agencies; in addition to their
information gathering function, they also convey Joint Force Commander’s messages.
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COMMUNICATION PLANNING OUTPUTS:
Communication input to the war gaming process (simulation of communication capabilities
and functions).
Proposed COA evaluation criteria focused on the Information Environment.
Communication input to the synchronization matrix (reference to the implementation routeprovided in the Information Strategy).
Lines to take for external communication.
Updated training/education plan for internal communication programs.
e) Courses of Action Validation and Comparison (OLPP Step 5)
: Validate and compare the COAs that were analysed during the previous step.PURPOSE
: Evaluated COAs; a recommended COA; the COA selection rationale.PRODUCTS
:COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES AND PARTICIPATION
Command and Control: Based on the results from war gaming and following consultationwith the Joint Force HQ communication capabilities and functions, the HoC recommends to
the Commander how to evaluate COAs from a communication perspective. Once approved,
he provides guidance to the JOPG.
Analysis of the Information Environment: Continued from previous step.
Coordination: Internal coordination amongst the communication capabilities and functions,
as mentioned above. The Info Ops staff will contribute the coordinated input from the
communication capabilities and functions.
Direct Communication: Continued from previous step.
Media Communication: Continued from previous step.
Education and Training: Continued from previous steps.
COMMUNICATION PLANNING OUTPUTS:
Communication input to COA evaluation, including recommendations and guidance (inter
alia advantages and disadvantages concerning desired effects in the Information
Environment and the achievement of strategic / Information Objectives, and prioritisation of
joint functions, sequencing and phasing).
Lines to take for external communication.
Updated training/education plan for internal communication programs.
f) Commander's Courses of Action Decision (OLPP Step 6)
: Gain the Commander's decision on a chosen COA and then refine this COA as the futurePURPOSE
core of the CONOPS.
: The Commander's COA selection; COA modifications; a refined Commander's intent.PRODUCTS
:COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES AND PARTICIPATION
Command and Control: The HoC directs the Info Ops staff to coordinate contributions to the
refinement of the selected COA. He will advise and consult with the Commander on potential
adjustments of his statement of intent.
Analysis of the Information Environment: Continued from previous step.
Coordination: The HoC, in close coordination with the POLAD, contacts strategic-level
communication managers and practitioners – within the OLPP and C2 procedures – in orderto confirm concurrence of the selected COA and the proposed refinement with strategic-
political guidance. The Info Ops staff coordinates contributions to COA refinement with
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activities and effects – in other words: messages and audiences – PA should participate in
and contribute to target nomination, as appropriate.
Activity Planning: Information Activities will be planned and conducted by the force
capabilities. The Info Ops staff – through the IACB – advises activity planning with a view on
creating desired Information Effects and assists the force generation process, i.e., the
identification of required means and assets.
Coordination: The HoC contacts strategic-level communication managers and practitioners in
order to directly harmonise communication input to CONOPS development. The Info Ops
staff – through the IACB – will involve the Joint Force HQ’s as well as subordinate commands’
communication capabilities and functions to contribute to the development of Information
Effects, and for planning Information Activities.
Direct Communication: Continued from previous step.
Media Communication: Continued from previous step.
Education and Training: Continued from previous step.
COMMUNICATION PLANNING OUTPUTS: Modified Commander’s intent regarding communication, if required.
Refined estimate of the Information Environment (in support of CONOPS development).
Proposed desired Information Effects.
Proposed target nomination for creating Information Effects and achieve decisive conditions.
Proposed set of ROEs relevant to the Information Environment.
Proposed Information Activities to create desired Information Effects.
Proposed force capabilities for conducting Information Activities (as part of the CJSOR).
Lines to take for external communication.
Updated training/education plan for internal communication programs.
h) Campaign Assessment and Plan Review / Revision (OLPP Step 8)
: Monitor and assess campaign progress; adapt the OPLAN, as required; and plan for conflictPURPOSE
termination and transition.
: Operational-level assessment reports for the strategic level; revised OPLANs.PRODUCTS
:COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES AND PARTICIPATION
Analysis of the Information Environment: Continued from previous steps.
