- 1. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic
of ChinaANNUAL REPORTTO CONGRESSMilitary and Security
DevelopmentsInvolving the Peoples Republic of China 2013Office of
the Secretary of DefensePreparation of this report cost the
Department of Defense a total of approximately $95,000 in Fiscal
Years 2012-2013.
2. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic
of China 3. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to
Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples
Republic of ChinaAnnual Report to Congress:Military and Security
Developments Involvingthe Peoples Republic of China 2013A Report to
Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act
forFiscal Year 2000Section 1246, Annual Report on Military and
Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic ofChina, of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public
Law 111-84, which amendsthe National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1202, Public Law 106-65, provides thatthe
Secretary of Defense shall submit a report in both classified and
unclassified form, on military andsecurity developments involving
the Peoples Republic of China. The report shall address the current
andprobable future course of military-technological development of
the Peoples Liberation Army and the tenetsand probable development
of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the
military organizationsand operational concepts supporting such
development over the next 20 years. The report shall also
addressU.S.-China engagement and cooperation on security matters
during the period covered by the report,including through
U.S.-China military-to-military contacts, and the U.S. strategy for
such engagement andcooperation in the future. 4. OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and
Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of
ChinaExecutive Summary 5. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual
Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the Peoples Republic of ChinaiTHE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(PRC)continues to pursue a long-term,comprehensive military
modernizationprogram designed to improve the capacity ofits armed
forces to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity regional
militaryconflict. Preparing for potential conflict in theTaiwan
Strait appears to remain the principalfocus and primary driver of
Chinas militaryinvestment. However, as Chinas interestshave grown
and as it has gained greaterinfluence in the international system,
itsmilitary modernization has also becomeincreasingly focused on
investments in militarycapabilities to conduct a wider range
ofmissions beyond its immediate territorialconcerns, including
counter-piracy,peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance/disasterrelief, and regional military operations. Someof
these missions and capabilities can addressinternational security
challenges, while otherscould serve more narrowly-defined
PRCinterests and objectives, including advancingterritorial claims
and building influence abroad.To support the Chinese Peoples
LiberationArmys (PLA) expanding set of roles andmissions, Chinas
leaders in 2012 sustainedinvestment in advanced short- and
medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, land-attack and
anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space weapons, and military
cyberspacecapabilities that appear designed to enable
anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) missions (whatPLA strategists refer
to as counter-intervention operations). The PLA alsocontinued to
improve capabilities in nucleardeterrence and long-range
conventional strike;advanced fighter aircraft; limited
regionalpower projection, with the commissioning ofChinas first
aircraft carrier, the Liaoning;integrated air defenses; undersea
warfare;improved command and control; and moresophisticated
training and exercises acrossChinas air, naval, and land
forces.During their January 2011 summit, U.S.President Barack Obama
and then-PRCPresident Hu Jintao jointly affirmed that ahealthy,
stable, and reliable military-to-militaryrelationship is an
essential part of [their] sharedvision for a positive, cooperative,
andcomprehensive U.S.-China relationship.Within that framework, the
U.S. Departmentof Defense seeks to build a
military-to-militaryrelationship with China that is sustained
andsubstantive, while encouraging China tocooperate with the United
States, our allies andpartners, and the greater
internationalcommunity in the delivery of public goods. Asthe
United States builds a stronger foundationfor a
military-to-military relationship withChina, it also will continue
to monitor Chinasevolving military strategy, doctrine, and
forcedevelopment and encourage China to be moretransparent about
its military modernizationprogram. In concert with its allies and
partners,the United States will continue adapting itsforces,
posture, and operational concepts tomaintain a stable and secure
Asia-Pacificsecurity environment. 6. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of ChinaContents 7.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic
of ChinaExecutive Summary iChapter 1: Annual Update 1Chapter 2:
Understanding Chinas Strategy 15Chapter 3: Force Modernization
Goals and Trends 29Chapter 4: Resources for Force Modernization
45Chapter 5: Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency 55Chapter
6: U.S.-China Military-to-Military Contacts 61Special Topic:
Space-Based Imaging and Remote Sensing 65Special Topic: Chinas
First Aircraft Carrier 65Special Topic: PLA Air Force Stealth
Aircraft 66Special Topic: PLA Integrated Air Defenses 67Appendix I:
Military-to-Military Exchanges 69Appendix II: China and Taiwan
Forces Data 75Appendix III: Additional Maps and Chart 79 8. OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and
Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of
China1ANNUAL UPDATE 9. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual
Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the Peoples Republic of China1DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINASBILATERAL OR
MULTILATERALRELATIONSHIPSChinas military engagement with
othercountries seeks to enhance Chinasinternational presence and
influence byimproving relationships with foreign
militaries,bolstering Chinas international and regionalimage, and
assuaging other countriesconcerns about Chinas rise. The
PeoplesLiberation Armys (PLA) engagementactivities assist its
modernization through theacquisition of advanced weapons systems
andtechnologies, increased operational experienceboth throughout
and beyond Asia, and accessto foreign military practices,
operationaldoctrine, and training methods.In January 2013, Chinas
Ministry of NationalDefense released information about the PLAs2012
military diplomacy, which it stated hadstood severe tests under a
difficultinternational and regional situationthroughout the year.
In 2012, senior militaryofficials from at least 25 countries
visitedChina, including officials from Australia,Germany, Russia
and Ukraine. Senior PLAofficials visited at least 33 countries,
includingIndia, Poland, Tanzania, and Turkey. ThePLA participated
in UN peacekeepingoperations (PKO), carried out
humanitarianassistance and disaster relief work in Pakistanand
conducted the second global goodwillvoyage of the PLA Navy ZHENG
HEtraining vessel. PLA leaders participated invarious multilateral
meetings, including theDefense Ministers Meeting of the
ShanghaiCooperation Organization (SCO) and theAssociation of
Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) Regional Forum Security
PolicyConference.Combined Exercises. PLA participation inbilateral
and multilateral exercises isincreasing. The PLA derives political
benefitthrough increased influence and enhanced tieswith partner
states and organizations. Suchexercises provide the PLA
opportunities toimprove capabilities and gain operationalinsights
by observing tactics, commanddecision-making, and equipment used
bymore advanced militaries.In 2011 and 2012 alone, the PLA held 21
jointexercise and training events with foreignmilitaries, compared
to 32 during the entire11thFive-Year Plan period (2006-2010).
Theseactivities included military exercises with SCOmembers, naval
exercises, ground forcestraining, peacekeeping, and search and
rescueoperations/missions. China also conductedjoint training for
operations other than war,including the 2011 COOPERATION
SPIRIThumanitarian assistance/disaster relief(HA/DR) exercise with
Australia. Chinaobserved KHAN QUEST-11, a peacekeepingexercise in
Mongolia the first time it haddone so. The PLA Navy conducted
maritimeexercises with Russia, Vietnam, and Thailand 10. and
counter-piracy exercises with France andthe United States.The PLA
Air Force (PLAAF) conductedunprecedented bilateral training during
2011,including its first bilateral air exercise withPakistan and
training with air forces in Belarusand Venezuela. In contrast, the
PLA AirForce participated in only one bilateralexercise in 2012 an
airborne trainingexercise with Belarus in November. PEACEMISSION
2012, conducted under theauspices of the SCO, did not include PLA
AirForce participation as in the past, and insteadfocused on what
SCO nations calledcounterterrorism training, which moreclosely
resembles training to suppress armedopposition within a member
country.Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Overthe past ten years,
China has increased itscommitment to UN PKO by approximatelyten
fold, building to its current level ofapproximately 2,000 personnel
in 11operations, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa andthe Middle East.
This level of support hasbeen steadily maintained since 2008 and is
thehighest among the permanent members of theUN Security Council.
In total, China hasdeployed more than 21,000 troops to 30
UNmissions and bears 3.93 percent of the UNscurrent peacekeeping
budget of $7.23 billion.PKO participation can serve
variousobjectives, including improving Chinasinternational image,
obtaining operationalexperience, providing opportunities to
gatherintelligence, and advancing the PLAs NewHistoric Missions by
taking on roles andgenerating capabilities for operations farbeyond
Chinas borders. China is currentlytaking steps to meet these
objectives bycommitting civilian police, military
observers,engineers, logistics support, and medicaltroops to UN
missions while abstaining frommissions that might result in regime
change orlack host country consent.In 2012, China for the first
time deployedinfantry to a UN PKO. This guard unit, asChinese media
described it, is tasked withsecurity for the PLA engineering and
medicalformed military units in its contingentdeployed to the
United Nations Mission inthe Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).These
forces, likely no more than 50personnel from the 162ndMotorized
InfantryDivision, are equipped with armored vehicles,enabling them
to provide fixed-site securityand convoy escorts.Chinese Arms
Sales. From 2007 to 2011,Chinese arms sales totaled approximately
$11billion. As of this reports publication, datafor 2012 arms sales
was not yet available.China primarily conducts arms sales
inconjunction with economic aid anddevelopment assistance to
support broaderforeign-policy goals such as securing access
tonatural resources and export markets,promoting its increasing
political influenceamong host-country elites, and building 11.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic
of China3support in international forums. Arms sales,however, also
can reflect the profit-seekingactivities of individual arms trading
companiesand efforts to offset defense-related researchand
development costs. For example, Chinacontinues to develop and
market unmannedaerial vehicles (UAVs) abroad, and in 2012,unveiled
a new tactical UAV, the Yi Long,which will likely be marketed to
developingcountries.From the perspective of Chinas armscustomers
(most of whom are developingcountries), Chinese arms are less
expensivethan those offered by the top internationalarms suppliers,
although they are alsogenerally of lower quality and
reliability.Chinese arms also come with fewer politicalstrings
attached, which is attractive to thosecustomers who may not have
access to othersources of arms for political or economicreasons.
