2011 Changing Role of Popular Religion of Nuo in Modern Chinese Politics

8/2/2019 2011 Changing Role of Popular Religion of Nuo in Modern Chinese Politics

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Modern Asian Studies 45, 5 (2011)pp. 12891311. CCambridge University Press2010doi:10.1017/S0026749X10000090 First published online 12 August 2010

The Changing Role of the Popular Religion

ofNuo ( ) in Modern Chinese PoliticsL A N L I

Irish Institute for Chinese Studies, University College Dublin, Belfield,Dublin 4, Ireland

Email: [email protected]

Abstract

Since the early 1980s, Chinas rapid economic growth and profound socialtransformation have greatly changed the role of popular religion in modernChinese politics. In the case ofnuo, these changes have been directly responsiblefor the incorporation of this popular religion into the implementation of Party-states policy on ethnic minority and the provision of evidence to support thelegitimacy of the Chinese Communist Partys regime. Through manipulationand reinterpretation by local governments, the popular religion of nuo has

not only become the target of local socio-economic development, a commonphenomenon in contemporary China, but has also played a key role in ethnicidentification, which is an important step for a post-Maos CCP to maintainpolitical stability in ethnic minority areas. In addition, nuo has through theresearch of Marxism-influenced schools fundamentally altered its position froman officially unrecognized religion opposed to both socialist political order andatheist ideology to a politically favoured living fossil1 of primitive culture. Thisproves the Marxist evolutionary theory in which socialism and communism arethought to be inescapable consequences of social development. The positive roleplayed bynuo in modern Chinese politics has brought the popular religion much

1 The term used almost exclusively by lay persons [not professionals] to indicate:(a) a living species with a morphology similar to that of fossils of great age; (b)indicative of a successful adaptation to an ancient niche, and the maintenance vianatural selection of conservative traits that permit the species to flourish in thatenvironment. From this definition two things are apparent: (1) the term living fossilis not particularly meaningful in the field of biology, and is not routinely used byacademics in the field; (2) a species is sometimes termed a living fossil if it appears

visually to resemble a fossil of great age. Its genetic and anatomical composition isusually not taken into account when the species is termed a living fossil. Thus, interms of culture, a living fossil may be defined as a cultural tradition that appearsto resemble another, and no longer a practised tradition. However, it should be notedthat the histories of the two cultural traditions may be very different. For a moredetailed discussion see the section of Nuo as a Living Fossil of Primitive Culture inthis paper.

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open support and endorsement from party-state officials at all levels, includingtop-ranking officials within the Central Committee of the CCP. Like any popularreligion, nuo has over the centuries undergone significant changes, but neverbefore has it experienced such dramatic changes in its relationship with an anti-

religious and pragmatic central government, something which has significantlyaltered the course of its development.

Introduction

Being diametrically opposed to the officially recognized Confucianismideology, popular religion in China has traditionally been the subject

of suspicion and repression by the Government, and its de-centralizednature has made it the cause of various rebellions and successionsof governments.2 This attitude prevails in modern China today andfor much the same reasons.3 As Overmyer notes, in the post-Maoera, [R]eligious traditions with completely non-Marxist ideologiesare flourishing, which amounts to a challenge to the authority ofthe Party and state.4 Nevertheless, the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) legalizes the five institutionalized religions (Buddhism, Roman

Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism and Taoism)

5

in order to preservean image of tolerance and thereby maintain its political controlthrough building legitimacy, but categorizes all other forms of religionas superstition.6 However, the CCPs continuing preoccupation

with Chinas modernization and its socio-economic development ischanging Party-state attitudes and its policies regarding popularreligion. The cause of these changes seems to lie in the difference

2 C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society (Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1961),pp. 218224.

3 Stephan Feutchtwang and Wang Mingming, The Politic of Culture of a Contestof Histories: Representations of Chinese Popular Religion in Dialectical Anthropology,16 (1991): 251272.

4 Daniel L. Overmyer, Religion in China today: Introduction in Religion in ChinaTodayThe China Quarterly Special Issues, New Series, No. 3 (2003), p. 1.

5 Joseph B. Tamney, Introduction in Fenggang Yang & Joseph B. Tamney (eds),State, Market, and Religions in Chinese Societies (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), p. 13.

6 Andrew B. Kipnis, The Flourishing of Religion in Post-Mao China and the Anthropological Category of Religion in The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 12,1 (2005): 3246; Mickey Spiegel, Control and Containment in the Reform Era in

Jason Kindopp and Carol Lee Hamrin (eds), God and Casar in China (Washington, DC:Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 51; Thomas Heberer, China and Its National

MinoritiesAutonomy or Assimilation? (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 1989), pp. 110113.


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in the needs of popular religion that have always existed betweenlocal and central government. For central government, the needfor religion is always political7 and its official attitude towards any

given religious organization is formulated on the sole criteria thatit must not represent a threat to the political leadership.8 Thus,over the past two decades, some religions (both institutionalized andnon-institutionalized) have become the targets of severe suppressionfrom the central Chinese government, and prominent examplesof such Party-state directed suppression include Xinjiangs Islam,Tibetan Buddhism, the underground Catholic church, Protestanthouse churches and Falungong ( ).9

This same political need for religion is not shared at the local

level of government for whom socio-economic development is ofgreater importance, and this difference in priorities is understandablegiven that the well-being of local officials are so much more closelytied to that of their administrative region; a critical differencethat essentially gives rise to the whole concept of local governmentagency.10 In order to further local development, local governmentshave learnt to apply varying degrees of creative re-interpretationand judicious misunderstanding to directives issued by the state,

and as Goodman rightly points out: Chinas provinces, or rather theprovinces, autonomous regions and municipalities at the immediatesub-central level of China, are considerable social, economic andpolitical systems in their own right.11 Without the need to maintainthe ruling power of the CCP as their first priority, local governmentsin China have been actively seeking ways to turn almost every resource

7 Daniel L. Overmyer, Religion in China today: Introduction in Religion in China

TodayThe China Quarterly Special Issues, New Series, No. 3 (2003), p. 1; Julian Pas,Introduction: Chinese Religion in Transition in Julian Pas (eds), The Turning of theTide: Religion in China Today (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 1213.

8 Jianbo Huang and Fenggang Yang, The Cross Faces the Loudspeakers: A villagechurch perseveres under state power in Fenggang Yang and Joseph B. Tamney (eds),State, Market, and Religions in Chinese Society (Leiden and Boston: Brill,2005), pp. 4849.

9 See Colin Mackerras, Chinas Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Pitman B. Potter, Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in Chinain Religion in China TodayThe China Quarterly Special Issues, New Series, No. 3 (2003),pp. 1131; Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen, Introduction: popular protest andstate legitimation in 21st century China in Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds),State and Society in 21st Century China (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), pp. 123.