Assessment of Effects: This activity is considered the most difficult one in the age of "swarm
communication"
31
and Social Media, where simple cause-effect relationships don't exist. Co-led by the Info Ops staff (involving those force capabilities that execute Information Activities
to create desired effects) and J2 INTEL (involving Information Analysts), communication
experts develop recommendations to the HoC for advising the Commander and further
coordination with the HQ's joint assessment staff (usually consisting of the J5 Plans in
cooperation with J2 INTEL and J3 Operations32
).
31
Frequently used term in robotics and elsewhere, meaning many-to-many or omnicast communication. [Cf.http://web.cs.swarthmore.edu/~meeden/cs81/s14/papers/AmyMurphy.pdf ;
http://users.cecs.anu.edu.au/~felix/studies/Publications/Swarm_Communication.pdf and others]32
[See NATO AJP-5(E) (2013), Para 0386; and NATO AJP-3(B) (2011), Para 0422.b.]
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2. Options for Capturing Communication Planning Outputs
This section proposes options for capturing communication planning outputs in alternative formats.
NATO doctrine is taken as a baseline for the design of an operational-level Operation Plan (OPLAN).
Based on results from experimentation, the theoretical option to produce a stand-alone
Communication Plan with information not contained in the OPLAN was discarded.
a) Integration with Existing Formats
Incorporate operational-level communication guidance in the33
, Main Body, Para 3.dOPLAN
"Concept of Operations" and Para 4.b.(7) "Coordinating Instructions / StratCom and Information
Strategy", and in the Annex A "Concept of Operations"34
. Note that the functional annexes TT (PA),
UU (Info Ops), VV (PSYOPS), and others, such as D (INTEL), Q (CIS) or W (CIMIC), need to be adjusted,
as appropriate. The use of Annex SS (StratCom) is currently not mandated for the operational level.
Figure 8: Communication Input to Existing OPLAN Format
b) Amendment of Existing Formats
Incorporate operational-level communication guidance in the , Main Body, Para 3.d "ConceptOPLAN
of Operations" and Para 4.b.(7) "Coordinating Instructions / StratCom and Information Strategy", in
33 [NATO SHAPE, COPD v2.0 (2013), Appendix D-7]
34 The CONOPS is a formal document, with the same format as the OPLAN; as such, the majority of the detail
of the 'concept of operations' is already contained in the main body of both the CONOPS and the OPLAN. If
the Commander produces a concept of operations synopsis, from which the CONOPS is based, it could be
captured in this Annex. Alternatively, some of the detail of the ‘concept’ could be placed here instead of themain body to keep the main body succinct, for example a detailed description of the phases. Finally, it could
be used only to introduce the attached appendices: Synchronization Matrix and Operational Design
target lists; maintaining a list of restricted targets and areas where Special Operations Forces (SOF)
are operating; ensuring target nominations are consistent with the Commander's intent and concept
of operations; and ensuring that Information Activities are adequately addressed.42
Figure 13 shows the current generic set-up of the joint coordination process at the military
operational level with the major bodies / meetings, working relationships, and related products.
40
[Based on: NATO SHAPE, AD 80-70 (2009), Figure 1, Page I-1-1]41 [For details on the bodies of the current joint coordination process see: NATO AJP-3.9(B) (2014); NATO
SHAPE, AD 80-70 (2009); and NATO AJP-3.10(A) (2014)]42
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PA and IACB representatives are currently in attendance of both the JCBWG and the JCB. In
accordance with this concept, the (decision-making) JCB should involve the HoC in his primary
responsibility for providing direction and guidance on communication issues. If so, it is suggested to
reconsider the attendance requirement of PA and Info Ops at the JCB.
Figure 15 shows a typical composition of a JTCB. It comprises representatives from the Joint ForceHQ staff, all Component / Single Service Commands (subordinate commands) and, if required,
national liaison representatives. Note that there are representatives of three groups of
communication experts envisioned to attend the JTCB (Info Ops, PA and StratCom), which indicates
some redundancy and should be reconsidered.