China also offers relatively generousterms and flexible payment
options to somecustomers.Counter-Piracy Efforts. China continues
tosupport counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf ofAden, a commitment
which began inDecember 2008. In July 2012, the PLA Navydeployed its
12th escort formation, whichincluded two guided missile frigates
and oneoiler. Operational highlights for thisformation included the
retrieval of 26 crewmembers of the fishing vessel Xufu-1
fromSomalia following their release by pirates inJuly 2012 (an
operation that was recognizedby Chinas Central Military
Commission); andthe first combined counter-piracy exercisewith the
U.S. Navy. After its departure fromthe Gulf of Aden, the 11thescort
formationvisited Ukraine and Turkey, and for the firsttime for the
PLA Navy, Romania, Bulgariaand Israel. Ships engaged in
counter-piracyalso conducted port calls in Australia,Mozambique,
and Thailand during 2012.Territorial Disputes. Senior Chinese
officialshave identified protecting Chinas sovereigntyand
territorial integrity as a core interest andall officials
repeatedly state Chinas oppositionto and willingness to respond to
actions itperceives as challenging this core interest. In2012, this
was demonstrated by Chineseactions at Scarborough Reef in the
SouthChina Sea and the Senkaku Islands in the EastChina Sea.The
Chinese government maintains that itsmaritime rights extend to
virtually the entireSouth China Sea and often illustrates thisclaim
using a nine-dash line thatencompasses much of the South China
Seaarea. At the same time, Beijing is ambiguousabout the precise
meaning of the nine-dashline; to date, China has not clarified
themeaning of the nine-dash line or its legal basis.In April 2012,
Chinese maritime lawenforcement vessels and Philippine coastguard
vessels engaged in a protracted standoffat Scarborough Reef, after
the PhilippineNavy attempted to conduct a fishingenforcement action
against Chinese fishermen. 12. Although overt tensions between
China andthe Philippines subsided by years end, bothsides continue
to claim jurisdiction over thereef. Chinese law enforcement vessels
havemaintained an almost continuous presenceever since.In November
2012, China also added a mapwhich contained the nine-dash line to
all of itsnew passports. This action elicited negativeresponses
from other nations in the Asia-Pacific region. Chinas increased
reference inofficial government materials to the nine-dashline is a
source of concern to its neighborsand other nations because, at a
minimum, itcreates an impression that China is not merelyclaiming
all the land features within the nine-dash line, but it may also be
claiming a specialsovereign status of all the water and the sea-bed
contained therein.China claims sovereignty over the SenkakuIslands
(what the Chinese refer to as theDiaoyu Islands) in the East China
Sea,territory also claimed by Taiwan and Japan.In April 2012, the
Governor of Tokyoannounced plans to purchase three of the
fiveislets from private Japanese owners. Inresponse, in September
2012, theGovernment of Japan purchased the threeislands. China
protested the move and sincethat time has regularly sent maritime
lawenforcement ships (and, less often, aircraft) topatrol near the
Senkakus to protect its claims;this has included regular Chinese
maritimeoperations within 12nm of the islands. OnSeptember 25,
China published a white paperentitled, Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent
Territoryof China. In addition, in September 2012,China began using
improperly drawn straightbaseline claims around the Senkaku
Islands,adding to its network of maritime claimsinconsistent with
international law. InDecember 2012, China submitted informationto
the U.N. Commission on the Limits of theContinental Shelf regarding
Chinas extendedcontinental shelf in the East China Sea thatincludes
the disputed islands.THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THETAIWAN
STRAITDealing with a potential contingency in theTaiwan Strait
remains the PLAs primarymission despite decreasing tensions there -
atrend which continued following the re-election of Taiwan
President Ma Ying-jeou inJanuary 2012. In this context,
shoulddeterrence fail, the PLA could be called uponto compel Taiwan
to abandon independenceor to re-unify with the mainland by force
ofarms while defeating any third-partyintervention on Taiwans
behalf.Cross-Strait Stability. China and Taiwanhave reached 18
agreements for cross-Straitcooperation on economic, cultural,
andfunctional issues, but Taiwan authorities andthe broader Taiwan
public do not supportnegotiation on issues directly related
tosovereignty. 13. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report
to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
Peoples Republic of China5China and Taiwan have also undertaken
somecombined security and police operations, andheld a combined
maritime rescue exercise inAugust 2012 featuring two helicopters,
14vessels, and 300 personnel, with both sidesequally represented.
Also in August, Chineseand Taiwan police apprehended 30 suspects
ina human-trafficking and prostitution ring afirst collaborative
effort to combat humantrafficking.During a mid-October 2011 speech,
PresidentMa stated that a cross-Strait peace agreementwith China
might be attainable in 10 years, butbacked down immediately in the
face ofwidespread negative public reaction and Maspecified the
conditions under which hewould pursue such an agreement.
Despiteoccasional signs of impatience, China appearscontent to
respect Taiwans current approachto cross-Strait relations. In
November 2012,Xi Jinping, Chinas newly selected generalsecretary of
the CCP Central Committee senta message to President Ma (in the
latterscapacity as chairman of the rulingKuomintang Party),
emphasizing the need tocontinue promoting the peaceful
developmentof cross-Strait relations. This early messagesuggests
that China under Xi Jinping may bewilling to follow President Hu
Jintaos multi-pronged strategy for developing cross-Straitrelations
rather than compelling unificationthrough the use of force.
President Hu in hisreport to the 18thParty Congress inNovember 2012
used language that promotedpeaceful reunification and called for
bothsides to explore political relations and makereasonable
arrangements to discuss thecreation of a military
confidence-buildingmechanism.CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THEPEOPLES
LIBERATION ARMYSecond Artillery. The Second Artillerycontrols
Chinas nuclear and conventionalballistic missiles. It is developing
and testingseveral new classes and variants of offensivemissiles,
forming additional missile units,upgrading older missile systems,
anddeveloping methods to counter ballisticmissile defenses.By
December 2012, the Second Artillerysinventory of short-range
ballistic missiles(SRBM) deployed to units opposite Taiwanstood at
more than 1,100. This numberreflects the delivery of additional
missiles andthe fielding of new systems. To improve thelethality of
this force, the PLA is alsointroducing new SRBM variants
withimproved ranges, accuracies, and payloads.China is fielding a
limited but growingnumber of conventionally armed, medium-range
ballistic missiles, including the DF-21Danti-ship ballistic missile
(ASBM). The DF-21D is based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5)
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)and gives the PLA the
capability to attacklarge ships, including aircraft carriers, in
the 14. western Pacific Ocean. The DF-21D has arange exceeding
1,500 km and is armed with amaneuverable warhead.The Second
Artillery continues to modernizeits nuclear forces by enhancing its
silo-basedintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) andadding
more survivable mobile deliverysystems. In recent years, the
road-mobile,solid-propellant CSS-10 Mod 1 and CSS-10Mod 2 (DF-31
and DF-31A) intercontinental-range ballistic missiles have entered
service.The CSS-10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of11,200 km, can
reach most locations withinthe continental United States. China may
alsobe developing a new road-mobile ICBM,possibly capable of
carrying a multipleindependently targetable re-entry
vehicle(MIRV).PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLA Navy has thelargest force of
major combatants,submarines, and amphibious warfare ships inAsia.
Chinas naval forces include some 79principal surface combatants,
more than 55submarines, 55 medium and large amphibiousships, and
roughly 85 missile-equipped smallcombatants.In the most publicized
PLA Navymodernization event of 2012, after a year ofextensive sea
trials, China commissioned itsfirst aircraft carrier, the Liaoning,
in September2012. The PLA Navy successfully conductedits first
launch and recovery of the carrier-capable J-15 fighter on November
26, 2012.The Liaoning will continue integration testingand training
with the aircraft during the nextseveral years, but it is not
expected to embarkan operational air wing until 2015 or later.China
also continues to pursue an indigenousaircraft carrier program (the
Liaoning is arefurbished vessel, purchased from Ukraine in1998),
and will likely build multiple aircraftcarriers over the next
decade. The firstChinese-built carrier will likely be
operationalsometime in the second half of this decade.The PLA Navy
places a high priority on themodernization of its submarine force.
Chinacontinues the production of JIN-classnuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines(SSBN). Three JIN-class SSBNs (Type 094)are
currently operational, and up to five mayenter service before China
proceeds to its nextgeneration SSBN (Type 096) over the nextdecade.
