1992 Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World_A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN

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Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of theRelevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)Author(s): Amitav AcharyaReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb., 1992), pp. 7-21Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/423875 .

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? Journal of Peace Research, vol. 29, no. 1, 1992, pp. 7-21

Regional Military-SecurityCooperationin theThirdWorld:A Conceptual Analysis of theRelevance and Limitationsof ASEAN(Association of SoutheastAsian Nations)

AMITAVACHARYA

Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore

In the Third World, regional military-security cooperation has evolved through three frameworks. The

advent of the Cold War saw the emergence of two competing frameworks, one of which may be termed

'autonomous' and the other, 'hegemonic'. A review of these frameworks and their practicalmanifestations

pointsto some

importantlessons

concerningthe limitations of

regional military-securitycooperation in the Third World. By using these lessons as a conceptual framework, the paper analysesthe role of ASEAN, which the paper finds as a third framework in the evolutionary adaptation of

regional military-security cooperation in the Third World. Within this framework, the four main criteria

of evaluation applied to ASEAN are: (1) ASEAN's role in intra-member conflict resolution, (2) the

structure of military-security cooperation within ASEAN, (3) the types of military-security cooperationundertaken by the ASEAN members, and (4) the conflict between ASEAN's professed aspirations for

regional autonomy versus the need felt by its members for great power security guarantees. On the basis

of such an evaluation, the paper establishes the major features and limitations of ASEAN and examines

whether these are similar to some other contemporary subregional groupings in the Third World

groupings.

1. Introduction

Military-security cooperation is one of the

least pronounced and effective aspects of

regionalism among Third World countries,

despite the emergence of many security-oriented regional organizations and insti-

tutions in the Third World. In the early

post-Second World War era, two conceptsof regionalism, which evolved parallel to

each other, provided the basic and contend-

ing frameworks for such cooperation: the

'autonomous' framework and the 'hegemo-

nic' framework. The distinction between thetwo was based upon the extent of depen-dence of a regional grouping on the security

guarantee offered by a hegemonic GreatPower. In the Third World context, 'auton-

omous' regional groups were those inspiredby anti-colonialism and nonalignment.Thus, the Arab League and the Organiz-ation of African Unity (OAU) fell into this

category because they emerged from theanti-colonial struggles of their membersand emphasized the principles of national

self-determination and regional collectiveself-assertion against the outside world

(Boutros-Ghali, 1975).The threat

posed bythe escalating superpower rivalry also

prompted these regional groups to acceptnonalignment as the basic norm of theirinternational conduct. The advocates ofautonomous regionalism stipulated that

regional arrangements should comprisestates with roughly equal power and

resources, avoid entanglement in GreatPower rivalry, and devote attention andresources to socio-economic and culturalissues (Panikkar, 1946, p. 4).

The concept of hegemonic regionalism,on the other hand, stressed the need forclose security dependence of Third Worldstates on the Great Powers of the day.George Liska's theory of 'Great Power

Orbits' contains a powerful advocacy ofsuch a concept. According to Liska:

... regional groupings of small states ought to clus-

ter around the local Great Power and pool military,economic, and other resources in peace and in war.. . The smaller communities ... stand to gain bytransferring to stronger hands the chief responsi-bility for organizing regional security and the GreatPowers would also profit from having dependable



8 AmitavAcharya

allies within their strategic area (Liska, 1973, p.236).

Of the two, the autonomous groupsplaced relatively little emphasis on devel-

oping military-security cooperation. Their

major role concerned the pacific settlementof intra-regional disputes and political oppo-sition to Great Power rivalry and interven-tion. Although the Arab League and theOAU did aspire to a collective security role

against commonly identified threats, par-ticularly Israel in the case of the League,neither had much success in this area

(MacDonald, 1965; Meyers, 1975). In fact

the failure of the League to develop itsmilitary-security cooperation mechanism

against Israel was a point made by the advo-cates of the hegemonic framework in

making their case against the autonomousalternative.

Thus, Liska argued that while the 'basic

ground rule for alliance for any kind ofstate' is aggregation of power, in the case ofassociations among Third World countries,'the aggregation is more likely to be one of

weaknesses, compounded bythe non-com-

plimentary nature of assets and the diver-

gent nature of interests and apprehensionsunder stress' (Liska, 1968, pp. 50-54).According to Liska, '. . . while busy asso-

ciating among themselves, the less devel-

oped countries may continue to derive theirreal security, both internal and exter-

nal, from markedly unintegrated and even

merely de facto alliances with extraregionalgreat powers ...' (Liska, 1968, pp. 50-54).Given that most Third World countries tend

to be weak both as states and as powers,realist arguments against non-hegemonic orweak state/power alliances are relevant to

assessing the prospect for military-securitycooperation in the Third World. Thus, Han-del argues that 'when the weak states chooseto align among themselves ... [T]heirdefence costs rise while the efficiency and

reliabiity of their security declines'. The taskof military and political coordination amonga large group of weak states becomes par-ticularly difficult, for technical, logistical

and doctrinal reasons, and because of 'hier-archies of interest, conflicting priorities, and

competition for leadership and influencewithin the alliance' (Handel, 1981, pp.154-156).

The theoreticalpositions

takenby

Liskaand Handel, however, come unstuck whenone looks at the fate of the two 'ideal types'of Third World alliances within GreatPower Orbits which emerged as a directresult of the spread of the Cold War to theThird World: the Southeast Asia Treaty Or-

ganization (SEATO) and the Central TreatyOrganization (CENTO). The credibility and

longevity of these alliances were under-mined by two crucial problems not foreseen

by the advocates of hegemonic regionalism.

