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FROMISRAEL’SPREEMINENTHISTORIAN,ASWEEPINGANDPROVOCATIVEHISTORYOF1967-THESIX-DAYWAR,WHATLED
UPTOIT,WHATCAMEAFTER,ANDHOWITCHANGEDEVERYTHING
Tom Segev’s acclaimed One Palestine, Complete and The Seventh Millionoverturned accepted views of the history of Israel. Now Segev brings hismasterlyskillstothewatershedyearwhensixdaysofwarreshapedthecountryandtheentireregion.Going far beyond a military account, Segev re-creates the crisis in Israel
leadinguptothewar,showinghoweconomicrecession,massemigration,afullgraspof theHolocaust’shorrors, and thedire threatsmadebyneighbor statescombinedtoproduceanapocalypticclimateofdoom.Oncethewarbeganandtheastonishingdisparityofforcesbecameobvious,tensionsshiftedawayfromthequestionof survival as Israel’sgenerals andpoliticianswrangledover justhow far the country could go. Then came victory, and with it a swifttransformationfromdreadtobravado,asonepopularpostwarjokerevealed:Asoldier says to his friend, “Let’s take over Cairo.” The friend replies, “Thenwhatshallwedointheafternoon?”Mining a wealth of unpublished letters, diaries, government memos, and
military records, Segev reconstructs an era of new possibilities and tragicmissteps. He introduces the legendary figures—Moshe Dayan, Golda Meir,GamalAbdelNasser,andLyndonJohnson—aswellasanepiccastofsoldiers,lobbyists, refugees, and settlers. He reveals as never before Israel’s intimacywith theWhiteHouse andexplainshowdomesticpolitical rivalries sabotagedIsrael’s chance of treaties on two fronts. Above all, he challenges theconventional view that the war was inevitable, showing that a series ofdisastrousmiscalculationslaybehindthebloodshedthenaswellasnow.Avibrantandoriginalhistory,1967issuretostandasthedefinitiveaccount
ofthatpivotalyear.
ALSOBYTOMSEGEV
ElvisinJerusalem:Post-ZionismandtheAmericanizationofIsraelOnePalestine,Complete:JewsandArabsUndertheBritishMandate
TheSeventhMillion:TheIsraelisandtheHolocaust1949:TheFirstIsraelis
SoldiersofEvil:TheCommandantsoftheNaziConcentrationCamps
1967
1967Israel,theWar,and
theYearThatTransformedtheMiddleEast
TOMSEGEVTRANSLATEDBYJESSICACOHEN
MetropolitanBooksHenryHoltandCompany,LLC
Publisherssince1866175FifthAvenue
NewYork,NewYork10010www.henryholt.com
MetropolitanBooks®and ®areregisteredtrademarksofHenryHoltandCompany,LLC.
Copyright©2005byTomSegevTranslationcopyright©2007byJessicaCohen
Allrightsreserved.
OriginallypublishedinIsraelin2005underthetitle1967:VehaaretzshintaetpaneihabyKeterPublishers,Jerusalem.
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataSegev,Tom,1945–1967:Israel,thewar,andtheyearthattransformedtheMiddleEast/TomSegev;
translatedbyJessicaCohen.—1stAmericaned.p.cm.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.ISBN-13:978-0-80507057-6ISBN-10:0-8050-7057-51.Israel-ArabWar,1967.2.Israel—Politicsandgovernment—20th century. I. Title. II. Title: Nineteen hundred sixtyseven.III.Title:Nineteensixtyseven.DS127.S44132007956.04’6—dc22
2006047043
HenryHoltbooksareavailableforspecialpromotionsandpremiums.Fordetailscontact:Director,SpecialMarkets.
FirstU.S.Edition2007
DesignedbyKellyToo
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica13579108642
ForItai,attwenty-five
CONTENTS
MapIntroduction:Heroes
PARTI:BETWEENRISHONLEZIONANDMANHATTANChapter1:SussitaDaysChapter2:OtherPeople
PARTII:BETWEENISRAELANDPALESTINEChapter3:MapsandDreamsChapter4:TheSyrianSyndrome
PARTIII:THEFORTYDAYSOFPRIVATEYEHOSHUABAR-DAYANChapter5:ThreeWeekstoWar:WhatDoesNasserWant?Chapter6:ElevenDaystoWar:Noa’sFatherIsWaitingChapter7:TenDaystoWar:WhatDoesAmericaWant?Chapter8:NineDaystoWar:ATerribleSituationChapter9:OneWeektoWar:TheGenerals’RevoltChapter10:FiveDaystoWar:TheOusterChapter11:ThreeDaystoWar:TheDecisionChapter12:DayOneChapter13:DayTwoChapter14:DayThreeChapter15:TheFinalDays
PARTIV:THEYTHOUGHTTHEYHADWONChapter16:ANewLandChapter17:VictoryAlbumsChapter18:TheEnlightenedOccupationChapter19:Teddy’sProjectChapter20:Face-to-FacewithIshmael
Chapter21:TheBlunderChapter22:HawksandDovesChapter23:StartingOverChapter24:AbsalomDays
NotesAcknowledgmentsIndex
1967
INTRODUCTIONHEROES
1.YEHIAM
OnJune5,1966,intheeveninghours,YosefWeitzlittwocandlesinmemoryofhis son, Yehiam, on the twentieth anniversary of his death. Weitz, who wasseventy-six at the time, was the head forester for the Jewish National Fund(JNF), one of the Zionist movement’s institutions, concerned with theacquisitionofpublic land.Hehad lived in the landof Israel forclose tosixtyyears,duringwhichtimetheJNFhadplantedmillionsoftrees.Weitzhadcomefrom Russia at the age of eighteen; he began his life in Palestine as anagriculturallaborerandwaspromotedovertheyearsuntilhebecameoneofthedirectors of the JNF.Hewas also involved in planningnew communities andwas considered a founding father of the Israeli state. In his old age, hewrotechildren’s stories. Sitting by thememorial candles,Weitz looked through oldlettersfromhisson;hisYehiam,hewroteinhisdiary,gazeddownathimfromaphotographonthewall,smilingsadly.Yehiamreceivedhisnamein themidstofaflurryofwarandhope.Hewas
borninOctober1918inoneofthefirstZionistagriculturalsettlements,Yavnel,intheLowerGalilee.ThearmyoftheBritishgeneralEdmundAllenbywasinthe final stages of occupying Turkish-ruled Palestine; his mounted soldiersreachedtheYavnelareaonthenightofYehiam’sbirth.Eightdayslater,ontheday of Yehiam’s circumcision and naming, YosefWeitz first heard about thestatement issued by the British foreign secretary, LordArthur James Balfour,proclaimingsupportfortheZionistmovement’saspirationstobuilda“nationalhome” in Palestine, a Jewish state. The Balfour Declaration had been issuedsome tenmonthsearlier,but theLowerGalileewasstillunderTurkish ruleatthetimeandhadnocontactwiththeBritish-occupiedareas.Weitzandhisneighborswereecstaticwhentheylearnedofthedeclaration;as
theygatheredforthebris,a“visionofimminentsalvation”beatintheirhearts.“Theirshiningeyesandjoyousexclamationsvoicedablessing—thattheJewishpeopleshallliveintheirland,”wroteWeitz.Whenthemohelaskedforthenameofthenewborn,oneoftheguestsshoutedout,“Yehiam!Yehiam!”—aHebrewconstructmeaning “Long live the nation.”And thatwas how the boy got hisname. Itwas“a tokenof thecovenant theEnglishhadmadewith theHebrew
nation,thatitwouldberesurrectedinitsownland,”inWeitz’swords.Hecouldnothaveconceivedofamorepatrioticname;ithadneverbeengivenbefore.Yehiam grew up in Jerusalem. His father was one of the founders of a
comfortable, remoteneighborhood in thewesternpartof town,BeitHakerem:stonehouseswithredtiledroofsweresurroundedbythegreeneryofpinetreesand cypresses.Daffodils and cyclamens blossomed in the gardens, andYosefWeitzhadacherrytree.Theresidentsoftheneighborhoodraisedtheirchildrenas loyal Zionists and pioneering leaders, in the spirit of European culture, inpreparationforlifeinthelong-awaited“nationalhome.”Yehiam studied at the HebrewGymnasium, as didmost of the children of
Jerusalem’s foundingelite.Hewasagood student,whooncecomplained thathisteacherswerenotadequatelypreparingtheirstudentstoservethehomeland.He grew into a handsome, charismatic young man, and he joined HashomerHatzair, thesocialistyouthmovement, to trainhimself foraworking lifeonakibbutz, aswas customary amongmany young people.When theArab revoltagainsttheBritishandtheZionistseruptedin1936,Yehiam“joinedtheranks,”as his fatherwrote—meaning theHagana, the largestmilitary organization oftheJewishcommunityinPalestine.“Heseemstobegainingserenity,”hisfatherwrote;“hashefoundhimself?”Itseemedhehadnot:Yehiamsoonlefttostudychemistry and botany at the University of London. “I’m falling in love withLondon,”hewrotetohisparents.ButwhentheSecondWorldWarbrokeouthecamehomeandsoonenlistedagain,thistimeinthePalmah,theHagana’squasi-standingarmy.Afterthewar,Yehiamwastrainedtocarryoutanti-Britishoperations.British
immigrationpolicy,intendedtogainfavorwiththeArabs,preventedvictimsofNazi persecution from settling in Palestine. On the night of June 16, 1946,Palmah units, striking a blow at British control, attacked eleven bridges,destroyingtenofthem,duringtheNightoftheBridges.YehiamwaskillednearAhziv, in the north.His father read about the operation in the newspaper thenextdayandafewhourslaterwascalledtothehospitalinHaifa.Heaskedtoseehisson’sbody.“Ipulledbacktheedgeofthesheetandsawhiscurlsandhisforehead. His thick hair was wild and alive and his brow was smooth andthoughtful.HerewasYehiam,foreversilenced.”1
Hewasburiedjustashehadlived,asthesonofhisfather,aprominentfigureinaverysmallsociety:almosteveryonekneweveryoneandmanywererelated.“JewishJerusalemintheirthousandsyesterdayaccompaniedYehiam,thesonofYosefWeitz,tohisfinalrestingplace,”reportedthedailynewspaperDavar.The
national flag was draped over the body. Thirteen men had been killed withYehiamthatnight,buttheirbodieshadbeenshattered,thushisfuneralstoodfortheirs, too. The public was called to take part: in Haifa, where the funeralprocession began, all work came to a halt, transportation stood still, schoolswereclosed.InJerusalemtheprocessioncouldhardlymakeitswaythroughthecrowds.YehiamwasburiedontheMountofOlives.Weitzpouredhispain intohisdiary.“Thebelovedson isgone!Onecannot
acceptit—ishetrulygone?Helivesonineverycornerofthehouse;hespringsnexttoeverytreeandeveryplant;heisreflectedineverybook,everyline,evenat this verymoment. . . . I hear his voice, hear his final shalom, uttered in ahurryasheleftthehouse.Heenterseverythoughtandinterruptsit.Ifindithardtowrite, I lament him, andRema, too.”RemaSamsonovwasYehiam’swife.Shecame froma family thathad lived in the small townofHadera formanyyearsandlatergainedfameasasopranovocalist.“Twoyoungpeople,tallandupright,beautiful,kind.Ihadsuchhighhopesforthem.”
WEITZBLAMEDHIMSELF. “WHYDID INOTGOWITHHIM? . . . IF IHADBEENWITHHIMperhapshewouldnothavebeenharmed?”Hehada“burningpassion”toknowexactlyhowYehiamwaskilled,howandwherehewashit,whathadhappenedinhisfinalmoments,whathehadsaidattheend.Friendsreportedhisson’slastwords,andyes,theycontainedaheroicelementofsacrificeforthehomeland:“Iamlost....Goonwiththeoperation,”or“Iamfinished—youcontinue,”andalso,“TakecareofRema.”His fatherseemedhurt:“Nowordsof farewell forhisgrievingparents?”ButperhapsYehiamnolongerhadthestrength.Describinghowhedealtwithhispain,Weitzwrote,“Mysoulistornin two,
thecollectiveandtheindividual.”Hefoundcomfortinthemassparticipationinhis mourning, the public aspect seeming to place a screen, at least at first,between him and his true, private pain; he felt that his taskwas to fulfill thepublic roleof abereaved father. “InHaifa and in Jerusalem, thewholenationaccompaniedus,”hewroteinhisdiary,“andthrongsofpeoplefromeverywalkof life rushed tomy home for condolence visits. They say he is the nation’ssacrifice.”Yehiam’sdeathindeedtookonanationalandhistoricaldimension.Oneofthe
newspaperswrote:“Wearenotfosteringacultofsacrifice,buteverysacrificelikeYehiamWeitzisprecioustoussevenfold.Notonlybecauseofthewayhelived, but because of the way his life was lost.” Among those who paidconsolationwas themostseniorZionist leader inPalestineat the time,MosheShertok,whowouldlaterbecomeMosheSharett, Israel’sfirstforeignminister
and second primeminister. He toldWeitz that Yehiam had followed the truepathandhadfulfilled“asacredduty.”WeitzembracedShertok’swords.“Isaidit too: we must have strength in the face of the evil goyim, both Arab andBritish.AndYehiamchosethatpath.Hebelievedinit.Hewasdevotedtoit.Heisadmiredbyall.”Thefatherwasawareoftheironyofhissondyinginananti-British operation—he, of all people, who had been born with the BalfourDeclarationandhadgrownupasthe“nationalhome”wasbeingbuiltwithsuchgreathope,undertheauspicesoftheempire.At the funeral,Weitz approached Shertok, although in “whispers,”with the
most difficult question a bereaved father can ask a national leader: “Was theoperation necessary? And what was the point of it?” Shertok, whose eyes,accordingtoWeitz,were“kindandcomforting,”repliedwiththeanswerWeitzfelt heneeded to hear:Yes, theoperationon thebridgeswasnecessary, for itbrought us closer to our goal. “The heart of stone was touched with tenderdrops,”Weitzrecalled.Hetormentedhimselfwiththesamequestioneveryyear,alwaysremindinghimselfthathissonhadnotbeenkilledinvain.Workingthelandandbeingwillingtodieforitwere,tohim,valuesthatreinforcedtheJews’righttoEretzIsrael,thelandofIsrael.Hecametoseeaunitybetweenhisdeadsonand the landof Israel—allof it. “Igo towander in thecountry,”heoncewrote,“andasIbreathetheairoftheentiretyofmylandfrombordertoborder,and that of the people who live in it and embrace it, my people, I hear acomfortingvoicethatsays:Yes,itwasnecessaryanditshallberewarded.Theson,andalltheothersons,arehere,intheseaandtheland,inthemountainsandvalleys, in thefieldsandgardens, in theshrubsandtrees.Theyarepartof thenationandpartofthelandandwhenthetwogrowandbecomeone,greatandstrong,thenwilltheirmemorybecelebratedbyeverygeneration.Thememoryofallthesons.”And so Yehiam became a nationalmyth, an emblem of his generation, his
imagerootedinthecountry’ssoilandintheJewishstruggleforindependence.The author S.Yizhar, his cousin, described him as “a tree in its glory.”2 Themythtookholdrapidly.Yehiamwasdescribedasamemberofagenerationthatbreathed thecountry’s“freeair,” thathad learned to love it,build it,andfightforit:“Thisgenerationproducedthefinestpioneers,conquerorsanddefendersofthewilderness;afreebornanduprightgeneration—theDiasporaanditswayswere foreign to it.” Moshe Dayan, who was three years older than Yehiam;YigalAllon,whowasthesameage;andYitzhakRabin,fouryearsyounger,allbelonged to the same generation, as did many of the figures who led Israelisociety andmolded its culture.YehiamWeitzwas supposed to symbolize the
“NewHebrew,”whomZionistleadershopedtocreateinPalestine.Hewastheoppositeofthe“OldJew,”theDiasporaJew,whowasviewedwithcontempt.InYehiam,theysaw“anewman.”*ThreemonthsaftertheNightoftheBridges,YosefWeitztraveledtotheArab
villageof a’Zib,northofAcre, and fromadistanceobserved theplacewhereYehiam had been killed. “I could not go right there and prostratemyself andsearch for the drops of his blood which the earth had soaked up,” he wrote.Lookingeast,hesawtheremnantsofQala’atDjedin,ortheHeroes’Fortress,animpressively tall stone tower built by the Crusaders that had become astrongholdof theGalilee rulerDaherel’Omar.The sunwas setting, the tower“glimmered and lit up the entire area, all theway toHaifa.”And thenWeitzknew; he swore that thiswould bewhereYehiam’smonumentwould rise.AnewJewishpioneeringsettlementhadtobebuilthere,inthisplace,fordefense,forforestation,andforagriculture.“Thefortressshallberenewedanditshallbeours,” he wrote, “and above it shall fly the name of Yehiam, a token ofinnocence and dedication and sacrifice, and by its side an eternal flame shallsendlightintothedistance.”Thisendeavor,Weitztoldhiswife,Ruhama,wouldbetheirsolace.ThusKibbutzYehiamwasfounded.
JUST BEFORE THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THEIR SON’S DEATH, YOSEF AND RUHAMAWeitzpublishedanoticeaskingfamilieswithsonsnamedafterYehiamtocometo theplantingofamemorialgrovenearMa’aleHahamisha, akibbutzon theway to Jerusalem, whose name refers to five settlers killed by Arabs. Theyreceiveddozensofresponses,includingonefromLincoln,Nebraska.4Itwasalivelygathering,as some twodozenexcited,neatlycombed toddlers,one inasailor suit, crowdedaround the firstYehiam’smotherand fatherandhad theirphotograph takenasasouvenir.Thesewere thechildrenof theZionistdream.Many were the first generation of Israelis born in the country; few of theirparents had been born in Palestine. Most came from Eastern Europe. TwofatherswerefromTurkey,onemotherfromGermany.Therewasalawyerandahousewife, a plumber and a secretary, amechanical engineer, a driver, and astorekeeper.The fatherofoneYehiamwasagovernmentemployee; another’sparentshad foundedamoshav, a collectivevillage, in theGalilee,where theyfarmed the land. Some served as army officers in the Israel Defense Forces(IDF). Most, identifying with the Israeli establishment, read Davar, thenewspaper that voiced the positions of the social democratic party in power,Mapai, led by David Ben-Gurion. The little Yehiams would soon be readingDavarLe-Yeladim,thechildren’sweeklysectionofthenewspaper.Theirparents
couldsafelyanticipatehappinessandprosperity for theirchildren.Theycouldalsoreasonablyhopethattheseboys’liveswouldbebetterthantheirown,inanenvironment that was Hebrew, secular, and safe: they would no longer bepersecuted. The children all knew they were named after a hero, and somewouldgrowupwithasensethattheirnamehadburdenedthemwithapatrioticduty.5
WHILETHEYEHIAMSWERESTILLINTHEIRCRADLES,THEIRNAMEHADALREADYBEENdragged into a major patriotic dispute. On November 29, 1947, the UnitedNations General Assembly proposed its plan to partition Palestine into twostates,oneJewishandoneArab.MostoftheJewslivinginPalestineatthetimeagreedwiththeassembly’sdecision,oftenenthusiastically,buttherewerethosewho opposed it because they wanted the state to control the whole of EretzIsrael.Theoppositionpublishedamanifesto thatproclaimed,“Wewillhaveastate—butwithnoYehiam.”According to thepartitionplan,KibbutzYehiam,foundedinaccordancewithYosefWeitz’svision,wouldhavefallenwithintheterroritorytobepartoftheArabstate.Ha’aretzobservedthatthetombofKingDavid,onMountZioninJerusalem,wouldalsobeleftoutsidethestateborders,sothatYehiamwouldbeingoodcompany.Jerusalem,inthepartitionmap,wasdestinedtobeaseparateentity,underinternationalrule.6
Attheendof1947,warbrokeout.ItresultedintheestablishmentoftheStateofIsrael,anditsterritoryincludedYehiamaswellasWestJerusalemandotherareasnotintendedforitunderthepartitionplan.YosefWeitzbelievedthatthesuccessoftheZionistenterprisenecessitatedtheremovaloftheArabpopulationfromPalestine.During and after thewar, hewas involved in deportingArabsfromterritoriesconqueredbytheIDF,preventingrefugeesfromreturning,andforciblytransferringArabswithinthestate.Inthe1950shewasinstrumentalinattemptstoencourageIsraeliArabstoleavethecountry.Hecontinuedtobelieveinthe“transfer”ofArabsuntiltheendofhisdays.7
THETERMSOFTHECEASE-FIREWERESETIN1949,ANDTHEBORDERSWEREMARKEDONthe map with a green line. The West Bank of the Jordan River and EastJerusalem soon cameunder the control of theHashemiteKingdomof Jordan.TheMountofOliveswas alsooutside the territoryof Israel, andYosefWeitzcouldnolongervisithisson’sgrave.TheGazaStripwastransferredtoEgyptiancontrol.ManyIsraelisrefusedtogiveuptheoriginalZionistdream,hopingfortheday
when Israelwould embraceboth sidesof the Jordan.Some Israeli politicians,
includingBen-Gurion, aswell as some IDFgenerals did not rule outmilitaryactiontoexpandthestateovertheGreenLine.Butforthemostpart,Israelisdidnotseriouslyconsiderthepossibilitythat theborderswouldchange,andIsraelrepeatedly declared that it wanted peace based on the existing situation.8Nonetheless, Israelis generally believed they had not seen their final war.“Sadly,almostfromaninherent inclination,Israeliswaitedfor thenextwarasfor the predictable visit of a wearisome mother-in-law,” wrote Amos Elon.9While they were not necessarily expecting a fresh round of fighting in theforeseeable future, most thought the Arabs had not abandoned their goal ofdestroying Israel and that Israelis could offer nothing to induce them torecognize the state and make peace. Until the beginning of 1966, Israelisbelieved that time was on their side, and assumed that as the country grewstronger,theArabswouldadapttoreality.WhenIsraelisusedtheterm“Arabs,”theyweremainlyreferringtoEgyptians,
Jordanians, Syrians, Lebanese, and Iraqis—not to the Palestinians. Ever sincethey had fled and been deported during Israel’s War of Independence, thePalestinianshadceasedbeingconsideredanenemyforceandwerementionedonly as a diplomatic nuisance: refugees whose affair came up for discussiononceayearattheUN.TerroristattacksweremostlyattributedtotheArabstates,not to thePalestiniannationalstruggle.The1949armisticebetweenIsraelanditsneighborswasviolatedbynumerousactsof terrorismandborder incidents,andin1956IsraelandEgyptengagedina“secondround”ofcombat,knownastheSinaiCampaign.Mostof theYehiamswere inelementaryschoolduring theSinaiCampaign,
andtheyweretooyoungtoremembertheWarofIndependence.Itwasnotuntil1964 that they began to join the army, part of the country’s first enlistedgeneration.Armyservicewassomethingtheytookforgranted,partofaroutinethatmostIsraelisfeltbothcommittedtoandpowerlesstochange.“Iwasattheendofeleventhgrade,andallIcaredaboutbackthenwaswhereIwouldserveinthearmy,”oneoftheYehiamsrecollected.10Theirwarcamein1967.
2.ABIE
In themid-1960s Israelwas emerging as one of themore impressive successstoriesofthetwentiethcentury,andmostIsraelishadgoodreasontobeproudoftheircountryandbelieveinitsfuture.Manylappeduptheprogressivespiritofthe sixties, perceptible primarily inTelAviv.Most cars driving downtownonDizengoff Street were European and Americanmodels, but one out of every
four new cars was assembled in Israel.11 The models bore Hebrew names—Carmel,Gilboa, Sussita—and therewas even the Sabra, a fanciful sports car.OnemodelassembledinIsraelwastheContessa,afamilycarmanufacturedbytheJapanesecompanyHino. Itsdesignwas reminiscentofAmericancars,buttheenginewasintherear.“Howcomeyoudon’thaveaContessa?”askedtheadvertisements,asifitwereasocialdutytoownone.12
The U.S. ambassador described the local automotive industry as “one ofIsrael’s miracles.” Whether harmless fantasy or a megalomaniac adventure,however, the industry was short-lived. But while it lasted it was yet anothermanifestation of the Israeli dream, born in Tel Aviv, “the first Hebrew city,”aroundaplazawithafountain,woodenbenches,andpalmtrees.13
Dizengoffwasmorethanastreet:itwasaculturalandsocialidealthatevenenrichedtheHebrewlanguagewithanewverb,“toDizengoff,”coinedby thepopularweeklymagazineHa’olamHazeh.WhenpeoplesaidtheyweregoingtoDizengoff,theymeanttheyweregoingouttoseeandbeseeninaninnovative,secular, urban milieu, while longing for London and New York. Buyers ofluxuryitemsfoundexpensiveboutiquesandshoeshopsthatdisplayedthelatestfashions from Milan and Paris. The sidewalks were dotted with café tableswhereauthorsandpoets,journalistsandactors,andotherdoyensoflocalculturetook care of business. They did not have far to go—work was close by:downtown Tel Aviv was the center of Israel’s cultural activity. Theaters andconcerthalls,museumsandnewspapers,theywereallhere.Thiswaswherethenewestmovieswerescreenedandsubversiveideaswerebandiedabout.TelAvivgaveoffaMediterraneanease,butmanyofthecoffeehousehabitués,
immigrantswhohadcometo thecity in the1920s,werefromEasternEuropeandoftenstillspoke inRussian,Polish,andYiddish.The thirtieshadseen thearrival of refugees from Central Europe, many of whom still spoke German.ThesewerethepeoplewhopopulatedDizengoffStreetbyday.Butaseveningfell, thecrowdchangedandthecafésfilledupwithayoungerclientele,manyborn in Israel. Café Roval was the place to see attractive young women andgvarvarim—anothertermcoinedbyHa’olamHazeh—meaning theswaggeringyoungmenwhoactedtwicetheirage.TheydroveVespasandLambrettasmadeinItaly.ActorandfilmdirectorUriZoharsetafewscenesfromhisfilmAHoleintheMooninCaféRoval.Itwasasatiricalfilm,oneofthefirsttopokefunatthe Zionist ethos. The iconic Café Kassit was the place for argument andsubversion. Here journalist Amos Kenan and the sculptor Yigal Tumarkinsigned a letter to Prime Minister Levi Eshkol informing him that they had
decidedtobreakthelawandenterprohibitedmilitaryzonestoidentifywiththestruggle of the Israeli Arabs, who had been living under various restrictionssince 1948.14 This was a civil rights cause, not unlike the campaign againstracial discrimination in the United States. Not far from Café Kassit was aneateryownedbyamaneveryoneknewasAbie.PopularamongpoliticiansandIDF generals, Abie’s place was called the California, and it served the firstIsraelihamburger.AbieNathanwas awell-likedman, and rightly so, becausehe sought todo
good.Mostpeopledidnottakehimseriously—this,too,withgoodreason.Theylikedhimbecausehewasnaïveandseemedloathtogrowup.OriginallyfromIran, he was the son of an affluent textile merchant who observed Jewishtraditions and spoke English at home. At the age of six, Abie was sent to aCatholicschoolinBombay,wheretherestofthefamilyeventuallymoved.Hewas brought up as an uncompromising Zionist. Among other things, he wastaught a Hebrew song with words by Ze’ev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky, the right-wingRevisionistleaderwhosepoliticalmovementbelievedthatthebiblicallandof Israel promised to the Jews stretched fully to the Euphrates. “The RiverJordanhas twobanks,” sowent thewordsof the song. “This one is ours, theother one too.”Noone ever bothered to explain themeaningof thewords toyoungAbie.15
Aftergraduatingfromhighschool,Abiehadtroubledecidingwhethertobealawyer or an actor. He eventually settled on becoming a pilot and joined theIndianairforce.AftermovingtoPalestine,hebecameoneofthefirstpilotsinthe Israeli air force, in 1948, and during the War of Independence bombedseveralArabvillages.Walkinginonevillage,Sa’asa,inthenorthofIsrael,hefoundtheplaceabandonedandmostofthehousesdestroyed.AmongtheruinsAbie saw scorched corpses. “Iwas overcome by a deep depression,” he laterrecounted. “More and more I began to be troubled by what war does topeople.”16 He had also taken part in the air attacks on the Faluja pocket, anEgyptian stronghold near Kibbutz Negba in southern Israel. One Egyptianofficer who survived that attack was Gamal Abdel Nasser, who went on tobecomepresidentofEgypt.When the war was over, Abie first found work as a pilot with the Israeli
airline,ElAl,andthenheopenedtheCalifornia.Ahandsomeman,oozingwithcharm, he married, had a daughter, divorced, and cultivated his image as awealthyandgenerousplayboywhobelievedinabetterworld.Heoftendonatedmoneytogoodcauses.
Abiewas a new kind of hero, completely different fromYehiamWeitz.Atsomepointovertheyears,betweenthetimeoftheJerusalem-bredwarriorwhoepitomizedthenationalepicandthemomentoftheamiableTelAvivcelebritywho symbolized the good life, Israel had changed to become a country quitedifferentfromthevisionofitsfounders.Intheearly1960s,theIsraeliairforcehadlaunchedtheslogan“Thebestjoin
theairforce.”Thesloganwascontroversial,butcaughton.17Abie’shistoryasapilot in theWar of Independence awardedhima place among “the best.”Hisownershipofaprivateairplane,even if itwas leased,wasseenasanexcitinginnovation. Set against the labor values of the first Zionists, the socialisteconomytheyinstituted,andthenationalideologytheynurtured—glorifyingthekibbutz farmer and scorning theurban entrepreneur—Abie emerged as oneofthe first agents of an American culture that had begun to penetrate Israel.Surroundedbyglamorouswomen,hewasadaringmanbreakingfreefromtheshackles of convention, although not a real revolutionary.As a forty-year-oldchildhealsofoundarealpurposeinlife:tomakepeace.Hisfriendsconvincedhim to run for the Knesset in the November 1965 elections and during hiscampaignhepledgedtoflytoEgyptandholdpeacetalkswithNasser.
ONTHEELECTIONBALLOT,EACHPOLITICALPARTYISREPRESENTEDBYTWOORTHREEHebrew letters; Abie’s letters were nun-samekh, which happen to spell theHebrew word for “miracle.” He received only 2,135 votes, but his non-parliamentary popularity was unharmed by his defeat.18 On the contrary, hisfailureinpoliticsonlyburnishedhisimageasoneof“thebest.”Abie’sfantasyofflyingtoseeNasserpersisted,althoughheneversaid,andmostlikelyhadnoidea, what he would tell the president of Egypt when they met—perhaps hethought the encounter itself would have the power to change history. Hepromotedtheideafrequently,andwrotetoprominentfiguresaroundtheworldasking for their support. One of them, the undersecretary general of the UN,RalphBunche,triedtoexplainwiththeutmostgravitywhytherewasnochancethatNasserwould respond to the initiative.MinisterYigalAllon came to theCaliforniatotrytopreventtheescapade,butbythetimeAllonhadfinishedhismeal,accordingtoAbie,hewaspromisingtogoalongontheflight.19
It ishard topinpointexactlywhen the flightceasedbeingaDizengoff-stylegimmickandbecamearealoperation.Bytalkinguptheidea,Abiehadputhisintegrity and courage on the line.He felt he had to prove to his friends, andperhaps to himself, that he was true to his word, for the sake of peace. InFebruary1966,hepublishedacall for thepublic tosignapetitionofsupport.
ManyIsraelisresponded,excitedbyAbie’spromisetohopoverthebordersoflittle Israel and sally directly into the regions of peace. They wanted Abie’sflight to happen much as the British, almost a century earlier, had wantedPhileasFoggtosuccessfullygoaroundtheworld ineightydays.Perhaps theyfelt the “sorrow of distances” that writer AmosOz had identified among thekibbutzyouth, a sorrowexperiencedbypeoplewho felt shut in. “Theirheartslongforotherplaces thatarenot specific,but theyaredistant.”20Onewayoranother, the mass support deepened Abie’s commitment. He consulted hisattorney,signedawill,and invited journalists toviewcrates thatwerefull,hesaid,ofpagesbearingtensofthousandsofsignatures.Whenhehadcountedonehundredthousand,hedecideditwastime.21
ON THEMORNINGOF FEBRUARY 28, 1966, ABIEWASAWOKENBYHIS PHONERINGING.ZviElgat,areporterforMaariv,wasonthe line.Anhour later,ElgatcametodriveAbietoalittleairfieldinthesmall townofHerzliya,astheyhadagreedthe night before while sitting at the bar at the California. On the way, theypickedupaphotographerfromthenewspaper.TheytoldtheairfieldemployeesthatAbiewastheretohavehispicturetakennexttoaplanehehadleasedfromafertilizationcompany.Itwasasingle-engineStearmanbuiltin1927,theyearAbiewasborn,withanopencockpit.ThenamePeace1hadbeenpaintedonthewhiteplaneinHebrew,English,andArabic.Abie,wearingaflightsuit,satdownbehindthecontrols,lookeddirectlyatthe
camera,andstartedup theengine.“Forasecond,perhapsan infinitemoment,myheartstoppedbeating,”Elgatwrotethenextday.“Ihadafeelingthatmaybe,after all, it was just a dream. I went up to him and shouted. My voice wasdrownedoutbythepropeller.Icamecloser.’Abie,areyouflying?’Henodded.Iknew.Iwasproudofhim.Abiehaddoneit!Iwillneverknowwhowasmoreexcited—Abieormyself.IonlyknowthatIhadtimetoaskhim,’Abie,areyouscared?’Hewaspale,wearingahelmet,andhesignaledoneword:’No!’Thenhetookoff.ForamomentIrefusedtobelieveit.”Elgatwas theonlyreporterwhohadaccompaniedAbie,butby the timehis
scoopwaspublished,newshadcomefromanAmericanpressagencyinCairothattheplanehadcrashedandAbieNathanwasdead.Thepopularrestaurateurbecameaninstantnationalhero.“Iwillsueanyonewhosaysthatthemanwasonlydoing it forpublicity,”Elgat swore.22The newsofAbie’s death sent thecountry intomourning.TheHebrewdailiesMaarivandYediotAharonot cameoutwithspecialeditions;theradiointerruptednormalbroadcasting.ThrongsofpeoplegatheredoutsidetheCalifornia,manyweepingasiftheyhadlostafriend
andahope.Abie’sclosefriends,manyofwhomwereartistsandmediapeople,squeezed into the restaurant and spoke inwhispers. Suddenly one of them, agallery owner, raised his voice: “I am his best friend, but I didn’t sign thepetition.Itshouldn’thavebeensigned.YousenthimtodieinEgypt.Youkilledhim!”Therewasaterriblesilence.AndthenHaimHefer,thesongwriter,madehisway through the crowds and shouted, “He’s alive!He’s alive!”There hadbeenanannouncementontheradio.TheAssociatedPress,whichhadinitiallyreportedAbie’sdeath,hadmadea
mistake. After taking off, Abie hadmade a sharp turn toward the ocean andflownas lowashecould, toavoidbeingpickedupbyIsraeliAirForceradar.WhenheflewoverTelAvivhewasalmosttouchingtherooftops;ashepassedovertheseahewassprayedwithfoamfromthewaves.Theairforcedetectedhimandalertedplanestoescorthimback,butherefusedandkeptgoing.23Andthentheylosthim.Hedidnothavearadio,norenoughfueltoreachCairo.HegotasfarasPortSaid,atthenorthernendoftheSuezCanal,wherehelandedsafely,introducedhimselftotheastonishedairportemployees,andaskedtobetaken toNasser.TheEgyptiansdidnotharmhim.They tookhim to the localgovernor, gave him a heartymeal, allowed him to spend the night, and evendrove him into town to buy some pajamas. Then they took him back to theairport.Atnightheplayedcardswith theguardsandwon.Thenextday theytoldhimtogohome.When thenews thathewasalive reached the restaurant,peoplehuggedand
kissedoneanother,tearsofjoyminglingwithchampagne.Someoneoutonthesidewalksaidaprayerofthanks.Wordtraveledquickly,andtherewerereportsofspontaneousgesturesofcelebrationallaroundthecountry.SoldiersinKiryatGatboughtabottleofcognacandaskedpassersbytoraiseatoast.Thenextday,thousandsofpeoplecametogreetAbieattheairfield,andtherunwayhadtobecleared so he could land. His fans hugged him almost to death.24 It was adecisivelyIsraelimoment:nothingcharacterizedIsraelismorethanthesesuddentransitions between paralyzing depression and intoxicating joy, between thedepthsofdespairandthejoyofsalvation.Thatwasalsothestoryof1967.
THESIX-DAYWARWASACULMINATIONOFEVENTSTHATHADBEGUNSEVERALYEARSearlier. Starting in the mid-1960s, Fatah, the Palestinian National LiberationMovement,beganattackingmilitaryandcivilian targets in Israel, seeing theseactions as a direct continuation of the Palestinian defeat in 1948.Despite theIsraelis’disregardofthePalestiniansasanenemyforce,thewarthatbrokeoutinJune1967was,infact,anotherroundintheconflictbetweenthetwopeoples.
ManyoftheterroristswhoinfiltratedIsraelpriortoJune1967camefromSyrianterritory,whichledtoanincreaseinfrictiononthenorthernborder.OnApril7,the Israeli air force shot down sixSyrian air force planes in response to suchinfiltrations. Further warnings and threats voiced in Israel just beforeIndependence Day in May created the impression that Israel was close toattacking Syria, which had a defense pact with Egypt. In mid-May, theEgyptiansdecidedtointerveneandbegandeployingtroopstotheSinaiDesert.The most concise description of this development can be found in the
governmentminutesfromMay16,1967,inastatementbyPrimeMinisterLeviEshkol: “In light of information and requests reaching Egypt from Syriaregarding Israel’s intentions to takeextensiveactionsagainstSyria, in lightofIsraeli declarations and warnings over the last few days, and in light of thedifficult situation in which Egypt has found itself following April 7, Egyptdecidedthatitcannotsitbyidlygiventhecurrentstateofaffairs.”InEshkol’sjudgment, Egypt intended to deter Israel from carrying out its threats againstSyria.25ThetensionontheEgyptianfrontquicklyspreadtotheJordanianandSyrianfronts.WhilewarwithEgyptwastheoutcomeofIsrael’sdemoralizationandasenseofhelplessness,thefightingwithJordanandSyriaexpressedasurgeofpowerandmessianicpassion.Theevents that led to thewar,aswellas itscourseandconsequences,have
beenwidelyresearchedandanalyzed,buttounderstandwhyitbrokeoutinthefirst place, it is not enough to know the diplomatic andmilitary background.WhatisneededisdeepknowledgeoftheIsraelisthemselves.In1966,theyhadbeen struckby an emotional, political, andmoral earthquake.Therewere justover 2.3 million Jews and a few more than 300,000 Arabs in the country.Beginning in 1966, more and more Israelis had started to lose faith inthemselvesand sink intodepression.Thedoubtwaseverywhere, and it led todespair.“Whattodo,people,whattodo?”lamentedthesongwriterHaimHefer.“Nothing goes right and there’s not a drop of good luck . . . Everything isdepressing and everybody sad Things aren’t working out and no one knowswhy.”26
Theyearsawadreadfuleconomicrecessionandasharpdropinimmigration.Tensof thousands left Israelpermanently. Israel’sAshkenazi-Europeanculturewas threatened by the influx of Mizrahim, Jewish immigrants from Arabcountries,resultinginsocialtensionandresentment.Thesedevelopmentsledtoadeepandpainfulidentitycrisis,andtheZionistvisionseemedtohaverunitscourse.“Weareapatheticpeople,”saidoneMapaileader,andmanyconcluded
that,asonenewspaperputit,“theprojecthadfailed.”27
In themonths leadingup to thewar therewasawidespreadfeeling that thestate’smostbasicvaluesofsacrificeandnationalunityhad lost theirheftandmeaning,yettherewasnothingtoreplacethem.Drawingagainandagainonthebasic tenets ofZionism,people argued a lot, andoften thesewerenotmerelypolitical arguments between “left” and “right,” but rather fundamentalexaminationsof the Israelidream itself.Many felt that the societywas fallingapart.Againstthisbackground,aneditoratMaarivexplainedtheneedfeltbysomany to loveAbieNathanandembracehimasahero:“You tookusaway,atleastforoneday,fromtheterribleroutinethateatsawayatus.”28
The crisis prior to the Six-DayWar found Israelis utterly downcast. “I amfilledwith fear,”wrote theminister of agriculture,HaimGvati, inhisdiary.29Israel, he felt, was about to be tested as it had not been since the War ofIndependence.“Everyoneunderstandsthisisabattletothedeath.”Intheprimeminister’soffice,GvatiheardthattheSovietUnionhadapparentlydecided“togoalltheway,nolongerhesitanttodestroyIsrael.”Therewasnobasisforthisreport in fact, but primed for annihilation, Israelis let no rumor go unheeded.Soldiershomefortheweekendspokeofdejectionandlowmoraleinthearmy.“Therearerumorsthatwearenotpreparedforwar...thereisnofaiththatwecan stand up to our enemies,” the minister wrote. This fear had no basis inreality, either.Butwar appeared inevitable.AsGvati participated in a cabinetmeeting,IDFChiefofStaffYitzhakRabininterruptedtoreportthatfourSoviet-made Egyptian planes had infiltrated Israeli airspace. The planes had beendrivenout,buttwoofthemhadapparentlyhadtimetophotographthenuclearreactoratDimona.30
Prepared for an apocalypse, many Israelis pondered the Holocaust. “Howcouldthisbe?”awomanfromRamatayimwrotetoaformerclassmatelivinginLosAngeles.“Nottwenty-fiveyearshavegonebysinceWorldWarIIandit’shappeningagain?”31 A report to President Lyndon Johnson said that EphraimEvron, an Israeli diplomat inWashington, had come to ask for U.S. support“withtearsinhiseyes.”32
When war finally broke out, Minister Gvati spent the first few hours in abomb shelter, togetherwith his neighbors.The next day, thewhole thingwasvirtuallyover.“Itwasthegreatestdayinourlives,perhapsinallthehistoryofthe Jewishpeople,”hewrote.33Most Israelis believed that the IDFhad savedthemfromdestruction.Manydescribedthevictoryasamiracle,asif theyhadbeensprungfromhellandborneuptothesummitofsalvation.Itwas“thehand
ofGod,”declaredYediotAharonotinaneditorial.34Thesenseoftotaldoomallbut disappeared; history was about to begin again. Two popular jokes drivehomethis reversalofmood.According to thefirst, toldbefore thewar,asignhangs near the boarding gate at Lod Airport asking the last one out of thecountry to turn off the lights. In the second, after the war, two officers aretalkingabouthowtospendtheirday.“Let’sconquerCairo,”oneproposes.Theotherreplies,“Butwhatwillwedoafterlunch?”35
SOME MONTHS BEFORE THE WAR, MOSHE DAYAN HAD VISITED VIETNAM. “THEAMERIcans are winning everything here—except the war,” he wrote when hereturned.36Not longafterJune1967, theoppositecouldhavebeensaidof theIsraelis: their only achievement was actually winning the war. Nothing wasgainedbyoccupyingtheterritoriescapturedinthewar.Butsweptawaybyfearandsubsequentlyby the intoxicationofvictory, theiremotionsoftenpropelledthem to act against their national interests, a pattern of behavior the Israelisoften attributed to the Arabs, prompting the British ambassador to write inamazementtohissuperiorsinLondon:“ItisremarkablehowoftentheIsraeliscan behave in a manner more Arab than the Arabs.”37 There was indeed nojustificationfor thepanic thatprecededthewar,norfor theeuphoria that tookhold after it, which is what makes the story of Israel in 1967 so difficult tocomprehend.
*InYehiam’s letters, published posthumously, he defined himself as aZionistand a socialist, in the spirit of his father. He intended, like many of hisgeneration,tocontinueonthepathhisparentshadpaved.Onecriticpraisedthe“age-old Jewish sorrow” reflected inhis letters,whichpointedup the identityconflict between theDiaspora Jew and theNewHebrew that remained at thecenterof Israeli publicdiscourse formanyyears afterYehiam’sdeath.Letterswrittenby soldierswho fell in Israel’swarswereoftenpublished, asmuch toimmortalizethewritersastoconveyanadmirableeducationalmessage.3
PARTIBETWEENRISHONLEZIONANDMANHATTAN
Inthesecondhalfofthe1930s,ayoungmanbythenameofGabrielSterncameto Jerusalem fromGermany.He tookcourses inMiddleEastern studies at theHebrew University and devoted himself to bringing about reconciliationbetween Jews and Arabs. During the War of Independence in 1948 he wasstationed at a guard post in the Italian Hospital, in Jerusalem’s Musraraneighborhood.Onedayhe suddenly foundhimself face-to-facewith aman inuniformwhowasaimingagunathim, fingeron the trigger.Theenemy.Themanwas standingat theendof a long,dimly lit corridor.Sterndidnotknowhowhehadgottenthere.Hefeltatthatmomentthathislifewasontheline:oneofthemwouldopenfireandlive.Theotherwoulddie.Sternpulledthetrigger.The bullet went straight into the figure—and shattered it into a thousandfragments of glass: itwas a largemirror. Stern had shot at himself.He nevershotatanyoneagain.
CHAPTER1SUSSITADAYS
1.ISRAELISI:“GETTINGALONGPRETTYWELL”
OnThursday,May18,1967,YehoshuaBar-DayancamehomefromworkandtookhisSussitaforanoilchange.Bar-Dayan,thirty-five,workedfortheCitrusFruitMarketingCouncilinRishonLezion.Togettheoilchanged,hehadtogotoRehovot,andhetookhistwo-year-oldson,Yariv,withhim.Onthewaytothegarage,Bar-Dayannoticedthereweren’tmanytrucksontheroads,whichwasunusual. The IDF had begun calling up reservists because of sudden tensionsalongtheborderwithEgypt.“IhaveafeelingIwillbecalleduptonight,”Bar-Dayanwroteinthediaryhestartedwritingthenextday.1Hehopedhewouldn’tbecalled,butinhisgutheknewitwouldhappenthatnight.His wife, Gila, a kindergarten teacher, was busy with the usual Thursday
errands,includingavisittothehairdresser.Thecouplewenttosleepateleven-thirty that night. Bar-Dayan had trouble falling asleep, and at midnight thephonerang:itwasUziAvrahami,anarmyfriend.“Bereadyintenminutes,”hesaid. Bar-Dayan wrote of that night in his diary, “Gili was trembling. Icomfortedher,butIwasalsotrembling.”HedrovetheSussitatoUzi’sandoverthenextfewhourstheyusedarmy-issuedaddressliststogofromdoortodoorand call up fellow soldiers, drivers, and vehicle crews for reserve duty. Thesamescenerepeateditselfateachof theirstops: theywouldwalkupthestepsandringthedoorbell.Frightenedwiveswouldgettheirhusbandsoutofbedandpreparebackpacksforthem.Themenwouldgointotheirchildren’sbedroomsandkissthechildren;sometimestherewouldbeelderlyparentstokissaswell.Theywouldsaygood-byetotheirwivesandsetoffforthestagingarea.Unlikethe other men, Bar-Dayan got to return home again after rounding up thereservists. He was back just before dawn and slept for two hours. Gili hadpreparedhisgear.Uzicametopickhimupatsix-thirty.ItwasFriday,May19.Theatmosphereinthecountryhadbeentense,andnoweveryonewassuddenlytalkingofwar.A year and a half earlier, things had looked very different. Yehoshua Bar-
Dayan,knowntofriendsandfamilyasShuka,wasanoptimisticandcontentedman.RishonLezion,withapopulationofalmost36,000,preservedsomethingof its original character as one of the first Zionist agricultural settlements in
Palestine.LetterswrittenbyresidentstofriendsandrelativesoverseasdepictedalifestylecommonamongIsraelis.Nineoutofeverytenlivedintowns,oneoutofthreeincitieslikeTelAviv,Haifa,orJerusalem.2Atthebeginningof1966,letters sent by Israelis expressed satisfaction and a fundamental faith in theirfuture. They saw themselves as part of the Western world and shaped theirexpectationsoflifeandthecountryaccordingly.Theytraveledabroadoften,andthey bought televisions; although there were no Israeli broadcasts yet, theyexpectedtherewouldbesoon.Sincetheendofthe1956SinaiCampaign,theyhadlivedwithasenseofsecurity,believingthatlifewasonlygettingbetterandwouldcontinue todoso. In themid-sixties, itdid indeedseemthat Israelwaschalkingup immense accomplishments, in practically every arenaof life.Thestandardoflivinghadimprovedgreatlysincetheestablishmentofthestateandwas now approaching that of several European countries, with soaringproduction levels, a surplus of jobs, and a continuous increase in salaries andprices.Intheearlysixtiestheeconomyexperiencedextremelyhighrealgrowthratesof10to12percentayear.3AnupswingwasapparentinallIsraelicities,generating hope and pride. The architecture reached for the stars, just like inAmerica.Beersheba’sfirstfourteen-storyresidentialbuildingwasconstructed.InKiryat
Eliezer, a suburb of Haifa, the tallest residential building sprang up, twentystorieshigh. InRamatGan theywere about to finish constructing the twenty-seven-floorDiamondExchange.InTelAvivthetallestbuildinginIsraelopened,a thirty-four-floor skyscraper. From the Shalom Observatory at the top, onecouldlooknorthandseetheoutskirtsofHaifa,orsouthtoglimpsetheperipheryofJerusalem.Inthesouthofthecountry,“themostplannedcityintheworld”was rising out of the sand:Arad.New public-use buildingswere opening alloverthecountry.InOctober,thecornerstoneforBeitHatefutsot,theMuseumoftheJewishDiaspora,waslaidinTelAviv.Afewmonthspriortothat,theIsraelMuseum had opened in Jerusalem. On the hilltop across the way, the newKnesset building opened in August 1966. According to Yediot Aharonot, theceremonywas themostmagnificent thecountryhadeverseen.The“shrineoftheKnesset,”as itwasdescribed,wasbuiltwithfundsdonated to thestatebytheBritishbranchoftheRothschildfamily.Institutesofhighereducationwerealso developing rapidly. “Auniversity is born in theNegev,” reportedMaarivfromBeersheba.TheUniversityofHaifaannounced itwasmovingup“PhaseA” of its establishment, and planned an eighteen-story high-rise building. TelAvivUniversityopenedalawschool.Israelis could read their newspaperswith a sense of pride.Maariv reported
thatIsraelwouldbeinvolvedintheFrenchspaceprogram,whichwassettingupasatellitecommunicationssystem.Ha’aretzquotedaprominentscientist,ErnstDavidBergman,whoasserted that therewas reason toexpectan Israeli spaceprogram.Aninternationalsurveycomparingachievementlevelsinmathematicsamong students in a dozen countries ranked Israelis first; U.S. students camelast.Thatsameyear, Israelwon theAsianchampionship inbasketball.“We’regetting along prettywell,” one governmentminister said, aptly describing thelocalframeofmind.4InRishonLezion,ayoungcoupleorderedarockingchairforthelivingroomoftheirapartmentonWeizmannStreet.Lifehadbeenkindtotheyoungcouple,DavidandRina:liketheirneighbors,
YehoshuaandGilaBar-Dayan,theyhadacutelittlebabywhomadethemveryhappy.Oneevening,Rinawrotealettertoheroldersister,Edna,inNewYorkasshesatwithDavidontheirbalcony.Asshewrote,shewastossingamatchboxtohimandhekeptthrowingitbacktoher,andsotheyamusedthemselves,shementionedintheletter.Thebabywassleeping.Itwasalmostmidnight.Shewasinhertwenties,andshewaspreparingforateachingcertificationexam,takingabreakfromherstudiestowritetheletter.Asusual,shewasusingapostage-paidairmailletterissuedbythepostoffice;itwaseasierandcheaperthananormalletter with an envelope. The rocking chair would comewith an ottoman, shewrote,andtheupholsterywouldmatchthecolorsoftheroomnicely.Theywereplanningtoorderamatchinglampshade,andifthingswentwellfinanciallytheywouldalsobuyalovelyrug.5
In1966,theaverageworkingJewishfamilylivedonanincomeof700lirasamonth.Anelectricalengineerandhiswife,whomadealmosttwicethatmuch,couldliveverywell.“Mynetmonthlysalaryisabout850liras,andasateacher,Zipporamakesabout400Israelilirasamonth,”wroteoneyoungman,YehudaYost,tofriendsinLosAngeles.“Withthesesalarieswecanlivewell—wehaveaphone,weboughtfurniturefortheapartment,we’repayingbackdebts,andofcoursewehavetolive,too.”Theyownedacar,asecondhandBritishHillman.6In that regard theywere in theupperbrackets:onlyone in ten Israeli familiesownedtheirowncar,butthenumberswererapidlyincreasing.7*Rinaandherhusbandhaddecideditwastimeforhertolearnhowtodrive.In
the meantime they continued to make improvements in the apartment: theyinstalled wood paneling on the wall opposite the front door and along thehallway from the kitchen. It was Finnish pine, with lots of dark knots, Rinawrote.“It’sreallylovely.Yousitinthelivingroomandthewallgivesitawarm,homeyfeeling.”Sheputthephilodendronnexttothatwall.InNovember1966,
theywereinformedthattheywouldbegettingatelephone.ThePostalMinistry,whichoversawthetelephonenetwork,hadalreadysentthemabillfor650liras.“The whole thing came as a complete surprise, because we only ordered thephone lastNovember, and in Israel youusuallywait about twoor threeyears(usuallythree)togetit,”theywrotetoNewYork.Nowtheywouldonlyhavetowaitafewmonthsatmost.†ThetelephonearrivedjustbeforePassover,withasix-digit number, andwas awarded a detailed description in the next letter toManhattan: “It’s ivorywhite and for now it sits in the study, where it fits innicely with the Formica tabletop.” They added an extension outlet in thehallway.Soon theywouldbuy a large copper tray for the telephone; itwouldperchonwoodenlegsagainstthenewwood-paneledwallintheentryway.‡Davidworkedhardeveryday.LikeYehoshuaBar-Dayan,hewasanexperton
citrus fruitmarketing.He had a degree from theUniversity ofCalifornia andhadservedasaregimentcommanderintheIDF’sartillerycorps.Severaltimesayear,hewascalledupforreserveduty.Hiswifecleanedthehouse,cooked,andtookcareofthebaby.“EverydayIfindsomethingimportanttotidyorbuyandIneverknewtherecouldbesomanychores,”shewrote,assuringhersisterthatshewasnotatallbored.SometimesshetookthebabytotheWeizmannInstituteswimmingpool.“It’sabig,clean,beautifulpool,andthepeoplewhogothereare very ‘select.’ They are employees of the Institute, or people from outsidewhobuyanannualmembershipforthelargesumofafewhundredliras.”Onceshewrotetohersisteraboutanewpairofblackshoes.“Acombinationofsuedeand patent leather. They’re the latest fashion, with a very wide heel, closedbacksandsquaredinfront.”Hersistersenther“adorable”pantsandasweaterfor the baby, and a lace slip that arrived just in time: “I have an appointmentwiththeseamstresstomorrow.”OnceortwiceaweekRinawouldpopintoseeherparents,wholivednearby
onSokolovStreet.HermotherwasateacherwhohadcometoIsraelinthemid-thirtiesfromBialystok,Poland.Herfather,anaccountant,wasfromtheUkraine.They had been among the founders of a kibbutz and had moved with theiryounger son to Rishon Lezion after twenty years. “A pleasant familyatmosphere,”theirdaughterwrotetohersister.“Weallsitaroundinthekitchen.Father eats cauliflower with butter and Mother peels potatoes at the sink.”*Theyhadagasstoveforcookingand,asdidnineoutoftenIsraelifamilies,anelectricrefrigerator.Theyusedkerosenestovestoheattheirapartment,likemostIsraelis.Thekerosenepeddlerswouldmaketheirroundsoftheneighborhoods,ringing bells as theywent. Some of them still used horse-drawn carts; otherscame with motorized vehicles. The Friedman company of Jerusalem sold a
kerosene heater that was considered a dramatic improvement in homeconvenience; it bore anEnglishname,Fireside.Rina’s parents didnot have atelephone.Lunchwasthefamily’smainmeal.Rinahadgonetovisitherparentsbecause shewas “exempt from cooking” that day, as shewrote: her husbandwouldbehomelatefromwork.
2. WOMEN: “SHOULD THE BOY SEW HIS OWNBUTTONS?”
Awoman’sroleinthehomewastakenforgranted.“Yourhusbanddeservestobe spoiled by you, at least a little,”Ha’aretz advised its female readers. Thepiecewenton,“He is, afterall, themanaroundwhomyour life revolves.Lethimfeel thatyouvaluehisefforts for thefamily.”In thespiritofoptimismofthetime, thenewspaperrecommended:“Besatisfiedwithyourlifeanddonothesitatetoadmitit.”Therewasalsoalistofpracticalsuggestions:•Beforeyourhusbandcomeshome,airthehousetogetridofcookingodors,exceptthosethatarepleasant.Makesureyouleavetimetofreshenupandrestbeforehegetshome.•Whenyourhusbandarrives,musterallyourintuitiveenergiestoobservehismood.Ifheseemsirritableandtense,letthemealwaitandgivehimtimetofreshen up. Or better yet—take preventative measures: decorate the tablewith a vase of flowers, turn on the radio, play some softmusic and smilewhenhewalksin.•Whenyourhusbandishomefromwork,youwillmakehimveryhappybysittingatthetablewithhim,evenifyouhavealreadyeatenearlierwiththechildren.Halfaman’senjoymentofagoodmealisthepleasantcompanyofhiswifeafteraday’swork.•Adrawn-outand laboriousprocessofclearing thedishesoff the tableandwashingthemmightruinthecomfortableatmosphereyouhavemanagedtocreate.Letthemealgoonforaslongashewishes,andfinishitoffwithacupofcoffee,servedinthelivingroomandnotatatablefullofdishes.Youwillhavetimetowashthemlater.In order for a wife to look “cute, as any man would wish,” the paper
suggested that its female readers have their hair done regularly, not just forspecialevents.“Makesureyourhairisalwaysexpertlycutandsoftlycombed.Ahandsome,neathairstylecanserveasasourceofprideandsatisfactionforyourhusband.”Thepaperwent on to caution that nomanwants to runhis fingersthroughastiff,pricklyhairdo thatmakesexcessiveuseofhairspray—thiswas
one of the “womanly sins” that most men find difficult to forgive. Othertransgressionswerelipstickmarksonawoman’steethorbeyondherlips,abrastrappeekingthroughthesleeveofherdress,ordandruffonhershouldersafterbrushingherhair.Animpressiveappearancewasnotsufficient,however.“Awomancapableof
providingherhusbandwithinterestingconversationevenaftertwentyyearsofmarriage, who tells him of the events of her daywith humor, keeps upwithworldly affairs by listening to the radio and reading newspapers, and debatescurrent affairs with him will enchant him even after many years of livingtogether,” promisedHa’aretz.Ahusbandwould also be happy for hiswife toengage in a hobby of some sort, such as flower arranging, gardening, orpainting.“Donotbetooconcernedabouttheresults,”thenewspapersuggested,“theenjoymentcomesmainlyfromtheactivityitself.”Still,womenwere supposed to bewary of toomuch independence: “When
you are planning to purchase a new item for your home, discuss itwith yourhusband.Notonlybecauseitishismoneyandhishome,butbecausehemaybeabletooffersomegoodadvice.”Ifawomanboughtanewappliance,shewoulddowelltofollowthemanual.“Mentendtolosetheirpatiencewithwomenwhobreakeveryobject they touch,”wroteHa’aretz, andofferedone finalpieceofadvice:“Havingtowatchawomanwhileshecleansthehousemakesamanjustasuncomfortableasifhehadseenherwithrollersinherhairandcreamonherface.Trytoplanyourworksothatmostofitisdonewhileyourhusbandisnotathome.”11
One reader asked the newspaper if she shouldmake her sonmendhis ownclothing:“Shouldtheboysewhisownbuttons?”Theresponsewasthataboymustnotbecompelledtoperformactivitiesthatmightimpedethedevelopmentofhismasculinity,suchassewingbuttons.Agirlshouldobviouslydoso,wroteoneof thepaper’s advisors,TamarHareli, sincegirls arenaturally inclined tostay at home, while boys are supposed to branch out and play at Tarzan,cowboys,sailors,soldiers,andsuchthings.Shecontinuedwithacaution:aboywhosefatherfigureisweakandsubmissive,whilehismotheriscontrollinganddictating,couldsufferdamage.Hemightacquirethecharacteristictendenciesofwomen—intaste,instyle,insex,andmore.“Thiswilldistorthissocial,moral,emotionalandperhapsalsomentaldevelopment.”AndsoHarelidecreed that,forthegoodofthechild,amothermust“restrainherself”andleaveherhusbandinapositionofrespectinthefamily.Hareliwasalsoconcernedbythestateofthingsinschools.“Feminizationsometimesentersintotheeducationalcontent,whichisunjustifiable,”shewrote.Sheinsistedthat,at theveryleast, informal
educationduringafter-schoolhoursshouldprovideyoungboyswithmasculinerolemodels.*Rina, themotherfromWeizmannStreet,dressedherbabyinhisfirstwinter
outfit.Hehadtwopairsofflanneljeans,onefromhisgrandparentsandtheotherfromhisparents.“Eachpairhas impressively largecuffs,as it shouldbewithjeans,” shewrote proudly. “He looks like aman.”Her sister,meanwhile,wastryingtofindworkinNewYork.Shehadleftintendingonlyavisit,butnowshewantedtostay.Heryoungerbrotherviewedthetripas“agoodinvestment,”solongasshedidcomeback;hebelievedshewould.