The JIN-class SSBN will carry thenew JL-2 submarine launched
ballistic missilewith an estimated range of more than 4,000nm. The
JIN-class and the JL-2 will give thePLA Navy its first credible
sea-based nucleardeterrent.China also has expanded its force of
nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). TwoSHANG-class SSNs (Type
093) are already inservice, and China is building four
improvedvariants of the SHANG-class SSN, which willreplace the
aging HAN-class SSNs (Type091). In the next decade, China will
likelyconstruct the Type 095 guided-missile attacksubmarine (SSGN),
which may enable a 15. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual
Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the Peoples Republic of China7submarine-based land-attack
capability. Inaddition to likely incorporating better
quietingtechnologies, the Type 095 will fulfilltraditional
anti-ship roles with theincorporation of torpedoes and
anti-shipcruise missiles (ASCMs).The current mainstay of the
Chinesesubmarine force is modern diesel poweredattack submarines
(SS). In addition to 12KILO-class submarines acquired from Russiain
the 1990s and 2000s (eight of which areequipped with the SS-N-27
ASCM), the PLANavy possesses 13 SONG-class SS (Type 039)and eight
YUAN-class SSP (Type 039A). TheYUAN-class SSP is armed similarly to
theSONG-class SS, but also includes an air-independent power
system. China may planto construct up to 20 YUAN-class SSPs.Since
2008, the PLA Navy has embarked on arobust surface combatant
constructionprogram of various classes of ships, includingguided
missile destroyers (DDG) and guidedmissile frigates (FFG). During
2012, Chinacontinued series production of several classes,including
construction of a new generation ofDDG. Construction of the LUYANG
II-class DDG (Type 052C) continued, with oneship entering service
in 2012, and anadditional three ships under various stages
ofconstruction and sea trials, bringing the totalnumber of ships of
this class to six by the endof 2013. Additionally, China launched
thelead ship in a follow-on class, the LUYANGIII- class DDG (Type
052D), which will likelyenter service in 2014. The LUYANG
IIIincorporates the PLA Navys firstmultipurpose vertical launch
system, likelycapable of launching ASCM, land attack cruisemissiles
(LACM), surface-to-air missiles(SAM), and anti-submarine rockets.
China isprojected to build more than a dozen of theseships to
replace its aging LUDA-classdestroyers (DD). China has continued
theconstruction of the workhorse JIANGKAI II-class FFG (Type 054A),
with 12 shipscurrently in the fleet and six or more invarious
stages of construction, and yet moreexpected. These new DDGs and
FFGsprovide a significant upgrade to the PLANavys area air defense
capability, which willbe critical as it expands operations
intodistant seas beyond the range of shore-based air
defense.Augmenting the PLA Navys littoral warfarecapabilities,
especially in the South China Seaand East China Sea, is a new class
of smallcombatant. At least six of the JIANGDAO-class corvettes
(FFL) (Type 056) werelaunched in 2012. The first of these
shipsentered service on February 25, 2013; Chinamay build 20 to 30
of this class. These FFLsaugment the 60 HOUBEI-class
wave-piercingcatamaran missile patrol boats (PTG) (Type022), each
capable of carrying eight YJ-83ASCMs, for operations in littoral
waters.The PLA Navy also increased its amphibiousforce in 2012. Two
YUZHAO-classamphibious transport docks (LPD) (Type 16. 071) were
accepted into service during theyear bringing the total of YUZHAO
LPDs tothree.PLA Air Force (PLAAF). China basesapproximately 500
combat aircraft withinunrefueled operational range of Taiwan andhas
the airfield capacity to expand thatnumber by hundreds. China
continues tofield increasingly modern 4thgenerationaircraft, but
the force still consists mostly ofolder 2ndand 3rdgeneration
aircraft, orupgraded variants of those aircraft.Within two years of
the J-20 stealth fightersfirst flight in January 2011, China tested
asecond next generation fighter prototype.The prototype, referred
to as the J-31, issimilar in size to a U.S. F-35 fighter andappears
to incorporate design characteristicssimilar to the J-20. It
conducted its first flighton October 31, 2012.China continues
upgrading its H-6 bomberfleet (originally adapted from the late
1950sSoviet Tu-16 design) with a new variant thatpossesses greater
range and will be armedwith a long-range cruise missile. China
alsouses a modified version of the H-6 aircraft toconduct aerial
refueling operations for manyof its indigenous aircraft, increasing
theircombat range.The PLA Air Force possesses one of thelargest
forces of advanced SAM systems in theworld, consisting of a
combination ofRussian-sourced SA-20 battalions anddomestically
produced HQ-9 battalions.Chinas aviation industry is developing a
largetransport aircraft (likely referred to as the Y-20) to
supplement Chinas small fleet ofstrategic airlift assets, which
currently consistsof a limited number of Russian-made
IL-76aircraft. These heavy lift transports areneeded to support
airborne command andcontrol (C2), logistics, paradrop,
aerialrefueling, and reconnaissance operations, aswell as
humanitarian assistance and disasterrelief missions.Developments in
Chinas commercial andmilitary aviation industry indicate
improvedaircraft manufacturing, associated technology,and systems
development capabilities. Someof these advances have been made
possible bybusiness partnerships with Western aviationand aerospace
firms (including cleared U.S.defense contractors), which provide
overallbenefit to Chinas military aerospace industry.China will
continue to seek advancement inaerospace technology, capability,
andproficiency to rival Western capabilities.PLA Ground Force. The
PLA is investingheavily in modernizing its ground force,emphasizing
the ability to deploy campaign-level forces across long distances
quickly. Thismodernization is playing out with
wide-scalerestructuring of PLA ground forces thatincludes a more
rapid, flexible specialoperations force equipped with advanced 17.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic
of China9technology; improved army aviation unitsutilizing
ultra-low altitude mobility helicoptersarmed with precision-guided
munitions; andcommand and control (C2) capabilities withimproved
networks providing real-time datatransmissions within and between
units. Inaddition, the PLA has focused itsmodernization efforts on
transforming from amotorized to a mechanized force, as well
asimproving the ground forces armored, airdefense, aviation,
ground-air coordination,and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.
PLAground forces have benefited from increasedproduction of new
equipment, including theZ-10 and Z-19 attack helicopters. New
airdefense equipment includes the PLA groundforces first
medium-range SAM, the CSA-16,as well as domestically-produced
CSA-15s (acopy of the Russian SA-15) and a newadvanced
self-propelled air defense artillerysystem, the PGZ-07. PLA ground
forcerestructuring is highlighted by thedevelopment of brigades as
a key operationalechelon for combat in diverse terrain andunder
complex electromagnetic conditions.The ground force is a proponent
of jointoperations since it requires transport fromother forces to
operate beyond Chinasborders. To assist with its power
projectionneeds, PLA ground forces have practicedusing commercial
transport assets such as roll-on/roll-off ships, to conduct
maritimecrossing operations. However, broader jointoperations
capability are still the primary goalfor the ground force, a goal
that is now amandate for all the military services followingthe
General Staff Departments (GSD)December 2011 creation of the
MilitaryTraining Department to oversee all PLAtraining, ensuring
all military services realizethe prominence of joint training.Space
Capabilities. In 2012, Chinaconducted 18 space launches. China
alsoexpanded its space-based intelligence,surveillance,
reconnaissance, navigation,meteorological, and communications
satelliteconstellations. In parallel, China is developinga
multi-dimensional program to improve itscapabilities to limit or
prevent the use ofspace-based assets by adversaries during timesof
crisis or conflict.During 2012, China launched six Beidounavigation
satellites. These six satellitescompleted the regional network as
well as thein-orbit validation phase for the globalnetwork,
expected to be completed by 2020.China launched 11 new remote
sensingsatellites in 2012, which can perform bothcivil and military
applications. China alsolaunched three communications satellites,
fiveexperimental small satellites, onemeteorological satellite, one
relay satellite, anda manned space mission.China continues to
develop the Long March 5(LM-5) rocket, which is intended to lift
heavypayloads into space. LM-5 will more thandouble the size of the
Low Earth Orbit 18. (LEO) and Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO)payloads
China is capable of placing intoorbit. To support these rockets,
China beganconstructing the Wenchang Satellite LaunchCenter in
2008. Located on Hainan Island,this launch facility is expected to
be completearound 2013, with the initial LM-5 launchscheduled for
2014.Military Information Operations. Chinesewritings have outlined
the five key features atan operational level of a maturing
Chineseinformation operations (IO) strategy. First,Chinese authors
emphasize defense as the toppriority and indicate that Computer
NetworkDefense (CND) must be the highest priorityin peacetime;
Chinese doctrine suggests thattactical counteroffensives would only
beconsidered if an adversarys operations couldnot be countered.