First, they were unable to live up to Liska'sexpectation concerning the congruence of

strategic perception between the GreatPower sponsors and their Third Worldclients. In the case of SEATO, its ThirdWorld members (such as Pakistan, the Phi-

lippines and Thailand) saw threats emanat-

ing from within their boundaries and neigh-bouring states as the chief objective of their

security, the alliance of which they were

part was largely driven by the larger 'sys-temic' security concern of their Great Power

patrons for whom the primary objective wasto contain the expansionist drive of theSoviet Union and China. In general, suchalliances relying on the resources of anexternal power were not appropriate deter-rents against internally generated threats totheir Third World client-members, whichhad roots in the socio-economic imbalancesand political cultures of their societies.

Second, the Cold War alliances were ren-dered obsolete by a rapidly changing stra-

tegic environment in the 1960s. The adventof superpower detente and domestic oppo-sition in Western countries to interventionabroad raised questions over the credibilityof the security guarantees underlying thesealliances (Feldman, 1981). In the context of

CENTO, Lenczowski has pointed out that it

'either did not quite fit the new political con-ditions of the world, or had disappointed itsAsian members by failing to give them

adequate assurances and guarantees' (Lenc-zowski, 1980, p. 161). The same applies to

SEATO, which also became rapidly defunctby the early 1970s. While two of the regional



Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World 9

members of SEATO opted for a more

'autonomous' regional security framework

by pushing for the establishment of

ASEAN, the members of CENTO, con-vinced of the limited utility of the alliance inthe field of defence, sought to move it to-

wards regional socio-economic cooperation(Ramazani, 1966, p. 122).

Thus, neither autonomous regional

groups nor hegemonic alliances have provento be a viable basis for regional military-security cooperation in the Third World.Their experience points to some interestinglessons regarding the conditions of, and

prospect for, military-security cooperation

in the Third World. At least four majorlessons can be identified.

1. Intra-member Conflict Resolution:

military-security cooperation undertaken

by a regional group cannot thrive unless the

group is also attentive to the task of intra-

regional conflict resolution. The two US-

sponsored Cold War alliances were far moreconcerned with external issues that relatedmore to the threat perceptions of theirGreat Power patrons than with the task of

resolving disputes that divided their

membership. This was a major factor in theineffectiveness and irrelevance of these

groups. As Miller points out:

. . . had it been possible (not that it was even

seriously attempted) to make these organizationsinstruments for the settlement of regional problems,these organizations might, over time, have solidi-fied Western ties to these areas . . . instead of

becoming moribund (Miller, 1973, p. 62).

2. Structure of Military-Security Cooper-

ation: Third World states are likely to facemajor problems in developing formal insti-tutions to operationalize military-securitycooperation. This was evident in the case ofboth the continental groups and the ColdWar alliances. Their attempts to build inte-

grative mechanisms to link the militaryestablishments of their member states were

largely unsuccessful. The League developed

only a nominal integrative structure (Said,1986, pp. 258-259), while the OAU had

difficulty in generating resources for even a

peace-keeping force (Imobighe, 1980; Luck-ham, 1985, p. 321; Meyers, 1975; Sesay,

1989). The hegemonic alliances fared little

better; SEATO especially had minimal

organizational links among its members

(Brecher, 1973, p. 376). Most members ofthe League and the OAU have been wary of

committing themselves to intra-regionalsecurity obligations, due mainly to theirlimited resources, different levels of militarycapability, divergent threat perceptions, and

incongruent political and security interests.3. Forms of Military-Security Cooper-

ation: An agenda of military-security coop-eration within Third World regional groups,in order to be realistic and relevant, has toaddress intrastate threats to regional actors

as much as external military threats. Themix of security problems faced by ThirdWorld states is weighted heavily in favour ofthose arising within their domestic sphere(Ayoob, 1986; Azar & Moon, 1988; Buzan,

1988). As Ayoob has argued, many so-called external threats to Third World stateswould be 'quite ineffective if internal threatsand domestic fissures did not exist' (Ayoob,1986, p. 8). Neither the autonomous groupsnor the hegemonic alliances were concernedwith intrastate threats, and the limited in-volvement of the former in intrastate con-flict resolution was almost totally ineffective

(Nye, 1971, ch. 5). The autonomous groupswere constrained by regional norms which

prohibited external, including a regionalgroup's, interference in intrastate conflicts,even in a mediation role (unless such con-flicts spilled over state boundaries). In thecase of the Cold War alliances, their pri-mary orientation, as noted earlier, was

largely external, be it direct aggression or

externally aided subversion.4. Autonomy versus Dependence: WhileThird World states might be unable toundertake effective military-security coop-eration due to their lack of 'power', depen-dence on Great Power security guaranteeswithin alliance frameworks is not necessarilythe ideal way to achieve security. Two of thebasic problems with Third World securityand defence associations within Great

Power orbits have been identified by Yalem:

(1) the difference in power and resources of

the Great Power and its regional allies, andthe consequent opportunity for and 'the



10 Amitav Acharya

tendency of great powers to manipulate andcontrol their lesser allies', and (2) the con-flict between the 'global' interests of the

Great Power and its ability to concentrateits superior military and economic resourceswithin one region on the one hand, and the

regional security environment where threatscould be indigenous in origin on the other

(Yalem, 1973, p. 225).With the decline of the two original

frameworks of military-security cooper-ation, the Third World states have searchedfor alternatives. In this respect, one signifi-cant development is the emergence of anumber of 'subregional' or 'micro-regional'

groups (Ispahani, 1984, pp. 152-153). Anumber of them have developed a relativelystrong security role which has included mili-

tary-security cooperation undertaken on abilateral and multilateral basis among their

membership. These groupings include theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations, the

Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organiz-ation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).The Front Line States (FLS) in SouthernAfrica had developed such cooperation in

the 1980s and the EconomicCommunity

ofWest African States (ECOWAS) has

recently shown a collective security functionwith its intervention in Liberia. Together, ina sense, these groups represent a new stagein the 'evolutionary adaptation' of regional-ism in the Third World. While the first stagein the evolution was dominated by the

peace-making role of the autonomousframework and the alliance role of hegemo-nic framework, the regionalism embodied in

groupings such as ASEAN is marked by a

preference for narrow geographic scope aswell as a more specific security agenda,aimed at developing a political and military

approach against a particular conflict intheir geostrategic neighbourhood, ratherthan espouse general ideological objectivesand the principle of regional autonomy(Brown, 1986, p. 213).