MORETHANAHUNDREDTHOUSANDISRAELISWENTABROADIN1966.MOSTOPTEDFORrelativelycheaptrips,takingboatstoEuropeandfromtheretravelingbybusorcharter flights.The tripsusually lastedaboutamonthandencompassedsixorseven countries. One out of every two Israelis who traveled abroad went toSwitzerland.Suchatripcostbetween1,600and1,700liras,andwasaformativeIsraeliexperience.13
WhentheygottoEurope,manyIsraelislikedtoseekoutotherIsraelis.Mostof them had not traveled outside of Israel the previous year and knew theywouldnotdosothenext.Before leavingIsrael,a typical touristwouldfillhisnotebookwith telephonenumbersofdistant relatives, forgottenacquaintances,and the forgotten acquaintances of forgotten acquaintances, according to thejournalistYoelMarcus.Assoonasthetouristgottohishotel,hewouldquicklyphoneeveryonetoletthemknowhewasinParisandtoask,“Whatistheretodohere?”Helackedself-confidenceandsufferedfromaninexplicablefearthathewasnotbehavingproperlyorthathewouldgetlost.Andsohewouldlookfor a “clean, cheap” hotel near the Israeli embassy: the proximity to Israeliterritorygavehimconfidence.Hewouldvisit theembassy forno real reason,justtoaskhowthingsweregoingathome.UponhearingHebrewspeakersonthe street, he would go up to them unhesitatingly and ask, “Are you alsoIsraelis?”Andthen,“Whatareyoudoinghere?”Israelitouriststooklotsofpictures.TherollsofKodakfilmcamewithyellow
fabricbagsinwhichtheyweresentbacktobedeveloped.Severalweekslater,thereturnedtravelerwouldorganizeaslide-showevening.“Wearegreetedbyapleasantdimness,”wrotethejournalistTamarAvidarofonesuchevening.“Thecrowdisalreadysittingcomfortablyoncouches,armchairsandrugs,andYaelprods Haim, ’Nu, start already, it’s nine-thirty and we have three thousandslides.’ At eleven-thirty a few people try to escape, claiming they’ve got thechildrenathome.Butthenteaorcoffeeandcakeareserved,andmoreslidesare
shown.Attwelve-forty-fivesomeonesnoreslightlyandeveryonelaughsandthelights come on. The guests sense this is their moment to flee and the hostspromisethatnexttimethey’llstartearlier.”14
ButIsraelisdidnottraveloverseasonlytobephotographedatthefootoftheEiffelTowerorBigBen.Theclichédperceptionof Israel as “a small countrysurrounded by enemies” represented the reality and reflected a feeling ofclaustrophobia.TheauthorMosheShamirexpressedthesentimentinhisnovelHagvul(“TheBorder”),publishedin1966.AnarticleaboutIsraeliindustrialistsattempting to set up factories abroadwas entitled “Is Israel Too Small?” Thenewspapers invested a fair amount of patriotic fervor in demanding that theentry-visa requirements for European countries be canceled.Ha’aretz printedthedailydepartureandarrivalschedulesforLodAirport,andoftenreportedthecomingsandgoingsofpublicfigures.PresidentZalmanShazar’svisitstoSouthAmericaandtheUnitedStateswerecoveredintheleadheadlinesasiftheyboretruepoliticalsignificance.Foreign travel deepened Israelis’ sense that they belonged to the world at
large;eachhomecomingseemedtopersuadethemthattheywerelivinginIsraeloutofchoice,notasrefugeeswithnowhereelsetogo.Thisalsomeantthatfewthings irritated themmore than the travel tax theywere required topay.Theywerevexednotonlybythepaymentitself,butprimarilybythefeelingthattheirfreedomtocomeandgoastheywishedwasbeingrestricted.15
Whenwriting to his sister inNewYork about daily life,Uri fromSokolovStreet inRishonLezion described Israel as “provincial.”America aroused hiscuriosity.Heaskedhissister forpicturesfromNewYorkandwanted toknowwhat the buildings and shops looked like. He also asked about Americantelevision, having heard all about “commercials” and that there was a showcalled Candid Camera. He also took an interest in the news: Were thereprogramsontelevisionthatshowedtheVietnamWar?Hisfamilydidnotownatelevision.
3.TELEVISION:“ACERTAINSYMBOLISM”
By1966,thenumberofIsraeliswatchingTVhadreachedsomefiftythousand.Theysometimespickedupblack-and-whitebroadcasts fromCairoandBeirut,andtheluckyonescouldgetpicturesfromCyprus,butoftenall theysawwas“snow.” Television manufacturers took out large advertisements in thenewspapers, andHa’aretz gave its readers guidance on how to purchase theappliance.Atthisstage,thepaperwrote,itwasimportantthatthetelevisionbe
designedasanattractivepieceoffurniture,“appropriatefor theapartmentandpleasingtolookatevenwhenitisnotturnedon.”16
Secret talks on starting local television broadcasts had begun in the earlysixties,andvariousgovernmentcommitteeswereexaminingthenationalbenefittobegainedbybroadcasts,primarilyeducationalprogramming.Theassumptionwas that local programming would accelerate the formation of a commonidentity for the immigrants from various countries living in Israel. TelevisionwassupposedtoexpandtheuseofHebrew,helppeoplegettoknowthecountry,and bring them information “about developments in government.” Above all,Israeli television would stop the country’s citizens from watching broadcastsfromArabcountries.17
InJanuary1966,anexperimentalbroadcastwentout.ThefirstimageseenonthescreenwasaflyhoveringoverstillphotographsfromvariousplacesaroundIsrael, as Suppé’s “Light Cavalry” played in the background. The broadcastcontinued for about thirtyminutes, andwhen it ended viewers saw aHAWKmissilebatteryandheardTchaikovsky’s“1812Overture.”Theexperimentdrewgeneral admiration. In Tel Aviv, people crowded around appliance stores towatch themarvel in thedisplaywindows,another innovation thatpromised tobringthemclosertotheworld,andtheworldclosertothem.18
Three months later, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol pushed the button thatactivatedthefirsteducationalprogram,atwenty-five-minutemathclassfortheninthgrade.19 Educational televisionwas establishedwith donations from theFrench Rothschilds. And thus, reportedHa’aretz, television won its place inZionist history: “There is something symbolic in the fact that the family thathelped lay the foundations for agricultural Jewish settlement in Palestine andplacedpicksandhoesinthehandsofyouths...isnowhelpingtoassuremoreexcellenteducationfortheoffspringofthefirstsettlersandforthosewhocameto Israel after.”20 Some months later, an agreement was signed with CBS inAmericatolaunchageneral-interestTVchannel.Itwasthetriumphofcommonsenseovercommonnonsense,assertedHa’aretz, sincecommonsensedictatedthatIsraelitelevisionbeIsraeliandnotArab.*AthomeinRishonLezion,Uriandhisfamilylistenedtotheradio.Heliked
Two’s Company, a popular quiz show. His parents liked the Friday nightconcerts.Theywereenthusiasticconsumersofculture,andoftenwrotetotheirdaughteraboutplaystheyhadseen.
CULTURALLY, ISRAELI CITIES RESEMBLED OTHER MAJOR CITIES IN THE REST OF THE
WORLD.OnanordinaryJanuaryeveningin1967,theatergoersinTelAvivcouldchoose amongNathan theWise,Who’sAfraid of VirginiaWoolf?, TheMaids,HeddaGabler,Othello,andRichardIII,allinHebrew,aswellasaboutadozenother plays, including some written by Israeli playwrights. One newspaperdevotedaleadstorytothevibrantspiritofIsraelitheaterandtoaseriesoffineproductionsthatincludedLittleMalcolmandHisStruggleAgainsttheEunuchsandthemusicalManofLaMancha.TheproducerandimpresarioGioraGodikimportedseveralsuccessfulBroadwaymusicalsandproducedtheminHebrew,becomingaprimaryforceinIsrael’semulationofAmericanculture.Theseandsimilarplays,wroteHa’aretz,werewellreceivedbyanewtypeofaudiencethatwasyoung,curious,alert,andpicky.22
ItwastheIsraelPhilharmonicOrchestra’s thirtiethseason.Sinceitsopeningconcert in December 1936, conducted by Arturo Toscanini, the Philharmonichad become one of the Zionist movement’s prominent cultural undertakings.Much like theHebrewUniversityand theHebrewEncyclopedia, theorchestraembodiedtheeffort tomoldaEuropeansocietyinPalestine.Asubscriptiontothe Philharmonic was a status symbol, not only because of the cost and theorchestra’s caliber, but mainly because of how difficult it was to obtain. Asubscription was an asset, for which people waited for years and which theyaspiredtohanddowntotheirchildren;atleastonecouplebestowedoneontheirdaughterasadowryuponhermarriage.Among Israel’s guests during those months were the musicians David
Oistrakh, Otto Klemperer, Mstislav Rostropovich, and Artur Rubinstein; thewritersGüntherGrassandJohnSteinbeck;thehistorianBarbaraTuchman;andthesculptorHenryMoore.MarleneDietrichandAlfredHitchcockalsopoppedover,asdidluminariesfrompracticallyeveryfieldoftheartsandhumanities.S.Y.AgnonbecamethefirstIsraelitoreceivetheNobelPrizeinLiterature.Withtwenty-fourdailynewspapers,fifteenoftheminHebrew,Israeliswereexposedtosome“virulentanddestructivebrainwashing,”wroteaBritishembassystaffworker. But, he said, in some publications the level of Israeli journalismexceededthatofmostdailynewspapersinBritain.There were innovations in leisure activities, too. The new Cinerama
auditoriuminTelAvivboastedthatitsfilmswereprojectedonthelargestscreenin the world.Movies were themost popular form of entertainment, and newoneswereshownalmostsimultaneouslywiththeirreleaseabroad.MostIsraeliswenttothemoviesalmosteveryweek.Manywrotetotheirfriendsabroadaboutthe films they saw. One of Rina’s letters to NewYork praised The SpyWhoCamein fromtheCold—theplotwas toocomplicatedandhard to follow,but
Father had explained it.The Russians AreComing, the Russians AreComingwasalsoenjoyed,aswasIsrael’sownThreeDaysandaChild,bydirectorUriZohar.*In1966aboutamillionandahalf ticketswere sold for five Israelimovies,
includingMoisheVentilator,aparodyofspymovies.Thefilmincludedcameoappearances by Shaike Levi, Yisrael “Poli” Poliakov, and Gavri Banai, whoconstituted Israel’smost famous comedy troupe,HagashashHahiver. The triocame into being at the endof 1963, after finishing their service in oneof themilitaryentertainment troupes,whichwerepopularat the time. InApril1966,they opened their second show of songs and sketches. Their biggest hit was“TheTelephoneSong,”aboutthetrialsofusingpublicpayphones.Noonedidmore than the Gashashim, as they became known, to develop a specificallyIsraelibrandofhumor,andnoonecouldmakeIsraelislaughquitethewaytheycould. Another popular form of entertainment, identified primarily with theauthorandinterviewerDanBen-Amotz,involvedinterviewswithpublicfiguresconductedinhotelsandpublicauditoriums.The British Wimpy hamburger chain opened more and more branches in
Israel;thefoodwasnotnotedforitsquality,buttogetherwithasoftdrinkcalledSunfresh,itseemedtomakeIsraelpartofthebigwideworld.AneaterycalledPam Pam advertised itself as “a household name among gourmands in Paris,Nice,Milan, Capetown,Montreal, Tahiti, and everywhere around theworld.”All of its features had non-Hebrew names: the Grill Bar, Milk Bar, Bistro,Conditoria,andQuickBar,emblemsof thegoodlifeabroad.SeveralHa’aretzreaderswere also contendingwith culinaryproblems: “The selectionofwinesontheIsraelimarketislargeandvariedanditisdifficulttomakesenseofthemazeofnames.”23
ATSUMMER’SEND,1966,THELETTERSFROMRISHONLEZIONREPORTEDANIMPORTANTchange: Uri had started high school. He had successfully faced one of thetraumaticexperiencesinflicteduponIsraelistudents,the“SurveyExam,”whichdetermined who among the eighth-grade graduates would go on to the moreprestigiousacademic schools,whowouldgetonlyavocationalor agriculturaleducation, and who would leave school and look for work. Educators andpoliticianswere still involved in a debate over reforms thatwere supposed toinstituteajuniorhighschoolsystem,butinthemeantimethestateofferedeightyearsoffreeeducationtoallchildrenthroughagefourteen.Highschooltuitionwas between seventy and eighty liras a month, and the Survey Exam alsodeterminedwhichstudentswereeligibleforasubsidy.Theexamwasthereforea
centraleventinthelifeofeverystudentandhisorherfamily,andwasdescribedas“thegreatgodofeducation.”Essayswrittenabout theexambystudents inJerusalemreflectextremeanxiety.Eightoutofeveryteneighth-gradegraduateswentontostudyatasecondary
school,butonlyhalfgraduated.24Uriexcelledathisstudies,particularlymathandEnglish.Hisletterswerewrittenwithhumorandvivacity.Togetherwithhisabsentsister’sboyfriend,astudentattheHebrewUniversitywhohadremainedin Israel while his girlfriend traveled, he would fill out forms for the soccerlottery, the Totto. The two also solved the crosswords and other puzzles thatappearedinMaariv,andtheyoncewonabookforsubmittingthecorrectanswertoamathquestion.Likemanyotherstudents,UrilikedtoreadEphraimKishon,another founding fatherof Israelihumor.Healsoenjoyed takingphotographs.Oncehewentwithhissister’sboyfriendtotheannualflowershowinHolon.Thetwoyoungmen,UriandhissisterEdna’sboyfriend,oftenwrotelettersto
NewYorkaboutthepoliticalstate—“thesituation,”asitwascalledinHebrew—repeatingscrapsofinformationpickedupfromtheradioandnewspapers,asdid Rina. There was nothing new to report, she wrote, “except for a warmexchange of greetings once in awhile on the Syrian border, everything is allright.”Theexchangeswereofbullets.But therewasonepieceofgoodnews:“Yesterday an important visitor arrived in Israel. An Iraqi pilotwho defectedwithhisplane.HeisaChristian.Heclaimsheis tiredofthelongwaragainstthe Kurds. Because of his religion he has no chance of promotion, so Israelseems to be the solution to all his problems.” This sort of report occupied aparagraphortwoinmanylettersIsraelissenttofriendsandfamilyabroad;theywerealwayskeentohearthenews.“Thesituation”waspartoftheirexistenceand often affected their mood. The reports frequently took on an ironic,noncommittaltone.25
Uri also wrote to his sister about the Iraqi pilot and his MiG, as did herboyfriend, and they were both very proud, as if about a personalaccomplishment. The brother was impressed by the plane’s three-million-liravalueandthecountry’ssuddenwindfall.“EveryoneinthecountrywillgetoneliraandtherestwillgototheJNF,”hewrote.Healsowroteabouttheexchangeof fire between Israel and Syria: “Things are getting lively on the northernborder.” The boyfriendmentioned that the United States, France, and Britainwanted to inspect the plane, but Israel “of course” would not allow that, forpolitical reasons. “There’s enough trouble with Russia as it is,” he explainedknowledgeably.*Likemost Israelis, he did not think therewas any reason to
expectwar,notrightatthemoment.Theheadsofstatewereuptotheirearsindomestic troubles,making it unlikely that theywould entangle the country inwar,“anadventurethatwouldnotultimatelyresolveanything,”ashewrote.Notsoon,anyway.HewroteenthusiasticallyaboutIonesco’sHungerandThirst,whichhesawat
theOhelTheater.Theavant-gardeplayconcernedamandetachedfromreality,who leaves everything and goes off towander in search of perfect happiness.But, as the boyfriend wrote, it turns out there is no such thing as perfecthappiness.Hewantedhisgirlfriendtocomeback.TheywereplanningtobuildtheirlivesinIsrael,andtheideaofsettlinginanothercountryneverenteredhismind.
4.PARENTS:“HOPEFULLYWEWON’THAVEADROUGHT”
TheparentswantedtheirdaughterEdnatocomehome,too.Fromthefirsttheyhadbeenopposed toher trip.Theywouldhavepreferred that shecontinueonthe path they had charted for her—work, directly after university—instead of“losingayear”inAmerica.Theyusuallysentjointletters,writtenattheendoftheirday.AtelevenP.M. they listened to the lastnewsbroadcastonKol Israelradio. Over and over they reminded their daughter to keep in touchwith theaunts and uncles in America. The packages she sent irritated her father,offendinghisIsraeliego.“Welacknothinghere,”hescoldedher,andbesides,the shippingandcustoms feesmade thegifts far tooexpensive.Hecalledhertochter—theYiddishwordfor“daughter”—asifdoubtingthepowerofHebrewtoaccuratelyexpressthedepthofhisfeeling.Healsowroteabout“thesituation”often.Eventheweathercouldprompthim
to think in terms of the collective: “There has been some rain, and if itcontinues, hopefullywewon’t have a drought.” In one letter hewrote of theachievements of the neo-Nazi party in Bavaria, Germany: “The world haslearnednothing, least of all theGermans.”Hebelieved that Jewsbelonged inIsrael. Then he told her angrily about a remark attributed to Dr. NahumGoldman,thepresidentoftheWorldZionistOrganization.SupposedlyGoldmanhadsaid that theStateof Israelhadbeenestablishedprematurely.Themotherwasalsoangeredby thingssheheardon thenews.The formercommanderofUNobserversintheMiddleEast,GeneralCarlvonHorn,ofSweden,publishedhismemoirs, inwhich he said that Israel used female IDF soldiers to seducemaleUNpersonnelforspyingpurposes.27“Motherisupsetjustlikeeveryoneis,andshe takes itpersonally,”Uriwrote tohissister.Likesomanyothers, they
readDavarandidentifiedcompletelywiththestate.Thesummerof1966wasmarkedbythefather’sillness:hesufferedfromhigh
bloodpressureandwashospitalizedforseveralmonths.HismembershipintheHistadrut health fund assuredhim, as it didmostworking Israelis, reasonablygood medical treatment at no extra cost. His job was secure and the officetreatedhimfairly,atsomepointevensendinghimworktodoathome.Hisbabygrandson gave himmuch joy andwas themain protagonist of his letters.“Aganzermensch”(“arealmensch”),hewroteinYiddish,becausetheboycouldalreadysitatthetablewitheveryoneandeatgrown-upfood—Mother’sfishandabitoftzimmes.In January themotherwent to Jerusalem to stand in forherdaughter at the
graduation ceremony at the Hebrew University. The daughter had studiedHebrewliteratureandtheBibleandwasplanningtobeateacherwhenshegotbackfromAmerica.Itwasoneofthemostimportantdaysinthemother’slife.Sheboughtanewcoatfortheoccasion,“whichpassedmusterwithFather,”shewrote, and brown suede shoes, so shewould look elegant. “Wemade up ourmindsandthat’swhatwedid,”shesaidproudly.Graduation from the Hebrew University was not a given. Out of the
approximately1,700undergraduateswhocompletedtheirdegreesthatyear,onlya thirdwerewomen.28 The ceremony was impressive. Themother had somedisapproving comments on theminiskirts she saw, but she camehome full ofexcitement. The father explained the deeper roots of this enthusiasm to hisdaughter: “You seem to have fulfilled a dream of hers. She dreamed ofuniversity and ended up on a kibbutz, and now she is thrilled with youraccomplishment.”Themother confirmed this, and said shewas “counting themonths”untilherdaughtercamehome.Justbeforesummer,theboyfriendwrotethat theyneeded tomakeabigdecision: itwas time tobuyanapartment inanew development for young couples. The apartment on offer had three mid-sized rooms, a small hallway, a bathroom, a separate toilet, and a kitchen. Itsareawas635squarefeet.AtleastsixoutofeverytenIsraelifamilieslivedintheirownapartments,and
almostnoonewanted to rent.Rentingmighthavebeenmoreeconomical,butapartmentownershipwastheprevailingaspiration—itwasexpected,muchlikeeducation, health care, job security, and a pension. There was probably ahistorical aspect to this ambition: owning an apartment promised the samepermanence and security that ownership of land was supposed to ensure theentireJewishpeople.
AsurveyconductedbytheMinistryofHousingfoundthatmostIsraelishopedtomovefromtheircurrentapartmentsintomorespacioushomes.Oneofeveryfour young couples fulfilled this hopewithin the first four years ofmarriage.Many said theyhoped tomoveoncemore, to an even larger apartment.Mostsaid,optimistically,thatthiswishwouldcometrue.Thesurveyalsofoundthatalmost75percentof thecostofanapartmentcamefromsavingsandparentalassistance, the rest frommortgagesandbank loans.Theministry suggested tocitizens that theystartsavingearly ina“BarMitzvahsavingsplan,” toensurethat their children toowould one day be able to live in their own homes. InnorthernTelAviv,anewone-and-a-half-bedroomapartmentsoldfor34,000to39,000liras,anaverageofabout$12,000.29*InplaceslikeRishonLezion,suchan apartment could be bought for around 26,000 liras. The asking price for anewsingle-familyhouse—knowninHebrewasavilla—intheupscalesuburbofSavyon was 99,780 liras, twice as much as the biggest prize in the nationalweeklyMifalHapayislottery.30
TheapartmentunderdiscussioninthecorrespondencewithManhattanwasinJerusalem,oppositeasubsidizedhousingdevelopmentonEmekRefaimStreet,not far fromtheswimmingpoolandnear the railroadcrossing.Thepricewas23,000 to 24,000 liras, depending on the floor. The down payment was only9,000 liras; the rest would be covered by a fixed-rate mortgage. It was areasonableoffer.Advertisements forapartmentspraisednotonly theconstructionquality,but
also the caliber of the neighbors. One promotional piece featured Edna andBinyamin Suttendorf, a young couple living in theRimon neighborhood nearTelAviv. She studied architectural drawing in the evenings and taught duringtheday,thedevelopersaidinitsad,whilehestudiedeconomicsandjournalismand worked at the university library. Their parents liked the neighborhoodbecausetheyknewtheapartmentwouldkeepitsvalue,andthecoupledecidedto settle inRimonbecauseof theotheryoungcoupleswho lived there.Thesesortofpeople,whoseemedtoenjoylifeandhavefaithinthefuture,alsostarredin a series of ads for Ascot cigarettes, named for the British racecourse. InJanuary1966,onesuchadvertisementfeaturedaphotographtakenattheentrytoaPicassoexhibitionintheTelAvivMuseum.*YehoshuaandGiliBar-DayanlivedintheirownapartmentinRishonLezion.
TheywerethekindofIsraelissometimesdescribedas“thesaltoftheearth.”Hewas a child of the inner Zionist circles in Palestine, one of the first Israeligenerationsthatcouldsaythattheircountrywasgoodtothem.Hisgrandfather
AlexanderAlexandrowitzAbrahamSussman, fromOdessa,wasawell-knownagronomist anda founderofBilu,oneof theearliestZionistorganizations. InOctober1899hehadcometoobservethesituationinPalestinewiththenotedZionistwriterAhadHa’am, and in1924 settled inNahalatYehuda, amoshavnot far fromRishon Lezion.32 Out on themoshav, Grandfather Sussman hadcowsandanorchardandavineyard.HeoftensocializedwithhisneighborandfriendfromKfarMalal,ShmuelSheinerman—ArielSharon’s father.The threepalmtreesheplantedhavesurvivedhimbydecades,andarethetallestinIsrael.His wife was an aunt ofMoshe Shertok (Sharett), a familial connection thatplacedBar-DayanattheheartofthepoliticalandmilitaryestablishmentthatledtheJewishpopulationtoindependence.HisuncleEzrawasawell-knownpoetand his mother, Devorah, was a doctor. Dr. Devorah Sussman, an ardentfeminist,kepthermaidennameaftermarryingBenZionBorodianski,wholaterchangedhisnametoBar-Dayan;hewasalsoaphysician.Duringthetwenties,Devorah Sussman rode a donkey around the Jezreel Valley to get from onekibbutz to another and treat her patients. On Kibbutz Degania, one of thechildrenshecaredforwasDevorahandShmuelDayan’slittleson,Moshe.TheSussman-Bar-Dayan family later lived in the town of Afula, where their sonYehoshuawasborn,andthenmovedtoKfarSaba,notfarfromTelAviv,whereDr.Bar-Dayanwasgivenahorseandcarriage.ThecouplespokeRussianwitheachother,HebrewwithShukaandhistwobrothers.When he graduated and finished his army service, Yehoshua Bar-Dayan
settlednotfarfromtheborderwiththeGazaStrip,onKibbutzErez,wherehetendedtheorchardandbeehives.ThekibbutzsenthimtovisitBrotherAdam,aGerman-born Benedictine monk who lived in Devonshire and was a world-renowned authority on beekeeping. After eight years on Kibbutz Erez, Bar-DayanmovedtoTelAviv.Hetookpartinthefirsttrainingcourseforcertifiedtour guides and later found permanent work in the Citrus Fruit MarketingCouncil.Thecouncil senthim toLondon,wherehemet another Israeli livingthereatthetime,GilaSamsonov,whocamefromawell-knownfamilyofcitrusgrowers inRishonLezion.Her auntRemawasYehiamWeitz’swidow and awell-knownsoprano.WhenBar-Dayanreturnedhome,heaskedGilaSamsonovtogowithhim.Theynamedtheir firstsonYariv.33GiliandShukaplanned tohavemore children.He likedhis job,whichgavehiman annual bonus and aSussita.Thecouplehadfaithintheirfuture.Andtheneverythingseemedtofallapart.
5.RECESSION:“ANILLWINDISBLOWING”
It started at the beginning of 1966.A new buzzword took over life in Israel:mitun, or recession. The term referred to a slowdown in economic activity,reflected in the transition from excessive demand to paralysis and cutbacks,fromasurplusof jobs tounemployment.Theshifthadnotbegunabruptly: itsoriginswere in 1965, but the election campaign had concealed it. Before theelection, thousandsofIsraelishadreceivedsalaryraises,mostofwhichwouldbe swallowedup in thewaveof price increases the country experienced soonafter.Byonecount,afamilythatspentapproximately735lirasamonthin1966wouldhaveneededatleast85morelirastomaintainthesamelifestylein1967.But the public seemed to become aware of the recession as if a suddencatastrophehadoccurred.LetterssenttofriendsandrelativesoverseasreflectedasensethatIsraelisweregoingthroughsomethingextremelydramatic.Manyofthe letter writers were not directly affected, but they feared the country waslosingitsabilitytooffercitizensthegoodlifemanyhadgrownaccustomedto—andthatmanymorewerehopingtoachieve.Economists spoke of a curbing of economic growth and explained that the
primarycausewasaslowdowninpopulationgrowth,from4percentin1964tozeroin1966.Thishadhappenedmainlyasaresultofdecreasedimmigration,aswellasadropinthebirthrate.Lowpopulationgrowthrateaffectedthedemandforhousing.Theslumpinconstructionspreadtorelatedindustriesandresultedin decreased demand for a variety of products and services.Many businesseswentbankrupt.Thesecondfactordepressingeconomicactivitywasadropininvestments:a
30 percent decline in construction, 20 percent in industry. At the same time,foreigninvestmentplummetedby40percentin1964andanother15percentin1966.The growth inmeans of payment—cash and checking account depositsheld by the public—also dropped, and this trend, in turn, further reduceddemand,asdidthe8percentriseinpricesin1966.Onlyonceintheprecedingdecadehadtherebeenasharper increase inprices: in1962,whenthe lirawasdevalued.Thentwoyearslater(in1964)therewasa17percentdecreaseinthereparationsawardedbyGermanytovictimsofNazipersecution.Anticipatingafurtherdevaluationofthelira,peopledepositedtheirGermanmarksinthebankand left them there, thereby further constraining economic activity. Themid-sixties also saw the completion of several large projects that had fueledeconomic activity: the National Water Carrier, the Port of Ashdod, anddevelopmentworkattheDeadSeaIndustries.Thegovernmentfailedtoinitiatenewprojects,depictingtherecessionastheresultofadeliberatepolicyintendedto reduce spending and increase production, particularly for export.34 Israelis
wereaskedtoexerciserestraint.In February 1966, Prime Minister Eshkol attempted to explain that the
recession was necessary because life in Israel was too good. Nowhere in theworld,he saidona radiobroadcast,was thereacountrywhosequalityof lifehadgrownasrapidlyasIsrael’shadduringthepastfiveyears.Hisspeechwasareprimand: “We dress far better today, we eat far better,” he asserted. “Onefamilytradesintheirapartmentforabiggerone,theotherbuysnewfurniture....”Apartmentswerefullofnewelectricalappliances,headded.“Onemanbuysamoped, the other a car.” But, as Eshkol would have it, all this spendingwasfunded not by Israeli labor but by capital recruited abroad. The Jews of theworldweregivingmoney,asweretheUnitedStates,WestGermany,andprivateinvestors.Thefundsservedfordevelopment;developmentledtoprosperity.Buttheprosperity,claimedEshkol,hadcreated“afrenzyofgrab-and-eat,grab-and-drink.”Thepeoplewere,inhiswords,livingin“afools’paradise.”Eshkol took theopportunity todenounceworkers’ groupsdemanding salary
raisesthathedescribedasinordinate,andhecommendedagroupofprofessorswho had initiated a “concessionmovement,” agreeing towaive compensationowed to them for previous years’ pay. Eshkol also quoted a letter from adisabled ex-servicemannamedAvrahamShapira,whodeclaredhewas givingbacktotheMinistryofDefense600ofthe621lirashehadreceivedasbenefitpayments. Eshkol’s speech was meant to inspire the public to patrioticallytightentheirbelts,butinsteaditprovokedangerandcontempt,disappointmentand anxiety. The “concession movement” turned out to be illusory; itdisappearedasabruptlyasithademerged.35
The government’s role in creating the recession remains controversial. TheU.S.ambassadortoIsraelquotedareportstatingthatthegovernmenthadindeedinitiatedaneconomicdeceleration,butthattheprocesshadgoneoutofcontroland matters had never been intended to reach such a low point. “Havingdiagnosedthediseaseandprescribedthecorrecttreatment, thedoctorwasstillshowinghesitationandsomeineptitudeinhishandlingofthepatient,”wrotetheBritish ambassador in his assessment of the recession. A report presented toWalt Rostow, special assistant to President Lyndon Johnson, however,commended the Eshkol government’s “courageous policy,” and a New YorkTimeseditorialalsopraisedIsraelforitseconomicpolicy.Another school of thought held that the government had initiated the
recession, although not for the reasons it gave—rather, the downturn waspoliticallymotivated. “Mapai could not continue tomaintain growth and full
employment,althoughthiswasitspurpose,”wroteonehistorian,“becausethesephenomenaonlystrengthenedtheworkersandunderminedtheauthorityoftheHistadrut”—the labor federation, which was controlled by Mapai. Therecession,inthisview,wasmeanttoensurethattheHistadrut—meaningMapai—wouldmaintaincontroloftheworkers.36
INTHESUMMEROF1966,HA’ARETZSENTREPORTERSOUTTOSTORESTOASSESSTHEREcession’s effect on consumers. Not surprisingly, they found that people werebuying lessandbeingmorechoosy.Significant losseswere recorded in storesthatsoldhomeappliances,furniture,andrugs,aswellasinartgalleriesandthelike—placessellingnonessentialitems.Butpeoplealsoboughtlessfreshmeatand more frozen; there was no change in the consumption of poultry. In thegroceries,therewasadropinsalesofimportedchocolate,butter,andliquor.AtHerli,awell-knownTelAvivcafé,fewercakeswereordered.Restaurantownersinthecitysaidreservationswerenolongernecessary.Clothingandshoestoreownerscomplainedofa10percentto15percentdropinrevenues.37
“Peoplearestartingtothinktwicebeforespendingmoney,”wroteoneIsraelitoafriendintheUnitedStates.Manyweretakingtheircarsoutofcommissiontemporarily,hesaid—turning their licenses in to theLicensingBureau tosaveontaxesandinsurancepremiums.Peoplewhohadpreviouslytakenthebusfortwostopsnowchosetowalk.OnSaturdaynights,whentheSabbathended,youcould get tickets for the cinema inTelAviv because theyweren’t selling out.Several months later, Ha’aretz found that the effects of the recession werebecomingmore noticeable. Thousands of apartments stood empty throughoutthecountry.InMarch1967,anAmericanwhohadcometosettleinIsraelwroteto friends in Boston, “The situation in Israel is very difficult. . . . If you’reinterestedinbuyinganapartmenthere,nowisthetime.”Andhequotedaprice:athree-bedroomapartmentinnorthernTelAviv,whichwouldhavecost90,000to100,000lirasayearago,couldnowbeboughtfor75,000liras.The recession also affected institutions that primarily served the elite: the
HebrewUniversity’sfinanceshadneverbeenworse,accordingtoitspresident.SimilarnewscamefromtheHaifaTheaterandtheIsraelMuseuminJerusalem.Amongtheheadlines:“VillasAwaitBuyers”;“GrowthinVehicleFleetHalts”;“CrisisattheHiltonHotel.”Inthefallof1966,onenewspaperwrote,althoughwith some degree of astonishment, of a “Certified—and unemployed—engineer.” Everyone was talking about the general state of dejection. A“psychology of decline” was evident, wrote one observer of the recession.“Thereisnodenyingit,”admittedYehudaGothelf,theeditorofDavar,“anill
wind is blowing in the country these days.” Quoting theminister of finance,PinhasSapir,headded,“Moreprevalentthantheeffectsofeconomicfactorsatthemomentarethesymptomsofpsychologicalfactors....”Themoodslowedeconomicactivityevenmore.38
TherecessionhitRishonLezion,too:almostadozenfactoriescloseddown,leaving hundreds ofworkers unemployed. “Things are very difficult. They’veknownforyearsthatthe’economicmiracle’wasnomiracleatall,andstillthegovernmentmade no preparations, unemployment is growing . . . the humansufferingisvast,”wrotethefatherfromSokolovStreettohisdaughterEdnainNewYork.Herboyfriendwroteof a seriesof economic scandals that seemedtypicalofthegovernment’sfailureandhaplessness.OneinvolvedMeirHalevi,whoobtainedagovernmentguaranteeforaloanofmillionsoflirastoestablishashippingcompanycalledSomerfin.39“Itturnsouthe’sacheatandathief,andnowthegovernmenthas topayoffhisdebts,”wrote theeconomicsstudent toEdna.HealsodiligentlyreportedtheeventsatFeuchtwanger,asmallbankthatgotintotroubleandalmostcollapsed.Hehadgoodreasontofollowtheaffair,asEdnawasoneofitscustomers.Hetoldheraboutthefourhourshehadspentatthelocalbranch.“Whatamess.Yougoinandstandinline,youtakeanumber,therearepolicemenstandinginthedoortomaintainorder.Andtheyellingandthebitter,heartfeltcrying.Justimagineallsortsofelderlymenandwomenwhocan’treadorwrite,beingtoldtheirmoney,whichtheyhavesavedoveryearsofhardwork,hasgonedownthedrain.Whatdopeoplelikethatknowofcurrencytrading?Alltheyknowistheygavethebranchmanagermoneyandthat’swhotheywantitbackfrom.”HeestimatedthattheBankofIsraelwouldcompensateFeuchtwanger’s customers, otherwise “there will be a small uprising in thiscountry.”Hewasultimatelyabletosalvageabout80percentofEdna’smoney.40
Thereisnothinglikeabankcollapsetoundermineconfidence.AndthenthegovernmentdecidedtoselltheShalom, theluxurypassengershipbelongingtothestate-ownedshippingcompany,Zim,whichwasmillionsoflirasinthered.The buyers were German investors, which added a dimension of nationalhumiliationtothefailure.Thedayonwhichtheship’sflagswerechangedwasadayof“griefandinsult”notonlyfortheStateofIsrael,butfor“theJewsoftheDiaspora,”saidonememberof theKnesset.Anotherdescribedhowtheship’sGermanownerswouldtakeoveritssynagogueandsetupabaroradancehall“orsomethingelse”initsplace.TheministeroftransportationgavetheKnessetanextremelydetailedreviewofthehistoryofthisventure,butallhiseffortstoexplaintheShalom’seconomicfailurewereseeminglyshatteredbyonehecklerwhosequestionspokefor thegeneral“psychologyofdecline”:“Whatelseare
youplanningtosell?”Theprimeminister received countless letters, fromboth Israeli citizens and
Jews abroad, with emotional pleas not to sell the ship, especially not toGermans. A seven-year-old girl from Haifa received a reply from the primeminister’sspecialassistant:“Onlyifweallworkhardandwithdevotionwillwecreate the opportunity to own such ships.” He suggested that the girl studydiligently, “so that our country will grow strong.” The artist Danny KaravandemandedthatashipboardmuralhehadpaintedberestoredtohimbeforetheShalomwasdeliveredtotheGermans.41
Alongwiththescandals,arumormillspreadnewsofgovernmentwasteandcorruption. A Ha’aretz journalist covering the effects of the recession onrestaurants observed a certain deputyminister, somemembers of theKnesset,anda fewseniorofficialsdiningatYarden,anupscale restaurant.A reportonthetwothousandguestsattheweddingofthedaughterofMinisterofFinanceSapirwaspublishednext to theheadline“MinisterofFinanceWon’tGiveUpHisAmericanCar.”The paper determined: “It’s timeministers served as rolemodels for theordinary taxpayingcitizens fromwhom the treasury constantlywrings taxes, especially from owners of small and mid-sized vehicles.” In asimilar tone, the paper reported on the remodeling of the plane that took theprimeministeronhis tourofAfrica.Thenewaccoutrements included“luxurychairs,”arefrigerator,andaloveseat,atacostof50,000liras.InJanuary1967,wordcameofplansforanewbuildingfortheIsraeliembassyinParis,secondinsizeonlytotheU.S.andSovietembassies.42
THE CRACKS IN ISRAELI OPTIMISM CREATED BY THE RECESSION RAPIDLY DEEPENED.LETtersfromIsraelbecamemoreandmorepessimisticandincreasinglycynical:“Nothingmuchisnewhere,everythingbadisonlygettingworse.”Internalizingthe depression around him,Uri fromRishon Lezion began describingmainlybadnews: fiftypeoplehadbeenkilled inmotor accidents; an Israeli ship, theHashlosha, sunkoff thecoastofFrance,killingeighteencrewmembersandawoman who had gone on a honeymoon with her sailor husband; the formerminister of police, Behor-Shalom Sheetrit, had passed away. There was noreasonfor thedeathofanelderlypolitician toconcern theboyorhissister inNewYork, but it fit inwith the overallmoodhis letters nowconveyed. “Thesituation is not good,” he wrote in one. He also told his sister about therecession, but claimed it wasmainly something that “you heard a lot about.”Theyweren’tawareofitathome,heassuredher.
“ThetruthisthathereinJerusalemwedon’tevenfeeltherecession,”wrotearesidentof thecity tohis friend inAmerica.Hebelonged toanentireclassofIsraelis thatwere immune to thedistress,butnonethelesssawtherecessionassomething inflicted on “us”—meaning the state—against all expectations, andthatmainlyharmedimmigrantsfromArabcountries,theMizrahim,orOrientals.“Themost suffering is in thedevelopment towns,and that isofcoursewhat’sworrisome.”43Similar sentimentswereexpressedby Israeliswhose liveswerestill relatively comfortable. The damage to “others” truly troubled them, andtheyfoundtheenforcedawarenessofotherpartsof thepopulationunpleasant.Mosthadtendedtoignoretheother—non-European,orAshkenazi—sectorsofsocietyupuntilthen:itwasconvenientforthemtoassumethat“thestate”washandlingthepopulationasnecessary.Therecessionbroughthometheextentoftheir self-delusion, forcing them to recognize that Israeli realitywas differentfrom the pictures projected in Ascot cigarette ads, and less homogenouslyAshkenazithanwasperceivedbytheswimmersattheWeizmannInstitutepool.And there were Israeli “others” who were Arab, or who lived on kibbutzim.Thesepeopleleddifferentlives.
CHAPTER2OTHERPEOPLE
1.MIZRAHIMI:“IT’SBETTERTOBEASHKENAZI”
The houses in Jerusalem’sMusrara neighborhood faced the walls of the OldCity,rightalongtheJordanianborder.ThefirstIsraelistoinhabitthemmovedinassoonasthehouseswereemptiedoftheirArabresidentsduringthe1948Warof Independence. The neighborhood was given an official Hebrew name,Morasha,butaswithmostoftheformerlyArabareas,everyonekeptcallingitby its original name, and when they said “Musrara” they meant poverty anddistress.Inthe1960s,closeto4,000peoplelivedthere.Theywereconstructionworkers,sanitationworkers,maids,carpenters,locksmiths,painters,andownersof small shops. Some60 percent of them came fromMorocco, and likemostMizrahiminIsrael,theyhadtomakedowithalowerqualityoflifethanthatoftheaverageAshkenazi.1
DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1960S, ISRAEL WITNESSED ITS MOST DRAMATICREVOlution since the state’s inception: the Ashkenazis stopped being themajority.When the statewas established, eight out of every ten IsraeliswereAshkenazi;onlytwooutofeverytenbabieswereborntoMizrahimothers.Overtheyears,moreMizrahimthanAshkenazissettledinIsrael,andtheyproducedtwiceasmanychildren.In1967,sixoutoftenchildreninthefirstgradewereMizrahim.Thatsameyear,theMizrahipopulationmatchedtheAshkenazi,andsoonovertookit.In1968,onlythreeofeverytenbabiesinIsraelwereborntoAshkenazimothers.2
“ItisneveragoodthingtobeMizrahi,notunderanycircumstances,”YediotAharonot concluded on the basis of an official survey. “It’s better to beAshkenazi,aveteranofthecountry,withasmallfamily,livinginHaifaorTelAvivandearningalivinginoneoftheliberalprofessions.Inanyprofessioninwhichonemightengage,Ashkenaziswillearnmore.”Thatwastrueforpeopleateverylevelofemployment,fromtheagriculturallaborertothephysician,andit was independent of how long a person had been living in Israel: newimmigrants from Europemademoremoney than new immigrants fromArabcountriesworkinginthesamefield.Inmanycases,Ashkenaziimmigrantsmadeeven more than veteran Mizrahim.3 An average Ashkenazi family had a
householdincomeof825lirasamonth,aMizrahifamily536liras.ManymoreAshkenazis thanMizrahim lived in spacious apartments, with a bedroom foreachfamilymember.Overtheyears,mostMizrahimmanagedtogetholdofgasheaters and electric refrigerators, but telephones and car ownership were stillclearidentifiersofAshkenazis.4
There were various reasons for these discrepancies, including deliberatediscrimination. Most longtime Israelis were Ashkenazis, and most of theMizrahim had arrived after the establishment of the state—the majoritydestitute. Many came with neither the education nor the professional skillsrequired to succeed in the Western society that Israel emulated. More than250,000 Israelis, survivors of the Holocaust, were receiving reparationspaymentsfromGermany,andthatmoneywasoftenspentonbetterapartments.The average income of thosewho receivedGerman reparationswas some 30percenthigherthanthosewhodidnot.ThiswasanotherfactorinthedeepeningethnicgapbetweenAshkenazisandIsraelis fromArabcountries.5 InMusrara,lessthan15percentoftheresidentswereAshkenazi.Houses in Musrara were, for the most part, outwardly attractive. Built of
Jerusalemstone,theywerearemnantofanoldarchitectureofprosperity,withlemontreesgrowinginbeautifulcourtyards,wherestaircasesandbalconiesandother ornamentation reflected the taste of the Arabs who had lived therepreviously.Inside,however,everythingwasrottingandmusty,wroteShoshannaYovel, a community worker who visited the neighborhood on behalf of themunicipality. The houses had once been home to one or two families; theentrance ledontoanexpansive foyer thatopenedup to theother rooms.Nowtherewasonefamilycrowdedintoeachroom.Manyofthenewresidentssetupkitchenettes in theentrancesto theirrooms,sotheycookedin theirbedrooms.Thecommunityworkerdescribedelderlywomensittingonthefloors,cookingonportablePrimusstoves.Theyusedavarietyofspicesboughtat themarketandgroundathome,andcookingoilsplatteredineverydirection.Yovelnotedthat thepots,coffeefinjans,andcopper trayswerealwayspolishedtoashine.Cooking stations equipped with gas rings were available, but the womenpreferredthePrimusstovesonthefloor,becausetheyfounditstrangetocookwhile standingupanddidnotknowhow tooperate thegas rings.Evenmanyyoungwomenalsocookedthisway.Cookingwasadailyritualthatwentonfora long time,and thepeopleof theneighborhoodmade freshdisheseveryday,ratherthancookingforseveraldaysahead,probablybecausethefamilieswerelarge.AccordingtoYovel,nutritionwasmarkedlydeficient:thefoodwasfillingbut not nourishing. They ate lots of bread. Apart from the cooking area,
bedroom furnishings consisted of beds and a cupboard. Showers and toiletssharedbythefamilieswereattheendofthehallway,orsometimesoutsidethehouse.“Theymisshavingtheirownapartments,theyseethatasarealluxury,”Yovelnoted.Manywantedtoleavetheareaandtheneighbors,butwereafraidtosetoffontheirownintonewenvironments.Mostresidentsdidnot imaginetheycouldaffordbetterapartments.Theythoughtofthehousingprojectsbuiltbythegovernmentastoosmall.Thewomenhadmanychildren,whichmadeitdifficult to keep things clean.Yovel recounted the story of one neighborhoodwoman.She had gone to elementary school. At fourteen or fifteen she had started
work as amaid, and at sixteen or seventeen she started going to partieswithboys,andtothemovies.Shehadspentmostofthemoneyshemadeonclothesand shoes. She did her hair at home. “A common sight in the neighborhood:youngwomenpeekingout of thewindowor from the balconywith rollers intheirhair.”Atsomepointshehadfoundaboyfriendandstartedgoingoutwithhim. After obtaining parental approval, the couple decided to marry. Manyweddings inMusrarawereheldunderpressure fromtheyoungwomen,Yovelnoted.Aswascustomary,theweddingwasaslavishaspossible.“Incontrasttothe difficult financial situation, the inadequate nutrition, and the insufficienteducation,wefindsomeconspicuousconsumptionintheneighborhood,”wroteYovel disapprovingly. “Almost every family holds celebrations: brisses, barmitzvahsandweddings.Thesecelebrationsentailhugeexpenses.Customoutfitsare tailored even for the children. The youngwomen borrowwedding gownsfromfriends,butarestaurantisrented,dinnerisserved,andsometimesabandishired.Wheredotheygetallthismoney?Theygointodebtformanyyears.”Aprominent Israelisociologistattributed theshowycelebrations to the lossoforiginal cultural identity and the search for a new one. In summer, someweddings were held in the courtyards, which pleased Yovel. “Everything iswonderfully decorated, all the relatives are recruited to help cook, bake, andorganize,andeverythingisdonewithagreatdealofloveanddevotion.”Somehow theyoungcouple founda room to live inandbegan raising their
ownchildren—again, indifficult andcrowdedconditions.Twoyearswentby.“Thewell-groomedseventeen-year-old,whowassoattractivewhensheusedtogoto themovieswithherboyfriend,hasbecomeanirritable,nervouswoman,neglected, depressed and apathetic, busywithhousework all day long,”wroteYovel. The youngmother complained that her husband did not help; he wasshort-temperedandhitthechildren.Theyhadaninfantandaneighteen-month-old girl. The husbandwas apologetic: heworked all day, andwhen he came
homeand thechildrencried,he losthis temper.Thechildren lookedpaleandspotty—like, Yovel noted, many of the neighborhood children. They cried atnightandwokepeopleup,saidtheparents.Sometimesagrandmothermighthelpandevenenableayoungwifetoholda
job.But thechildrenkeptcoming.FamilyplanningwaspracticallyunheardofinMusrara; around half the residents were under the age of eighteen. Yovelworriedaboutthedamagechildrenmightsufferfromsleepinginthesameroomas their parents. One woman told her, “My husband and I behave like twostrangers in thehouse,weshoweachothernoaffection,so thechildrenwon’tsee.”Butthecouple’sbedwouldbeinthecenteroftheroom,surroundedbythechildren’sbedsinthecorners.AboycominghomefromschoolinMusrarawouldgrabahunkofbreadand
hurryback to the streets, returningwheneverhepleased. In theevenings, if itwasn’t too cold, one could still find children running through the streets. Themothers complained, but as the community worker wrote, “What is there athomethatwouldmakethechildrenwanttostayinside?Thehomeismessy,themotherisalwaysbusy,therearenotoys,nocornerwhereachildcansitquietlywithafriend.”MostmothersspokeMoroccanArabictotheirchildren.Parents usually bought their children the cheapest clothes they could find,
whichquicklywore thin.Manychildrenwalked aroundwith torn clothes thatwere not warm enough. Yovel found that the children were physicallyunderdeveloped,shortandthinfortheirage.Theirhandsandfaceswerealwaysdirty. She often heard of childrenwith rickets,madeworse by the damp andmold. The residents’ grasp of medical terms and institutions was “slightlyconfused.”ThosewhobelongedtotheHistadrut’shealthfunduseditsservices,but others neglected illnesses and onlywent toHadassahHospitalwhen theirhealth deteriorated badly. Still others preferred to take counsel of an elderlywomanwhohadbeenknownasahealerbackinMorocco.Themunicipalityof Jerusalem tried to setupa sewingclub inMusrara,but
thewomendidnotcome.Aparents’meetingorganizedbythemunicipalitywasalsopoorlyattended.6Theresidentshadlittlecausetotrustthecity.Theirlettersto themunicipality expressed a sense that they had been abandoned, and thereplies they received, if any, were disrespectful. “I have not yet received aresponsetomyletter,”wroteSa’adiaMarcianofromblock13/35,twoandahalfmonthsaftercomplainingaboutsewagerunningpasthisfrontdoor.Governmentministries also failed to provide the neighborhood with services. In January1967,VictorSuissa,ofblock15,sentasecondcopyofaletterhehadsenttwo
yearspreviouslytothedistrictengineerofastatehousingcompany,inwhichhecomplainedofthedampinhisbuilding.Thecompanyhadsentsomeoneover,but thedamppersisted. “All the furniture and thewalls are ruinedbecauseofleaks,”wroteSuissa.Residents complained of having no street lights at night, despite the
neighborhood’sproximitytotheborder.TheMinistryofDefensebuiltapublicbomb shelter, but neglected to remove the construction debris. Zvi Sela, ofHahomaHashelishitStreet,notifiedtheMinistryofHealththataftertwoyearsof complaints, the sewer was now overflowing into the middle of the road.Childrenwere playing in the filthymud and catching diseases. “The childrencan’t stayathomeallday,butwealsocan’t send themout to theyardwherethere’sfilthflowing.Wecan’topenthewindowsbecauseofthestenchandthemosquitoes, and inside it’s stifling and hot,” wrote Sela. Later the sewageflowedintothekindergarten,too.