Second, IO is viewed as anunconventional warfare weapon, which
mustbe established in the opening phase of theconflict and continue
during all phases ofwar. Third, IO is characterized as apreemption
weapon to be used under therubric of achieving information
dominanceand controlling the electromagneticspectrum. Fourth, IO is
seen as a tool topermit China to fight and win an
informationcampaign, precluding the need forconventional military
action. Fifth, potentialChinese adversaries, in particular the
UnitedStates, are seen as information dependent.An IO campaign
includes actions taken toseize and maintain campaign
informationsuperiority, unify command campaigninformation
operational forces, carry outinformation warfare-related
reconnaissance,and offensive and defensive informationwarfare
methods. According to a PLAmilitary manual, there are many types
ofsupporting IO to campaigns including anisland-landing campaign
IO, blockadecampaign IO, fire power attack campaign IO,border
counterattack campaign IO, counter-landing campaign IO, and
counter-airstrikecampaign IO. These IO campaigns can besub-divided
into joint campaign IO andcombined arms campaign IO. Depending
onthe military services involved in the campaign,IO can be further
divided into army campaign,navy, air force, and strategic missile
forcecampaign IO. Their primary tasks are toprotect the PLAs
campaign informationsystems, collect intelligence from
enemyinformation systems, destroy enemyinformation systems, and
weaken the enemysability to acquire, transmit, process, and
useinformation during war.The PLA continues to conduct
frequentmilitary exercises demonstrating advances ininformation
technology and informationintegration of its military forces. China
hasperformed integrated joint combat operationsexercises showcasing
intelligence acquisition,joint command, joint strike, and
supportoperations, increasingly incorporatedinformation technology
and informationintegration into its annual trainingrequirement. A
number of annual exercise 19. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China11series,
including the Vanguard, Lianhe, and JointEducation series have
increased requiredintegration and full reliance on
informationtechnology for command of complexoperations. In 2012,
according to PLAnewspapers, many military exercises bannedpaper
maps and orders altogether. Also in2012, there was an increasing
emphasis onPLA command academies participating injoint exercises
using command informationtechnologies, which indicates proficiency
onsuch platforms is now a requirement forgraduation to higher
command positions.DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESEMILITARY DOCTRINE
ANDTRAININGIn 2012, the PLA heavily emphasized trainingunder
realistic, high-technology conditions.The Chinese aim to operate in
informatizedconditions by emphasizing system-of-systemsoperations,
a concept similar to U.S. network-centric warfare. This requires
linkinggeographically dispersed forces andcapabilities into an
integrated system capableof unified action. These operational
trainingreforms are a result of the Outline of MilitaryTraining and
Evaluation (OMTE), which waslast published in mid-2008 and
becamestandard across the PLA on January 1, 2009.Since that time,
the PLA has pushed toachieve OMTE objectives by
emphasizingrealistic training conditions, training incomplex
electromagnetic and jointenvironments, and integrating new and
hightechnologies into the force structure. A resultof these changes
is a more flexible year-roundtraining cycle, which is a departure
from theSoviet-style conscript-dependent trainingcycles that were
prominent throughout thePLA over the previous decades.Additionally,
the PLA is laying the foundationfor future changes in military
doctrine. Todevelop a new cadre of officers, the PLA isreforming
its academies to cultivate juniorofficers proficient with and
capable ofleveraging technology in all warfightingfunctions for
joint operations. The NationalUniversity of Defense Technologys
year-longjoint operations staff officer course is servingas a pilot
for a future national-level program.The course allows junior
officers to rotate tothe command elements of other PLA servicesto
enhance their skills in joint operationsplanning and
preparation.ADVANCED TECHNOLOGYACQUISITIONChina relies on foreign
technology, acquisitionof key dual-use components, and
focusedindigenous research and development (R&D)to advance
military modernization. TheChinese utilize a large, well-organized
networkto facilitate collection of sensitive informationand
export-controlled technology from U.S.defense sources. Many of the
organizationscomposing Chinas military-industrialcomplex have both
military and civilian 20. research and development functions.
Thisnetwork of government-affiliated companiesand research
institutes often enables the PLAto access sensitive and dual-use
technologiesor knowledgeable experts under the guise ofcivilian
research and development. Theenterprises and institutes accomplish
thisthrough technology conferences and symposia,legitimate
contracts and joint commercialventures, partnerships with foreign
firms, andjoint development of specific technologies. Inthe case of
key national security technologies,controlled equipment, and other
materials notreadily obtainable through commercial meansor
academia, China has utilized its intelligenceservices and employed
other illicit approachesthat involve violations of U.S. laws and
exportcontrols.A high-priority for Chinas advancedtechnology
acquisition strategy is its Civil-Military Integration policy to
develop aninnovative dual-use technology and industrialbase that
serve both military and civilianrequirements. Chinas defense
industry hasbenefited from integration with its expandingcivilian
economy and science and technologysectors, particularly sectors
with access toforeign technology. Examples of technologiesinclude:
advanced aviation and aerospace (hotsection technologies, avionics
and flightcontrols), source code, traveling wave tubes,night vision
devices, monolithic microwaveintegrated circuits, and information
and cybertechnologies.Differentiating between civil and military
end-use is very challenging in China due to opaquecorporate
structures, hidden asset ownership,and the connections of
commercial personnelwith the central government. Somecommercial
entities are affiliated with PLAresearch institutes, or have ties
to and aresubject to the control of governmentorganizations such as
the State-owned AssetsSupervision and Administration Commission.In
March 2012, Hui Sheng Shen and HuanLing Chang, both from Taiwan,
were chargedwith conspiracy to violate the U.S. ArmsExport Control
Act after allegedly intendingto acquire and pass sensitive U.S.
defensetechnology to China. The pair planned tophotograph the
technology, delete the images,bring the memory cards back to China,
andhave a Chinese contact recover the images.In June 2012, Pratt
& Whitney Canada (PWC),a subsidiary of U.S. aerospace firm
anddefense contractor United TechnologiesCorporation (UTC), pleaded
guilty to illegallyproviding military software used in
thedevelopment of Chinas Z-10 military attackhelicopter.UTC and two
subsidiaries agreed to pay $75million and were debarred from
licenseprivileges as part of a settlement with the U.S.Department
of Justice and State Department.PWC "knowingly and willfully"
caused sixversions of military electronic engine controlsoftware to
be "illegally exported" from 21. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China13Hamilton
Sundstrand in the United States toPWC in Canada and then to China
for the Z-10, and made false and belated disclosuresabout these
illegal exports.In September 2012, Sixing Liu, aka SteveLiu, was
convicted of violating the U.S.Arms Export Control Act and
theInternational Traffic in Arms Regulations(ITAR) and possessing
stolen trade secrets.Liu, a Chinese citizen, returned to China
withelectronic files containing details on theperformance and
design of guidance systemsfor missiles, rockets, target locators,
andunmanned aerial vehicles. Liu developedcritical military
technology for a U.S. defensecontractor and stole the documents
toposition himself for employment in China. 22. 2UNDERSTANDING
CHINASSTRATEGY 23. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report
to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
Peoples Republic of China15NATIONAL-LEVEL PRIORITIESAND GOALSChinas
leaders characterize the first twodecades of the 21stcentury as a
strategicwindow of opportunity. They assess thatduring this period,
both domestic andinternational conditions will be conducive
toexpanding Chinas comprehensive nationalpower, a term that
encapsulates all elementsof state power, including economic
capacity,military might, and diplomacy. Chinas leadersanticipate
that a successful expansion ofcomprehensive national power will
serveChinas strategic objectives, which include:perpetuating
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)rule, sustaining economic growth
anddevelopment, maintaining domestic politicalstability, defending
national sovereignty andterritorial integrity, and securing Chinas
statusas a great power.Chinas leaders routinely emphasize the
goalof reaching critical economic and militarybenchmarks by 2020.
These benchmarksinclude successfully restructuring theeconomy to
maintain growth and increase thequality of living of Chinas
citizens to promotestability; making major progress in
militarymodernization; and attaining the capability tofight and win
potential regional conflicts,including those related to Taiwan,
protectionof sea lines of communication (SLOCs),defense of
territorial claims in the SouthChina Sea and East China Sea, and
thedefense of western borders. Statements byChinese leaders
indicate that, in their view, thedevelopment of a modern military
is necessaryfor China to achieve greater power status.These
statements also indicate that theChinese leadership views a modern
military asa critical deterrent to prevent actions byoutside powers
that could damage Chineseinterests, or to allow China to defend
itselfagainst such actions should deterrence fail.Since China
launched its reform andopening in late 1978, the essential
elementsof Chinas strategy to accomplish these goalshave remained
relatively constant. Ratherthan challenge the existing global
order, Chinahas adopted a pragmatic approach tointernational
relations and economicdevelopment that seeks to strengthen
theeconomy, modernize the military, and solidifythe CCPs hold on
power. China balances theimperative to reassure countries that its
rise ispeaceful with the imperative to strengthenits control over
existing sovereignty andterritorial claims.China regards stable
relations with itsneighbors and the United States as essential
toits stability and development. Chinacontinues to see the United
States as thedominant regional and global actor with thegreatest
potential to both support and,potentially, disrupt Chinas rise. In
addition,China remains concerned that should regionalstates come to
view China as a threat, theymight balance against China through
unilateralmilitary modernization or through coalitions, 24.
possibly with the United States. ManyChinese officials and the
public see the U.S.rebalance to Asia as a reflection of Cold
Warthinking and as a way to contain Chinas rise.Despite its desire
to project an image of adeveloping country engaged in a
peacefuldevelopment strategy, Chinas efforts todefend national
sovereignty and territorialintegrity (underpinned by growing
economicand military capabilities) have occasionallymanifested in
assertive rhetoric and behaviorthat generate regional concerns
about itsintentions. Prominent examples of thisinclude Chinas
response to Japans arrest of aPRC fishing trawler captain following
acollision with Japanese coast guard vessels in2010, its use of
punitive trade policies as aninstrument of coercion, its actions to
shieldNorth Korea from the international responseto its sinking of
the South Korean naval vessel,Cheonan, and its action to pressure
Vietnamand the Philippines in the South China Seaand Japan in the
East China Sea. Officialstatements and media during these
situationsindicate that China sees itself as responding toperceived
threats to its national interests orprovocations by outside actors.
Chinas lackof transparency surrounding its growingmilitary
capabilities and strategic decision-making has also increased
concerns in theregion about Chinas intentions. Absent amove towards
greater transparency, theseconcerns will likely intensify as the
PLAmodernization progresses. 25. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China17Origin of the
New Historic MissionsIn 2004, former President Hu Jintao
articulated a mission statement for the armed forces titled,the
Historic Missions of the Armed Forces in the New Period of the New
Century. These newhistoric missions focus primarily on adjustments
in the leaderships assessment of theinternational security
environment and the expanding definition of national security.
