1973 US Air Force Command Post Program Study Executive Summary 18p

7/27/2019 1973 US Air Force Command Post Program Study Executive Summary 18p

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ACN 18972Comtnand Pos t Program Study- A

F ina l StudyExecutive Summary

UNITED STATES.ARMY,COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND.Intelligence and Control Systems Group

Approved for publicrelease; distributionunlimited .

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NOTICEDISCLAIMER

The contents of t h i s study, including findings, conclusions, andrecommendations, are not t o be construed as an o f f i c i a l i)epartwntof the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized docu-ments.



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The conclusions and recommendations of this study are those of theCommander, USACDC INCS Group. This study is based upon infornationgathered and analysis performed primarily by the CSACDC INCS Group.Individuals having a major area of responsibility i n the preparationof supporting study material are. listed be l ow :

@

Major James L . Osteen Study Project Off i ce r , USACDCINCSDr. Leon Narwocki Statician -and Technical Advisor,ARI

Cooperation and assistance were received from all USACDC elementsi n preparation of this study.



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COMMAND POST PROGRAM STUDYEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION.a. With the recent reduction of US Army personnel strength basedon the reduced level of hostilities in SEAsia and concurrent budgetaryrestrictions, additional emphasis is being given to means by which armyresources both men and materiel - may be more efficiently utilized.

A major objective of this effort is improvement of the comand andcontrol structure for tactical forces in the field.b. .In1971, USACDC conducted a preliminary investigation to deter-mine equipment changes which could be expected to improve command andcontrol capabilities of echelons from battalion through corps in the1972-76 time frame. This investigation indicated that no major equip-ment changes would be effected during this period. As a result CDR

USACDC directed that attention should be given to the current o'rganiza-tion of tactical command posts with a view towards reducing personnelrequirements and improving utilization of existing equipment.c . This guidance has resulted in the Command Post Program, a studyundertaken by USACDC Intelligence and Control Systems Group to determinemeans for improving equipment utilization and reducing personnel require-ments of tHe current TO&E command post organization at battalion through

corps levels in the 1973-76 time frame. To 'accomplish this task, aquestionnaire was developed and directed to commanders and former com-mandersoat these echelons, soliciting ideas and opinions which couldform a base for development of Cesired ikprovements. The conclusionsand recommendations of this study specifically exclude certain possiblechanges currently the subject of othet formal study efforts as wellas changes which could not rea-lis ically be implemented prior to 1976.These ideas w i l l , however, be introduced into other ongoing command andcontrol studies.2. PROBLEM.

a. Commitment of sizable numbers of personnel to comand andcontrol functions has long been a matter of concern in the Army. Inthe near future, with significant reductionof forces expected, themost efficient utilization of soldier-strength is essential. Thebasic problem is to identify the iowest personnel commitment levelwhich insures effective comnand and control and to recommend appro-priate changes to H-series TOE.b. In view of the anticipated imposition of lower overall troopstrength ceilings, failure to identify excess personnel associated with



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Tthe command and cont ro l function may result in a lower number of per-sonnel being available f o r combat forces. How-ever, an indiscriminatereduction in t-he number of personnel associated with command and con-tro l may negate p o s s i b l e improvements in the commander's a b i l i t y t odirect h i s fighting forces. Thus, a balance must be stru*ckbetweenpersonnel reductions and command and con t ro l improvenents.3. PURPOSE. To review command and control functions during the pre-1976.time frame t o determine how reductions in number of personnelcan be achieved while increasing mobility and survivabi l i ty and de-creasing s ize and signature of command p o s t s . Exp e c t e d use of studyresults includes recommendations for minor changes t o H-series TOEand doctrinal manuals which will result in improvement in camand andcontrol without causing major disruption.4. OBJECTIVES.

a. To determine if the number of people c o m i t t e d to cammand andcontrol during the pre-1976 time frame can be reduced, and if so, haw,without causing major organizational disrupt ion or degradation ofcornand and control .

b . To EVALUATE physical size of conrmand posts ahd.RECOMMENDfeasible decreases.c . To DETERMINE means for reducing the electronic signature ofconhand posts , without degradation of camand and control.d . To ASSESS the mobility and survivability of command posts with

a view toward 'improving both.e. To DETERMINE what minor revisions of TOE could be made t o , imp le -ment results of t h i s study.f . To DETERMINE testing require~ents n support of evaluation ofthe study results.