10 Melissa J. Brown, Local Government AgencyManipulating Tujia Identity inModern China, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2002), pp. 362395.

11 See David S. G. Goodman, Chinas Provinces in Reform: Class, Community, and PoliticalCulture (London: Routledge Curzon, 1997).


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at their disposal, including local popular religions, to promoting socio-economic benefits to the region.

As an example of this, Dean describes that in some areas around

Outian, local communal religious rituals have become significantarenas for the negotiation of modernity in contemporary China. Also, the networks of village temples have formed a second tier oflocal government, providing services, raising funds, and mobilizingentire communities to participate in collective rituals.12 An analogouscase can be found in the work of Wang where, in response to thenumbers of wealthy overseas Chinese wishing to worship at theirhome village of Shiniushan ( ), the local cadres have restoredthe local Shihu Temple ( ) and constructed a new mountainside

road providing access to the temple. These works were funded bydonations from overseas Chinese, whose continuing investment inand visits to the temple remain the sole driving force behind the

villages rapid economic development. Ever since the 1980s the ShihuTemple has generated the majority of the villagers incomes and nowwork on the temple and work on the local economy have cometo mean the same thing for these villagers.13 Taken together, thesecases have led Chau to argue that, at the local state level, economic

development has largely replaced political performance as the majorcriterion for judging an officials worth. So in Longwanggou, the localstate is inclined to exchange protection of local temples for economicbenefits, even if doing so means protecting superstitious activitiesthat are technically illegal.14

In this paper, a political perspective will be given by examining thecase of nuo in north-east Guizhou province where, as a result of themanipulation by the local government and the research by Marxism

influenced scholars, nuo has significantly changed its role in modernChinese politics. Nuo is first used by the local government as an ethniccultural marker to identify the highly Han-assimilated Tujia ethnicgroup, thus turning a large originally Han area into a Tujia ethnic-

12 Kenneth Dean, Local Communal Religion in Contemporary South-east Chinain Religion in China TodayThe China Quarterly Special Issues, New Series, No. 3 (2003),p. 3252.

13

Mingming Wang, Lingyan de YichanWeirao Yige Cunshen Jiqi Yishi deKaocha ( Heritage of Efficaciousness and AccuratenessA study on a village godand ritual) in Yuhua Guo (eds), Yishi Yu Shehui Bianqian (Ritual and Social Change)(Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2000), pp. 1156.

14 Adam Yuet Chau, The Politics of Legitimation and the Revival of PopularReligion in Shaanbei, North-Central China in Modern China, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2005),pp. 236278.


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minority area in order to exploit Party-state policies designed to aid thedevelopment in ethnic minority area and to maintain political stabilityof the state. Then, nuo was reinterpreted by Marxism-influenced

scholars as a living fossil of primitive culture and transformed intoa local cultural brand. It has placed the religion in a position whereit can be viewed as supporting the official atheist Marxist ideology.

As a living fossil of primitive culture, nuo provides evidence for theevolutionary theory of society and thereby supports the legitimacy ofthe CCPs regime by offering a rational explanation for its existence.This has brought nuo much open support and praise from party-stateofficials at all levels, including the top-ranking officials within theCentral Committee of the CCP. Like any popular religion nuo hasover the centuries undergone significant changes in its cosmology,ritual symbolism and other characteristics, but never before has itexperienced such dramatic changes in its relationship with an anti-religious and pragmatic central government, something which hassignificantly altered the course of its development.

Nuo as the Ethnic Cultural Marker of the Tujia

History of Nuo: an Overview

Nuo is a complex of religious beliefs and practices prevailing mainly inethnic minority areas in todays southwest China. Originally derivedfrom a form of exorcism more than 2,000 years ago, nuo was once theprevailing religion in central China until strict enforcement of theofficial Confucianism ideology during the Ming (13681644 AD) andQing (16441911 AD) dynasties drove it into eventual decline. Nuosurvived, however, having been brought out of central China by Hanimmigrants who eventually settled in ethnic minority areas in south-

west China, where the popular religion has been gradually integratedinto, and been influenced by, the local culture. In north-east Guizhou,for example, nuo has been progressively re-invented by the locals toincorporate additional elements of drama, vow-making and redeemingtothegods,andisknownas nuotangxi ( ), lit. nuo drama performedin the central room [of a household]. Generally, contemporary nuorituals in the north-east Guizhou are divided into two categories:

chongnuo ( , exorcism) and huanyuan ( , the making and

redeeming the vows to the gods), and each of them encompasses threedistinct ritual functions.15 Apart from the two major rituals, there are

15 Chongnuo rituals primarily involve exorcism and are normally performed inemergency situations in which the client seeks immediate results, and depending


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various short rituals, such as the songchuan ( , to send a boat of evilspirits away), the gemen ( , to keep the evil spirits away from thedoor of house), xietu ( , to comfort the gods of the land), and so on.

Among the local religious rituals of affliction, nuo is the one thatis most powerful, ceremonious, extensive and widely applicable. Nuospecialists are employed when the natural progression of the lifecycle is disturbed, as in cases of sterility, dystocia (difficulties inchildbirth), stunted growth, illness, accidents, natural disasters andunusual death. It involves varied and complex symbolic performancesand encompasses and articulates with local worldview and cosmoscomprehensively. Moreover, nuo ritual can be held with nuo dramaperformance, in which many relatives of the clients within the clan

and kin group living in the host village and in neighbouring villagesare invited to participate; also all the villagers, both within and outsidethe host village, are welcomed to join. Thus, nuo ritual performanceprovides a context for sociability and for the construction of a moralcommunity among all its participants.

Prior to the early 1980s, however, nuo had remained largelyunknown to the outside world, and this isolation is attributable mainlyto the anti-religious climate in China at the time, as well as to

the geographical isolation of the regions where nuo was practised.Since the institution of the Communist regime in China in 1949,religious activities had been actively discouraged by the Party-state,and although the Party-state attitude towards religion has relaxedsomewhat with the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1976,nuo was still nevertheless categorized as a non-institutionalized andtherefore illegal religion. Thus, the practice of nuo throughout thisperiod was confined to small, semi-covert displays that were always

kept hidden from the public. Adding to this political isolation, nuohad in modern times been largely concentrated in a mountainousregion spanning across the borders of the Sichuan, Hunan, Hubei

on the nature of the emergency one of three variants of the basic chongnuo ritual areperformed: chongjijunuo ( ) is used in medical emergencies such as terminalillnesses, chongtaipingnuo ( ) is used to counteract the appearance of ill-omens,and chongdinuo ( ) is reserved for solving serious crimes such as substantial theft,fraud or adultery by asking the gods to identify the culprit. Like the chongnuo rituals,different huanyuan variants exist to address different problems: the huanzitongyuan( ) involves a request for fertility by a couple with no child; the huanguoguanyuan( ) is meant to restore the health of a child with stunted growth; and the

huanshouyuan ( ) ensures long life to elderly people.