Thesemissions were further codified in a 2007 amendment to the CCP
Constitution. The missions, ascurrently defined, include: Provide
an important guarantee of strength for the party to consolidate its
rulingposition. Provide a strong security guarantee for
safeguarding the period of strategicopportunity for national
development. Provide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding
national interests. Play an important role in safeguarding world
peace and promoting commondevelopment.According to official
writings, the driving factors behind the articulation of these
missions were:changes in Chinas security situation, challenges and
priorities regarding Chinas nationaldevelopment, and a desire to
realign the tasks of the PLA with the CCPs objectives.
Politburomember and CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou in 2005 asserted
the historic missions embody thenew requirements imposed on the
military by the Partys historic tasks, accommodate newchanges in
our national development strategy, and conform to the new trends in
global militarydevelopment. While these missions are not expected
to replace the defense of Chinassovereignty in importance,
implications for PLA modernization may be increased preparation
forand participation in international peacekeeping and disaster
relief operations, interaction withthe international community that
allows the PLA more opportunities to learn from other
militaries,and greater efforts to improve PLA logistics and
transport capabilities.FACTORS SHAPING CHINASLEADERSHIP
PERCEPTIONSChinese leaders continue to view themselvesas operating
in a window of opportunity toadvance their priorities of
economicdevelopment, territorial integrity, anddomestic stability.
Although domesticstability is believed to be Chinas top
priority,official documents indicate that China sees itssecurity
environment becoming morecomplex as a result of several
factors:Economics. Continued economicdevelopment remains the
bedrock of socialstability. A wide range of economic factorscould
disrupt this trajectory, including afailure to shift away from its
overreliance oninvestment and exports to drive growth.Chinas
leaders scaled back GDP targets for2011-2015 (from 8 percent to 7.5
percent) tomitigate risk of overheating and to manageexpectations.
Other potential economic risksfor China include shifting global
tradepatterns, domestic resource constraints, rising 26. wages
driven by labor shortages, or attemptsto challenge Chinas access to
global resources,including energy.Nationalism. Communist Party
leaders andmilitary officials continue to be affected by,and in
some cases exploit, nationalism tobolster the legitimacy of the
Party, deflectdomestic criticism, and justify their
owninflexibility in dialogues with foreigninterlocutors. However,
nationalist forcescould ultimately restrict the
leadershipsdecision-making on key policy issues orpressure the CCP
if these forces perceiveparty leaders as insufficiently
satisfyingnationalist goals.Regional Challenges to Chinas
Interests.Tensions with Japan in the East China Seaand with South
China Sea claimants challengeto Chinas desire to maintain a
stableperiphery. Combined with a greater U.S.presence in the
region, these factors raiseChinese concerns that regional countries
willstrengthen their military capabilities orincrease security
cooperation with the UnitedStates to balance China.Domestic Unrest.
The CCP continues toface long-term popular demands for
limitingcorruption and improving governmentresponsiveness,
transparency, andaccountability. If unmet, these factors
likelyweaken the legitimacy of the CCP in the eyesof the Chinese
people. The Arab Spring andfears of a Jasmine Revolution
amplifyhistorical concerns about internal stability.Environment.
Chinas economicdevelopment has come at a highenvironmental cost.
Chinas leaders areincreasingly concerned that
environmentaldegradation could undermine regimelegitimacy by
threatening economicdevelopment, public health, social
stability,and Chinas international image.Demographics. China faces
the dual threatof a rapidly aging population and a decliningbirth
rate, one that now falls belowreplacement level. Longer life
expectanciesmay force China to allocate more resources tosocial and
health services, while the decliningbirth rate will continue to
reduce Chinassupply of young and inexpensive labor, a keydriver of
the countrys three decades ofeconomic growth. This dual
phenomenoncould lead to economic stagnation that couldthreaten CCP
legitimacy. 27. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to
Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples
Republic of China19Chinas Energy StrategyChinas engagement,
investment, and foreign construction related to energy continue to
grow.China has constructed or invested in energy projects in more
than 50 countries, spanning nearlyevery continent. This ambitious
investment in energy assets is driven primarily by two factors.
First,China is increasingly dependent upon imported energy to
sustain its economy. A net oilexporter until 1993, China remains
suspicious of international energy markets. Second, energyprojects
present a viable option for investing Chinas vast foreign currency
holdings.In addition to ensuring reliable energy sources, Beijing
hopes to diversify producers and transportoptions. Although energy
independence is no longer realistic for China, given
populationgrowth and increasing per capita energy consumption,
Beijing still seeks to maintain a supplychain that is less
susceptible to external disruption.In 2011, China imported
approximately 58 percent of its oil; conservative estimates project
thatChina will import almost two-thirds of its oil by 2015 and
three-quarters by 2030. Beijing looksprimarily to the Persian Gulf,
Africa, and Russia/Central Asia to satisfy its growing demand,
withimported oil accounting for approximately 11 percent of Chinas
total energy consumption.A second goal of Beijings foreign energy
strategy is to alleviate Chinas heavy dependence onSLOCs,
particularly the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. In
2011, approximately 85percent of Chinas oil imports transited the
South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca.Separate crude oil
pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan to China illustrate efforts to
increaseoverland supply. A pipeline that would bypass the Strait of
Malacca by transporting crude oilfrom Kyuakpya, Burma to Kunming,
China is currently under construction with an estimatedcompletion
time of late 2013 or early 2014. The crude oil for this pipeline
will be supplied bySaudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern and
African countries.Given Chinas growing energy demand, new pipelines
will only slightly alleviate Chinas maritimedependency on either
the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz. Despite Chinas
efforts, thesheer volume of oil and liquefied natural gas that is
imported to China from the Middle East andAfrica will make
strategic SLOCs increasingly important to Beijing.In 2011, China
imported 14.3 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas, or 46
percent of all of itsnatural gas imports, from Turkmenistan to
China by pipeline via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Thispipeline is
designed to carry 40 bcm per year with plans to expand it to 60
bcm. Another naturalgas pipeline designed to deliver 12 bcm per
year of Burmese-produced gas is underconstruction and estimated for
completion in late 2013 or early 2014. This pipeline parallels
thecrude oil pipeline across Burma. Beijing is negotiating with
Moscow for two pipelines that couldsupply China with up to 69 bcm
of gas per year; discussions have stalled over pricingdifferences.
28. Chinas Top Crude Suppliers 2011Country Volume (1,000 barrels
per day) Percentage of Imported Crude OilSaudi Arabia 1010 20Angola
626 12Iran 557 11Russia 396 8Oman 365 7Iraq 277 5Sudan 261
5Venezuela 231 5Kazakhstan 225 4Kuwait 192 4Others 956 19Total 5096
100INTERNAL DEBATE OVERCHINAS REGIONAL ANDGLOBAL ROLEChinas
leadership has supported formerparamount leader Deng Xiaopings
dictumfrom the early 1990s that China should,observe calmly; secure
our position; copewith affairs calmly; hide our capabilities
andbide our time; be good at maintaining a lowprofile; and never
claim leadership. Thisguidance reflected Dengs belief that
Chineseinterests are best served by focusing oninternal development
and stability whilesteering clear of challenging or
confrontingmajor powers. In December 2010, StateCouncilor Dai
Bingguo specifically citedDengs guidance, insisting China adhered
to apath of peaceful development and wouldnot seek expansion or
hegemony. He assertedthat the hide and bide rhetoric was not
asmokescreen employed while China buildsits strength, but rather an
admonition to bepatient and not stand out.However, some Chinese
scholars questionwhether Dengs policy approach will continueto win
support as Chinas interests increaseabroad and its power expands.
Chinasperceived security interests have changedconsiderably since
Dengs era to include aheavy reliance on maritime commerce.Chinas
improving naval capabilities enableroles and missions that would
have beenimpossible for the PLA to pursue just adecade ago.
Proponents of a more active andassertive Chinese role on the world
stage havesuggested that China would be better servedby a firm
stance in the face of U.S. or otherregional pressure. These voices
could increase 29. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report
to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
Peoples Republic of China21as a result of renewed tensions with
thePhilippines and Vietnam over the SouthChina Sea and with Japan
over the Senkakus,further complicating this debate.New Type of
Relationship. Top Chineseleaders have repeatedly advocated for a
newtype of relationship between great powers inmeetings with U.S.
officials. The new typeof relationship concept urges a
cooperativeU.S.-China partnership based on equality,mutual respect,
and mutual benefit. Theconcept also reflects Chinas aspirations to
beregarded as a great power, emphasizingconflict avoidance to
maintain its peacefulrise.Chinas Periphery. The Chinese
leadershipfaces a policy dilemma in seeking to maintaina stable
periphery in order to assure itswindow of opportunity for
developmentremains open. China also perceives otherregional
countries asserting their nationalinterests in Chinas periphery and
feelscompelled to respond to ensure continuedstability; however,
too strong of a responsemay motivate regional actors
tocounterbalance Chinas rise through greatercooperation with each
other and the UnitedStates. Therefore, Chinas leaders are tryingto
maintain a delicate balance betweendefending territorial integrity
in the face ofperceived provocations by its neighbors
whileconcurrently tamping down threat perceptionsacross the globe.
China publicly states that itsrise is peaceful and that it harbors
nohegemonic designs or aspirations forterritorial expansion.