5. METHODOLOGl. A comprehensive command and control-.survey, designedt o support accomplishment of the stated objectives, .was developed anddistributed t o selected comanders and former commanders world-wide.A qualitative, quantitative, and comparative analysis was then made ofthe survey results. Recormnendations,.where appropriate , for minorchanges in organization, equipment, aid doctrine will be forwarded t o t h eappropriate proponent agency for evaluation and possible implementation.

ANALYSIS.Qualitative Results.(1) QUESTION 1. Can you suggest changes in personnel authoriza-t ions (numbers,functional organization, or grade) which would improve



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your comand and c o n t r o l capability?(a) There was a 97% response t o this q j e s t i o n .(b ) Respondents t o t h i s quest ion-stated t h a t an increasei n number of personnel in the form of assistants,clerks, or r ad iooperators are necessary t o improve comand an d control c a p a b i l i t i e s .These requirements vary from b a t t a l i o n through division t o f a c i l i t a t ea 24-hour opera t i ona l cap ab i l i t y over an extended period of t i m e .Changes suggested f o r corps echelon stated that e l imina t i ng redundancyof com uni ca t ion s equipment and associated personnel would improve com-mand and c o n t r o l effectiveness.(c ) No st ru c tu r a l real ignment o r grade change was sug-gested at Corps o r Division echelons. Respondents did suggest t h a t t h etwo Majors (04) c u r r e n t l y w i t hi n the battalion be redesignated Deputyfor Operat ions and Deputy for Support as an improvement. The two-

deputy'idea was also suggested f o r brigade echelon by some respondents .(2 ) QUESTION 2. I n the combat environment, do you be l i evethat any of th e principal staff members ( ~ 1 1 ~ 1 ,2 / ~ 2 ,3 1 ~ 3 ,4 / ~ 4 ,~ 5 / G 5 ) hould be senior i n grade to t h e others? I f so , indicate whichones.

(a) There was a 98 . 5% response t o this quest ion.(b) Respondents t o t h i s question favored t h e S3 beingthe senior staff off icer at battalion. Comments addressing brigade

echelon were fairly equal b u t tended t.0 support the S3 b e i n g ' t h esenior staff o f f i c e r and the position upgraded t o LTC. For Divisionand Corps echelons , there was s t r o n g feeling all staff officers shouldbe of equa l rank.(3 ) QUESTION 3. Can you suggest a means f o r reducing t h enumber of personnel committed to comand and control a t your echelonwhich would still allow you t o achieve continuous operations?

(a) There was a 98.5% response t o this ques t ion .(b) Most respondents to this question suggested t h a t areduction i n t h e number of personnel would be detrimental to commandand c o n t r o l effectiveness.( c ) Respondents addressing Corps eschelon d i d suggest are du ct io n i n communications equipment which would t h e r e b y reducepersonnel.

(4) QUESTION 4 . Can you suggest a means of reducing t h ephysical size of your command po s t complex without degradation ofyour command and c o n t r o l c a p a b i l i t y ?



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(a) There was a 100% response t o t h i s question.(b) Respondents addressing each echeloi suggested thesize of comand post can be reduced through austerity. Opinionsreflected t h a t less austerity could be implemented at b a t t a l i o n while

austerity is suggested at each succeeding higher echelon. Austeritys suggested through eliminating luxury items, elaborate briefing facili-ties, and excess vehicles.

(c ) Decentralizing or dispersing s taf f elements was also sug-ested as a way t o reduce the physical size of comand p o s t complex. Onlythe functions essential t o tac t ica l operations should coniprise the commandcomplex.(5) QUESTION 5 . Can you suggest a means for reducing the elec-8tronic "signature" of your command p o s t complex without seriously de-grading your conrmand and cont ro l capabil i ty?

There was a 97% response t o t h i s question.(b ) Reduction in transmission time was suggested a s theredominate means f o r reducing the electronic signature of command

To reduce transmission time. equires using radios for onlyssential tact ica l information and strict adherence t o proper operating

( c ) Issuing secure transmission radios was suggested ascontributing t o decreasing transmission time by allowing informationt o be transmitted without being concerned with violating security.(6) QUESTION 6, Can you suggest changes in the t ype , quanti ty orcapability of the communications equipment you are now authorized whichimprove yo6r command and control capability?