Of the newer subregional groups, the

ASEAN is generally regarded as the mostsuccessful experiment in regional cooper-ation in the Third World. Yet, ASEAN has

not formally promoted military-security co-operation among its members on a regional

basis. Instead of constituting an alliance,ASEAN members have cooperated exten-

sively on military-security issues on a bilat-

eral basis. Over the years, these bilateralties have developed into an overlapping and

interlocking network. As such, a strong casecan be made that bilateral cooperationundertaken within the regional grouping canno longer be excluded from any discussionof ASEAN's overall political and securityrole, even though there is no formal

approach to collective security within theASEAN regionalist framework (Weather-bee, 1984).

It is this aspect of ASEAN which sets it

apart from the two earlier frameworks ofregional military-security cooperation. Italso sets the context for a closer scrutinyof military-security cooperation withinASEAN in terms of the four lessons derivedfrom the experience of the autonomous and

hegemonic frameworks. Such an exercisewould be useful in establishing whetherASEAN constitutes a distinctive and poten-tially more viable approach to regionalmilitary-security cooperation than the twoearlier frameworks.

2. ASEAN and Intra-Regional ConflictASEAN came into being in 1967 largely asthe result of a desire of its five originalmembers (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,

Singapore and the Philippines; Brunei

joined the group in 1984) to create a mech-anism which could contribute to peace and

stability in intra-regional relations. The

original goal of ASEAN was certainly not to

form a military pact but to act as an instru-ment for the prevention and resolution of

disputes among its members. The need forsuch a mechanism was urgent. The ASEANstates were involved in a number of serious

disputes which had led to armed conflictsbetween Indonesia and Malaysia (Indone-sian leader Sukarno's confrontation policy),war-like tensions between Singapore on theone hand and Malaysia and Indonesia on

the other (over Singapore's separation from

Malaysia and the distrust of Chinese-domi-

nated Singapore by its Malay neighbours)and a similar situation between Malaysia




and the Philippines (over the latter's claim than formal, institutional mechanisms. Asto Malaysia's Sabah province). In this light, Jorgensen-Dahl observes:

... the establishment of ASEAN may be regardedas a consummation of the peaceful settlement of an

international dispute, the confrontation between

Indonesia and Malaysia. By fostering unity and soli-

darity through regional cooperation in various fieldswithin the framework of ASEAN, the memberstates will attempt to prevent, contain, and bypeaceful means solve any further intra-regional con-flict among themselves. In so doing they will be able

to avoid any possible external interference that maythreaten their security (Djiwandono, 1988, p. 539).

ASEAN has specified a set of norms to

govern the conduct of inter-member rela-tions, and has established procedures andinstitutions for conflict management andcontrol. The norms2 have been enumeratedin two major documents: the 1967 BangkokDeclaration announcing ASEAN's creationand the Treaty of Amity and Cooperationsigned at the first-ever summit meeting ofASEAN leaders held in Bali in 1976. The

following five norms taken from the 1976document are especially relevant to assess-

ingASEAN's contribution to

regionalcon-

flict resolution: (1) 'Mutual respect for the

independence, sovereignty, territorial integ-rity of all nations'; (2) 'The right of everystate to lead its national existence free fromexternal interference, subversion and co-

ercion'; (3) 'Non-interference in the internalaffairs of one another'; (4) 'Settlement ofdifferences and disputes by peaceful means';and (5) 'Renunciation of the threat of use offorce' (Thongswasdi, 1979, p. 123).

Insofar as procedures and institutions of

conflict resolution are concerned, ASEANstates have instead relied on 'using the pro-cedures of discussion and accommodation at

high political levels' to settle their conflicts

(Pathmanathan, 1978, p. 20). This role wasmost seriously tested in the case of the

Malaysian-Philippines dispute over Sabah

(Lau, no date). Admittedly, such consul-tations have been useful tools for buildingconfidence and trust among the ASEANstates and in this respect the psychologicaland political aspects of ASEAN, the so-

called 'ASEAN spirit', have been moreuseful to intra-ASEAN dispute settlement

ASEAN served a useful purpose by providing aframework within which the parties could discusstheir differences in a 'neutral' atmosphere . . . The

multilateral framework allowed the parties toremain in contact in circumstances which either hadcaused a collapse of bilateral channels or placedthese channels under such stress that they could no

longer function properly. ... Through the steadilyincreasing scope and range of its activities, ... it

produced among government officials of the five,attitudes which were much more receptive andsensitive to each other's peculiar problems, andwhich made compromise solutions to conflictinginterests a much more likely outcome than before. . the multilateral

settingserved to

discourageextreme behaviour, modify extravagant demands,and inspire compromise (Jorgensen-Dahl, 1980,

pp. 56-57).