THEREWERE TWO SCHOOLS INMUSRARA. INAPRIL 1967, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THEneighborhood’shistory,tengraduatesoftheelementaryschoolgotintothehighschool affiliated with the Hebrew University, one of the most prestigious inIsrael. Itwasanimpressivefeat,but itdidnotalter thenationalstatistics.Theolder theclass, the lower thepercentageofMizrahipupils:from63percent inthe first grade to 15 percent in the twelfth grade. Only in vocational andagriculturalprogramswereMizrahipupilsamajority.Theywerelesssuccessfulacademically,too:only31percentofMizrahipupilsachievedagradeof70orhigher on the Survey Exam conducted in the eighth grade, compared to 70percentamongAshkenazis.“TheSurvey[results]arearealblowtous,”saidtheminister of education,ZalmanAran. In 1966,Mizrahi children constituted 46percentofIsraelisofgraduatingage,butonly13percentofthemwereeligibleformatriculation.Ashkenazipupilsdidfarbetteronthegraduationexams.Only13percentofuniversitystudentswereMizrahim,andonly8percentofdoctoralcandidates. The proportion of Mizrahi students studying medicine was evenlower.Prime Minister Eshkol asked Aran what could be done to reduce the
disparities between Mizrahim and Ashkenazis, and was given a soberingresponse: “The past casts a long shadow,” wrote Aran. There were plans toprovideextraattentiontoMizrahikindergarteners,andMizrahistudentswenttohigh school practically for free. One aim of instituting a junior high schoolsystem as part of the education reforms was to narrow the gap betweenAshkenazisandMizrahim,wroteAran.But toremovetheshadowof thepast,
the income of the Mizrahim had to increase and their living conditionsimprove.7
Atsomepointthename“Musrara”cametosignifynotonlydistress,butalsoviolence.AnIDFunitdecidedto“adopt”theneighborhood,butjustbeforetheCentral Command entertainment troupe was scheduled to perform there, anargumentarosebetweentheIDFandthemunicipalityoverwhowouldpayforthe chairs and benches that would be broken during the performance; theassumptionwasthattherewouldbevandalism.Poverty and distress also touched other neighborhoods, among them
Katamonim,KiryatYovel,andBak’a.Theconditionoftheseareasstoodoutincontrast to the prosperity of other Jerusalemneighborhoods, such asRehavia,most of whose residents were Ashkenazi. In some of the “distressedneighborhoods,”astheycametobeknown,streetgangssprangup,comprisingyoungsterswhodidnotworkorgotoschool.Fullofangerovertheirsituation,they spoke of rebellion. At their mildest, they would sneak into the moviesdowntown or the swimming pool in the German Colony neighborhood; notinfrequently, they broke into cars, shops, and apartments, drank alcohol, usedhashishaswellasharderdrugs,andcommittedassaults.OneofthespotsintheBukharimneighborhoodwastellinglygiventhenicknameHopelessSquare.8
InTelAviv,sometwentythousandfamilieslivedinlow-incomehousing.Thedeputymayor,AvrahamOfer, promised that theproblemofpovertywouldbesolved within ten or twelve years, but later said he might have been overlyoptimistic.PreviouslyArab,WadiSalibStreetinHaifa’slowercitysymbolizednotonlypovertybutalsoanationaltrauma:inthesummerof1959ithadbeenthe siteofMizrahi riots that spread to other parts of the country.Sevenyearslater, theWadiwas still an areaof extremedistress.Thepoverty-strickencitysuburbsweretheworst.Livingconditionsinthedevelopmenttownsestablishedbythestatefornewimmigrantsweremorespacious,buttheretoothehardshipstook their toll. In almost all of these towns, most residents were Mizrahim.Duringtherecession,manyofthembecameunemployed.9
Economists,statisticians,andpoliticiansarguedamongthemselvesoverhowmany Israelis were left jobless during the recession. The figures hoveredbetween 11.6 and 12.4 percent of the workforce—in either case, more than100,000people.Unemploymentspread“likewildfire,”asEshkolsaid,andtherewasnoargumentovertheveryrealdamageitinflicted,bothpsychologicalandpolitical.Thepapersdealtwithitextensively.10
After the initial shock over losing one’s job, after the sense of failure and
frustration, came the shame. One newspaper report about the unemploymentoffice described the people who had been sitting there every day for weeks.When a new person came in, his facial expression and all his body languagesaid,Idon’treallybelonghere,IjustcametogetsomethingsortedoutandI’llbe gone soon. The veterans would sit and snigger: they’d seen it before. Anunemployedhousepainterwhowishedtoremainanonymoustoldareporterthathe lefthomeeverymorning,walkedaroundtown,andbeforereturningdirtiedhisfingerswithpaintsohischildrenwouldn’tknowhehadnojob.“I’mafraidofthemomentwhenmykidsaskforbreadandIwon’thaveanytogivethem,”another man said. Most of the jobless people quoted in the papers wereconstructionworkersborninMorocco,Iraq,andotherArabcountries.*Unemployment hit young people especially hard and theMizrahim among
themevenharder.EightoutofeverytenapplicantsseekingjobcounselingfordischargedsoldierswereMizrahim.Manyshunnedthecounselingandavoidedregistering at the unemployment office out of shame. Various parts of thecountryreportedanincreaseincrimeduetotherecession.11
ESHKOL’S HEARTWAS HEAVY. HE HAD NO IDEA HOW TO CURB UNEMPLOYMENT. THEgovernor of theBank of Israel and the financeministerwere losing no sleepoverit,hegrumbled,andhedidnotknowwhattotellpeople:“FirstIsaidthisandthenIsaid that.Whatarewedoingabout it?”Oneeveninghe telephonedYosefWeitz at home and asked if the JNF could provide forestry jobs to theunemployed. Itwas eight o’clock, the holiday of Shavuot had just ended, butWeitzsatdownatonce toworkonaplan.By ten thatnight, itwasready.Herecommended entrusting its implementation to Pinhas Sapir, the minister offinance.Sapirwasunenthusiastic;hebelievedthatunemploymentwouldrestoretheeconomy.“TheJewishheartisunabletotoleratepeoplewithoutjobs,”Sapircomplained to members of Mapai; but “we must accept the pain and theanguish.” He insisted that the recession had to continue.When he heard thearguments in his party, “the self-flagellation,” particularly when there werejournalistsaround,hebecameangryandbitter,hesaid.Healsocomplainedof“demagoguery and wickedness”—these, he claimed, aided the party’sopponents,whowereoverestimating thenumberof unemployed.Tohim, thiswastherealscandal.Sapirobjectedtotheworrisome,almostmagicalnumberof100,000, and evenwhen speaking at governmentmeetingshewent out of hiswaytorefuteit.12
Sapir,bornPinhasKoslowski,wassixtyatthetime.OriginallyfromPoland,hesettledinKfarSabain1930andbecameaMapaiactivistalmostontheday
thepartywasestablished,inhisfirstyearinIsrael.Hebeganhispoliticalcareeras an assistant to Levi Eshkol,was involved in several development projects,andexcelledat raisingforeign investment.AsEshkol’sheir in theMinistryofFinance, he looked tomany,with his bald head and thunderingvoice, like anomnipotenteconomictyrant.Sapirwasnogreatbelieverinsystematicdecisionmaking, preferring to manage the state’s economy from a little notebook hecarried everywhere.Likemanyof the country’s leaders, he tended to think inYiddish.13 In his party speeches, he flitted from topic to topic withoutexhaustinganyofthem,oftendigressingfromthemainargumenttorecountananecdotefromthepastthathadjustenteredhismind.Heoftengotintopersonalarguments with his colleagues. The economy and politics were, for him, oneentity,andentirelypersonal.In light of the unemployment, he could not rest for even onemoment, said
Sapir.Andno,hedidnotwanttoseethecountrylivingwithmanythousandsofunemployed,sincehe,too,fearedanoutbreakofviolence.“Itwillendwiththedestruction of government buildings,” he cautioned. But he claimed therecessionwasalreadyyielding initial results: thediscrepancybetween importsand exports had shrunk, interest rates were down, workers had stoppeddemanding cost-of-living increases. Another year or two, or five, and theeconomywouldrecover.Sapirsworethathewasconstantlyatwork,andthathehad his finger on the pulse. “I meet with the public too, not only with mydriver,”he toldhis friends, and to reassure them,he said that close to20,000unemployedpeopleweretakingpublicworksjobs,manyoftheminJNFforests.“YosefWeitzthinksthisworkcontributessomethingtothecountry,”hesaid.*
YOSEF WEITZ WAS ABOUT TO RETIRE FROM THE JNF, SOMETHING HE WAS HAVINGTROUbleaccepting.Likemanyofhiscolleagues,heneededtobeactive,andwasmiserable without something to do. He found old age loathsome. “I am notafraidofdeath,”hewroteinhisdiary;“whatIfearislifewithoutinterest.”HisZionist faithwas unblemished by questionmarks—itwas adorned entirely byexclamationpoints.Butratherthanideasandwords,thetoolsofhistradewereclodsofearthandsaplings.Heknew thecountry’severy fieldand tree, everypathandwaterhose,andbelievedthatthesewerethefoundationsoftheJewishstate.Thestatewastheobjectiveandheidentifiedwithitwholly:“Iyearnedforit,Idreamedofit,andIhavelivedmyprivateandpubliclifeforitssake.”HispersonaldiarywastoagreatextentthediaryoftheZionistdream:thecountrywouldbeaslargeaspossible,withasmanyagriculturalsettlementsaspossible,itslandsfarmedandcoveredwithwoods.ThemoreJewsandthefewerArabsin
it,thebetter.Afterforty-sevenyearsofactivity,thedoorsofgovernmentofficeswerestill
open toWeitz. He spokewithministers andwith the chief of staff, trying toadvancesettlementplansthatincludedamoshavtobenamedHazon,“Vision.”In early January 1967,Weitzwrote toEshkol to caution him against grantingunemployment benefits, an idea in which he detected “severe corruption.”Educatedpeople,peoplewithdignity,wouldrefusetheaid,while“themasses”wouldprefer to take themoney insteadofpublicworks jobs, suchas forestryandpathmaintenance,inserviceoftheJNF.“Themasseswilldefect,”assertedWeitz, as if public works were a national duty like military service. Herecounted a long list of settlement plans that the government, he said, haddelayed for three years: only onemoshav,Netua, had been set up.He arguedthatthewidespreadunemploymentwasanopportunitytorenewthesettlementdrive, including in those areaswith anArabmajority.Weitz gave details andurged the primeminister to “turn your attention to your first love, the earthlyone—agriculturalsettlement!”Afterthisappealtosentiment,Weitznotedthataministerial committee headed by Eshkol had invited him to join a discussionabout settlement in theGalilee.He had refused the invitation, of course:whywashemerelyaskedto“join”adiscussioninsteadofbeingafullmemberofthecommittee?TheprimeministerinvitedWeitztohisoffice.WhenWeitzarrived,hefound
Eshkol busywith other people.Hewaited for twenty-fiveminutes and then adelegationfromaminorpoliticalpartyarrived;theirappointmentwasafterhis,but theywere allowed togo in first. “Therewasno secretary in sight,”Weitzrecountedinhisdiary.Eventually,hewascalledin.Eshkolwasonlyfouryearsyounger than Weitz and also believed that the Zionist future depended onagricultural settlement.“Hesits inhischairwearingacardigan fastenedup tohisneck,withawhiteshirtcollarandnotie,”notedWeitz,whohadcomearmedwithmapsandplans.ButEshkolbeganthemeetingwithacomplaint:“WhereisRaanan?”Weitz’ssonRaananwastheheadof theJewishAgency’ssettlementdepartment,apositionEshkolhimselfhadoccupiedintheearlyfifties.EshkolthoughttheyoungerWeitzwastakingtoomanytripsoverseasandthiswaswhy“nothingwasmovingahead.”WeitzseniortriedtointerestEshkolinaseriesofprojects,buttheprimeministersaidtherewasnomoney.PerhapsWeitzwouldcometovisithimathomeoneofthesedays,onShabbat,Eshkolsaid,andthentheywouldtalkabouteverything.“Isawhimboggeddownbyinternalpolitics,”wroteWeitz.Severalministers
weredemandingcost-of-livingincreasesforworkersandthreateningtoresignif
their demands were not met. Others were threatening to step down if thedemands were met. “And he sits on the fence,” wrote Weitz. He wasdisappointed, not necessarily by Eshkol himself but by his office, whichwasdrowninginproblemsandhadnotimetoanalyzethemproperly.Eshkolneededadvisers,Weitzwrote.InalettersenttoWeitzaftertheirmeeting,Eshkolwrotethat therewasnogettingaroundunemploymentbenefits.“Wemust rememberthattimeshavechangedandwemustconsidertheeducationoftheunemployedandtheirprofessions.Wecannotofferroad-pavingjobstoacademics,althoughin our day we were not above that—quite the contrary.” It was not thegovernment, he said, but rather the Zionist organization that was not doingenoughtoencourageagriculturalsettlement.Raananwasgoingabroadtoooftenandperhapsthatwaswhyhewasnotpayingenoughattentiontotheneedsofthecountry,Eshkol reiterated.Buthedidnotneglect toappease theelderlyWeitzandmakeupforpastdisrespect:ofcourseWeitzwasinvitedtobeafullmemberoftheGalileesettlementcommittee;heapologizedforthemisunderstanding.15
•••
IN NOVEMBER 1966, THE GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO EXTEND THE LENGTH OFmen’sIDFservicetotwoandahalfyears,whichhadbeentheterminthepast.The length of women’s service remained unchanged, at twenty months. Theextension of service postponed a deterioration in unemployment for a fewmonths. The followingFebruary the government decided to provide a job foranyone who sought one, although no one knew exactly how this would beaccomplished. A fewweeks later, the public witnessed a riot in Tel Aviv byunemployed people. Most of them were Mizrahi, which was particularlyalarming. Those in government were not surprised. “Today, this Mizrahipopulation is our proletariat,” said one participant in a discussion held by theprimeministersometimeearlier,adding,“Itisacompletelydifferentworldfromtheoneweknow.”16
Beginning in 1966, newspapers had begun to write about the plight of theMizrahim, especially in the development towns. “It seems that of the tenmeasures of filth that have descended on Israel, the development towns havetaken nine. . . .Most of them are dirty andmany of them look like garbagedumps,”wroteHa’aretz. The pressures of poverty were reported all over thecountry.“Wheneversomeonegetssick,wehavetowalkmorethanamiletoBetShemesh to call a doctor,” said a resident of Mahseya, a moshav in theJerusalemcorridor.Not far from there, in an all but abandonedmoshav, lived
EliyahuAmsalem, father of twelve, unemployed.His daughter Sarahwrote alettertotheprimeministeronhisbehalf:“Mr.PrimeMinister,ifyoudonothelpme,Iwillkillmyself.”IreneArbiv,awidow,livedneartheairportatLod,inatownshipnamedafter
PresidentTruman.Her husbandhaddied in an electrocution accident, leavinghertoraiseelevenchildrenonherowninatwo-bedroomhouse.Snakescrawledinto thehouse throughcracks in thewalls. InLodandRamle, unemploymentwas on the rise, although the local labor unions reported that there was nostarvation in their towns—not yet. Similar reports came from Or Akiva andCarmiel, from Yokneam and Upper Nazareth, and from Ma’alot. KiryatShmoneh,whereroughly70percentofthepopulationwasoriginallyfromNorthAfrica,wasdescribedasadyingtown.Someeightythousandpeoplehadlivedinthetownsinceitsestablishmentin1949,butbythebeginningof1967onlyfifteenthousandremained.Betweenfortyandfiftythousandpeoplehadsettledin Beit She’an after the establishment of the state, but by 1967 only twelvethousandwereleft.17
OnaDecemberdayin1966,fourreportersfromKolIsraelradiowenttoBeitShe’an.Newarcheologicalfindingshadrevealedthatthisimmigranttownwasbuilt on a site that had been inhabited almost continuously for four thousandyears. A Talmudic scholar determined that it lay at the gates of Eden. Thereporters met a thirteen-year-old girl named Yaffa Cohen. Asked if she washungry,shereplied,“Yes.”YaffaCohenwasnottheonlypoverty-strickenchildinBeitShe’an,andshelaterrevealedthatshehadn’tbeenhungryatallbuthadsimply said what she had been told to say. The daily Maariv had alreadyreportedonhungrypeople inBeitShe’an,but thepowerof radiowasgreaterandYaffaCohenbecamea symbol.Thebroadcast shocked the entire country.“TheStateofIsraelhasthepowertofaceanyenemy,”saidoneKnessetmemberafterthebroadcast,“butitcannotfaceaboyoragirlwhosays,‘Iamhungry.’”Hunger was relative, wroteHa’aretz, and Israel was no India. But the paperofferedadefinition:severehungerinIsraelwasaconditionwherebyafamilyofninesubsistsonbread,potatoes,oralittlerice,andtea.Suchhungerexisted,thepaperdetermined,andaddedthattherecessionwashurtingMizrahimmorethanAshkenazis. Statistics confirmed this assertion. “The situation is explosive,”Ha’aretzcautioned.18
FormerprimeministerDavidBen-GurionsenseddesperationinthesoutherntownofDimona.Therewasnoconfidence in thefuture,“as if thesituation ishopeless,”hewroteinhisdiary.Oneofthecity’sresidents, twenty-eight-year-
oldProsperLazimi,said,“Bloodwillbespilledhere.”BloodhadalreadybeenspilledintheporttownAshdodonthefirstofMay,internationalworkers’day.Afewhundredunemployedpeopletookpartinademonstrationthatturnedintoaconfrontationwiththepolice.Twodozenpeoplewereinjured,includingeightpolicemen. The unrest in Ashdod had taken on the characteristics of a civiluprising,wrote oneof the papers.Violent demonstrations occurred elsewhere,too.AreporterforHa’aretzdescribedtheatmosphereinYeruham,adevelopment
town.Heobservedtwogirlsplayinghopscotchonthesidewalkoutsidethelocalcouncil building.Onewas in the advanced stagesofpregnancy.Therewere afewotherunmarriedpregnantgirlswiththem.Intheunemploymentoffice,onesixteen-year-old girl threatened the staff that if she couldn’t find work, shewould become a prostitute “like those other girls.” At Makhluf’s café, moreunemployedpeoplesataround.Onedischargedsoldiersaidthatasfarashewasconcerned, “thewhole country can go down the drain.” The reporterwarned:“Thesoldiersandtheprostitutesaredangerouslyflammablematerial.Onesparkcouldresultinanexplosionthatwouldshockthewholecountry.”AreporterforYediotAharonotdescribedlifeinKiryatShmonehasadisgrace
tothememoryoftheheroesforwhomthetownhadbeennamed,among themthepioneerYosefTrumpeldor,who,beforebeingkilledinanattack,hadutteredthememorablewords,“Itisgoodtodieforourcountry.”IfTrumpeldorknewofthe conditions in town, hewould have kept his famouswords to himself, thereporterwrote.Anothernewspaperwondered:“Ashdod,Dimona,BeitShe’an,Kiryat Shmoneh: of thesewe knew.Butwho imagined unemploymentwouldreachTelAviv?”Therewerepeopleonthevergeofstarvationinthecenterofthe city, another paper reported. The media reports and the message ofhelplessness emanating from Eshkol’s office quickly gnawed at Israel’s self-image,frighteningeventhosepeoplewhohadatfirstdescribedtherecessionasmerelysomethingoneheardabout.MoreandmoreIsraelisbegantofearthattherecession was not simply a discrete economic crisis, but something that wasundermining the country’s very foundations. Obviously, the crisis wasdeepening.TheU.S.ambassador,WalworthBarbour,informedWashingtonofaprofound
disparity between “Occidentals and Orientals” in education, housing, andemployment. Alongside the disparity, he said, was deliberate discriminationagainst theOrientals. They lived in a sort of ghetto, effectively isolated fromtrue contact with the Occidentals. It could therefore be said that, to a greatextent, a person’s ethnic origin determined his future. This was the greatest
dangerfacingIsrael,theambassadorconcluded.19
2.MIZRAHIM II: “INEUROPE, PEOPLEDONOTEATONTHESTREETS”
One evening in October 1966, Yosef and Ruhama Weitz went to the HaifaTheater to seeMosheShamir’sHeWalked in theFields. In the play, a youngmannamedUri,bornandbredonakibbutz,fallsinlovewithMika,aHolocaustsurvivor.Heenlists in the fightagainstBritish ruleand, likeYehiamWeitz, iskilled,apparentlyontheNightoftheBridges.ThewidowedMikabearshissonandnameshimafterhisfather,Uri.“Apleasant,enjoyableplay,itssubjectandtheacting leaveagreat impressionandwill surelybeagood influenceon theyouth,”wroteWeitzinhisdiary,observingthatmostoftheaudiencewasyoung.The play may have been appreciated in Haifa, but residents of Ofakim,
originating predominantly in North Africa, said they did not want Shamir’sheroic Ashkenazi play in their town. Their chosen heroine was the star of alighterplayinwhichAlizaMizrahi,acleaningwoman,becomesadetectiveandsolves a murder mystery.20 This was not the world envisioned by the firstZionists.The Zionist movement had been born in Europe, the cradle of the ideas it
went on to cultivate: national identity—as well as nationalism—liberalism,socialism, and Marxism; all were anchored in European thought. HavingdeterminedthatthesolutiontotheJewishquestionrequiredrelocatingtheJewsto the landof Israel, theZionist leaderswere thinkingof the Jews inEurope.ThestatetheyenvisionedwastobeculturallyapartofEurope,andwhentheytraveled to European capitals asking for support, they promised a bastion ofEuropeanculture in theMiddleEast.Thiswas the image inwhich the Jewishstatewasbuilt,undertheauspicesoftheBritishempire.ButthemurderofJewsin the Second World War depleted the state’s potential population, and theZionistmovementbegantolookelsewhereforpossibleimmigrants,totheJewsofArab countries. Prior to theSecondWorldWar, theyhad aroused, atmost,anthropological curiosity within the Zionist movement; they were notconsideredpartnersinthedream.21
TensionsbetweenAshkenazisandMizrahim(orSephardim,or,astheywerealso then called, “members of eastern communities”) had plagued the JewishsettlementinPalestinesinceitsinceptionandworsenedupontheestablishmentof the state, as the balance of numbers changed. Israel’s basic goal was toachievea“mergingofdiasporas,”inthespiritoftheAmericanattempttocreate
a“meltingpot”society.Thestatehadatitsdisposaltwoprimarymeanstoreachthis end: schools and the military.22 But when Zionist leaders spoke of a“merging of diasporas,” they meant that the Mizrahim would assimilate intoEuropeansociety—whichtheyhopedwouldbestrongenoughtoabsorbthem—without requiring it to give upWestern values and culture. This attitude stillprevailed in 1966. “We must try and bring European culture to the Mizrahicommunities,”saidthewriterHaimHazaz.Thestoryof thisattempt isoneofaccomplishmentsanderrors, illusionand
sobriety, goodwill and arrogance to the point of racism, deliberate andnondeliberate discrimination, and affirmative action both useful and harmful.Aboveall,itisastoryofalienation:theAshkenazisfounditdifficulttolivewiththeMizrahim,whointurnfoundtheAshkenazistrying.Theintermarriageratein1967wasapproximately15percent.Astudyconductedamongyoungpeoplerevealed that Ashkenazi youth felt alienation, and even hostility, towardMizrahim.One teacher, Bilha Noy, documented accounts of growing up in Israel and
heardmanyreferencestothishostility.Someofherinterviewsubjectstoldherthat inthefifthorsixthgrade,AshkenaziandMizrahistudentswereseparatedand streamed, ostensibly according to scholastic ability. “Weweren’t told thisopenly,”onepersonrecalled,“itwasthekindofthingyoudidn’ttalkabout,buteveryoneknew.Thenatsomepointtheschooldecidedthatitdidn’tseemnicetohave’our’classand’their’class.Theydidn’tactuallychangeanything,theyjustannouncedthat therewasnodifferencebetweenus.Theclasseswererenamedwith thenamesof flowers,but thecosmeticsdidn’tdeceiveus—or them.Thefactis,intheafternoonswehadnocontactwhatsoever.”Sociologicalstudiesconfirmedtheexistenceofagreatdealofethnictension
andevenmutualhostility.“TheheartsoftheMizrahiethnicitiesbearenvyandhatred of theirWestern brethren,” determined awriter forHa’aretz, who alsonotedthatamong“Westerners,”onlytheeducatedwerefreeofcontempttowardtheMizrahim.Studiesalsoexposed“internal”hostilityamongAshkenazisandMizrahimoriginatingfromdifferentcountries.23
Citizens fromArab countries sent furious letters to PrimeMinister Eshkol.Oneof themaccusedthegovernmentofbeingcomprisedof“anunadulteratedrepresentationoftheEuropeanrace.”24Indeed,IsraelhadnotyethadaMizrahipresident, chief justice, or Knesset chairman, or aMizrahi prime minister orchief of staff.Only one SupremeCourt judge, EliyahuMani,was ofMizrahidescent. Only twenty-five of the 120 members of the Sixth Knesset were
Mizrahim,onlytwogovernmentministers,notasingleIDFgeneral,andnoneofthemayors of large cities.Mizrahi representation in other centers of politicalpower—theHistadrutandtheseniorcivilservice—wasalsodisproportionatetotheirshareinthepopulation.25*Thepostalminister,EliyahuSasson,himselfMizrahi,said thatmanypeople
turnedtohimtoprotestthemeagerrepresentationofMizrahiminpolitics,andhecautionedthatMapaiwaslosingitsinfluenceamongMizrahim.Sassonwasone of the two non-Ashkenaziministers in Eshkol’s government, but like theministerofpolice,Behor-ShalomSheetrit,alsoMizrahi,hewasanold-timerinthecountryanddidnotrepresentthenewerimmigrants.Inearly1966,Eshkolmet with the Mizrahi Knesset members to discuss the advancement of theirconstituentsandproposedthattheyestablishateamtoreportontheneedsinthedevelopmenttowns.WhenMinisterSheetrit resigned,shortlybeforehisdeath,SassonwasgiventheMinistryofPolice,andthePostalMinistrywenttoIsraelYeshayahu,thefirstcabinetministerofYemeniteorigin.Ha’aretzdeclaredthatthis appointment refuted the repeated claims that Mizrahim suffereddiscrimination.“Onemaywithsatisfactionnotethatapersonwhocamehereasayoungman thirty-sevenyears agohasmanaged to climbup theparty rungsuntilreachingthepostofminister,”wrotethepaper,asproofthatthedoorwasopen to any diligent, talented activist.* Most government members came toIsrael as youngmen and had not had towait nineteen years before becomingministers—buttheyhadcomefromEurope.University students of North African origin tried to establish a movement
named Oded in Jerusalem, aimed at improving the image of Mizrahim andneutralizingtheAshkenazisenseofthemasforeigners.Theyreceivedassistancefromthegovernment,andthepresssupportedthem,buttheU.S.embassywaspessimistic about what they could accomplish. As long as the disparitiesbetween themand“theAshkenaziminority”werenoteradicated, theembassycharged,JewsfromNorthAfrica,andMizrahimingeneral,wouldcontinue toexist as passive observers on the margins of society. The embassy attributedtheirconditiontothe“superioritycomplex”oftheAshkenaziestablishment.28
ManyIsraelisacknowledgedthediscrimination.AreporterforMaarivwrote,“One day theywill share the seats at the government table. So itwould be agoodideaforthosewhoaresittinginthoseseatstodaytoconsidertheissue,tomake sure that when that day comes their children are not appointed to thePostal andPoliceMinistries.”EvenBen-Gurion,no longerprimeministerbutnowspeakingasanordinaryKnessetmember,admitted,thoughcautiously,that
he was not certain that allMizrahim enjoyed the same treatment afforded toAshkenazis.29
In early 1967, twowomenweremaking headlines in the papers, one fromYemen and the other fromMorocco. The Yemenite woman implied that sheblamed herself for her predicament, while the Moroccan woman projectedgratification and a certain self-righteousness. The mother from Yemen wasHamamaTan’ami, a residentofGedera.Some seventeenyears earlier, shortlyafter her family arrived in Israel, her four-month-old son, Yehuda, haddisappeared. Infant mortality rates in Yemen were high and were predictablyelevated among the Yemenite Jewswho had recently immigrated. Theywerehoused at first in transit campswhere conditionswere extremely harsh: therewasinsufficientnutrition,poorhealthcareandsanitation,andinadequateshelterfrom the cold.Hundreds of children fell ill and died.But at the beginning of1967,MosheandHamamaTan’amireceivedtwonoticesfromthegovernment,one informing Yehuda Tan’ami that he was now eligible to vote, the othersummoning him for IDF service. Similar notices were received by dozens ofIsraelifamilieswhohadlosttheirbabies,virtuallyallofthemfromYemen.Thenotices reopened the wounds and restarted the wave of rumors that hadcirculatedovertheyears:thechildrenhadnotdiedbutbeenstolenandpossiblyevensoldforadoption.HamamaTan’ami’saccountwasechoedbyhundredsofothers.Shewasatthe
transit camp in Rosh Ha’ayin; her baby was in the special infant housing.“EverydayIwenttonursehim,”shetoldaMaarivreporter.“OnedayIcameearly.Amancleaningthewardtoldmetowaitoutside.Istoodbythewindow.TwoladieswerestandingnearmyYehuda’sbed.Theywerearguing.Eachonesaid,‘He’smine.’Thentheyspokeinaforeignlanguage.Iwalkedaroundandheard two nurses talking.One said, ‘Sowhat? She has lots of children!’ Theothersaid,‘Yes,butthisiswrong.’Myheartwasburning.Iaskedtogoinsideimmediately. I went in and one of the nurses told me Yehuda had died. Thenursesaid,‘Gototheoffice,he’sthere.’Iwent.Hewasn’tthere.Iwenttothetenttotellmyhusband.Ontheway,Iheardthemcallingovertheloudspeakerformetocomestraightaway.Irantotheoffice.TherewasamancalledOzerithereandhesaid,‘Youshouldknowthatyourboydidnotdie.I’minchargeofburialshere.Goandlookforhim.’IsearchedandsearchedandsearchedandIcouldn’tfindhim.Wewerelikeblindpeopleinanewland.Therewasnoonetotalkto.Noonelistenedtous.Weyelled,wecried.Webegged—nothing.”In 1967, the government set up an investigative committee to look into the
issueofthemissingchildren.Thecommitteelocatedthegravesofmost,butnot
all.Theyfoundnoevidenceofchildrenhavingbeenkidnappedorgivenupforadoption illegally.The inductionorderandvotingnoticessent to thedeceasedchildrenseemedtoreflectthegeneraldisorderthatcharacterizedthehandlingofimmigrants. The committee found that Yehuda Tan’ami had died ofmalnutrition,malaria,andpneumonia,andthathehadbeenburiedinaplotthatthe committee had located.30 But the rumors were extremely persistent andhauntedIsraelforyearstocome.Someoftheinfants’bodiesweresubjectedtoautopsieswithout their parents’ knowledge.Most of the parentswere devout;theymayhavefounditeasiertoblamethedisappearanceoftheirchildrenonthegovernmentthanonGod.Eitherway,itisdoubtfulthatanyincidentcouldbetterhave illustrated the great sense of injustice felt byMizrahim, and the chasmbetweenthemandtheAshkenaziestablishment.31
The woman fromMorocco was Amalia Ben-Harush, of Kiryat Ata. In themiddleofMay1967,shegavebirthtoason,whomshenamedIsrael.Hewasachubby,healthybaby.Thenursesinthematernitywardtiedaredribbonaroundhis neck in celebration of his birth. A few days later his mother received anenthusiastic letter from David Ben-Gurion, expressing his admiration of herheroism as a mother in Israel, “unique in her generation and perhaps in allgenerations.”Asagift,hesentheracheckforonethousandliras.LittleIsraelwas the twentieth child of Amalia and Meir Ben-Harush, and Ben-GurionwishedtolaudherasaheroinetoboosttheJewishbirthrate.*The press took part in this familial celebration. Journalists made a valiant
effort to commend all twenty children, and to record their names, theirbirthdates, and their occupations. Various papers produced different lists, butthey created a single myth: Meir and Amalia Ben-Harush emerged as idealMoroccans. Theywere happy. So happy and so thankful.And so quiet. Theytaught their children to speak quietly, too. They were not bitter about theirdeprivation; they did not set fire to cars or make demands, but only askedpolitelyforwhattheylacked.TheBen-Harushesdidnotyethavearefrigerator,a fact thenewspapersobserved as if todemonstrate the family’smodesty andcommendablewillingness tomakedo, for the sakeof thecountry.The familywassoexaltedthatMaarivassigneditabiblicalromanticismbydescribingitas“atribe.”MeirBen-Harushwasareligiousman,butthesecularMaarivassuredits readers thatheworeonly“asmallyarmulke,” thusposingnoreal threat tosecularAshkenaziculture.Goingoutofitswaytosanctifythefamily,thepresspositioneditattheheartofIsraeliiconographyandcomparedittoakibbutz.32
Denialofdiscriminationwasevidentinotherspheres,too.Thestagehitofthe
seasonwasKazablan,starringYehoramGaonandwrittenbyYigalMosenzon.Maarivpraiseditasafascinatingmusical“abouttheMoroccanmanKazablan,who is unable to find a place for himself after his discharge from the army.”Much likeWest Side Story, which producerGioraGodik had imported a fewyears previously,Kazablan obliquely hinted at true social distress and, as onBroadway, turned it into an entertaining spectacle that angered no one and,consequently,worriednoone.MinisterHaimGvatiwasimpressed.“Adynamicplay,veryimpressive,”hewroteinhisdiary.“It’snowonderithasbeenrunningforseveralmonths.”33
YetMizrahimwereasserting themselvesagainstsuchcomplacency.ThedayafterPassoverended,afewthousandMoroccanIsraelishadheldtheirMimounacelebration, an annual festivity that had been customary in Morocco andrenewedinIsraelonlyin1965,inaforestnearLodnamedafterTheodorHerzl.Morethanreinvigoratingapopularfolkloristicritual,theresurrectedMimounasentamessage:wetoo,thenativesofMorocco,havesomethingtocontributetoIsraeli society. Someviewed this as a threat.A senior editorialist atHa’aretz,ShabtaiTeveth,warnedthat“IsraelistakingonanOrientaltone.”Thisanxietysurpassed even economic and political concerns. More profound than theworriesregardingpovertyandunemployment,evenviolence,ittouchedonthefoundationsoftheIsraelidreamandIsraeliidentity.
UNEASEOVERTHEDESTRUCTIONOFISRAELICULTUREHADBEENWITHTHEASHKENAZIestablishment since the first days of the state. “Indeed, there is cause foranxiety,”wroteYosefWeitz as early as1950.Over theyears,more andmoreIsraelis registered the fact that the countrywas losing itsAshkenazi characterand lookedonwithdistasteasMizrahiculturemade inroads.“Wecannot turnintoaMizrahipeople,”saidtheauthorHaimHazaz;whathemeantwaswemustnotbecomesuchapeople.“Ihaveagreatobjection,”heexplained.“WehavetraveledfortwothousandyearstobecomeaJewishEuropeanculturalentity.WecannotnowturnbackthewheelandacceptthecultureofYemen,Morocco,andIraq.”Hazaz further cautioned, “We are nearing the precipicewith regards toLevantinism.”34*ShabtaiTevethfearedagenerationinwhichthreeoutoffourIsraeliswould lackanyaffinitywithWesternculture.Suchagenerationmightbecloser to“thecultureofoursurroundings,”hewrote, implyingaproximitybetweenMizrahimandArabs.Hisconcern,Tevethexplained,stemmedfromthefact that the governmentwas not doing enough to eradicate thegapsbetweenMizrahim and Ashkenazis—that is, to bring Mizrahim closer to Europeanculture. “The greater the proportion of descendents ofAfrica andAsia in the
population,thelowertheeducationlevelmightdropandthegreaterthebreachwith European culture.” Teveth drew encouragement from the fact that mostteachers tended to be women, which he believed delayed the entrance ofMizrahimintotheprofession,butitwouldnotalwaysbeso.“GiventherelativeincreaseofnativesofAsiaandAfrica,surelytheytoowilljointhepopulationofteachers. . . .Canweassume thata teacherborn inAsiaorAfrica,orborn inIsraeltoparentsfromthere,willbeabletomaintainthelevelofinstructionofteachersfromEurope?”Thequestionwasrhetorical.Tevethdeterminedthattoprevent a deterioration in the level of education, and even to improve it, thecountryshouldavoid“toogreatadropintheproportionofteachersofEuropeanorigin.”One reason for Teveth’s view of the country’s European character asessentialwas the importanceof the relationshipbetween Israel and the restoftheJewishworld.“MostJewsintheworldleanonthecultureofEurope,noton‘the Levant culture,’” he wrote. Only in Israel was there a growing JewishcommunitythatwasnotEuropean.IfthegovernmentfailedtoinstillEuropeanculture in Israeli children, Israel would be “a mirror image” of the Jewishpeople,whichwoulddeterJewsfromprosperouscountriesfromsettlingthere.36
Ha’aretz monitored the daily manifestations of Levantinism. “People eatwhilewalking alongDizengoff Street,” the paper reported in early 1966, anddescribedwithdistasteanew“steakhouse,”thebrainchildofthreecabdrivers,that sold grilledmeats in pita.AbieNathan’sCalifornia also served steaks inpita. Like falafel and shwarma, this dish came “from the fringes,” wroteHa’aretz,noting that“inEurope,peopledonoteaton the streets.”37Ha’aretzalso campaigned to preserve the customary two-hour period of afternoonsilence. This effort seemed to be intended to educate noisy Ashkenazis, too,includingmusic teachers,whohadbeen taintedby themannersof theLevant.The paper devoted an editorial to the topic: “The boy whose music practicewaftsfromtheneighbor’swindow,completewithgrating,screeching,andoff-keynotes,mightormightnotbeafuturePaganini.Butwillthechild’sgeniusbethwarted if he does his homework until four and only then picks up theviolin?”38*In theopinionofAvrahamHarman, Israel’s ambassador toWashington, the
battleoverculturewasvirtuallyalostcause.“AJewlikemyselfdoesnotinfactrepresentthecurrentIsraelireality,”heproposed.Asambassador,heofcoursegavevoicetotheconcernsofMizrahiJewsandpresentedtheirclaims,butinhismannerofspeakingandhisoutwardappearancehedidnottrulyrepresentthem,he said. This notion troubled him not only as an Israeli but as a professionaldiplomat.Therehewas,onatelevisionshow,debatingtherepresentativeofan
Arab state. “He speaks Englishwith anArab accent,” saidHarman, “I speakBritishEnglish.Andhemaywellaskme—indeed,throwitinmyface—‘WhatareyouevendoinginIsrael?’YouwereborninLondon,yourparentscametoLondon fromRussia,whatareyoudoing there?’”Thiswouldnothappen, forexample, to an Israeli born in Iraq,Harman explained as ifwith professionalenvy, because he could say, “I, too, am from theMiddle East, I am in Israelbecauseitismyhomeland.Itisthelandofmyforefathers.Ihaveahistoricrighttoit,althoughofcourseIcouldhaveremainedinyourcountryandwaitedforyou to hang me in the town square.” And then the Arab ambassador in thetelevisionstudiowouldhavetoshuthismouth,Harmanconcluded.40*Clearly, the Israeli unity thatHarman ostensibly represented inWashington
was farmore fragile thanmany Israelis had perceived. The recession openedtheireyes.
ONLYFOUROUTOFEVERYTENJEWSLIVINGINISRAELIN1967HADBEENBORNTHERE.The other six-tenths, amounting to more than a million people, came frompracticallyeveryotherplaceonearth.MostwerefromEasternEurope;manyofthesewereHolocaustsurvivors.AbouthalfcamefromIslamiccountries.Morethan half the Jews had settled in Israel after the establishment of the state.Nearlyhalfamillion,oneoutofeveryfive,had lived in Israel for less thanadecade.42 Many Israelis had not settled there of their own free will, but asrefugees,andmanyofthosewouldhavepreferredtostayintheirowncountries.Neither Zionist ideology, the emerging Hebrew identity, patriotism and awillingness to sacrifice, nor anti-Semiticpersecution, nor even thememoryoftheHolocaustsufficedtoerasefrommanyheartsthevaguesensethattheyhadleftbehindabetterlife,oratleastthechanceforabetterfuturethanwhattheyfoundinIsrael.In“TheSpottedTiger,”writerYaakovShabtaigavehischaracter,Shoshana,a
Vilna-bornownerofasmallrestaurantinTelAviv,thefollowingline:“IfIhadstayedthere,andIhadgonetotheacademy,Iwouldhavebeenintheoperabynow.” Her chances of ending up in Auschwitz would have been greater, butShabtaiwas expressing, through Shoshana, a common perception. LikemanyEuropean Jews, a largenumberof Jews fromArabcountrieswouldhave alsopreferredtostayintheircountries.TheycamebecausetheWarofIndependenceand the establishment of the state had made their lives among the Arabsimpossible. The loss of home was the price they paid to realize the Zionistdream.Likemanynewcomers,bothAshkenazisandMizrahim,theywerealostgeneration, doomed to lives spent in the misery of immigration. In a
conversationwithareporterfromYediotAharonot,oneimmigrantsoundedasifhehadsteppedstraightoutofShabtai’sstory:“IfIhadstayedoverseas,Iwouldhaveownedashopbynow,maybeeventwo.”AndréChouraqui,anAlgerian-bornlawyerwhobecameadeputymayorofJerusalem,wrote:“AlgerianJewsinFrance enjoy thewide variety of social services offered to families, includingfreeeducationfromkindergartentouniversity.”*Onalmost everycontinent conditionsharsher than in Israel couldbe found,
butwhenIsraelistalkedabout“abroad”theywerereferringnotonlytoahigherstandard of living, but often to a better quality of life and even better humanrelations. “If, for example, you purchase an inferior product,” wrote ShmuelSchnitzerinMaariv,“anditbreaksbeforeyouhavethechancetoenjoyit,canyouexpecttogetyourmoneybackfromanIsraelistore(evenareputableone)?Canyoubesurethatwhenyougoandcomplaintheywillevenlistentoyouandbelieveyou?Incivilizedcountriestheybelieveyouandtheyapologizeandgiveyourmoneyback.Here...innocaseandnowherewilltheydothat.”AmosOzfoundithard,whenyoung,toseeIsraelas“arealplace,”aboutwhichtherewassomethingtowrite.“Arealplace,”hewrote,wasParis,Madrid,NewYork.44
As long as the country seemed to be forging a stable society that wasintegratingwithintheWesternworldandoffereditspopulationbothsharedandpersonal growth, people could believe in the Israeli dream, asmany did untilearly 1966. People likeYosefWeitz,YehoshuaBar-Dayan, and evenUri, theyoungboyfromRishonLezion,knewitwastheirtasktoleadthosewhocamelater,includingtheweakamongthem,toasaferandbetterfuture.Theyweretheelite and they knew it. The recession,Mizrahi poverty, andmounting anxietyaboutthelossofWesternidentityabruptlyshowedthemhowdistantthatdreamreallywas.
3.ISRAELIARABS:“MYNAMEISAHMED”
YossiMizrahispentalmostayearonakibbutzinthenorthbeforethetimecametodecidewhetherhewouldbeacceptedasafullmember.Inthemeantime,hehadfalleninlovewithakibbutznik,Rivka.Thefirsttimetheyweretogethershehadaskedhim,“You’reYemenite,aren’tyou?”Yossiwasstartled.“GoodGod,what is she thinking to herself right now?” he wondered. But he found anacceptable answer:No, he told her, hewasn’tYemenite.Hewas Israeli-born.There was nothing he found more troublesome than the kibbutz members’probingquestions—whowashe,wherewashefrom,whowerehisparents,whydidn’ttheycometovisit?Thekibbutzsecretary,Selig,toldhimthatbeforethey
couldaccepthimasamember, theyhad toknoweverythingabouthim.YossiMizrahitoldSelighehadgrownuponanotherkibbutz.Thisopenedthepathtoaninvestigation,whichexposedthetruefacts.“You’renotJewish!”saidSelig,whichwastrue.YossiMizrahiwasanArabposingasaJew.Wouldthekibbutzstillaccepthim?YossiMizrahiandRivkaandSeligwerecharactersinanovel,InaNewLight,
publishedbyAtallahMansourin1966.Mansour,ajournalistforHa’aretz,wasthirty-twoyearsoldatthetime,oneofthefewArabjournalistsemployedbytheHebrewpress.HehadbeenbornintheChristianvillageofJeish,inthebiblicalGushHalavregion.In1946,hewassent tohighschool inLebanon,wherehewasstill livingwhentheWarofIndependencebrokeoutandcuthimofffromhisvillage.In1950hecrossedtheborderbackintoIsraelillegallyandstudiedHebrewonKibbutzSha’arHaamakim.HelivedasanillegalalieninIsraeluntil1960 and then, alreadywriting forHa’aretz, obtained Israeli citizenship. In aNewLightwaswritteninthefirstperson.Thekibbutzmembersareconflicted.“Look,Yossi,”saysSelig,“wereturned
aftertwothousandyearsofexilefromcountriesallovertheworldtobewithourpeople.”YossiaskswhetherSeligiscertainthathisancestorswerereallyJewswhohadlivedinthisland,andSeligreplies,“Thepersonaldimensiondoesnotmatter!”Well,then,asksYossi,whydoeshisownpersonaldimensionmatter?“Ithought it did to you!” replies Selig. But he agrees to raise the issue at thekibbutzassembly.“Wefaceahistoricaldecisionthisevening,”hebeginsatthemeeting. “Wehavenochoice.This eveningwemustdecideonour continuedpath.We are at a crossroads.”Yossi tells them thatwhen hewas five, duringBritishrule,hisfatherwasmurdered;hedoesnotknowbywhom.Perhapsthemurdererwas anEnglishman, perhaps a Jew, perhaps anArab.AmannamedMizrahitookhimin,andlaterhemovedtoakibbutzandgrewupthereasaJew,but the kibbutzwas too homogeneous for him and so he left. He could havestayed,butthekibbutzmembers’viewsdifferedfromhis,perhapsbecauseofhispast.Hecouldmove toacity,ofcourse,buthe loveskibbutz lifeandhealsolovesRivka.Hewants to stay, he tells themembers.He believes he can livewiththemandthattheycanlivewithhim.OnememberaskswhetherheisaJeworanArab.Hispapers,hereplies,say
heisJewish.Themembersdemandtoknowhowhefeels.“Likeeveryone,”hesays.Onepersoncomments,“Thetruthis,myfriends,thatwearefacedwithafundamental problemof the utmost importance.True,wewere brought uponideals of full equality among men! But I believe our first duty is to be thepioneeringforceforourpeople in itsstruggle to implementsocialism.Yosef’s
place is not among us. He must live among his people and wage his battlethere.”SomeoneelsesaysthatYosefisnotanArabinmuchthesamewaythatthey are, in fact, not Jews: who among them is aware, for example, that thediscussionistakingplaceontheeveofTishaB’av, theholyfastday?Butonememberraisesthequestionoffuturechildren.Shewonderswhethertheyshouldnotbeconsideredandtheirtragedyprevented.Yossiresponds,“Iwillstriveformychildren tobehumanbeings.Not JewsorArabs.”But thememberstandsherground.“Heisplanningcertaindisasterforhischildren!”shemaintains,andproposesthattheyrejecthisrequest.Onemembersaysthattheyshoulddecidewhethertheirkibbutz,ofallplaces,shouldbeacenterofracialmixing,andthedebate briefly becomes an argument over discrimination against blacks inAmerica. Then Selig stands up and proposes a compromise. Yosef will beaccepted for full kibbutz membership, but no protocol will be recorded. Thekibbutz will simply be accepting another member. Not an Arab, not a Jew.“Furthermore,” he adds, “I move that this debate be kept secret by everymember.That’sthat.Arethereanyotherproposals?”Everyonebreathesasighof relief.Even thememberswhohad initially objected nowagree. “Selig hasfound the golden mean.We are not a forum authorized to decide on such asensitivematter,butwecannotignoreoureducationassocialistsandasJews.”AndsoYossiisallowedtostay.45
TheZionistmovement had adopted liberal democratic ideals from the first.JewishleadersinPalestinewerecommittedtosocialismandsocial-democraticprinciples. But during the thirty years prior to independence they were oftenforced to choose between humanistic socialist principles and the nationalinterest,andtheyusuallychosethelatter.ZionismrejectedtheideathattheJewsofEuropecouldeverattainequal rights in theircountries, andso it called forthemtomovetotheirownstate.ManyofthefoundersbelievedthattheArabsinPalestineshouldalsomovetoothercountries,asifitwereahistoricalrulethatminorities could not achieve equal rights. “These Arabs should not be livinghere,justasAmericanJewsshouldnotbelivinginAmerica,”saidDavidBen-Gurionin1950.46
The first Israelis were aware of their past as a persecuted minority and asHolocaust survivors, and they spoke often of themoral humanistic obligationthathistoryhadplaceduponthem.Thenewlyfoundedstate’sProclamationofIndependencepromisedequalityforall,regardlessofreligion,race,orsex.By1967, IsraeliArabs representedwhatAtallahMansour’sYossiMizrahiwasonhiskibbutz:alitmustestforIsrael’sbasicprinciples.
EIGHTOUTOFEVERYTENARABSLIVINGINPALESTINEPRIORTOTHEESTABLISHMENTof Israel became refugees; some 20 percent of Palestinian Arabs—approximately 160,000 people—remained within the borders of the newcountry.Shockedanddefeated,theybecamecitizensofastateatwarwiththeirownpeople.Thelanguage,religion,andcultureofthenewnationwereforeigntothem.By1967,theirnumbershadalmostdoubled,to312,000,makingthemroughly 12 percent of Israel’s population. In the Galilee and the so-calledTrianglearea in thenorth, theywere themajority.MostwereMuslims,withaminorityofChristians,Druze,andothers.Theylivedpredominantlyinvillages.Thepopulationwasrelativelyyoung;thereweresixpeopleinanaverageArabfamily, as opposed to four in a Jewish family.By 1967, six out of ten IsraeliArabshadbeenbornafter theestablishmentof the state.47As Israeli citizens,theywere entitled to vote and run for theKnesset, but theywere not Israeliswithequalrights,orequalduties.VeryfewservedintheIDF.Thestateviewedthemasasecurityrisk,andsinceIsrael’sestablishmenttheyhadbeensubjecttomartiallaw.Martial law was the product of emergency laws imposed by the British in
Palestine, laws that had been designed to, among other things, subjugate theJewishpopulation.Jewishlawyerswhohadtriedtofighttheseregulationsatthetime had compared them to Nazi policy. In daily life, martial law wasmanifestedmainlyinrestrictionsimposedonresidents’mobility.Whenevertheywished to leave their area of residence they had to appear at the militarygovernor’sofficesandobtainapermit,whichstatednotonlythedestinationandthedate,butalsothetimeofdepartureandreturn.Thepermitwasrequiredforeverypurpose,whether for travel forwork, business,medical treatment, or tovisitrelatives.Weddings,funerals,surgery,goingtothemoviesinthenexttown—allrequiredapermit.Obtainingpermitsmeantstandinginlines.Thereweredifferent types of permits, issued on forms that periodically changed. Permitsoften entailed extensive interrogation and petitions.Granting andwithholdingpermitsweredoneatthediscretionofthegovernor,andoftendependedonhismoodorotherarbitrary factors.Notallof thegovernor’s representativeswereimmune to accepting favors of various kinds. Naturally, the travel permitsservedasameansofoppressionandcontrol:peoplewereaskedtospyontheirneighbors,todenouncethem,allinordertoobtaintravelpermits.Thousandsofpeoplewere punished bymeans of orders forbidding them from leaving theirplacesofresidence,orevenbydeportationordersthatforcedthemtoliveawayfromtheirhomes.Martiallawwasimposednotonlybecauseofsecurityconsiderationsbutalso
to facilitate the state’s confiscation of land from Arabs and to control theirpoliticalactivities.Overtheyears,thestateconfiscatedroughlyhalfofallArab-owned land and transferred it to the Jewish National Fund’s authority. As adirectoroftheJNF,YosefWeitzhadsignificantinfluenceovertheallocationofappropriated lands to Jewish communities. The JNF was also involved in anational campaign to destroy the remnants of Arab villages that had beenemptiedoftheirinhabitantsduringtheWarofIndependence.Mapai,whichdidnotacceptArabcitizensasmembers,setupArabsatellite
parties. By the end of the sixties, most Arabs were voting forMapai and itssatellites. Some gave their votes to other Zionist parties, as well as to theCommunistparties.Outof120members,theSixthKnessetincludedsevennon-Jews.ThepartiesboughtArabvoteswithmoneyandvariousmethodsofthreatsandintimidation,somecoordinatedwiththemilitarymartial-lawadministration,thesecurity service,and thepolice.Theircommongoalwas toprevent IsraeliArabsfromstartingtheirownpoliticalorganizations.Tothisendtheyalsousedtheeducationalsystem:tobehiredasateacher,oneneededauthorizationfromthe security service. Teachers, as well as students, were forced to serve ascollaborators.Teacherswerequestionedaboutwhatwentoninstudents’homes,students aboutwhat teachers said in class.* Politics among IsraeliArabswasstill based, to a great extent, on family affiliation. Government offices andpartiesdispensedfavorsbasedonpoliticalconsiderations,notonlytodifferentsectorsbutalsotoindividuals.The treatment of IsraeliArabswas always extremely contradictory.Martial
lawwas supposed to ensure isolation in their villages, but the confiscation ofland meant that one out of every two Arab breadwinners had to work for aJewish employer. Many worked in agriculture or construction, receivingauthorizationfromthemilitaryadministrationtogotowork.48
By 1967, most Israeli Arabs were living in poverty and under precariousconditions. Although their circumstances had improved over the years, theysuffereddiscriminationinpracticallyeveryaspectoflife.TheiraverageincomewaslessthanhalfofthegeneralaverageinIsrael.Seventy-fourpercentofArabvillages were not hooked up to the electricity grid, 75 percent were notconnectedtothenationalwatersystem,and20percenthadnoaccessroads.NotasingleArabvillagehadpavedstreets,norhadsewageinfrastructurebeenlaid.Publichousingwas seldombuilt forArabs.Only threeout of tenArabswereinsuredbythenationalhealthfund,whereaseightofeverytenJewswere.InsixoutoftenArabvillagestherewasnoclinicoperatedbythehealthfund.FifteenpercentofstudentsinelementaryschoolswereArab,butthestateallocatedonly
3 percent of its education budget to Arab education. An Arab farmer madebetween 30 and 50 percent less than a Jewish farmer. A Jewish constructionworkermadeuptotwiceasmuchasanArab.Inthespringof1966,duringtheeconomicrecession,theunemploymentrateamongArabswastwiceashighasamongJews.49Until thenmost Israelishad tended to ignore theArabs’plight,but it toobecameunavoidable, reinforcing the suddenandpainful recognitionthattheIsraelisuccessstorywas,toagreatextent,onlyamyth.Ha’aretz reported Arab laborers’ destitution and exploitation in a series of
articlespublished inearly1966,which includedadetaileddescriptionof theirappalling living conditions in abandoned barns and packing houses and inleaking tin shacks. Some even lived out in the open, in junkyardsor garbagedumps.Not confined to distant villages, enclosed and cut off from the Israelicommunity, these conditions existed right in theheart of the country,betweenTel Aviv and Rishon Lezion. Most Arab laborers were afraid to give thenewspapertheirnames.TheirspokesmanwasAhmedMasrawa,fromthevillageof Ar’ara.50 He worked in a diamond-cutting business owned by DavidEhrenfeld,whogavemoney to reconciliationeffortsbetweenJewsandArabs.Ehrenfeldfinancedaseventeen-minutefilmthatdocumentedtheplightofArablaborersandcausedascandal.MyNameIsAhmedwasapowerfulfilm.ItdidnotdealwiththeIsraeli-Arab
conflict,didnotevenmentionmartiallaw,anddidnotexposethedeprivationinArabvillages.Itsproducers—AvshalomKatzandRamLevi,bothemployedbyKol Israel radio—accompaniedoneyoungman, ahigh schoolgraduate, ashesetoffforworkinTelAviv.HisnamewasAhmedMasrawa.Withhimonthebus were other young Arabs, including children who had not finishedelementary school. They worked hard. Contractors preferred to hire Arablaborers because no one tried to enforce their rights.Masrawa described theirattitudetowardthelaborers.Togoadthem,thebosswouldsay,“Don’tworklikean Arab,” because “Arab work” was considered substandard. Some Arabworkers disguised themselves as Jews.One, Jamal,wore a Star ofDavid andwent by the name ofYitzhak.Before that, saidAhmed, he had been called a“dirtyArab.”Theyoungmentriedtorentrooms.Thecamerafollowedthemtosix addresses, where, as soon as it became clear that they were Arabs, thelandlordswouldsaytheyweresorry,theroomwastaken.Attheseventhaddresstheywereexplicitlytold:Wedon’trenttoArabs.Ahmed’sfriendsuggestedtheyintroduce themselves using Jewish names. Ahmed refused. “My name isAhmed,”hesaid,andwenttosleeponamattressinashantytown.
He understands the Israelis, Ahmed tells the camera. This is a land undersiege. Almost every day there’s a terrorist attack. But the terror comes fromoutside,it’snottheworkers’fault.HewalksaroundTelAviv,aloneamongthetwinklinglights,watchingcouplesouthavingfun.HewantstolivewithJewsinfriendshipandreconciliation,buttheytreathimasifhewereinvisible.“They’reafraid ofme, theyhateme,” he says.Theydonotwant himhere,with them,withtheirwomen;theywouldlikehimtogotoAmericaorCanada.Buthestillhashope,hesays.Hestillhasdreams.ThelastsceneshowstheCapitolbuildinginWashington,D.C.Thefilmhitanerve.“Aharshfilm,”wroteMinisterHaimGvatiinhisdiary.
“Ittellsthetruth,butnotthewholetruth.”Theprimeminister’sadviserforArabaffairs,whohadatfirstagreedtohelpfundthefilm,changedhismindinapanicassoonashesawit,sotheproducersagreedtomodifyafewlines.InsteadofhavingAhmedsay,“Oncewehadalotofland,nowthekibbutzimhaveit,”theyagreedtohavehimsay,“Beforethewarwehadlotsofland.”InsteadofsayingthatArabswereemployedbecausefewJewswerewillingtotakeonhard,dirtywork, they said, “Contractors hire Arabs who are willing to do hard, dirtywork.”Buttheself-censorshipdidnothelp.Mapaiofficialsaskedwhythefilmdidn’tshowIsraeliArabsbeingtreatedbythehealthfund,ortheArabvillagesthatwereconnected topowerandwatergrids.Wherewas theHistadrutclub?theyaskedintheKnesset.SomeclaimedthefilmmightinciteArabsagainstthestate,andtherewerethosewhoarguedthatitcoulddamageIsrael’sreputationinthe world. Ha’aretz concluded from these responses that most Israelis wereunwillingto lookat the truenatureof theirsociety.51Since thedayIsraelwasestablished, theArabshad indeedposedachallenge to its identityasaJewishanddemocraticstate.Onoccasion,ArabmembersoftheKnessetaccusedthestateoftryingtoforce
Arabstoleavethecountry;somedidleave.Theprimeminister’sofficefounditdifficult tomonitor the phenomenon becausemany of thosewho left did notdeclarethattheyweredoingsopermanently.Butaccordingtooneestimate,thepercentage of Arabs leaving the country for good was twice as high as theirproportioninthepopulation.Theprimeminister’sadviseronArabaffairsnoted,however, that this amounted to only a few hundred people. Prime MinisterEshkolsaidheregrettedtheemigrationofArabsandcalledonthemtostay.Headdedthisexpressionofsorrowbyhandtoadraftofaspeechpreparedbyhisoffice.Someoneputalargequestionmarknexttohisnote.Ha’aretz called for the integration of Arabs into civic life and gave fairly
broadpublicitytoprivateinitiativesmeanttoreconcileJewsandArabs,suchas
those organized by the Tel Aviv socialite Nina De-Nur. When a few ArabsfoundedapubliccommitteetoenhancetheirstatusasIsraeliswithequalrights,theygainedsupportfromHa’aretz.52Butalongsidetheideological,moral,andpoliticaldifficultiesinvolvedinlivingwiththeArabs,therewasagenuinefearofthemasspiesandterrorists.Thepressattributedtothemextremenationalismandanti-Israelisentiments,andportrayedthemasagentsoftheenemy:“15spynetworksin7years,”announcedMaariv,apparentlyonthebasisofinformationobtained from the security forces.53 In August 1963, the mayor of Netanya,OvedBen-Ami, said, “Netanya is theonlyurban center that stands as a forceagainstArabsintheTrianglearea,whoareincreasingandflourishing.I’mnoteven talking about the temporary border between us and the otherArabs, thecease-fire line.As the years pass,we’ll also see a problem atTulKarem andNablus[intheWestBank]aswell.WemusthavealargeJewishcentertostandagainst theArabsector.Wecannotallow thecountry’scentralarea tobecometooweak.”54
AdebatearoseoverwhethertoincludeArabstudentsintheweaponstrainingadministeredtoJewishstudentsaspartoftheGadnayouthbattalionsprogram.Inmixed cities, such as Haifa, there were close to a thousand Arab studentsinvolved.Everyoneagreedtheycouldnotbeallowedtoparticipateinweaponstraining.Soasnottodiscriminateagainstthem,theMinistryofEducationruledthat in mixed schools the Jewish students would not have weapons trainingeither. The army objected, and Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin demanded thatEshkolstepin.Itwasproposedthat thoseexemptfrommilitaryservicewouldalsobeexemptfrompre-militaryservice.ThismeantthatArabstudentswouldnottakeanypartatallintheGadnatraining.TheMinistryofEducationchargedteacherswithexplainingthisnewpolicytostudents“inaninoffensiveway.”55
The Hebrew papers wrote about Arabs as they wrote about theMizrahim,with a sort of anthropological fascination. “Even Dowry Prices Are Up ...”announcedMaariv, the ellipsis signaling that this was something ridiculous.Ha’aretz reported enthusiastically on the first Bedouin to study medicine inIsrael.Butitsliberalismdidnotpreventitfromrunningheadlinessuchas“EightArabsArrestedforAssaultinga15-Year-OldGirl”and“ForeignersFarmingtheLand at Megadim,” the foreigners being Arabs. In the second half of 1966,Ha’aretzrantwoshortstoriesinwhichArabswerefeaturedasmurderers.56Butabovealltheywerefearedasthemothersandfathersoffuturechildren.
IN A SHORT STORY PUBLISHED BYHA’ARETZ IN THE SUMMER OF 1966, A JEWISHMANmeetsanArabman.“Doesyourfatherhaveonewifeortwo?”askstheJew.The
Arabresponds,“That’swhatyoualwayswant toknow. . . .Hehas two.”TheJewthenasks,“What’sitliketolivewithtwowives?”andtheArabrepliesthattheyareallonefamily.57Hereinlaytherealdanger.“Intheyear2000therewillbe amillion and a halfArabs here,”warned onemember of theKnesset in adebatedevotedtoencouragingtheJewishbirthrate.TheaverageJewishwomanhad3.1children,whileanaverageMuslimwomanhad8.2.“Thisisahorrifyingphenomenon,” said Knesset member Yitzhak Rafael of Mafdal (the NationalReligiousParty).“Arabswhoadhere to theirhealthynational inclinationswillcontinue to grow among us: Shall we not learn from them?” asked Rafael.“Shouldwenotalsoadheretoourownnationalinclinations?”AnothermemberoftheKnesset,MordechaiHaimStern,appealedtoJewishmothers’patriotism:“Every newborn child increases the security of the child already living andserving in the Israel Defense Forces.” Stern said he often envied the goodfortuneofhiswife,whowasathomeraising theirchildren.Butsomewomenpreferred tohold jobsandevenemployedmaids,andsomefeared thathavingmore childrenwould restrict their freedom. Theywere to be reminded, Sternsaid, that they too, as women, bore a national, religious, and familialresponsibility.OppositionKnessetmemberUriAvneriprotestedthestate’sattempttoenter
citizens’ bedrooms and to introduce biology into politics. Human beings arehumanbeings,saidAvneri,adding,“Idonotwanttomentionregimesthatweall abhor, which at their base had this dangerous mixture of biology andpolitics.” In a similar discussion held in the Knesset, Meir Vilner, of theCommunist party, said, “My entire family was destroyed because they wereJewish.AsaJew,Iobjecttonationalisticanti-Arabtones.ItoffendsmydignityasaJewwhenracistquestionssuchastheseareraisedintheKnesset.”58
Thegovernment appointed a committeeof experts to findways to raise theJewishbirthratewithoutincreasingthatoftheArabs.Theassumptionwasthatthe state could encourage people to enlarge their families through economicincentives,suchaschildsupportgrants;buthowtoensurethatonlyJewswouldreceivetheseincentives?Ben-Gurionhadanidea:thewholesubjectshouldbetakenoutofthegovernment’shandsandgiventotheJewishAgency,whichbydefinitionservedonly the Jewishpopulation—if thegovernmentbegan topayout birth incentives, “it would spend all its money on families with manychildren,andtheyareofcoursealmostallArabs.”*Agovernmentstatistician,RobertoBachi,wrotetoEshkolthatthenationalperilposedbyfamilyplanningmustbeexplainedtoJewishparents.Thiskindofcampaignwouldbestbelefttosome kind of nongovernment association. At the same time, information on
familyplanningmethodsshouldbedisseminatedamongtheArabs,andthis,too,of course,would require “the utmost discretion.”Earlier, the government haddecidedonanefforttocurbabortions.59
InAugust1966,YosefWeitzwrotetoEzraDanin,anadviseronArabaffairsin the ForeignMinistry, “I do not see a remedy or solution to this problem,whichposesadanger toourstate,other thanbywayof‘transfer.’There isnoplacefor thisminorityamongus.Wedreamedof transferandweaddressed itbefore the establishment of the state. But its realization at that time was notpossible. This is not the case now: transfer to countries near and far.”Weitzseems to have been referring to a population transfer that would be arrangedbetweenIsraelanditsneighbors,intheframeworkofapeaceagreement.ThatDecember, a senior IDF officer, Shlomo Gazit, explored an old fantasy ofattaching some of theArab villages in the Triangle region to an independentArab state in the West Bank.60 However, from elsewhere on the politicalspectrum,increasinglyloudvoiceswerecallingfortheliftingofmartiallaw.Oppositiontomartiallawcameatfirstfromtheleftandwasexpressedbythe
CommunistsandtheAhdutHa’avodapartytogetherwithMapam,bothsocialistparties with many constituents among kibbutzim. They gained reinforcementfromtheright:MenachemBegin,theleaderoftheHerutparty,demandedrepealoftheemergencylaws,whichwereleftoverfromtheBritishMandateandhadbeendesignedtorepresshimandhismovement.HecalledtoreplacethemwithIsraelistatutes.TheKnessetrepeatedlydebatedliftingmartiallaw.Whileprimeminister,Ben-Gurionhadinsistedthattherelevantlawsnotberepealed,buttoappeasehisoppositionheagreedtoperiodicimprovementsintheArabs’livingconditions and introduced various measures relaxing the severity of theirgovernance.61 Ben-Gurion’s resignation in 1963 gavemomentum to the fightagainstmartiallaw.ItwasnowthemaincauseoftheliberalleftandthewarwaswagedinthespiritofthecivilrightsmovementintheUnitedStates,withrallies,strikes, and even civil disobedience: activists entered closed areas in order toprovoke arrest. The hero of this fight was a philosophy student named UriDavis, a pacifist and a conscientious objector from the small town of KfarShmariyahu.HiscampaignagainstlandconfiscationintheGalileetofoundthecityofCarmielhadlandedhiminprison.Intellectualsandprofessors,includingMartinBuber,lenttheirnamestothecauseofliftingmartiallaw.UriAvneriandhis weekly magazine, Ha’olam Hazeh, gave voice to the Tel Aviv leftists,amongthemwell-knownartistsandmediafigures.62
Atthebeginningof1966,IsserHarel,aformerheadoftheSecurityService
andtheprimeminister’sadviseronsecurityaffairs,voicedsupportforrevokingmartial law, thus opening the door to dismantling the legal apparatus.* OnNovember8,1966,EshkolannouncedintheKnessetthatmartiallawhad“cometo an end.” It was a dramatic announcement, but not accurate: control hadsimplybeentransferredfromthearmytothepolice.Theprimeminister’sofficejudged that the change would have a positive effect, “especiallypsychologically.”Eshkol’sbiographer,YossiGoldstein,wrotethatliftingmartiallaw did not reflect Eshkol’s humanism: he continued to view theArabswithsuspicion and believed that Jews were entitled to settle the entire country.However, he believed that transferring supervision over the Arabs from themilitarytothepolicewouldreducetheirhostilitytowardthestate,andthatthisclearingoftheairwouldmakeiteasierforthestatetosetupafewdozenJewishvillages in the Galilee. Judaization of the Galilee had always been one ofEshkol’sprimaryinterests.Hewasalsoattheheadofaparliamentaryalignmentbetween Mapai, his party, and Ahdut Ha’avoda, which had long beendemandingtherevocationofmartiallaw,sohisdecisiononthematterwasalsoafunctionofcoalitionpolitics.However,thepoliceenforcedthelawmorerigidlythanthemilitaryhad,and
overthenextfewmonthsconditionsforArabsworsened.Arablaborerswhohadworkedillegallyforyearsinclosedareasnowlosttheirjobs.“Therewasgreatanticipationoftherevocationofmartiallaw,butsinceinpracticetherehasbeenhardlyanyeasingoftherestrictions,theresulthasbeennosmalldisappointmentandmuch criticism, among both Jews andArabs,”wrote Eshkol’s adviser onArabaffairs,ShmuelToledano.“Allourpropagandaefforts...haveyieldednoresults: thegeneral opinion, unjustly, is that thegovernmenthas fulfilledveryfew of its promises.” Toledano therefore recommended further relaxing therestrictions.64
Similar pressure continued to come from the kibbutzim, aswell.ManyhadbeenfoundedontheruinsofArabvillageswhoseinhabitantshadfledorbeendeported,andwhose landthekibbutzimwerenowfarming.But thekibbutzimalso frequently declared their commitment to the principle of equality for allIsraelis,includingArabs.KibbutzYehiam’snewsletterpublishedalovelypoemfortheJewishnewyear,hopingfor“Peaceforbothpeoples,undertheshadeofonefigtree...ForredwinesparklingwithgrapesForathousandflowers,withnohatredorgriefFortheswordtoreturntoitssheathforever/Forachildtofree a white dove.”65 Perhaps the incongruity here between loftily declaredideals and sober reality reflected a real moral and ideological dilemma, orperhapsitwasameansofexploitationandhypocrisy.Inthisregard,thepoetsof
KibbutzYehiamwerenodifferentfrommostotherIsraelis.
4.KIBBUTZIM:“IT’SALLACARDBOARDSET”
Whenever Yosef Weitz visited Kibbutz Yehiam, he came away impressed.“Fromyear toyear, theplacegrowsmoremagnificent,”hewrote inhisdiary.Hewasenchantedbythetrees,theflowers,andthelawns.66Therewasalemongroveandachickencoopandaherdofcattle.Themembersgrewcottonandbananas.Kibbutz Yehiam’s founders had come to Palestine as children, from
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Their parents, who had remained behind, weremurdered by theNazis. The newcomers set up the kibbutz, at the foot of theisolated Crusader fortress in the Galilee, within six or seven years of theirarrival.Lessthantwoyearslater,in1948,theyhadtofightfortheirlives.AftertheIsraelivictory,Yehiamwasallottedmoreterritory,landthathadbelongedtoArabs.Onitstwentiethanniversarythekibbutzhadroughly450fullmembers,fourtimesasmanyasinitsfirstyear.Therewereplansforexpansion,aswellasmany apprehensions. “Wego back and forth between hope and fear,” kibbutzmemberswroteintheirnewsletter.67
By 1967, Yehiam was one of 232 kibbutzim, whose total population wasapproximately 81,000, about 3.5 percent of the Jewish population of Israel.68Therewerelargekibbutzimandsmallones;someweremoreleftistthanothers,and a few were religious. They were organized within a number of politicalmovements. Yehiam was part of Hashomer Hatzair, the youth movement towhichYehiamWeitzhadbelonged.