( a ) There w a s a 100% response to t h i s question.(b) Respondents suggested that a l l radios have the securetransmission capabi l i ty . They a l so recommended that communications

equipment be more rel iable , durable, less complex, lighter, smaller,better weather-proofed and more powerful.(7 ) QUESTION 7. Are the maps you are currently authorizedadequate f o r your operational needsin terms of scale and quantity?

(a) There was a 98.5% response to t h i s question.(b) The majority of respondents t o t h i s question consider&rent authorization of maps as adequate. Those who felt it was lessthan adequate suggested a more l ibera l distribution of 1:50,000 scale



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orders. The machine will have t o be.sufficiently rugged t o withstandf t e l d operations.(13) QUESTION 13. Can you suggest improvement i n your personalcommand vehicle (s)

(a) There was a 92.5% response to this question.(b) Respondents suggested that the M114 Command Vehiclebe replaced with the M113 Personnel Carrier.( c ) For all command vehicles it was recommended thatsecure cownunications equipment be installed.

(14). UESTION 14. Can you suggest improvement in the vehiclesyou and your staff are currently authorized for use as operations centersin the field?(a) There was a 92 . 5% response to this question.(b) Respondents suggested that operation. enter vehicleshave the capability t o be connected to form a more integrated operationseffort. To accomplish this, tent extensions on operational staff vehi-cles should have snaps or zippers to facilitate joining them together.

b. Qualitative Results..(1) QUESTION 15. Current TOE authorization regarding ORGANIZATION

for command and control is:

adequate adequate

t I

(a) The scale on this question was collapsed into "adequate-excellent" versus "less than adequate-inadequate" categories.

I

(b) Respondents to this question generally felt that thecurrent TOE regarding organization is adequate t o excellent. Augmentationis accomplished when and where the situation so demands.

Cexce l lent more than adequate less than inadequate

(2) QUESTION 16. It has been suggested that the combination ofoperations and intelligence elements might result in more effective com-mand and control. Do you find this proposition at your level:



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b m I 1 I

highly somewhat indifferent somewhat undesirabledesirable desirable undesirable

(a) The scale on this question was collapsed into "indif-ferent-highly desirable" versus "somewhat undesirable-undesirable"categories. F

(b) Generally, respondents interpreted the combining ofoperations and intelligence functions as collocating them in onephysical facility. The respondents favored this combining of thesetwo functions.

(c) There was strong opinion that merging the two func-tions at battalion under the supervision of a deputy for operations wouldimprove effectiveness of command and control. Respondents tended toaccept the merging of these two staff-elements t Brigade. At Divisionarid Corps echelons, respondents rejected the idea of merging the twoelements due to their complexities at these levels.

(3 ) QUESTION 17. At your leve l , do you consider the numberof personnel authorized by TOE for the receipt, processing and di s -semination of informat ion/ i r , t e l l igence :

excessive more thanadequate

adequate less thanadequate

inadequate

(a) The scale on th i~ ~q ue st io nas collapsed two dif-ferent ways because of the varying responses' for each category. Responses1 1were collapsed first as adequate-excessive" versus "less than adequate-

" * then "more than adequate-excessive" versus "adequate-nadequate ,inadequate" categories.(b) A significant number of respondents f e e l the- OEpersonnel authorizations are adequate. This is to say that they feltit was neither excessive nor inadequate, hut just sufficient for thereceipt, processing, and dfssemination of information or intelligence.

( 4 ) QUESTION 18. If someone suggested that you combine yourlogistics and personnel elements into a single staff element, wouldyou find the idea:b mi

t - L Aundesirable somewhat indifferent somewhat highlyundesirable desirable -desirable