ASEAN's contribution in muting inter-member rivalries has benefited from threatsto regional stability commonly perceived byits members, especially the challenge posedby the communist victories in Indochina andthe threat of Vietnamese expansionism. Butthese challenges also confronted ASEANwith another issue of conflict management,that of finding a solution to the Cambodiaconflict (Chan, 1980). ASEAN played a

leading role in defining the terms of thedebate concerning a possible conflict settle-ment with initiatives such as playing hostto formal and informal dialogues betweenthe rival Cambodia factions (the series ofJakarta Informal Meetings) (Acharya et al.,

1991). Admittedly, the impact of this roleon ASEAN's long-term health is a mixedone. While propelling the grouping to inter-

national recognition and acclaim, ASEAN'smediation efforts on Cambodia were ham-

pered by two factors: (1) the very fact that ithas not been a neutral party in the conflict;

(2) internal political differences, especiallyover divergent perceptions of Vietnam andChina (Leifer, 1989). (Malaysia and Indone-

sia, viewing China as the long-term threat tothe region, sought accommodation withHanoi which was seen by them as a counter-

weight to Chinese expansionism in the

region. Singapore, and until recently Thai-

land, took a more hardline stance towardsHanoi and developed a strategic partnership



12 AmitavAcharya

with Chinain its bid to contain Vietnameseadvance into Cambodia.) Apart from ex-

posingintra-ASEANdifferences,the Cam-

bodia conflict has diverted ASEAN fromits other securityand economic objectives(Huxley, 1985).

The Cambodiaconflicthas also exposedthe limits of ASEAN's collectivediplomaticprowess. While ASEAN has often set theterms of international deliberations overthe issue, it has little actual influenceoverthe parties o the conflict.As such,ASEANhas turned to the Great Powers, includingthe Soviet Union, China and the USA toensure conflict resolution. Recent develop-ments in the Cambodiapeace processhaveled the five permanentmembersof the UN

SecurityCouncilto assume the key role in

finding an acceptable formula for conflictsettlement, thus amply underscoringthelimits of weak power coalitionsin regionalconflict resolution, akin to the problemssuch powersface in the arenaof military-securitycooperation.

ASEAN's ultimate goal with respect to

intra-regionalconflict is the creation of a

'pluralistic ecuritycommunity'n Southeast

Asia. A 'securitycommunity's defined as a

group of states which have developed'dependable expectations of peacefulchange' n intra-regional elationsandruledout the use of force as a meansof problem-solvingin intermemberrelations(Deutsch,1957,pp. 5-6). WhileASEAN has come a

long way in reducingtensions between its

members, t hasnotyet reached he stageofa 'securitycommunity'.A numberof actualor potential conflict situations remain.

Among these is the unresolveddisputebe-tween the Philippines ndMalaysiaovertheformer'sclaimto Sabah,maritimeboundarydisputes amongvariousASEAN countries

(Malaysiahas maritimeboundarydisputeswith each of its ASEAN neighbours)and

continuingethnic-based uspicionsbetween

MalaysiaandSingapore.The degreeof mis-trust also means that some ASEAN statescontinue to plan against potential militarythreats from others, and these are partlyreflected in competitive arms acquisitions

thathave been a marked eatureof defencebuildupsof ASEAN states(Huxley, 1990).

3. The Structure f Military-SecurityCooperationwithinASEANSince the foundingof ASEAN, numerous

suggestions have been put forward toprovide the regionalgroupingwith a mili-

tary-security ole. Such ideas haveincludedformal/informal commitments by itsmember states to assist each other in theevent of armed aggression,ASEAN-wide

military exercises, regular meetings ofASEAN defence and interior ministers,standardizationf weaponsandthe creationof an ASEAN defence industry.A recent

example is a vaguely defined call by the

foreign minister of Malaysiafor the estab-

lishment of an ASEAN 'Defence Com-munity' Acharya,1990b).

Yet the member states of ASEAN havenot only rejectedthe idea of a militarypact,but have also opposed any formof multila-teralmilitary-security ooperation.In 1976,an Indonesianproposal o institutesuchco-

operationwas rejected,as was a suggestionby Singapore'sPrime Minister Lee KuanYew in 1982for multilateralASEAN mili-

taryexercises. At the Bali summit n 1976,ASEAN leaders

agreedthat bilateral

arrangements undertaken outside theASEAN frameworkwere the mostdesirableform of military-securitycooperation. A

majorfactorinfluencing he attitudeof theASEAN states towards the issue of mili-

tary-securitycooperation is of course thenature of their securityenvironment. Thethreat perceptions of its member regimesare more inward-looking nd an alliance isconsidered both irrelevant and ineffective

against intrastate threats (Paribatra &

Samudavanija, 1986; Wanandi, 1984, p.305; Weinstein,1978).A Malaysiananalysthas identified a number of other reasonsthat have weighed stronglyin determiningthe ASEAN states' rejectionof a militaryallianceoption:

First, alliances demand commitment and a certainloss of political independence and are not beneficialunless there are benefits on the other side of thescale. Second, militaryalliances with militarilyweak

states or between such states have little militaryutility .... Third, the idea that one Asean state will

actually militarily go to the assistance of another ina meaningful or substantial way has lacked credi-

bility (due to doubts about political will and actual




capability).Fourth, the transformation f Aseaninto a military lliancewouldruncounter o ... the

continuingdesire to reassure he communist ndo-china states that ASEAN's goalsand activitiesare

peacefulin nature.Fifth, militaryalliances and adefence communityhave been seen to be largelysuperfluous,given that informal,semi-formalandformalmechanisms f military ooperationalreadyexist and arejudgedto be adequate.Sixth,Vietna-mese taunts rom the sixties that Aseanwasa mili-

taryorganization asresulted n a defensivemind-set that is loath to eventhinkof the military ption(Sopiee, 1983,pp. 22-23).