THE FIRST KIBBUTZNIKS ARRIVED FROM EUROPE IN THE 1920S. DREAMERS ANDPIONEERS, naïve revolutionaries, they believed in the power of choice—thechoicetosettleinPalestine,tostaythere,tojoinakibbutz,andtoremaininit.Theywanted to live togetherwithoutprivateproperty,eachpersonworking tohis or her utmost ability, mainly in agriculture, and each person receivingaccording to his or her needs. Everyone was supposed to make decisionstogether at the kibbutz assembly. Early kibbutzniks even showered together,shared clothes, cooked together, and ate in communal dining rooms. Whenchildrenwereborn, theywerehoused together in“children’shouses.”69Thesechildrenwere commonly called Sabras, for a local cactus; they grew up, likeYehiamWeitz, into the fightagainst theBritishand theWarof Independence.Manyofthemfought,againlikeWeitz,intheexclusiveideologicalframework
ofthePalmah.TheSabra, the“newman,”born in Israel, isapersonwhoseexistence isas
part of a group that preserves its uniformity and tends to stifle independentthoughtandpersonalinitiative:theIretreatsinthefaceofthewe.Hesuppressesemotion,reveresstringency,scornspolitics,and,frequently,disdainseducationand words in general. The Sabra is supposed to be direct, a blunt talker: hespeaksdugri (anArabicword adopted byHebrew slang,meaning “coarsely,”“straight from the shoulder”).Hewas supposed tobe a revivalof thebiblicalhero: upright, proud, brave, masculine, defending his honor and that of hispeople.Thiswas theoriginof theHebrewexpression“From theTanach—theBible—tothePalmah.”AsthefirstgenerationofIsraelis,theseyoungmenandwomennurtured their loveof thehomeland throughhiking and a near cultishdevotion toarchaeology.“TheLandof Israelclubonourkibbutz is theoldestandmoststableofalltheotherclubs,”assertedamemberofYehiam.70
In the thirties and forties the kibbutzim were considered the jewel in theZionistcrown.Duringthefirstyearsofthestate,nothingepitomizedIsraelmorethan thekibbutz, and the countrywasoftendepictedprecisely as someof thekibbutzmovement’sfoundershaddreamed:asonebigkibbutz.TheirfoundationthroughoutPalestineplayedalargepartindeterminingthebordersofthestate,and no one didmore than they to celebrate it. But as the yearswore on, thekibbutzniksbegantolosetheirelitestatus,andby1967theyfoundthemselvesengagedinthesomewhatpatheticstruggleofadyingaristocracy.Neweliteshadsprung up in their place: politicians, administrators, scientists, industrialists,academics. These groups had gained in strength partly at the expense of thekibbutzniks’politicalandmoralstatus;theprimaryremainingstrongholdofthekibbutzniks was the army. “Since the establishment of the state, kibbutzmembershavefeltdespondent,”saidaleaderofthekibbutzmovement,YitzhakBen-Aharon,adding:“Thekibbutzhasseeminglybeenpushedaside.”71
Theideologicalstandpointofthekibbutzmovementwasreflectedduringthesixtiesinitsattitudetowardthreecountries:theUnitedStates,theSovietUnion,andGermany.TheUnitedStateswasperceivedas corrupting its youthwith adeluge of commodities. Elvis Presley symbolized the decadent bourgeoisculture.As the influenceofAmerican culturegrew, thekibbutzim sensed thatthe threat from the outside world was growing.72 The USSR, by contrast,representedthesought-after“worldoftomorrow.”ThesongsoftheRedArmywere considered Israeli folk songs. One kibbutz movement leader, YaakovHazan, described the USSR as “our second homeland.”73 Asmore andmore
newscameoftheSovietregime’scrimesandcorruption,thekibbutzimbecameengaged in debates over the essence of true socialism. Later, Moscow’sincreased hostility toward Israel and the persistent news of anti-JewishrepressionintheSovietUnionplungedthekibbutzimintomuchsoul-searching.With regard to West Germany, kibbutz representatives were members ofEshkol’sgovernment,whichhaddiplomaticrelationswiththatnation,althoughthe kibbutz movement had rejected any such contact for many years. Afterreparations for Holocaust crimes began, however, the kibbutzim startedexportingtoWestGermany.Thekibbutzniksdebated,asonlykibbutznikscould,ifitwouldbefittingtosingSchubertinGerman.Totheoutsideworld,accordingtohistorianAlonGan,thekibbutzmovement
continued to voice familiar slogans againstAmerican capitalism and tieswithGermany, against consumerism and slavishness to fashion, against privateproperty and salaried work. But in practice, Western consumerist cultureattractedeverykibbutzhousehold,asdidsalariedworkoutsidethekibbutz.74
INSEPTEMBER1966,AREPORTERFORYEDIOTAHARONOTWENTTOVISITFRIENDSONAkibbutz.Whenhewroteabouthisvisithedeployedaplethoraofforeignterms,as if to indicate that theworld at largehad finally reached thekibbutz. “Withmilk or without?” asked his hostess as she pulled the lever on an espressomachine.SomeoftheguestssatonbarstoolsatamarblelikeFormicacounter.Coffeewasservedindecorativeceramicmugs.Theyoungwomanoperatingtheespressomakerleafedthroughaglossymagazine.Softlightingfromanunseensourcegavethelow-ceilingedroomarelaxedatmosphere,asbackgroundmusicdrifted through. One young couple engaged in a slow dance. This was themembers’clubonayoungkibbutz.75
Thewriter’santhropologicaltonewasnotunusual:papersreportedonkibbutzlifeasifvisitinganexotictribe.Kibbutznikswereponderingtheobservanceofmourningcustoms,wroteMaariv,whichalsoreportedinamazementonkibbutzmembersfindingsuccessasfactorymanagersinthecities.Thestatusofkibbutzwomensuppliedmaterialformanyarticles,andYediotAharonotreportedforthethousandth time that in the early days of the kibbutz, children “went throughhell” because theywere “prey” for all sorts of educational ideals and “guineapigs for things like common showers for boys and girls under the age ofeighteen.”76
Meir’ke,thefriendoftheYediotAharonotreporterwhowrotethatstory,tookhimtohisapartment,whichhadonebedroom,a livingroom,akitchen,anda
bathroom.Outofhabit,Meir’kestillreferredtoitashis“room.”Hehadabaracrossoneentirewall,andtheybothsipped777,awell-knownIsraelibrandofcognac.This is the life, thought thereporter; thingshavechanged.Andat thispoint, inthesecondofthearticle’sninecolumns,hementionedtheswimmingpool, a symbol of the good life on the kibbutz.* The reporter and his friendreminisced:Wherehad theymet last?Was it inParis,London,orStockholm?Meir’ke said that everyone onKibbutzNahalOz had been overseas and theywere starting a second roundof travel. “Whynot? If they can,why shouldn’ttheygo?Everyone travels.WhydoesaguyfromnorthernTelAvivdeserve itmorethanakibbutznik?”Meir’kesaidthekibbutzimwerestillanequalsociety,with ideals and a value system that hadnot changed for the last fifty years.78Thiswasnottrue:by1967,lifeonthekibbutzimhadcertainlychanged,leavingmanyoftheold-timerswithabadtasteintheirmouths.Kibbutzmembershaddiscoveredtheelectrickettleandtherecordplayer,the
refrigeratorandthetelevision,allofwhichmadeitmoreenjoyableformembersto spend time in their rooms, thus threatening kibbutz togetherness. The newway of life necessitated new regulations. Typically, kibbutzniks argued thesematters heatedly. The televisionwas considered a true enemy, amonster, andthentherewerethetransistorradios,thecameraspeoplereceivedasgiftsfromtheir relatives in the cities—all detrimental to the principle of equality. ThesechangeswerediscussedinYehiam,too.79
Kibbutzniks began reading the general national newspapersMaariv, YediotAharonot,andHa’olamHazeh inadditiontothedailypaperspublishedbythekibbutz movements, and often instead of them.80 The Yehiam newsletterattributedthisphenomenontothefactthattheideologicalnewspapers,Mapam’sAlHamishmarmostprominently,no longermetkibbutzmembers’needs.Thenewsletter wasmainly troubled by themembers’ inclination to readHa’olamHazeh,whichwassomuchaproductofTelAviv.“Thisisunfortunateandsad,becausethisweeklyinallrespectsbelongsatthebottomofthebarrel,”observedthenewsletter.OnememberofKibbutzRuhamawhowenttotownwasaskedtobringback
theweekly journalsLa’isha (“ForWomen”) andKolnoa (“Cinema”).What apeculiar request, thought the man, and promptly reported it to his kibbutznewsletter.Hecouldn’tevenfindthetimetoreadeverythinginAlHamishmar,hewrote.Heaskedaroundthekibbutzanddiscoveredthatthereweregirlstherewho tookan interest inElizabethTaylor’s futuremarriageandSophiaLoren’swedding gown and the extramarital affairs of a third actress whose name he
could not recall.He viewed this phenomenon “with concern and pain.”Moreandmore kibbutzimwere restoring to families the roles they had taken fromthemwhenthemovementbegan.Inthetwenties,thefamilyunitwasconsideredathreattothecommunity.In1967,thechildrenofYehiamwerestillsleepingincommunal children’s houses, but parents were playing a larger role in theirupbringing.
KIBBUTZYEHIAMCELEBRATED ITSTWENTIETHANNIVERSARY INDECEMBER1966.THEnewsletter tried to project satisfaction, pride, and optimism, but between thelines one could read disappointment andmuted sorrow, an echo of the bleakmood in the country as a whole. Less romantic and more sober than at thebeginning,Yehiammembersopeneduptheirnewslettertothequestionoftheirhappinesstogetherandwhethertheywouldchoosethesamepaththeyhadtakenin their youth if they could do it over again. “The number of members andmembership candidateswhohave failed and left and are not livingwith us isalmostequal to thenumberofmemberswithus today,” thearticlenoted.Onemember,Avri,concludedthat“therehavebeenpainfulfailuresthatthekibbutzcouldhaveprevented.”The contradictions between ideology and the daily routine became
increasingly troubling as the years went on. “Salaried work has become aregular feature in recent years,” wrote a Yehiammember, referring to peoplefrom outside employed by the kibbutz. There were repeated reminders thatindividual wedding gifts, inheritances, insurance payouts, and Germanreparations belonged communally to the kibbutz, as if this were no longerobvious. Despite the stated equality between men and women, there werenonethelessseparateeducationalprogramsforboysandgirls.Theboyslearneddraftsmanship andhow to dismantle and assemble agriculturalmachinery; thegirls took sewing, cooking, psychology, and education.Women began gettingtheirhairstyled;someworejewelryandevendemandedcosmeticproducts.Inthe spirit of the kibbutzmovement’s values, the newsletter published a livelyarticle describing the dangers of smoking—but one source of kibbutz incomewastobacco.ThemembersofYehiamdeliberatedatlengthovertheinternalcontradictions.
Relations among thememberswere not ideal. “Despite the accomplishments,weshouldnotdeludeourselves,”wroteEstherG.;“deepinourheartsthereisasenseofsocialuneaseandcoolnessinourhumanrelations.”Hanohcomplainedaboutthe“members’lackofidentificationwiththekibbutz,”andRinaclaimedthat people shut themselves up in their rooms. The clubhouse was a
disappointment.Moreandmoremembers,particularlywomen,feltlonely.Theydid not all speak Hebrew fluently. Throughout the kibbutz movement, thesecondgenerationofmembersnolongerformedaclose-knit,committedgroupas their parents had done, but rather simply a community that viewed thekibbutz as, above all, a home, not necessarily a mission. Only 18 percent ofmembersinthesixtiessaidthattheylivedonkibbutzimforideologicalreasons;others reported reasons such as ties with family and friends, work, or thelandscape.Forty-fourpercentsaidtheylivedonakibbutzoutofhabit.Mostnolonger placed society and the state at the center of their being, but rather justtheirowninterests.81Inthiscontext,abitterconflictbegantorisetothesurfacebetweenkibbutzmembersandthenewIsraelis—theMizrahim.Themorethekibbutzimflourished,thedeepertheriftgrewbetweenthemand
their neighbors in the development towns. One kibbutz member recalled, “IremembertheywouldcomeonSaturdaystolookattheswimmingpool,andthesame scene would occur every week: they would come and watch us frombehindthefence,staringlonginglyatthepool—Idon’tthinktheyeverswaminit—and we would chase them away, yelling, and sometimes someone wouldthrow a stone. I can see in my parents, who lived on a kind of island ofEuropeanAshkenazis,thattothisdaytheydonotknowthatotherworld.”TheAshkenazicharacterofthekibbutzwasanassumedfact,oftenmentioned
in thepress.Anarticleabout the townofKiryatShmonehpublished inYediotAharonotattheheightoftherecessionnoted,“InthesurroundingareaareKfarGiladi, Kfar Szold, Hagoshrim, and Lehavot Habashan—fattened kibbutzimwith a plumply sated population. And in the middle, a large town silentlywastingaway.”82 InSeptember 1966,Maariv published a prominent full-pagefeature reporting that thegovernment planned to grant thenorthernkibbutzimlandthatwouldfurther increase theirqualityof life,and that thiswouldentailleaving250familiesfromKiryatShmoneh“withoutanyemploymentorbread.”Accordingtothepaper,“thiscruelplan”couldonlybeimplementedbecausethekibbutzim had strong support in the government and the residents of KiryatShmoneh had none. The planwas for a few of the kibbutzim in the north toreceive sizable parts of the drained Hula Lake region.Maariv wrote that thekibbutzim were planning to grow cotton and alfalfa on the new land, whichwouldallowthemtoreplacetheircropsofpeanutsandvegetables;thesecrops,less labor intensive, would reduce the need for hired workers—work theresidents ofKiryat Shmonehhaddone. “Time is running out” for the kibbutzethos, reported Maariv with open hostility. Members of Kfar Giladi werealreadywalkingaroundtheareatalkinglikelandowners.*
The kibbutz already had a fair number of hired workers, according to onemember.“Thereisnodoubtthattheywerelookeddownupon—howelsewouldtheyhavebeentreated?Itwasanunpleasanttime.Howcanyoueducatepeopletobesocialists ifahiredworker iscleaningtheirkitchen?”Thehiredworkersdidthe“dirtywork,”whichwasthesourceofa“longconflict”inthekibbutz,saidanothermember.OnInternationalWorkers’Day,May1,1967,theYehiamnewsletter published worrying details of the gaps between Ashkenazis andMizrahim.“Whatwillwetellourchildren?”thewriterswondered.84
Many kibbutzmembers found it difficult to adapt to livingwith “the otherIsrael,” as theMizrahimwere described.AlonGanwrites, “Most of the newimmigrantswere utterly alien to the values of the labormovement in generaland, more important, the kibbutz lifestyle in particular. Thus the dream ofcreatinganewJewishcultureinPalestinecollapsedandshatteredinthefaceofa flow of immigrants who were distant strangers to this dream world.” TheYehiamnewsletterstated,“OurpeopledonotlikeMizrahimusic.. . .”Thirty-two immigrants from France and South America were set to join KibbutzYehiamin1967,andonlyonefromMorocco.†
Israelis who attacked the kibbutzim for not doing enough to absorb newimmigrants often did so to blur the responsibility of society as a whole forhaving neglected the Mizrahim. The kibbutzim aspired to be leading societydowntherightpath,andsoitwaspertinenttocriticizethemforthisfailure.Butthe recognition that kibbutzim were not meeting expectations deepened thecracksinthefoundationsofIsraeliunity.Inaddition,thekibbutzimsoonfoundthemselves having to defend what had been virtually the last remainingjustification for their unique image: their caliber as fighters and theircontributiontotheIDF.
INTHEWINTEROF1966YEHUDAAMIR,APSYCHOLOGISTATBAR-ILANUNIVERSITYANDin the IDF’spsychological researchunit,publishedanarticle inaprofessionaljournal,Megamot, inwhichheconcluded thatkibbutzmembersweresuperiorsoldiers.Accordingtohisfindings,kibbutzmembersweremoreintelligentandbettereducated,withabettercommandofHebrew;theywerenotableforhavingthe range of personal qualities that the army sought in its officer material.According to Amir, these qualities explained the fact that kibbutz membersfrequently volunteered for commandpositions: they represented22percent ofofficers in compulsory service, more than five times their proportion in thepopulation.Most of them had been born in Israel, andmostwereAshkenazi,Amirnoted.86
It was one of those sociopsychological studies that provide scientificconfirmationofsomethingeveryonealreadyknows,but theYehiamnewslettergave it prominent publication, with unconcealed pride. The study’s findingswere also published in the daily press, where they aroused hostile responses,mainlyonatopicAmirhadnotexamined:motivation.“Volunteeringinandofitselfdoesnotattesttothepersonalitylevelofasoldier,becausethemotivesforvolunteeringcouldbenegative,”wroteBenjaminAmidrorinHa’aretz,adding,“SSofficerswerevolunteers.”UntilthenitwouldhavebeendifficulttoimagineanIsraelinewspaperpublishingsucharemark.“Thosewhoseeinvolunteeringforthearmydefinitiveproofofthemoral,social,ormilitarynatureofapersondo not know what they are talking about,” wrote Amidror. Volunteers, heexplained,alwaysoperateoutofpersonalmotives.Therearekibbutzmemberswhovolunteerforthearmybecausekibbutzlifedoesnotchallengethem;somewish to leave thekibbutz,and thearmyoffers thema transitional stage; somejoin tomakemoneyoroutof adventurousnessor anurge toproveapersonalcapabilityorbecausetheyareattractedtouniformsandmedals.Theexaltationofvolunteerismasavalue,Amirdorwenton,mayalsoresultinaconcentrationofsuperiorsoldiersinthevolunteerunits,suchastheparatroops,attheexpenseof other units, like the infantry. Young men from the cities fill the ranks ofofficersinarmiesallovertheworldandthereisnoreasontoassumethattheirqualityinIsraelisanyworse,headded,warningthatkibbutzmemberswereanendangeredminorityandthatthearmywoulddowellnottobuilditsfutureonthem.87
Thekibbutzimhad never suffered such a brutal assault, reflecting profounddisappointment in the kibbutz as the standard-bearer of Israel’s fundamentalvalues.BoazEvron,a seniorwriter forYediotAharonot, attackednotonly thekibbutzmembers’pretensionsas fighters,but theveryessenceof theirwayoflife.Thepioneeringdaysofmostkibbutzimhadendedevenbeforethestatewasestablished, he said, and ever since, the kibbutzim had enjoyed an averagebourgeoislifestyle.TheyhadcontributedinthepasttotheaccomplishmentsoftheZioniststruggle,butthestatecouldn’tgoonrepayingthatolddebtforever,particularlywhenithadcompensatedthekibbutzimfortheirpastsacrificeswithextremely generous loans and support. Second, Evron asserted, the kibbutzimdid not have amonopoly on the pioneering spirit. The residents of Jerusalemwere also pioneers, as were others, yet only the kibbutzim had turnedpioneerismintoasourceofprofit.Yes,admittedEvronacidly,perhapskibbutzsociety was more just, more kind, and happier, as it claimed—although thecountry was full of kibbutz refugees and the kibbutzim were having trouble
findingpeopletojointhem.Andsothequestionremained,ifkibbutzlifewassogood, why was it so bad? Amir’s study, wrote Evron, proved at most thatkibbutzmemberswerebettersoldiers,butitdidnotprovethattheywerebetterpeople. “We do not find that kibbutzmembers are better scientists, artists, ormanagers.”Theywereprobablybettersoldiersbecausethatwashowtheywerebrought up, Evron suggested, and this was a question of taste, to his mind.“SomeviewNapoleonasthesupremehumanideal,whileotherspreferNewtonorBach.”Evron had something to say about how kibbutzim were managed, too. “Is
their equipment exploited to the fullest? Are their per capita expenses not inexcess of their production? Is the kibbutzim’s agricultural product capable ofcompeting in foreign markets without subsidies?” The kibbutzim, he wrote,represented a burden on the state no less than car manufacturers and otherindustrialists.Heasked,therefore,“WhymusttheworkersofAshdodandotherdevelopment towns pay the price for industrialists’ villas and the kibbutzswimmingpools?”Theanswerwasthatthestatewasbasedonfalsepretenses,aswerethepioneervaluesascribedtothekibbutzim.“It’sallacardboardset,”wrote Evron—meaning the manicured lawns, the spacious dining rooms, thegospelofZionismandsocialism.88Thiswasanotherpronouncementthatwouldnever have found itsway into the newspapers in the past. The assault on thekibbutzimthusjoinedthegeneralgloomandmadeitallthemoreprofound.
5.POLITICS:“THEBIGGESTLIARINOURCOUNTRY”
AtthebeginningofMarch1966,LeviEshkolcametotheWiseAuditoriumatthe Hebrew University in Jerusalem for a question-and-answer session withstudents. An uncharismatic seventy-two-year-old, Eshkol was a life-sizedpoliticianwhohadreplacedagiant,DavidBen-Gurion,andhewashauntedbyhis shadow. “Iwalkwith slight trepidation and seek cover,” hewrote severaldays after becoming prime minister. Eighteen months later he was all butpleadingwithBen-Gurion: “Givemecredit! . . .Pleasedonot letmebelievethatmyfearofbecomingprimeministerforalltheseyearswasjustified.”89
The evening at theHebrewUniversitywas difficult.More than a thousandunrulystudentscrowdedintotheauditorium.Theystoodup,shouted,stampedtheir feet, andheckled the primeminister continuously.Only a few supportedhim.A fewdaysearlier, the studentnewspaper,Nitzotz,hadappearedwithanall-blackcoverbearingasingleHebrewword:Hamatzav(“theSituation”).Theconfrontationwith Eshkolwas, therefore, notmerely a show of rudeness and
chutzpah, nor a simple youthful rebellion against a representative of the oldguard. The studentswere expressing a sense that something fundamentalwasgoingwronginIsrael.One student asked Eshkol why he didn’t resign, or at least call for new
elections.Eshkolrepliedthatthequestionwaschildish.HetriedtoexplainthatelectionsfortheKnessethadbeenheldlessthansixmonthsprior,andthathisgovernmentwasbuiltonacoalitioncomprising75ofthe120Knessetmembers.Hewasdrownedoutby the students’ shouts.SomeoneaskedwhyEshkolhadcometotheuniversityattheinvitationofhisownparty’sstudentdivision,buthadrefusedtocomewhenhehadbeeninvitedbythestudentunion.Didheonlydareappearbeforehissupporters?Washeafraidtoheartheentirestudentbody?The prime minister seemed to be uninformed of the details behind hisappearance.AnadviserhandedhimanoteandEshkoltriedtoexplain,butthehead of the student union shouted at him, “Mr. Prime Minister, you areknowingly lying!” Then the power in the auditorium suddenly failed and thelightswent out, not an uncommon occurrence. The students started singing alullaby, then moved on to a folk song: “We will build our country, ourhomeland,becausethislandbelongstous!”Afewminuteslatertheemergencygenerator kicked in and three dim rays of light came on. They revealed theprimeministerstillstandingonthestage,andalthoughhistwobodyguardswerenowathisside,helookedlonelyandbedraggled.SomeonebroughtakerosenelampandEshkoltriedtosalvagetheevening,butwithoutamicrophonehehadnochance.AccordingtoYediotAharonot,heandhishandlerslefttheplace“ingreatdarkness.”ThiswouldnothavehappenedtoBen-Gurion.Afewdaysearlier,peoplehad
crowdedaroundhiscarwhenhepassedthroughBeersheba.Onewomanpointedtohimandtoldherchild,“That’sthekingofIsrael.”90
Ben-Gurionhad steppeddown fromhis position as primeminister in 1963,andshortlythereafterhehadafallingoutwithMapai,hisparty.Heleft itandstarted the IsraelWorkers’ List, known asRafi. This schism had come in theaftermath of the “Lavon affair,” a political earthquake that had begunwith abotchedactofterrorismcarriedoutbyIsraeliintelligenceagentsinEgyptintheearlyfifties.TherevelationofthefailedoperationembroiledIsraelinacomplexnetworkofintriguesandquarrels,threatsandblackmail,liesandfabricationofevidence, and brought on a tormented and reproachful self-examinationregardingIsraelidemocracyandthebasicvaluesofsocietyingeneral.91WhenheleftMapai,Ben-Guriontookwithhimafewmajorplayers,includingMoshe
Dayan,theformerIDFchiefofstaff.ButmostMapaisupportersremainedloyaltotheirpartyandtoitsnewleader,LeviEshkol.Thelatterformedanalignment(inHebrew,Ma’arah)with the smallerAhdutHa’avodaparty. In theelectionsheld inNovember1965, theMa’arah listwonforty-fiveseatsof theKnesset’s120.Ben-Gurion’sRafipartywononlytenseatsintheKnesset.Theleaderofthe
right-wingopposition,MenachemBegin,ranwithGahal,apartnershipbetweenhisHerutpartyandtheLiberalparty.Theywontwenty-sixseats.Mostmembersof thisKnesset, the sixth elected since the foundingof the state,weremen intheir fifties and sixties, predominantly from overseas: more than half fromEastern Europe, mostly Poland and the Ukraine. Only ten members werewomen,twenty-twoMizrahim,twenty-twoJewsborninthecountry.Threeoutof every tenhad sat in theKnesset since theday itwas established.92Oneofthesewastheprimeminister.Levi Eshkol had spent most of his life developing the country and its
economy and was described as “one of the greatest go-getters of JewishsettlementinthelandofIsrael.”93HehadcomefromtheUkraineasaZionistin1914,whenhewas nineteen years old.His father had stayed abroad andwaslatermurderedinapogrom.MostofEshkol’sdaysinPalestinewerespentunderforeignrule—firstTurkish,thenBritish.TheZionistenterpriseoftencalledfordevious and evasive methods, and Eshkol knew each and every trick to getaround prohibitions, restrictions, and obstacles; this deviousness was a skilllearned in the Jewish Diaspora. Shkolnik—his surname then—began life inIsraelasanagriculturallaborerandwasamongthefoundersofKibbutzDeganiaBet. He entered public life almost immediately after his arrival and was afounder of Mapai. The party was destined to control events in Palestine formanyyears;beforetheestablishmentofthestate,itbaseditspoweronthelaborunionfederation,theHistadrut,andonanumberofeconomiccentersofpower.Duringthefirstdecadesofindependence,thepartywoneveryelectioninwhichitstood.In1933,onthebasisofanagreementbetweentheZionistmovementandthe
Nazis, Eshkol facilitated the transfer to Palestine of property belonging toGerman Jews. He founded Mekorot, which assured the supply of water toJewish settlements, and oversaw the settlement department of the JewishAgency. Among its other responsibilities, after 1948 the department preparedhousing for hundreds of thousands of new immigrants, at first in villagesabandonedbytheArabs,thenintransitcamps,aswellasinpermanenthousing
inhundredsofnewtownsandvillages.Hebelievedthebestwaytotakecontrolofthecountrywasbydevelopingandpopulatingit,stepbystep,“acreafteracreandgoataftergoat.”In1952,EshkolbecametheministeroffinanceinBen-Gurion’sgovernment,
a position he occupied until he was himself appointed prime minister andminister of defense when Ben-Gurion stepped down. In the fifties he wasassociatedwiththedifficultiesandfailuresthataccompaniedtheabsorptionofimmigrants,includingthediscriminationagainstMizrahim.Likeothers,EshkolfeltthattheMizrahimwereaburdenonthestate,andheoftenspokeofIsrael’sneed for immigrants from Western countries. In the early sixties, he wasidentifiedwiththecountry’srapideconomicgrowth.Hispracticalinvolvementin security affairs was minimal, restricted primarily to his support of Ben-Gurion.LikeBen-Gurion,heacceptedtheneedtopartitionthecountrybetweenJews andArabs; but, like others, he alsowanted it to be as large as possible.“The eastern bank of the Jordan has been the constant dreamof every youngman and woman in Eretz Israel since time immemorial,” he wrote in 1927.Thirty years later, he proposed annexing the Gaza Strip after it had beenconqueredintheSinaiCampaign.His status in the party was strengthened as a result of his handling of the
Lavon affair: more than anything, he wanted it to disappear. Ben-Gurion, incontrast,wishedtodigfurtherandfurtherintothematteruntilhisownconductcould be vindicated. Their differences in this led Ben-Gurion to develop aprofoundhatredofEshkol,whohefelthadbetrayedhim.Ben-Gurion’spersonalprestigeandinfluencewerefargreaterthanRafi’sstrengthinthe1965elections,whileEshkol’swere less significant thanMa’arah’s strengthas aparty; to thepublic he represented party hackery and political pettiness, rather thanstatesmanshiporleadership.Inthetwentieshehadonceinterferedinaquarrelbetweentwoofthefirstsettlements,KinneretandDegania,whichwerefightingover trash removal. Eshkol wrote to them that life was based on mutualagreement and awillingness to compromise. Thiswas his basic outlook as apolitician. Not necessarily indecision, not compromise at any cost, but acombinationofcautionandanintuitiveassessmentofwhatcouldbeachieved.94
Amanofthepeople,lackinginpretense,Eshkoldidnotinstillmuchrespect.HethoughtandoftenjokedinYiddish,andwasproclaimedbyTimemagazinetobe“simplyhaimish,”homey,familiar.ReviewingIDFtroopswhilewearingablackberet,heappeared“analmostgrotesquefigure,”themagazinecontinued.*Eshkol’smilitarysecretary, IsraelLior,wrote thatEshkolsometimes remindedhim of his late father: he had a lifetime of wisdom, experience, and a keen
instinctforpeople.LiorpraisedEshkol’sabilitytolistentoothers.Heknewhowtomake a direct connection to people and he liked them. But, in an echo ofYosefWeitz’s impressionsafterhisvisit toEshkol’soffice,LioralsocriticizedEshkol’s tendency to talkwith toomany people: everybody came through hisoffice,andtheyallhadsomethingtosayabouteverything.Theofficeoperatedinconstantchaos,wroteLior.AtleastoneofEshkol’sministersalsofeltthattoomuchtimeingovernmentmeetingswaswastedontrivialmatters.96
Eshkolwasindeedalong-windedspeaker.Likehisministeroffinance,Sapir,andmanymembersofhisgeneration,hespokeinadisorderly,unfocused,andpurposeless fashion.He repeatedhimself, andhis audienceoften lost patiencebefore he had finished.Known as a ladies’man, hewasmarried twice (oncedivorced, once widowed) before becoming prime minister, and in 1964 hemarriedtheKnessetlibrarian,MiriamZelikowitz.
•••
AS THE ECONOMICRECESSIONDEEPENED, EVERYONEBEGAN TO SPEAKOF THENEEDFORstrongerleadership.TheU.S.ambassadorhurriedtoupdateWashingtononthecommonlyheldopinionthat thenextprimeministerwouldbeeitherYigalAllon,theleaderofAhdutHa’avoda,orMosheDayanofRafi.InMarch1966,Ma’arah sent out questionnaires to ten thousand citizens asking what theythought were the burning problems of the day. The responses were notencouraging.Notevenhalftherespondents(48percent)praisedthegovernmentfor its handling of foreign and security affairs. Daily life was even moretroubling.Approximately 51 percent cited unemployment and inflation as themost pressing issues. “Why has the price of eggs gone up?” asked onerespondent. Forty-three percent complained about bureaucracy and thearrogance of government officials, demanding a higher quality of life. “Whyaren’tthereafternoonofficehours?”“Whycan’twetakecareofthingsoverthephone?”“Whydolettersgounanswered?”Manydemandedan“improvementintheterriblestateofthepostalservice.”PeoplewantedbetterandmoreeffectivetreatmentattheHistadrut’shealthfund,ofwhichsometwomillionIsraelisweremembers. “It is doubtfulwhether there is a single other institution so bitterlycriticized by so many people, in such a focused and frequent way,” wroteMaariv.“TheHistadruthealthfundprovidesclear—andverystrange—evidencethat such a huge institution can continue to exist despite themassive scale ofdiscontent,disappointment,andharshcriticism.”Forty-one percent of respondents to the Ma’arah questionnaire complained
about the high cost of high school education. “How can anyonemanagewith900 lirasand twoschool-agedchildren?”Somedemandedmoremale teachersinsteadof femaleones.Thirty-ninepercentprotestedethnicdiscrimination;19percentdemandedlegislationtopreventstrikes.Theremainingissuestroublingrespondents included governmental compliance with the demands of theOrthodox(18percent);thesorrystateofpublictransportation(12percent);thedifficulties of getting a phone line (10 percent); and neglect in the cities (10percent).97 There was also a particularly irritating branch of Amisragas, thenationalgassupplier:“Everytimeyouorderacontainerofgas,theypromisetodeliveritonacertaindateandyouknowinadvancethattheywon’tkeeptheirpromise,”wrote a columnist forMaariv. “After a few days you contact themagain,andyouknowtheirsecondpromisewillbeworthnomorethanthefirst.Thethirdwillbenobetterthanthesecond.Andnoonewilleverapologizefortheliesofthedaybefore,andwhenyoucomplain,themanagerwilltellyouthatyoucanwritetothenewspapersaboutit—heisn’tafraidofthepress.”Disgruntlement over the poor quality of life was relatively new and was
gainingattention.“Despiteallthecriticism,theypersistinbuildingasingularlyuglyplace,”wroteMaarivof thenew townofCarmiel,“asoulless townbuiltfroma randommixtureof concrete ‘boxes,’ those sameugly ‘boxes’ thatmarmost of the country’s landscape.” Others denounced the “jungle atmosphere”prevailingonIsraeliroads.ThisarrayoffactorssustainedadissatisfactionthatdeepenedthegeneralgloomspreadingoverIsraelin1966.ThefeelingwasalsoreflectedinIsraelis’letterstofriendsabroad.Asthemonthswentby,moreandmoreofthembegantoexpressdistrustofthepoliticalsystemitself,withafairdegree of cynicism. “Our system and our government are rotting,” wroteHa’aretz,quotingHaimGadol,atailorfromHaifa:“Ifeelthatthecountryhasnofatherandthere’snoonewhocanlead,whocangiveinspiration,encourage,energize,andserveasanexampletocitizens.”Eshkol blamed the press and launched a personal attack on the editor of
Ha’aretz,GershomSchocken.Hehas“astrangetendency”todenigrateJewishreality in Israel, saidEshkol in theKnesset.Schocken“systematicallypoisonsthesoulsofhis readers.”TheeditorofDavaruseda similarmetaphor:“well-poisoners.”ButhewasreferringtoMaariv.Sixmonths later, inSeptember1966,Ha’aretz conducted its own surveyof
thebig cities.Forty-twopercentof respondentswantedEshkol replaced.Ben-Gurion received the resultsofapollhispartyhadconducted,which indicatedthatEshkol’spopularityhaddroppedby50percentoverthepastthreemonths,
whilehisownhaddoubled.98Itwasabirthdaygift:onOctober16,1966,Ben-Gurionturnedeighty.Justbeforehisbirthday,Ben-Gurionsaid thathewasnot turningeightybut
rathersixtyplussixdays,sincehecountedtheyearsofhislifefromthedayhecametoPalestineandsawhimselfashavingbeenbornthere.OnlyinthelandofIsrael had he discovered the truemeaning of Zionism and socialism, he said.Only in the land of Israel had he begun to truly comprehend the Bible, andthrough it the people of Israel, their history and destiny. The Bible, he said,unitedthepeopleofIsraelintheirmoralsuperiority,whichhadenabledthemtofaceallenemiesandtosurviveasapeopleofeternity.99
Noone else possessedBen-Gurion’s ability to internalize the history of theJewish people, identify with it, and present his politics as a reflection ofhistory’s course. He often appeared to himself and to others as thepersonificationofthishistory.Whenheresigned,hedevotedhimselftowritinghisownversionofthehistoryofZionistsettlement.Daybyday,hourbyhour,Ben-Gurion alsowrote in his diary.He summarizedmeetings and events andcopieddownstatisticalcharts,onlyoccasionallyaddingapersonal impression.Heseldomwroteofwhathefelt.Althoughhewasnowonlyamemberof theKnesset,attheheadofasmallsplinterparty,heremainedoneofthestrongestfiguresinthestate.Assuch,hewascarefultomaintainhisrelationshipwiththemilitaryforces.WhenArielSharonwaspromotedtotherankofgeneral,Ben-Gurionwrote tohimwith thesalutation“Dear,greatArik”andpromisedhim,“You are destined for great things!” He praised Sharon for having overcome“somefaults”thathehadidentifiedinhimpreviously.*Hewrotethousandsofletters,usuallyinanswertocorrespondentshedidnot
know personally. As the gloom in Israel increased, he received and archivedlettersfromcitizenspleadingforhimtoreturntoaleadershippost;withouthim,they said, theywere likeorphans.Peopledidnotholdhis role in creating thecurrent failings against him. They missed the days of national glory hesymbolized.Asagreatman,healsoseemedtobesomeonetowhomtheymightaddress great questions, as if to a biblical prophet. No, wrote Ben-Gurion toAmos Frisch of Tel Aviv, who asked him about Israel’s status as a chosennation:ItwasnotGodwhochoseIsrael,butIsraelthatchoseGod.Manywrotefrom abroad. Ruth Todd of Denton, Maryland, received the following reply:“According tomybelief there isnoquestion: Jesuswasborn inNazarethandnot in Beth Lechem.” To Stanley Blumberg of Baltimore, Maryland, Ben-Gurionwrote:“UncleTom’sCabin . . . isoneof the firstbookswhich Ihave
readinmyyouth,whenIwas9orten.IreadittheninaHebrewtranslationanditmadeonmeaverydeepimpression.”OnceinawhilehereadthewritingsofPlato.100
Israel observed Ben-Gurion’s eightieth birthday with dozens of ceremoniesandotherevents,asifitwereanationalholiday.TenthousandpeoplecametoSde Boker, his kibbutz in the Negev, for a grand celebration in the localamphitheater.TheIDFloanedthekibbutztwofloodlightswhosebeamsformedanarchinthesky.TheHabimacompanyactor,AharonMeskin,spoketwolines:“The nation loves you, Ben-Gurion. Thank you for what you have done andgoodluckinthefuture.”Thepresident,ZalmanShazar,wasthere,aswasS.Y.Agnon.EshkolstayedinJerusalem.The next day, on October 17, Ben-Gurion wrote an entry in his diary that
those in charge of his archives have seen fit to conceal from researchers forthese past four decades. Perhaps he had repeated nuclear secrets he had beentold,orperhapsthearchiveissimplytryingtoprotecthisimage:inhisoldage,Ben-Gurion grew bitter and often embarrassed himself. As time went on, heburroweddeeperanddeeper into theLavonaffair,withagrumblingobstinacyandcompulsivevindictiveness.Hewrotemoreandmore letterson thematter,filled with minute details, dates, names, and quotes. He became increasinglyderogatorytowardEshkol,describinghimasaswindlerwhoruledthecountrywithdistortedjustice,fear,anddeceit.Eshkol,hesaid,was“thebiggestliarinour country.” Only toward Menachem Begin did he display comparablevirulence.Nordidheconfinehisopinions tohisdiary. “Theupper echelon iscoveringuptheembarrassingandshamefulbehaviorofamanservingasprimeminister, and accepting moral deterioration within the party, which couldundermine and destroy the state of Israel,” he wrote to a Mapai leader. Thestate’s well-being depended on security assistance from the outside, andthereforeitcouldnotexist if thenationsoftheworlddidnottrustandrespectIsrael’sleaders,hewarned.AndwithaleaderlikeEshkol,Israelwouldnotlastlong.Startingin1966,Ben-GurionalsobeganblamingEshkolforamysterious“securitybreach.”Hetookthisaccusationalloverthecountry,butrevealednodetails.HemayhavebeenreferringtoEshkol’shandlingofIsrael’sattemptstoobtainmissiles.*Ben-Gurionrepeatedhisclaimsoverandover,bothinpublicappearancesand
inpressinterviews;noothertopicsopreoccupiedhim.Heclaimedtobeabletoseewhatwas going on “with complete objectivity,” and nothing could budgehimfromhisstance,evenifhewerethelastofIsrael’sdefenders.“Iamwillingtobelonelyandisolatedandevenostracizedandvilified,”hewrote.“Ichoose
tobeostracized—butIwillnotlendahandtothosewhodistorttruthandjusticeand undermine the existence of the state of Israel.” He also excoriated theleaders ofMapai, friends and partners for decades, accusing them of viewingpoliticalpowerasasupremegoalthatsanctifiedallmeans.HewonderedwheretheMa’arahhadfoundthehundredmillionlirasheclaimedithadspentonthemost recent electioncampaign: “Wherewillwegetwith suchcorruption?” InoneletterhecomparedhimselftotheprophetIsaiah.Hispatheticbehaviormadehimseemlikeachilddeprivedofhistoy—or,in
this case,ofhis state.Butnootherperson in Israelwascapableofprovokingsuchastrongpublicresponse,andwhen“thefatherofthenation”voicedsuchharsh accusations against the prime minister, using such sharp words, hedeepened the sense that something terrible was happening. Ben-Gurion eventoyed with the idea of having Eshkol forcibly removed from office. Hediscoveredthatfour“prominent,dedicated,andimportantmembers”ofMapaihadcometothepartyleadershipdemandingtogetridofhim.TwowereKnessetmembers, andBen-Gurionwasquick to spread thenews.102Thishappened intheaftermathofthemurderofBenBarka.
MEHDIBENBARKAWASTHEEXILEDOPPOSITIONLEADEROFMOROCCO.WHILETHEREwerenoofficialties,Israelhadcovertlinkstothekingandhisheadofsecurityandformerinteriorminister,MohammedOufkir,whichenabledMoroccanJewsto leave the country for Israel. Reportedly, Oufkir had asked the head of theMossad,MeirAmit,tohelphimdoawaywithBenBarka,whodisappearedinOctober1965andwasneverseenagain.AccordingtoAmit,theoperationitselfwas ultimately carried out by French mercenaries. “We came out completelyclean,”helaterwrote.103
InDecember1966,thepornographictabloidBulwasabouttogotopresswithastoryimplyingthatEshkolwastobereplacedbyYigalAllonbecauseoftheinvolvementofMossadagentsinthemurderofBenBarka.TheSecurityServiceand the police confiscated the issue before copies could be distributed. Theeditors,ShmuelMorandMaximGilan,weretriedbehindcloseddoorsandeachsentencedtoayearinprison.Thetrialwaskeptsecret,thetabloidwentonbeingpublished,andMorandGilan remainedon themastheadaseditors topreventtheexposureof theepisode.But inFebruary1967theentirestoryappearedintheNew York Times and a firestorm erupted. The details of the Ben Barkaoperationwerenotpublished,buttheBulaffairprovidedatemporaryfocalpointforacontinuingstruggleoverfreedomofthepressinIsrael.104*
The excitement surrounding Ben-Gurion’s birthday bolstered his publicsupport and popularity, despite his ongoing obsession with the Lavon affair.“Thefuturewill tellwhatconsequences thisdevelopmentwillhavewithin theinternalpolitical landscape,”wroteYaacovHerzog, thedirectorgeneralof theprimeminister’soffice,inhisdiary.Herzog,whowasborninIrelandtoachiefrabbi,hadbeenambassador toCanadaandwasaprivateadviser tobothBen-GurionandEshkol.Thediplomaticskillsofthisbrilliantmanweretestedbyhisdualloyalties.ShazarhadbeenplanningtoholdanationalcelebrationforBen-Gurion in thepresidential residence, butHerzog explained tohim thatEshkolwouldnotbeabletoparticipateandthereforethegovernmentministerswouldnotcome.Topreventascandal, thepresidentshouldgo toSdeBoker instead.Herzog then had to find the words with which Eshkol’s government couldcongratulate Ben-Gurion. Eshkol refused to laud him for “developing thecountry,”becauseheheldhiscontributionstobegreaterthanBen-Gurion’s.Theminister of education came to Herzog with his own troubles: should thegovernment’smessagepraisingBen-Gurionforhiscontributiontostatesecuritybe translated intoArabic?Herzog suggested that inArabic theymentiononlytheestablishmentofthestateandBen-Gurion’scontributiontotheadvancementofallitscitizens.106*
IN FEBRUARY 1967,MAARIV PUBLISHED A DEBATE OVER THE QUESTION OF THE IDEALtype of leader. The debate appeared in “Square Table,” a personal columnwrittenbythewell-knownjournalistGeulaCohen.Oneoftheparticipants,thepoetHaimGouri,said,“Ibelievethiserarequiresastrongpersonwithclearandunflinchingvision,who takes somethingofaphilosophicalviewof the Israelirevolution.”109 He was probably referring to Yigal Allon, an admiredcommanderinthe1948war.Inall thepartiestherewereyoungmemberswhowere trying to reach prominence, but the great original leaders survived:Menachem Begin in Herut, Meir Ya’ari in Mapam, Haim Moshe Shapira inMafdal.OnlyMapaiwasleftwithoutitsleader,Ben-Gurion.BorninPolandin1911,MenachemBeginwasafollowerofZe’evJabotinsky,
the father of Revisionist Zionism, who had challenged the leadership of theZionistmovementwith his demand for a faster,more energetic realization ofZionist objectives, throughout thewhole of Eretz Israel, through resistance tocompromiseandterritorialconcessions.BegincametoPalestineonly in1942,wherehebecametheheadofEtzel,a terroristorganizationthatfoughtagainstBritishrule.Upontheestablishmentofthestate,hetookthehelmoftheHerutparty.IncontrasttoBen-Gurion’swillingnesstoacceptthe1949borders,Begin
aspired to “the whole country,” extending to both sides of the Jordan River;against the centralized economic policy rooted in Mapai’s social-democraticideals,Begindemandedafreemarketinthespiritofclassicalliberalism.Inhisparty,which he alwaysmade a point of describing as a “movement,” hewasvirtually a unilateral leader, aswas Ben-Gurion in his. And like Ben-Gurion,Beginwassurroundedbyworshipers.Alwaysasmartdresser,politeandwell-spoken,hewasblessedwithasenseofdrama,history,andsymbolism,completewithuniforms,torches,songs,flags,andslogans.Atownsquaredemagogue,heknew how to inspire his audience with rousing nationalistic speeches.“Sometimeshisentirebodywasshakenbypathosandhe rockedfromside toside; hismusical voice rose to a crescendo and fell to awhisper,”wrote onejournalist.Ha’aretz compared him toMussolini;Ben-Gurion used to comparehimtoHitler.Whilestillprimeminister,Ben-GurionconcludedthatBeginandhis movement were unacceptable partners in any coalition, as was theCommunist party, and hewas always careful not tomentionBegin by name.Beginwasabraveman.ItwasnoteasytostanduptoBen-Gurion,andnootherpoliticianmadeagreatercontributiontoIsrael’sdemocraticparliamentarianism.Eshkol,ontheotherhand,introducedaconciliatorystyleinIsraelipolitics,as
whenheinstructedthatJabotinsky’sremainsbebroughttoIsraelforburial.TheleaderoftheRevisionistmovement,whohaddiedinAmerica,haddesiredtobeburiedinIsraelinastatefuneral;Ben-Gurionhadrefused.TheroleoftheStateof Israelwas tobring living Jews to the country,notbones, lest it become“aland of graves,” he argued callously. Eshkol, on the other hand, agreed, andJabotinsky’sremainswereburiedonMountHerzl.Later,aplaquewashungonhis house in Jerusalem.110 Itwas a peace-making gesture to the rightwing, adisplayofEshkol’swillingness todo things thatBen-Gurionhadblocked.Butthe transferof Jabotinsky’s remains toMountHerzlwasmore thanapoliticalgesture: itbroughtHerut intoZionisthistory.Until then, theLabormovementhadmonopolized that history, an important asset in a society stillmolding itsnational identity. Eshkol may not have been aware of the magnitude of hisconcessiontoBegin,butBegincertainlywas.In the summer of 1966, Herut held its national congress, where something
occurredthatnoonecouldhavepredicted:a twenty-one-year-oldnamedEhudOlmert demanded that Begin resign because the party had lost repeatedly inelectionsandwasunabletoattaingovernmentpower.OlmertwasthesonofaKnessetmemberwhomBeginhadousted,yettheassaultwasnotinterpretedassettling personal accounts but rather as an effort to undermine yet anothercornerstone of Israeli life. Begin immediately acknowledged his failure and
announced that he would step down as head of the party. The response waspredictablyhysterical.Thedelegatesroared,“Begintopower!Begintopower!”and someburst into tears. “Don’t leaveus,you’re likeour father!” adelegateshoutedout.Onewomansaid,“He’s likeGod. Ifhegoes—everything’s lost.”Hestayed.111
A few restless people, young and less young, attempted similar maneuversagainst the legendary leaders of Mapam, Meir Ya’ari and Yaakov Hazan,althoughthetwooldmensucceededinquashingthem.112Anewgenerationalsosprungup inMafdal.Oneyoungmemberof theparty,YoelYinon,wrote toafriend in America about an article written by Rabbi Haim Pardes, a Mafdalleader:“IreaditwithdisbeliefbecausethisisthesameHaimPardesweknewtenyearsago.[He]writesasifhe’satleastseventyyearsold.Theconservatismandnarrow-mindednessaretrulyamazing.Inthearticlehelamentsthefactthatnowadayspeopledon’t come to ask for the rabbi’s advice like theyused to. Ithoughttomyselfthatifhisthinkingisasold-fashionedandfrozenashisarticleindicates,it’snowonderpeopledon’tcometohim.Ionlyhopethereareyoungrabbiswithadifferentattitude.Ifnot—woetous.”Buttheleaderoftheparty,HaimMosheShapira,sixty-fiveyearsold,alsoheldon.113
In the shadow of these giants, Eshkol found himself in a nearly untenablesituation.Peoplebeganmockinghimwithcrueltyandbitterness.UriinRishonLezion wrote to his sister in New York about a little book called CompleteEshkolJokes thatwasbeingpassedaroundathishighschool.“Inmyopinionit’sgonebeyond the limitsofgood taste,”headmitted,buthe toldhera jokeanyway,onethatwasn’tinthebookbutwasstillprobablydoingtheroundsofhis fellow students: Eshkol almost drowns at sea. Someone saves him andEshkol asks how he can show his thanks. His savior replies, “Just don’t tellanyoneaboutwhatI’vedone.”Ha’aretzwrote,“Therehaveneverbeensomanyjokes about a primeminister as there are now,” and quoted one of the morepainfulexamples:“AwaiterasksEshkol ifhe’d like teaorcoffee. ‘Youknowwhat?’ replies Eshkol. ‘Give me half and half.’”* His wife, Miriam, laterrecalledthatsheandtheprimeministerhadeachgottenholdof thejokebookandhiditfromtheother.Whentheydiscoveredtheyhadbothreadit,sheaskedhimwhathethought.“Icouldhavecomeupwithbetterjokes,”hesaid.Butthegibesupsethim.“Icannotrecallanothergovernmentthatfacedsuchdestructive,bitterandarrogantopposition,”heoncesaidinacabinetmeeting.114
6.JEWSI:“LETUSDIEINPEACE”
OntheeveningofSaturday,August13,1966,justaftertheSabbathended,thesculptorDavidPalombolefthishomeonMountZioninJerusalemandheadeddowntown on hismoped. A fewminutes later, he hit an iron chain stretchedacrosstheroad.Palombodiedshortlyafterwardoftheinjurieshesustained.At the top of Mount Zion stood a German church that marked the place
where,accordingtoChristiantradition,themotherofJesushadfallenasleepforthelast time.Atthefootof thehillwasadarkenedclusterofdomed,charred,and semi-ruined buildings; before the hill was conquered in the War ofIndependence, they had belonged to Arabs. In one of them lay a large stonelegendarily identified as the tombstone of King David. Thousands of peopleusedtovisitthetomb.ItsfolkloreattractedpredominantlyMizrahiIsraelis,whosawitasasubstitutefor theWesternWall,whichwasintheJordanianpartofJerusalem. From the tomb, one could see the TempleMount, and some evenbelievedtheycouldseeacornerofthewall.Withitsmanylegendsandsacredvantagepoint,MountZionformedthefocusofapassionatepowerstruggleoverthe character of Israeli identity. Various factions also viewed the mount as alocus of political power. The dispute centered around the shaping of nationalmemory.ThedirectorgeneraloftheMinistryofReligiousAffairs,S.Z.Kahana,established the Holocaust Basement on Mount Zion, which consisted of agloomy display of charred Torah parchment and ancient lampsmade of suchparchmentsorevenofhumanskin,aswellasbarsofsoapallegedlymadefromthe bodies of Jews murdered by the Nazis. There the chief rabbinate buriedremnants of Torahs salvaged from European synagogues, and even urnssupposedlycontainingtheashesofHolocaustvictims.Therewasanincineratorthatcouldbelit.“WhenIgouptoMountZion,Iamoutragedatthewaythingshave been done, which, in my opinion, is not in keeping with the spirit ofJudaism and verges on idolatry,” complained Moshe Kol, a director of YadVashem,thenationalHolocaustmemorial,withwhichtheMountZionsitewasmeanttocompete.115
TheroadonwhichPalombowaskilledhadbeenpavedin1963inpreparationforthevisitofPopePaulVI.ThechainstretchedacrosstheroadwasintendedtopreventmotortrafficontheSabbath,butPalombohadnotseenitinthedark.He and hiswife, also an artist,were among the fewpeoplewho lived on themount.HehaddesignedtheentrancegatestothenewKnessetbuilding.Manysecular Israelis came to see him as a victim of “religious oppression.” TheSabbath was defined as the Jewish weekly rest day but while the use oftransportation was forbidden in Jewish law, only a few roads were actuallyclosed to traffic; in Haifa and the surrounding area there was even public
transportationonSaturdays.ThestruggleovertheroleofreligioninpubliclifeinIsraelhadbeenapartof
Zionist politics from the outset. David Ben-Gurion had instituted a series ofbasicaccommodations—referredtoasthestatusquo—thatallowedcoexistencebetween secular and religious Jews and included exemption from militaryserviceforreligiouswomen,separatereligiouseducationalsystems,andkosherfoodinthearmy.In1967hewasstilldefendingthestatusquo.“Thisisnotthetime to ignite adispute among thepeopleover absolute separationof religionandstate,”hewrote.116MostIsraelisweresimilarlyunwillingtofightforsuchacompleteseparation:themajoritywerenotentirelysecularandalmosteveryoneobservedJewishlawtosomeextent.Forthemostpart,theywerewillingtolivewith the status quo’s concessions to Orthodoxy, albeit often grudingly. Thepartnershipbetweensecularand religiousnecessitatedaconstant,almostdailyreaffirmation.Asofearly1967,Israeliswerestillunabletoagreeamongthemselvesonthe
crucialquestionofwhowasandwasnotaJew.AnavalofficernamedBenjaminShalit wished to register his children as Jewish or of theHebrew nationality,despite the fact that theirmotherwas not Jewish. The issue soon reached theSupreme Court, which deliberated over the case for years. The Orthodoxmonopoly on conducting Jewishweddingswas another divisive issue. In onecase,amanwhowantedtomarryadivorcéehadtodosoinNewYorkbecauseasa“Kohen,”ordescendantofthepriestlycaste,hewasforbiddentomarryadivorcedwoman, according to Jewish law. Theman argued that his intendedwifewasawidow,sinceherex-husbandhadsincedied.Thelegalaspectsofthecase prompted a public dispute and the story caused a scandal, because theapplicantwasSupremeCourtJusticeHaimCohen,andhisfiancée,Mihal,wasthedaughterofthefirstpresidentoftheIsraeliSupremeCourt.117
Another story that made headlines was that of Benjamin Getieh, born inEthiopia, whom the rabbinate refused to marry because it did not recognizeEthiopianimmigrantsasJews.Getiehpresentedtherabbinatewiththetestimonyofawomanwhohadtakenpart,withherhusband,inoneofthegreatadventuresin the history of the Jewish people. Miriam Faitlovitch had been with herhusband, Jacques, when he “discovered” the Jews of Ethiopia in the earlytwentiethcentury,onamissionfundedbyBarondeRothschild.Hehadbroughta fewyoungEthiopians toPalestine,where theywere trainedas teachers,andthen returned them to their country. One of these young Ethiopians wasYirmiyahuGetieh,Benjamin’sfather.“BenjaminGetiehwasbornaJew,andnot
onlyhisfatherYirmiyahubutalsohismotherwasJewish,”MiriamFaitlovitchtestified.Buttherabbisrepeatedlyrefusedtomarryhim,atwhichpointGetiehwenttothepress:“AmIadogwhodoesnotneedtobeanswered?WhatmustIdotobeallowedtomarry—converttoChristianity?”Eventually,hewasmarriedin a private ceremony.118 Kibbutz Yehiam’s newsletter reported on no fewerthanfiftycouplesfromthekibbutzwhohadbeenmarried“incivilorsemi-civilways,” and whose marriages were not recognized by Israeli law. “Theconscientiousdecisionovertheformofmarriageisaprivatematter,”arguedthekibbutz movement, demanding “equal legal opportunity for all”—that is, theestablishmentofsecularmarriage.119
There were those who felt that Jewish law—halakha—comprised racistelements,andsomecomparedtherulingsofthechiefrabbinatetoNazilaw.120Dr. Israel Shahak, a chemistry professor at the Hebrew University and aHolocaustsurvivor,oncefoundavisitingstudentfromAfricaunconsciousonaJerusalemstreet. Itwason theSabbathandanearbyresident refused toallowDr.Shahaktousehistelephonetocallanambulance,claimingthatthesanctityoftheSabbathcouldnotbeviolatedtosavethelifeofanon-Jew.Shahakwenttothechiefrabbinate,whichconfirmedthisinterpretationoftheSabbathlaws.He sent letters to the newspapers about the incident, and one respondentwasIsrael’s ambassador toAustria,MichaelSimon. “This is themost horrific andshocking thing I have ever read,” he wrote to Prime Minister Eshkol. Hewonderedhow the storywould affect the country’s standing inAfricaorhowIsrael could continue to denounce discrimination against Jews in the SovietUnion.Maariv asked for the opinion of the minister of religious affairs, Dr.ZerahWarhaftig.Theminister did not refute the rabbinical ruling, but quotedfromtraditionalJewishsourcesaccordingtowhichJewishdoctorshadsavedthelives of non-Jews on the Sabbath, although they were not required to do so.Maarivwas not satisfied. “The argument over this seriousmatter is only justbeginning,”readitseditorial,assertingthatinthebattlehehadstarted,Shahak“would not remain alone.”121 People like Shahak and Ambassador Simonrepresented Israel as itwas:a largely freecountry,builton the foundationsofseculardemocracy,despiteitslimitations.From time to time Israelis examined and expanded the boundaries of their
tolerance,similartotheprocessinothercountriesduringthesixties.WhentheJewishReformmovementhelditsfirstpublicprayerserviceinIsrael,aheateddebate broke out.122 The minister of justice, Yaakov-Shimshon Shapira, wasaskedwhetherthetimehadnotcometorevokethelawprohibitinghomosexualrelations.“ThetruthisthatalthoughIhavereadafairamountofmaterialonthe
topic,ithasnotreallypreoccupiedme,”respondedtheministeruncomfortably.“PerhapsIamnotprogressiveenough,”headded;“therearethingsthatIdon’ttakemuchofan interest in.”Hemadeapointofobserving that therewerenohomosexualsamonghisacquaintances,norhadheknownanyasayouth.Butwith respect to thematter at hand theminister set forth a liberal position: “Imyselfdonotunderstandwhythesekindsof thingsshouldbeamatterfor theauthorities—something a person does privately andwhich harms no one.... Iftwoadultswishtostandontheirheadsanditdoesnotdisturbanyone—Ithinkcriminal law should not interfere.”He also pointed out that therewas no lawactuallyforbiddingIsraelicitizenstotransgressJewishlaw.123
A Jerusalem writer, Dan Omer, was tried and convicted because the statefound that his novel,On the Road, was pornographic; a debate ensued. OneprogramdirectoronKolIsraelradioprohibitedthebroadcastofapopularsongwith lyrics by the poet Haim Hefer. The song, “El El Yehezkel,” was ahumorous takeon the storyof theProphetEzekiel,but thedirectorclaimed itridiculedtheprophet.Anotherargumentensued.ThestreetinJerusalemnamedafterRabbiKookwasfrequentedbyprostitutes,sparkingadebateoverwhethertoremovethemorchangethestreet’sname.124
The dispute over the status of religion reflected dilemmas of identity—Jewishness versus Israeliness—and also touched on the relationship withDiaspora Jews. Should the state president go to see the Lubavitcher rebbe inNewYork,orshouldheexpecttherabbitohonorhimastheheadofstateandcometohishotel?(Shazarwent to therebbe.)“ForyearsIhadanaversiontotheDiaspora, to the Jew-boysyndrome,” recalledTikvaSarigofKibbutzBeitHashita.Herhusbandwasa founderof thePalmahandhadbeenanesteemedofficer in theWarofIndependence.“NahumandIwerethefirstgenerationinIsrael,thefirstgenerationtobefreeofDiasporacustomsandmentality.Andtheteachersdideverything theycould tomakeus forget theDiaspora.Wesimplyhated it.” This disdain for Diaspora Jews strengthened Israelis’ self-image asproudHebrews.Theirnewlife inIsraelwassupposed toembodynotonly therevolt of Jews against enslavement and persecution, but also the “rebellionagainst the Jews,” as itwas described byBerlKatznelson, a labor leader andideologue, the founder of the newspaperDavar. He saw life in Israel as “adeclarationofwaragainsttheJews’aptitudetosufferandbesubordinate.”125
This rejection troubled religious people, however. In April 1967,Ha’aretzpublished a letter from a reader named Haim Schechter from Givatayim, inwhichhetoldofhisdisappointmentasanimmigrant.“Yourexpressionsarefull
of contempt for this simple Jewwho somisses simple Jews like himself,” hewrote.“Youtookourchildrenfromusandinjectedtheirheartswithpoisonandscorn against their parents, Diaspora Jews. You turned them from Jews intoIsraelis,andnowthisyouthisliketheyounggenerationofgoyimfromwhomIfled.”126
Most Israelis were searching for the best way to be “secular Jews.” Theminister of education, Zalman Aran, gathered a select group of scholars toadvise him on how to deepen the Jewish awareness of Israeli schoolchildren.YoungIsraelisshouldnotgrowupfeelingcutofffromtheJewsoftheDiaspora,saidtheminister.Theexperts thought thatamoreprofoundidentificationwiththe Holocaust and with Soviet Jews might characterize a “secular Judaism.”Aranproposedrequiringeverystudent topassanexamon“JewishandIsraelihistory,”similartothenationalhistoryexamsrequiredintheSovietUnion.ButtheparticipantsfearedthatthiswouldnurtureIsraelichauvinism.Theywereatalossforwhattodo.127*ThequestionoftheappropriateattitudetowardJewsoverseaswasalsofullof
contradictions.ThepressoftenreportedonthepersecutionofJews,inheadlinesthatleftnoroomfordoubtthatlifeintheDiasporawasmoredangerousthaninIsrael:“JewishWomanMurderedinHarlem,”“TwoBlacksBeatandRobRabbiinNewYork.” But the papers also boasted of Jewish successes abroad, as ifIsraelis had some part in these accomplishments: “38 Jews in BritishParliament,” “Four Jewish Members in Multi-National Council on CancerResearch.”The editor ofYediotAharonot protested the stagingof themusicalOliver! inTelAvivbecauseofthecharacterofFagin.ProtectiveoftheJewishimage,heviewedtheplayas“ahorror,”anditsproductioninTelAvivasaformofmasochism.129
THEPREVAILINGTHESISWASTHATTHEJEWSOFTHEWORLDLIVEDINSAFETYDUETOtheexistenceoftheStateofIsrael.“ThankstothemightofIsrael,evenDiasporaJewscanholdtheirheadsuphigh,”assertsoneprotagonistinAmosOz’snovelElsewhere, Perhaps.130 Meanwhile, the prime minister’s office had created asecret unit namedNativ tooversee the international campaign for Jews in theSoviet Union, whowere not allowed to leave theUSSR andmany of whomwerepersecutedonthepretext that theywereinvolvedinZionistactivity.Thehead of Nativ was Shaul Avigur, who had been a prominent figure in thesecurityestablishmentinPalestine,alabormovementleader,andsecretadviserto Ben-Gurion and Eshkol. A 1966 report on Nativ activities enumeratedroughly seventy supposedly spontaneous public protests all over the world,
includingademonstrationoutsidetheSovietconsulateinCanberra,aresolutionproposedataGuatemalanauthors’congress,andanagendaitemofferedattheBritishCommunistparty’sconference.LikeMossadagents,andincoordinationwith them,Nativ agents actedunder theguise of being Israeli diplomats.Thepoet Emanuel Litvinoff acted in support of Soviet Jewry on behalf of thephilosopherBertrandRussell;LitvinoffwasinfactanagentforbothNativandtheMossad.Russellprobablyknewnothingofhisconnections.*The government often had to choose between the state’s security, political,
and economic interests, on the one hand, and its responsibility to protectpersecuted Jews—primarily in the USSR—on the other. Some claimed thatIsraelwasnotdoingenoughfortheJews.Thecontextofthisargumentwasthelingeringdebateover thefailure torescueJewsduring theSecondWorldWar.Ambassador Harman strongly denied the existence of a conflict, although heclaimedthatIsraelwastryingtoinstitutea“divisionoflabor”betweenitselfandDiaspora Jews, so that “Jewish issues” would not get in the way of itsdiplomaticties.“Theproblemthatfrequentlytroubledmewasadifferentone,”saidHarman.“Theproblemwaswhetherwewerenotharming”SovietJewsbyinterveningintheirsituation.“Ihadneverexperiencedsucharegime.WhatwasI, who was I, to do something that might put them in harm’s way?”131 ThisargumenthadalsobeenvoicedduringtheHolocaust.MostoftheNativfilesareclassified,so there isnowayofknowinghowexactly thiscovertorganizationoperated andwhether it restricted its activities to advancing thehumanitarian,religious,andZionistinterestsofSovietJews,orwhetheritalsoengagedinanti-Soviet activities such as espionage, subversion, and anti-Communistpropaganda.*Nahum Goldman, the president of the World Jewish Congress, attacked
IsraelisfortheirpatronizingattitudetowardtheDiasporaandremindedthemoftheunpleasant truth:without theDiaspora, theStateof Israelwouldnotexist.Goldman, who also served as president of the World Zionist Organization,frequentlyangeredtheIsraelipress.“Whydoesn’tGoldmankeepquiet?”fumedMaariv after he said he supported a revival of Jewish life in Germany.133Goldmanwashighlyvolubleonthe“moralandemotionalcrisis”inIsrael,butEshkol dismissed his comments: since the World Zionist Organization wasunabletobringJewstoIsrael,theviewsofitspresidentwereofnointerest.134
MANY RELIGIOUS ISRAELIS, PARTICULARLY THE BRAND OF ULTRA-ORTHODOXY THATOPposed themodernJewishstateassacrilegious, found itdifficult toquell thefearofasecularcountrytheyhadfeltsincethedeclarationofindependenceand
Israel’searlyyears.Theywereafraidthatthestatewouldharmtheirwayoflife.Rather than attempting to impose Jewish law upon the rest of Israeli society,they were primarily focused on defending their community’s interests. Thebattlewagedbytheultra-Orthodoxagainstautopsieswasoneexampleoftheirconcern.“Letusliveourlivesourownway.Webelievethatourbodiesmustnotbetamperedwithafterdeath,”wroteRabbiKalmanKahana.Autopsieswerenota new battlefield; they had been a part of the conflict between religious andsecular Israelis for years. Prior to 1967, the Knesset had begun debating aproposalforalegislativeamendmentthatwouldreducethenumberofautopsiesdone.As inother conflicts, non-Zionist ultra-Orthodoxwerenotonly fightingthesecularestablishmentbutwerealsodemonstratingtheirhigherloyaltytothecommandsof Jewish lawcompared to theircompetitors, theZionistOrthodoxcamp.The struggle was passionate. While thousands of people rallied under the
slogan“Letusdieinpeace,”theultra-Orthodoxdisseminatedgruesomepostersandhorrorstoriesabout“abuseofcorpses”thatwentagainstthelaw,overrodethe desires of the deceased and their families, and even ignored the explicitassurances of physicians. They also claimed that Israel was selling soldiers’body parts to Syria.135Awoman fromBatYamwrote about the body of hermother,theninety-two-year-oldwidowofarabbi:“Afterthewomenbathingthebody went in and cleansed her, they came out sobbing. They had found thedeceasedwithhereyesremovedandherheadsmashedandherentirestomachempty and full of cottonwool and even her thighwas open.”Ultra-OrthodoxKnessetmemberShlomo-JacobGrossannouncedintheKnessetthathewasinpossessionofaphotographofacratecontainingthebrainsofdeceasedpeople.The minister of health confirmed that close to three out of every ten bodiesunderwentautopsy;theultra-Orthodoxclaimedthenumberwasmuchhigher.In March 1967, a related and rather macabre argument took place in the
Knesset. Shlomo Lorincz, an ultra-Orthodox member, protested the fact thatsome two-thousand-year-old human skeletons uncovered in excavations atMasadahadbeen removed for scientific study in Israelandabroad, insteadofbeingburiedaccordingtoJewishlaw.TherockofMasadatowersmajesticallyover theDeadSea, anemblemof theheritageof Jewishheroism inPalestine.Masada marked the last stand Jewish rebels had made against Roman rule;almost a thousand men, women, and children had held out in the fortress,besieged, for three years. When defeat became inevitable, they proudlycommittedsuicideinsteadofshamefullysurrendering.DuringadigatMasada,Yigal Yadin, Israel’s most senior archeologist and a former chief of staff,
discoveredtwenty-fiveskeletons,whichhesurmisedweretheremainsofsomeofthedefenders.Threeyearsafterthediscovery,researchontheskeletonswasstillongoing.KnessetmemberLorinczthoughtthiswasshameful:“Thousandsofyoungpeopleand IDFsoldiers climb to thepeaksofMasadaand swear tofollowin thepathof thoseheroes.Theyrepeat thevow‘Masadashallnotfallagain.’ I am sorry to announce today thatMasada has fallen again.Not to anenemyoranoutsideconqueror,buttothecynicismofourtimes,tothespiritofwheelinganddealingthathastakenoverandknowsnoshame.”Hisspeechwashighly emotional. “This is secularism and these are its fruits,” he shouted.Eshkoltriedtohalt thepoliticaluproarovertheskeletonsandthetreatmentofcorpses, as some doctors published opinions stating the value of autopsies.136But thedeathofone rabbi’swifehad caused thedebate to spreadbeyond thestateandnowthreatenedtoupsetIsrael’sstatusintheUnitedStates.RabbiHerschKohnhadlivedinNewYorkforthirtyyearsbeforemovingto
Jerusalem, where his wife died. Since she had died on a Saturday, HadassahHospital performed an autopsy without being able to obtain her husband’sconsent. The hospital director later claimed that this was the result of amisunderstanding:when thewoman’s deathwas pronounced, the hospital hadsentanambulancedriverwithanoteinformingherfamily.Forsomereason,thedriverdidnothanddeliverthenote,butratherleft it inthemailboxwherethefamilyfounditonlyaftertheSabbathhadended.“Thedoctorsbelievedingoodfaith thatyouhad received thenotice in themorning,andsince theyheardnoobjectiononyourpartand thewife’sdeathwassuddenandunexplained, theyperformed the autopsy in the early evening after obtaining the necessarysignatures.”Heapologizedandpromisedtopreventsimilarcasesinthefuture.The fact that the director even wrote the letter reflected increasing religiouspressureontheHadassahorganizationintheUnitedStates,whichsponsoredthehospital. Rabbi Kohn was also the father of a senior writer for the English-languagedaily,theJerusalemPost.WhenKohnphonedtheIsraeliconsulateinNewYork after hiswife’s death, hewas treatedwith hostility at first. “Iwasrudetohim,”acknowledgedaconsulatestaffer,inareportthatdidnotconcealhishostilitytoultra-OrthodoxJews.HeassumedthattherabbihadreturnedtoAmericato“bad-mouthIsrael”—andmaybetomakesomemoneybygivingoutafewkashrutcertificates.KohnhadassuredthediplomathewasnotanIsrael-hater.137
Israeli diplomats in the United States and Britain, meanwhile, reported onembarrassingarticlesabouttheaffairthatappearedinJewishpapersandintheNew York Times. Ultra-Orthodox Jews held protest rallies outside the Israeli
consulateinNewYorkandplannedsimilaronesoutsidetheWhiteHouse.Therewas even a fear that one of the leading American rabbis, Moshe Feinstein,would publish a religious ruling forbidding Jews to settle in Israel. InWashington, Ambassador Harman tried to moderate the ultra-Orthodoxopposition toautopsies,but felt itwasa lostcause:AmericanJewswouldnotsupport Israel on this matter, particularly since in America the wishes of thedeceased and the family were respected. The ambassador suggested to thegovernment that it amend the relevant legislation on its own initiative;otherwise, it would have to do so under pressure from the ultra-Orthodox inAmerica.138
THERELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAELISANDAMERICAN JEWSWASCOMPLICATEDANDOFten tormented, reflecting mutual dependency, exaggerated expectations,stereotypical perceptions, hypocrisy, and a fair amount of guilt. As Zionists,Israelis believed that Jews should leave theUnited States and settle in Israel.Apart from the ideological reasons, Israel also needed immigrants from“prosperouscountries,”meaningAshkenazisfromtheUnitedStates,tobalanceoutthewavesofimmigrationfromdisplacedpersonscampsinEuropeandArabstates,aswellasthehighArabbirthrate.139IsraeliJewsconstitutedonlyabout17percentoftheworld’sJewishpopulation.FewerthantwentythousandimmigrantscamefromtheUnitedStatesduring
thefirsttwodecadesafterindependence.MostU.S.Jewsdidnotevencometovisit.ManyIsraelisderidedthemforpreferring“thehumiliationsof life in theDiaspora” and anti-Semitic persecutions to national sovereignty in their ownland.PresumingthatJewsintheUnitedStatesfeltsomeguiltaboutnotlivinginIsrael, many Israelis expected their American brethren to shower them withhero-worship: whenever the admiration from America seemed to be waning,Israelisfeltreasonforconcern.ButtheseheroesalsoexpectedAmericanJewstohelpthem,andoftentheysawthisassistanceasanobligation,practicallyatax.Theyassumed thatmost Jewsagreedwith thisview, and thatwhenAmericanJewshelped Israel, theywere in essencealso ensuring theirownexistence.140Butaspecialenvoyfortheprimeminister,EliezerLivneh,whowassenttotheUnitedStates in1967to learnabout theattitudesofJews there, reporteduponhisreturnthatmanyofthemlookeddownonIsraelfornotbeingabletosurvivewithout theirmoney. The need for assistance “greatly decreases the country’smoral standing,” wrote Livneh to Eshkol, and asked that Israel demand thatAmericanJewshelp increase immigration.Therewasacertaindegreeof self-contempt among Israelis becauseof thewillingness—and theneed—toaccept
donationsfromAmerica.“NooneknowsexactlyhowmanyIsraelishavetheirhands held out to the Jewish benefactor in America,” wrote one paper withdisgust. People who had been willing to sacrifice their lives for theindependence of the state were living on “foreign charity,” wrote BenjaminTammuz.* “Yourmoney prevents us fromworking hard,” saidLivneh in oneforum promoting dialogue between Jewish scholars from America and theirIsraelicounterparts.“Theonlythingweneedfromyouisimmigration.”141
Livneh’sreport toEshkolwaspessimistic.HewasextremelyconcernedthatAmerican Jews were neither sufficiently aware of their identity as Jews norsufficiently Zionist. The relationship between Israel and American Jews wasapproaching an impasse, he said, partly because American Jews wereundergoing a process of Americanization and losing their Jewish uniqueness.TensionsbetweenthemandtheAmericanblackswereleadingthemtobemoreconcerned about their own standing than about Israel. Livneh reported to theprime minister about a new book, Herzog, by Saul Bellow. “Israel is notmentionedinthenovelatall...eventhoughitsJewishprotagonistspendsthreehundred pages prattling on about an array of spiritual, social and politicalproblems from all corners of theworld,” hewrote.MeirRosen, at the Israeliconsulate in New York, complained of an American Jewish diplomat whohesitated to promote the inclusion of anti-Semitism in any charter againstracism:hewasafraid todefineJewsasanation, lest itdamagetheir imageasAmericans.†JewishintellectualsfromtheUnitedStateswhoparticipatedintheannualdialoguewiththeirIsraelicolleaguesclaimedtheyweremoreinterestedinthelifeofthemind.Oneofthemsaid,“JewishintellectuallifeintheUnitedStatesisdevelopingfasterthanJewishintellectuallifeinIsrael.”ManyofthemdemandedthatReformJudaismberecognizedinIsrael.142
AsforJewishstudentsintheUnitedStates,Ha’aretzreportedthatIsraelhadceasedtointerestthem.AgroupofAmericanstudentsvisitingIsraelexpresseddisappointment and bitterness to a Maariv reporter. They complained of adepressinggrayness,alackofrespectfortheindividual,ethnicdiscrimination,chauvinism and hypocrisy, narrow-mindedness, and intellectual boredom: onecouldfindtwentysetsofthecompleteworksofPushkininthelibrary,butnotasingle bookbyHannahArendt, they claimed.Ha’aretz quoted thewriter ElieWiesel:“TheJewishnessofJewishyouthcanstillbe reached,butnot throughIsrael. Perhaps through the problems of the Jews in Russia. Perhaps throughquestionsabouttheHolocaust.NotthroughIsrael.”AmbassadorHarmanarguedthat the public campaign for the rights of Soviet Jews was contributing to aZionistawakeningamongAmericanJews,therebyhelpingIsrael.143
InfluentialJewsintheUnitedStatesoftenhelpedpromoteIsrael’sinterestsinother countries, and were sent on missions intended to make life easier forpersecuted Jews inArab statesand in theCommunistbloc.Harmandescribedthisdiplomaticeffortas“lobbying,”aninsultingterminHebrew,reminiscentofthehelplessnessofJewsbeforetheestablishmentof thestate,buthisembassyalsoemergesfromhisdescriptionsasahugelyinfluentialJewishagencyactivein precisely the same sort of interventions.144 At the same time, the questionoftenaroseastowhatextenttheJewsoftheUnitedStateswereobligedtoabidebypoliciesoftheIsraeligovernmentandactinitsbestinterests.*Thiswasnotanewdilemma.Manyyearsbefore,JacobBlaustein,theoiltycoonandpresidentof theAmericanJewishCommittee,hadmanagedtogetawrittenundertakingfrom then prime minister Ben-Gurion that Israel would not interfere in theaffairs of JewishAmericans andwould not demanddual loyalties from them.Ben-Guriontherebyrelinquished,ineffect,Israel’sZionistmonopolyonJewishidentity, and acknowledged the legitimacy of Jewish life outside Israel, incontradictiontotheprinciplesofZionism.146†ThispragmaticapproachmadeiteasierforAmericanJewstostandbyIsrael.