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(a) The scale on this quest ion was co l lapsed i n t o "somewhatundesirable-undesirable" versus "undesirable-highly de sirab le" cate gorie s..Ic(b) Respondents f e l t t h a t t h e functions of l o g i s t i c s andpersonnel were too divergent and complex t o be combined. Each area is

a separate career f i e l d unre la ted in training, procurement, distribu-tion, and use.(5) QUESTION 19. (Please respond to t h i s quest ion eved though

i t a p p l i e s t o t h e d i v is i o n level.) FM 101-5 s ta tes that dual-dutyassignments should be l imi t ed t o p rese rve i n t eg r i t y . A t d i v i s i o n level,several staff elements are perenially organized .undera "dual-hat"concept; notably engineer, s i g n a l and a r t i l l e r y units. Do you believethat this "dual-hat" t echn ique ' i s p re fe r red fo r elements of :ENGINEERSIGNALARTILLERY

(a) The str en gt h of respondents ' opinions on t h i s ques-t ion was measured for each of t h e three branches.(b) A t Brigade, Division, and Corps echelons, there is asignificant pre fe rence fo r t he dual-hat technique. Eowever, at Bat-talion eahelon, the preference i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t for o r a g a in s t t h edual-hat concept.

(6) QUESTION 20. Current STAFF PROCEDINES f o r command andcontrol, as o u t l i n e d i n FM 101-5, are:

inadequate less than adequate more than exce l l en tadequate adequate(a) The scale on t h i s question was collapsed into "lessthan adequate-inadequate" versus "adequate-excellentt ' categories.(b) A high ly s ign i f ican , t percentage (95%) of respondentsfelt sat is f ied with cu r ren t staff procedures -as out l ined i n FM 101-5.

(7 ) QUESTION.21. Some commanders establish clear-cut separa-t i on between planners and operators. Others integrate the two on acontinuous basis. Does your TOC have any responsibility for PLANNINGoperations beyond 24 hours?/9 YES



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(a) Respondents felt that some planning beyond 24 hours isnecessary at all echelons. At battalion and brigade @this planning con-sisted primarily of command post displacement, contingency missions, andlogistics functions.(b) At division l eve l , it.was felt that good planning i sdone a minimum of 24 hours in advance. While at Corps level, it is

essential that planning be conducted as far in advance as permissible.(8) QUESTION 22. In terms of current authorizations of per-sonnel, is the information flow within your TOC, that i s . the flow ofinfomation between elements of your TOC:

excellent more thanadequate adequate-- - - - - --less thanadequate inadequate

(a) The scale on this question was collapsed into "adequate-excellent" versus " ess than adequate-inadequate" categories.(b) Respondents felt-that nformation flow within tacticaloperations centers is adequate. Comments were made that it could beimproved and suggestions for improvement were also stated.

(9) QUESTION 23. In terms of the information you need tomake decisions, the information flow into your TOC from other TOCs is:

inadequate less thanadequate

adequate more thanadequate

exc l l en t

(a) The scale on this question was collapsed into '?adeqbuate-excellent" versus "less than adequate-inadequate" categories.(b) A significant portion of respondents who had commandedin combat felt that information flow between TOCs was adequate or better.On the other hand, non-combat commanders indicated no significant opinion

on adequacy or inadequacy of information flow between TOCs.(c) The majority of respondents who expressed dissat i s -faction with the information flow between TOCs directed their commentsto the lateral flow rather than the vertical flow of information.

(10) QUESTION 24. Would you evaluate your ab i l i t y t o accom-plish airspace coordination as :



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f a i r good very good ex ce l le nt(a) The scale on t h i s q u e s ti o n was collapsed into "good-versus "f air-poor" categories .(b) A s i gn i f ic an t por t ion of responden ts expressed a f a i ro p o o r a b i l i t y t o accomplish airspace coord ina t ion a t a l l echelons.given include a l a c k of d o c t r i n a l agreement between the Armyd A i r Force and la ck of dedicate d personnel and equipment t o per fo rm

funct ion.-(11) QUESTION 25. Current TOE au th o r i za t io n s r eg a rd in g EQUIPMENTo r command and control are:

more thanadequate adequate less than inadequateadequate(a) The scale on t h i s q u e s ti o n was co l lapsed into-versus "less than adequate-inadequate" categories.(b) Responden ts ge nera l ly f e l t t h a t command and c o n t r o lcu r ren t ly au th o r i zed i s adequate: Improvement of curren tw a s expressed as n ee di ng a t t e n t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y radios and

equipment.(12) QUESTION 26. With cu rr en t org an iz ati on and equipment doconsider your command post :

immobile

m

mobile mohile

i

(a) ' The scale on t h i s q u e st i o n was co l lapsed in to ."border-versus "almost ixnobile--immobile" ca te go ri es .