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and Guizhou provinces, and the geographical remoteness of this areafurther insulated nuo from outside attention.

It was in this socio-political context that nuo was rediscovered by

the local Dejiang county government, who judged it to be useful asa cultural marker of the highly Han-assimilated Tujia ( ) ethnicminority, a decision that would dramatically alter the political statusof the popular religion.

The process began in the early1980s during the height of the ethnicidentification project (minzu shibie ), a time when the CCPprioritized the socio-economic development of ethnic minority areas inorder to further its goals of national unification and political stability.

The Tujia and the Ethnic Identification Project

Like many ethnic minorities in China in the past, the Tujia in Dejiangwere wary of declaring themselves as such for fear of either ethnicdiscrimination or refusal by the Han government to recognize theirethnic minority status.16 Thus, it was not until the launch of an ethnicidentification project in the 1950s17 that the Tujia were officiallyclassified as a single ethnic group. However, before all the Tujiacould be identified the ethnic identification campaign was abruptlyterminated by the events of the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1958

which attacked ethnic rightists and various contemporary views onethnic separatism (minzu fenlie, ).18 This left large numbers ofTujia people inhabiting the region spanning the borders of Sichuan,

16 For ethnic discrimination in China see Ralph A. Litzinger, Other Chinas: the Yaoand the Politics of National Belonging (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), pp. 34;for Tujias ethnic identity issue under Han chauvinism see Dejiang Xian Minzu ZhiBianzuan Bangongshi (The Editing Office of The History of Nationalities in Dejiang)(eds), Dejiang Xian Minzu Zhi (The History of Nationalities in Dejiang) (Guiyang: GuizhouNationality Press, 1991), pp. 171173.

17 Thomas Heberer, China and Its National MinoritiesAutonomy or Assimilation?(Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1989), pp. 3435; Stevan Harrell, Language DefiningEthnicity in Southwest China in Lola. Romanucci-Ross and George A. De Vos(eds), Ethnic Identity, Creation, Conflict, and Accommodation (London: Alta Mira Press,1995); Ralph A. Litzinger, Other Chinas: the Yao and the Politics of National Belonging(Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), pp. 78; Stevan Harrell, Introduction inStevan Harrell (eds), Cultural Encounters on Chinas Ethnic Frontiers (Seattle and London:University of Washington Press, 1994), pp. 336.

18 Jinggui Tian, Queding yu Huifu Tujiazu Chengfen de Qianqian Houhou (TheProcess of Identifying and Restoring Tujia Ethnic Identity) in Zhenkun Peng (eds),

Lishi de Jiyi (The Historical Memories) (Guiyang: Guizhou Nationalities Publisher,2003),pp. 338365.


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Hunan, Hubei and Guizhou without an official ethnic classification,and subsequently most of these people retained their self-declaredHan ethnic identity.

The ethnic minority situation in China changed dramatically in thepost-Mao era with the introduction of preferential socio-economicpolicies for ethnic minorities by the Party-state such as higher birthquotas, sponsorship of ethnic schools and development projects, alowering of university entrance requirements as well as important taxexemptions19. With ethnic minority status suddenly so closely linked

with local socio-economic development, the re-claiming of ethnicminority status became a priority not only for ethnic minority peoplethemselves (about 5 million have asked to return to their ethnic

minority identity since 198220) but also for their local governments.When these needs were reported to the CCP, the ethnic identificationproject, which had been on hold since 1957, was resumed in theearly 1980s21 and 2.6 million people had returned to their ethnicminority identities by1990.22 In Dejiang county, the Office of EthnicIdentification (shibieban ), was established in 1983 especially forthis purpose.

The Search for Cultural Markers of the Tujia

As the ethnic identification project in Dejiang progressed, it quicklybecame clear to the officials of the Ethnic Affairs Commission thatmany of the people trying to reclaim their ethnic minority status hadbeen significantly assimilated by the Han, and consequently many oftheir traditional ethnic characteristics had been lost. This made itdifficult for local officials to distinguish those locals of minority origin

from those of Han origin, as the criteria used at the time to identifyethnic minorities were observable cultural markers, rather than the

19 See Chih-yu Shih, Negotiating Ethnicity in ChinaCitizenship as a response to the state(London and New York: Routledge,2002),p. 10; Melissa J. Brown, Local Government

AgencyManipulating Tujia Identity inModern China, Vol.28,No.3 (2002), pp. 362395; Barry Santman, Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China: The Caseof Xinjiang, in William Safran (eds), Nationalism and Ethnoregional Identities in China(London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 86118; Colin Mackerras, Chinas Ethnic Minorities

and Globalisation (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 27.20 Guangxue Huang and Lianzhu Shi, (eds),Zhongguo de Minzu Shibie (Chinas Ethnic

Identification) (Beijing: Nationality Publisher, 1995).21 Ibid; Melissa J. Brown, Ethnic Classification and Culture: The Case of the Tujia

in Hubei, China in Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 2, No.1 (2001), pp. 5572.22 Ibid.


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peoples own self-ascribed perception of ethnic identity. In their searchto find an unique cultural marker, the Dejiang officials initially turnedto investigating people with an inhabitant surname, such as Tian ( ),

Zhang ( ), An ( ), Yang ( ) and Ran ( ), as those people werebelieved to be the descendants of the indigenous rulers of the Tujia(tusi )23 and to still retain some of the ethnic characteristics of theTujia in their daily lives. Prominent examples of such characteristicsinclude their language, which still contain words used by the ancientTujia, their use of the traditional Tujia dress, and the fact that theycelebrate the Chinese New Year one day earlier than usual, accordingto the Tujia custom.24

As the investigation continued, however, it further became apparent

that large numbers of Tujia descendants possessed neither these eth-nic characteristics nor an inhabitant surname, and subsequently theuse of these cultural markers had to be dropped. This lack of reliablecultural markers made it impossible for Dejiang officials to convincehigher ranking officials at the prefecture level of the legitimacy ofDejiang Countys bid for minority status. As Jin Jiguang ( ), thenin charge of the Office of Ethnic Identification in Dejiang recalls:

The Party Secretary of Tongren ( ) prefecture was among the [higherranking] officials who was strongly opposed to our proposal. He said that theTujia language was no longer maintained in this area and that the peopledid not speak the Tujia language any more. Therefore, there was no reasonto allow the local people to reclaim their Tujia ethnic identity. He even usedStalins definition of the four elements of ethnicity to defend his view and

went on to say that what we proposed was ridiculous, as it was impossible tohave so many Tujia people in this area [ . . . ] Our proposal was eventuallyturned down.25