7.JEWSII:“IT’SGOODTOHAVETHISSORTOFFAUCET”
AmbassadorHarmanspentmuchofhistimefosteringtherelationshipwiththenearly sixmillion Jews in theUnited States, whom he viewed as an integralcomponentofhispoliticalcontacts.Jewswhowereclose toPresidentLyndonJohnson helped the ambassador plead Israel’s case directly, and the presidentalso relied on their help for talks with Israel. These contacts were oftenmaintainedonadailybasis,sometimesevenhourly,andtheyincludedfrequentphonecallswiththepresident’sassistantsaswellasmeetingsatsocialeventsinWashington and on the president’s ranch in Texas.147 Israel enjoyed anextremely close relationship with the Johnson administration. Israel’s specialenvoy toWashington, Ephraim Evron, once reported a conversation with theU.S.ambassadortotheUnitedNations,ArthurGoldberg.GoldbergconfidedintheIsraelidiplomataboutthepersonaltensionbetweenhimselfandhissuperiorsat theStateDepartment, inpartconcerningtieswithIsrael.“Hiscommentsonthematterwere amixture of anger and pain,” reportedEvron, and noted thatGoldbergwas a personal friend. Evron also developed a friendly relationshipwithPresidentJohnsonhimself:theyplayedgolftogethertwice.148
Thepositionof JewishAmericans in relation toWashingtonwasacomplexone. Jews did not control theworld orAmerica, but the anti-Semiticmyth of
theirpowerwashelpfultotheZionistmovementandtotheStateofIsrael,andsoitwasintheZionists’bestinteresttonurtureit.TheodorHerzlhaddeployedthe myth of Jewish power to enlist support for the Zionist idea; ChaimWeizmannhaddonethesametoobtaintheBalfourDeclarationfromtheBritish;Nahum Goldman knew how to create the impression that his influence wasboundlessduringnegotiationswith theGermangovernmenton reparations forvictimsof theNazipersecution.Goldman,adiplomatwithoutahomelandandwith half a dozen passports, frequently irritatedHarman, but according to theambassadorhehadlearnedfromGoldmanaboutthesecretofthe“Jewishmyth”andhowtoemployitsinfluence.“It’sgoodtohavethiskindoffaucet,”hesaidoftheJewsofAmerica;“wehavecertainlygainedallsortsofthingsthankstothisfaucet,anditisdoubtfulwewouldhavegottenthempurelyonthebasisofmerit.Butwiththiskindoffaucetyoualwayshavetoconsiderwhentoturniton:it’seasiertoturnonthanoff.”149ThebattleofAmericanJewsagainstCoca-Colawas,hefelt,oneexampleofthetroublesomefaucet.MosheBornstein,aHolocaustsurvivor,wastheowneroftheIsraelibeverage
companyTempo, andhadbeen trying foryears towin the Israeli franchise tomake Coca-Cola. The company had repeatedly turned him down, apparentlyfearing thatmanufacturing the beverage in Israelwould lead to its boycott inArabcountries.*IsraelandJewishorganizationsinAmericaconsistentlyfoughtagainst theArab commercial boycott, and Israel evenkept a special consul inNewYork specifically for that purpose. In 1966 the consulwas the journalistYuval Elitzur, a writer for Maariv. Elitzur frequently worked with ArnoldForster, an official of the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, who, asElitzur described, launched an initiative called “Operation Coca-Cola.”WhenthecompanyrepeateditsrefusaltograntBornsteinthefranchise,Forsterwenttothe U.S. press; before long, a “counter boycott” was under way amongAmericanJews;theyprobablyswitchedtoPepsi.Eventhewell-knownhotdogchainNathan’sannounceditwouldnolongerserveCoca-Cola.TheIsraelipressattributednearexistential importancetotheissue.“Ourcountry,initspoliticalsecurity condition, is unusual,” said Maariv in an editorial. “While in anynormal country, Coca-Cola is a drink and, at most, a symbol of Americancivilization,weseeCoca-Colanotonlyasadrinkbutalsoasapoliticalfactor.”Thepapersdepictedanarduousbattleagainstafar-reachingevilempire.Whenthesodacompanyfinallycapitulated,itwasasiftheJewishpeoplehadgainedagloriousvictoryworthyofcomparisontoDavid’soverGoliath.150
Behindthescenes,therehadindeedbeengreatdrama.MosheBornsteinhadcome toNewYork inApril 1966 to join the struggle, and one Friday, at the
heightofnegotiations,helefttospendtheSabbathoutoftown.HehadgivenacontactnumbertoConsulElitzur,butapparentlyitwasnotthecorrectnumber.JustbeforetheSabbathbegan,anAmericanJewishCommitteeboardmember,an intermediary, phoned Elitzur with Coca-Cola’s proposed settlement andasked for the Israeli government’s approval: the company would authorizeproductionofCokeinIsrael,butitwouldawardthefranchisenottoBornsteinbut to an American Jewish businessman, Abe Feinberg, who had also beenpursuing it for years. Elitzur could not get hold of Bornstein, but he phonedAmbassador Harman, who responded that the State of Israel was hardly in apositiontodictatetermstoCoca-Cola.Forster,whowasalsocontacted,decreedthatFeinbergwouldtakethefranchiseandthentransferittoBornstein,andthesettlement was approved.When Bornstein came back to town, he discoveredthatFeinbergintendedtokeepthefranchiseforhimself,and,feelingcheated,hethreatenedtocreateascandal.AmbassadorHarman thought the entirematter was needlessly damaging to
Israel.Hesaid,“IsraelneedsCoca-Colalikeaholeinthehead”;thecountryhadplentyoforangejuice.Elitzursawthewholethingdifferently.“SincetheAllies’victoryinWWII,thisinternationalbeverage,forbetterorforworse,hasbecomea symbol of American culture,” he wrote, and warned that foreign investorsmightbeputoffiftheyconcludedthatbigcompaniesdidnotdobusinesswithIsrael.Norwouldtouristscomeiftheycouldn’tfindthedrinkstheywereusedtoinIsraelihotels.151
MostIsraeliswouldhaveagreedwithElitzur:theyneededCoca-Colaforthesame reason they took so many trips abroad and bought television sets longbeforetherewasanythingtowatch:theyfelt theclaustrophobiaofthebordersandlongedtobepartofthegreatwideworld,withAmericaatitshelm.Mostofthemhadnowayofknowingthatthemanbehindthebottle,AbeFeinberg,wasakeyfigureintherelationshipbetweenIsraelandtheUnitedStates.
FEINBERGHADSTUDIEDLAWINNEWYORK,BUTRATHERTHANGOINTOPRACTICEHEentered into a partnership with his father, a hosiery manufacturer. He wassuccessfulinbusinessandafewyearslaterbecameabanker.ThepersecutionofJews in Europe motivated him to become active raising money through theUnitedPalestineAppeal.Heorganizedactivitiesamonghispartnersandotherhosierymanufacturers, anddistinguishedhimselfwithhisgenerousdonations.Whilestillinhistwenties,hehadbecomeinterestedinpolitics.Now,impatient,he decided to skip the standard stages of activism and go straight to thepresidenthimself.Heknewsomeonewhoknewsomeonewhoknewsomeone
who had gone to school with one of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’saides. Feinbergmetwith the aide to talk of the needs of the Jews, presentinghimself as more of a moderate than the leader of the Zionist movement inAmerica,AbbaHillelSilver,aRepublican.Feinbergpromisedhehadnointerestinputtingpressureonthepresidentorextortinghimormakingthreats.Hewasnotlookingforpublicity.HewantedsimplytopassoninformationregardingtheneedsoftheJewishpeopleandtoconsiderinformallywhatthepresidentcoulddo for the Jews and what they could do for him and the Democratic Party.Roosevelt’saidesuggestedhefirstmeetthevicepresident.Feinbergwasnonetoo impressed: people barely knew who Harry Truman was at the time. ButRoosevelt’s man arranged for Feinberg to be invited to a small party withTruman, and the two struck up an acquaintance. A few months after thismeeting, Roosevelt died and was replaced by Truman. Feinberg had thebeginningsofafriendshipwiththemanintheWhiteHouse.FeinbergnowbecameinvolvedintheeffortstobringHolocaustsurvivorsto
Palestine,whichwas still underBritish rule.He financedandevenpersonallyaccompanied ships full of illegal immigrants. He helped purchase arms forprotectionandoncegotmixedupinanespionageepisodethatledtohisarrest.In Palestine, Feinberg was asked by the Hagana to deliver a report to Ben-Gurion,whowasatthetimeinParis.ThereporthadcomefromDamascusfromthe journalist-spy Eliyahu Sasson, later the Israeli minister of police. TheBritish,suspiciousoftheHagana,arrestedFeinbergbutreleasedhimthankstohis tieswith theWhiteHouse, and hewas able to carry out themission. HeclaimedtohavehadapartindefiningPresidentTruman’spositionthat100,000Holocaust survivors be allowed to enter Palestine. He was a guest of ChaimWeizmanninhishotelinNewYorkwhentheUNdecidedtopartitionPalestinein1947,andsaidhewasamongthosewhoinfluencedTrumantorecognizetheStateofIsrael.Before the presidential election of 1948, Truman gathered a few of his
acquaintances, including Feinberg, and told them that his chances ofwinningdependeduponhisabilitytoreachouttothevoters.Hewantedtotravelbytrainfromcoasttocoast,andtodothatheneededmoney.Feinbergpromisedtoraise$100,000, and he succeeded.Most of the donors were Jewish: Feinberg toldthem they had to help Truman because he supported the State of Israel.AlthoughFeinbergwasexaggeratingwhenhetookcreditforTruman’selection,thepresident’sgratitudedidenablehimtocementhisstatusasaliaisonnotonlybetweentheadministrationandprominentJewishDemocrats,butalsobetweentheWhiteHouse and the Israeli government.Once, he later recalled, Truman
senthimtoIsrael tomediatebetweenPresidentWeizmannandPrimeMinisterBen-Gurion. The United States wanted Israel to allow a few thousand Arabrefugees to return to their homes as part of a family reunification program.Weizmannsupportedtheproposal;Ben-Gurionobjected.Feinbergtalkedtobothmenandwasabletobringaboutthereturnofsomeoftherefugees.FeinbergrecountedallthisinalonginterviewhegrantedtheTrumanLibrary,
yearsaftertheevents.152Noteverythinghesaidisverifiable,butWhiteHouseand State Department documents, as well as Israeli government materials,confirmthathewasIsrael’smanintheWhiteHouseformanyyears.*Healsohad tieswithPresident JohnF.Kennedy,buthiskeypersonalconnectionwaswith Lyndon Johnson. Their acquaintance began during Truman’s presidencyand continued throughout Johnson’s terms in theHouse and the SenatewhenJohnson was already a supporter of Israel.153 Over time, the former hosierymanufacturerbecamemoresophisticated,overcominghisaweofthepresidency.Thoughalways respectful to thepresident, he talkedwithhimas an equal. InApril1966,hesentJohnsonanote thankinghimforan invitation toTexas:“IcannottellyouhowmuchIappreciatethefactthatyouinvitedmeonthetriptoHouston.Thespeechwasgreat,theplanewasmagnificent,theWhiteHousebedwas long enough, and your pajamas fit perfectly.” He wrote on his bank’sofficialletterheadandaddedahandwrittennoteinwhichhecommentedonhowwellthepresident,hiswife,andhisdaughterslooked.AWhiteHouseassistantwrotetohimthathewasamongthepresident’sclosestfriends.Johnson and the White House used Feinberg as a link to Prime Minister
EshkolandtoJewishpublicopinion.Theyexpectedhimtoattractpoliticalandfinancial support, and theywere not disappointed. Feinberg did not representofficial Jewish organizations, but Johnson saw him as an ambassador of theJews,or,astheywerecarefultosayintheWhiteHouse,Feinberg’s“friends”or“the friends of Israel.” Johnson repeatedly sent him to deliver messages toEshkol and to handle business he preferred not to put through officialadministration pipelines. Once, meeting Ambassador Harman at a reception,Johnsontoldhim,“TellAbeFeinbergIwouldliketoseehimandtalktohim.”Thetwomensometimesspokeonthephone.154
At the beginning of 1967, when Johnson wanted to communicate that theUnited States would find it hard to respond to all of Israel’s requests forassistance, Feinberg was the man who received the news. This was shortlybefore one of his trips to Jerusalem.When he returned toAmerica, Feinbergbrought theWhiteHouse Israel’s response. Inpreparation foranothermeeting
withFeinberg,JohnsonwasgivenmemosdetailingIsrael’srequestsforfinancialandmilitaryaid,includinginformationontherelevantcreditratingsandinterestrates. Feinberg was proficient in all the details. The particulars wereaccompaniedbyamemoanalyzingthefoundationsoftherelationshipbetweentheUnitedStates and Israel,which stated that “the existenceof a large,well-organizedgroupof Israel sympathizerswithin theU.S.bodypoliticobviouslyputs a limit on the degree to which the USG [U.S. government] mightcontemplateadifferentpolicy” towardIsrael.This relationshipwasFeinberg’sdomain.TheWhiteHouseopenedafilenamed“FeinbergGoodWorks,”whichcontained an article in support of the president that had appeared in a Jewishpaper.155JohnsononcecalledFeinbergtoconvincehimthatIsraelshouldbackthesupplyofAmericanarmstoJordan,sinceit,too,hadaninterestin“thelittleking”maintaining power.But Johnson said hewaswilling to accept Eshkol’spositiononthematter,sothathe,Johnson,shouldnotbeperceivedasimposinganythingonIsrael.Ifthatimpressionwerecreated,Johnsonsaid,he’dhaveJimNovyonthelineinfiveminutesprotesting—somethinghe’dliketoavoid.NovywasawealthyJewishscrap-irondealer,borninPoland,whohadbeenhelpfultoJohnsonatthebeginningofhiscareer.JohnsonassuredFeinbergthathewantedtopleasetheJews,notirritatethem.156*
WHENIN1966THEWHITEHOUSEWANTEDTOFINDOUTHOWTHEJEWISHCOMMUNITYwouldreacttoaproposedarmsdealwithJordan,aconversationwithFeinbergdidnotsuffice;twootherJewishmen,DavidGinsburgandArthurKrim,werealsobroughtin.ThethreeconveyedthatbothIsraelandtheJewscouldlivewiththedeal.158Ginsburg,anattorney,hadbeenalongtimefriendofJohnson’s.“Itwas funbeingwithhim,”Ginsburg later recalled.AHarvardgraduate,hehadlawofficesneartheWhiteHouseandservedonvariouspublicboardsfromtimetotime.Althoughheheldnogovernmentposition,hespentalotoftimeattheWhite House “as a friend of the President.”159 Johnson told Feinberg thatGinsburgwasoneofthemosttalentedpeopleheknewandthathewouldliketobringhimintothegovernment.ThatwasinMarch1967,duringadiscussionofa series of requests Israel had presented to the administration. In the sameconversation,thepresidenttoldFeinbergthathehadgivenGinsburgamission.Thiswasanunusualepisode,evenfortheJohnson-Jews-Israeltriangle,andanapparently astonishedGinsburg had been quick to report thematter to IsraelirepresentativeEvron:hehadmetwithJohnsononadifferentmatterentirely—topresent the findings of an arbitration committee convened to address railroadworkers’demands.WhenGinsburghadfinished,thepresidentpulledhimaside
and asked him to prepare amemo specifyingwhat he, Johnson, could do forIsrael over the next few months. Administration officials wouldn’t like it,Johnson said, but he was certain he could arrange passage of whatever planGinsburgcameupwith.HeknewthatmostJewshadvotedforhimandhedidnotforgethisfriends,thepresidentexplained.Therewasnodoubtthathewasthinkingaheadto the1968elections.HeurgedGinsburgtohurry; indeed, twodayslaterheranintohimandaskedifhe’dstartedworkingontheplan.TheIsraelis treatedthepresident’srequestasawindfall.Asafirstresponse,
AmbassadorHarmanfantasizedaboutaU.S.-Israelidefensepactandanofficialvisit toWashingtonby theprimeminister.Hequickly sent Jerusalemamemodraftenumeratingalonglistofproposedrequests:planeengines,tankengines,armoredpersonnelcarriers,economicaid,andpoliticalsupport.Figures,creditterms, supply and payment dates were all written down in great detail. ThememoGinsburg ultimately gave Johnsonwas very similar to this hasty draft,andGinsburgreportedthatJohnsonreceiveditfavorably.Theysattogetherfortwo and a half hours, and then, inGinsburg’s presence, the president phonedSecretaryofStateDeanRuskandSecretaryofDefenseRobertMcNamaraandinvitedthemtodiscussthematter.Afewdayslater,Ginsburg,accompaniedbyFeinberg, went to Jerusalem tomeet with PrimeMinister Eshkol. The wholematterwastopsecret:embassytelegramsreferredtoFeinbergas“Andre,”whileGinsburg was “Harari.”* Ginsburg told the prime minister that PresidentJohnsonwaswillingtodomorethananyotherpresident,includingTruman,forIsrael’ssake.However,therelationshipbetweenIsraelandtheUnitedStates,heclaimed,dependedonone thing: Johnsonwantedevidence that Israelwasnotbuildinganuclearbomb.Therewasnomatterofgreaterimportance,Ginsbergreiterated:Feinbergbackedhimup.ThetwoseemedtohaveknownmoreaboutIsrael’s nuclear program than most Israelis, and this intimate knowledgepresentedthemwithaseriousdilemma.†Ginsburg’smemotoJohnsonreflectsafairly acrobatic attempt to represent Israel’s position on the matter, but hesuggestedthatJohnsongooverthedetailswithEshkolhimself.162
Thewholeepisodewassoextraordinary,andGinsburgandFeinbergweresodeeply involved in such profound, confidentialmatters, that the Israelis felt itnecessarytobeprudent.“Thepresidentpersonallyneedsusverymuchandhispersonalstatusmayweakenevenmoreinthecomingperiod,”wroteHarmantoEshkol, referring to the war in Vietnam and his bid for reelection, but “wecannotgivehimtheimpressionthatweareextortingapoundoffleshinlightofhis serious personal situation.”163Moshe Bitan, an official at theMinistry ofForeignAffairs,sentAmbassadorHarmanhis theoryregardingwhathecalled
the“magiccircle”:themoreJohnsonwasinclinedtodoforIsrael,themorehispeoplerejectedIsrael’srequests.Johnson,Bitanexplained,actedpersonallyonIsraelimatters, even trivial ones.This angered both theStateDepartment andthePentagon, and sowhen they leaned on Israel, theywere not acting out ofpracticalconsiderationsbutresponding,firstandforemost,tothefactthatIsraelwas going directly to the president and that he was talking to the countrythrough its friends. Since the officials could not blame the boss himself, theytook their anger out on Israel, wrote Bitan. He suggested doing everythingpossible to mend relations with the administration branches. These were thelimitsofthe“Jewishmyth”ofpower.Many years later, Ginsburg believed it had been wrong to pigeonhole
AmericanJewsasDemocrats:thewealthiestamongthemsupportedRepublicancandidates, he said.But inhismemo to Johnsonhe emphasized that the Jewshad supported Democrats for years. However, one could not rule out thepossibilitythataRepublicancandidatemightmakeaspecialefforttogaintheirsupport,Ginsburgcautioned,andthatobligedJohnsonhimselftomakeaspecialeffort.164 In his striving to comply, Johnson sought the assistance of a couplewho added a certain glamour and romance to the story: Arthur andMathildeKrim.HewasaJewishmovieproducer,sheaformerIsraeli.
WHILE STILLAYOUNGATTORNEY,KRIMHADHANDLEDTHEAFFAIRSOF THEZIONISTACtivistMeyerWeisgal,ChaimWeizmann’srepresentativeinAmerica.Weisgalwasajournalistandtheatricalproducerwhohadaknackforbefriendingtherichand famous. In 1937 he produced The Eternal Road in New York, a playcommissioned fromFranzWerfelabout thehistoryof theJewishpeople,withmusicbyKurtWeill;thedirectorwasMaxReinhart.Thecriticspraisedtheplay,butWeisgalwentintodebtandsoughtKrim’shelp.Weisgalwaslaterafounderof theWeizmann Institute of Science, in Rehovot; to support it, he recruitedmany of his American acquaintances, including Abe Feinberg and DavidGinsburg. One day he invited Arthur Krim, who had just purchased UnitedArtistsfromCharlieChaplin,tovisittheinstitute.WhenKrimcametoRehovot,Weisgal introduced him to the biologist Dr. Mathilde Danon, who was, asWeisgal put it, “the most beautiful woman scientist” at the institute. In hertwenties,shewasindeedabeautifulblonde.Mathilde Galland had been born in Italy to a Swiss Calvinist father and a
Catholicmother.While shewas still in high school, the news emergedof theextermination of Jews in the war, and she responded with profound shock.During her studies at the University of Geneva, shemet a few concentration
campsurvivors.HerknowledgeoftheHolocaustdrewhertoJewishcirclesandshe soon fell in love with a Bulgarian-born student from Palestine, DavidDanon, who was also active in Etzel, the Jewish underground organizationfightingtheBritishMandate.MathildeGallandsawinhimnotaterroristbutafreedom fighter, a Jewish hero. She herself began to participate in Etzelactivities inEurope,crossingbordersonabicycle tosmuggle informationandexplosives.TogetherwithDanon,shetookpartinpurchasingarmstobeshippedbyEtzelonboard theAltalena.*Theydrove fromvillage tovillage ina jeep,buyingriflesfromfarmerswhohadkeptthemsincetheiranti-Naziundergrounddays.ShemarriedDavidDanonin1948andtheirdaughter,Dafna,wasbornin1951.WhentheirstudieswereovertheysettledinIsraelandbothgotjobsattheWeizmann Institute in Rehovot. Mathilde Danon, who had converted toJudaism,worked on chromosome research. She remained at the institute evenafterseparatingfromherhusband.MeyerWeisgal,shelaterrecalled,askedhertogiveArthurKrimatourofthe
institute, and he asked where he could get a good steak. The best steaks inRehovotwerehers,shesaid,andsheinvitedhimtoherhome.Krimvisitedheroftenoverthenextfewmonths,andsheeventuallyagreedtomarryhim.†WhenshecametotheUnitedStates,Krimcontinuedherscientificworkandemergedasaglamoroushostess,too:theirguestswereawho’swhoofentertainmentandpolitics.Shewasalsoinvolvedinherhusband’spoliticalactivism.ArthurKrimsupported Kennedy and helped raise funds for his presidential campaign. Hewasgoodatmatchingwealthypeoplewithmoviestarsandpoliticians,andwasafrequentnamedropper;HarryBelafonte,RudolfNureyev,WoodyAllen.WhenKennedy became president, Krim started an exclusive “club” of donors whowere privy to occasional political briefings, sometimes from the presidenthimself.Noonereceivedtangiblebenefitsinreturnfortheirmoney,Krimlaterinsisted,buttheyallenjoyedtheproximitytopowerandcharisma.InMay 1962, the Krims threw a party in their NewYork home. President
Kennedy was among the guests, as wereMarilynMonroe andMaria Callas.Vice President Lyndon Johnson was “somewhat ignored,” Arthur Krimrecollected, althoughMathildeKrim tried to entertain him. Johnson ended upstayingtilloneortwointhemorning,anditwasthebeginningofawonderfulfriendship.After the Kennedy assassination, Krim was reluctant to continue his fund-
raising activities. Like many of Kennedy’s supporters, he was planning toabandonpoliticsbutJohnsonurgedhimtocontinue.AsthewidowedDr.Krimlaterrecounted,Johnsontoldhim:“Youhavenootherpresident.”Krimhadto
staythecourse“forAmerica.”Krimstayed.InaseriesofinterviewshedidfortheJohnsonLibrary,KrimrecountedingreatdetailhowJohnsonhadbefriendedhim and his wife with a series of surprising gestures. Once the presidentsuddenlycalledthemathomeandaskedDr.KrimtoleaveforParisthatnight,to escort a delegation of U.S. astronauts. He explained that her command ofFrench and her European manners would prevent the astronauts’ wives fromembarrassingthedelegation.Dr.KrimstayedoverattheWhiteHousepriortothe trip—theKrimswere to do so often, in a regular roomon the third floor,number 303. She also visited several times on her own. Johnson occasionallyinvited theKrims to accompanyhimonhis helicopter and evenonAirForceOne,whenheflewtohisranchinTexas.Hisdisplaysoffriendshipwerelavishand at some point he even tried to convince the Krims to buy a ranchneighboring his.Dafna,MathildeKrim’s daughter, received a letter from himwhileshewasservingintheIDF.HeoncetoldGoldaMeironthephone,muchtoherastonishment,thathewascomingtoIsraeltovisitDafna.The friendship between Johnson and the Krims was no secret, and yet the
threepreferredthatthepressnotwriteaboutthemorphotographthemtogether.A photographer once shot Mathilde Krim sunning on board the president’syacht. The picture was published the next day with the caption “Who Is theBlondeonPresidentJohnson’sBoat?”Johnsonwasfurious.WhiteHouselogsshow that the two spoke on the phone frequently, sometimes when she wasstayingon the third floor of theWhiteHouse andhewas in theOvalOffice.Manyyearslater,Dr.Krimwasaskedwhetheritwouldbetruetosayshewas“Israel’swoman in theWhiteHouse.”She responded that shehadneverbeenaskedtodeliveranofficialrequestfromtheIsraeligovernmenttothepresident.Yes, she said, she might have given him messages from David Ginsburg orothers.Shedescribedherrelationshipwith thepresidentas“avery,veryclosefriendship.“ Asked whether it was a romantic relationship, she replied in thenegative.But,sheadded,itwasnotthefirsttimeshehadbeenasked.Arthur Krim said that Johnson communicated through himwith the Israeli
government when he wanted to circumvent the State Department and thePentagon.*JohnsononceaskedhimwhathethoughtofEshkol,butKrimknewtheprimeministeronly inpassing.MathildeKrim,on theotherhand, told thepresidentthathewouldlikeEshkolbecausetheywerealike:“Bothcamefromthesoil,and[were]veryblunt,strong,pragmaticmen.”Shemighthaveaddedthat theyhadbothbeenrequired tostepoutfrombehind theshadowsofgreatmen,Ben-GurionandKennedy.TheKrims assumed that Johnsonwas grateful for their ongoing assistance.
According to themhewas hurt by the attitude ofKennedy’s people,manyofthemNewEnglanders andHarvard graduateswho looked downon theTexasrancher. Johnson felt compassion toward people who had suffereddiscrimination and could identify with them, the Krims said. He appreciatedpeoplewhohadmade it the hardway, becausehe felt that he, too, had faceddiscrimination and had worked hard to get where he was. They thought heidentifiedwithJewsandwithIsraelmuchashedidwiththeplightoftheblacksand the poor, and at times they said they would have expected to find suchwarmthonlyinsomeonewhohadJewishrootshimself.166
BEYOND GINSBERG, FEINBURG, AND THE KRIMS, THE MOST SENIOR FIGURE TOINFLUence President Johnson’s policy on Israel was Associate Justice of theSupremeCourtAbeFortas. Inearly1967,Fortasgaveaspeech inChicago todelegatesataregionalconventionoftheUnitedJewishAppeal.HereminiscedabouthischildhoodasaJewishboyinMemphisduringthedayswhentherewassomedoubtastowhetherJewscouldsurviveinAmericaasJews.Theydidso,heargued,partlythankstotheirprideinIsrael’ssuccess.ItwasawarmJewishspeech,andFortascharmedhisaudience.He tolda joke:TwoAmericanJewsvisitIsrael.Theygotoanightclubandseeacomedyact.Oneofthetworollsaroundlaughing.“SincewhendoyouunderstandHebrew?”hisfriendasks.“Idon’t,” thefirstsays,“but I trust theIsraelis.” In thesamespeech,FortasalsorecountedhowhehadonceinvitedDavidBen-Guriontobreakfastathishome.They had talked about the similarities and the differences betweendiscriminationagainstMizrahiminIsraelandblacksinAmerica.AccordingtoFortas,IsraelhadovercomediscriminationandAmericawouldfollowsuit.*AmbassadorHarmanwouldoftenmeetwithFortas,andlatersaidthatFortas
couldseeJohnsonwheneverhewanted,“evententimesaday.”ButFortaswasmorethanaconduit:healsogavethepresidentadviceandplayedanextremelyimportant role in talks that preceded the Six-Day War. Like Israel’s otherliaisons to the White House, Fortas was careful to keep these talks strictlyconfidential.InIsrael’sdiplomatictelegramshewasidentifiedas“Ilan.”Manyyearslater,theformerenvoyEphraimEvronstilldeniedthatFortashadservedas a liaison to theWhiteHouse.168 Fortas’s situationwas particularly delicatebecause of his position on the SupremeCourt. Although hewas not the firstJewishjudgetoserveasapoliticaladvisertoaU.S.president,hisstatusintheWhite House and his involvement in many key issues generated criticism.ArthurKrim later commented thathehadbeen surprisedat thepresident, andmainlyatFortashimself,fornotbeingsufficientlysensitiveaboutthis.Johnson
knewthathisrelationshipwithFortaswasproblematic,andonceinstructedthataWhite House brochure be shelved because it featured a photograph of himwith his advisers, including Fortas. Johnson’s close adviserWalt RostowwasalsoJewish.HisbrotherEugenewasaseniorofficial in theStateDepartment.Ambassador Harman reported to Jerusalem that “unlike his brother,” Eugenewas positive about his Jewish identity and saw himself as part of the Jewishpeople.169
Johnson’sspecial feelingfor theJewsprompteda legend that found itswayintothepressandintoresearchonthepresident.Thestory’soriginsgobacktoDecember 1963, when the president attended the opening ceremony of theConservativeAgudasAchimcommunity’snewsynagogueinAustin,Texas.Theeventseemedtobeofnoparticularimportance,warrantingtwenty-onelinesatthebottomofpage16of theNewYorkTimes,alongsideanevenshorterstorycoveringtheappointmentofSheldonS.Cohen,apartnerinthelawfirmofAbeFortas,asthenewcommissioneroftheInternalRevenueService.170Johnson’shost at the synagoguewashisold friend JimNovy. Inhiswelcoming speech,Novysaidthatearly inWorldWarII,CongressmanJohnsonhadhelpedforty-twoJewsleavePolandandGermanyviatheU.S.embassyinWarsaw.In1940,hecontinued,JohnsonhadarrangedforanothergroupofpersecutedJewstobehousedinTexas.Johnsondidnotdenythedetails,andhiswife,LadyBird,evenreinforcedit.Attheendoftheceremony,shewrote,“personafterperson”cameuptoherandtoldherthattheywouldnothavebeentherethatdayifnotforherhusband. “Hehelpedmegetout,” she said they toldher, adding that thiswasoneofthemostmemorableeventsoftheday.171Initsnextincarnation,thestorytoldof“hundredsofJews”persecutedbytheNaziswhomJohnsonhadhelpedsmuggleintotheUnitedStatesandhousedinTexas,illegally.TheUniversityofTexasawardedadoctoratetoastudentwhomadetherescuethesubjectofhisthesis, even giving it a name:Operation Texas. Others copied the story fromhim.172Hadtheepisodebeentrue,Johnsonwouldhavebeenentitledtoplantatree on the Avenue of the Righteous Among the Nations at Yad Vashem, inJerusalem,anopportunityIsraelwouldnothavebeenlikelytopassup.Butthestorywascompletelyunfounded.IntheJohnsonLibraryinAustinthereisathickfiledocumentingtheefforts
ofaseniorarchivistnamedClaudiaAndersontotrackdowntheevidence,partlyat the request of Johnson’s daughter. Anderson discovered that Johnson, orsomeone in his office acting on his behalf, had helped the renowned JewishconductorErichLeinsdorfremainintheUnitedStatesaftertheAnschluss;othermembersofCongresshadassistedJewsinsimilarways.Johnsonprobablyalso
helped the relatives of a Texas Jewish businessman reach the United States.Anderson made extensive efforts to locate Jews supposedly rescued in“OperationTexas,” and she publicized her searchwidely, hoping some of thesurvivorswouldcomeforward.Shefoundnoone.TheNovyswerealsounableto help. Anderson searched various archives but could find no confirmingdocumentation. She did, however, expose a little lie in which Johnson hadindulged. He had spoken of visiting Nazi concentration camps after the war;indeed, he did go to Europe with a congressional delegation, Andersonconcluded,andthedelegatesdidvisitDachau;buthehimselfwasinParisthatday.173 And so the mystery behind Johnson’s special treatment of the Jewsremainedmysterious.“I think he is part Jewish, seriously,” said Johnson’s special counsel,Harry
McPherson,whooversawtieswith theJewishcommunity.“Hereally remindsmeof a . . . slightly cornyversionof a rabbior a diamond-merchanton44thStreet. . . . He has the kind of hot nature that one associates with Jews.”McPhersonrememberedaJewishwriterwhohadonceentertainedotherWhiteHouseguestsbycomparingthe“non-JewishJew”andthe“Jewishnon-Jew.”Hedescribed the “Jewish non-Jew” as a Texan: frank, amusing, alwayscomplaining,alwaysexaggerating.ThatwasJohnson,saidMcPherson:“Hewasoutrageous and he talked too much and demanded too much and was neversatisfied andwas a lot of fun.” Speakingmore soberly,McPherson explainedthatJohnsonspokeofJewswiththesomewhatamusedtoneoftenheardamongTexans,whichmainlyexpresseda senseofotherness: “Iwouldn’t call it anti-Semitism; it was a little of the southern country attitude toward urban, verydifferentJews.”WhenJohnsonpraisedArthurGoldbergbeforeappointinghimU.S. ambassador to the UN, he said that Goldberg “understands our countrywell”andthat“heunderstandsusbetter thanotherJews.”AsaJew,Goldbergwas apparently not part of theAmerican “us” to Johnson.MathildeKrim feltthatJohnsonidentifiedinU.S.Jewsapowerfulpoliticalfactor,onewithwhichtherecouldandshouldbecollaboration.174Heseemstohaveseenthedifferentaspectsasone:theJewsoftheUnitedStates,includingtheirfinancialsupportofhisparty,theirpublicsupportofhispolicy,andtheirvotes;theMiddleEast;andtheUnitedStates’supportofIsrael, includingeconomic,military,andpoliticalaid.AlltheseelementswerepiecesinonepuzzletoJohnson.AnotherpiecewasVietnam.
THE ESHKOLGOVERNMENTWAS CAREFUL NOT TO IDENTIFY PUBLICLYWITH THE U.S.INvolvement in Southeast Asia, a focal point of the conflict between the
CommunistblocandtheWest.TheobligationtoprotectSovietJewswasamongthefactors thatshapedIsrael’spolicyontheVietnamWar,aswellasrelationswithFrance,whichdenouncedAmerica’sinvolvement.Israelvaluedthesupportof several prominent intellectuals in Europe who also objected to U.S.involvementinVietnam.Mapamministerswereamongthewar’sdetractors,andtheyrejectedanyhintofidentificationwiththewar.By 1967, two out of every three Israelis said they were following the war
closely.AlittleoverhalfsaiditwasanattemptbytheCommunistsintheNorthtotakeovertheSouth,whilejustunderhalfsaidthewarwasbeingwagedovertheUnited States’ attempt to take over theNorth. “A crazywar,” proclaimedZe’ev Schiff, the military commentator for Ha’aretz, after returning fromVietnam.SchiffacceptedthepremisethatiftheUnitedStatesweretolose,thesecurityguaranteesitextendedtoitsfriendswouldbeworthless.InDecember1966, and again in March 1967, a prominent ad denouncing the war ran inHa’aretz,signedbysomethreehundredacademics,writers,andartists,mostofthem well-known. Many had previously signed petitions condemning theimpositionofmartiallawontheArabsinIsrael.MostIsraelis,however,didnotjointheprotest.OnKibbutzYehiamtherewasanattempttoraisemoneytoaidtheVietnamese, but themajorityofmembers remained indifferent: themoneytheywerebeingaskedtosendtoNorthVietnamwouldcomebacktothemviaSyria,theysaid.Thefund-raisersadmonishedthem:Whatwouldtheytelltheirchildren, who had been raised on principles of absolute justice? On a walloppositetheAmericanembassyinTelAvivsomeonespray-paintedtheslogan,“YankeesQuitVietnam,”andacoupleofdozenpeopleheldaprotestvigil.TheU.S.consulinJerusalemreportedthatonlyaboutforty-fivepeopletookpartinademonstration there, and that at one point there were more police thandemonstrators.Cautiouslyrefrainingfromsupporting thewar, Israelwasalsocarefulnot to
join the countriesdenouncing it, insteaddoing its best to avoid taking a clearposition.TherewereoccasionalsignalsofgoodwilltowardWashington:perhapsIsrael could host students from South Vietnam? Humanitarian aid to SouthVietnam was worth discussing, but not diplomatic relations. Walt RostowbelievedthathumanitarianaidtoSouthVietnamwouldgiveAmericanJewstheimpressionthatIsraelsupportedthewar.*InJune1966,PresidentJohnsoncalledameetingwith theeditorsofJewish
newspaperstotalkabouthisadministration’saidtoIsrael.Themeetingwaspartof a campaign to elicit support fromAmerican Jews for theVietnamWar, towhich many of them objected. Israel’s consul in NewYork sent Jerusalem a
telegram with the results of a survey that showed 44 percent of U.S. Jewssupported Johnson’s policy in Vietnam, while 41 percent objected to it.Johnson’s response to the survey was fury that so many Jews opposed hispolicy: Jews should support thewar, he said, becausehe supported Israel.Herepeatedthiscontentionoften,aswhenhemetwiththenationalcommanderofthe Jewish War Veterans Association. Israeli diplomats, as well as ForeignMinisterAbbaEbanhimself, tried to help Johnson by attempting to convinceJewishcommunityleaderstotonedowntheiroppositiontothewar.176ThiswasadifficultpointinthehistoryofAmericanJews.Johnsontreatedthemasiftheywere agents of Israel, questioning their right as citizens to shape their ownposition on thewar—for or against—on the basis of their own reasoning andconscience. One Jewish community leader later accused Johnson of trying toblackmailAmericanJews.Israelwastroubledbythis,too.DavidAriel,fromtheIsraeliconsulateinNewYork,sentJerusalemadetailedreportonaconfidentialmeeting of the Conference of Presidents, the umbrella organization of theleadersoflargeJewishorganizationsinAmerica.Thequestionwaswhethertodeclare a united “Jewish position” on Vietnam. It was a tense and emotionaldebate, wrote the Israeli diplomat, with a mixture of personal bitterness,competition between organizations, and opposing ideological standpoints.Accordingtotheconsul,thedebateexposedaninsecurity—whoseexistencehadbeen denied until then—regarding the participants’ very status as Jews inAmerica.177 ConsulMichael Arnon sent a similar report: President Johnson’sdemand for support “uncovered the fear hidden in thehearts ofmany Jews—although they of course like to deny it outright—that there is in America aserious danger of anti-Semitism.” Arnon believed, however, that Israel couldbenefit from this fear. Recently, he complained, Jewish activists had beenneglecting“thepurelyJewishdomain”andfocusing theiractivitiesongeneralissues,suchasU.S.policyinVietnam,humanrights,andsoforth.TheconsulpointedoutthatmanywereevenignoringJewishissuesintheirblessingsfortheJewish New Year, Rosh Hashanah, “and preaching general moral sermons”instead.ButPresidentJohnson’s insistenceonsupporthadshaken themoutoftheircomplacency,and the imposedJewishawakeningmighthelp“restore thecorrectbalance,”wrotetheconsul.178
InbothJerusalemandWashington,thestateofaffairswascausingsignificantalarm, partly because of a letter from the president of the American JewishCongress,JoachimPrinz,toForeignMinisterEban,inwhichPrinzmadeclearthatAmericanJews’commitmenttoIsraelwasnotsoprofoundastoinfluencetheirpositiononVietnam.* Israeli envoyEphraimEvronhurried to theWhite
House and urged Johnson’s special counsel, McPherson, to “lay off” on thisissue,assuringhimthathewasspeakingasapersonal friendand thatheonlywanted to ensure that the president’s political interestswere not harmed.TwoJewish leaderswent tosee thepresident todiscuss thematterandEvron,whobriefed thembefore themeeting, urged them to try to bring the conflict to anend.JohnsondeniedhavingdemandedaunifiedpositionfromtheJewsandsentArthur Goldberg to appease the community. The newspapers gave prominentcoveragetothewholeaffair,andtheIsraeliconsulinNewYorkalsoreportedonhisefforts to rein in thepress.180Forawhile it seemed thematterwas fadingfromtheheadlines,but then themostfamousandadmiredofall Israelis,afterDavid Ben-Gurion, announced that he was going to tour Vietnam. This wasMosheDayan.Ten years after his last war, two years after resigning as minister of
agriculture,KnessetmemberDayanwasfindinglifeasthemanagerofasmallfishingcompanyboring.HewasfascinatedbyVietnam.“Thereisawarbeingfought in Vietnam with conventional weapons and on a limited scale,” heexplained, “and inwhich theguerrillaelementplaysa significantpart. I thinkwe have a lot to learn from this war and the way it’s being conducted.” HetraveledasareporterforMaarivandtheWashingtonPost,butwhereverhewentthegeneralwaswelcomedasanesteemedmilitaryleader.Histripwascoveredextensively in theUnitedStates andpeople awaited his pronouncements—notbecausetheywerehopingtolearnsomethingfromhisperspective,butbecauseeverythingDayansaidandwrotemadeheadlinesthatfitintothegreaterdebateoverthewaritself.Rejuvenatedbythisnewwaveoffame,Dayanenjoyedeveryminute. The Israeli government, on the other hand, was unenthusiastic andanxiousabouthistravels:DayanwasaRafimanandEshkolhadnointerestinany revival of his glory as amilitary leader. TheMinistry of ForeignAffairsfeared that any statement from Dayan would be identified with the State ofIsraelandmightimplicateit.Dayanhadnotaskedforauthorizationforthetrip,and Foreign Minister Eban rebuked him on the Knesset floor. Within theministry,opinionsweredivided.Israel’sambassadortoParisdemandedthatthestateexplicitlydisavowthevisit,whileHarmaninWashingtonwarnedthatsucha declaration would be interpreted as a denunciation of the war itself. Thegovernment declared thatDayanwas entirely responsible for the trip, and theMinistryofForeignAffairssentinstructionstotheIsraeliembassiesinvolvedonhowDayanshouldbe treatedwhenhearrivedat thevariousstopsonhis tour.Officialcontactwithhimwouldonlyexacerbatethe“awkwardsituation,”theyweretold,andtheyshouldthereforenotinitiatecontact,lesthelaterclaimthat
Israelhadtriedtooverseeorcensorhim.Ifhegotintouchwiththeembassieshimself, he should be offered assistance “as is customary for a man of hisstature.”Undernocircumstancesshouldhebeaccompaniedtomeetings.*En route toVietnam,Dayan stoppedoff inParis andWashington,wherehe
met with the U.S. defense secretary, Robert McNamara, among others. AmessagewaswaitingforDayanwhenhevisitedAmbassadorHarmanathome:AbeFeinberghadcalled.WhenDayanreturnedthecall,FeinbergexplainedthattheJewswereamongthesharpestofJohnson’scriticsandsoitwas importantthat whenever Dayan spoke publicly, he should emphasize the similaritybetween SouthVietnam and Israel: the United States was defendingVietnamjust as itmight one day be required to defend Israel. Feinberg of coursewasconcernedaboutanewspotlightfocusedontheJewishpositiononVietnam,sohe had arranged for Dayan to meetWalt Rostow; at the end of the meetingDayancouldmakethispoint,asanexpressionofJewishsupport.Feinberghadpreviouslywritten toRostow thathewould“arrange” forDayan to“make thenecessaryremarks.”ButDayandeclined.181
MostIsraelisknewof theinfluencewieldedbyAmericanJews.Onlyafew,however,knewjusthowindebtedtheywere,andmanydidnotwishtoknow.AreportpresentedtoPrimeMinisterEshkolwentsofarastoclaimthatthegoodstanding of U.S. Jews should be troubling to Israel, for “the existence of anaffluent and well-organized Jewish community in North America encouragesemigration fromIsraelandhelps theemigrantsbecomesettled there.”182 OnlyArabplans todestroy thecountryworried Israelismore thanwhatseemed,by1967,tobeamassescapefromasinkingship.