However, Chinas lackof transparency surrounding these
growingcapabilities has increased concerns in theregion about
Chinas intentions.Chinas Territorial DisputesChinas use of force in
territorial disputes has varied throughout its history. Some
disputes led towar, such as Chinas border conflicts with India in
1962 and Vietnam in 1979. A contestedborder with the former Soviet
Union during the 1960s raised the possibility of nuclear war. In
morerecent cases, China has been willing to compromise with and
even offer concessions to itsneighbors. Since 1998, China has
settled eleven land-based territorial disputes with six of
itsneighbors. Several disputes continue over exclusive economic
zones (EEZ) and ownership ofpotentially rich, off-shore oil and gas
deposits.The East China Sea contains approximately seven trillion
cubic feet of natural gas and up to 100billion barrels of oil.
Japan maintains that an equidistant line from each country involved
shouldseparate the EEZs, while China claims an extended continental
shelf beyond the equidistant lineto the Okinawa Trench (which
almost reaches Japans shore). In early 2009, Japan accusedChina of
violating a June 2008 agreement providing for joint exploration of
oil and natural gas 30. fields, and claimed that China unilaterally
drilled beneath the demarcation line, extractingreserves from the
Japanese side. China, Japan, and Taiwan continue to dispute
possession ofthe nearby Senkaku Islands.The South China Sea plays
an important role in Northeast and Southeast Asian
securityconsiderations. Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow
of oil and commerce through SouthChina Sea shipping lanes,
including over 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea,
andTaiwan. China claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel
island groups and other landformations within its nine-dash line
claim - claims disputed in whole or part by Brunei, thePhilippines,
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba in
the SpratlyIslands, makes the same claims as the PRC. In 2009,
China protested extended continental shelfclaims in the South China
Sea made by Malaysia and Vietnam; in its protest to the
U.N.Commission, China included the ambiguous nine-dash line and
reiterated that it hasindisputable sovereignty over the islands in
the South China Sea and the adjacent waters andenjoys sovereign
rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the
seabed and subsoilthereof.Despite increased political and economic
relations over the years between China and India,tensions remain
along their shared 4,057 km border, most notably over Arunachal
Pradesh(which China asserts is part of Tibet, and therefore of
China), and over the Aksai Chin region atthe western end of the
Tibetan Plateau. Both countries in 2009 stepped up efforts to
assert theirclaims. China tried to block a $2.9 billion loan to
India from the Asian Development Bank,claiming part of the loan
would have been used for water projects in Arunachal Pradesh.
Thisrepresented the first time China sought to influence this
dispute through a multilateral institution.The then-governor of
Arunachal Pradesh announced that India would deploy more troops
andfighter jets to the area. An Indian newspaper reported that the
number of Chinese borderviolations had risen from 180 in 2011 to
more than 400 by September 2012.Power Projection Capability. There
hasalso been an active debate among military andcivilian theorists
in China concerning futurecapabilities the PLA should develop
toadvance Chinas interests beyond traditionalrequirements. Some
senior officers andcivilian theorists advocate an expansion of
thePLAs power projection capabilities tofacilitate missions well
beyond Taiwan andregional disputes. Publicly, Chinese
officialscontend that increasing the scope of Chinasmaritime
capabilities is intended to buildcapacity for international
peacekeeping,humanitarian assistance, disaster relief,
andprotection of sea lanes. The commissioningof the PLA Navys first
aircraft carrier in2012, in addition to serving as a symbol
ofnational prestige, exemplifies theseaspirations.Indicators of
Decision and Intent. Thereare several possible indicators of change
in 31. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic
of China23Chinese decision-making, depending on theissue. This
intent could be reflected throughspeeches in regional and
multi-nationalorganizations, commentary in official,domestic
newspapers or prominent Chinesethink tanks, adjustments to Chinas
DefenseWhite Paper, changes in talking points withcivilian and
military interlocutors, dispositionof forces, and changes in
military diplomacy.PLA MILITARY ENGAGEMENTThe PLAs level of
engagement with foreignmilitaries continues to grow significantly.
Atthe operational level, this engagementprovides the PLA with
opportunities to sharedoctrines, strategies, tactics, techniques,
andprocedures with other militaries - bothmodern and developing. At
the strategic level,China uses military engagement as a platformfor
demonstrating the PLAs growingcapabilities, its status as a modern
military,and its potential role as a responsible
securitypartner.Senior-level visits and exchanges provideChina with
opportunities to increase militaryofficers international exposure,
communicateChinas positions to foreign audiences, betterunderstand
alternative world views, andadvance foreign relations
throughinterpersonal contacts and military assistanceprograms.
Expanded PLA travel abroadenables Chinas military officers to
observeand study foreign military commandstructures, unit
formations, and operationaltraining.The PLA is participating in a
growing numberof bilateral and multilateral military exercises.The
PLA derives political benefit from theseexercises in terms of
increased influence andenhanced ties with partner states
andorganizations. These exercises also contributeto PLA
modernization by providingopportunities to improve capabilities in
areassuch as counterterrorism, mobility operations,and logistics.
The PLA gains operationalinsight by observing tactics,
commanddecision making, and equipment used by moreadvanced
militaries.PLA participation or observer status inmilitary training
exercises of nations inpossession of U.S. military
equipment,systems, and weapons may, in certaincircumstances, have
unintended consequencesthat could result in the
unauthorizeddisclosure of defense articles, technical data,or
defense services to China. Public Law 101-246 the Tiananmen
Sanctions prohibitsthe transfer or disclosure of U.S.-origindefense
articles, defense services, technicaldata, and/or technology to
China.Additionally, Public Law 94-329 the ArmsExport Control Act -
and the InternationalTraffic in Arms Regulations list China as
anation for which U.S. policy denies thetransfer or export of
defense articles(including technical data) and defense
services.Beijing primarily conducts arms sales toenhance foreign
relationships and to generaterevenue to support its domestic
defenseindustry. Chinas arms sales range from small 32. arms and
ammunition to joint development ortransfer of advanced weapons
systems.Chinese companies sell mostly to developingcountries where
Chinas low-cost weaponssales serve a strategic purpose. For
example,China maintains strong and longstandingmilitarytechnical
cooperation with Pakistan,which includes arms sales and
defenseindustrial cooperation. With other countriesof strategic
importance to China, such asSudan, arms sales and other security
assistancedeepen developing ties and balance Chinasenergy
imports.As Chinas regional and international interestsgrow more
complex, the PLAs internationalengagement will expand, especially
in theareas of peacekeeping operations, counter-piracy,
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief(HA/DR), and joint
exercises. In addition tofurthering PLA modernization, the focus
ofthese engagements will likely remain onbuilding Chinas political
ties, assuaging fearsabout Chinas rise, and building Chinasexternal
influence, particularly in Asia.Chinas Military LeadershipThe PLA
is the armed instrument of the CCP and, organizationally, is
subordinate to the Partyapparatus. Career military officers are CCP
members, and units at the company level andabove have political
officers responsible for personnel decisions, propaganda,
andcounterintelligence. Major decisions at all levels are made by
CCP committees, also led by thepolitical officers and
commanders.The PLAs highest decision-making body, the Central
Military Commission (CMC), is technically adepartment of the CCP
Central Committee, but is staffed primarily by military officers.
The CMCChairman is a civilian, usually the General Secretary of the
CCP and President. Other membersinclude several vice chairmen, the
commanders of the military services, and the directors of thefour
general headquarters departments.Chinas Ministry of National
Defense (MND) is not equivalent to the defense ministry in
mostother nations, but rather is a small office coordinating
military-related tasks where responsibilityoverlaps between the
civilian government and the armed forces, including foreign
militaryrelations, mobilization, recruitment, national defense
education, and civil support to militaryoperations. The Minister of
Defense is a uniformed military officer, a member of the State
Council(the countrys chief administrative authority), and also a
CMC member.Following the increasing professionalization of the PLA,
the military now holds fewer formalpositions in key political
bodies than in the mid-1990s or even the mid-2000s. With the
passing ofChinas revolutionary generation, few national leaders
have served in the military: the PolitburoStanding Committee has
not had a uniformed member since 1997 and only 4 of the 25
currentPolitburo members have military experience. However, the PLA
remains an influential player in 33. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China25Chinas
defense and foreign policy due to the CMCs special bureaucratic
status and the PLAsnear monopoly on military expertise. Even as the
PLA remains subordinate to top Partyleadership direction as the
armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party, longstandingbureaucratic
coordination issues and Chinas increasingly active media landscape
havesometimes led to PLA-associated actions or statements that
appear to diverge from the positionsof Chinas other key
bureaucratic actors, especially on national sovereignty or
territorial issues.Members of the Chinese Communist Partys Central
Military Commission (CMC)Chairman Xi Jinpings appointment as Party
General Secretary and CMC chairman, and hisexpected selection as
state president in the spring, represent the first clean transfer
of power inrecent decades. Prior to becoming Chinas new
commander-in-chief, Xi served as the CMCsonly civilian vice
chairman. Xis father was an important military figure during the
Chinesecommunist revolution and a Politburo member in the 1980s.