However, another Dejiang official, An Gaoke ( ), then theDeputy Director of the Office of Ethnic Identification, disputes theapparent contradictions in Stalins definitions as the real reason forthe rejection of their proposal:

Songtao ( ) county [one of Dejiangs neighbouring counties withinTongren prefecture] was classified as Miao ( ) nationality in the 1950sand has since then enjoyed the various privileges of the Party-states policies

23 Between the Southern Song (AD 11271279) and the Qing Dynasty (AD 16441911).

24 Juexu Li (ed), Dejiangxian Minzuzhi (Annals of Dejiang County) (Internal Circular,1993), p. 266.

25 The authors interview record, September 2005.


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on ethnic minority, such as special promotions for minority cadres. [TheSongtao officials] were worried that their privileges would be reduced ifa large number of people in Tongren prefecture were allowed to reclaimtheir ethnic minority status. An official from Songtao county who had been

promoted to a high ranking position in the State Ethnic Affairs Commissiontalked to both the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of the Committee ofCCP in Tongren, and convinced them to use their powers to limit the numberof people given permission to reclaim their minority status.26

As the two counties were concerned only with the socio-economicbenefits associated with ethnic minority status, and both knowinglyused the ethnic cultural markers as the only legitimate means with

which they could advance their cases before the prefecture authorities,

Dejiang officials were determined to find that elusive cultural marker which could uniquely identify the Tujia and thereby force theprefecture authorities to approve their proposal. They took theirsearch to the countryside and it was here that nuo was re-discovered.

Nuos Uses as a Cultural Marker

The re-discovery ofnuo caused much excitement amongst the Dejiangofficials, as nuo was a common practice within the area but was rarelyseen in contemporary Han areas. Thus, local officials firmly believedthat nuo could be used as a major Tujia cultural marker by which thehighly Han-assimilated Tujia within the county could be differentiatedfrom the real Han from outside the area. Echoing this view, localofficials attributed the local peoples belief in nuo to their consciousnessof Tujia ethnic identity:

We found that nuotangxi was one of the major characteristics of theTujia. Tulaoshi ( )27 still performed nuotangxi rituals. . .

They also makereference in their songs that their ancestors had lived in caves, which was

where the ancient Tujia had their seat of power [government centre].Tulaoshiwere well preserved in Dejiang. In spite of what had happened duringthe so-called Destroy the Four Olds campaign, nuo had not been destroyedand the local people still wanted to perform [its rituals]. The masks of thenuotangxi had been protected [during the Cultural Revolution] by all meansnecessary and this indicated that the local peoples consciousness of Tujiaethnic identity remained strong.28

26 The authors interview record, September 2005.27 One of the local terms for nuo practitioners.28 Jin Jiguang ( ), then in charge of the Office of Ethnic Identification, the

authors interview record, September 2005.


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However, the ability of nuo to act as a unique cultural markerfor the Tujia was severely limited by its mixed heritage. Long-terminter-cultural assimilation among the locals with multiple ethnic

origins made nuo a representation of multiple cultural traditions, notonly of Tujia, but of other ethnic groups. This mutual inter-culturalassimilation is not uncommon in ethnic minority areas in south-westChina, and a case studied by Shih in Yongshun ( ) county within theTujia-Miao Autonomous Prefecture of Western Hunan, for example,suggests that the Tujia and Miao ethnic minorities in Yongshun havemixed with the Han in culturally indistinguishable ways.29 The declineof nuo during the Ming and Qing dynasties, and its subsequent re-location to ethnic minority areas in south-west China, led to nuogradually acquiring many non-Han characteristics, and among theTujia ethnic group such characteristics include the worship of theTujia ancestors, nuogong ( ) and nuopo ( ), vow-making and vow-redeeming to the gods, as well as the practice of re-counting stories oflocal history during nuo drama performances. However, nuo today stillretains its core symbolism: exorcism, the enshrinement of the foundersof Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism as well as the incorporationof the history of Central China in its drama plays, which are all strictly

in the Han tradition. An indication of the extent of the assimilation ofnuo by various cultural traditions can be seen in the fact that there isno longer any discernable difference between nuo rituals performed byteams in different regions within Dejiang county. During my fieldworkI followed closely two different nuo performing teams, one claiming tobe Tujia and the other claiming to be Han, and subsequently foundthem to be identical in organizational structure, ritual symbolism andexecution of performances.

Thus, although nuo does encapsulate certain cultural characteristicsof the Tujia, it is far from being the unique cultural marker thatthe Dejiang government could use to identify the Tujia from otherlocals: the nuo in Dejiang contained not only elements of Tujia culture,but also that of the Miao, Hui ( ), Zhuang ( ) and even the localHan. Had the Dejiang government attempted to use nuo in the waythey had originally intended, they would have been completely unableto distinguish the Tujia from these other local ethnic groups, withdisastrous consequences for their bid for Tujia minority status.

29 Chih-Yu Shih, Ethnicity as Policy Expedience: Clan Confucianism in EthnicTujia-Miao Yongshun in Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2001), pp. 7388.


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The Dejiang government was well aware of the unsuitability ofnuoas a unique ethnic cultural marker for the Tujia, but unwilling toabandon their bid for ethnic minority status, chose to misrepresent

the situation to the prefecture authorities by positioning nuo asa suitable marker. The Dejiang government claimed that nuo candifferentiate the highly Han-assimilated Tujia within the countyfrom the real Han outside, as the latter had ceased to practisethe popular religion tradition several centuries ago. Used in this

way, nuo constituted indisputable proof to the prefecture authoritiesthat Dejiang did indeed contain a significant Tujia ethnic minoritypopulation with distinct cultural traditions from the real Han.However, when carrying out the ethnic identification, the Dejiang

government shunned the use of nuo as a cultural marker of Tujiaethnic minority in order to prevent the confusion caused by locals

with different but culturally indistinguishable ethnic origins. In theend, the officials identified the Tujia within the county by using theiroriginally conceived criteria such as surname and dress code, but withan important additional criterion, the length of residency: applicants

were only allowed to reclaim their ethnic minority status if they hadresided within the county for more than 270 years.