8.EMIGRANTS:“ADISGRACETOTHECOUNTRY”
Inearly1966,areporterforHa’aretzspentaneveninginasmallstripclubinHollywood.He sat at the barwatching a brightly lit stagewhere onewomanafter another tookher clothesoff.Hewasbored.Ayoungwomanwhomighthave been a waitress or a stripper served “decidedly mediocre” whiskey, herecounted.HewaswithanIsraelifriend,whotoldhiminHebrewthatheshouldtakehistimeoverthedrink,becauseassoonashisglasswasemptythesemi-naked young woman would pounce on him with the bottle and refill it. Thewaitress overheard him. “Almost naked, yes—that’s true,” she said in perfectHebrew,butaddedthatshewouldn’tpounceonhimwiththebottlebecauseinthis bar they didn’t force the customers to drink. The reporter was stunned:Hebrew in this remote spot? The woman replied “with forlorn laughter” that
centralHollywoodwashardly“remote.”Whenthetwospokelater,shetoldhimshewasoriginallyfromTelAviv.She
hadbeenbeautifulasayounggirlandwasalwayshearingthatshehadtalent,soshe had come to seek her fortune in the movie capital. She arrived to findHollywoodfullofyoungwomenlikeherself,fromeverycountryintheworld,alldreamingofbecomingmoviestars.Thestripclubpaidprettywell,shesaid:“Youhavetomakealiving,don’tyou?”Shehadbeenthereforfiveyears,andher dreams had faded. The reporter asked why she didn’t go home. InHollywood,sheexplained,shewasnotembarrassed,buttogobacktoIsraelandtellpeopleshe’dfailed—shewasashamed.Ha’aretzpublishedherstoryaspartofaseriesaboutthelivesofIsraeliemigrantsintheUnitedStates.Theheadlinewas“Hollywood:GraveofIllusions.”183
The reporter also went to visit a childhood friend who had been living inWashington,D.C.,forseveralyears.Helivedinafive-bedroomapartment,ranasuccessful business, and owned a year-old Buick. His wife told the reporterabouttheweekendtheyhadspentinNewYorkandpraisedthequalityoftheirtelevision sets. When the children came home, they said, “Hi, Mom,” andsprawledontherugtowatchawestern.Afterthenoisehaddieddownandthewifewenttomakedinner,thereporter’sfriendgavehimatruerpicture.“Whenweopenedourfirststore,nineyearsago,thiswasaquiet,calmneighborhood.Overtimeitbecamerowdyanddangerous.Notlongagotherewereraceriotsinafewplacesinthecountryandwewereafraid.Westilldon’tknowwhateachdaywill bring.We feel foreign, and sometimes afraid, and there’s the lackofconnectionyoufeelhereeveryday.Thatdoesn’tgoawaywhenyoudriveanewcar or buy two color TVs.” The headline of this story was “Apartment, TV,Buick, andHomesickness.”Anotherpiece in the seriesdepicted the reporter’sencounterwithafamilythatwassimplyashamedofhavingleftIsrael,andthatheadlinewas“AFamilyLowersItsEyes.”184
Thiswas a prevalent trend in the Israeli press—emphasizing that emigrantswereunhappyintheirnewhomesandthattheyhadnotbeenwisetoleave.Allthenewspaperssawemigrationasamajorstory,devotingspecial investigativeseries to thesubjectandcovering itextensively inboth thenewsandeditorialpages.185 “They’re fleeing like rats from a sinking ship,” reported YediotAharonot on emigrants from Ashkelon, andMaariv informed its readers thatcentralAshdodhadbecome“abargainmarket”ofemigrants’possessions.“Justlike the stockmarket, thepriceof televisionsgoesup anddown, thevalueofPersian rugs fluctuates, and silver and crystal sell high today, low tomorrow.”
Onepaperevenreportedonanewprofession:“emigrationpimps”specializedinfindingemploymentinothercountriesforpeoplebeforetheyhadleftIsrael.186
TheconsulinNewYorkreportedworriedlythatmanyU.S.JewswerestartingtowonderwhatwascausingsomanyIsraelis toflee.InQueensandBrooklyntherewereentirestreetsofHebrewspeakers,henoted.MostIsraelisknewthatemigrationwaswidespread,andtheywereconcerned,angered,andsaddenedbyit.Nothingundermined faith in the futureof the state somuch as emigration.Foralongwiththeriseinemigrationtherewasalso,forthefourthyearrunning,a steep decline in the number of immigrants—just over eighteen thousand in1967.Only twice in the country’s history, in the early fifties, had the numberbeenlower.187
NooneknowsforcertainhowmanyIsraelisleftpermanentlyintheeighteenmonths preceding the Six-DayWar, but their numbermay have exceeded thenumberofimmigrants.U.S.embassyfiguresindicatethatapproximatelyhalfoftheemigrantssettledinAmerica.Itissuedonlyroughly1,500immigrationvisasa year, but the figure ismisleading sincemost Israelis entered the country ontouristvisas:onlyafewdeclaredtheirintenttoleaveIsraelpermanently.Manywentabroadtostudy,ortookajobforonlyafewyearsandthencameback,andmanydidnotknowwhentheyleftthattheywouldnotreturn.Eitherway,writerHaimGouriwas rightwhenhe said that thenumberof Jews from Israelwhobecame Americans was greater than the number of Jewish Americans whobecame Israelis. It was not the statistic that bothered him, but the underlyingissue: “I heard aman say that the number of peoplewhowould die in awaragainst theSyrians issmaller than thenumberofpeople leavingus.”188Muchlike the recessionandevenunemployment, the“emigrationplague,”as itwascalled,wastoagreatextentamoralandpsychologicalproblem.ItforcedIsraeltocometotermswiththefactthatpeoplehad,oftheirownfreewill,chosentheDiasporaovertheHomeland.TherecouldbenogreaterblowtotheZionistego.Israel’sconsul inSydneyreported thatemigrants fromIsraelwere receiving
assistance fromCatholiccharitiesandwerespokenofas“asylumseekers”—atermtremendouslywoundingtoZionistears.YediotAharonotprintedasimilarlyinsultingpieceofnewsonitsfirstpage:JewishcharitiesinFrancewerehavingtroublemeeting theneedsofIsraeliemigrantsseekingassistance.OtherIsraelidiplomatsreportedtheappearanceofemigrantsinmanycountries,fromCanadato South Africa, Sweden to Nigeria. “It is the tragedy of our people,” wroteYosefWeitz.189
IsraeliemigrantswerereferredtobytheHebrewwordyordim,whichliterally
means“thosewhodescend.”ImmigrantscomingtosettleinIsrael,ontheotherhand,werecalledolim,“thosewhoascend.”Bothwordshavebiblicalorigins,buttheirmodernusageischargedwithheavyideologicalsignificance:apersoncoming to live in Israelwas “ascending” in amoral sense,whereas someonewho “descended” had failed andwas to be shamed.* The press often treatedyordim rather as the kibbutzimdid thosewho left for the cities. “It is not thegoodpeoplewhoemigrate,butthebadones,theoneswhoseZionistandIsraeliconsciousness is lacking,outofanunwillingness toputdownroots—theoneswho give in to trivial difficulties and go off to roam the world,” wrote onenewspaper.190
Thegovernmentweatheredtheoccasionaloutcryovertheemigrationfiguresandtriedtocomprehendwhypeoplewereleavingthecountryandwhatcouldbedonetostaunchtheflow.Itcommissionedadetailedstudymeanttolocatethefactors thatmightbeswayingIsraelistudents tostayin theUnitedStates.TheministerofhealthtoldtheKnessetthatthenumberofyoungdoctors,graduatesof Hadassah’s medical school, who were leaving for the United States hadincreased “tremendously,” from 9 percent to 40 percent. He proposedconditioning theacceptanceofnewstudentson theircommitmentnot to leaveIsrael during the first few years after graduation. In February 1967, thegovernment censored a news item reporting that immigrants from the SovietUnion wanted to return home because of difficulties integrating into dailylife.191
Thewidespreademigrationnecessitatedaseriesofdecisions,suchaswhetheryordim should be allowed to give up their Israeli citizenship, whether theirpassports shouldbeextendeddespite their residenceabroad,andwhether theyshould be given various benefits upon returning to Israel, of the kind newimmigrants received. These questions provoked arguments within the variousgovernment ministries, arguments that often became debates over principle.Israel’s ambassador to Sweden believed that yordim should not be made toencounter difficulty when they wished to extend their passports, but he wasreprimanded by the Ministry of the Interior, which found it odd that anambassador would defend these people. The ambassador, Yaakov Shimoni,retorted,“Iamacting indefenseofmycountry,whichIwish toprevent fromlookinglikeanarbitrarystatethatsetscruelorunreasonableregulations.Evenyordim are human beings and are entitled to reasonable and humane rules bywhichtoregulatetheirstatus.”*Theparliamentaryoppositionarguedthat“thehigh tide of emigration and the ebb of immigration” justified replacing thegovernment.“Youaredismantlingthestate,”accusedKnessetmemberShmuel
Tamir, andcompared thedecline in immigrationduringEshkol’s tenure to theprohibition on Jewish immigration to Palestine during the British Mandate.Sincetheestablishmentofthestatetherehadnotbeensuchapredicament,saidKnesset member Arieh Ben-Eliezer. Emigration was widely denounced andcould never be justified, Ben-Eliezer claimed, but it was undeniable thatpeople’sdecisionstoleaveresultedprimarilyfromthegovernment’spolicies.Eshkolrespondedthatthiswasnotthefirsttimetherehadbeenmoreyordim
thanolim.But,ofcourse,therewasadifferencebetweenthepeoplewholeftthestateduringitsearlyyears,mostofwhomhadbeennewimmigrants,andthosewho left as Israel approached its twentieth anniversary. Eshkol was aware ofthis, and so he attacked the yordim themselves: “Many of the yordim aredefectors, because they are leaving and defecting even though their economicsituation does not require it and even though there is no explanation and noexcuse—apart from the Gypsy inclination still deep within us, the urge towanderfromonecountrytoanother.”193
Eshkol’sstatementisworthanotherreading.Inhisclumsy,disorganizedway,Eshkol haddefined the credoof IsraeliZionism.Althoughhe recognized thatcertain economic difficulties might justify emigration, he considered life inIsrael tobe anobligation, likemilitary service, and emigrationwasdefection.The term was used routinely by other politicians, too, including Minister ofEducationAran andMinister of FinanceSapir, aswell as by the newspapers.Somedescribedyordimas“fallout,”andHaimGourisaid,“Everyemigrationisabetrayal.”194Thiswasmore than just invective.One readerwrote toDavar,“They leave their parents here—the pioneerswho founded the state andwhohave grown old—and their little brothers and sisters, and the Holocaustsurvivorsamongus.Whatwillhappenif,Godforbid,awarbreaksout?”Davarprinted a letter from an eighteen-year-old boywho denounced a friend of hisbrother’s for wanting to immigrate to America. A soldier at war does notabandon the battle, wrote the young man. “There is no forgiveness foremigration,”wroteDavar,anddemandedthatIsraelismakedowithwhattheircountry could offer, maintaining that it did not owe them everything. “IfEdmundHillarywasJewishandimmigratedtoIsrael,wouldweberequiredtogive him a Mount Everest? . . . This is our country and these are itspossibilities,” wrote the author Haim Ya’ari, “Today no one is asking anengineertobeadairyfarmer,butheshouldatleastbeanengineerinIsraelandnot inAmerica. . . .And if indeedopportunities forprofessionaladvancementhereareslighterorslowerthaninAmerica—well,thatisthefateofpeopleborninIsraelandnotinAmerica,andthatisthepriceonepaysforfate.”Theaffinity
forone’shomelandiswhatsetsmanapartfrombeast,wroteonereader.195
ThewriterHanochBartovattributedemigrationto“someunnaturalattractiontoself-destruction.”CommentatorShmuelSchnitzerwroteinasimilarveinthathe viewed the yordim as someone for whom Israel was a hotel, not a home,someone who had exile in his heart and whose decision to move to anothercountry was the symptom of a disease. Schnitzer claimed it was “the Jewishgenetic disease of parasitism and an inability to connectwith the homeland.”Another commentator,EliezerLivneh,wrote: “Emigration is an expression ofthenatureofmanyJewsafteremancipation,whoarerootless,agile,andshrewd,andwhose primary (and sometimes only)motive is the increase of profit andmaterial income.Their ‘homeland’ iswherever the profit is greater.”No anti-Semitecouldhavesaiditbetter.YediotAharonotparticularlydenouncedyordimwhosettledinGermany,wheretheywould“liveinproximitytoFritzandAdolf,who amere twodecades agowere sending them to the crematoria.” In short,theywere“adisgracetothecountry.”196
CarefulnottojustifyleavingIsrael,thepapersstillallowedaself-criticaltoneto creep into their articles, and once in awhile even a sharp sense of failure.Whentheministeroffinancedescribedyordimasdefectors,Ha’aretzrespondedbydeclaringthat“facedwithsuchaleader,theyhavenochoicebuttodesertthewar.” The paper wrote that travel overseas was arousing jealousy, making“overseas” seem a better place in public perception. “Israel Pushes, AmericaPulls”was theheadlineof another article.197As part of this trend, the papersgavevoicetopeoplethreateningtoemigrateduetotherecession.“Iaskmyselfwhattodo,”oneunemployedmantoldHa’aretz,adding,“Iamnowatthepointof taking an interest in foreign countries to see if there’swork there.”YoungpeoplewhohadfinishedtheirmilitaryservicetoldMaarivtheyhadregisteredattheconsulatesofCanadaandDenmark,andotherssaid theywereconsideringdoing the same. “We’ll have no choice,” they said. A graduate of the IsraelInstituteofTechnology,whomaMaarivreportermetattheAustralianembassy,asked,“Whohastherighttostopmefromgoing?”198
ThecaseoftwoimmigrantsfromArgentinawhofledIsraelasstowawaysona German ship led to a series of articles expressing understanding of thedifficulties immigrants from SouthAmerica faced in becoming part of Israelilife, and indirectly of their decision to leave. “One of the important factorsleadingtodesperationamongtheseimmigrantsisanalmostdailytramplingofthe dignity and pride they felt in their countries of origin,” wroteHa’aretz.Other papers began to take on a similarly self-accusatory tone. “We do not
accepttheimmigrantslivingamongus,”concludedMaariv,andYediotAharonotattributedtheemigrationtothecontrastbetweentheidealworldtheimmigrantshad hoped to find in Israel and the reality they discovered. In a somewhatphilosophicaltone,thepaperwonderedifthiswerenotaproblemfacedbyallIsraelis.199
LETTERS SENT BY ISRAELIS TO THEIR RELATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES DID NOTREFLECT the disapproval expressed in the papers. These people shared thefamily’s daily events with their relatives as if they had never left. Anaccordionist played at the children’s birthday party; a mother had surgery toremovea suspicious lump; therewas troubleatwork; thedaughter startedherarmy service, hermotherwasworried, but then the daughterwas assigned tooffice work in a nearby base and came home every day. And there was thegossip: this young woman went out with that young man and her parentsthought, “Anyminute now,” but then he left her, so shemarried aHungariandoctorfourteenyearshersenior.Israelisoftenaskedrelativestosendthingstheycould not get at home, such as medication, but also clothes, which could beboughtinAmerica“onsale.”Thiswasnotthewayloyalistsaddresseddefectorsandtraitors.Butemigrationwasundoubtedlyacentraltopic.“Idon’tknowexactlywhatHanatoldyou,”wroteamannamedIsrael,from
RamatAviv,tohisrelativesinBoston,“but...leavingwasneverarealthoughtfor us and I hope it never is. It would come up only in case of a seriousemergency.”Hegavetwohypotheticalreasonsforleaving:ifhecouldnotmakealivingorifasecuritysituationdevelopedthatendangeredthechildren’slives.Then he changed hismind and crossed out thewordswith thick lines and anapparently determined hand.He left only oneword: “lives.”As long as theirliveswere innodanger, therewasno thoughtofemigrating,hewrote.Butheleft himself an opening for further consideration: “If the situation gets reallybad, Imay ask for your help.”Hana, hiswife, added a few lines. “We’re notcomingyet,”shewrote,butshelikedtotakeallpossibilitiesintoaccount,eventheworst.Emigrationwasnotatallattractive toher,“especially if it involveschangesforthechildren.”Meanwhile,thelittlegirl’sbronchitiswasbetterandshewasbackatkindergarten,andHanaandherhusbandhadseenanicemovie,TheRussiansAreComing,theRussiansAreComing.Afewmonthslater,Israelwroteagain.“I’mplanningtogetpassportsforthekidsafterall,justincase,andif it is possible to arrange for an affidavit valid for, let’s say, three to fivemonths,Iwouldliketodothat.It’sbesttohavepapersreadyforthem,itcan’thurt.”
Manylettersmentionedacquaintanceswhohadleft.So-and-So’sdaughterandher husband, So-and-So’s brother. This one already had a visa and the othersweregoingtolivewiththewife’sbrotherinDetroit,wheretheywouldgetalongprettywell, but theyweren’t taking the aunt and shewas in tears—to be leftaloneatherage!TheideaofleavingIsraelemergesfromtheselettersfirstandforemost as a relocation from one place to another; the considerations werepersonalandfamilial,notnationalorideological.200
Thepaperslookedfordeepermeaning.ShmuelSchnitzerofMaarivattributedemigration to the compromisebetween theStateof Israel and the Jewsof theworld,acompromiseoverthereasonforZionismitself.“BecauseiflivingintheDiaspora is positive as long as one donates to the Jewish Appeal and learnsHebrewandavoidsintermarriage,whyshouldanIsraeliJewnotalsoliveinthisway?IflivinginIsraelandlivingintheDiasporaarethesame,whyshouldn’tall theJewsliveinaplacewherelife iseasier?”Hearguedthat inall the120nations in theworld therewas no other statewhere childrenwere allowed togrow up with so little awareness of a homeland, as in Israel. States withoutheroes invented them, he said, while Israel, which had so many heroes,neglectedthem.YediotAharonotalsocomplainedthat“wedon’tprovideheroesfor our youth,” and determined that “militarism is the only state value thatarousesanyenthusiasm.”Ha’aretzfoundthateducationinIsraelwasfailinginmanyways,anddescribedemigrationasaresultofacrisisamongtheyoungergeneration.201ItwasonlyasmallstepfromheretothequestionraisedbyGeulaCohen’s “Square Table” column in Maariv: Does emigration begin in theschools? The answer was unequivocal: schoolchildren did not know enoughabout the history of Zionist heroism—or, asCohen put it, “Theymight get abullet before finding out how the state they live for was established.”ManyIsraelisfelttheywerelosingtheyounggeneration.
9. YOUTH: “THERE IS BITTER DESPERATIONEVERYWHERE”
InJanuary1966,journalistShabtaiTevethcausedanuproarwhenhequotedinHa’aretz threehighschoolseniorswhosaid theydidn’t reallyknowwhy theyshouldstayinIsrael.Theyhadnothingagainstthecountry,theysaid,theyevenlovedit,buttheydidnotfeellikeJews,andiftherewasabetterplacetostudyandlive,whyshouldn’t theygothere?Thethreewerenot identifiedbyname,andeveniftheywerefigmentsofthewriter’simagination,thepaperpresentedthemas thespokespeopleofageneration,childrenofaffluentparents innorth
TelAviv.Horrifiedreaderssentinlettersthatappearedundertheheadline,“WhoIsto
Blame for theAttitudesof theYouth?”GeulaCohenwent to speakwithhighschoolstudents.“IknowmoreaboutNapoleonthanaboutHerzl,”saidone,andanotherfounditdifficulttorecallthewordsof“Hatikva,”thenationalanthem.*One pupil said he was willing to tell Jewish Americans that they shouldimmigratetoIsrael,butthatinhisheartheknewthatsomeofthemshouldstaythere to influenceU.S.policy toward Israel.Manyof the students argued thatemigrationwas justified.Cohen alsowent to talkwith several educators.Onetold her that some students were not convinced that the Jewish people had arighttotheland,andanothersaid,“Thewayliteratureandhistoryaretaughtinschoolsmustbedrasticallyrevised.”Oneteacheradmittedthat theschoolwasdoing “very little” in the area of teaching national awareness, and anotheraccused the Ministry of Education of not encouraging teachers in that area.Geula Cohen was not alone in her criticisms. The editor of Davar, YehudaGotthelf,firstmadeajokeyattempttodefendEshkol’sgovernment—“AsfarasIamconcerned,thecrisisbeganwiththeexpulsionofAdamandEvefromtheGarden of Eden”—but then admitted, “We have not sunk our youth’s rootsdeeply enough in the homeland, history, and destiny of the chosen people.”Davar had previously published an article stating that Zionist education wasneeded“tosavethecountry.”ThestateofIsraeliyouthwasatthecenterofpublicdiscourse,addressedby
theKnessetinadebatethatlastedformonths.202Besidessecuritytensions,therepercussionsoftheeconomicrecession,andemigration,noissuewasofmoreconcern. Compulsive and emotionally charged, the debate over the futuregeneration reflected the distress of the present, and involved tormented andanguishedsoul-searchingbyadoubt-riddensociety.The Zionist revolution identified itself from the first as an expression of
youthful rebellion. “Do not heed, son, the morals of the father, and to themother’s teachings do not lend your ear,” wrote the poet David Shimoni(Shimonovitz).The secondgenerationofZionists inPalestine tended toadopttheirparents’ideologicalfoundations,resultinginfairlycommonconservatism.“Ourworldwascreatedforusbyourfather.Inthatrespect,FatherwasGod,”wrote the son of a labor movement leader. But those fathers now found itdifficult to livewith theirchildren,whohadbeenborn inIsraelandgrownupinto the sixties. They had stopped treating the state as if it were a historicalmiracle.“Howhavewereachedsuchasteepdeclineinallareasoflife,andinsuchprominentcontrasttoouraspirationsandideals?”lamentedaneditorialist
inDavar.203
Thedeputyminsterofeducation,AharonYadlin,confirmed:“Thisgenerationhasnosenseofbeingborneonthewingsofhistory.”HedescribedIsraeliyouthas practical, unsentimental, purposeful, and career-driven. They were cynicalanddistantfromabstractideas,aswellaspoliticallyindifferentandreluctanttoidentifywithZionist ideology. “It is as hard as the parting of theRed Sea to‘cloak’themwith‘ourworld,’”wroteHaimGouri.204
Ha’aretz reported that Israeli children in the fifth and sixth grades werealreadyformingso-calledballroomsocieties.Asearlyas theninthgrade,girlswere going to ladies’ hair salons. More and more young girls were usingmakeupandfollowingthelatestfashiontrends.Youngboysworedresspantstoparties, and by the twelfth grade they were used to wearing suits and ties.Ballroom societies, Ha’aretz explained, involved Western-style ballroomdancing.Thehostsservedrefreshments,oftenatacostoftwentyorthirtyliras,includingcoldcuts(orlox,inwealthierhomes),pickles,pistachios,cakes,andcoffee. Girls in the twelfth grade who were expecting soldiers to attend alsoservedbeer.Thepartieswereheld in theparents’homes,butmostapartmentsweretoosmall,whichledtotheinventionoftherooftopdanceparty.“Afriendwith a good roof is not to be taken lightly,” said the paper.Many neighborscomplained about the noise, so the municipalities set up dance clubs. Theballroomsocietiescompetedwiththeyouthmovementsthatoperatedundertheauspicesofpoliticalparties,andwiththeScouts.205
The firstZionistpioneersbrought local folkdanceswith themfromEasternEurope,suchasthehora,andcultivatedthemaspartoftheIsraeliidentitytheywerehopingtocreate.Folkdancingwasthenormonkibbutzim,inurbanyouthmovements, and at national ceremonies. To many in the older generation,ballroom dancing represented a daring, almost reckless deviation fromprevailing values. “Indeed, vanity has affected all layers and levels of ouryouth,”wroteDavar,andcomplainedaboutthedevaluationofideologicalyouthmovements, which it attributed to the influence of movies, “a pipeline tovulgarization, exploiting themasses to admireviolence andmaterial success.”The paper printed more and more articles raging against the destructiveinfluence of cinema, a wellspring of adultery, prostitution, trickery, violence,andmurder,“aterriblepoison”anda“primarybreedingground”forcrime.206
Shabtai Teveth, writing for Ha’aretz, recounted a visit to a studentdiscothequeinTelAvivnamedBarBarim(anamethatbothemploystheEnglishword“bar”andplaysontheHebrewwordforbarbarians,barbarim).Hisreport
conveyedanastonishedanthropologicaltone,asifhehadreturnedfromvisitingsome remote tribe. “The young are taller, thinner, better groomed, and moresupplethanwegenerallythinkofthechildrenofIsrael,”hewrote.“Nowadays,girlsmaturebiologicallyawholeyearearlierthanintheirmothers’generation,andtwoyearssoonerthanintheirgrandmothers’,”reportedthedeputyministerof education in the Knesset. One writer for Ha’aretz, Amnon Rubinstein,maintained,“Israeliyounggirlsaremoreshapely,womanlyandpleasant”thanthepreviousgenerations.207
TheBarBarimdiscoheld about threehundredpeople, and themain activitywasonFridaynight,theSabbatheve.Forthreeliras,guestsreceivedahalf-hourentertainment program, dancing, and a choice of ice cream, sodas, or cake.Additionalrefreshmentscost35agurasforsodawaterand75agurasforabottleofbeer.TevethtoldhisreadersthattheGashashHahivercomedytroupewasthemostpopularamongtheyounggeneration.ThesingerArikEinsteincomesinaclosesecond,headded.BothwereamongthearchitectsofIsraeliculture.Thewordplay of the name “BarBarim” reflected a self-directed irony and a goodcommand of the Hebrew language, enabling a playful adaptation toWesternculture.OnceaweektherewasanopenmikejazzeveningatBarBarim,whenwhiskey was also served. On other days the disco did not serve hard liquor,whichmeant that therewasnogreat reasonforalarm,butTevethneverthelessfelt as if he had found himself in another world. “Visiting this place, onescarcely recognizesone’sownpeople.Tosee theyoungmenwearing trousersthatlooklikehosepipesandtheyoungwomeninhalf-skirtsandbighairdos,onewould think one had landed in Stockholm, Paris, orGreenwichVillage.”TheeditorofDavarscoldedthestudentsfortheirinferior“degreeofspiritual-moralawareness.”208
Many young people went to London, to soak up what Yediot Aharonotdescribed as “a revolution of spiritual being and new moral standards.” TheeditorsofDavarperceiveddangerouscompetitionhere.“Wedonotyethavealargemovementofbeatniks,butmanyofourfinestyouthsareattracted to thecircleofinfluenceprojectedbythecultureoftheabsurd,”theycautioned.Thepaper explained why Israelis should be more cautious than others: “Thephenomenonofbeatniksandsoforthexistsinallthenationsoftheworld,butthere,thisyouthfulinsolenceisnothingmorethanfoamonagreatocean.Herein Israel, such a phenomenon could undermine our foundations, leading todeteriorationandcompletedestruction.”209
Dissenting voices were occasionally heard. “I don’t see myself rearing my
children as criminals by allowing them to wear jeans,” said KnessetmemberShulamit Aloni.210 In January 1966, Amnon Rubinstein published an articlecalled“Shake,”inwhichhearguedthatballroomdancingmight“shakeoffthedustthathasgatheredforgenerations.”Thiswasasocialandpoliticalstatement:hewasreferringtothefossilizedmentalityofthefoundersofthestate,manyofwhomwerestillitsleaders.Forallhisabhorrence,ShabtaiTevethalsofeltthatIsrael failed to encourage its youth. “There is no competition in Israel overyoung people, not in the economy, not in higher education, not in researchinstitutes.”Theonlyorganizationeager to take in educatedyoungpeoplewasthearmy,hewrote,andthiswaspartlybecausethestatewasstillclingingtoamoribund ideology that favored collective responsibility over individualinitiative. Rubinstein further defended the young by claiming that the outcryoveritslossofvalueswasunfounded.Hesawyoungpeopleinconcerthalls,atplays, and in art galleries. The veteran educatorBaruchBen-Yehuda also feltthattheyouthofthesixtieswasnotinferiortothatofpreviousgenerations,andDavid Ben-Gurion agreed.211 A few young people on Kibbutz Yehiamdemandedtherighttolistento“acertaintype”ofmusic,lateintothenight,andwent to see movies in the nearby town of Nahariya. The religious youthmovement, Bnei Akiva, conducted a survey among its members after twotwelfth-grade students, Yaakov and Hana, were seen kissing. Thirty-eightpercentsaidthekissshouldbepermitted.For most young Israelis, things did not go much further than that. Sixties
culture largely reached Israel in the form of music and fashion. It changedrelationshipsbetweenyoungmenandwomen,andsomeofthemengrewtheirhair long. But it did not threaten the founding principles of the state. A fewsociologists later explained that a real upheaval could never have occurred inIsrael as long as theZionist revolutionwas ongoing,manifested partly in thewar between Israel and the Arabs. But public discourse during the eighteenmonthsprior to theSix-DayWar reflectedanextremelysolemnmood,almostoneofbereavement,asiftheyoungergenerationwerelostandtheparentsweresomehow bereft. “Zionism, as an idea and as a deadmovement, is no longerrelevanttotheJewishquestiontoday,”wroteHaimGouriinresponsetoaradiointerviewwith a student namedEilonKolberg,whowonderedwhyhe shouldeven stay in Israel. Gouri was expressing a common sentiment. Against thisbackground, an editorial inHa’aretz wondered, “When all hope is lost, whatelsecanonehopeforifnotamiracle?”Afewdayslaterthesamepaperstated,“Thereisbitterdesperationeverywhere.”212
During the year and a half leading up to the Six-Day War, the following
headlines appeared in the papers: “How Did They Manage to Destroy ThisCountry?”; “The Seed of Destruction”; “The Crisis”; “The Shattering of aDream”; “Death of a Vision”; “Vision and Failure”; “Israel Is Not aChallenge.”213Thepapersdescribed“demoralization,” “bitterness,” “distress,”“indifferenceanddesperation,”“illwindandsuffocation.”214*Teveth believed that Israelwas simply boring its youth, andAmosOz also
described“theburdenofboredom,”whichhesawas“utterwearinessthatseeksnot rest, but rather its opposite.” Oz expressed the sentiment in a short storynamed“TiredMan.”Theprotagonist lives inJerusalemforfourteenyearsandthen returns to Tel Aviv, where he finds neglect and wretchedness, and theapartment building he used to live in crumbling from dampness due to itsproximitytothesea.Thestoryprojectsanauraofdeath:anemptylotwiththechassisofadeadtruck,abus’sfinalstop,and,worstofall,thetediumthatthecity casts upon the man. His father, who seems to have been a member ofMapai, was injured in a terrorist attack on a bus after the UN decision topartitionPalestine.Beforedying,hetoldhischildren:Ibelievewewillhaveastate.Themother,whosuffersfromboutsofinsanity,hasmarriedanothermanandmovedtotheUnitedStates.AnovelpublishedbyPinchasSadehin1967issimilarly pervaded by the grayness of daily tedium and the routine of Israelidespondency.“Thesituation,”mumblestheprotagonistinthebook’sfinallines,“thesituationisthereforeworsethanIthought.”*YaakovTalmon,thedeanofIsraelihistorians,assertedthatIsraelhadentered
the“postrationalist”era,bywhichheseemed tobesaying that thedreamwasover.Anotherscholar,YosefSalmon,wrote,“Israelisocietyhaslostitsnationalsocialvisionand is therebyenteringanew,postZionistcrisis in thehistoryoftheJewishpeople.”ShmuelSchnitzerofMaarivfearedthatIsraelwaslosingitshistoricaluniqueness,becomingjustanotherHongKong.215
In theirstateofgrieving, thepapersoftendwelledonanniversaries:seventyyears since the publication of Herzl’s The Jewish State; fifty years since theBalfourDeclaration; thirtyyearssincetheArabRevolt; twentyyearssincetheUN partition resolution; ten years since the Sinai Campaign. This near-compulsivepreoccupationwithhistoryreflectedwhatHaimGouridescribedasthesecond-daycrisisoftherevolution.Thetimeofdullroutineseemedtohavecometoosoon.216SomeofthepapersbegantowaxnostalgicoverthefigureofAvshalom Feinberg, “the wondrous hero of Eretz Israel,” as Yediot Aharonotwrote, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of his disappearance in thedesert.
Fearless, tough, and brave, the paper recounted, Feinbergwas also delicateandsentimental.Ahorseman,fencer,marksman,andboxerwhostruckfearintothe heart of the entire country, he was also an intellectual, a philosopher, awriter,andapoet.Anintrepidandflawlessknight,asoneofhisacquaintancessaid,hewashandsomeand refined,hiseyesas fieryas fireflies inanautumnnight.HewasconsideredthefirstSabra,andwasindeedoneofthefirstchildrenborn among the Zionist settlers in Palestine. In 1917, Feinberg joined theundergroundresistancemovementNili,whosepurposewas tohelp theBritishwrestPalestine from theOttomanEmpire.WhenhisgroupwasdiscoveredbytheTurks,hefled toEgyptbutnevermade it,presumablydying in thedesert.AccordingtoBedouinlegend,hewascarryingafewdatesinhispockettoeatontheroad,andafterhisdeathoneofthemsproutedandgrewintoapalmtree.The nostalgia forAvshalomwas nostalgia for the once-great revival of the
Jewishpeopleintheirland,andforthegloriousearlydays—daysofchallenge,vision, and inspiration, valor and excitement.HistorianAlonGan identified asimilar feeling among kibbutz members: “The first generation lived thetransitionfromdreamtoreality,whilethesecondgenerationissearchingforapathfromrealitytodream.”217
The country had known difficult periods before; but never had so manyIsraelisfeltthatthesituationwassobadforsomanyreasonsasduringEshkol’stime.Thelevelofdistressevenreachedthosewhoknewpracticallyeverythingthatwasgoingoninthecountry.YaacovHerzog,directorgeneraloftheprimeminister’soffice,andhiswife,Pnina,invitedEllaandShimonAgranatoverforteaoneday;Agranatwaspresidentof theSupremeCourt. “Theconversation,like most conversations these days, revolved around the country’ssocioeconomic crisis, the confusion of the younger generation, the dangers ofemigration,thesenseofhelplessness,”wroteHerzog.218
CHAPTER3MAPSANDDREAMS
1.FATAH:“THEREISALSOPALESTINIANZIONISM”
InearlyJanuary1966,adotonthenorthernborderthatmostIsraelishadneverheardofmadeheadlines.“Fatahterroristshavedonethemafavor,”saidMaariv.“The assault on theKfarYuval swimming pool has put the forgottenmoshavbackon themap.”The fewhundredpoultry farmerswho lived inKfarYuvalhad never been in the limelight before. Originally from Cochin, in southernIndia, theywere the fourthor fifthcycleof residents to live in theplace.Thefirst residents had beenArabs; the villagewas called al-Zuk al-Fawqani. TheArabs had been driven out during theWar of Independence. They had beenreplacedby Jewswhohadbeendrivenout from theOldCityof Jerusalem in1948.NewimmigrantsfromIraqalsocame,buttheyfoughtamongthemselvesandeventuallyleft.TheywerereplacedbynewimmigrantsfromNorthAfrica,who, according toMaariv, “took one despondent look around and scattered.”The Cochin Jews who came next stuck with the place, but they felt that thegovernmenthadabandonedthem.“WeareclosertoBeirutandDamascusthantoJerusalem,” theysaid,andMaariv added,predictably,“To thisday theyarelooked down upon by the established kibbutzniks in the Upper Galilee.” Itwould only take a basketball court and a kindword for the residents ofKfarYuval to feel less anonymous and remote, the paper said.1 Other distantcommunitieswereoccasionally covered in thepresswhen their existencewasrecalledasaresultofterrorism,andtheytoowerequicklyforgotten.During the eighteen months before the Six-Day War, almost 120 acts or
attemptedactsofsabotagewerecarriedoutinIsrael—anaverageofalmostoneeveryfivedays.Mostof theFatahsaboteurscamefromSyriaandoperated insmalltownsandvillagesclosetotheborder.OtherterroristscamefromJordan.Theybombedpipelines,waterpumps,warehouses,andpowerplants, and laidlandminesonroads,highways,andrailroadtracks.Theyusuallymanagedtogetbacktotheirpointofdepartureinonepiece.ElevenIsraeliswerekilledintheseoperations, including three civilians, four Border Guard policemen, and foursoldiers. More than sixty Israelis were injured, approximately half of themcivilians;inotherwords,aroughaverageofonecasualtyperweek.Thenumberof incidents rose steadily, doubling between 1966 and 1967.2As a permanent
phenomenon in Israel’s daily routine, terrorism exacerbated the overalldepression. Its psychological effect, like that of the recession, was far moreprofoundthanthetangibledamageitdid;and,muchasIsraelisfounditdifficultto livewith the recession, theyalso felt that theyshouldnothave to livewithterrorism.FatahfirstbecameknowninJanuary1965,whenitsoperativesattemptedto
sabotagethenationalwatersupplysystem.Inanefforttofillinthebackgroundof thisdebut,Maarivquotedofficial IDFsourceswhopointed to tiesbetweenFatahandSyria,but theprecisenatureof theaffiliation remainedunspecified.Theheadlinesaidtheorganization“drawsinspirationfromDamascus”;thestorywenton toassert that“theauthorities inDamascusarebehind”Fatahand thattheorganization“isprobablyoperatedbySyrianauthorities.”YediotAharonotranamoredecisiveheadline:“SyrianSabotageAttemptThwarted.”3ThepapersdidnotknowmuchabouttheFatahorganization.Eventhenamewassomewhatmysterious:spelledbackward,itwastheacronym,inArabic,ofthe“PalestinianNational Liberation Movement.” The press was at first derisive of thisPalestinian force, as if theywereunworthyofbeing considered a true enemy.Theyhadnotdemonstratedmuchoperationalabilitythusfar,andsotheyneededthesponsorshipof theSyrianintelligenceservice,onepaperexplained.MosheDayandismissedthemas“afewbandits.”4
YediotAharonotquotedIsraelicommandoswhohadinfiltratedtheJordanianvillage ofKala’at inMay 1966 to blow up the houses of residentswhoweresuspectedofcollaboratingwithFatah.Theyfoundtheminwretchedconditions.Onesoldiertoldofhowhisunitburstintothehomeofavillageelderandfoundhim standing in a room, surrounded by four children. “He was a huge man,maybesix five,” thesoldier recounted.Thechildrenwerecrying; theirmotherwasbesideherself.Themanbegged,“WhathaveIdonetoyou?Don’tkillme.”Heprotectedthechildrenwithhisbody.Thecommanderrepliedthatnoonewasgoing to hurt him or his family, but their house would be destroyed aspunishmentforhissupportofFatah.Themanresponded,“IcurseFatah!Longlive the Jews!” The visit to the house of the villagemukhtar was “far moreamusing,” according to the correspondent. The unit commander described ahuge house with beautiful furniture. The mukhtar, a middle-aged man,welcomedthesoldiers“bybowingandpleadingforhislife.”Hiswifewasinthenext roomwith an elderlywoman, probably hermother.At first themukhtartriedtoconcealhistrueidentity.“Weexplainedtohimthepurposeofourvisit,”the commander told the reporter. “When he picked up the word ’Fatah,’ hestartedshoweringjuicycursesontheheadsoftheorganizationanditsmembers.
‘There’s no Fatah in our village,’ he said.” The commander said themukhtaradvisedhimtoattackanothervillage,wherehesaidtherewasFatah.Hewasnottheonlyonetodisavowtheorganization.“TheydisassociatedthemselvesfromFatah activities so excessively that it disgusted the IDF soldiers,” the reporterwrote.5
Several intelligenceorganizationsaround theworld tried topiece together apictureofFatah.Althoughitwasaneworganization,everyonebelieveditwasdirectly continuing the war over Palestine that had begun at the turn of thecentury.JewsandArabshadusedterrorismasearlyasthe1920s,bothagainsteachotherandtogetridoftheBritish,observedintelligencereportswritteninBritainandtheUnitedStates.6ThesaboteurswhohadinfiltratedIsraelleftnotesatthesiteswheretheystruck,givingtheirnamesandunits.OneunitwasnamedafterthePalestinianfighterAbdelKhaderHusseini,whowaskilledin1948inthebattlefortheKastel,nearJerusalem.Onenewspaperexplainedthishistoricalcontexttoitsreaders,notingthatHusseiniwasarelativeoftheGrandMuftiHajAmin, the leader of the Arabs in Palestine during the British Mandate. Theformermuftiwasstill alive,andhis travelsandspeecheswere reported in thepapersfromtimetotime.*The press soon turned its attention from the image of themufti to Ahmad
Shukeiri, thefirstchairmanofthePalestineLiberationOrganization—thePLO—which had been established earlier in 1964. Shukeiri, an attorney and arefugee fromAcrewho had become a diplomat, was portrayed in Israel as acorruptand laughablecrook.FatahandseveralotherPalestinian organizationsaroseascompetitorstothePLO.ItwassometimebeforeIsraelisheardanewnametheycouldassociatewithterrorisminsteadofShukeiri’s,butattheendofSeptember 1967, Ha’aretz reported a revelation that came directly from acapturedFatah operative taken hostage: “The chief of operations in the Fatahgangs is a Syrian Palestinian by the name of Yasser Arafat, known as AbuAmar”8
The renewed clashes reminded everyone of the fundamental causes of theconflict in Palestine. Fatah, explained one newspaper, wanted to revive thePalestinianquestionandconvincetheworldthatitwasnotanissueofrefugeeswishingtoreturntotheirhomes,butratherastrugglefornationalliberation.AsoneIsraelicommentatorasserted,“ThereisalsoPalestinianZionism”9
EshkolthoughtitnecessarytoreassertthetenetsoftheZionistfaith:“Wearenotaforeignentitythatjusthappenedtofancythiscountrytolivein.TheLandofIsraelandthePeopleofIsraelhavebeenintertwinedandboundtogethersince
thedawnofhistory.Israelhasreturnedtoitslandanditshome,andthereisnopower that can sever the eternal bond between our nation and its land.”OneKnessetmember said, “Ournational revivalbeganalmost at the same timeastheArab liberationmovement rose against Ottoman rule, a few decades ago.Onlybitterfatedeterminedthatthesetwomovements,whichshouldhavebeencomplementary, are not, and we find ourselves in a position where the othermovementishostiletowardus.”10
YehoshafatHarkabi,anarmygeneralandMiddleEast scholar,whowas theIDF chief of intelligence and oversaw strategic research during the fifties,observed the rise of a new generation. The young Palestinians who werechildrenwhentheirparentsfledorwereexpelledfromtheirhomesin1948andwhohadgrownup in refugeecampswerenowreadyfor thesecondround.Asecuritystudyarchivedintheprimeminister’sofficeconcludedthataslongastherewererefugees,therewouldbeterror.11ForeignMinisterEbanalsostudiedthe topic,viewingguerrillawarfare as theclassicweaponof theweakagainstthepowerful. Inhisview,sinceWorldWar IIguerrillagroupshadbeengivencauseforhope:handgrenades,landmines,andsmallarmshadprovedeffectivein various corners of theworld, evenmore than nuclearweapons.One papernoted that the“guerrillamystique” flourishedeverywhere, fromFidelCastro’sCubatoHoChiMinh’sVietnam.Respect forFatah’smilitarycapabilitieswason the rise.Ha’aretz described
theorganization’smembersas“excellentsoldiersinthefieldwhoknowtheareatheyoperateinwell.”OneKnessetmembersuggestedtohiscolleaguesthattheyrereadapoemwrittenbyYaakovCohenaftertheviolentconflictsinPalestineinthetwenties:“Intheplacewhereonefalls,tenshallrise;intheplacewheretenfall,gloriousthousands.Everystoneintheravineshalltestify,everyknollshallbeasign,forthislandisourssincethedawnoftime.”12
ONFRIDAYNIGHT,OCTOBER7,1966,JUSTBEFOREMIDNIGHT,THREEEXPLOSIVEDEVICESblewupbeneaththesupportingpillarsoftwoapartmentbuildingsinRomema,aneighborhoodin thewesternoutskirtsofJerusalem,afewhundredyardsfromtheborderwithJordan.Afourthdevicefailedtodetonate.Onewomansustainedeye injuries andwashospitalized.Twootherwomen, a younggirl, and a boyhadminorinjuries.Theexplosionswereaudibleallovertown.ThiswasthefirstterroristincidentinJerusalemsincetheWarofIndependence.Mostof thebuildings’ residentswere inbedat the time theattackoccurred.