The younger Xi served as secretaryto a defense minister early in
his career and would have had ample opportunities to interact
withthe PLA as a provincial Party official. In meetings with U.S.
officials Xi has emphasized increasingmutual trust between Beijing
and Washington.Vice Chairman Fan Changlong is Beijings top
uniformed officer. He formerly commanded theJinan Military Region
(MR), a test bed for new operational concepts and technology that
hasbeen at the forefront of the PLAs joint training efforts in
recent years. Fan was the longest servingof Chinas seven MR
commanders at the time of his promotion to the CMC. He also spent
35years in the Shenyang MR where he reportedly served in the same
unit as outgoing CMC ViceChairman Xu Caihou, the PLAs top political
officer.Vice Chairman Xu Qiliangthe first career air force officer
promoted to CMC vice chairmanpreviously served on the CMC as PLA
Air Force commander where he oversaw rapid forcemodernization and
expanded the air forces foreign engagement. He vocally advocated
forincreasing the PLA Air Forces role within the larger PLA
including arguing in 2009 that the airforce should lead the
development of offensive space capabilities. Xu may have crossed
pathswith Xi Jinping earlier in their careers when both men served
in Fujian Province. Xu was the firstPLA Air Force officer to serve
as deputy chief of the General Staff Department (GSD) since
theCultural Revolution period, andat 54the youngest in PLA
history.Chang Wanquan was appointed Minister of National Defense at
the National Peoples Congressin March 2013. The Minister of
National Defense is the PLAs third most senior officer andmanages
its relationship with state bureaucracies and foreign militaries.
Chang previouslyoversaw the PLAs weapons development and space
portfolio as head of the GeneralArmament Department. He is a
veteran of Chinas border skirmishes with Vietnam and held topposts
across military regions. 34. Chief of the General Staff Department
Fang Fenghui oversees PLA operations, training, andintelligence. He
served as commander-in-chief of Chinas 60th anniversary military
parade in2009 and oversaw security for the 2008 Beijing Olympic
Games. Fan is the first Beijing MilitaryRegion commander to move
directly to Chief of the General Staff Department. He was
theyoungest military region commander when he was promoted to lead
the Beijing Military Regionin 2007.General Political Department
Director Zhang Yang oversees the PLAs political work to
includepropaganda, discipline, and education. He previously served
as Political Commissar of theGuangzhou Military Region, which
borders Vietnam and the South China Sea. Zhang assumedthat position
at a relatively young age and is unusual among the other newly
appointed CMCmembers for spending his entire career in one military
region. Zhang also participated in Chinasborder conflict with
Vietnam and supported disaster relief efforts following a January
2008snowstorm in southern China.General Logistics Department
Director Zhao Keshi is responsible for overseeing PLA
supportfunctions including finances, land, mining, and
construction. Zhao spent his entire career in theNanjing MR
responsible for a Taiwan contingency and most recently served as
its Commander.He was also reportedly an exercise commander in the
large military drills that induced the 1996Taiwan Strait Crisis.
Zhao has written on defense mobilization and reserve
construction.General Armament Department Director Zhang Youxia is
responsible for overseeing the militarysweapons development and
space program. Nicknamed General Patton, he has rareexperience as a
combat commander during Chinas brief conflict with Vietnam in 1979.
Zhangformerly commanded the Shenyang Military Region, which shares
a border with North Korea andRussia. Zhang is one of Chinas
military princelings. His father, a well-known military figure
inChina, served with Xi Jinpings father in the 1940s.PLA Navy
Commander Wu Shengli has served as head of the navy since 2006 and
on the CMCsince 2007only the second PLA Navy Commander to do so in
recent decades. Under Wu, thenavy has increased its out-of-area
exercises, multinational patrols, and foreign naval exchanges,and
initiated its first deployment to the Gulf of Aden. The first
career navy officer to serve as aDeputy Chief of the General Staff,
Wu held leadership positions in two of the PLA Navys threefleets,
spending most of his career in the East Sea Fleet.PLA Air Force
Commander Ma Xiaotian previously oversaw the PLAs military
engagementactivities as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Ma led
the PLA side in key military-to-militaryexchanges with the United
States, including the Defense Consultative Talks and the
StrategicSecurity Dialogue component of the U.S.-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue. Ma hassignificant operational experience
both as a pilot and staff officer in multiple military regions. 35.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic
of China27Second Artillery Commander Wei Fenghe oversees Chinas
strategic missile forces and bases.Wei served in multiple missile
bases across different military regions and held top posts in
theSecond Artillery headquarters before being promoted in late 2010
to Deputy Chief of theGeneral Staff - the first officer from the
Second Artillery to do so. In that role, Wei met frequentlywith
foreign delegations, including senior U.S. officials, affording him
greater internationalexposure than previous Second Artillery
commanders. 36. 3FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALSAND TRENDS 37. OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and
Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of
China29OVERVIEWAlthough Taiwan continues to dominate thePLAs force
modernization agenda (seeChapter Five: Force Modernization for
aTaiwan Contingency), Beijing is investing inmilitary programs and
weapons designed toimprove extended-range power projection
andoperations in emerging domains such as cyber,space, and
electronic warfare. Current trendsin Chinas weapons production will
enable thePLA to conduct a range of military operationsin Asia well
beyond Taiwan, in the SouthChina Sea, western Pacific, and Indian
Ocean.Key systems that have been either deployedor are in
development include ballistic missiles(including anti-ship
variants), anti-ship andland attack cruise missiles, nuclear
submarines,modern surface ships, and an aircraft carrier.The need
to ensure trade, particularly oilsupplies from the Middle East, has
promptedChinas navy to conduct counter-piracyoperations in the Gulf
of Aden. Disputeswith Japan over maritime claims in the EastChina
Sea and with several Southeast Asianclaimants to all or parts of
the Spratly andParacel Islands in the South China Sea haveled to
renewed tensions in these areas.Instability on the Korean Peninsula
could alsoproduce a regional crisis involving Chinasmilitary. The
desire to protect energyinvestments in Central Asia, along
withpotential security implications from cross-border support to
ethnic separatists, couldalso provide an incentive for
militaryinvestment or intervention in this region ifinstability
surfaces.Chinas political leaders have also charged thePLA with
developing capabilities for missionssuch as peacekeeping, disaster
relief, andcounterterrorism operations. Thesecapabilities will
increase Beijings options formilitary influence to press its
diplomaticagenda, advance regional and internationalinterests, and
resolve disputes in its favor.China has become more involved in
HA/DRoperations in response to the New HistoricMissions. Chinas
ANWEI-class militaryhospital ship (the Peace Ark) has
deployedthroughout East Asia and to the Caribbean.China has
conducted more than ten jointmilitary exercises with the SCO
members, themost prominent being the PEACE MISSIONseries, with
China and Russia as the mainparticipants.China continues its Gulf
of Aden counter-piracy deployment that began in December2008.
Outside of occasional goodwill cruises,this represents the PLA
Navys only series ofoperational deployments beyond theimmediate
western Pacific region.PLA FUTURE CAPABILITIESNuclear Weapons.
Chinas official policyon nuclear weapons continues to focus
onmaintaining a nuclear force structure able to 38. survive an
attack and respond with sufficientstrength to inflict unacceptable
damage on anenemy. The new generation of mobilemissiles, with
warheads consisting of MIRVsand penetration aids, are intended to
ensurethe viability of Chinas strategic deterrent inthe face of
continued advances in U.S. and, toa lesser extent, Russian
strategic intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR),precision strike, and missile defensecapabilities. The PLA
has deployed newcommand, control, and communicationscapabilities to
its nuclear forces. Thesecapabilities improve the Second
Artillerysability to command and control multiple unitsin the
field. Through the use of improvedcommunications links, the ICBM
units nowhave better access to battlefield
information,uninterrupted communications connecting allcommand
echelons, and the unit commandersare able to issue orders to
multiplesubordinates at once, instead of serially viavoice
commands.China has consistently asserted that it adheresto a no
first use (NFU) policy, stating itwould use nuclear forces only in
response to anuclear strike against China. Chinas NFUpledge
consists of two stated commitments:China will never use nuclear
weapons firstagainst any nuclear-weapon state, and Chinawill never
use or threaten to use nuclearweapons against any
non-nuclear-weaponstate or nuclear-weapon-free zone. However,there
is some ambiguity over the conditionsunder which Chinas NFU policy
would apply,including whether strikes on what Chinaconsiders its
own territory, demonstrationstrikes, or high-altitude bursts
wouldconstitute a first use. Moreover, some PLAofficers have
written publicly of the need tospell out conditions under which
China mightneed to use nuclear weapons first; for example,if an
enemys conventional attack threatenedthe survival of Chinas nuclear
force or of theregime itself. However, there has been noindication
that national leaders are willing toattach such nuances and caveats
to ChinasNFU doctrine.China will likely continue to
investconsiderable resources to maintain a limited,but survivable,
nuclear force (sometimesdescribed as sufficient and effective),
toensure the PLA can deliver a damagingretaliatory nuclear strike.
39. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic
of China31PLA Underground FacilitiesChina maintains a
technologically advanced underground facility (UGF) program
protecting allaspects of its military forces, including C2,
logistics, missile, and naval forces. Given Chinas NFUnuclear
policy, China has assumed it may need to absorb an initial nuclear
blow while ensuringleadership and strategic assets survive.China
determined it needed to update and expand its military UGF program
in the mid to late1980s. This modernization effort took on a
renewed urgency following Chinas observation of U.S.and NATO air
operations in Operation Allied Force and of U.S. military
capabilities during the1991 Gulf War. A new emphasis on winning
hi-tech battles in the future precipitated researchinto advanced
tunneling and construction methods. These military campaigns
convincedChina it needed to build more survivable, deeply-buried
facilities, resulting in the widespreadUGF construction effort
detected throughout China for the last decade.Land-Based Platforms.