The additional requirement on the length of residency was not atrivial addition as it not only excluded recent migrants to the county,

who it was believed would not be able to become local Tujia in so shorta time, but it more importantly provided the Dejiang government

with a mechanism to limit the number of successful applicantsto what they believed would appear reasonable to their prefecturepeers.30 Eventually it was claimed to the prefecture authorities thatnuo had played a major role in the identification of the Tujia, and

through this deliberate misrepresentation ofnuos role in the campaignDejiangs bid for ethnic minority status was subsequently approved,transforming Dejiang county from a Han area with an ethnic minoritypopulation of 0.03 % into an ethnic minority area with an ethnic

30 A similar case can be seen in Enshi, Hubei, which was approved as an autonomousprefecture in 1983 through local governments manipulation of ethnic identity. In thecase, because local officials could not use cultural practices to classify the population,they developed a new method of classification using a combination of surname, theidentity of a familys local ancestral place, and the timing of migration to the localancestral place. See Melissa J. Brown, Local Government AgencyManipulatingTujia Identity in Modern China, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2002), pp. 362395.


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minority population of over 54 %.31 Thirty-four townships within thecounty were subsequently granted the title of Tujia ethnic minoritytownship and received preferential socio-economic policies normally

reserved for autonomous minority counties.32

Contributions to Local Socio-Economic Development and the Political Stabilityof an Ethnic Minority Area

The role nuo had played in the ethnic identification campaignsignificantly altered its position in modern Chinese politics. AsHerberer noted, the Chinese leadership has since 1987 openlyadmitted that there had been very few changes, if any, in the socio-economic conditions in minority regions up until the late 1970s,and that moreover the Cultural Revolution had brought severeoppression to many minority regions throughout the country. Thelong-term results of this dismal state of affairs were not only chroniceconomic and cultural backwardness in minority regions, but also alarge measure of alienation between the Han and the various ethnicminorities.33 The seriousness of the situation eventually arousedthe attention of the CCP, as Li Ruihuan ( ), the member of

the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of 15th CentralCommittee of the Communist Party of China, recognized in hisspeech in the Forum of Personages of Various Circles of EthnicMinority, ethnic work is always a serious issue in our country, as itis closely associated with the unification and stability of the state,economic development, and the consolidation of state defence.34

In order to address the issue of ethnic affairs, the Party-statecreated a set of preferential policies for ethnic minorities, but as the

Party-state was well aware, the successful implementation of thesepolicies is dependent on the success with which the various ethnic

31 Juexu Li (ed), Dejiangxian Minzuzhi (Annals of Dejiang County) (Internal Circular,1993), pp. 173174.

32 Ibid, pp. 181183.33 Thomas Heberer, China and Its National MinoritiesAutonomy or Assimilation?

(Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1989), pp. 67; Chih-yu Shih, Negotiating Ethnicity inChinaCitizenship as a response to the state (London and New York: Routledge, 2002),pp. 14.

34 8 September 1994, in Zhongyang Dangxiao Minzu Zongjiao Lilunshi(Department of Religious Theory of Ethnic Minorities, Party School of the CentralCommittee of the Communist Party of China) (eds),Xinshiqi Minzu Gongzuo XuanchuanShouce (A Publicity Handbook of the Work on Ethnic Religions during the New Era ) (Beijing:Religious Culture Publisher, 1998), pp. 5051.


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minorities could be identified. In the light of such emphasis on ethnicidentification work by the CCP, the importance of nuo claimed bythe Dejiang government in identifying the Tujia greatly elevated the

position of the popular religion in the eyes of the CCP.Moreover, socio-economic development has always been at thecentre of the Party-states strategy for the development of ethnicminorities in the post-Mao era. As Deng Xiaoping phrased it, to judgea minority area is to mainly judge its socio-economic development,35

further stressing that the implementation of autonomy in an ethnicminority region would be an empty phrase if the local economy couldnot be developed.36 Also, from an ideological view-point, the Party-state strategy has also emphasized socio-economic development for

ethnic minorities, as is evident from the following explanation of Party-state strategy:

Devoting major efforts to developing social productive force is the essentialtask of our work on nationalities [ . . . ] [I]t is the basic demand of [the] social-ist system of our country as well as the basic principle of Party-state policy onnationalities that we completely change the backwardness of ethnic minorityareas and gradually realise the common prosperity of all nationalities.37

This strategy formed the ideological framework upon which theParty-state built its preferential policies for ethnic minorities andthese policies, which came into effect in Dejiang county followingits change to an ethnic minority region, allow Dejiang county andother such administrative regions to receive substantially more statefunds for socio-economic development projects than Han regions ofcomparable size. Such regions also enjoy lower rates of taxation, andif the region is deemed especially poor, it then becomes entitled toreceive additional financial aid in the form of a Subsistence Fund

for Poor Minority Areas. In addition, the area is prioritized for thereceiving of state loans, essential materials, and other goods.38 In

35 See Zhongyang Dangxiao Minzu Zongjiao Lilunshi (Department of ReligiousTheory of Ethnic Minorities, Party School of the Central Committee of the CommunistParty of China) (eds), Xinshiqi Minzu Gongzuo Xuanchuan Shouce (A Publicity Handbook

of the Work on Ethnic Religions during the New Era) (Beijing: Religious Culture Publisher,1998), p. 213.

36 Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected Works on Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing:Peoples Publisher, 1994), p. 167.

37 Zhongyang Dangxiao Minzu Zongjiao Lilunshi (Department of Religious Theoryof Ethnic Minorities, Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Partyof China) (eds), Xinshiqi Minzu Gongzuo Xuanchuan Shouce (A Publicity Handbook of theWork on Ethnic Religions during the New Era), p. 216.

38 Ibid, p. 265.


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accordance with these policies, Dejiang county has been allocated467,000 RMB of extra state funds per annum, which has been used toimprove local services and infrastructure such as the construction of

roads, bridges, water conservation facilities as well as education andpublic health facilities.39

The role of nuo in consolidating the CCPs political control overethnic minority areas and helping to implement the CCPs statedgoals of directing ethnic socio-economic development has madenuo no longer politically opposite to the regime as a feudalistsuperstition and oppressed, but consistent with Party-states goalof constructing The Four Modernisations40 in the new era andthereby openly supported by government officials. This led to the

more intensive research cooperation between the Dejiang Nationality Affairs Committee and the Institute for Nationalities Studies,Guizhou Nationalities College, by which a completely new valueof nuo was discovered and, as discussed below, nuos situation wasunexpectedly further changed in terms of its relationship with post-Maos ideology and its cultural policies.

Nuo as A Living Fossil of Primitive Culture

Nuos rise to prominence in north-east Guizhou brought it much out-side attention, particularly from Chinese academics who, influencedby the evolutionary theory of Marxism, were keen to find examples ofa living fossil of ancient culture. The effects of this period of intenseinterest in nuo cannot be understated, for not only did it provide localgovernment with an opportunity to transform nuo into local culturalbrand to promote regional publicity and explore new commercialopportunities at a local level, but it also brought nuo much supportand praise from top-ranking officials within the Central Committeeof the CCPan unprecedented occurrence in a Socialist country.