Recent developments in the security en-vironment of the ASEAN countries suggesta greater recognition of external threats

(Acharya, 1988) and this has led someASEAN policy-makers to rethink their

options for military-security cooperation.Thus, it has been suggested that a multi-lateral ASEAN defence arrangement would

be a necessary response to the prospectivewithdrawal of US bases from the Philippinesand the growing naval strengths of China,India and Japan, all of whom have the

ability to threaten regional stability inSoutheast Asia. It is in this context that

Singapore has advocated ASEAN military

exercises, and opposition to an ASEANmilitary arrangement has weakened amongthe region's policy-makers. Yet, ASEANstates continue to recognize the advantagesof bilateral cooperation over an ASEAN

military pact. As the chief of the MalaysianArmed Forces stated:

Bilateral defence cooperation is flexible and

provide[s] wide ranging options. It allows anyAseanpartner o decide the type, timeand scale ofaid it requiresand can provide.The questionofnational ndependenceand sovereignty s unaffec-

ted by the decisionof others as in the case of analliancewhere members anevoke the termsof the

treatyand interfere n theaffairsof anotherpartner(MohammedAli, 1990,pp. 41-42).

Strong opposition to an ASEAN military

pact by Indonesia - the de facto leader of

ASEAN - makes it highly unlikely in the

foreseeable future. In March 1991, Indone-sia's Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, rejected a

suggestion by the Philippines that ASEANshould form a regional security alliance.

According to Alatas, ASEAN 'shouldremain true to its essence and that is econ-

omic, social, cultural and even now politicalco-operation, but not a defence pact' (StraitsTimes, 29 March 1991, p. 20). But the rapidevolution of bilateral

military-securityties

has led to the emergence of what the Chiefof Indonesia's armed forces has described asan 'ASEAN defence spider web'. With the

exception of Malaysia and the Philippines,all other ASEAN members are involved insome form of bilateral military-securityarrangement. The next section provides abrief look at the nature and forms of such

cooperation.

4. Forms of Military-Security CooperationWithinASEAN3The bilateral security linkages that have de-

veloped among ASEAN states fall into twodistinct categories. The first includes mea-sures geared to counter internal threats tothe members, such as cooperation on cross-border communist insurgencies and other

security threats, as well as sharing of intelli-

gence about subversive elements. This is

complemented by a commitment to denysanctuary to insurgents and political oppo-nents of the regimes, as well as extraditionprocedures. The second form of cooper-ation addresses external threats to regionalsecurity, as well as measures to enhance the

long-term self-reliance of the members in

security and defence. These measuresinclude joint exercises, training, cooper-ation in arms manufacturing and exchangeof senior level personnel for familiarizationwith each other's military establishments

(Acharya, 1990b; Hamzah, 1983; Mak,

1986;Palmer &

Reckford, 1987; Simon,1978, 1982).There have been four bilateral border

security arrangements within ASEAN: be-tween Thailand and Malaysia, Malaysia and

Indonesia, the Philippines and Indonesia,and Malaysia and the Philippines. Of

these, the Malaysia-Philippines agreementremains moribund due to their continuingdispute over Sabah. The Philippine-Indone-sia border agreement involves periodic exer-cises and naval patrols to check smuggling,

piracy and illegal shipment of arms. Themost important arrangements related to



14 Amitav Acharya

communist nsurgency re the ones between

Malaysiaand Thailand,and MalaysiaandIndonesia.Both have involved intelligence

exchanges,joint militaryexercisesand mili-tary operations o stampout the insurgents.The Malaysia-Thailand rrangements on-stitutethe earliestand most comprehensivesuch cooperation within ASEAN. Since

1977,joint operations,both combinedand

coordinated,have been usedto suppress heremnants f the CommunistPartyof Malaya(CPM) operating on the Thai-Malaysianborder. These operations continued until

1989,when the CPMsigneda peace accordwith the Thai-Malaysianauthorities pro-

claimingan end to its armedstruggle.Thecredit orthisdoes notentirelybelongto the

joint effort, which had been marred bymutual suspicionsbetween Kuala LumpurandBangkokover the former'salleged sup-port for Muslim separatists in southern

Thailand,and the latter'salleged toleranceof CPM activitieswithin its border. None-

theless, the joint operationsled to the de-structionof several CPM sanctuaries,keptthe CPMon the run for most of the 1970sand

1980s,and led to demoralizationwithin

its ranks.The Indonesia-Malaysiaborder cooper-

ation has been much more smooth and ef-fective. Beginning soon after the peaceaccordsignedbetweenthe two countriesatthe end of their confrontation n 1967, the

arrangement ed to the establishmentof a

joint bordercommitteeto conductcounter-

insurgencyoperations along the Kaliman-tan-Sarawak and Kalimantan-Sabahborders. These operations were largely

responsible ora dramaticall in the numberof insurgents.The scopeof the arrangementwas expanded in 1984 to cover maritime

security ssues facingthe two sides, includ-

ing smuggling,piracy and arms peddling.With the declineof the communist hreats,the border committee shifted its attention to

military threats from the South China Sea as

well, and devised a series of military exer-

cises and joint contingency plans for acommon response against a spillover of theIndochina conflict.

Extensive intelligence-sharing on commu-nist insurgencies in the region had become

commonplace within ASEAN by the mid-1970s as a result of rising concern over

developments in Indochina. Intelligence

cooperation provided an initial foundationfor other forms of defence-related co-

operation, and, to this day, intelligenceexchanges remain the only known form ofmultilateral military-security cooperationwithin ASEAN. In addition to annual meet-

ings of the intelligence agencies of all the

ASEAN countries, bilateral arrangementscovering intelligence exchanges exist be-tween Singapore and Malaysia, Thailandand the Philippines, Singapore and Indone-

sia, Indonesia and Thailand, Singapore and

Brunei (Acharya, 1990b).Military-security cooperation among the

ASEAN states geared to external threatsintensified after the Vietnamese invasion ofCambodia. Currently, the most importantform of such cooperation in ASEAN is aseries of bilateral military exercises involv-

ing land, air and naval forces. Althougharmy exercises initially formed only a small

part of these, largely due to sensitivities ofthe host country regarding the presence of

foreign troopson its soil, recent trends

pointto an increase in army exercises as well. Thechief purpose of these exercises is to de-

velop joint operational procedures and doc-

trine, which in turn would facilitate acommon response in times of crisis. At the

height of the Cambodia conflict, it wasclaimed that some bilateral exercises couldbe geared to providing a common responseto a Vietnamese threat. In addition, bilat-eral military exercises have also served as a

confidence-building measure, helping the

participants to overcome mutual suspicionsand promoting an understanding of eachother's military-security requirements.