Figure 15: JTCB Composition45
3. Integrating Communication in the Joint Coordination Process
In order to promote a common understanding of communication guidance throughout the joint
coordination process, the HoC will have to take on his responsibility and play a visible role. A clear
division of labour needs to be established amongst the staff elements involved in communicationmanagement, distinguishing between preparatory working groups and decision-making bodies.
The HoC should be supported by a team of assistants and a Communication Coordination Board
(CCB) as his tool for communication management.
Figure 16 shows the position and working relationships of a CCB in the joint coordination process.
The CCB should link up with the IACB (to provide communication guidance and coordination to the
targeting process), the JCBWG (to guide the preparation of Joint Coordination Orders, JCOs), and the
JCB (to participate in the decision-making process from a communication perspective).
The subsequent Section VI.C will discuss details on the task and composition of a CCB.
45 [Based on: NATO AJP-3.9(B) (2014), Figure 4.1, Page 4-6]
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Figure 17 shows the proposed new composition of a JTCB without PA (and StratCom) representation.
Once prepared by the CCB, Info Ops should be in a position to adequately contribute to the targeting
process – based on direction by the HoC and coordinated with PA (considering that PA usually does
not nominate 'targets' as such, but advises on potential public and media issues).
The JCBWG should involve a CCB representative in addition to PA and Info Ops (Figure 18). This is toensure that the HoC (or a deputy or assistant of his choice) has a formal seat in JCBWG meetings to
deliver his opinion. Although PA and Info Ops themselves are part of the CCB (see Section VI.C), their
attendance is necessary to assure situation awareness and avoid misinterpretations, and to provide
ad hoc advice to the HoC / CCB representative, as required.
Figure 18: CCB Reps in the JCBWG
The JCB assists the Joint Force's activity and effects synchronization, specifically to prepare and issue
the Commander's priority guidance across the subordinate commands, and to resolve potential areas
of conflict. The JCB assigns execution responsibilities, prioritises, de-conflicts and synchronizes all
aspects of the employment of lethal and non-lethal means. The Commander provides, through the
medium of the JCB, further amplification to his direction and guidance. JCB representatives must
have the experience, knowledge and authority to take decisions (on behalf of their commanders).46
With respect to the decision-making function of the JCB, its high-level tasking authority, and its role
in support of requests and recommendations to the strategic level, the HoC himself should attend
JCB meetings. PA and Info Ops will be kept involved through the CCB and informed through their
attendance at the JCBWG.
For the proposed (new) composition of the JCB: see Figure 19.
46 [Based on: NATO SHAPE, AD 80-70 (2009), Para I-2-2 and I-2-3, Page I-2-1]
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VII. EDUCATION AND TRAINING
A.
Qualification of the Head of CommunicationThe HoC has to be a communication expert, a smart consumer of consulting services and a problem-
solver. There must be a comfort level with a range of subject matter, from marketing and media
relations issues to human resources or legal matters. The best person to drive that integration
process is someone with the largest possible view of how the processes should work. The ideal HoC
must be a generalist, with enough experience in several disciplines and able to manage them
effectively when the need arises. Equally, he must be rooted in at least one specialty (e.g., PA or Info
Ops) that will serve him well when the best-laid plans are interrupted by an unexpected crisis.
The HoC should be experienced in helping to preserve and protect the command's reputation on a
number of levels. The individual should have a clear understanding of intended messaging and how
the Joint Force responds to incoming information and inquiries, as some messages may do more
harm (or good) for the command's reputation. He must be able to facilitate open dialogue to buildstrong relationships with important stakeholders and should fully understand the value and role that
third-party endorsements play in managing perceptions of an organisation or in perpetuating
misperceptions.
The HoC has to be a counsellor to senior leadership. He must be proficient at playing the advisory
role to the Commander, and in certain situations as being the organisation's spokesperson – the
voice of the organisation – when necessary.
A HoC with a deep understanding of PA would be in a good position to manage the integrated
communication process. A HoC should be a skilled public speaker, have established relationships with
leaders, and be generally knowledgeable with every facet of the Joint Force organisation, in
particular with the operations planning process.