The Evolutionary Classification of Ethnic Minorities

One of the fundamental preoccupations of Chinese nuo studies hasbeen the study of historical and evolutionary processes. Traditionally,

39 Juexu Li (eds), Dejiangxian Minzuzhi (Annals of Dejiang County) (Internal Circular,1993), pp. 262263.

40 In December 1978 at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee,Deng Xiaoping announced the official launch of the Four Modernizations, namely,

Agriculture, Industry, National Defence, and Science and Technology.


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the study of history in China has been undertaken to guidecontemporary decision-making, and for centuries political leadershave been careful about keeping meticulous records of important

events and daily life in their imperial state. This historical traditionin Chinese scholarship was strengthened to a great extent by Marxistperspectives after the communist revolution. In one of the branchesof Marxist thought, evolutionary theory was used to explain astage-by-stage process in the social development of society, which

was seen to move from primitive communism, to slave society, tofeudalism, to capitalism, and finally to the modern communist utopia.This approach, as Maurice Bloch rightly points out, developed anevolutionary theory for political purposes.41 When Marx and Engels

considered history and evolutionary processes, they were interested inwhat led to the transformation of one social system into another, andin what led to the breakup of the past systems.42 Therefore, studiesof history and evolution intended to show how capitalism and itsinstitutions have been produced by history and how they will thereforebe destroyed by history.43 Moreover, it aimed to show how the beliefsand values which organize our society are produced by the history ofthe social formation.44

In interpreting Marxist thinking, Chinese scholars saw it as a re-affirmation of the importance of historical reconstruction as a guideto current social processes. Thus, the Marxist evolutionary approachbecame a sacred doctrine dominating Chinese academic circles forabout four decades. During this period, the notion was adopted thatthe development of human history proceeds everywhere in distinctstages, and since each of these stages consists of a complex of relatedcultural traits, it follows that peoples who display certain sorts of

culture traits must be representative of the particular stage in whichthose traits occur.45 The adoption of this evolutionary theory of socialdevelopment drove contemporary Chinese scholars to attempt toapply Stalins definition of the nationality and five-stage theory

41 Maurice Bolch,Marxism and Anthropology (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1987),p. 31.

42 Ibid, p. 9.43 Ibid, p. 27.44 Ibid. p. 27.45 Stevan Harrell, Introduction in Stevan Harrell (eds), Cultural Encounters on

Chinas Ethnic Frontiers (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1994),p. 16.


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of social systems to Chinese social situation,46 and this created apreoccupation with the evolutionary classification of ethnic minorities.

As a result, much contemporary ethnographic evidence was distorted,

in order that it might fit the various stages of social evolution definedby the evolutionary framework.47 One of the examples mentioned byMcKhann is the sexual relationship zouhun ( , walking marriage)practised among the Mosuo in Yunnan province, in which differentmen may visit and stay overnight with a particular woman, but neverco-habitat with the woman or share custody of any children that areborn from the relationship, who are strictly raised in their mothershousehold. The zouhun is held to represent an evolutionary stageonly slightly more advanced than that characterized by Morganshypothesized consanguine familywhat Chinese authors call groupmarriage.48

The Transition from Religion to Culture

For above mentioned reasons one of the dominant approaches to thestudy ofnuo has been the investigation of the origins and evolutionaryprocesses of the tradition and its constituent elements. For these

scholars nuo was a living fossil of primitive culture,49 particularlyancient drama,50 and thereby worthy of preservation.51 As Holmsuggested, anyone who has read any of the increasingly voluminousliterature from scholars in China on the subject of nuoxi ( , nuo

46 Nicholas Tapp, Chinese Anthropology in Jonathan Spencer (eds), Encyclopaediaof Social and Cultural Anthropology (London and New York: Routledge,1996), pp. 9596;See also Thomas Heberer, Ethnic Enterpreneurship and Ethnic Identity: A case studyamong the Liangshan Yi (Nuosu) in China in The China Quarterly, Vol. 182 (2005),p. 409.

47 Charles F. McKhann, The Naxi and the Nationalities Question in StevanHarrell (eds), Cultural Encounters on Chinas Ethnic Frontiers (Seattle and London:University of Washington Press, 1994), pp. 3962.

48 Ibid, p. 43.49 Lan Li, Yuanshi Wenhua de HuohuashiZhonguo Nuo wenhua Pingjie (The

Living Fossil of Primitive CultureAn introduction to Chinese nuo culture) inGuangming Ribao (Guangming Daily), 3 June, 1990.

50 Liuyi Qu, Zhongguo Geminzu Nuoxi de Fenlei, Tezheng Jiqi Huohuashi Jiazhi(Characteristics, Classification and Value of Living Fossil of Nuo Drama amongthe Chinese Nationalities) in Xiuming Tuo, Puguang Gu, Tinghua Luo, ZhenguoLiu (eds), Zhongguo Nuo Wenhua Lunwen Xuan (Selected Essays on Chinese Nuo Culture)(Guiyang: Guizhou Nationalities Press, 1989), pp. 121.

51 See Tim Oakes, Tourism and Modernity in China (London and New York: Routledge,1998), pp. 188189. The dixi which was proclaimed as a living fossil worthy ofpreservation is thought to be a form ofnuo prevailing in Anshun, Guizhou.


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drama) today will know that these forms of performance are usuallydescribed as living fossils and their origins traced back to the nuoritual of classical times.52 For example, Professor Feng Qiyong ( ),

then the Vice President of the Academy of Chinese Arts commented:Nuo drama and its masks are valuable discoveries of ancient culture.They have encapsulated and preserved a unique ancient culture sorepresentatively, integrally, and systematically that their importance canbe compared with that of the recent important discoveries in archaeology.53

Qu Liuyi ( ), the Chairman of the Chinese Association for NuoDrama Studies, defined three contemporary religious rituals foundin Guizhou Province as nuo rituals and classified them from an

evolutionary perspective with the conclusion that they representedthree different stages of development in Chinese ancient religiousdramas.54 Cao Yu ( ), then Chairman of the Chinese Dramatist

Association regarded nuo ritual, particularly its drama play, as capableof supplying many of the missing pieces of evidence in the evolutionaryprocess of Chinese drama and therefore concluded that: The historyof Chinese drama should be re-written.55

What all these works had in common was a distinct emphasis on

the value ofnuo as a living representation of ancient Chinese culture,and that as such nuo can aid scholars in reconstructing the history ofChinese culture. These works do not take into account, however, theconstant re-invention of nuo over time, to the extent that nuo as itis practised by ethnic minorities today is greatly different from thatpractised by the Han people of the past.