Apart from counter-insurgency cooper-ation and joint exercises, ASEAN stateshave developed military-security ties

through officer exchanges and provision offield training facilities. It is fairly common-

place for middle-level officers from one

ASEAN state to attend command and staff

courses offered by military institutions ofanother state. A major benefit of such

exchanges, as with joint exercises, is said tobe confidence-building through familiariza-



Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the ThirdWorld 15

tion with each other's military doctrines and

capabilities. But in terms of practical valueto military preparedness, provision of field

training facilities by one ASEAN state toanother assumes greater importance.Singapore, whose small air and land spaceconstrains training on its own soil, is themain beneficiary of this form of intra-ASEAN cooperation. Singapore maintainsair force training facilities in the Philippines,army training facilities in Thailand and Bru-

nei, and has developed a joint air weapontesting range with Indonesia on the latter'sSumatra Island. It has also gained access toIndonesian territory for exercises involving

its land forces.Recent trends in intra-ASEAN military-

security cooperation point to a shift from

counter-insurgency cooperation towardsdefence against external threats. Thisreflects the virtual collapse of communistmovements in ASEAN (except the Philip-pines), and a greater concern with potentialthreats arising from ASEAN's maritime andwider geopolitical environment (Acharya,1988; Nor, 1989). But while externaldefence cooperation within ASEAN is

evolving at a rapid pace, it faces several

major constraints. The three major require-ments of inter-operability and integrationamong armed forces within a given regionare (1) development of a common doctrineand language, (2) standardization of equip-ment, and (3) development of common

logistics facilities. The armed forces of the

ASEAN countries still lack a common doc-trine and language, the standardization of

weapons has been more accidental than by

design; and development of logistics facili-ties, such as a 'war reserve contingencypool' suggested by Thailand, has not been

seriously tried (Garcia, 1986, pp. 9-10;

Mak, 1986, p. 17). As a result, the conceptof an 'ASEAN deterrent' against aggressionremains far from credible (Hashim, 1990,

p. 41). The political will for greater militaryintegration is clearly lacking, and this meansthat to this date the record of intra-ASEAN

cooperation on internal security and

counter-insurgency has been more elaborate

and effective than that on external defence(Acharya, 1990b).

5. Autonomy Versus Great Power SecurityGuarantees: An ASEAN DilemmaIntra-ASEAN deliberations over regional

securityhave led the members of the

groupto ponder the classic dilemma between

regional autonomy on the one hand and ac-

ceptance of Great Power security orbits onthe other. ASEAN has been, and remains,an essentially pro-Western coalition, whose

philosophical basis was a common oppo-sition to Soviet, Chinese and Vietnamese-backed communism (Ghazalie Shafie, 1982,

p. 31). But within this broad political arena,

perspectives of the members have differedon the relative degree of regional autonomy

which would be ideal for the long-termsecurity interests of the regional actors. Ona more general level, the grouping's formalcommitment to the 'neutralization' ofSoutheast Asia has been balanced by the

persistent and close military dependence ofthe members on Western powers, and the

resulting contradiction vitiates ASEAN'ssearch for a consensus on the approach to

regional order.The quest for regional autonomy under-

lying ASEAN's origin and evolution was

shaped by two considerations. The first wasthe general concern with the implications ofGreat Power rivalry in the region. Thisconcern was particularly salient due to the

region's proximity to China and the historicUS involvement in the region. Thus, GreatPower rivalry in Southeast Asia had meantnot just the familiar US-Soviet Cold War,but also the Sino-Soviet conflict whichintensified around the time of the formationof ASEAN. Although all the ASEAN states

had been tied to military-security arrange-ments with Great Powers in the past, theyshared a general view that increased compe-tition by the Great Powers in the regionwould aggravate existing intra-regional ten-sions and polarization. The ASEAN states,of course, had no illusions that even withtheir collective political and diplomaticability, they could eliminate foreign powerpresence in the region. Nonetheless, region-alism was seen as a device to enhance the

bargaining power of the regional actors vis-

a-vis the Great Powers on issues affectingregional security and stability. As the then



16 Amitav Acharya

Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik,

put it:

Southeast Asia is a region in which the presence and

interestsfmostmajor owersonverge.. [exert-ing a] dominant nfluenceon the countries n the

region. .. [T]hesmallernationsof the regionhaveno hope of ever makinganyimpacton thispatternof dominant nfluence on the big powers, unless

theyactcollectively nd until hey develop hecapa-cityto forgeamonghemselvesnareaof internalcohesion, stabilityand common purpose (Malik,1975, pp. 162-163).

The second factor contributing to the im-

portance of regional autonomy for the

ASEAN states was their declining faith in

the utility and relevance of external securityguarantees. On the one hand, the ASEAN

states recognized that seeking support fromexternal powers was unlikely to be helpful in

situations of domestic strife, which was the

major security problem confronting the

ASEAN regimes. As noted by a former

Malaysian Foreign Minister:

External support . . . for governments combating

insurgencies have the effect of raising the level of

violence and complicating both conflict manage-ment and the peaceful resolution of conflicts

through political means. Internal stability cannotafter all be imposed from the outside (GhazalieShafie, 1975, p. 23).