A HoC will have to recognise opportunities when they are presented and use the process of
integration to advance all communication disciplines. To do so, the HoC needs to be an active listener
and committed to expanding communication related research and measurement capabilities. He will
have to place the highest value on consistency and quality, for the end result of all integrated
communication efforts must be the consistency of all messages. And above all, he should make the
commitment to providing complete communication solutions to operations problems, regardless of
where those problems are rooted in.
B. Qualification of the Information Analysts
The primary qualification requirement for Information Analysts is systemic analysis. They should be
competent to conduct an interdisciplinary analysis and assessment of the Information Environment
across the PMESII47
domains, considering the Information Factor throughout.
Information Analysts need to be familiar with general KD and INTEL procedures, processes and tools
applied by the J2 Intelligence division. A specific contribution from an integrated communication
perspective will be required to the comprehensive preparation of the operational environment
(CPOE). This includes familiarity with and active involvement in the joint targeting process.
Information Analysts also need to be team players, able to fully integrate in various different groups,
and planning and coordination processes within the HQ staff routine. They must understand military
thinking and be able to 'operationalize' academic insight in order to incorporate the Information
Factor in the CPOE, OLPP, targeting and assessment.
47 PMESII = Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information.
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Training in one or more communication capabilities (such as PA or PSYOPS) would be an optional and
complementary qualification requirement for Information Analysts. Experience in Target Audience
Analysis (TAA) or media analysis may benefit their systemic analysis of the Information Environment.
Information Analysts – provided additional functional training – could also be employed as
Information Planners.
C. Qualification of the Information Planners
Information Planners need to be proficient in all aspects of the OLPP. They contribute their
comprehensive understanding of the Information Environment as core competence to planning and
assessment of operations.
The main function of Information Planners is the development of information effects and related
indicators and metrics in conjunction with Info Ops and force capabilities, as appropriate. In order to
do so, Information Planners should be trained in at least one communication capability or function,
such as PA, PSYOPS or Info Ops.
Information Planners – provided additional functional training – could also be employed as
Information Analysts.
D. Integration of Communication in Leadership and Staff Development
Led by the HoC and based on the Commander's guidance, the Joint Force HQ staff as well as
subordinate commanders need to involve in education and training programs that support the
development of the mind-set of integrated communication. Each and every member of the Joint
Force must acknowledge the fact of not being able to not communicate, and implement this in their
plans and actions – shaping the 'body language' of the Joint Force's operations.
Staff education programs also serve the purpose of promoting situation awareness, information
exchange, transparency, and a common understanding of the Commander's intent related to the
Information Environment. Cross functional individualised training should be considered extremelyimportant as it will help communication and coordination amongst all staff elements. Staff training
will also assist the development of a corporate identity of the Joint Force, and consequently, a
corporate image in the perception of external stakeholders and audiences.
Leadership development efforts should include the commanders and key leaders of the Joint Force. It
is a primary responsibility of the HoC as the senior communication expert to plan and conduct these
activities. In addition, the permanent advice of the HoC to the Commander will contribute to the
achievement of a better understanding of his role in the Information Environment.
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58
available, in particular concerning analysis, assessment, strategic political judgement, and military
advice.
The process of developing an Information Strategy may start even before a mandate is agreed on.
However, the strategic Narrative needs to refer to the mandate and, therefore, an Information
Strategy cannot be formally issued prior to the mandate.The first version of an Information Strategy should be ready and approved by the political authorities
prior to strategic operations/mission planning is concluded. This is to ensure that strategic planning
appropriately considers effects in the Information Environment.
An Information Strategy should be produced as an internal document in the first place, with no pro-
active external distribution. However, in order to meet the principles of transparency, credibility and
authenticity, it should ideally contain only unclassified information so that it could be shared with
partners and public disclosure would not jeopardise mission accomplishment.
LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY
Commanders should consider themselves as the supreme communicators and champions ofintegrated communication of the Joint Force. Ideally, the senior leadership should personally commit
themselves in communication rather than delegating messaging to others. Therefore, communicative
competence should become a selection criterion for commanders.
HEAD OF COMMUNICATION
A HoC functionality should be established at a Joint Force HQ to enhance the traditional StratCom
function beyond its doctrinal coordination role. It should be supported by a team of assistants and a
capable staff organisation (with alternatives for manning and positioning).