In ancient times, nuo was strictly a rite of exorcism that wascharacterized by singing and dancing, as well as the wearing of masksrepresenting the gods, who were believed to be able to drive awayevil spirits with their supernatural powers.56 This form of nuo ritualbegan to change, however, first during the Song Dynasty (9601279

AD) when additional drama elements were introduced, and then againduring the Ming and Qing Dynasties following the decline of nuo and

52 David Holm, The Death of Tiaoxi (the Leaping Play): Ritual Theatre in theNorthwest of China in Modern Asian Studies, 37, 4 (2003): 863884.

53 Hualin Li (eds), Dejiang Nuotangxi ( Nuotangxi in Dejiang) (Guiyang: GuizhouNationalities Press, 1993), p. 14.

54 Ibid.55 Ibid.56 Deng Guanghua, Nuo-Culture and Music: Traces of Chinese Primitive Music in

Nuoyi and Nuoxi in Music Performance, Vol. 2 (1998), pp. 4151.


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its subsequent re-location from central China into ethnic minorityareas in the south-west. The assimilation and re-invention of nuo bydifferent ethnic minorities led to a major branching in its development

and created a set of distinct forms of the popular religion.

57

Innorth-east Guizhou where Dejiang county is situated, for example,the common local religious practise of vow making and redeemingto a pair of ancient ancestors became incorporated into local nuorituals, which consequently became a combination of exorcism, dramaplay and vow-making and redeeming to the gods, known as chongnuo

huanyuan ( ) today. Moreover, the re-invention ofnuo continuesin contemporary China: for example, the nuo drama Gansheng Gankao( ) was recreated by adding various episodes drawn from local

peoples contemporary lives. These new episodes reflect the localpeoples concerns about the marriage crises caused by the recent waveof migration as well as expressing their criticism of the issue.58

As such a living and dynamic religion, nuo could never serve as theliving fossil of primitive culture by which past cultural traditions maybe re-constructed. However, the focus on the cultural aspects of nuoand the wide-scale recognition accorded to these works by Chineseacademics at the time shifted the focus of studies on nuo from its roots

as a form of religion to its manifestation in culture. The term nuoculture was coined by Tao Lifan ( ) in his article A PreliminaryStudy onNuo Culture published in1987, in which he justifies his use ofthe term by pointing to nuos cultural values in history, folklore, history

57 In contemporary ethnic minority areas in south-west China, various forms ofnuo can be seen, such as shigongxi in Guangxi, guansuoxi in Yunnan, dixi and nuotangxiin Guizhou. See Yuezhen Gu, Cong Gunuo Dao Shigongxi (From Ancient Nuoto Shigongxi) and Feng Gu, Yizhi Dute er Xiyou de NuoxiGuansuoxi (A Uniqueand Valuable Nuo DramaGuansuoxi) in Xiuming Tuo, Puguang Gu, Tinghua Luo,Zhenguo Liu (eds), Zhongguo Nuo Wenhua Lunwen Xuan (Selected Essays on Chinese NuoCulture) (Guiyang: Guizhou Nationalities Press, 1989), pp. 256264 and pp. 265280respectively; Fuxin Shen, Anshun Dixi de Xingcheng he Fazhan (The Formationand Development of Dixi in Anshun) and Xiuming Tuo, Gupu de Xiju, Youqu deMianjuGuizhousheng Dejiangxian Tujiazu Diqu de Nuotangxi (Ancient Dramaand Interesting MaskNuotangxi in the Tujia Area of Dejiang, Guizhou) in XiumingTuo, Puguang Gu, Chaolin Pan (eds), Nuoxi Lunwen Xuan (Selected Essays on Nuo

Drama) (Guiyang: Guizhou Nationalities Press, 1987), pp. 125137 and pp. 193210 respectively.

58 Li Shihong, Dejiang Nuotangxi de Fenlei yu Tese (Classification andCharacteristics of the Nuotangxi in Dejiang) in Qu Liuyi & Chen Xinda (eds), NuoYuanZhongguo Fanjingshan Nuowenhua Yantaohui Lunwenji (Nuo GardenSelected Essays

of Chinas Fanjingshan International Conference on Nuo Culture) (Beijing: China DramaPublisher, 2004), p. 249.


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and epistemology.59 This view gained the acceptance and endorsementof Chinese academics through a number of books emphasizing thecultural aspect of nuo,60 and also through organisations such as the

Chinese Association for Nuo Drama Studies (Zhongguo Nuoxi Xuehui), established in 1988 for the purposes of promoting nuo

culture. In 1993 the Department of Culture of Guizhou provincialgovernment officially granted Dejiang County the title Hometown of

Nuo Drama (Nuoxi Zhixiang ), again highlighting the culturalaspect of nuo. Moreover, exhibitions on nuo culture were held twicebetween 1987 and 1990 in the capital Beijing in which nuo masks,books, tools, and paintings were displayed and some excerpts of nuodrama were performed.

A Religion to Support the Official Atheist Marxist Ideology

The most important consequence of this change of focus on nuo from itsreligious to its cultural aspects was that the only major opposition fromParty-states official ideology had now been removed, for post-Maoideologues make it clear that religion is an inseparable part of culture.

As Luo Zhufeng writes in his book Religion under Socialism in China:

We hold that religion, as a social substance, is not only an ideology but alsoa form of culture, a social grouping, a social community of definite economicsubstance. We must, of course, engage in a comprehensive multidisciplinarystudy of this multi-structured religious phenomenon in order to make ourunderstanding conform to the reality of religion.61

When religion is viewed as a cultural phenomenon, as FenggangYang puts it, its ideological incorrectness becomes unimportant and

59 Lifan Tao, Nuo Wenhua Chuyi (A Preliminary Study on Nuo Culture), inXiuming Tuo, Puguang Gu, Chaolin Pan (ed.), Nuoxi Lunwen Xuan (Selected Essays on

Nuo Drama) (Guiyang: Guizhou Nationalities Press, 1987), pp. 1428.60 Such as Hengfu Wang (eds),Nuo, Nuoxi, Nuo Wenhua (Nuo, Nuo Drama, Nuo Culture)

(Beijing:Culture andArts Publisher,1989); Xiuming Tuo, Puguang Gu, Tinghua Luo,Zhenguo Liu (eds), Zhongguo Nuo Wenhua Lunwen Xuan (Selected Essays on Chinese NuoCulture) (Guiyang: Guizhou Nationalities Press, 1989); Xiusong Wu, (eds), Tongren

Nuo Wenhua Wenji (Selected Essays on the Nuo Culture in Tongren Prefecture) (InternalCircular,1993); Yuehong Chen, Jianxin Xu, Yinyu Qian,Zhongguo Nuo Wenhua (Chinas

Nuo Culture) (Beijing: Xinhua Publisher, 1991); Liuyi Qu, Fu Qian, Zhongguo NuoWenhua Tonglun ( A General Study on Chinese Nuo Culture) (Taibei: Taiwan StudentPublisher, 2003).