On the other hand, the ASEAN states were

faced with the disengagement of their exter-nal security partners from the region, with

the British withdrawal from Malaysia and

Singapore, and US withdrawal from Indo-china. Thus, the strengthening of ASEAN

was not only helped by the perceived threat

from Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union,

but also by the dilution of US securitycommitments in the region after the enun-

ciation of the so-called Nixon Doctrine in

1969. The Doctrine was a clear signal toAmerica's Asian allies to assume greaterresponsibilities for their own security, andthis had a direct bearing on the interests of

two of the USA's treaty partners in

ASEAN, Thailand and the Philippines. The

limited protection offered by a new com-monwealth security system for SoutheastAsia to offset the British withdrawal from

the region, the Five Power DefenceArrangement (FPDA), similarly led Malay-

sia to make a virtue out of necessity by call-

ing for the neutralization of Southeast Asia

(Wilson, 1975). This proved to be the

genesis of ASEAN's formal declaration ofits goal of creating a Zone of Peace, Free-dom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in South-east Asia in 1971. The aim of ZOPFAN wasto persuade all Great Powers, whether theywere perceived as threats or as securityguarantors, to refrain from intervention inthe region. The ASEAN states, for their

part, would undertake to abstain from

entering into military alliances with external

powers and remove foreign military basesfrom their soil. Although the ZOPFAN con-

cept is a long way from becoming a reality,largely due to internal differences amongthe ASEAN states with regard to its scopeand timing, it underscores ASEAN'scommitment to the goal of regional auton-

omy based not on ideological rhetoric, buton the perceived benefits of autonomy for

regional stability.But the ASEAN states have maintained a

careful balance between their quest for

regional autonomy on the one hand, and the

existing dependent security relationships(with the exception of Indonesia) with theGreat Powers on the other. While publiclycommitted to the withdrawal of all foreignmilitary bases from the region under theterms of ZOPFAN, ASEAN states have

regularly endorsed, publicly or privately,the continued presence of US forces in the

Philippines and maintain close security linkswith Western powers (Young, 1989). NoASEAN country sees regional military co-

operation as a substitute for security links

with external powers. In the case of Thai-land and Singapore, security ties with the

US were strengthened in the early 1980s,while Malaysia and Singapore called for the

strengthening of the Five Power Defence

Arrangements. A security treaty withBritain remains the cornerstone of Brunei's

security posture (Menon, 1988). ASEAN's

continuing need for external military link-

ages (Young, 1989) can be seen from fearsvoiced by leading regional policy-makersregarding the implications of a possible US

withdrawal from the Philippines. Concernthat the US departure would create a 'power




vacuum' in the region has led Singapore andBrunei to offer some military facilities to theUS on its soil. Other ASEAN countries,

while maintaining a public position of non-commitment, have privately expressedworry that the US withdrawal might encour-

age expansionist maritime activities byChina, Japan and India. Thus, ASEANstates see the continued maintenance of a

regional 'balance of power' conducive totheir security interests as being contingenton a strong external input; it cannot be de-

veloped only through regional military-security cooperation, notwithstanding the

scope and intensity of the latter.

6. ConclusionThe primary theoretical objective of this

paper has been to identify ASEAN as a

regional grouping whose orientation and

role differ from those of the autonomous

groups and hegemonic alliances in the keyarea of military-security cooperation. The

foregoing discussion of military-security co-

operation within ASEAN yields several

conclusions whichhelp

todistinguish

it from

the latter. Especially, four broad character-

istics of ASEAN are worthy of particularmention.

1. Norms and procedures governing the

prevention, management, isolation and res-

olution of intermember conflicts are as im-

portant a part of intra-ASEAN cooperationas bilateral and multilateral arrangements

against common internal and external

threats. In this respect, ASEAN has playeda role akin to the original autonomous

regional organizations. On the other hand,ASEAN's conflict-management role covers

'external regional' conflict, i.e. conflicts

within the larger regional security complexwhich do not involve its members directly.ASEAN's role in the Cambodia conflict

is less effective than its role in buildingan intra-ASEAN security community,

although the former largely accounts for the

grouping's international cohesion.2. The structure of intra-ASEAN mili-

tary-security cooperation places less

emphasis on institutional and formal mech-anisms. Expectation of reciprocal help to be

activated at the time of a threat is one aspectof intra-ASEAN military-security cooper-ation, but this is largely a declaratory

commitment and not a formal obligation asin the case of alliance.3. Intra-state security issues have been

an important concern in the evolutionof ASEAN military-security cooperation.Norms against interference in the internalaffairs of member states and denial of sanc-

tuary to insurgents have been comple-mented by joint action against border regioncommunists. In fact, cooperation againstsuch threats has provided the foundation fordefence cooperation against conventional

military threats, and the former has gener-ally been more effective.

4. Bilateral military-security cooperationwithin ASEAN has not led to the repudia-tion of the external security linkages of themember states. Because of their militaryweakness, the ASEAN states have sought a

relationship of close security interdepen-dence with Western powers, especially theUS. On the other hand, the security per-spectives of the ASEAN states have at thesame time been

shaped bytheir fear of

superpower rivalry in the region, as well asthe declining credibility of their GreatPower security guarantees. Thus, ASEANstates have felt the need to develop a greaterdegree of self-reliance in providing for theirown defence. As a result of these two con-

tradictory pressures, ASEAN states haveembraced a more pragmatic notion of

regional autonomy. Autonomy in this senseis not equated with complete self-reliance,but with an ability to override external

pressures through collective bargaining(through measures such as ZOPFAN and

the Southeast Asia Nuclear Free Zone) andto minimize the need for seeking externalintervention in the region.