Chinas nucleararsenal currently consists of approximately 50-75
ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4(DF-5); the solid-fueled,
road-mobile CSS-10Mods 1 and 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and themore
limited range CSS-3 (DF-4). This forceis complemented by
liquid-fueled CSS-2intermediate-range ballistic missiles and
road-mobile, solid-fueled CSS-5 (DF-21) MRBMsfor regional
deterrence missions. By 2015,Chinas nuclear forces will include
additionalCSS-10 Mod 2 and enhanced CSS-4 ICBMs.Sea-Based
Platforms. China continues toproduce the JIN-class SSBN, with
threealready delivered and as many as two more invarious stages of
construction. The JIN-classSSBNs will eventually carry the
JL-2submarine-launched ballistic missile with anestimated range of
7,400 km. The JIN-classand the JL-2 will give the PLA Navy its
firstlong-range, sea-based nuclear capability. Aftera round of
successful testing in 2012, the JL-2appears ready to reach initial
operationalcapability in 2013. JIN-class SSBNs based atHainan
Island in the South China Sea wouldthen be able to conduct nuclear
deterrencepatrols.Future Efforts. China is working on a rangeof
technologies to attempt to counter U.S.and other countries
ballistic missile defensesystems, including maneuverable
reentryvehicles (MaRVs), MIRVs, decoys, chaff,jamming, thermal
shielding, and anti-satellite(ASAT) weapons. Chinas official media
alsocite numerous Second Artillery trainingexercises featuring
maneuver, camouflage, andlaunch operations under simulated
combatconditions, which are intended to increasesurvivability.
Together with the increasedmobility and survivability of the new
40. generation of missiles, these technologies andtraining
enhancements strengthen Chinasnuclear force and enhance its
strategic strikecapabilities. Further increases in the numberof
mobile ICBMs and the beginning of SSBNdeterrence patrols will force
the PLA toimplement more sophisticated command andcontrol systems
and processes that safeguardthe integrity of nuclear release
authority for alarger, more dispersed force.Anti-Access/Area Denial
(A2/AD). Aspart of its planning for military contingencies,China
continues to develop measures to deteror counter third-party
intervention,particularly by the United States. Chinasapproach to
dealing with this challenge ismanifested in a sustained effort to
develop thecapability to attack, at long ranges, militaryforces
that might deploy or operate within thewestern Pacific, which the
DoD characterizesas anti-access and area denial
(A2/AD)capabilities. China is pursuing a variety of air,sea,
undersea, space and counter-space, andinformation warfare systems
and operationalconcepts to achieve this capability, movingtoward an
array of overlapping, multilayeredoffensive capabilities extending
from Chinascoast into the western Pacific. Chinas 2008Defense White
Paper asserts, for example,that one of the priorities for the
developmentof Chinas armed forces is to increase thecountrys
capabilities to maintain maritime,space, and electromagnetic space
security.An essential element, if not a fundamentalprerequisite, of
Chinas emerging A2/ADregime is the ability to control and
dominatethe information spectrum in all dimensions ofthe modern
battlespace. PLA authors oftencite the need in modern warfare to
controlinformation, sometimes termed informationblockade or
information dominance, andto seize the initiative and gain an
informationadvantage in the early phases of a campaign toachieve
air and sea superiority. China isimproving information and
operationalsecurity to protect its own informationstructures, and
is also developing electronicand information warfare capabilities,
includingdenial and deception, to defeat those of itsadversaries.
Chinas information blockadelikely envisions employment of military
andnon-military instruments of state poweracross the battlespace,
including in cyberspaceand outer space. Chinas investments
inadvanced electronic warfare systems, counter-space weapons, and
computer networkoperations (CNO) combined with moretraditional
forms of control historicallyassociated with the PLA and CCP
systems,such as propaganda and denial throughopacity, reflect the
emphasis and priorityChinas leaders place on building capability
forinformation advantage.In more traditional domains, Chinas
A2/ADfocus appears oriented toward restricting orcontrolling access
to Chinas periphery,including the western Pacific. Chinas
currentand projected force structure improvements,for example, will
provide the PLA withsystems that can engage adversary surfaceships
up to 1,000 nm from Chinas coast. 41. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China33China is also
developing weapons for itsentire military to project force further
from itscoast.Current and projected missile systems willallow the
PLA to strike regional air bases,logistical facilities, and other
ground-basedinfrastructure. Chinese military analysts haveconcluded
that logistics and power projectionare potential vulnerabilities in
modern warfare,given the requirements for precision incoordinating
transportation, communications,and logistics networks. China is
fielding anarray of conventionally armed ballistic missiles,ground-
and air-launched land-attack cruisemissiles, special operations
forces, and cyber-warfare capabilities to hold targets at
riskthroughout the region.Counter-Space. PLA strategists regard
theability to utilize space and deny adversariesaccess to space as
central to enabling modern,informatized warfare. Although PLA
doctrinedoes not appear to address space operationsas a unique
operational campaign, spaceoperations form an integral component
ofother PLA campaigns and would serve a keyrole in enabling A2/AD
operations. Publicly,China attempts to dispel any skepticism
overits military intentions for space. In 2009, PLAAir Force
Commander General Xu Qiliangpublically retracted his earlier
assertion thatthe militarization of space was a
historicinevitability after President Hu Jintao swiftlycontradicted
him. General Xu Qiliang is nowa Vice Chairman of the Central
MilitaryCommission and the second highest-rankingofficer in the
PLA.The PLA is acquiring a range of technologiesto improve Chinas
space and counter-spacecapabilities. China demonstrated a
direct-ascent kinetic kill anti-satellite capability tolow Earth
orbit when it destroyed the defunctChinese FY-1C weather satellite
during a testin January 2007. Although Chinese defenseacademics
often publish on counterspacethreat technologies, no additional
anti-satelliteprograms have been publicly acknowledged.A PLA
analysis of U.S. and coalition militaryoperations reinforced the
importance ofoperations in space to enable informatizedwarfare,
claiming that space is thecommanding point for the
informationbattlefield. PLA writings emphasize thenecessity of
destroying, damaging, andinterfering with the
enemysreconnaissance...and communicationssatellites, suggesting
that such systems, aswell as navigation and early warning
satellites,could be among the targets of attacksdesigned to blind
and deafen the enemy.The same PLA analysis of U.S. and
coalitionmilitary operations also states that destroyingor
capturing satellites and other sensorswilldeprive an opponent of
initiative on thebattlefield and [make it difficult] for them
tobring their precision guided weapons into fullplay.Information
Operations. New technologiesallow the PLA to share intelligence,
battlefieldinformation, logistics information, weather 42. reports,
etc., instantaneously (over robust andredundant communications
networks),resulting in improved situational awarenessfor
commanders. In particular, by enablingthe sharing of near-real-time
ISR data withcommanders in the field, decision-makingprocesses are
facilitated, shortening commandtimelines and making operations
moreefficient.These improvements have greatly enhancedthe PLAs
flexibility and responsiveness.Informatized operations no longer
requiremeetings for command decision-making orlabor-intensive
processes for execution.Commanders can now issue orders tomultiple
units at the same time while on themove, and units can rapidly
adjust theiractions through the use of digital databasesand command
automation tools. This iscritical for joint operations needed to
executeA2/AD. However, to fully implementinformatized command and
control, thePLA will need to overcome a shortage oftrained
personnel and its culture of centralized,micro-managed command.The
PLA GSD Fourth Department(Electronic Countermeasures and
Radar)would likely use information operations (IO)tools, to include
jamming/EW, CNO, anddeception to augment counter-space andother
kinetic operations during a wartimescenario. Simultaneous and
paralleloperations would involve strikes against U.S.warships,
aircraft, and associated supply craftand the use of IO to affect
tactical andoperational communications and computernetworks. The
PLA would likely rely on IOto disrupt the U.S. capability to
usenavigational and targeting radar.Maritime. The PLA Navy is in
the forefrontof Chinas A2/AD developments, having thegreatest range
and staying power within thePLA to interdict third-party forces. In
a near-term conflict, PLA Navy operations wouldlikely begin in the
offshore and coastal areaswith attacks by coastal defense cruise
missiles,maritime strike aircraft, and smallercombatants, and
extend as far as the secondisland chain and Strait of Malacca using
largesurface ships and submarines. As the PLANavy gains experience
and acquires largernumbers of more capable platforms,
includingthose with long-range air defense, it willexpand the depth
of these operations furtherinto the Western Pacific. It will also
develop anew capability for ship-based land-attackusing cruise
missiles. China views long-rangeanti-ship cruise missiles as a key
weapon inthis type of operation and is developingmultiple advanced
types and the platforms toemploy them for this purpose.
Theseplatforms include conventional and nuclear-powered attack
submarines (KILO SS, SONGSS, YUAN SSP, SHANG SSN),
surfacecombatants (LUYANG III DDG [Type052D], LUZHOU DDG [Type
051C],LUYANG I/II DDG [Type 052B/C],SOVREMENNY II-class DDG,
JIANGKAIII FFG [Type 054A], JIANGDAO FFL [Type056]), and maritime
strike aircraft (JH-7 andJH-7A, H-6G, and the SU-30 MK2). 43.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic
of China35China would face several short-comings in anear-term
A2/AD operation. First, it has notdeveloped a robust, deep water
anti-submarine warfare capability, in contrast to itsstrong
capabilities in the air and surfacedomains. Second, it is not clear
whetherChina has the capability to collect accuratetargeting
information and pass it to launchplatforms in time for successful
strikes in seaareas beyond the first island chain. However,China is
working to ove