a lmost bor der l in e moderately h igh ly

I

(b) The majo r i t y o f ' r e sp o n d en t s f e l t t h a t c u r r e n t organi-permi t reasonable m o b i l i t y of t h e command po s t ,n th e verge of being just s u f f i c i e n t .(13) QUESTION 27. I n l i g h t of the mid-intensity n u c lea rdo you consider your command pos t :



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(a) The scale on this question was collapsed into "border-line-invulnerable" versus "somewhat vulnerable-very vulnerable" cate-gories.

w

i

(b) Respondents felt that command post vulnerability is afunction of echelon. That is, the higher the echelon, the greater thefeeling that the command post i s vulnerable to a nuclear attack, e.g.,61% at battalion related to 100% at division and corps.

m

(14) QUESTION 28.level of command:

very somewhat borderline safe"-moderately invulnerablevulnerable vulnerable

Do you find the idea of computers at your

undesirable desirable desirable(a) The sca le on this question was collapsed i n t o"indifferent-highly desirablem versys "somewhat undesirable-undesirablett

, categories.[b) Most of the respondents find the idea of computers

as undesirable. This feelinp; tendsto decrease at division and corosechelons.(15) QUESTION 2 9 . Would you describe your "hands-on" ex-perience with computers as :

extensive above average average very little non-existent(a) The scale on thi-s question was collapsed two d i f -ferent ways to more accurately pin point thelevel of the respondents'

I ?experience. The scale was first collapsed into average-extensive"versus "very little-non-existent" categories. Secondly, the scale wasI ?collapsed into above average-extensive" versus "average-non-existent"categories.

(b) A majdrity of the respondents have had very little orno "hands-on" experience with computers.



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( c ) The relationship on how respondents replied to thisquestion and Question 28 is reflected in the chart'below.

1 2 3 4 5Figure 1 - Level of Experience

C . Comparative Analysis. Evaluation and comparison of the surveyr e s u l t s revealed s t a t i s t i c a l insignificant dif ferencedn responses bycategory. Therefore, a comparative analys i s was determined t o be oflittle or no value and was not conducted.7. - CONCLUSIONS. In forming conclusions for-this survey report, ques-t ions were grouped t o support the study objectives t o which they arerelated, either directly or indirectly.

a. Objective 1. To determine if the number o f people committed t ocommand and control during the pre-1976 time frame can be reduced, andif so, how, without causing major organizational disruption or degrada-tion o f command and control.

(1) Thete are three i n t e r re l a t ed components which e f f ec t theperformance of a particular function. Survey questions were groupedt o address these components and conclusions thereto are included underth i s objective. These interrelated components are:

(a) Staff organization.(b) Staff procedures and techniques.(c) Equipment supporting staff procedures and techniques.

(2 ) Staff Organization.(a) Current TOE authorizations regarding organization areadequate; therfore, any reduction in the number of personnel would3esult in a degradation of ~ ~ m a n dnd control effectiveness. Personnelchanges to improve c~mmand nd control necessitates an increase of staffassistants, clerks and radio operators.



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(b) A t battalion level command and control would be en-hanced by designating two deputy commanders. One deputy corcmander wouldbe des igna ted fo r opera t ions (cu r ren t ly the S3), who would superviseand direct t h e fu n c t i on s of operations and intelligence. The seconddeputy commander would b e des igna ted fo r suppor t (cu r ren t ly the execu-tive o f f i c e r ) , who wo-uld supervise and d i r e c t the func t ions of per -sonnel and logistics. Adaptation of the two-deputy concept may provee f f e c t i v e a t brigade l eve l t o enhance command and cont rol .

(c) The merger of personnel and l o g i s t i c s s t a f f functionsshould be discounted due to the complexity and diversi ty of these areas.(d ) The merger of operat ions and in te l l ig en ce staff func-tions a t b a t t a l i o n level , and possibly a t brigade level , 2s f e a s i b l e .