Based on insights from experimentation, the HoC should be positioned in the Command Group as the
preferred option. However, depending on command and staff management requirements (e.g., for
high-intensity warfighting vs. low-intensity peacekeeping or stabilisation operations), other options
may be considered as well.
The HoC should represent the coordinated functional expertise on the Information Environment of
the participating nations and organisations – not any national perspective, be it that of his own
country or that of the lead nation. Therefore, the HoC should be appointed by the Strategic
Commander, in close consultation with the designated Joint Force Commander, to act as the Joint
Force's principal assistant on all communication issues.
The HoC should be granted the authority to assign tasks and require consultation between the
agencies involved (organisations or commands and their representatives) for all issues related to
Joint Force communication. The HoC should also be authorised to directly address all members of the
Joint Force HQ.
HQ STAFF ORGANISATION AND CAPABILITIES
Information Analysts and Information Planners should be introduced as new, additional capabilities
to existing HQ organisations to promote the wider integration of communication expertise in the
analysis, planning, execution and assessment of operations. These capabilities should ideally not be
centralised or pooled, but assigned to those staff elements the primary responsibility of which rests
with analysis and planning, i.e., the J2 and the J5. Other options may be considered, as appropriate.
Organisationally the PA staff should remain unchanged as part of the HQ's HQ Advisory Group (if so
positioned) and perform their doctrinal role in conjunction and fully integrated with the HoC
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Organisationally the Info Ops staff should remain unchanged within the J3 Operations staff division
(if so positioned) and also perform their doctrinal role in conjunction and fully integrated with the
HoC function.
COMMUNICATION PLANNING
An Information Strategy should be considered as additional planning guidance at the operational
level. Operation planners and operators should be aware of the Information Strategy content in
order to support the alignment of messaging by Joint Force operations.
In order to fully integrate communication planning and operations planning at the operational level,
there must not be a parallel, segregated planning process for communication. It is required that
communication capabilities and functions play an integral part in the operational-level planning
process.
The development of effects in the Information Environment needs to be guided from a commander's
perspective and fully integrated with the development of operational effects.
Communication planning outputs should become an integral part of the OPLAN main body andannexes. As an UNCLASSIFIED excerpt from that, a Communication Plan should highlight the most
important parts from a communication perspective, able to be shared with external actors for
coordination of communication efforts.
CAMPAIGN SYNCHRONIZATION
Communication as a joint function should comprise a broader scope of capabilities and functions
than Info Ops currently does, including PA and internal communication. Therefore, communication
should replace Info Ops as joint function in the joint coordination process. It should be represented
by the HoC in all Joint Force HQ decision-making processes.
The (decision-making) JCB should involve the HoC in his primary responsibility for providing direction
and guidance on communication issues. It is suggested to remove the attendance requirement of PA
and Info Ops at the JCB.
The JCBWG should involve a CCB representative in addition to PA and Info Ops to ensure that the
HoC (or a deputy or assistant of his choice) has a formal seat in JCBWG meetings to deliver his
opinion. The attendance of PA and Info Ops is necessary to assure situation awareness and avoid
misinterpretations, and to provide ad hoc advice to the HoC / CCB representative, as required.
Info Ops should represent communication management in the JTCB. Once prepared by the CCB, Info
Ops should be in a position to adequately contribute to the targeting process – based on direction by
the HoC and coordinated with PA.
COMMUNICATION COORDINATION BOARD
As the HoC's primary tool for communication management (i.e., coordinating and implementing
integrated communication), a CCB should be established and incorporated in the Joint Force HQ staff
routine / battle rhythm.
The CCB should comprise the core of the Joint Force HQ communication experts, the DOS, and
communication representatives from superior and subordinate commands as well as other external
representatives, as required.
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Through education and training opportunities all Joint Force personnel should develop the mind-set
of integrated communication, and consequently be empowered to participate in Joint Force
messaging within their scope of tasks and responsibilities.