61 Zhufeng Luo, Religion under Socialism in China (London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991),p. 155.


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its scientific incorrectness obscure, eliminating two key criticisms ofreligion by the militant and scientific atheisms respectively.62

Inthecaseofnuo, not only has the new view of the religion eliminated

its two key criticisms, but it has now placed the religion in a position where it can be viewed as supporting the official atheist Marxistideology. As a living fossil of primitive culture, it provides evidence forthe evolutionary theory of society and thereby supports the legitimacyof the CCPs regime by offering a rational explanation for its existence.Since imperial times, popular religion has invariably stood opposed tothe official ideology of Confucianism. Although Confucianism andthe heavily Confucianism-influenced imperial ideology have neveradvocated a state of atheism,63 popular religion has previously at

best been tolerated by governments that were only too aware ofits opposition to their official ideology and as a potential source ofrebellion against the state.64 This chief antagonism has only growndeeper with the rise of the CCP and its Marxist ideology. In morerecent times popular religion had been banned and labelled feudalistpoisonous weeds during the Cultural Revolution, and even afterChina initiated its open door policy in the late 1970s, popularreligion remained a non-institutionalized and therefore illegal form

of religion.65In a complete reversal of their historical positions here, it is Party-

state ideology that grants nuo its right to exist. This helps nuo sustaincriticism from Communist ideologues and gain open encouragementof high-ranking authorities. Since nuo became a living fossil ofancient culture, no one has ever mentioned its remaining elements offeudalist superstition and nuo has been given the highly prestigioustitle of invaluable treasure of national culture, a transition that

has elevated its status considerably. This newly-acquired enthusiasm

62 Fenggang Yang, Between Secularist Ideology and Desecularising Reality: TheBirth And Growth of Religious Research in Communist China in Sociology of Religion,

Vol. 65, No. 2 (2004), p. 108.63 See Julian Pas, Introduction: Chinese Religion in Transition in Julian Pas (eds),

The Turning of the Tide: Religion in China Today (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1989),p. 5.

64 C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society (Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1961),pp. 218224.

65 Stephan Feuchtwang and Wang Ming-ming, The Politics of Culture or a Contestof Histories: Representations of Chinese popular religion in Dialectical Anthropology,16 (1991), pp. 251272; Pitman B. Potter, Belief in Control: Regulation of Religionin China in Religion in China TodayThe China Quarterly Special Issues, New Series, No. 3(2003), pp. 1131.


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for nuo is most striking when it is seen coming from high-rankingofficials, who have since then turned out in great numbers to attend

various nuo exhibitions and opening ceremonies. For example, during

the late 1980s and early 1990s the Vice-Chairman of the ChinesePeoples Political Consultative Conference, Yang Jingren ( ), cutthe ribbon in the opening ceremony of the Exhibition on GuizhousNational and Folk Nuo Mask.66 Similarly, when the Tongren NuoPerforming Team visited Shenzhen, many high-ranking Party officials

were present at the display, including the Premier of the State Council,Li Peng ( ), his deputy Tian Jiyun ( ), and the Deputy Chairmanof the Standing Committee of the Chinese Peoples National Congress,

Ji Pengfei ( ).67

Such unprecedented endorsement of a popular religion from theupper echelons of central government is not only attributed to thechange of focus on nuo from its religious to its cultural aspects, butmore importantly, the position it places where it can be viewed assupporting the official atheist Marxist ideology. However, it should bestressed that such role-change does not necessarily ensure that nuois completely shielded from political suppression. The CCPs long-standing fear of any religious organization or activity that it does not

control forces all forms of religion to fit state-defined criteria and avoidpolitics.68Nuo practitioners, as the case of Zoupings Christians stud-ied by Kipnis, have never undertaken any explicitly political activitiesas Fa Lun Gong practitioners did.69 For local governments, focusing onthe cultural aspects of the popular religion ofnuo is socio-economically,rather than politically, important as it will open the door for thecommercial exploitation ofnuo as a local cultural attraction targetingboth tourists and investors (zhaoshang yinzi ).70 The preoccu-

pation of local governments with local socio-economic development

66 Hualin Li (eds), Dejiang Nuotangxi ( Nuotangxi in Dejiang) (Guiyang: GuizhouNationalities Press, 1993), p. 14.

67 Lihua Pan, Tongren Nuowenhua Kaifa Xianzhuang Jiqi Sikao (The CurrentSituation and Development ofNuo Culture in Tongren) in Wu Xiusong, (eds), Tongren

Nuo Wenhua Wenji (Selected Essays on the Nuo Culture in Tongren Prefecture) (InternalCircular, 1993), p. 5.

68 F. Ying, A Reading of the Mutual Collaboration between Religion and ChineseSocialism (in Chinese) in Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences, 9

(1997

):961991.

69 Ibid.70 For such strategy of local government, also see Tim Oakes, Tourism and Modernity

in China (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 222; Tan Chee-Beng, Tourismand the Anthropology in China in Tan Chee-Beng, Sidney C. H. Cheung and YangHui, (eds), Tourism, Anthropology and China (Bangkok: White Lotus Press,2001),p. 189.


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has helped many popular religions such as nuo maintain an apoliticalimage.71

Conclusion

Since the early1980s, Chinas rapid economic growth and profoundsocial transformation have greatly changed the role of popular religionin modern Chinese politics. In the case of nuo these changes havebeen directly responsible for the incorporation of the popular religioninto the implementation of Party-states policy on ethnic minorityand provision of the evidence to support the legitimacy of the CCPs

regime. Such a prominent change of roles is the direct result oflocal governments manipulation of popular religion for the purposesof promoting local socio-economic development and the centralgovernments pragmatic attitude towards religion. The case study ofnuo indicates that the flourishing of Chinese popular religion in thecurrent post-Mao regime is not only attributed to the CCPs relaxedpolicy over religion and the position popular religion stands in aidingthe development of local economy, but also to the positive role it plays

in modern Chinese politics. Such a political role is unprecedentedin Chinese history in the sense that popular religion has long beenopposite to official ideology, in both the imperial and communistregime, and it has never been in a better position to be toleratedby the ruling regime.

71 See Andrew B. Kipnis, The Flourishing of Religion in Post-Mao China and theAnthropological Category of Religion in The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 12, 1(2005): 3246; Mickey Spiegel, Control and Containment in the Reform Era in

Jason Kindopp and Carol Lee Hamrin (eds), God and Casar in China (Washington, DC:Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 3246.

2011 Changing Role of Popular Religion of Nuo in Modern Chinese Politics

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