MargalitShafirinApartment7onthesecondfloorheardtheexplosionandfelt
a strong shock wave. She thought it was an earthquake. But her husband,Eliyahu, a worker at the Friedman stove factory, smelled gunpowder andrealized immediately that itwasanexplosion.Beforehecouldevenget to thelight switch, the second explosion rocked the building. The apartment wasshoweredwithbrokenglass,andcracksappearedinthewallsandceiling.Intheapartmentnextdoor,thegeologistZe’evBenyaminBeginlivedwithhisfamily.Theywerenothurt.Hisfather,KnessetmemberMenachemBegin,arrivedlaterthatnight.Thenextafternoon,ontheSabbath,theprimeministerandtheIDFchief of staff also came. Eshkol’s military secretary said the prime ministerchose his words carefully in advance. “The ledger is open and the hand isrecording”washiswayofsayingthatIsraelwouldnotrespondimmediatelybutreservedtherighttodosolater.13*General opinion held that the operation, carried out by Palestinians from
Fatah,wasintendedtoentangleIsraelinaconflictwithJordan.YaacovHerzog,whooversawrelationswithJordan,wroteinhisdiarythathehopedIsraelwouldnotrespondwithforce.Mostnewspapersalsourgedrestraint.“Itistruethattheattack occurred in Israel’s capital,”wroteHa’aretz, “and the explosives couldhavekilledandinjureddozensofpeople.ButJerusalemisabordertownthatisnotdifficult topenetrate,andtheactualdamagewasminor.Letusbethankfulfor that and remain levelheaded.” The paper praised Eshkol’s response: “Weshouldrecord,butweshouldnotstrike,atleastnotnowandnotinJordan.”Butthe Herut movement’s publication, Hayom, demanded action, as did YediotAharonot.Thearmybeganplans fora security fencemeant toprevent furtherinfiltrations.14
Forty-eight hours after the attack, on the day the papers publishedEshkol’s“open ledger” statement, fourBorderGuardpolicemenwerekilledwhen theirvehicledroveover a landminenot far from theSyrianborder.Twohadbeenborn in Morocco, one in Yemen, one in Bulgaria. Maariv described theirfamilies’hardshipsandprominentlyquotedMeirGigi,thebrotherofoneofthemen killed: “Tell Eshkol not to be so quiet; he should avenge my brother’sblood!”Ha’aretz called for restraint again. “The rules of blood vengeance cannot
serveasabasisforIsraelipolicy....Itisnotgriefandangerthatshoulddictatethe steps to be taken by the government toward Syria; the account must besettledlogicallyandcold-bloodedly,notonthebasisofaneyeforaneye.”15Butamidthegeneralgloom,doubtsnowaroseastowhetherIsraelwascapableofprotecting the livesof itscitizens.Thequestionwaspresented toEshkol,as it
had been in the fifties toDavidBen-Gurion in light of attacks by Palestinianterrorists, most of whom had come from the Gaza Strip. Ben-Gurion hadorderedaseriesofcross-borderretaliations,culminatingintheSinaiCampaign.The tenth anniversary of that campaignwas around the corner.Alongside thenews of the four policemen’s deaths,Maariv ran a large headline quoting theBritishSunday Times of London: “Syria Fears a Suez-Style Israeli Invasion.”The Suez anniversary prompted the press to reveal details of a trilateral pactmade in 1956 between Israel, France, and Britain, with the aim of removingNasserfromtheEgyptianpresidencyandensuringWesterncontroloftheSuezCanal.Mostofthedetailshadpreviouslybeenclassified,orhadbeenpublishedonlyabroad.A short while earlier, Moshe Dayan had published his war diary. The
prevailing view at the time was that the Sinai Campaign had strengthenedIsrael’ssecurity,ledtoanalmostcompletecessationofterroristacts,openedtheRed Sea to Israeli shipping, and had brought UN forces to Sinai and Gaza.Maarivstressedthatthecampaignhadbeen“anexistentialnecessity,”partlyforpsychological reasons with which most readers were personally familiar: theterrorist attacks that had preceded the campaign had sunk Israel into deepdespair,andtheatmospherehadbecomeintolerable.MaarivdepictedtheSinaiCampaign as a personal victory for Ariel Sharon. “Arik and his youngcommanders gave the chief of staff considerable confidence,” the paperdetermined,asifDayanhadbeenshortonconfidenceinthefirstplace.Itquotedpraiseforanarmoredcorpscommander thatmadereference tooneofHitler’smilitary leaders: “He fought like a tiger.A real Rommel!”But the press alsoprojecteddisappointmentwiththecampaign’soutcome,becauseIsraelhadbeenforced towithdrawfromSinaiand theGazaStrip.Thesensewas that theUNandworld powers had robbed the country of a justly acquired piece of land.Duringthemonthsaroundtheanniversary,MaarivalsopublishedchaptersfromabookbyBen-Gurion,inwhichherevealeddetailsofconversationsheldinthethirtieswithleadersoftheArabpopulationinPalestine.Thepreoccupationwiththis chapter of Israeli history was part of some national soul-searching; theconclusionwasthatnotmuchhadchanged,andthatallattemptstotalkwiththeArabsmetwithrefusal.16
2.SAMUAVILLAGE:“MADNESS”
OntheeveningofOctober25,1966,acargotraintravelingfromJerusalemtoTelAvivstruckalandminethatderailedtwoenginesandtwocars.Apassengertrainhadtraversedthesametracksabouttwohoursearlier.Thepapersquoteda
statementissuedbyacommandounitnamedafterAbdelKhaderHusseini:“Getout!Getoutofourlands,youZionists!”Thenextday,YediotAharonot’s frontpagecitedabroadcastheardoverRadioPalestine,thePLOstation,fromGaza:“Tomorrow we will reach Netanya and Eshkol’s office.” Headlines have thepower to create reality, and Eshkolwas finding itmore andmore difficult toignore the question of what should be done. Terrorism took center stage atalmost every government meeting, and public pressure to act was steadilyincreasing. “Restrain Fatah Immediately!” demanded Yediot Aharonot. A fewdays later the paper cautioned, “The success of the Fatah terrorists and theirSyrianbackersinevadingpunishmentseemstohaveencouragedothers.. . .Ifthe impression is created that Israel does not respond—and the mistakenconclusion that Israel has beenweakened is not far behind—Nassermay alsosupport’activist’enemiesastheleadersofSyriahavedone.”17
On Friday night, November 11, three paratroopers doing their compulsorymilitaryservicewerekilledwhentheircommandcardroveoveralandminenotfarfromArad,inthesouth.TheywereontheirwaybackfromMountHebron,where they had collected some soldiers after setting an ambush for terrorists.Tracks leading to the borderwith Jordanwere identified at the site. The nextday,theSabbath,Israelhadtodecidehowtorespond.TheGeneralStaffmetinthe morning, and the generals agreed that there was no way to prove Syriaresponsible and that action could only therefore be taken against Jordan. Themilitaryhadbeendemandingpermissionfromthegovernment toactagainstaJordanian village for months. They wanted to operate in daylight and with alarge force, to compel the civilian population to drive out the terrorists andprevent themfrominfiltratingIsrael.Thegovernmenthadrefused,authorizingonlylimitedactionthatthemilitarycommandersdeemeduseless.NowthearmyproposedenteringthevillageofSamua,lessthanfifteenmilessouthofHebron,andbombingafewdozenhousesthere.ChiefofStaffRabinwenttoseeEshkolat his home in Jerusalem. Eshkol would have preferred to take steps againstSyria,butheagreedthatthecircumstancesdemandedactioninJordan,despitetheriskofunwantedconflictwiththeJordanianarmy.ForeignMinisterAbbaEban laterwrote that thedeathsof the threesoldiers
hadconstitutedanescalation:“Thereisanincreasingimpressioninthecountryof’openseason’formurdersandattacks,asourneighborssitbysecurely.”Ebanfelt that a government incapable of ensuring regular train service and theexistence of normal life in the national capital “is in grave condition by anystandard.” Ebanwas referring to Israel’s ability to deter attack, but hemighthaveaddedthataprimeministerwhowasmockedforhisindecisivenesseven
byhisownsupportershadalsofoundhimself“ingravecondition.”Eshkol could not ignore the military’s demand to avenge the three
paratroopers’ deaths; “Israel’s patience is not unlimited,” he told the securitycabinet. Military secretary Israel Lior documented an argument among theministers.Threeof them,MinisterofHealthIsraelBarzilai(Mapam),Ministerof theInteriorHaimMosheShapira(Mafdal),andMinisterofTourismMosheKol(IndependentLiberals)wantedassurances that theoperationwouldhaveamorelimitedscopethanwhatRabinwasproposing.Others,mainlyYigalAllon(Ma’arah),supportedRabin.ThenewspapereditorialsonSundaymirroredthisdisagreement.“Wemayhavetogetusedto the thought that thepenetrationofthese infiltrators,well trained in fieldoperationsandsabotage techniques,willcontinue,”wroteHa’aretz,callingfordefensiveandpreventativesteps.Maariv,conversely,quoted the relativesofoneof thesoldiers,whodemanded that thegovernment“avengehisdeath.”18
KingHussein of Jordan, apparently assuming Israelwould not let the threeparatroopers’ deaths go without a response, quickly expressed his regret in amessage to theUnitedStatesgovernment.Recordskeptby thedirectorof theprimeminister’sofficeshowthatthecontentoftheking’smessagewasrelayedtotheIsraeliembassyinWashingtononSaturdayeveningandsenttoJerusalemthat night in encoded form. Eshkolwas informed of themessage on Sunday,November 13, at nine A.M., by which time the Samua operation was alreadydrawingtoanend.19
Selma Nasser Salameen, an eighty-five-year-old woman, told UNinvestigatorsaboutthebombingofherhouseinSamua.“Yesterdaymorningatnearly0700hoursLT,Iwasinmyhouseata-Samua.Iheardshootingalloverthe village and I heard aircraft roaring in the sky in the a-Samua area. I tookshelterinmyhouse;thenIsraelisoldierscametomyhouse.TheyorderedmeinArabictoleavemyhouse,becausetheywantedtoblowupthehouse.AfterIleftthehouseforafewmeters,thehousewasblownupandIwashitbyfragmentsfrom the explosion.” The soldiers destroyed dozens of homes in this way,without allowing the residents time to bring out their belongings. Furniture,rugs,storedfood,kitchenequipment,personaldocuments,familyphotoalbums—everythingwasburiedundertherubble.Jordanlaterclaimedthatmorethanahundredhomeswereblownup;Israeladmittedtodestroyingforty,althoughaninternal report gave the number as sixty. The military attaché at the U.S.embassy inAmman,whovisitedSamua, estimated that thenumberof housesdestroyedwasmuchhigher than Israel’s figure. Israel’s envoy toWashington,
Ephraim Evron, reported that the attaché had seen “many civilians’ bodies,”whichsuggestedthatnotallthehouseswereevacuatedbeforebeingblownup.Some of the bodies were those of elderly women who had not been able toescapeintime,Evronreported.Operation Shredder, as it was called, grew far beyond the cabinet’s
expectations, culminating in an air battle with Jordanian forces. A regimentcommanderintheparatrooperswaskilledandtenIDFsoldierswerewounded.OntheJordanianside,fourteenofficersandsoldierswerekilledandthirty-seveninjured; the casualties included a pilot. Upon returning from Samua, theparticipants in theoperation tookpart in avictoryparadeof sorts through thestreetsofBeersheba.20
Onthedayaftertheoperation,threeoutoffourcitizenssurveyedinaquickpollconductedbyHa’aretz said that theysupported it.YediotAharonotwrote,“Weknewweweredealingwithanirrationalandhopelessfactor,withsaboteursandmurdererswhohavenoself-restraint....Theycannotstop,becausewhenananimal,drivenonlybyitsurges,tastesblood,itisnotsated,butrathergrowsthirstier.”According toMaariv, “Itwas notwith joy that the IDF crossed theborder,butratherbecausetherewasnochoice.”Thepaperwasremindedofthecircumstances during the War of Independence, when Israelis were similarlyfacedwithapowerfulenemy,knowingfullwellthattheyhadnooptionbuttowin.21 Israelhadno interest inenteringaconflictwithJordan,and theSamuaincident was a severe departure from its operational intentions. But even thecriticsshiedawayfromcondemning thearmy.“Assuccessfulas this raidwasmilitarily, doubts remain as towhether itwas as successful politically,”wroteHa’aretz,andmaintainedthattheoperationhadexposedIsrael’sweakness.“ItisdifficulttoavoidtheimpressionthatJordanwaschosenasthetargetbecausethedefenseofSyriabytheUSSRpreventedanattackontherighttarget.”22
Behindcloseddoors,morecriticalvoiceswereheard.Sixcabinetmembers,includingthetwoministersforreligiousparties,expressedangerovertheextentand resultsof theoperation.Eshkol tried tomollify thembypointingout thatIsraelspent1.5billionliraseveryyeartobuildupitsdeterrentforces—shouldit,atthemomentoftruth,makedowithasimplemezuzahonthedoor?“Andevenwith amezuzah there, is there any guarantee that devilswill stay outside thehouse?Here is Israel telling thewholeworld that it has deterrent forces, butwhenourbloodisspilledshouldwejustuttertheShema?”Yes,Eshkoladded,he too had said the Shema once, twice, even three times, but eventuallysomethinghadtoactuallybedone.AlthoughhealsobelievedthattheIDFhad
gonetoofar,henonethelessdefendedthearmy,tellingthecabinetthatitwasnottrue that the operation had gonewrong. He expressed his full support of thechief of staff, and talked of how touched he had been,while visiting soldierswounded in the operation, to see their steadfast spirits. Rabin himself, andAharonYariv,headoftheintelligencebranch,admittedtheyhadbeenwrongtoestimate that the Jordanian army would not react. Rabin now feared theJordaniansmight try to hold up trains to Jerusalem and slaughter passengers.But he did not agree that recommending action against Jordan had beenwrong.23
Foreign Minister Eban requested and received permission from thegovernment to explain “candidly” that the operation’s scope had beenunexpectedlyexpanded,andthatintentionsdidnotalwaysdetermineresults—inotherwords,thattheyhadfailed.InaconversationwithUNsecretary-generalUThant,Eban said that the operation “got out of hand.”Theneed for “candor”had arisen owing to the United States’ blistering response. When PresidentJohnsonheardwhathadhappenedhewas“deeplydistressed”accordingtoonereport, “extremely upset” and even “furious” according to another.24 TheAmericansopposedretaliationbyIsraelinJordan,reasoningthattheJordanianarmywouldnotbeabletoadequatelydefendthecountryandthekingwouldbehumiliated. An American intelligence report fromMay, analyzing the factorsthatcouldignitewarbetweenIsraelanditsneighbors,putborderincidentsandterroristattacksatthetopofthelist.TheAmericanspassedmessagesbetweenJerusalemandAmmaninanefforttobringaboutthedismantlingofFatah.Oneofthepresident’sassistants,RobertKomer,wassenttotellAmbassadorHarmanthatifIsraelcontinuedtostrikeinJordan,theUnitedStateswouldbeforcedto“reexamine”itssupplyofarmstoIsrael.Itwasnoteveryday that Israelwas threatened in thisway.Harman tried to
explainthatEshkolhadacted“underheavypressurefromhisownconscience,”butthisdidnotsatisfyPresidentJohnson,whosentKomertoseeAbeFeinberg.Komer heard that Feinberg had just spoken with the director general of theprimeminister’soffice,Herzog,whotoldhimtheyhadintendedtoblowuponlyfourhouses in thevillage.Komer replied that they shouldhave thoughtaboutthepossibilityofescalationbeforetheyacted,notafter.FeinbergaskedwhetherheshouldconveyKomer’smessagetoAmbassadorHarman,butKomersaidhewouldmanageHarmanhimself,andaskedFeinbergtogiveEshkolthemessage.As usual, Feinberg accepted the assignment. On behalf of his president, heexplained to Eshkol that Johnson was afraid that there were officers in theJordanian army who might take action against Israel, in opposition to King
Hussein’swishes,and that Israel’s responsecouldresult inanuprisingagainsttheking.25
AseniorofficialintheStateDepartment,NicholasKatzenbach,explainedtoForeignMinisterEbantheabsurdityofthesituation:itwasasifhe,Katzenbach,hadwantedtoslaptheIsraeliambassadorintheface,butbecausehecouldnotdoso,heslappedtheambassador’ssecretary.*AmbassadorHarmanviewedtheSamuaoperationas“madness,”andclaimedthatnotasingleIsraelidiplomatintheUnitedStates thoughtotherwise.Heregretted,however, thatIsraelhadnottakenactionagainstSyriaafterthedeathsofthefourBorderGuardpolicemenamonthearlier.TheIDFhadsoughttoactagainsttheSyriansatthetime,butwasstymied by the government, partly because of American pressure. Instead ofattacking,IsraelwenttotheUNSecurityCouncil,buttheSovietUnionblockedthecouncilfromevencensuringSyria.“Thatwastheoriginalsin,”Harmanlatersaid. If the government had agreed to act against Syria inOctober, perhaps itwouldnothavehadtosuccumbtothemilitary’sdemandtoactagainstJordaninNovember.FollowingtheSamuaoperation,demonstrationswereheldagainstHusseinin
Jordan.TheIsraelipressvoicedconcern,andHa’aretzreportedthat17percentofIsraelisnowdisapprovedoftheoperation,threetimesasmanyasonthedayafter it took place.Herzog, alsoworried,made sure thatHusseinwas sent anexpression of regret through a London physician who functioned as a covertliaisonbetweenthetwomen.HerzoghopedthekingwouldviewtheletterasanIsraeliapologyofsorts.27
THE UNITED STATES OFFERED ISRAEL AN ARRAY OF ELECTRONIC BORDERSURVEILLANCEdevicesmeanttoimpedeFatahoperatives;thehopewasthatsuchdefenseswouldnotonlyhaltterrorbutalsorestrainIsrael.Theofferwaswidelypublicized, but Israel examined the technology and responded that it wasinadequate.28 Eshkol, meanwhile, was flooded with letters from concernedcitizens suggesting ways to fight terror. One demanded the death penalty forFatahmembers;anothersuggestederectinganelectrifiedfencealongtheborder.EhudBuch,astudentfromJerusalem,sentEshkoldetaileddiagramsofsecuritysystem improvements. Some civilians warned against explosive devices thatcould be placed in public places like sports stadiums and cinemas. Onesuggestedcheckingthebagsofeverypersonenteringa theater,withparticularattention paid to anyone who left the auditorium before the program ended.AnothercitizenwasespeciallyconcernedaboutIsraeliArabs,whocouldeasilyplace bombs anywhere. Some suggested retaliatory terrorism. “Why not
organizesaboteurunitslikeFatah’sandmaketheirliveshell?”askedRahamanMizrahi.Hereceivedabriefbutcourteousresponse:theletterwouldbebroughttotheprimeminister’sattention.29
DuringoneoftheclosedmeetingsEshkolheldperiodicallywitheditorsofthedaily newspapers, Herzl Rosenblum of Yediot Aharonot asked whether Israelmightemployretaliatoryterrorism.“Thereisademandtothateffectinsecuritycircles, for us to have our own commandos,” said Rosenblum. He was wellinformed. The possibility that Israelmight employ its own guerrilla forces tocarry out terror attacks had in fact been discussed by the General Staff. TheproposalwasmadebyIsraelTal,commanderofthearmoredcorps,andhewassupportedby thedirectorgeneralof theMinistryofDefenseand the inspectorgeneralofthepolice.“Wewillusethesameweapon,butwithgreaterpowerandawidereffect,”saidTal.AmbassadorHarmanalsospokeofthisoption.Eshkoldidnotruleoutan“eyeforaneye”policyinprinciple,andeveninsinuatedthat“certainthings”(but“notmany”)werebeingdoneinthisrespect.Hedescribedtheoperationaldifficulties for theeditors:“It’snot thatsimple.They’resittingonthemountain,andsowehavetosendtwoorthreemenupthemountain,intohouses,toremovewomenandchildren.Andthenthemenhavetogetback—it’snotsimple.But it ispossible, if thesituationdeteriorates, thatwewillhave totakethatroute.”*Whentheyhadtoactagainstterrorism,IDFgeneralsraisedvariousideasbut
always reverted to the sameproposal: large-scaleoperationsagainstSyria andJordan.AdisputesoonarosebetweenEshkolandRabin.Theprimeministerandmany of his ministers believed in defensive mechanisms, such as fences,ambushes, and various electronic devices. The chief of staff and the generalsdemanded an offensive policy. More than a simple tactical and politicalargument, this was also a generational conflict—and an ideological andpsychologicalone.Eshkoland thecabinet feared thepolitical repercussionsoflarge-scale offensives. The IDF, however, was designed not for response anddefense,butforinitiativeandoffense.Thestate’sborderswerenotfortifiedorfenced,andthiswasnotbychance,asMosheDayanexplainedinApril1967:“TheIsraelDefenseForceisadecidedlyaggressiveassaultarmyinthewayitthinks,thewayitplans,thewayitimplements.Aggressionisinitsbonesanditsspirit.”For Rabin and the generals, most of whomwere Israeli born, this was not
merely a professional military issue, but a question of their prestige, theirdignity,andtheirimageasSabrawarriorsfacingweak-spiritedpoliticians.TheyviewedtheseEasternEuropeans,someofwhomwerethreedecadesolderthan
they, as clinging to “Diasporapsychology.”Thebelief that terrorismcouldbeovercome by defensive means might bring about the construction of electricfences along the borders, said Rabin, and “they’ll turn Israel into anotherghetto.”WhenspeakingatGeneralStaffmeetings,RabinusedtorefertoEshkolandhisministersas“theJews.”†
3.CONTRASTS:“TWOPEOPLESOFISRAEL”
About ten days after the Samua operation, Eshkol received a letter from anelderlyhistoriannamedYitzhakBaer,oneofthefirstprofessorsattheHebrewUniversity, urging him to remember that “the government’s decisions mustcorrelatewiththehistoricalcharacterandthereligiousandsocialidealsofournation, and any action must be inherently persuasive of its justice and haveeducational force.” Baer was from Germany, a founder of the “Jerusalemschool,”whichprovidedacademicsupportfortheZionistidea.In1966hewasseventy-eightyearsold.Hesaidhewaswriting“onbehalfofafewfriends,”andaddedanapologeticnote:“Thesewordsstemfromasenseofresponsibilityfortheimageandfateofourstateandourpeople.”One could still find in Jerusalem a few of the founding members of the
Hebrew University who had proposed a binational alternative to the Zionistprogram: instead of a Jewish state on part of the land, there would be abinationalJewish-Arabstateonall the land.Within thecolorful Israelimosaicof ideas there was room for this position, expounded by the philosopherSchmuelHugoBergman,theKabbalahscholarGershomScholem,theeducatorAkibaErnstSimon,andothers,butithadnexttonoinfluence.ThesescholarscamefromCentralEuropeandlivedwithinwalkingdistanceofoneanotherintheJerusalemneighborhoodofRehaviaandnearby.AlthoughtheywerefluentinHebrew, they feltmore comfortable inGerman, and as they grewold theydistancedthemselvesfromtheIsraeliexperience.Bergmanrecordedinhisdiarya conversation among guests at a reception held by President Shazar, whereSimon’s new book was being discussed. It had been published, of course, inGerman,andeveryoneagreedthatitsimplycouldnotbetranslatedintoHebrew.Afewprofessorswerevocalindemandingmilitaryrestraintandeffortstotalk
withtheArabs.Oneofthem,thephilosopherYehoshuaBar-Hillel,saidasearlyasApril1967thattheArabrefugees’righttoreturntotheirhomeswasnolessvalidthantherightofSovietJewstosettleinIsrael,andthattheIsraelis’moraldutytoacceptthemwasasgreatastheirobligationtotakeintheJewsofRussia.AphysiciannamedShimonSherashevskialsosuggestedrestoringtherefugees
tothevillagestheyhadabandoned.Althoughtheseandsimilaropinionshadnoreal impact, they were notable as part of the constant clash of fundamentalvaluesthatwasoccurringinIsrael,andthatoccasionallyescalatedintoaculturewar. It was a conflict between Athens and Sparta; between optimists andpessimists; between thosewhochampionedhumanisticvalues andbelieved inthepossibilityofpeacewith theArabsand thosewhosawwaraspredestinedandheld that theArabswouldneveraccept theexistenceof Israel.Bothsidesspoke in the name of the “People of Israel,” but it often seemed they weretalkingabouttwodifferentnations.“TherearetwoPeoplesofIsrael,”wroteBergman.“Therehavealwaysbeen
two dueling currents in Judaism. The first is isolationist; it hates the goy,emphasizes at every opportunity the imperative to ’Remember what theAmalekite did unto thee’”—Bergman was referring to a biblical massacre—“and cultivates this Amalekite-syndrome. And there is the other Judaism,whichIwouldperhapscharacterizewiththeverse‘Thoushaltlovethyneighboras thyself.’ This is a Judaism that prays, ’Let me forget the Amalekite,’ aJudaismof love and compassion.”Herein lay thedeeper layer of thepoliticaldisagreement between “left” and “right,” between “doves” and “hawks.” Thedilemmawashowtodeterminewhetherthestatewasinactualdanger;atwhatpoint and towhat extentwas it essential or desirable for the IDF to act; andwhether restraint would result in moderation across the border or simply beinterpretedasweaknessandsoencourageaggression.31
TheCommunistpartyspokeofIsrael’sneedforacceptedpermanentbordersand for recognition of the Palestinian refugees’ right to choose betweenreturning to their homes or receiving compensation. Mapam raised thepossibilityofIsraeltakingin“anagreed-uponnumber”ofrefugees.UriAvneri,of Ha’olam Hazeh, did not rule out the return of refugees, either. MapamproposedaconfederationbetweenIsraelandJordan,whileAvnerisuggestedafederation between Israel and a “Republic of Palestine.” Israel Baer, a well-knownmilitary commentatorwhowas also a senior officerwith close ties toDavidBen-Gurion,proposedafederationbetweenIsraelandaPalestinianstatethatwouldriseinplaceoftheKingdomofJordan.ButtheIsraelipeacemovementhadtroubleofferingimmediatesolutionsand
wasperceptibleonlyonthemarginsofpublicdiscourse.TheCommunistsspokewith thevoiceof theUSSR,andMapamrepresentedkibbutzimbuiltonArablands.AvneripublishedhispositionsalongsidepicturesofscantilycladwomeninHa’olamHazeh,andIsraelBaerwasa traitor:hehadbeenarrestedin1961and sentenced to fifteen years for spying for the Soviet Union. Although his
story aroused a great deal of attentionwhen itwasmade public, he remaineduninfluentialandultimatelydiedinprison.32
TheelderlyProfessorBaerdidnotmentionwhathadpromptedhimtowritehislettertotheprimeminister,apartfromavaguereferenceto“recentevents,”bywhichhemeanttheSamuaoperation.Theweaktenorofhisprotestreflectednotonlyhispersonalaversion topolitical involvement,butalso thedeclineofthealternativeposition.Astheyearsworeonandtheuniversities’dependenceonthestateincreased,theprofessorsfromRehaviasoundedmoreandmorelikeanechoofthepast.Eshkolhadgoodreasontoviewtheacademicsashisallies,fortheyhadextendedmoralsupportinhisgreatstrugglewithBen-GurionovertheLavonaffair;manyhadopposedBen-GurionevenbeforeEshkoldid.Fromtime to time he sought their advice on how to improve the gloomy nationalmood,althoughtheywereashelplessashe.33Eshkolwasalsoreceptivetotheirdemandtorevokemartiallaw.BaerreceivedalongreplyfromEshkolthatwasprobablymeantforposterity,
as is often the case with such correspondence. Eshkol detailed at length thepeaceful intentions he had expressed in the past, and described the acts ofterrorism.“IdonotknowwhetheryoumetwiththeresidentsofRomemaaftertheexplosionsinthatneighborhood’shomes,whetheryousawthedemolishedtrain on theway to Jerusalem, orwhether you visited the families of soldierskilledintherecentattacksalongourborders.Youcansurelyimaginethatonewho does come in contactwith all these, onewho bears the responsibility ofsecuringthecountry’sbordersandensuringthesafetyofitscitizens,mustactasbesthecantoensurepeaceandfortifytheborders.”EshkolmentionedthattheUNSecurityCouncilhadnotsidedwithIsrael.Hewentontoask,“Whatfurtherjustificationandinherentpersuasiondidweneedsothatwecouldexerciseourrighttoprotectourselves?Afterall,wehavepracticedrestraintmorethanonce,more than twice,more thanseven times.Mustweallowourselves tobeworndownandkilledbitbybit,ifnotdestroyedinafutureall-outwar,aspromisedbyNasser?MustwewaitforHannahArendttowritearticlesaboutourfailuretoresist?”*Aseventh-gradeschoolboyfromRehovot,EitanGalon,askedEshkolwhythe
IDFhad set out to kill innocent civilians in Jordan instead of striking againstSyria. An assistant replied that Jordan was responsible for the infiltration ofterrorists over its borders, andpromised that “decisions aboutmilitary actionsare made in the government following serious debate and extensiveconsideration.”35
•••
IN 1966, THE IDF ENLISTED THE FIRST GENERATION OF ISRAELI-BORN SOLDIERS, AJUNCture Yitzhak Rabin saw as symbolic of the state’s independence. MostIsraelisidentifiedtheestablishmentofthestatewithitsvictoryoverArabarmiesintheWarofIndependenceandtrustedtheIDFtoensureitscontinuedexistencein the faceofArab intent to destroy it.Almost everyyoungman andwomanknew theywould serve a few years in the army and be called up for annualreservedutywellintomid-life.Theyalsoacceptedthepossibilityoflosingtheirlives in the course of military service. Yitzhak (Iki) Kotler of Kibbutz GivatBrennerwrotetohisgirlfriendaboutafriendwhohadbeenkilledinatrainingaccident, and shared with her his response: “To simply . . . continue beingourselvesandgobacktoroutine,becausesuchislifeandsometimesitdemandsvictimsofusandthereisnothingtobedoneagainstthis.”*Most Israelis tended to assume that the army’s operations were usually
necessary and appropriate. People knew the units and the commanders, andmany carried into their civilian lives ties forgedduringmilitary service.TheytalkedknowledgeablyaboutIDFequipment,analyzedoperations,strategies,andtactics, and whispered military secrets to one another. The IDF was part ofroutine life, a component of Israeli identity. At least once a year, onIndependenceDay, thepowerof theIDFtookcenterstageasmilitaryparadesanddisplaysdrewthousandsofspectators.37AccordingtoMaariv,theycameto“visually caress themetal and themuscle of their army.” In July1966, an airshow was held in the center of Israel to celebrate Air Force Day. Ha’aretzreportedthatthedemonstrationincludedtheuseofnapalmbombs.38
The Israeli ethos ruled out “militarism,” a term reminiscent of malignantregimesinEurope.Israelislikedtobragabouttheirpeacefulaspirations,andthearmy was deployed in a series of civilian missions, including agriculturalsettlement,theabsorptionofimmigrants,andeducation.Itwassupposedtofightonlytoprotectthestate’sexistence.ThedayaftertheSyriansshelledakibbutzin the north, Tel Katzir, a Yediot Aharonot reporter met with children on thekibbutz.Six-year-oldZehava said that theArabs in Israel shouldbedeported,andaboynamedNirassertedthat“anyonewhospeaksArabic isabadman.”Thereporterexplainedthat“aforeignerhearingsuchwordsfromthesechildrenmaymistakenly conclude that themilitaristicviewpoint is imbibedhere alongwithmother’smilk.However,anyexperiencedkindergartenteacherwilltellyouthat this isachild’semotional response to theexperienceoffightingforone’srights.”Thekindergartenteacherstoldthereporterthattheytriedtopreventthe
children from developing hostile feelings. They told the children about theArabswholivedinIsraelandemphasizedthatthereweregoodArabsinSyria,too. Only the bad Arabs wanted war. The reporter was impressed by thechildren’stoys.“InvainIsearchedformodeltanks,cannons,orrifles,liketheones children play with all over the world. But the children of Tel Katzirapparentlydonotneedthem.Theyhaveplentyinreallife.”TherewerethosewhowereproudthatthevictoryintheWarofIndependence
hadnotproducedgreatmythsofheroismorsongsofglory.One literarycriticpraised the children’s writer Israel Menahem Weisler, who wrote under thepseudonymPoochoo, for his antiwar book. The book did not justify thewar;rather,thehero,Yoram,andhisfriendswerebornintoasituationwherethewarwas “imposed on them by reality,” said the critic. He added, “War is like anupper class in high school, which you reach naturally and without too muchthought.Whoeverdoesnotgoontothenextclassistheoddoneoutandistobeshamed.”At the beginning of 1967, enrollment in the Gadna youth battalions was
approximately seventy thousand. This training program under the IDF’sauspicesinstilledthebasicpreceptsofmilitaryserviceinhighschoolboysandgirls. Khaki uniforms were mandatory at the weekly meetings. The trainingincludedcamping,topography,sports,firstaid,self-defense,andmarksmanship.Older students went on excursions across Israel and took part in NationalService army camps, where they had target practice. The children’s weeklyDavar Leyeladim pointed out that many Gadna trainees were engaged innonmilitaryactivities,suchasvolunteeringathospitals, restoringantiquitiesatMasada,andplantingtrees.Butthemagazinealsolinkedacademicachievementwith the possibility of becoming an IDF officer. “Talented students” withsuitable qualities took part in squad commander training during their Gadnasessions, and most of them were admitted to officer training programs whentheyjoinedthearmy.DavarLeyeladimalsorananeditorialentitled“GoodGuysGo to Military Boarding School.” These were institutions that acceptedelementaryschoolgraduatesandcombinedhighschoolstudieswithpreparationformilitary service, encouragingcamaraderie anda senseof shareddestiny—values highly praised in the article. Before Independence Day in 1967, aparticularly patriotic issue of the magazine was published, featuring a storyaboutchildrenwhohadsavedasoldier’slifeandwhodistinguishedthemselvesby other heroic acts, as well as an article about the IDF’s British-madeCenturion tanks.That same issue carried the first installment of a comic stripabouttheWarofIndependence.
Asimilarspiritwasprojectedbyotherpapers.TheIndependenceDayeditionofMaariv Lanoar, the daily paper’s magazine for young people, looked likesomething published in the Soviet Union. The cover, featuring the blacksilhouetteofasoldieragainstaredbackground,borethecaption“IsraeliYouthsSendBlessingstotheIDFontheNation’sNineteenthIndependenceDay.”First-graders inBeitLehemHaglilit sent a poem toDavidBen-Gurion inpraiseofTzahal, theHebrewacronymbywhichtheIDFiswidelyknown:“TzahalOurTzahalSostrongProtectsusFromalltroubleYouareourbravestarmyYouwesaluteFor youwe cheerAnd youwe lovemore than anything.” Ben-Gurionkeptthepoeminhispersonalpapers.39
“Ben-Gurionandhisassociatesconferredanalmostsacredauraon the IDF,and the public accepted that image,” wrote Yosef Lapid in aMaariv articlewhoseheadlineranthewholewidthofthepage:“IsThereaDangeroftheIDFTakingOvertheGovernment?”Militarycoupswereadailyoccurrencearoundtheworld,Lapid argued, not just in Indonesia,Ghana, and otherThirdWorldcountries,butalsoinGreece,forexample, thecountrythatgavetheworldtheterm “democracy.” “With the exception of Britain and the Scandinaviancountries,notonecountryseemstobeimmunetothepossibilityofaputsch,”heexplained. That term, of course, evoked the events preceding the rise of theNazis.“Why, then,doesnooneentertain the thought that theIDFmaydecideonedaythatithashadenoughofchaos,moderation,andchitchat—it’stimetoputthingsinorder?”ButLapiddidnotbelievethattheIDFwasconsideringthisidea. The Jewish mentality would not accept any form of dictatorship, andhistorical experience had made the prospect unthinkable. The IDF’s seniorcommandhadbeeneducatedinthebosomofdemocracy,andalthoughthetopbrasshadallcomefromasimilarideologicalbackground,theyheldarangeofpoliticalviews.The frequent turnoverofofficersprevented the formationofamilitary cult, and the people would not accept a coup: the Histadrut wouldparalyzetheeconomy,thekibbutzimwouldprotest.*Havingsaidthis,LapidwentontodescribetheIDFasextremelyinfluential,
partly becausemany officers became directors of financial organizations aftertheirdischarge.AlthoughtheIDFwasoftencalled“thepeople’sarmy,”Lapidsawaproclivitytosocialisolation,exemplifiedbyspecialhousingformembersof the standing army. “Friday-night dinner conversation focuses on militarytopics, while the wives discuss products sold at the army canteen,” Lapidexplained. “The dominant topics are not those that preoccupy other Israelineighborhoods.Forexample,therecessionisapurelytheoreticalissue,becauseitdoesnotaffectarmypeople.”IDFmembershadtheirownlanguageandtheir
ownclass consciousness: thedistinctions included“a seniorofficerwith a caranddriver,anofficerwithacar,anofficerwithoutacar.Anarmyboymighttellhis friend, ’Mydad is a lieutenant colonel; yours is only a captain.’”When aresidential neighborhood was built in Nazareth for members of the standingarmy,theseniorofficers’wivesdidnotwanttolivenextdoortothefamiliesofnoncoms.Acolonelwouldnotfoolaroundwiththewifeofalieutenantcolonel,saidLapid,quotingaseniorofficer.*IsraelisworshipedtheIDF,wroteLapid,andthatwasasitshouldbe.Butthe
dangerofprojectingsuchaperfectimagewasthatthearmyitselfmightstarttobelieveinit.“AnofficerwhoreadsinthepaperseverydaythatthegovernmentappearspowerlessandtheKnessetishelpless,andatthesametimereadsonlypraisefortheIDF,willsoonerorlaterstarttobelievethatheismadeofbetterstuff,”Lapidconcluded,andobservedhowrarelythepresscriticizedthearmy.42
Thepapersdidcultivateadmirationofthearmyandoftensangthepraisesofitscommanders.SpeakingtoYediotAharonot,AvrahamVered,aphotographerfor the IDF weekly, Bamahane, described the paratroopers whom he oftenaccompaniedonmissions:“Fromthemomenttheycrossedtheborder,ourboysshowed a kind of masculinity and dedication. They suddenly matured andbecame as one muscle, taut and invincible.” Until that experience, he hadviewed the soldiers as innocent curly-haired boys, kibbutznikswho liked folkdancing and dabbled in ideological arguments. “I could see them workingquietlyonthekibbutz,herdingsheepordrivingtractors, takingpityonapoorkitten suddenly caught in their path.” But en route to their mission, theychanged. “When given an order to carry out a mission, one that will clearlyinvolve killing—with the cruelty inevitable in any war—they will do itperfectly,withouthesitation,withoutphilosophizing.That’s thewaytheyare!”Veredwas impressed that the paratroopers did not “play hero.” Their attitudewasbusinesslike,practical,straightforward.Suchwas“thedoubleidentityoftheparatroopers,”notedIlanKfir,theauthor
of the article that quoted Vered. They included not only kibbutzniks but citymen, among them“the lions fromHatikva,” a poor neighborhood in southernTelAviv;buttheentirecorps(hereKfirquotedVeredagain),“thesewide-eyed,golden-hairedboys,wastouchedbyanearthyspirit.”Itwasaspiritofmischief,he continued,which at the rightmoment turned into amood of vengeance, acrushingfist.Vereddescribedatargetbeingstormed:“NeverinmylifehaveIseen amore shocking andmagnificent sight.”Above all, the soldiers dreadedfailure,andthisleftnoroomforthefearofdying.“Ifaparatrooperknowsheisalive because he fled or backed down, he will despise himself, and will no
longer see his life as having any value,” said Vered. In a historical vein, headded that they remindedhimofEzekiel’sprophecyof thedrybones comingbacktolife:“Thisistheresurrection.ThisfeelingdidnotexistamongDiasporaJews. They were content to preserve their lives. Here we have somethingentirelydifferent.”When Colonel Ariel Sharon was appointed head of the army’s training
department,Maariv raved, “Themuch-praised commanderof theparatrooperswillnowpasshiscourageousdoctrineontotheentirearmy.”43Similararticlesappeared about another commander, Ezer Weizman, nephew of ChaimWeizmann. The two generals were referred to by their nicknames, Arik andEyzer.44SharonspokeofhisattitudetowardtheArabs:“IdonothateArabs,butIcertainlyfeelstronglyaboutourhistoricrighttoPalestine,andthisofcourseintensifies my attitude to the Arabs. But that attitude is not, under anycircumstances,hatred.Ifullybelievethatourexistencedependsuponaresoluteinsistenceonour rightsand thatwemust retaliate relentlesslywhen there is aneed.”Hetalkedofhisfeelingsduringoneoperation:“ThemoonwasshiningandIlookedbackandsawthemightylineofmenfollowingme.Itgivesagreatsenseofstrength,ofpower.”45
UriAvneri’sHa’olamHazehalsocultivatedadmirationoftheIDFasoneofthe components of the Israeli ethos Avneri was trying to create through hismagazine. Other figures identified with dovish positions also venerated thearmy:“Weareproudofourarmyandweloveit,”wroteNathanRotenstreich,awell-knownprofessorofphilosophy.46Inthegloomy,doubt-riddenatmospherethatpervaded Israel, the IDFwaspractically theonly institution still enjoyingpublicconfidence.
IN JULY 1966, A LARGE ADVERTISEMENT APPEARED IN HA’ARETZ PROTESTING THEINTROductionofnuclearweapons into theMiddleEast.Manyof thedozensofsignatorieswere the same professorswho had opposed other aspects of Ben-Gurion’s Israel, including martial law.47 Israel claimed it had no nuclearweaponsandthatitwouldnotbethefirstto“introduce”themintotheregion.*NucleardevelopmentinDimona,begunintheearly1950s,remainedshroudedinsecrecy.Israel tookvarioussteps toconceal it,but thecircleof those in theknow seems to have been larger thanwas thought at the time. In early 1966,Eshkolgavedetailsof theproject to theKnessetForeignAffairs andDefenseCommittee.Besides sixteenKnessetmembers, a few senior IDF commanderswere also present. Statements made by Moshe Dayan about Dimona at that
meetingleftlittleroomfordoubtastowhatwasinvolvedintheproject.49
A few journalists knew about Dimona, but were forbidden to publish theirinformation;theymadedobyquotingtheforeignpress,ofteninheadlines.50Itbecame increasingly clear that Israelwas arming itselfwith nuclearweapons.ProfessorErnstDavidBergman,headoftheIsraeliAtomicEnergyCommission,anofficialorganization,stoppedjustshortofsayingsooutright: indevelopingatomicenergyforpeacefulpurposes,oneattainsnuclearcapabilityanyway,hetoldMaarivinaninterview.ThepapercalledhimMr.Atom.YuvalNe’eman,ascientistinvolvedinthenuclearproject,wrote,“OntheeveoftheSix-DayWar,Israel had a broad nuclear infrastructure, with the security potential inherenttherein.”Washington’sassessmentwasthatIsraelhadtwobombs.51
Israel’s nuclear project hadbeenbegunpartly in response to theHolocaust.ThemassmurderofEuropeanJewsgaverisetotheviewthattheStateofIsraelneeded an atomic bomb to prevent a second Auschwitz. The strategicsupposition was that only a powerful Israel could deter the Arab states fromattempting todestroy it, and that if Israelhadnucleararms, itsenemiesmighteven be persuaded to recognize it and make peace. “The fear of nuclearretaliationpreventsanArabattackagainstIsrael”:thusYediotAharonotquotedareport produced by a British research institute.52 But opinion in Israel on thesubjectwasdivided.Amongmilitarymen and politicians, the Dimona project aroused strategic,
economic, and political controversy; naturally, power struggles, prestige, andegowere involved aswell. Some informationwasmade public. ThemilitarycommentatorIsraelBaer,whowroteabookonthetopic,rejectedtheinclinationtobase thestate’ssecurityondeterrentabilities:“In thefinalanalysis, Israel’ssecurity problem has no military solution, only a political one.” It would bebetter to attainnuclear disarmamentof theMiddleEast,wrote analystEliezerLivneh.53 Yigal Allon feared that nuclear weapons development would takemoney out of IDF budgets and thus limit the army’s ability to build up itsconventional forces. It might also spur the Arab states to attack, as they hadthreatened more than once. A member of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs andDefenseCommitteepointedoutthatsincethefirstatomicbombwasdroppedonHiroshima there had been countless conventional wars, in particular guerrillawars.Thiswasthemaindanger,andnucleararmswouldbeuselessagainstit.54Because they believed almost exclusively in preemptive attacks, IDF leadersworried that a nuclear capability would restrict the military’s operationalabilities to the point of near paralysis.55 If the General Staff had read Israel
Baer’sbookonIsrael’ssecurity,theyknewthatnucleararmswouldcomeattheexpenseofconventionalequipment,andiftheywerepersuadedbytheargumentthatnuclearweaponswouldpreventwar, theymighthaveconcludedthat theirtimewasup.Theofficersmayhavefearedthatthepossessionofnucleararmswould constrain them and even make them redundant. Perhaps it was thisanxietythatmadethemsopugnacious.56
Herzog’s diary, as well as American records and the few documents madeavailablebyIsrael’sstatearchives,allindicatethecentralityofthetopictotherelationship between Israel and theUnited States. “We have no evidence thatIsraelisactuallymakingabomb,”wrotetheAmericanundersecretaryofstatetoPresidentJohnsoninMay1967,buttheassumptionwasthatitcoulddoso“atreasonablyshortnoticeshouldtheneedarise.”ItwashighlyprobablethatIsraelwashidingthetruthfromtheUnitedStates,theundersecretaryadded.Americansuspicionswerebasedon,amongotherthings,Israel’srefusaltotellthemwhatithaddonewithbetweeneightyandonehundredtonsofuraniumconcentrateithad purchased fromArgentina four years earlier, and its evasions of theU.S.demand to conduct a regulatory visit toDimona.Time after time, the IsraelisdeliberatedoverhowtorespondwhentheUnitedStatesdemandeddetailsoftheDimona project. Ambassador Harman suggested that Eban not go to the UNGeneralAssembly,soastoavoidmeetingU.S.SecretaryofStateDeanRusk.InpreparationforthepossibilitythatU.S.ambassadorBarbourwouldaskEshkolabouttheArgentinianuranium,itwasdecidedintheprimeminister’sofficethathewouldtrytolaughoffthematter.57
The Israeli publicwas never asked to choose between thosewho supportedhavingthebombandthosewhoopposedit,butaslongasmostIsraelisfeltthatthe state’s existence was threatened, there was probably no chance that themajoritywouldobject.Living without final or internationally recognized peaceful borders, Israeli
citizens were not only in a state of constant anxiety, but also subject to theuneaseof temporariness,whichhampered their efforts to define their identity.More andmore people began to speak of the need for the state to restore thecountry’sbiblicalborders,includingEastJerusalem.InSeptember1966,YediotAharonothostedadiscussionwithJewishAgencyofficialsaboutthestateoftheZionistmovement.One reporter,EliyahuAmikam, askedhowmany Jews theagency thought could be settled in Israel “within its current borders.” YediotAharonot’s editor, Herzl Rosenblum, clarified the question: “Is it possible tobringmillionsofJewstoIsraelgivenitscurrentborders?”Theycouldnothave
presented the Zionist movement’s spokespeople with a more fundamentalquestion,andtheagencyleadersevadedit.A few weeks later,Maariv published a letter to the editor from a reader
grapplingwiththefoundationsofsecularIsraeliZionism.“InsteadofJudaizingHebron,thesiteoftheTombofthePatriarchs,webuiltRamatGan;insteadofprotecting theTombofRachel,weprotectKibbutzHanita in theGalilee; andaboveall, insteadofascendingJerusalem’sMountMoriah,webuiltTelAviv.”DividedJerusalemwasindeedanopenwound,stillpainfultomany.“ThetrueJerusalemistheonewithinthewalls,”thepoetUriZviGreenberghaddeclaredin 1949, referring to theOldCity.As amember of the FirstKnesset, he hadasked,“WhywouldwewantastatewithoutJerusalem?”58
4.JERUSALEM:“GOINGDOWNTOWN”
TheGreenLine,whichpartitionedPalestine,leftIsraeliJerusalemattheedgeofanarrowcorridor,virtuallyisolatedfromtherestofthecountry,anddividedthecitywith abelt of ruinedhouses, barbed-wire fences, cementwalls, andminefields.Thiswasano-man’s-land.On theother sidewere theancientOldCitywalls.TheIsraelipartoftownprojectedadrearygravityandweariness:in1967,nineteen years after being cut off from most of the sites that comprised itsreligiousandhistoricaluniqueness, includingtheWesternWall,Jerusalemwasalso lagging behind the new secular Israeliness that flourished in Tel Aviv.There, thebrightAmerican future set thecity’s tone; incentral Jerusalem, theatmospherewasshapedbyapast leftover fromtheBritishMandate.Thecitywasveiledinadustofmisery.Inthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcentury,mostofJerusalem’sresidentshad
beenJewish,butZionist leaders,primarilyTheodorHerzlhimself,nonethelessapproachedJerusalemwithhesitation,sometimeswithhostility:thecitywastooreligious for themand,unlikeTelAviv, thecapitalof theZionistenterprise, itwasconsideredabastionofOrthodoxoppositiontoZionism.TheBritishsawitas the country’s capital, but Jewish leaders neglected it.By accepting theUNpartitionplan in1947, theZionistmovementgaveuponJerusalem,acceptingthat the undivided city would become a corpus separatum, a separate entity.JerusalemwasdeclaredthecapitalofIsraelonlysomeeighteenmonthsaftertheestablishmentofthestate.Residentsof the citywere zealous about their identity as Jerusalemites, and
thatwaspracticallyall theyhad incommon.Mostwere Jewish,but theultra-OrthodoxwhogrewupinMeaShearimrarelyfoundthemselvesinthesecular
neighborhoodofBeitHakerem,orviceversa.ResidentsofaffluentRehaviadidnotusuallygotodistressedneighborhoodssuchasMusrara,northeotherwayaround.OnlyafewJerusalemiteseverreachedBeitTsafafa,anArabvillageinthe south that was split down themiddle by the Green Line. The city was acolorfulmosaicofisolatedneighborhoodsandcommunities,eachwithitsownbordersanddistinctpersonality,someprojectingacaptivatingairofstoneandfaith.Toanextentuniqueamongallthecitiesoftheworld,Jerusaleminspiredwritersandpoets.Ithadnosinglestory:almosteveryclichéandgeneralizationaboutithadagrainoftruth.59
DuringthenineteenyearsofJerusalem’spartitionedexistence,thepopulationof its Israeli sidedoubled;withclose to200,000 residents at thebeginningof1967, it was the country’s third largest city, after Tel Aviv and Haifa. Thepopulation had grown mainly thanks to the new immigrants sent there tostrengthenthecity,althoughinrealitytheyweakeneditbotheconomicallyandsocially.TheysettledatfirstinrentedroomsorinhousesabandonedbyArabsintheWarofIndependence.Whentheimmigrantskeptcoming,thestatehousedtheminma’abarot,neighborhoodsoftentsandtinshacks.Laterthestatebeganbuilding big, ugly apartment houses. These complexes almost immediatelybecame poverty-stricken zones, most of whose inhabitants were immigrantsfrom Arab states.60 Most of the city’s residents either worked for publicinstitutionsor receivedpublic assistance, including thepoor,who survivedonvarious stipends; the ultra-Orthodox, who lived on community charity; andteachers and clerks working for the government, the Jewish Agency, themunicipality,andtheuniversity.Jerusalemhadfewindustrialfactories,becauseitwasmorecost-effectivetoopenthemalmostanywhereelseinthecountry.Many spoke highly of the Jerusalem air, but one resident, Eliezer Livneh,
complained about a persistent foul smell that welcomed visitors. Oneacquaintance,Livnehrecounted,hadcometotownonaricketyoldtrain;ithadseemedsoromanticasitpassedthroughthewonderfulmountainlandscape.Themanwasadmiringacharmingcreekthatwoundamongtherocksalongsidethetraintracks,sprayingalovelyfoam.Howniceitwastoseeamountaincreekonahotsummerday,hethought,openingawindow—onlytodiscoverthatwhathewasadmiringwasJerusalem’ssewage.Pilesofgarbagecoveredthestreets,andthe trash cans were overflowing, where there were any. Beggars sat at everycorner, a city-wideplague.Thebuseswere cumbersomeandnoisy, givingoffnoxiousfumes,andwereneitherheatedinwinternorair-conditionedinsummer.Theirwindows, floors, and seatswere filthy.Evenwhen theancient localbuscompany, Hamekasher, merged with the nationwide Egged concern in 1967,
there was no immediate improvement. Residents complained about theinfrequency of buses and the lack of schedules. Every few years, when itsnowed in the city, Jerusalem was completely cut off from the rest of thecountry.WhenJerusalemitessaidtheywere“goingdowntown,”theywerereferringto
the triangle formed by Jaffa, KingGeorge, and Ben-Yehuda Streets, with thecentralpostofficeandtheFruminbuilding,homeoftheKnessetuntil1966,atone point of the triangle; Café Ta’amon, Steimatsky (the bookstore in ZionSquare), theSchwartzDepartmentStore,CaféAtara,Friedman (thebookstorefor thosewith refined taste), andRosenblumWomen’s Fashionswere nearby.AnothersideofthetriangleledfromZionSquarethroughRosenfeld(toys)andFreimann& Bein (shoes) to Tarablus (a restaurant). The triangle’s third sidestretched from King George Street past the Café Allenby and Hakol Lanoar(notebooksandtextbooks)toHeihalShlomo,seatofthechiefrabbinate.AlittlebeyondthetrianglewastheMahaneYehudaoutdoormarket,aparticularlyfilthyarea.ManyJerusalemitespreferredtoshopinTelAviv.AccordingtoUriScharf,a
reporterforHa’aretz, thebuyingpowerofmostresidentswasfairlynegligibleand,unlikeTelAvivandHaifa,Jerusalemwasnotsurroundedbysmallertownswithadditionalconsumers,whichmeant that ithadfewerstoresandasmallerselection. The variety of clothing and shoes, especially for women, wasextremely poor, Scharf reported. “A style will be seen around Tel Aviv andHaifaformonthsbeforeitmakesitspilgrimagetotheholycity.Andifastoredoes offer an original style at a moderate price, one immediately fears thatbuyingitwillbeamistake,becauseinamatterofdaystherewillbecountlesswomenon thestreetsofJerusalemwearing thesame item.”Scharf listedonlysixreasonableclothingstores.ShoeswerecheaperinTelAviv,aswerefurnitureandelectricalappliances.Therewasonestorethatwoulddarnnylonstockings,twobusinessesthatfixedelectricshavers.Theusualrefrainwas“We’llhavetosendittoTelAviv.”Shopsclosedatlunchtime.Therewerea fewcinemas in thecenterof townwhereonecould see fairly
newmoviesaftertheyhadalreadybeenscreenedinTelAviv.TheZion,Orion,Orgil, and Tel Or cinemas had no air-conditioning or heat, and their creakywoodenseatswereoftenbroken.Ticketswerenotsoldinadvance.Thescreenswerecrackedandtornaroundtheedges;thesoundsystemsweregrating.Beforethemovietheprojectionistshowedslidesadvertisinglocalbusinesses;aftertheMoch launderette slide, the movie would begin. The projectors often brokedowninthemiddleofamovie.Emptybottlesrolledaroundnoisilybetweenthe
seats, and cars couldoftenbeheardhonking through the thinwalls.Smokingwas prohibited, but only rarely did anyone enforce the ban. Only the Hencinema offered a slightly higher level of comfort. There was no theater inJerusalem,andoneMaarivreportercomparedthecitytoOfakim,animmigranttown in the desert.61 TheKnesset and the SupremeCourt lent a conservativegravity;thiscityofscholarsandscientists,wordsandideas,wasalsothehomeoftheuniversity,withitsNationalLibraryandstudentlife.
DIVIDED, JERUSALEM LIVED WITH THE TENSIONS INHERENT TO BORDER TOWNS.DEFENsivewallsbuiltoutsidehousesduringtheWarofIndependencewerestillstanding,andawallfullofbulletholesstoodonKingGeorgeStreet,abovethepark looking out on theOldCity. The borderline attracted those visitorswholikedtotakepotentiallydangeroustours.Eccentricsfromallovertheworld,aswellaschildren,oftencrossedtheborderbymistakeorintentionallyenteredtheno-man’s-landtocollectscrapironforsale.Occasionallytheysteppedonlandmines. Jordanian soldiers could be seen in some places, and anyone trying totake pictures of themwas liable to be fired on. Jordanian snipers opened firefrequently,andthereweresomeincidentsinvolvingcasualties.Severeincidentsweredealtwithby theUNSecurityCouncil,while thoseofonly local importweresettledbytheMixedArmisticeCommission.TheJordaniansclaimedthatIsrael was violating the cease-fire agreement by preventing access to theJordaniansidealongBethlehemRoad.Israelirenovationsofabandonedhousesalongtheborder,suchasTanusHouse,oftencausedtensions.Israel,foritspart,claimedthatJordanwasrequiredtoallowIsraelistoprayattheWesternWall.“Our demand for access to the Western Wall is eternal,” declared Prime
Minster Eshkol in the spring of 1966. That summer, on the holy fast day ofTisha B’av, an article about the wall inMaariv ended with the words “TheWailingWallweepstodayforthechildrenofIsraelwhoarenotatitsside.”TheJewish holy places in the Old City had been “pilfered,” wrote the paper inJanuary1967:“Yoursoulcriesouttothembutyourfeetmaynottreadthere.”YediotAharonotreportedthattheJordanianshadnamedthestreetleadingtotheWesternWall after the ProphetMohammed’s horse, Alborak. Jordan allowedJewishtouriststoapproachthewall,butnotIsraelis.*ManypeoplepinedforhomesintheJewishQuarterthattheyhadbeenforced
toleaveduringtheWarofIndependence.“IhadahugelongingtogobacktotheOldCity, towander among the Jerusalemalleys, to see thewalls,” saidHanaRivlin. Nostalgia for the Old City was nurtured among schoolchildren. “Oh,howIlongedtoseetheOldCity!”wroteagirlatArlozorovElementarySchool
inthefifties.“Itoldmymother—Oh!IfonlyIcouldgothere!Mymothertoldme what the Old City looked like. . . . While I saw the Old City in myimagination,mymother showedmepicturesof it.TheymademeveryhappyandIsaidtoher,’MayithappenthatIshallseetheyearned-forcitynotonlyinpicturesbutinreality.’”Not far fromMountZion,which looked onto theTempleMount, stood the
YMCAbelltower,fromwhoseheightsonecouldseetheedgeofastreetintheArabpartofthecityandsometimesevencarsdrivingby.TheroofoftheNotreDamemonastery also offered a romantic glimpse of a foreign and forbiddenland,atoncethreateningandfascinating.Onecouldevenmakeoutpeople.ThepartlydestroyedFrenchmonasterywasevencloser to theOldCitywalls thantheYMCAtower;itsgardenwasintheno-man’s-land.63
Apart from the railroad and theTelAviv highway, the only legal departurepointsfromtheIsraelipartofJerusalemweretheMandelbaumGateandArmonHanatziv, the former British headquarters. Both had an air of internationalintrigue.TheMandelbaumGatewasanIsraeliroadblockpaintedinblack-and-whitethatopenedontoasmallsquare,ontheothersideofwhichwasared-and-white Jordanian roadblock.* Tourists were permitted to enter Israel from theJordaniansideoftown,whileChristianclergy,UNofficials,anddiplomatswereallowed to cross in both directions. Israeli Arabs were sometimes allowed tomeetrelativeslivinginJordanatthesquarebetweenthetworoadblocks.Theyreferred to the site as theGateofTears.Onceayear, onChristmas,ChristianIsraelicitizenscouldcrossovertoprayintheholyplaces.IsraeliandJordanianofficialswouldexchangenewspapersandtherewerefriendlyrelationsbetweenthe two sets of policemen, which lent the gate an almost surreal detachmentfromreality.Itwasoncedescribedas“aportholeinthewallofhostility.”†
Inthesouthernpartofthecityonecouldgetasfarastheironbarrierblockingaccess toArmonHanatziv, the building that had once served theBritish highcommissioner and was now the headquarters of UN observers. The buildingitself could be seen only from a distance, rising above a hill identified as thebiblical“hillofevilcounsel.”Hiddenfromviewinthedistantvalleywas“theLine”—theborder,mannedbyIsraelisoldiers—asecretpassedamongchildreninwhispered awe.The various prohibitions in theArmonHanatziv areaweremuchdisputedamongIsrael,Jordan,andtheUN.SecrecyalsohoveredovertheabandonedbuildingsoftheHebrewUniversityandHadassahHospitalonMountScopus.Themountainwas surrounded on all sides by Jordanian territory, butaccording to the cease-fire agreement it remained an enclave under Israeli
control.Onceevery twoweeks,an Israelipolicemotorcadewoulddriveup toMount Scopus, as permitted by the agreement. The motorcade would leavethrough theMandelbaumGate and cross Jordanian territory, protected byUNforces.Infact,Israelwastransportingtroops—soldiersandofficersdisguisedaspolicemenorevenasscientists—toscopeoutthearea.Itwasagameofcatandmouse, another of the secretswhisperedby somany Israelis.Theheadof theUN observer team complained that the Israeliswere also smugglingweaponsandevendisassembledmilitaryvehiclesupthemountain,whichwastrue.Overtheyears,too,theuniversitystaffmanagedtoremovemostofthebooksthathadremained on the campus after the War of Independence. The Mount Scopussituation led to frequent disagreements between Israel and Jordan, stemmingfromtheclaimthatIsraelwastryingtotakeoverterritoriesthatdidnotbelongtoit,andfromthedemandofvillagersinnearbyIsawiyathattheybeallowedtofarmlandsthatwereoff-limits,accordingtothecease-fireagreement.64
Mostcountries,includingtheUnitedStates,honored—atleastofficially—theUNpartition resolution and refused to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.Nordid theyrecognize theannexationof thecity’seasternpartbyJordan,butJordan,unlikeIsrael,didnotdeclarethecityitscapital.MostforeignembassieswereinTelAviv,whiletheconsulatesinJerusalemretainedthespecialinviolatestatustheyhadenjoyedsincethenineteenthcentury.Theefforttogaindefactorecognition of Jerusalem’s status as the capital of Israel was a focus of theForeignMinistry.Israeliambassadorsurgedheadsofstate, includingPresidentCharlesdeGaulleofFrance, not to address letters to “President of Israel,TelAviv.” Foreign Ministry officials tried to convince foreign reporters to useJerusalem as the dateline of stories filed from Israel. There were attempts toorganizeinternationalconferencesinJerusalem,andonesuccessinthisareawasan international book fair. But efforts to “strengthen Jerusalem” in morepractical ways, for example with investment in development, generallyamountedtoaratherpatheticseriesofletterswrittenbythecity’smayorstothesuccessiveIsraeliprimeministersandgrandioseannouncementsintheKnesset.In June 1966, the Knesset discussed the problems of Jerusalem and heardMinisterofFinanceSapirmakeseveralpromisestoimprovethecity’seconomicstate.AmonghisplanswastheopeningofaHiltonhotel.Until theoccupationofEast Jerusalem in theSix-DayWar, thegovernment
tended to view demands for the development of Jerusalem as a nuisance,particularlywhen they entailed spendingmoney. In early 1967, themayor ofJerusalem, TeddyKollek, asked ForeignMinisterAbba Eban to give the cityonemillionlirastobenefitaJerusalemDaythatwouldreinforceitsstatusasthe
capital. The eventswere to include an “international prayer for peace.” Ebanoffered100,000liras.Kollekwantedaspeciallawtorequirethegovernmenttoinvest indevelopmentof thecapital,butSapir andEshkolwereopposed.Theprimeministersuggestedpostponinglegislation“untilthereisanimprovementin the economy.” The minister of justice also objected. But Kollek wasrelentless,andthegovernmentmadeseveralsecretdecisionsthatwouldincurnomonetary costs: meetings with ambassadors and foreign reporters were to behenceforthheldinJerusalem,andtheForeignMinistrywouldlookintoenticingforeign diplomats to come to the city by inviting them to concerts at the cityauditorium,BinyaneiHauma,andsimilarevents.Onegovernmentministertookituponhimself to talk to the IDFchiefof staffaboutholdingceremoniesandmilitary displays in Jerusalem. In reality, Jerusalem was the capital for onlythreeorfourdaysaweek,sinceeveryWednesday(or,atthelatest,Thursday)itwasabandonedbymostKnessetmembers,ministers,andotherseniorofficials.Thosewhoremainedintownweresaidtohidefrompublicview,incasewordgotaroundthatsincetheyweren’trequiredelsewhereinthecountry,theymustbe superfluous.Kollekwrote to Eshkol that he felt as if hewere battling thewind.65
Teddy Kollek was a rising star in Israeli politics. He had previously heldvarious national positions, including that of director general of the primeminister’soffice.ThemayoralelectionsinJerusalemwerehisfirstexperienceasapoliticalcandidate,attheageoffifty-four.Hetookofficeattheendof1965,promisingtobringJerusalemintothetwentiethcentury.Heusedtogetupearlyand walk through the town making notes on what needed to be done: anunemptiedtrashcaninoneneighborhood;arosebushthatneededwateringinanother. Here he found a site that could become the public park that themillionairefromChicagowantedtofund;theretheycouldputthestatuethatthemovieproducerfromLosAngeleswantedtobuyforthecity.*Whenhearrivedat the office, usually before othermunicipal employees, hewas liable to calldepartmentmanagerswhohaddispleasedhim,waking themupandroaringatthem over the phone, but he often sent warm notes of appreciation to thosewhoseworkheliked.Hewasboredbytheroutinesofmanagement,preferringtodelegateauthority.Butonthefirstanniversaryofhistakingoffice,Ha’aretz’smunicipalaffairsreporterwrotethatKollekhadnotmadegoodonhispromisesandserviceshadnotimproved.Theopinionwasechoedinothernewsoutlets.“TeddyKollek’ssmileshavenotimprovedthecleanlinessofJerusalem,”wroteone.Kollekalsofounditdifficulttotakeaninterestinsocialdistress.Hewantedmomentum;hewantedinternationalprestige.Aconversationwithanimportant
Americanjournalistwoulddomoreforthecitythanameetingwiththemanagerofthewelfaredepartment,hebelieved.*Shortly after his election, Kollek canceled a plan to move the municipal
officesoutoftheirbuildingneartheborder;hereasonedthattherewouldcomeadaywhenthecitywasreunited,andthentheexistingbuildingwouldbeinitscenter. Speaking to delegates at the annualHerut political conference,KollekpubliclypromisedthatJerusalemwouldonedaybeunited.InDecember1966,Kollek told the Bar-Ilan University student newspaper, Bat-Kol, about othersteps the municipal government had taken to further the city’s reunification.Jerusalem’smasterplanensuredthatwhentheborderwasopenedtherewouldbe a smooth connection with the Old City. Newly built roads, such as theHebron Road, were being constructed in such a way that they could easilyconnecttotheOldCity’saccessroadswhenthetimecame.“Ihopepeacewillbringaboutanopenborderbetweenthetwopartsofthecity.CertainlyIdonotwishthistooccurinanonpeacefulway,”saidKollek.InApril 1967,Kollek dedicated amonument to a convoy that had tried to
reachHadassahHospitalonMountScopus twodecadesearlier.Severaldozenpeople in the convoy, doctors and nurses among them, had been killedwhenArabsattackedit.ThememorialwasbuiltonHanevi’imStreet,notfarfromtheborder.Attheceremony,Kolleksaidheprayedforthedividedcitytobeunifiedso that thememorial couldbe erected at the siteof the attack,next toSheikhJarrahontheJordanianside.66†
Many of the soldiers who had fought in theWar of Independence felt thatDavid Ben-Gurion had blocked them from conquering territories they couldhave taken, including the Old City and theWest Bank. “I never forgave theIsraeligovernmentunderBen-Gurionfornotlettingusfinishthejobin’48-’49,bothmilitarily andpolitically,” said formergeneralYigalAllon.A fewweeksbefore the signing of the agreement that demarcated theGreen Line betweenIsraelandJordan,AllondemandedthatBen-GuriongiveIsrael“strategicdepth”bysetting itsbordersalong theJordanRiver.He felt similarlyabout theGazaStrip:ifonlyheandhismenhadbeengivenafewmoredays,theywouldhaveoccupied it. But the government had succumbed to American pressure andorderedawithdrawal.ManyofAllon’scomradesinarmssharedhisfrustration,andsomeofthemwentontobecomeseniorofficers,includingafewgenerals.GeneralEzerWeizmanusedtosaythataJewishstatewithoutallofJerusalem,without theWesternWall,withoutShilohandAnatot(ontheWestBank),was“afragmented,defectivestatethatwouldhavetroublestayingalive.”67InIsraeli
history, this failure came to be viewed as the cause of “weeping forgenerations,”anditsmarkwastheGreenLine.