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A-1
Annex A – Information Strategy Format
REFERENCES: (to mandating, strategic assessments and planning)
1. INTRODUCTION
A. SLOGAN (name of the operation/mission with reference background or explanation, as required)
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE (strategic-political dimension: partner nations and populations, all instruments of power, global perspective)
C. CUSTODIAN AND CUSTOMERS (strategic commander; partners/allies, contributing nations, operational/force commander)
D. REVIEW AND APPROVAL (periodical and event-driven; political approval)
2. STRATEGIC CONTEXT
A. ASSESSMENT OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (synopsis; reference to separate document(s), as appropriate)
B. MANDATE AND MISSION (summary of relevant UNSCRs; strategic commander's mission)
C. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES (from strategic planning; non-military and military)
3. NARRATIVE AND INFORMATION OBJECTIVES
A. NARRATIVE STATEMENT (strategic-political dimension: partner nations and populations, all instruments of power, global perspective,
derived from mandate)
B. INFORMATION OBJECTIVES (linked to strategic objectives; phrasing: subject focus – quality of change - conclusion)
C. APPROVED AUDIENCES AND TARGETS (bullet list; amended with caveats, as required)
D. THEMES AND MASTER MESSAGES (not linked to specific audiences/targets; general overview; include Contingency Master Messages and Themes
to be avoided)
4. POTENTIAL ACTORS AND CAPABILITIES
(strategic-political level, all instruments of power; national responsibilities)
5. IMPLEMENTATION ROUTE (synopsis)
A. MILESTONES AND KEY EVENTS (milestones = decisive points; key events = important occurrences that happen anyway / periodically, story
events that may lead to milestones or result from them)B. COMMUNICATION APPROACH (broad description / summary: mapping of audiences/targets, Themes and Master Messages for each
Information Objective; continuous text)
6. COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS
(procedures ref. to partners/allies, information sharing arrangements, dialogue and interaction between civilian
and military actors; coordination between military and civil mission components in theatre)
ANNEXES:
A. IMPLEMENTATION ROUTE MATRIX (mapping of audiences/targets, Themes and Master Messages for each Information Objective on a timeline)
B. EVALUATION PLAN (indicators for the achievement of Information Objectives)
C. BUDGET AND FINANCE (financial arrangements based on national commitments)
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A-2
Reference to Chapter V, Section C.2: Once a is to be developed at theCOMMUNICATION PLAN
operational level – in a format similar to the Information Strategy – the following principle
adjustments should be made:
REFERENCES (Joint Force HQ OPLAN as the key reference document)
SECTION 2 – "Operational Context"
PARAGRAPH 2.C – "Objectives" (including strategic Information Objectives and operational objectives!)
PARAGRAPH 3.A – "Narrative Statements" (including the strategic Narrative from the Information
Strategy and the operational-level Narrative!)
SECTION 4 – "Potential Capabilities and Actors" (to outline operational-level force capabilities,subordinate commands' capabilities, as required, and other actors within the scope of the Joint
Force)
SECTION 5 – "Implementation Route" (Reference to the OPLAN Synchronization Matrix, Appendix A-1)
ANNEXES (review necessity and remove, as required)
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B-1
Annex B – Narrative (Example) The following example is taken from the VK14 exercise and reflects communication guidance
prepared at the military operational level.48
The international interim security assistance force to the Republic of BOGALAND – BFOR – is
mandated by the International Community and operates upon request of the signatories of
the Cease Fire Agreement and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to enforce, monitor and
verify the fulfilment of their commitments.
In the military aspects, NATO has established BFOR to affirm and provide its unwavering
support to the implementation of lasting peace and stability in the North Friendly Sea region.
BFOR's main effort is on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the former parties
in conflict, and on support to the security sector reform in BOGALAND.
BFOR has the capability and collective will to continue this task. We will embrace thecontribution of all regional parties who demonstrate a willingness to support the BOGALAND
peace process.
Reinforcing cooperation with the Transitional Government of BOGALAND and standing
shoulder to shoulder with UNMIB and EUFOR, BFOR will further improve safety and security
in BOGALAND, and set the conditions that enable the future regular BOGALAND forces to
take on their national responsibilities.