(3) Staff Procedures and Techniques.(a) FM 101-5 adequa tely ' descr ibes s t a f f procedures i nthe exercise of ef fe ct iv e command a nd xo nt ro l .(b) Dual-hat assignments fo r Engineer, Signa l , and

Artillery commanders a t d iv i s io n level p re s er ve i n t e g r i t y i n theseareas and should be re ta ined .( c ) Map symbols currently used for d isp lay of informa-t ion should not be al tered . Techniques f o r po stin g maps with cu rr entsymbols vary throughout t h e Amy and no ove technique i s prominent.(d) The a b i l i t y t o accomplish airspace coordinat ion a t

every echelon i s i n e f f e c t i v e to satisfy t h e needs of commanders.( 4 ) Equipment Supporting S t a f f Procedures and Techniques.

(a) Current ly authorized TOE equipment is adequate tosupport staff funct ions .(b) There are two weak areas where equipment should beimproved t o enhance command and co n t ro l . One area is:~communications,which requires a secure . radio t ransmiss ion capa b i l i ty f o r a l l radios .I n add i t ion , the qua l i ty of rad io s shou ld be improved so they are

more powerfu l, r e l i a b l e , du rable , requ i re less maintenance, and areless complicated t o r e p a i r and maintain. The other area requ i r inga t t e n t i o n is t h e quality of maps. Map production procedures shouldbe changed s o t h a t maps are reproduced t o be weat her-r esista nt andal low wri t ing and eras ure with bal lpo in t pens , lead penc i ls , and greasepencils.

( c ) A ruggedized autoroatic reproduction capability w i l lr ed u ce s t a f f r eac t i o n time a t brigade and d i v i s i on echelons i n publish-ing and d i s t r i b u t i n g plans and orders.



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(8 ) Use of computers should be limited at this time toabove the division echelon. Adaptation of computer system at divisionlevel and below will require less delicate equipment to withstand fieldoperations.

Objective evaluate physical s i z e posts andrecommend feasible decreases.

Z

(1) Survey questions considered related to this objective arethose which -address ajor items of equipment. Survey question number4 specifically addresses the physical size of CPs .(2) The physical size of a command post complex can be reducedby eliminating major items of equipment nonessential for effectivetactical operations, e. g. , elaborate briefing facilities and largemessing facilities.(3) Reduction .in the physical size of a command post complex

can be accomplished by the dispersion -and relocation of functionalelements not directly associated with control of tactical operations.(4) A command post complex can be reduced in physical size byrestricting traffic flow of all types of vehicles into the command postarea.

c. Objective 3. To determine means for reducing the electronic"signature'j of coxnand posts without degradation of command and control.(1) Survey questions related to thlis objective are those which

address *comunications equipment.(2) The electronic signature of command posts can be reducedby using secure transmission radios.to transmit only essential tactical

information with proper radio procedures being strictly enforced.d. Objective 4. To assess the nobility and survivability of com-

mand posts with a view toward improvingaboth.(1) Survey questions related to this objective are those whichaddress vehicles, shelters, and communications equipment.(2) Mobility.

(a) Increased mobility of command posts can be achievedby reducing set-up and tear-down time of shelters. This time can bereduced by using telescopic poles for tentage and replacing currenttentage with lightweight tentage. Tentage used as vehicle extentionsshould be designed to allow easily joining other vehicle extensiontentage.



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(b) The MI13 Personnel Carrier shou ld be used as thetactical command.vehicle.(3 ) Survivability.

(a) Vulnerability of command pos t s as a nuclear targetcan be decreased by reducing its physical s i z e and electronic signature.See conclusions for objectives 2 and 3 .

(b) Vulnerability (mobility, dispersion, hardening) ofcommand posts as a nuclear target cannot be significantly reduced with-o u t degradation t o command and con t r o l effectiveness.8. RECOMMENDATION. The conclusions drawn-from he questionnaireanalysis do no t appear to support any specific recommendations forthis study. In view o f the fact the survey population was l i m i t e d ;a transfer of ideas within questions and responses t o questionslacking; and th e main thrust of the study remains t o surface candidateareas for further investigation t o improve command and control , onlyone general recommendation is presented. It i s recommended that theCommand Post Program Study be incorporated into the IBCS 2d RefinementStudy , which will be f i e l d t e s t e d and later evaluated during t h e IBCS3d ~efinement tudy ef for t .


1973 US Air Force Command Post Program Study Executive Summary 18p

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