Although the foregoing discussion bringsout the distinctive features of ASEAN vis-a-vis the autonomous and hegemonic frame-works of regionalism, it also raises the

question whether ASEAN has any counter-

parts among the contemporary subregionalassociations in the Third World. A detailed

comparison of ASEAN with other subregio-nal groupings with similar security under-



18 Amitav Acharya

pinnings is beyond the scope of this paper.Moreover, caution must be displayed in

making such a comparison, given the

obvious differences between these group-ings which are shaped by the distinctive

security and political problems of their

respective regions. In this sense, ASEANshould not be construed as a model whichcan be easily duplicated elsewhere in theThird World. But there are several interest-

ing similarities and differences betweenASEAN and two other subregional groupswhich have developed a substantive agendaof military-security cooperation. Theseinclude the Gulf Cooperation Council and

the Organization of Eastern CaribbeanStates.

The GCC, set up in 1981, shares a

number of characteristics with ASEAN.

First, like ASEAN, the GCC is ostensibly a

multipurpose grouping. But it too has devel-

oped a 'security' aspect, which includes pre-senting a common front against threats to

regime survival and a solidarity againstexternal actors perceived to be harmful to

intra-regional stability.Second, like ASEAN but unlike the hege-

monic alliances, the GCC was not directlysponsored by a Great Power (despite receiv-

ing strong backing from the USA). In fact

the emergence of the GCC was partly due to

a growing disillusionment of Third World

members with the security guaranteesoffered by the USA in the wake of the

overthrow of a key US client, the Shah of

Iran (Ispahani, 1984, p. 153). Nonetheless,the GCC remained essentially dependent on

US military support, a dependence vividly

demonstrated in the aftermath of the Iraqiinvasion of Kuwait in August 1990.In terms of the lessons drawn from the

experience of the autonomous groupingsand the hegemonic alliances, both the GCCand the OECS are similar to ASEAN in

three respects: (1) their role includes settle-

ment of disputes within their membership;(2) their agenda of military-security cooper-ation addresses intra-state as well as exter-

nal threats; and (3) military-security coop-eration has been undertaken without

repudiation of the security linkages of theregional actors with Great Powers. Unlike

ASEAN, however, the GCC and OECShave seen the need to develop formal and

integrative military and security institutions.

Although in the GCC case bilateral securitypacts between Saudi Arabia and the othermembers exist, the grouping has also devel-

oped significant cooperation by creating aGCC 'rapid deployment force', an airdefence system and most importantly, bysigning a 'comprehensive security agree-ment' (Dowdy & Omari, 1989; Guazzonne,

1988). The fact that these mechanisms failedto deter the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait under-scores the limitations of the military-secur-ity cooperation among weak powers. It

should, however, be stressed that the GCCwas geared against internal threats, ratherthan an outright invasion such as thatcarried out by Iraq. The OECS membersare part of a 'Regional Security System'based in Barbados, which coordinates mea-sures to improve the internal and external

security of its members (Lewis, 1986; Sim-

mons, 1985).While ASEAN represents an approach to

military-security cooperation that is distinctfrom the autonomous or the

hegemonicalliance groups, it does not necessarily do

away with some of the limitations evident inthe case of the latter. In some respects,obstacles to closer ASEAN military-secur-ity cooperation are similar to those facingthe autonomous groups and the hegemonicalliances, even if their respective structuresof cooperation may differ. In this regard,ASEAN shares with the continental groupsthe problem of limited indigenous resourcesand capabilities. As a result, several

ASEAN states continue to seek separate bi-lateral arrangements with Great Powersrather than to look to regional cooperationas a means of providing for their security.Furthermore, lack of political will owing to

differing threat perceptions and intra-muralconflicts undermine the prospect for closer

integration of ASEAN armed forces. These

problems are not unlike those which con-fronted the continental regional groups andCold War alliances.

But these limitations of the ASEAN

framework must be viewed against the factthat they derive not so much from the bilat-




eral structure preferred by the ASEAN

states, but from a lack of political will to

develop the bilateral relationships fully.

Given the political will, considerable oppor-tunities exist among the ASEAN states forcloser military-security cooperation within

existing bilateral frameworks. Finally,although the ASEAN example might nothave exact counterparts elsewhere in theThird World, its own role constitutes an im-

portant and interesting area of scholarlyinvestigation. Such an exercise is all themore worthwhile as the world searches foreffective arrangements, both global and

regional, to provide security and stability in

the post-Cold War environment.

NOTES

1. Said has aptly summarized the limitations of the

League's Treaty for Joint Defence and Economic

Cooperation' adopted in 1950:

In spite of the theoretical significance of this treaty,it amounts in practice to very little. First, the treatyis not considered a part of the charter [of the

League], and membership of it was left optional.Second, it failed to grant the League an independentarmed force under its command. In fact, the goals ofthe treaty were thus aborted even at the moment of

its signing since it shared with all the League'sdecisions the lack of effective means of implemen-tation, other than the free will of member states.The same fate afflicted a series of decisions made bythe summit conferences since 1964 which established

a joint command of Arab Armed Forces. While this

command exists in theory, it does not possess any

independent power (Said, 1986, p. 259).2. According to a Malaysian analyst, these norms con-

stitute the 'ground rules of inter-state relations

within the ASEAN community with regard to con-

flict and its termination'. He mentions four such

rules: (1) 'system-wide acceptance of the principle of

the pacific settlement of disputes'; (2) 'non-interfer-

ence and non-intervention in the domestic affairs ofmember states'; (3) 'respect for each other's territor-

ial integrity and independence'; and (4) 'the prin-

ciple of not inviting external intervention on one's

behalf in the pursuit of disputes' (Sopiee, 1986, p.229).

3. Information provided in this section is based on ex-

tensive interviews and field research conducted bythe author in Southeast Asia during the 1987-89

period.

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AMITAV ACHARYA, b. 1962, PhD in International Relations (Murdoch University, Western

Australia, 1986); Lecturer, National University of Singapore (1990- ); research positions at theInstitute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore (1987-89) and York University Centre for Inter-national and Strategic Studies (1989-90). Major research interest: regional security in the ThirdWorld.