48 [COM BFOR Communication Plan for Peace Support Operations in BOGALAND – VK 14 v2, EXERCISE –
practices, and operational processes and policies. [Based on: Osterwalder/Pigneur (2010)] [MCDC]
: The process by which information, meanings and feelings are shared by peopleCOMMUNICATION
through an exchange of verbal and non-verbal messages. [Singh (2005)]
: The military capabilities and staff functions the primaryCOMMUNICATION CAPABILITIES AND FUNCTIONS
role of which is to execute communication management tasks, to conduct communication planning
and/or to create Information Effects. [MCDC]
: A term used in the broadest sense to include planning, approval andCOMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT
implementation of communication guidance. It corresponds with the terms 'operational design' and
'operational management' introduced in NATO's Allied Joint Doctrine to embrace analysis, planning,
execution and assessment [NATO AJP-01(D) (2010), Para 0525 and 526]. [MCDC]
: Contributions to the Operations Planning Process from a communicationCOMMUNICATION PLANNING
perspective. [MCDC]
: An action designed to have an effect in the information environment,INFORMATION ACTIVITY
performed by any actor. [MNE 6 Framework Concept v1.0 (2010)]
: Effects in the Information Environment. [MCDC]INFORMATION EFFECTS
: The virtual and physical space, in which information is received,INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
processed and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information systems. [MNE 6
Framework Concept v1.0 (2010)]
: The actuality of information pervading societies, such as actors and audiencesINFORMATION FACTOR
have become increasingly indistinguishable, and every action sends a message, intended or not. (In
the military, information is meanwhile recognised as a decisive factor per se that will increasinglyaffect the operational factors force, space and time.) [MNE 6 Framework Concept v1.0 (2010)]
: A desired condition to be created in the information environment. It shouldINFORMATION OBJECTIVE
be measurable to enable analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment /evaluation of
related actions and effects. [MNE 6 Framework Concept v1.0 (2010)]
: The interagency and multinational approach to crisis/conflict prevention andINFORMATION STRATEGY
resolution in the information environment. It constitutes mission-specific strategic and political
guidance for information activities across all levers of power in support of mission objectives. [MNE 6
Framework Concept v1.0 (2010)]
: The statement of identity, cause and intent around which people can unite. [Based on:NARRATIVE
Prof. Paul Cornish (2009); GBR Government working definition]
MNE 5 Framework Concept "The Information Factor within a Comprehensive approach to
Multinational Crisis Management" v3.0 (03 April 2009)
MNE 5 / MNIOE Analytical Concept "Development of a Multinational Information Strategy" v1.0 (31
October 2008)
MNE 6 Framework Concept "Integrated Communication in Multinational Coalition Operations within
a Comprehensive Approach" v1.0 (22 October 2010)
Mulder: "Driving Integrated Marketing Communication Home for Organisational Effectiveness"
(2007)
NATO AJP-01(D) – "Allied Joint Doctrine" (December 2010)
NATO AJP-3(B) – "Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations" (March 2011)
NATO AJP-3.9(B) "Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting", Study Draft 4 (July 2014)
NATO AJP-3.10(A) – "Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations", Pre-Ratification Draft (July
2014)
NATO AJP-5(E) – "Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning" (June 2013)
NATO SHAPE, "Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive" (COPD) v2.0 (04 October 2013)
NATO SHAPE ACO Directive (AD) 80-70 – "Campaign Synchronization and Joint Targeting in ACO" (12
January 2009)
Osborne/Brown: "Managing Change and Innovation in Public Service Organizations" (2005)
Osterwalder/Pigneur: "Business Model Generation: A Handbook for Visionaries, Game Changers, and
Challengers" (2010)
Schultz/Kitchen: "Communicating Globally – An Integrated Marketing Approach" (2000)
Singh: "Outsourcing: An Observation", PPT Presentation, University of Arizona: Course on Verbal and
Non-Verbal Communication of Americans (2005)
Watzlawick/Beavin/Jackson: "Pragmatics of Human Communication" (1967)
Welton, James G. – "Implementing Effects-Based Operations: Redefining the Role of the JTCB",Professional Studies Paper, USA Air War College / Air University (June 2003)