5.NOSTALGIA:“THEAXISANDBOND”
Theborderdemarcatedby theGreenLinefar fromcoincidedwith themapoftheZionistdream.UnderBritishrule,theZionistmovementhadbeenforcedtoexcludefairlyextensiveterritoriesfromitsambitions.TheWarofIndependencegaveIsraellargerterritorythanthatallocatedtotheJewishstatebytheUN,butdid not remove the sense among Israelis that they had compromised on theoriginaldream,waivingtheirhistoricalrighttotheentireland.AlthoughIsraeldid not demand territories that remained outside theGreen Line, there was aconsensusthatthebordersagreedtounderthecease-firemadeitdifficultforthecountrytodefenditself.68
Shortly after taking office as prime minister and minister of defense, LeviEshkoldiscussedapossibleexpansionofIsrael’sborders.InJune1963,theIDFchief of staffwasZviZur;YitzhakRabinwas his deputy.Rabin described toEshkol the idealboundariesof Israel: theywould follow theJordanRiver, theSuez Canal, and the Litani River in the north. Although he did not proposemilitary action to alter the existing borders, Rabin believed such alterationwould be desirable—not essential, butworthwhile if the opportunity arose.Afewmonths later, the IDFhad a plan, code-namedWhip, to occupy theWestBank,includingEastJerusalem.Amorelimitedproposal,code-namedMozart,involved“grabs”—takeoversofvariousspotsthatwerenotcontrolledbyIsraelatthetime,suchasArmonHanatziv,Latrun,ontheroadtoJerusalem,andotherareas.*AccordingtoaplannamedBneiOr(“SonsofLight”),intheeventthattheArabstatesattackedIsrael,theIDFwouldattempttorelocatethebattlefieldsin their territories. Israel would be slow to vacate territories it was able tooccupy,unlesssuchwithdrawalstookplaceinthecontextofpeaceagreementsthatassuredsaferbordersbetweenIsraelanditsneighborsJordanandSyria.69For years, Israel tried unsuccessfully to reach an agreement with Jordan toimprove the border in the Latrun area. Israel’s representative on the MixedArmisticeCommissionfeltthatthestatecouldachieveitsobjectivespiecemeal,bysimplyfarmingthelands.“Butwemustmakesurethesestepsdonotmakeheadlines.”Rather,thingsshouldbedonequietly,“bytheJNFmethod,acrebyacre.”Totherepresentative,accesstoMountScopusandtheholyplaceswas“avisionforthefuture.”EshkoldevotedagreatdealofthoughttothesituationonMountScopus.HeaskedthearmyforaplantotakeEastJerusalemandjoinupwithIsraeliforcesonthemount,intheeventthattheJordanianstriedtoconquer
it. Thiswas considered a strategic objective not only for the sake of nationaldignity, but also because itwas generally held that anyone controllingMountScopuswaseasilyinapositiontotakeovertheentireWestBank.A few of the generals who believed that Israel should expand its borders
discussedtakingovertheWestBankandevendebatedwhattodowithitonceitwasconquered.TheoptionswereeithertoannexittoJerusalem,ortosetupaPalestinianbufferstate.ShimonPeres,thenthedeputyministerofdefense,saidthat the day of geography had passed and had given way to the day oftechnology: nuclear deterrence could make border expansion irrelevant.However,evenifIsrael’snuclearcapabilitiesultimatelyledtopeace,ashoped,itmightstillbeadvisabletotakepreemptivestepstoensuremorecomfortableborders. The idea that the IDFmight actively seek to expand Israel’s borderscame up repeatedly during the mid-1960s. The discussion was alwaysconfidentialandthegenerals’positionsdidnotfiguremuchinpublicdiscourse.EshkoltoldtheGeneralStaffthatheruledoutanytakeoverofterritoriesbeyondtheGreen Line and cautioned against thinking of preemptivewar and borderalterations.Buthe, too,wasunable to resist: foryears,hehaddreamedof thewatersoftheLitaniRiverinSyria.*ManyIsraelis,oldenoughtorememberthedaysbeforetheGreenLine,were
loathtointernalizeitasapermanentsettlement.Somenurturedthememoryinthecontextof an ideology that rejectedpartitionof the land. “TheWestBankwasapartofmychildhood landscape,”wrote thehistorianMeronBenvenisti.Born in Jerusalem, he often went hiking with his father in Bethlehem, inHebron,andattheDeadSea.Benvenisti’sfatherwasageographerwhousedtotellhissonstoriesoftreksthroughtheJudeanDesert.Benvenistiwasayoungboy during theWar of Independence. On a January evening in 1948, hewasplayingbasketballwithagroupofHaganamembersintheBeitHakeremschoolgym.Twodayslatertheywerealldead:theywerepartofthefamous“Thirty-five,” a group that had tried to reach the Gush Etzion region of Jewishsettlements,whichhadbeencutofffromJewishPalestine.TheGushsettlementswereconqueredbyJordan.“Wemaynothavefelt,asothersdid,thatthestorybegan thirty-sevenhundredyears ago,whenAbrahampurchased theTombofthePatriarchs[inHebron] fromEphron theHittite.But formygenerationandformyolderfriends,theWestBankwasnotaforeignland,”Benvenistiwrote.“IneverlostEretzIsrael,”AzariahAlonreflected.AmemberoftheMahanot
Olim youth movement, Alon was known for his weekly radio broadcast onSaturday mornings, in which he directed his listeners on hikes around thecountry.EachIndependenceDay,hedevotedhisprogramtoasitebeyond the
GreenLine.In1967, twoweeksbeforethewar,hespokeofWadiKelt, in theWestBank.Mahanot Olim was part of the labor movement. It went through many
incarnations,anditsmembersfoundedseveralkibbutzim.Thepartytowhichitwas affiliated, starting in the fifties, Ahdut Ha’avoda, was led by a muchadmiredwhite-bearded oldman namedYitzhakTabenkin. Two of its primaryfigureswereinfluentialministers,IsraelGaliliandYigalAllon.Sincethe1920s,Tabenkinhadopposedallplanstopartitionthecountry;andhehadagreedonlyreluctantlytothe1947partitionplan.HispartyobjectedtoIsrael’swithdrawalfrom the territories occupied in October 1956. The right to control the GazaStrip and the Sinai Peninsula stemmed, Tabenkin claimed, from the TenCommandmentsandfromthebloodofthesoldierskilledduringthecampaign.HecomparedNassertoHitler,andthewithdrawaltotheMunichagreement.MahanotOlimmemberstookexcursionsalloverthecountryaspartoftheir
efforts to implement their right to the land. “I learned my love of the landthrough my feet,” recalled Rina Klinow. “Every beautiful spot we hiked to,everylovelycorneroflandscapeoutsidethecommunitieswherewecamped—wewoulddecidetogobackwhenthetimecameandbuildasettlement.”ThepoetHaimGourialsoparticipatedinthesetrips;hesaidtheyadded“avaluablecomponenttothesecretoftheancientconnectionbetweenthePeopleofIsraelandtheLandofIsrael.”Theexcursionswerepartofthecollectivebiographyofthefoundinggeneration,anongoing initiationceremonyofsorts, inwhich thehiker seemed to be “entering a covenant with the land and discovering itsexpansesanditstimes.”ThiswasbothanemotionalphenomenonandanaspectoftheZionistethos.“Weturnedouraffairwiththelandscapeintotheprimaryforceinouremotionalworld,”wroteBenvenisti.“Butwewerenotallowedtolove the landwith a quiet love, because our familiaritywith itwas an act ofoccupation:weweretaughtthatbyhikinginthedesert,wewereconquering—withourfeet—itsmountainsandvalleys.Theroadsandmountainpathswouldbecome Jewishwhenan Israeli vehicledrove across them.Archaeology,bird-watching,orplant identificationwasnotsimplyahobbyoraprofessionbutameans of taking title. Knowledge of the homeland and cultivation of thewildernesswere firmerevidenceofownership thanapropertydeed.After all,whomakesanefforttocultivatesomethingthatisnothisproperty?”Inschools,geographywascalledhomelandclass.71
TheestablishmentofthestatewithintheGreenLinedidnotalterthetendencythusexpressed.AfewhundredmembersoftheScoutssetofftoreenactthe1948battles on the hills of Jerusalem, defending their camp against an attack by a
gangof“Arabs.”Thestudentsthenreenactedthefailedattemptofthe“Thirty-five” to reach theGushEtzionsettlements.Since theareawasnowinJordan,the Scouts’ goalwas an abandonedArab village not far from their camp.Ontheirway,theymet“anelderlyArab”(oneofthecounselors)whomisdirectedthem, in accordancewith the story the students knew. In 1967, on the eve ofIndependence Day, prior to the war, a hundred students from the Or EtzionyeshivaheldaraceinmemoryoftheGushEtzionfighters.TheracebeganatapointwheretheGushwasvisibleandendedattwosettlements,EinZurimandMasuotYitzhak,which had been part of the originalGush bloc but had been“resettled”inthesouthofthecountry.In 1966, Nathan Shaham and Shmuel Katz published a coffee-table book
entitledA Journey Through Eretz Yisrael. Although Shaham, the author, andKatz, the illustrator, limited themselves to territorywithin the state’s borders,theywaxednostalgicforthedayswhenthelandwaswideopenandexpansive.The Yehiam newsletter reported that the book was extremely sought-afteramong kibbutz members. Amos Oz described kibbutzniks hiking among theruinsofanArabvillage,searchingforancientshardsandother“junk,”asifonlysuch a site, frombefore 1948, could represent the truePalestine. “The borderitself is invisible, and there is no knowing preciselywhere the State of IsraelendsandtheKingdomofJordanbegins,”wroteaYediotAharonotreporterwhovisitedthebordervillageofMeiAmi.“Thesamehills,thesamelandscape,thesamewonderfulmountain air—one perfect continuum of a beautiful picture.”This attitude had led a few adventurers to trespass into Jordan, attempting toreach Petra. The longing for the “RedRock” of that city fostered a romanticlegendof illegalbordercrossing,whichfired the imaginationsofmanyyoungpeople.72
Israelistudentswerenot,onthewhole,explicitlytaughttolongforterritoriesbeyond theGreenLine.But some textbooks sentadoublemessage, and therewere frequent discussions of how schools should present the issue. In aninterview with Maariv in 1963, the archaeologist Yigal Yadin said, “Oureducators,astheystandbeforethechildren,andourauthors,astheywritetheirbooks,willhavetodecide:Shehem[Nablus]—isitoursornot?TheOldCity—is it the past or the future? Inmy opinion, the foundation of all education istruth.Wemusttellourchildrenthetruth:Hebronisnotourstoday,butitwasinthepast,whenKingDavidruled.Thefactthatwehavehadtogiveituptodaydoesnotmeanweshoulderaseitfromourpeople’shistory.”73
Studentscouldinternalizetheconceptof“GreaterIsrael”justbyglancingat
theseriesofblueplasticbinderspublishedbytheIDF’seducationcorpsinMay1959,undertherubric,“IsraelfromDantoEilat.”Twoofthebookletsincludedthe Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, and three the regions of Judea andSamaria. There were dozens of pictures of Jerusalem, but only two showedsimply its Israeli part. Children who referred to the Speaking Maps atlasillustrated by Friedl Stern would have needed to be particularly attentive tonotice that Judea, Samaria, and Gaza did not belong to the State of Israel,becauseStern’s illustrations gave themaps an attractively colorful uniformity.SomeoftheArabtownsandvillagesbeyondtheborderwerelabeledwiththeirHebrewnamesfrombiblicaltimes,includingEshtamoa,forSamuavillage.TheGazaStripwasincludedinthemapoftheAshkelonregion,withanotereading,“ThecityofSamsonissurroundedbyhostilerefugees.”Theeditorsoftheatlas,publishedjointlywiththeMinistryofLabor,remindedyoungreadersthat,asaresult of the Sinai Campaign, Israel had controlled the Gaza Strip for fourmonths.“Wehadtowithdrawfromit,butthereisstillgreatconfidenceandfaithinabetter future. . . .”OfJerusalem, theysaidonecould lookout froma tallbuilding to the Judean Desert, Bethlehem, and Anatot—all of which were inJordan:“Expansiveareas, rich inmemories, that areunderenemycontrol andtowardwhichoureyesgazelongingly.”Many children during those years playedConcentration, a real estate board
game that was a precursor in Israel to Monopoly. Concentration includedtransactions involving a house in Hebron and a hotel in Jenin, or a house inNablusandahotelinGaza,alloutsideIsraeliterritory.Palestinewasdepictedasone undivided entity, as it had beenwhen the gamewas invented during theBritishMandate.*Duringthesixties,YitzhakTabenkinrepeatedlymaintainedthat thepartition
ofthecountrywouldonedayberevoked,eitherpeacefullyorbywar.Hedidnotbackdownfromthisposition,althoughhedidsoftenitforpoliticaladvantage:while negotiating an alignment withMapai before the 1965 elections for theSixthKnesset,hispartydidnotbringup the issue.But in June1966,hesaid,“Anywherewarwillallow,weshallgotorestorethecountry’sintegrity.”ThiswasalsotheapproximatepositionofMenachemBegin,theleaderofHerut.Begin’spartywascommittedtoZe’evJabotinsky’sviews,alsorootedinthe
twenties, thirties, and forties. Herut members sang an anthem with lyrics byJabotinsky:“LikethepillarsupportingabridgeLikethebackboneofmanTheaxisandbondofmycountry / Is theJordan, theholyJordan.”Thisversewasfollowedbytherefrain,“TwobankshastheRiverJordan.Oneisours,theotheronetoo.”†Inthefifties,Herut’slogowasamapofIsraelwithahandgraspinga
bayonetedrifleanditboretheslogan“OnlyThus.”Thedayafterthedeclarationof independence,Beginsaid,“TheStateof Israelhasbeenfounded,but letusremember that the homeland has not yet been liberated. . . . The soldiers ofIsraelwillyetraiseourflagabovetheTowerofDavid;ourplowwillyettillthefields of theGilead.”Begin often demanded that territories beyond theGreenLine be “liberated,” and hemaintained thatHebron andBethlehem, ShechemandevenAmmanwereallanintegralpartoftheJewishhomeland.Hisparty’sdailynewspapermadeapointofreferringtotheKingdomofJordaninquotationmarks,andgave thesametypographic treatment to the titleof“King”whenitprecededthenamesoftherulersofJordan,Abdullah,Talal,andHussein.UpontheIDF’swithdrawalfromterritoriesoccupiedintheSinaiCampaign,
Begin chastised Ben-Gurion’s government: “You have abandoned a liberatedpart of the homeland and delivered it knowingly to the enemy.” Like AhdutHa’avoda, which underplayed its views on Greater Israel when it entered analignment with Mapai, Begin was astute enough to establish Gahal, aparliamentary bloc with the Liberal party, without compelling his partners toaccepthisposition.ThedemandforGreaterIsraelobligatedonlyHerut,nottheGahalbloc.*“Theintegrityofthehomelandisanirrelevantslogan,andinfactisnopoliticalsloganatall,”concludedHa’aretz.ButinMarch1966,BeginwasstillspeakingintheKnessetofIsrael’sright tothehomeland,“thelandofourforefathers, which is one,” and the members of his party’s youth movement,Betar,werebroughtupinthisspirit.ConqueringPalestinewasatthecenterofthediscussionthatyearattheannualconferenceforbiblicalresearch;amongthelecturerswas a Jerusalem scholar named Israel Eldad,who presented a paperentitled“ConqueringtheLandasaMoralAct.”SimilarviewswereexpoundedbyafewofthereligiousZionist leaders.InasermononIndependenceDayin1967, Rabbi Zvi YehudaKook told students at theMercazHaravYeshiva inJerusalemhowhehadgrieveduponlearningoftheUNpartitionresolutiontwodecadesearlier.“WhereisourHebron—areweforgettingit?”heasked.“Whereis our Shechem? Are we forgetting it? And where is our Jericho—are weforgettingit?AndwhereistheeasternbankoftheJordan?”77
•••
THEDAYBEFORETHEINCIDENTTHATLEDTOTHESAMUAOPERATION,YEDIOTAharonotprominentlyfeaturedastoryrelatedtothe“weepingforgenerations”—aphrasethatreferredtogrievingforthelossofterritoryleftoutsidethe1949cease-fireborders. The background was a chapter in a biography of Ben-Gurion, by
MichaelBar-Zohar.According toBar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion claimed that he hadproposedconquering theWestBankduring theWarof Independence,but thattheproposalwasrejectedbythegovernment.Thearticlesentaclearmessage:aweak andhesitant governmenthad curbed a strong, battle-ready army.On theeve of Independence Day in 1967Maariv published an interview with YigalYadin.TheformerIDFchiefofstaffdidnotoftenspeakpubliclyabouttheWarof Independence, so the interview was widely read and prompted heatedresponses.Yadinprojected sorrow, regret, disappointment, and evenpainoverthefactthattheOldCityandotherareashadnotbeenconquered.HisstatementswereinterpretedasapersonalattackonDavidBen-Gurion.YitzhakRabinalsoassumedthatBen-GurionhadnotwantedtoconquertheWestBank.“WhateverBen-Guriontrulydesired,hecouldhavemadehappen,”hesaid.Thatsameweek,Ha’aretzalsorecalledtheomissionsof1948.Ze’evSchiff,
themilitarycorrespondent,publishedapieceabout thefailureof thebattleforJenin,theessenceofwhichwasregretthatthecityhadnotbeentakenandtheIDF had withdrawn. One reader reinforced this thesis: had the IDF beenvictoriousandtakenthecity,theArabfrontontheJordanianborderwouldmostlikely have collapsed, the Iraqi army would have retreated, East Jerusalemwould have been liberated, and the JordanRiverwould have become Israel’sborder.ThisscenariowasassumedtobepreferabletotheexistenceoftheGreenLine.78
6.REFLECTIONS:“WEHAVENOTHINGTOOFFER”
AsriotsinJordanintensifiedinthewakeoftheSamuaoperation,Israeliopinionmakers and officials were thinking about how to divvy up the spoils. HerzlRosenblumofYediotAharonotwroteofthepossibilitythatEgyptianandSyrianforceswouldenterJordanandcarveitupbetweenthetwoofthem:“Weshouldalsohaveashareinthebooty.BecausebeforeJordanwas’Egyptian’or’Syrian,’it was part of our own country and of the mandate we were given. Let the’looters’beware.”Israel would not accept a foreign military presence in Jordan, declared
Minister of Labor Yigal Allon, and Moshe Dayan spoke of forming aconfederation comprising Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan. Prime MinisterEshkolproclaimedthatIsraelreservedtherighttoactifthesituationinJordandeteriorated.79 However, King Hussein managed to quell the protests, and areportauthoredbytheIsraeliMinistryofForeignAffairsstatedthathispowerhad been underestimated. The king had in fact increased his prestige by
mobilizing the army to challenge the Israeli forces attacking Samua. Egypt’sfailure to come to his aid constituted a warning to Syria, said the report; ifterroristsoperatedfromwithinSyrianbordersandIsraelattacked,Egyptwouldnot help. The Syrians should be made unequivocally aware of this throughappropriate leaks to the press, proposed the memorandum’s author, MosheSasson,buttheheadlinesappearedevenbeforehehadfinishedwriting.“EgyptdidnotinterfereinSamuaoutoffearofasurpriseIsraeliresponse,”announcedYediot Aharonot. AsMaariv put it, “The cannons roared but the Egypt-Syriadefensepactwasnotimplemented.”80
TheimmediatequestionhadbeenwhatIsraelwoulddoifthedemonstrationshadtoppledHussein’sregimeandbroughtdownthemonarchy.Thiswasnotthefirst timethequestionhadconcernedIsrael.ShimonPereshadoncesuggestedthat ifHussein’s rule collapsed, Israel should “appoint” an IsraeliArab in hisplace.81ThediscussioncontinuedevenafterHusseinsucceededinquellingtheriots. The prime minister’s office accumulated information about Hassan,Hussein’s brother and potential heir. Foreign Minister Eban thought that theWestBankcouldnotexistasanindependentstateanditwasthereforeunlikelythat Jordanwould be dismantled, although itmight become a republic. “Howbig is theWestBank?”Eshkolenquired. IfJordanwere tobecomearepublic,Ebancontinued,itmightaskSyriaandEgypttopostforceswithinitsterritory.Israel should be prepared for any eventuality. In response to a request by thedirector general of the ForeignMinistry that there be some “planning,” Ebanreplied, “We could meet to analyze a few paradigms.” But Rabin respondedimpatiently,“Wecancomeupwith200speculations,”buttherewasnowaytoknow exactly what would happen in Jordan. Rabin did not think an Iraqibattalion entering Jordanwith tankswould compel Israel to “descend” on thecountry,andhealsoexpressedconfidencethattheUSSRwouldnotinterfereifIsrael attacked Syria, even if it reachedDamascus. “Theymay threaten us atworst,” he believed. He seemed to be satisfied with the existing contingencyplans.ButAharonYariv,headof the IDF intelligencebranch,was in favorof“sitting down together” to outline a plan of action.82 In fact, Yariv wasproposingdeliberationsthatwerealreadygoingon.ThemostcomprehensivepoliticalandstrategicdiscussionsprecedingtheSix-
DayWarbeganinNovember1966andconcludedinJanuary1967.Thereweretwoworkinggroups.ThefirstexaminedrelationswithJordan,thesecondthosewith Egypt. The participants, representatives of the Mossad, the IDF’sintelligencebranch,andtheForeignMinistry,laboredtoformulatejointanswerstoaseriesofquestionsposedbyAbbaEban.Thedocumentstheypreparedwere
approvedbyRabinandEshkol,andthereforereflectIsrael’sthinkingsixmonthsbeforethewar.TheNationalDefenseCollegealsoheldextensivedebatesonthefutureofrelationswithJordan,theconclusionsofwhichwerepresentedtothechiefofstaff.Thesurvivingprotocolsandpositionpapersreflectcertaindisagreements,but
onthewholethediscussionswerevirtuallydevoidofemotionallyorpoliticallycharged arguments. They were conducted in secret, although a few Knessetmembers,journalists,andprofessorswereultimatelyincluded.TheMossadrepresentative,YitzhakOron,askedwhetherIsraelshould“clean
up” theWestBank,meaning to put an end to Palestinian centers of hostility.ShlomoGazit, from army intelligence, said opinions on this in the IDFweredivided.SomethoughtHussein’sregimewasharmfultoIsraelbecauseaslongasheruled,IsraelcouldnotinvadetheWestBank,which,initscurrentstateofunrest,constituted“acatastropheforIsrael.”OthersbelievedthatHusseinwas“good for Israel.”Gazitpresented thecompromiseposition:“The IDFacceptsthecurrentsituation,butwouldwelcomeanopportunitytochangethestatusquoto create a new andmore comfortable one.” Under the present conditions ofhostilecoexistence,headded,theGreenLinerepresentedathreattothecenterofthecountry.ButweretheIDFtooccupytheWestBank,Israelwouldhavetoconsider what to do with it and, more specifically, whether it could annex it“without the annexed territory becoming a cancer that would gnaw away atIsrael from the inside.” In any event, Israel would not be annexing emptyterritory. To neutralize the dangers of theWest Bank, continued Gazit, Israelshould found an independent Palestinian state that would be completelydependenton the IDFfordefenseand internalorder; inaddition, Israelwouldoverseeitsforeignpolicy.MordehaiGazitoftheForeignMinistry,thebrotherofShlomoGazit frommilitary intelligence,respondedunenthusiastically that thiswouldbe“apuppetregime.”ThedocumentShlomoGazitofferedonbehalfoftheIDFgaveaPalestinian
protectorate only a slim chance. He presented another option, which heconsideredlessadvantageoustoIsrael:topostemergencyforcesontheborder,whetheraspartofaninternationaladministrationthatwouldgoverntheareaorasabufferbetweenIsraelandJordan.Nosucharrangementwaslikelytoensurea long-term solution, he said, and its purposewould be to afford a transitionperiod “until the introduction of unconventional weapons into our region.”83TheGazitbrothersarguedoverthisquestion.ShlomoGazitsaidthattheIDF’sresponses were appropriate “at least as long as the region does not enter thenuclearage,”andadded,“Therearethosewhobelievethatthemomentweenter
the nuclear age there will no longer be any thought of destroying Israel.”Mordehai Gazit responded, “As for the matter of nuclear weapons raisedrepeatedlyinthedocument,Idonotbelieveitholdstheanswertoterrorism.”84
In a lecture at the National Defense College,Mordehai Gazit spoke of thepossibilitythatIsraelwouldoccupytheWestBank.Thecountriesoftheworldwould not allow annexation, he said, and added the following consideration:“We had better be honest with ourselves. We are not interested today inannexing theWest Bank, because our small state would immediately face anextremelydangeroussituation.WhatwouldwedoifthepopulationintheWestBank,ourswornenemy,didnotfleeacrosstheborder?”85
In December 1966, General Elad Peled, the commander of the NationalDefenseCollege,sentahighlyconfidentialmemotothechiefofstaff,entitled“JordanasaMilitaryandPoliticalProblemfor Israel.”Peledfelt that thebestsituation for Israel was Jordan’s continued existence as an independent andrelativelyweakstate.Hedidnot ruleouthaving toattackJordan—if thekingweretobetoppled,ifhesenttanksintotheWestBank,orifJordanenteredanactive anti-Israel coalition and foreign Arab forces were placed in the WestBank.Inanyoftheseeventualities,Israelwouldnotconfineitselftoadefensiveposture, but would initiate preemptive attacks. The assumption was that thismeantoccupying theWestBank,andPeledreviewedat length thequestionofwhattodowithit.Thedocumentwasadecisivelysecularanddemocraticone,withnomentionofJerusalem.Peledopposedanyoccupation,reasoningthattheworldwouldneitherrecognizetheWestBank’sannexationbyIsraelnoracceptapuppetregimethere.TheUNcouldnotgoverntheWestBank,soIsraelwouldhavetodosobyitself.AnyoccupationoftheWestBankwouldultimatelyleadtoabinationalstateinallofthecountry.ThecollegehadcommissionedastudyoftheWestBank’seconomicviability
andtheeffectsofoccupationonIsrael’seconomy.ZviZussman,whoauthoredthestudy,concludedthatIsraelcouldaffordtooccupyandannextheWestBank,economicallyspeaking.However,employinganoldZionisttermthathadfallenoutofuse,Peledargued that“theYishuv”—theJewishcommunity inprestatePalestine—would move into white-collar professions, while Arab laborerswould focuson “manualwork,”with the economic and social implicationsofsuchadivision.Peledalsoanalyzedat length thedemographicsignificanceoftheWestBank.Atthelatest,hefound,theArabpopulationwouldcatchupwiththe Jewish population in 2050, but this wasmore likely to occur as early as2035, perhaps sooner in certain areas of the country. He assumed that Israel
would not deport theArab population of theWestBank and that it could notdeprivethemofcivilrights.AblocofthirtytofortyArabseatswouldemergeintheKnesset.ArabswouldbecomethesecondlargestoreventhelargestpartyintheKnesset,Peledwrote. Israelwouldhave toaccepta largenumberofArabministers, and at least one of them would have to receive an “important”ministryoverseeinglargebudgets.SomeambassadorshipswouldhavetogotoWestBankresidents,as“thesepositionscannotbegivenonlytoourownpeoplefor long.” Some Jewish groups might try to withhold these rights from theArabs,whowould in turnrevolt, forcing theJewishmajority toenactan iron-fisted policy that would include imposing harsh regulations and creatingrestricted areas of residence. This process could deteriorate into racism andoppression,which“we,asapeopleandasJews,abhor,andwhichmaycastthestate in a dubious light and make its international position difficult.” Theconceptof“restrictedareasofresidence”evokedthelimitationsondomicileandmovementimposedonRussianJewsundertheczars.The Arabs, Peled continued, might form opposition movements, and Israel
wouldthenhavetotakestepscharacteristicof“apolicestate.”IftheArabswerenotenlistedintheIDF,theiryoungpeoplemightcometoconstituteahardcoreofnationalliberationfighters.TheconcentratedareasofArabpopulationsmightserve as shelters for terrorist bases. Itwould also be necessary to provide theArabswith education.Within a short while, therewould emerge an educatedArab class demanding white-collar jobs. The separation between Jews andArabscouldnotbepreservedforlong.Arabswouldbeginlivinginthebigcitiesalongthecoast,andpoverty-strickenArabsuburbswoulddevelop.Thiswouldgiverisetosocialproblemsnecessitatinglargeexpenditures.TheArabswouldinfluence thecultureof those Israeliswith similar culturalorigins,namely theMizrahim.Therewouldbeintermarriage,Peledfurthercautioned.86
The deliberations over a possible occupation of theWest Bank and Jordanwere thorough and profound, taking into consideration both advantages and,more often, disadvantages. In the end, everyone agreed that it would be toIsrael’s advantage for King Hussein to remain in power: he had, in effect,accepted Israel’s existence, so Israel naturally had an interest in strengtheninghisregime.HusseinwasalsoendeavoringtounifytheWestBankwiththeEastBankandwasencouragingWestBankPalestinianstomigratetotheeast.Overthe preceding fifteen years, their numbers had reached 200,000. Moreover,Hussein allowed Palestinians to emigrate from Jordan, and approximately100,000 of them had done so. “This is a positive phenomenon from Israel’spoint of view,” concluded the final position paper that emerged from that
winter’s debates. In fact, Hussein was acting to eradicate the Palestinianquestion,and thiswasanexcellent reason—indeed,anexistentialone—not totaketheWestBankawayfromhim.87
THEWORKINGGROUPDISCUSSINGTHECONFLICTWITHEGYPTALSOINCLUDEDPEOPLEfromtheForeignMinistry,armyintelligence,andtheMossad.ThedebateoverEgypt was initiated by Eban, following a meeting in New York with anAmericanbusinessmannamedRobertAnderson.AfriendofNasser’s,AndersonhadmadeunsuccessfulattemptstomediatebetweenhimandDavidBen-Gurioninthepast.InAugust1966,AndersontoldEbanthatNasser’sapproach“hadnotchangedfortheworse,”andEbanheardfromothersthatNasser’spositionwasconsidered“moderate.”In lightof this,andofNasser’sproclamation that“thetime is not right” forwarwith Israel, Eban asked for an analysis ofwhethertherewasachanceofnegotiation.AttheendofNovember1966,roughlytwoweeksaftertheSamuaoperation,
therewasasuddenflare-upalong thenormallyquietEgyptianborder,and theIsraeliairforceshotdowntwoEgyptianMiGs.Inanotherdevelopment,IsraeliintelligencelearnedthatEgyptwasreinforcingitstroopsinthenorthernSinai.TheIDFcalledupsometwothousandreservesoldiers,butreleasedthemafterafewdays.88
The participants in the Egypt consultationwere given twoworking papers,one prepared by IDF intelligence and classified as “confidential,” the otherwrittenbytheMossadandclassifiedas“highlyconfidential.”Armyintelligenceasserted thatEgyptaspired todestroy Israeland that therewasnochance thatNasser would revise his position. Only deterrence would convince him thatIsraelcouldnotbedestroyed,andthatrecognitionmightonedayleadhimtoawillingness to accept its existence. Israel could achieve this objective solelythrough military strength. The Mossad agreed that Egypt still aspired toeradicateIsrael,butalsoexaminedtheprospectsfortalks.IfIsraelcouldprovidehundreds ofmillions of dollars in economic aid,Egyptmight be interested inrelations.ButinaidingEgypt,Israelwouldbestrengtheningit,againstIsrael’sowninterests.TheMossadsuggestedthatIsraelcouldencourageEgypttotonedownitspropaganda,andperhapsoffertoestablishaPalestinianstate“inplaceofJordanorasaresultofJordan’sdismantling.”Therewasonemoreoption:Israelcouldoffertohaltitsnuclearprogram,in
returnforEgypt’sendingthearmsraceandleavinginplacethecurrentbalanceofpower.Egypt,theMossadargued,laggedbehindIsraelbyfivetotenyearsin
thisarea,andtheattempttocatchupwasaheavyburdenonitseconomy.TheMossad’sconclusionwasthat“atthepresenttime,theonlysignificantinterestsharedbythetwosidesistobefoundinthisissue.”ButtheMossadestimatedthatEgyptwouldnotwishtolimititsmilitarypowerwithrespecttootherstatesin the region. “The question that comes up repeatedly is whether Israel iscapableofexploitingitsadvantageoverthenextfewyearsinthenucleararea,putting pressure onEgypt. This question is today perhaps themost importantone in theoverall relationshipbetween IsraelandEgypt.”Bothpartieshadaninterestinpreventingaccidentalwar,buteveninthisregarditwasdoubtfulthatEgyptwould agree to a fail-safe arrangement, theMossad believed, and so itconcludedthatthechanceoftalksoccurringwasslim.Theagencydidnotruleout, however, the possibility of an “open channel,” a pipeline that could beactivatedfromtimetotime.AnotherargumentarosebetweenthetwoGazitbrothersonthisissue.Shlomo,
fromarmyintelligence,heldthat therewasnochancethatEgyptwouldreviseitspositionon Israel.Heposited two theses that,withina fewmonths, turnedouttobemistaken.First,hesaid,“itiscleartousthattheEgyptianscannotriskwaragainstIsraelforthenextfiveyears.”Second,“whileinthepastitwasclearthatIsraelcouldoccupytheSinai,itisnowapparentthatiftheEgyptianarmywere to concentrate its forces there, Israel couldnot conquer it.”He thereforeemphasizedtheneedfor“qualitativesuperiority”ofanunspecifiednature,andsaid that in the meantime Israel must maintain peace along the borders.However,MordehaiGazit, thediplomat, searched forways toopen talkswithNasser.“AtsomepointwewillevenbeabletoinfluencetheU.S.presidenttosupply food aid to Nasser, reasoning that in return we could strengthen ourrelationship with him.” His brother objected. Such an initiative could causemore harm than good, he said. But, like theMossad, he did not rule out anattemptatsecrettalkswiththeEgyptians.*One ForeignMinistry official asserted, “If Israel obtains atomicweapons it
willbesafefromdestruction.Ifitdoesnotobtainsuchweapons,itmustnotbesatisfiedwiththecurrentsituationandmustacttothwartNasser.”TheministryofficialswereslightlymoreoptimisticthanthemilitaryandMossadpeople,butthey were basically in agreement: Nasser had not abandoned his dream ofdestroying Israel, and the safestway of stopping himwas to preserve Israel’sdeterrentforces.ThiswasalsotheviewoftheNationalDefenseCollege,aftermonthsofstudyingthetopic.“ThecurrentregimeinEgyptseestheobliterationofIsraelasoneofitsfundamentalpolicyobjectives.”90
This, ineffect,concluded thedebateonEgypt.But theheadof theMossad,
MeirAmit,believedthatthepessimismprojectedbytheteam’sfinaldocumentnecessitated furtherexamination:“The truth is that it is sopessimistic thatweourselveswerealarmedafterreadingit.”AndsooneeveningheinvitedafewKnessetmemberstohishome,aswellastwodistinguishedprofessorsfromtheHebrewUniversityandthreecommentatorsfromthedailypress.Theyweremetthere by officials from the Foreign Ministry, the army intelligence, and theMossad.TheidentityoftheheadoftheMossadwasoneofIsrael’stopsecrets.Knesset
members and senior media figures probably knew who he was, but Amit’sopening of his home for such a consultationwas an extraordinary event. Hisintellectual open-mindedness reflected a fundamental characteristic of Israelisociety:theseniorelitewascomposedofpeoplewhowereprivytostatesecrets,andtheyallknewoneanother,trustedoneanother,andcommonlyboastednotonlyofknowingsecretsbutalsoofkeepingthem.TherewereseniorjournalistswhobelongedtotheIsraeliaristocracyofsecrets,andtheydidnotusuallyfeelthatthisstatusconflictedwiththefundamentalrequirementsoftheirprofession.In this respect, Amit was not taking a real risk by inviting them. The threejournalistswereDr.Shlomo (“Poles”)Gross fromHa’aretz,ShmuelSchnitzerfromMaariv, andArelGinai fromYediot Aharonot. Amit told the group thattheirgoalwasself-examination,andaskedKnessetmemberYaakovRiftin,fromMapam,tobegin.Mapamwasinthecoalitiongovernment,butRiftinwasknownforhisdovish
positions. He suggested that Israel support the return of Palestinian refugees,“under specified conditions,” and proposed “saying something about afederation with Jordan.” He believed that contact with Egypt could be madethroughneutralcountries,andheofferedafewothersuggestions.Buthedidnotdeludehimself:hedidnotexpectpeace toprevail,andwouldbecontentwiththeavoidanceofwar.Dr.GrossraisedtheideathatIsraelmightallowEgypttotake control of the entire Middle East; in return, Egypt would “stop thisnonsenseabouttherefugees”andrecognizetheStateofIsrael“asitis.”Buthedid not truly believe this could happen: “We have nothing to offer.” Knessetmember Yizhar Harari, from the Independent Liberals, had an originalproposition:“Itisworthwhiledevelopingnuclearweapons,sothatwewilloneday be able to give them up.” But like Gross, he had little faith in his ownproposal: “I do not think that we can compromise [withNasser] onmuch ofanything.” Schnitzer brought up the territorial claims. While Israel couldperhapsrenouncesomepartsofPalestineinreturnforpeace,hedidnotbelievethat doing sowas practical. “We cannot buy anything fromNasser,” he said,
because the Egyptian president’s position was a matter of patriotism, andpatriotism was not for sale, not even with Nasser. The sociologist S. N.Eisenstadt said therewasnochanceof abroadagreement, butonlyof “smalldeals”over“insubstantial things” thatwouldbringabout thecreationof trust:one could unload as much baggage as possible, thaw things out, and try tomaneuverinalimitedway,“veryslowly.”Inthemeantime,therewasnothingtobegainedbythemedia’shystericalpropagandaagainstNasser.Therestoftheparticipants,includingaprominentMiddleEasternscholar,andanotherKnessetmemberfromMapam,agreedtherewasnochanceoftalkswithNasser.AndsotheguestsoftheMossadchiefparted.MostIsraeliswouldagreewith
their basic conclusion, which was partly based on a statement attributed toNasserhimself,inaninterviewwithLifemagazinethatwaspublishedinfullinHebrew. The only way to solve the conflict with Israel, said Nasser, was toreturnalltherefugeestotheirhomes.TheIsraelis,afterall,wantedimmigrantsfrom other countries, such as Russia, so why should they not take in thePalestinians?Nasserassertedthatalltherefugeeswishedtoreturn,incasetherewas any doubt. He understood, of course, that this was not feasible, but heclaimedthatfinancialcompensationcouldnotbeconsideredasubstitutefortheright of return. If thiswas the case, theAmerican interviewer suggested, thenwarwasinevitable.True,Nasserconfirmed,butheaddedthattherewasnorush:the Egyptians had inhabited the Nile Valley for thousands of years, and hadalwaysbeenvictorious.Timewasontheirside.Herepeatedthisthesisoverthenext months.91 The Israeli army, meanwhile, was conducting extensivediscussionsonthefutureofrelationswithSyria.
CHAPTER4THESYRIANSYNDROME
1. CONFRONTATIONS I: “IS DISHON WORTH DYINGFOR?”
Atthebeginningof1966,SyrianartilleryshelledthenorthernkibbutzimofTelKatzir,Gadot,EinGev,andothers.“Weweren’tafraid,”achildfromKibbutzHa’onwasquotedassayinginMaariv,“butwewantedtogooutsideandpickflowers.”Thechildrendidnotunderstandwhyplowingtheirfieldswasleadingtobloodshed.“Whydotheywantourfields?”achildfromTelKatziraskedinYediotAharonot.AccordingtoMaariv,farminglandsalongtheborderwasthemostcourageousjoboftheday.“Thesestrong,youngtractordrivers,operatingarmored tractors, and thesekibbutzmembersgoingabout theirdailybusiness,aretheheroeswhoprotectthesovereigntyofvulnerablesitesalongtheborder.”Thepaperofferedahistoricalperspective:“WorldWarIIfirstsawtheJapanesekamikazepilots.ThesesuicidalpilotscrashedintoAlliedshipsasiftodeclare,’Letusdie[likeSamson]withthePhilistines!’”Unlikethem,saidthepaper,thetractordriverswerenotsuicidal:theywereyoungmenwithathirstforlife.Butthey knew full well that the job must be done and that it demanded greatcourage,“nolessthanthekamikazefliersdemonstratedintheirtime.”Over the next fewmonths, tensions between Israel andSyria increased and
the air force was eventually deployed, shooting down a SyrianMiG in July.Ze’ev Schiff of Ha’aretz determined, “There is no chance of reaching anysettlementwiththeSyrians,evenonefromwhichtheSyrianswouldderivethemost benefit.” He explained that, unlike other states, Syria was ruled by“unregulated Arab gangs. Even when there is a chance of reaching anarrangement along the border, we do not know if the person talking with ustodaywillbetheretomorrowtofulfillhispromises.”Afewmonthslater,Schiffwrote,“SyriaisdraggingIsraelintowar.”1Themilitaryheldthesameview.TheconflictwithSyriadevelopedonthreetracks:thestruggleoverwaterand
theSyrians’attemptstodiverttheJordanRiver,quarrelsoveragriculturallandsinthedemilitarizedzonesalongtheborder,andtheFatahoperations.Thewaterissuewas especially dear to Eshkol’s heart, according to the primeminister’smilitary secretary, Israel Lior, since he had once been involved in thedevelopmentofthewatersystem.AccordingtoLior,Eshkolusedtosurprisehis
staff by spontaneously recalling facts and figures about the water supply. Heunderstood thatwithout controloverwater Israel couldnot realize theZionistdream.Eshkollaterattributedtohimselfthephrase,“Waterisblood.”HistorianAmiGluska,who focusedon thequestionof Israel’s strugglewithSyriaovercontrolofthewatersupply,wrote,“Inthebattleoverwater,theIDFgainedaneasy and cost-free victory, managing to disrupt the Arab diversion plan bysimple, cheap, and effective means, striking locally without risking full-scalemilitaryconflict.”ButSyrianattemptstodiverttheJordan’swatersdidnotstopcompletely,andtheIDFoccasionallyintervened.YitzhakRabinlaterconfirmedthat Israel had “staged” at least one incident that enabled it to bomb Syriantractorsworkingonwaterdiversion.*The1949cease-fire linebetween Israel andSyriadidnot correspond to the
international border between the two countries, and there were demilitarizedzones to which neither side was permitted entry. The question was whetherSyrian or Israeli farmers were allowed to work these lands. The disputesometimes seemed to be a conflict between farmers and shepherds, while atother times an argument among experts in international law. Some of thelandowners were Syrian, some Israeli, some were neither. Some of the landsbelongedtoBaha’icitizensofIran.Oneplotwasasquarewithinasquare:theownersof theoutersquarewere Israelis,while theownersof the innersquarewere Syrians who could not farm their land without crossing the Israeliperimeter. Some farmers, both Syrian and Israeli, claimed that over the yearstheyhadpurchased“rightofpossession”tocertainlands.Therewerealsoareasto which Israel and Syria attributed strategic value. Some bore names like“Horseshoe,”“LittleTable,”and“LegumePlot.”2
NotalltheincidentsinthedemilitarizedzoneswereinstigatedbytheSyrians.MosheDayanlaterclaimedthat80percenteruptedasaresultofIsraeliattemptstofarmthere,andthattheywereunnecessary.“Itwouldgolikethis.Wewouldsendatractortoplowtheearthinsomeplotyoucouldn’tdoanythingwith,inademilitarizedzone,knowinginadvancethattheSyrianswouldstartshooting.Iftheydidn’tshoot,wewouldtellthetractortogofarther,untilfinallytheSyrianswouldlosetheirtemperandshoot.Andthenwe’dfireback,andlatersendintheAir Force.” Dayan explained that the tension caused by Israel on the Syrianborderdidnotreflectastrategicapproach,butratherthefactthatIsraeldidnottakethecease-fireseriously.“Wethoughtatthetime,andthiswentonforquiteawhile,thatwecouldmovethecease-firelinesbyusingmilitaryactionthatwaslessextremethanwar.Meaning,takingoversomelandandholdingontoituntiltheenemygaveupandletuskeepit.”Onecouldsaythisrepresented“acertain
naïveté onour part,”Dayan conceded, but one also had to remember that thestate had not existed for very long. Either way, he said, “we thought of thecease-fire lines as a temporary arrangement.”He claimed that theSyrians didnottreattheagreementseriously,either.The head of the UN observer team, General Odd Bull, proposed various
agreements to enable agricultural work to proceed along the border. Rabininvited him to lunch and told him it was difficult to reconcile the Syrians’interestinanagreementwiththeirterroristactivities.Afterlunch,Rabinwenttothe IDF’s Command and Staff School, where he gave a speech that madeheadlines thenextday:“SyriaOperating ’PopularWar’andSabotageUnits inIsrael.”BullwrotetoRalphBunchethatRabin’sdeclarationwouldnotmakehiseffortsanyeasier.3
RelationsbetweenSyriaandFatahwereambiguous.InAugust1966,YaacovHerzog,directorgeneralof theprimeminister’soffice,wrote inhisdiary thatthe Syrians were trying to take over Fatah, restrict its independence, andintegrateitintothearmyasoneofitscommandounits.“Itiscleartousthattherecentoperationsaretheactsofthe[Syrian]unitsandnotFatah,”wroteHerzog,buthealsothoughtitpossiblethatthecommandounitswereoperatingwithouttheknowledgeof theSyrianauthorities. Informationwasscant,Herzogwrote,but hemaintained that Syriawas training Fatah, and that as far as Israelwasconcerned, it was therefore responsible for the organization’s activities. HeassumedthathadtheSyrianarmywantedtoreinthemin,itwouldhavedoneso.Roughly threemonths later, a ForeignMinistry official reported to the IsraeliembassiesthatSyriawasdemandingthatFatahexerciserestraint.Itwasactingout of fear of Israeli retaliation, as well as in response to pressure from theSovietUnion,whichhadan interest inpreventingescalation.Fatah,wrote theofficial, stillmaintainedadegreeof independence, and itwasunclear towhatextenttheSyrianscouldexertcontrol.4
Thenewspapers,theprimarysourceofinformationformostIsraelis,favoredtheopinionthatSyriawastoblame,justastheyhadbelievedinthefiftiesthatEgypt was responsible for commando activities carried out by Palestinianguerrillas.Astatewithacapitalandagovernmentandanarmycouldberelatedto.ThestillnascentPalestinianorganizationsweremoreelusive.Theyhadnoclearaddressandweredifficulttoexplaintoreaders.Thepapersusuallypaintedastraightforwardpicture: theSyrianswereharassingIsraelbecause theyhatedit. When S. Y. Agnon received the Nobel Prize in Literature,Maariv wrote,“There isnodoubt thatbestowing the literaryawardonaHebrewauthorwho
residesinIsraelwillarousemuchangerinDamascus,aswellasinCairoandtheothercentersofhatredandincitement.”5
ONEDAYINTHESUMMEROF1966,ANISRAELINAVYPATROLBOATRANAGROUNDONAsandbanknotfarfromtheeasternshoreofLakeKinneret,intheGalilee.Itwasa sensitive area, as the Syrians were only a few yards away. The patrol hadneeded authorization from the prime minister, and according to Israel Lior,Eshkolhadgivenpermissionbecauseitwasfishingseason,hehadasentimentalfondnessforthefishingbusiness,andthepatrolwouldprovideprotectionforthefishingboats.ButwhenheheardthatthepatrolboathadgonealmostasfarastheSyrian shore,he“grewveryangry.”Thenightbefore,hehadgone tobedlateandsohisstaffchosenottowakehimtoreporttheincident.WhenEshkol’smilitarysecretaryphoned,hewasnotavailabletotakethecall.Buthedidlatertakepartinthetechnicaldiscussionsofhowtofreetheship.WhenhewastoldthattheIDFdidnothavetherightkindofcable,hefumed,“Iwillpersonallygetholdofthecable!”HeaskedforMosheYulish,thedirectoroftheKoorbuildingconcern, recalling having once seen the proper cable in his yards. The storyilluminatesmuchaboutEshkol’sintimaterelationshipwiththearmy,andaboutthe dynamics of the entire Arab-Israeli conflict. Eshkol spent the whole dayoverseeing the efforts, demanding to know where Yulish was and what wasgoingonwiththecable.Healsowantedtoknowexactlyhowthecablewouldbeattached.Rabinhimself,incivvies,boardedtheboat.According toLior,Rabin requestedand receivedpermission fromEshkol to
sendoutpatrol flightsoverSyrianmilitarypostswhile therescueattemptwasunderway. In a report byOddBull, it is unclearwhich country deployed itsaircraftfirst.Eitherway,bothLiorandBullagreedthatthesituationbroughtthetwo countries to the brink ofwar, because at some point an air battle ensuedduring which the Israeli air forced down two Syrian planes. The militarycorrespondent forMaariv, Yaakov Erez, observed the fight: “They descendeduponus likebirdsofprey.Birdsofpreyafterour lives... all theywantedwasblood.”WhentheIsraeliplanesarrived,“Itastedforthefirsttimetheflavorofsweetrevenge.”A downed Syrian plane and its pilot plunged into the Kinneret, which
complicatedthesituationtonoend.Inthebackgroundwasastruggleamongthearmy, the Foreign Ministry, and the UN: Bull wanted to delay any furthermilitary activity, and Eban, who was inclined to agree, bought time bysuspendingcontactwiththeprimeminister’sofficesotheycouldnotfindhim.TheIDFwaspressingformoreaction,withouttheinvolvementoftheUN.“My
impression was that the IDF and the Ministry of Defense did not want UNassistance, if only for reasons of prestige,”wrote Lior. In the end the correctcablewasfound.Effortstofreetheboatwentonallnight,andEshkoldidnotrest,but inthemorninghewastoldtheattempthadfailed.Theboatwasonlyextricatedafewdayslater.AccordingtoBull,Syrianfrogmenhadmanagedinthe meantime to secretly retrieve their pilot’s body. The IDF was startled bywhatitsawastheSyrians’willingnesstoattacktheboat,andtheirboldnesswasinterpretedasanewstageintheconflict.6
“I had a bad feeling,” Lior wrote, reviewing the whole incident. “I keptthinkingYitzhakRabinwassufferingfromwhat’scalledSyriansyndrome.”Asheexplained,thesyndromeaffectsalmostanyonewhodoesmilitarydutyonthenorthernborder,himselfincluded.“Servingonthatborder,oppositetheSyrianenemy, inflamesextraordinaryhatred toward theSyrianarmyandpeople.”Hemaintained that therewasno resemblancebetween Israeli attitudes toward theSyriansandtheattitudetowardtheJordanianoreventheEgyptianarmy.Hedidnot explain the roots of the “Syrian syndrome,” but noted, “We loved to hatethem.”*Eshkolwasawareofthephenomenon.WhenRabinoncesuggestedthatIsrael
begin to farm a piece of land nicknamed the Yellow Plot, Eshkol feared anincident.Rabin tried toreassurehim:“We’renotsendingtanksoranything. Ifthereisanincident,we’llgetout.”Liorwasafraidofatrap:ifanexchangeofgunfiretookplace,therewouldbenochoicebuttobringtanksintothearea,andthiswouldsendthewholeregionupinflames.Eshkolasked,“Whatwillwedoiftheydon’tletusfarmit?”andRabinpromised,“We’llbringyouaproposal.”Eshkol fearedfor thesafetyof the tractordrivers:“Maybeweshouldput fourthicksteelplatesaroundthedriver’scompartment?”Rabinrepliedthatadriverin a steel box without a roof could be hit from above. “Then make a roof,”Eshkol replied; “we’re not going to just send people out there.”Rabin said ifthatwas thecase, itwasbetter tosend inarmored tractors.Heconfirmed thattheirusecouldbeinterpretedasaprovocation,butEshkoloptedforthedrivers’safety.7
Discussions among the General Staff and statements made in other IDFforums confirm Lior’s opinion that the generals viewed Syria as Israel’sforemost enemy and thought it should be attacked forcefully in a large-scalemilitary operation.8 The press was also recruited to give voice to this view.During the eighteenmonths leading up to the Six-DayWar, the papers oftenprinted threatsagainst theSyrians. It isdifficult tosaywhen thereportersand
analysts were speaking for themselves and when they were expressing theopinions of the political or military figures who briefed them. “We aredeterminedtoprotectthecountryfromanyincursion,andanyonewhoinfiltratesourterritorymusttakeintoaccountthatIsraelisecurityforceswillpursuethem,even beyond the border,” wroteHa’aretz in August. That same day,Maarivwrote,“TheborderwillnolongerprotecttheSyrians.”Against this background, a dispute arose betweenRabin andEshkol.Rabin
waspopularwiththemediaandimpressedreaderswithhisanalyticalskills;heoften voiced political opinions. Eshkol generally trusted Rabin—to a greatextent,theIDFchiefofstaffservedasthetrueministerofdefense—buthefeltthat Rabin was stealing the spotlight. Lior thought Eshkol was jealous,observinggraciously,“Eventheprimeministerisonlyhuman.”9
TheIDFweekly,Bamahane,publishedthetraditionalholidayinterviewwiththechiefofstaffonRoshHashana.Eshkolauthorizedtheinterviewonconditionthat Rabin restrict himself to technical military matters and avoid politicalpronouncements.The interview included the following remark: “The responsetoSyrianacts,betheyterrorism,waterdiversion,orborderhostilities,shouldbeaimedatthosewhocarryouttheattacksandattheregimethatsupportsthem.... The problem with Syria, then, is essentially a clash with the regime.” Thechoiceofwordswasunfortunate.Amplifiedbysubsequentinaccuratequotesinthe daily press, they were interpreted as a plot to bring down the Syriangovernment, whose leaders had seized control in a military coup only sixmonthsearlier.Eshkollosthistemperinresponsetotheinterviewanddecidedtoreprimand
Rabin.Hesummonedhimand, inhispresence,askedYaacovHerzogwhathethoughtofthecomments.Herzogwasinanawkwardposition:“Iwonderedwhytheprimeministercouldnotspeakwiththechiefofstaffonhisownandwhyhewas settingme up against him.” The scene reflected the essence of Eshkol’srelationshipwithRabin.Theprimeministerdidnotwantaconfrontationwiththepopularchiefofstaff;heprobablyfearedhewouldlose.RabinclaimedthatMaarivhadtwistedthethingshehadsaidtoBamahane.Heasked tocomparethe two versions. Herzog said that even the Bamahane interview gave theimpressionthatIsraelwasplanningtoattackSyria.Rabinsaidthatthiswasnotso,butthathedidnotmindiftheprimeministerpubliclydisagreed.EshkoltoldHerzog to draft a government statement for the press. Herzog realized thatEshkolhad foundanopportunity toput a stop toRabin’spolitical statements.“Maybe he’ll get the hint and tone down the self-promotion,” Herzog wrote,echoingEshkol’sownthoughts.
ThedifficultiesofphrasingthestatementreflecttheextenttowhichegoandpoliticswereinvolvedinformulatingIsrael’ssecuritypolicy.Theproblemwasthatthreethingshadtobeachievedsimultaneously,wroteHerzog:thestatementmust“imply”a reprimandof thechiefof staff,but“notgo too far”;outlineapolicy toward Syria that would clarify that the chief of staff’s view did notreflectthegovernment’sposition;andyetstillcontainawarningtotheSyrians.ItwasataskwellsuitedtoHerzog’sdiplomaticskills.Thegovernmentmadeonly“slightrevisions”toHerzog’sproposedwording:
Israeldidnotinterferewiththeinternalaffairsofothercountries,anditwantedpeace. The statement thereby seemed to diverge from Rabin’s. The greatestdifficultywaswhat to sayaboutRabinhimself.Herzog suggested thatEshkoldeclare,“Ihavespokenwiththechiefofstaffregardingacertainsectionoftheinterview,” and add that the chief of staff had “explained that in certainnewspapers his words were misinterpreted. Security and politicalannouncements are made solely by the prime minister and the minister ofdefense.”Rabin,arguingthatthenewspapersshouldnotbeaccusedofdistortionso casually, refused to accept this language. That part of the statement wasstruck.Rabinalsodemandedthattheparagraphdiscussinghimcomeattheendof the statement rather than the beginning.And he objected to Eshkol sayingthat Israel did not interferewith other states’ affairs:would it not interfere inJordan if King Hussein were to lose power? Herzog thought this was a“baseless” objection and sought advice fromMinister Israel Galili, himself amasterofrhetoric.TheywenttoseeEshkol,withthreeofhisseniorassistants,and found him with Foreign Minister Eban. Eshkol was asking Eban for aresponsetoaninterpretationofRabin’sinterviewgivenonRadioMoscow.ThentheyalldiscussedwhetherthereprimandHerzogproposedwassevereenough.Rabinmightresign,Ebancautioned.“Theprimeministersighedandcrossedouttheharshestwords.”Furious, Rabin enforced military censorship, to which all the media were
subject,tolimitdiscussionoftheaffair.“Itisinterestingtoseehowextremelysensitivepeopleseemtobeinsensitivewhenitcomestohurtingothers,”Herzogobserved.“Rabinfindsnofaultinhisowninfringementoftheprimeminister’sauthoritydayandnightwithpoliticalstatements,butwhensomeoneelsecallshis behavior into question, theworld turns upside down.”Eshkol said he hadhandledRabinwithkidglovesandwantedtoknowwhyhewaskickingupsuchafuss.10
EshkolhimselfbeganissuingfrequentwarningstoSyria,probablyinpartsoasnottobeoutdonebyRabin.InOctoberhesaidintheKnesset,“Iftheactsof
sabotageandmurdercontinue,wewilltakestepstostopthem.”Thepossibilityof Israel acting against Syria had of course been in the air formonths. “TheSyriansseemtobedoingeverythingtheycantoleaveIsraelwithnochoicebuttohalttheiractsofterrorismandsabotagethroughunequivocalandconspicuousretaliation,”assertedMaariv.11
ONTHESABBATHOFJANUARY14,1967,FATAHMENSTRUCKATAREMOTEMOSHAVNOTfarfromtheLebaneseborder.MostIsraelishadprobablyneverheardofDishon,inhabitedprimarilybyimmigrantsfromNorthAfrica.ThistimethePalestiniansattackedwith a force that prompted even the normally restrainedHa’aretz todeclare,“WecannotignorethepsychologicalimplicationsofwhathappenedinDishon.” One resident, Yosef Cohen, was killed when he stepped on a minehiddeninawoodenbox.Cohenwasaneighteen-year-oldsoldierhomefortheweekend.Theminehadbeenlaidinthelocalsoccerfieldandexplodedduringaleaguematch.Anotherundetonatedminewas foundon the field.A fewhoursearlier, anexplosivedevicehadblownupnear themoshav’spumping facility,andsubsequentsearchesrevealedadditionaldevices.12
Theattackaffectedtheresidents’morale.YediotAharonotwonderedontheirbehalf,“IsDishonworthdyingfor?”Therewasadangerthattheywouldleavethemoshav. “It’s time to take control,” the paper continued, and then tried todivine what UN observers might be thinking: Dishon, they feared, mightbecomeasmall-scaleSarajevo,adotonthemapthatstartedanall-outwar.ThemilitarycommentatorforHa’aretzreported,“Israelisconsideringitsresponse.”AccordingtoIsraeli intelligence, theSyriansfeared thatanattackmightoccur“withinminutes.”13
Roughlytwoweeksearlier,theIDFhadrenewedapracticeoffiringatSyrianfarmers and shepherdswho crossed into the demilitarized zones.This usuallyinvolvedsmallarmsandwasmeanttoforcetheSyriansback,atacticreferredtoinmilitaryparlanceasbufferfire.14Overtheprevioussixmonthstherehadbeena cease-fire in the area,mediatedby theUN,butRabinmanaged to convinceEshkol that the agreement served Syrian interests: the farmers and shepherdswere expanding their land, while Fatah continued to receive support. TheSyrians responded immediately to the Israeli fire, deploying tanks and heavyartilleryagainst tractors in fieldsbelonging toKibbutzHa’onandKibbutzTelKatzir.Thegovernmentrestrainedthearmyatfirst,forbiddingitfromreturningtankfire.Thepolicyofrestraintwaschampionedbytheministeroftheinterior,HaimMoshe Shapira. There was a distinct confrontation between doves andhawks,and themilitaryeventuallywonout.OverShapira’sprotests, thearmy
wasallowedtorespondwithtankfireandEshkolwasauthorizedtodeploytheairforce.Then,withindays,theSyriansopenedtankfireonanabandonedspotcalled
Nutra. Eshkol refused to allow a response—thus, Rabin claimed, diminishingtheIDF’sstatusasadeterrent.Rabinhadastrongcase,astheIDF’sdeterrencecapabilitieswereconsideredevenbydovestobethebestwaytoprotectsecuritywithout resorting towar.Because the government could not accurately assessthedegreetowhichdeterrencehadbeenweakened,itwasdifficulttoarguewithRabin.Thegovernmentrequiredasignificantamountoffortitudetoholdbackthearmy.Demandinga“restorationofdeterrence,”Rabinproposedprovokingthe Syrians. If they opened tank fire again, the IDFwould respondwith tankfire; if they fired artillery, the air forcewould be activated. Shapira faced offwithYigalAllon, theminister of labor,who supportedRabin and objected toministerial interference in military actions “on issues that are not matters ofprinciple.” However, the question of principle was, of course, whether theseremote fields were worthy of a military conflict whose outcome wasunpredictable.“Weknowthatusingairplaneswillopenthedoortomoreseriousclashes and thismaybring aboutwar,” saidShapira.Allon responded, “Ifweexercisemorerestraint,theprovocationswillintensify.”Eshkol told the cabinet about his visit to the northern kibbutzim. “The
members areonpins andneedles and say theycannot continue thisway.”HenotedthatincursionsbySyrianfarmersandshepherdsinthedemilitarizedzoneshadcostIsraelabouttwohundredacresofland.Hedidnotruleoutactivatingtheairforce.ButShapira threatenedtoresignifhedidso,andtheministerofreligious affairs, Zerah Warhaftig, joined him, as did the Mapam ministers.Theirthreatsledthegovernmenttodecideagainstcallingintheairforce.Israelifarmers were restricted to working in undisputed areas, but the IDF waspermittedtoopentankfireifSyriantanksappeared.AccordingtoabookpublishedyearslaterbytheMinistryofDefense,Rabin
himselfdeterminedthathadIsraelallowedtheSyrianfarmersandshepherdstowork in the demilitarized zones, tensions would not have escalated. TheintensificationalongtheborderwasaresultofIsrael’sdecisiontoresumebufferfire,followingsixmonthsofquiet.15AndthenYosefCohenwaskilledonthesoccerfieldinDishon.Two days after Cohen’s death, various assessments were presented at the
General Staffmeeting. Rabin said the device had been aminewith shrapnel,obviouslyhomemade.“Fairlysimilartoourownmines,”addedEzerWeizman,
andIsraelTalcommentedthatinWorldWarIItheGermansusedtolaysimilarminesinwoodenboxes,sothatthevictimwouldnotbekilledbutonlyhavehislegblownoff.“All inall, itwasawell-executedoperation,”Rabincontinued,“outperforming [Israel’s] operations up to this point.” A search of the siterevealedfoodscrapsleftbytheassailants,whichledinvestigatorstobelievethattheyhadreturned toSyria,althoughtheywereunsurewhether thatwaswheretheyhadsetoutfrom.Talwonderedwhytheterroristshadchosensucharemotetarget, andRabin explained, “There areDishon people among the Palestiniancommandos.”16 Dishon had been built on the ruins of the Arab village ofDayshum,whoseinhabitantsfledin1948.*OnthesamedayastheGeneralStaffmeeting,aspecialsessionoftheMixed
ArmisticeCommissionwasconvened.“Inviewofthemeeting,thepossibilityofresponse to Dishon was immediately dropped,” said Rabin.18 Eshkol tookadvantageofthisrestrainttowinpointsinWashington.“TodayImadethemostdifficult decision not to authorize a military reaction to the brutal Syrianprovocationthattookplaceyesterdaymorning,”hewrotetoPresidentJohnson,anddescribedtheattackinDishonastheapexofSyrianaggression,followingtendaysofshellingIsraelipopulatedareasandshootingatIsraelifishermenonLake Kinneret. “The country is seething with indignation,” wrote Eshkol.JohnsonquicklyexpressedhisregretforthetragedyinDishon,admittedthatnogovernment could remain indifferent to such events, and mentioned thetechnologytheUnitedStateshadofferedIsraeltohelpstopborderinfiltrations,technology he said was better than retaliation. He promised that the U.S.ambassador to Damascus would clarify the gravity of the situation to theSyrians.19
THERELATIONSHIPBETWEEN JERUSALEMANDWASHINGTONATTHETIMEWASCLOSETOideal. In October 1966, Abba Eban had conferred with his Americancounterpart,DeanRusk,onvariousissues.AmbassadorHarmansummedupthesignificant points of the conversation, which, he wrote, was conducted in a“decidedlyintimate”atmosphere.“WhentheproblemofSyriawasmentioned,RuskgaveustounderstandthatheknewthiswasaspecialproblemforusandhehadnotasinglewordofcriticismoverourpolicytowardSyria.”TheUSSR,ontheotherhand,supportedSyria’smilitaryrulers,thoughitalso
denounced the Fatah operations. The Soviets declared that Israel had aligneditself with the imperialist camp and was planning to attack Syria. They alsovetoed proposed UN Security Council resolutions denouncing Syria. TheRussians had previously cautioned Israel against attacking Syria, and
AmbassadorDimitriChuvakhinevenclaimed that Israelwasdeploying forcesalongtheborder.Ebansuggestedhevisitthenorthtoseewithhisowneyesthattherewasnomilitarydeployment,buttheambassadorturneddowntheoffer.Afewweekslater,theSovietstriedtoclarifytheissueoftroopsdeploymentwiththeheadsoftheIsraeliCommunistparty.Towardtheendof1966,Eshkolhadagain invited Chuvakhin to tour the north, and the ambassador once againrefused.20 Israel denied the Soviet claims. “Instead of warning the aggressor,they warn the victim,” Eshkol complained. To the assertion that Israel wasaligned with “the imperialists” he responded almost with insult: “Israel theliberator,which freed its people from the generations-longbonds of exile andghettoization;Israel,avictimofpogromsallovertheworld,thatnowreturnstoitshomelandafter thousandsofyears; Israel, the first to rid itselfofa foreignpowerwhenitrealizedthatthispowercouldnotfulfillitshopes—wearebeingdrivenbyimperialism?”But at the end ofDecember 1966, ShlomoArgov at the Israeli embassy in
Londonraisedaquestionthathadtroubledhimforsometime:wasitpossiblethat Israel was unwittingly becoming a pawn of foreign oil companies? TheSoviets believed thiswas the case, andArgovwonderedwhether itmight nothold“agrainoftruth.”Argovwasanindependentthinkerasadiplomat.“IwasstruckbythewaytheBritishambassadortoIsrael[MichaelHadow]practicallyencouraged us openly to strike against the Syrians,” Argov wrote. “To myknowledge, Hadow moved among various circles in Israel offeringencouragement in this direction. Today we are witnessing a confrontationbetweenIPC[theIraqPetroleumCompany]andSyria. Is itconceivable, then,that Hadow’s campaign was connected with British oil interests, whereby adestructive Israeli blow against Syria would have brought down the radicalregimeandpreventedthecurrentcrisis?Itmaysoundabsurd,butisit,perhaps,notthatabsurd?”Meanwhile,IsraelcontinuedtowarntheSyriansandeventuallyturnedtothe
SecurityCouncil.“Onecanrestrainoneselfuntil it issimply intolerable,”saidEshkolatTelKatzir;hemadesimilarcommentstothecabinet.“Israelwillnotaccept this,” “an intolerable situation,” “the end of patience is nearing,” andothersuchstatementswereintended,itseems,toappeasethecabinet.Eban,too,said,“Wewillnotacceptthis.”TheSyriansandtheRussianshadnoreasontotaketheseremarkslightly.The
U.S.ambassadorinDamascuswasinstructedtoconveyaharshwarning,almostathreat:“WebelieveIsraelisonthebrinkofanattackand[theSyrians]cannotcountonustoholdIsraelback.”Accordingto“credibleinformation”obtained
by Israeli intelligence, the Russians were also pressuring the Syrians not totanglewithIsrael.21Thispromptedadebate in theGeneralStaffat theendofJanuary 1967 on the future of relations with Syria; Eshkol was among theparticipants.Thediscussionwas,attimes,ratherembarrassing.
2. CONFRONTATIONS II: “WE’RE NOT GOING TO KILLSEVENMILLIONSYRIANS!”
Much like the analysis of Israel’s relations with Jordan and Egypt, the Syriadiscussion touchedon fundamentalquestions.Theminutes reflect theGeneralStaff’s opinion that Israel had been rendered virtually helpless in the face ofFatah infiltrations, and thereforemust conduct a large-scale operation againstSyria. Eshkol tried to rein in the army.22 Colonel David Carmon, the deputyhead of army intelligence, named the various Palestinian organizations andproceeded to describe the leaders of the Syrian regime.Theywere intelligentandflexible; they tookthe initiative,and theyknewwhento takechancesandwhen not to. They acted despite their very strong sense of threat and werepreparedtotakerisks,evenifdoingsoelicitedretaliation,whichtheyestimatedwouldnotbetoosevere.EshkolwantedtounderstandtheSyrianinterestinthedemilitarized zones. Carmon said the Syrians wanted to farm that land. Hebegananalyzingthesituationinthedemilitarizedzonesregionbyregion:here,theSyrianswereonasounderlegalfootingthanIsrael;there,Israelwasbetteroff.ButRabin interruptedhim,claiming the legalandagricultural issuesweresecondary.ThecentralproblemwasthatSyriawantedtobethespearheadinanArabwaragainstIsrael.ThediversionoftheJordanRiverwasanotheressentialproblem, as was the “popular war”—the Palestinian infiltrations. Theseproblemsdemandedimmediatesolutions,buttherewerenoclearanswers.Rabin proposed a number of options. First, Israel could increase its
intelligenceeffortusingsecretagentsborninthecountriesinwhichtheywouldoperate.Anotheroptionwasthe“StarofDavidline,”whichinvolvedsealingallIsraeli borders with fences and land mines. There was a third option.“Gentlemen, the Syrian operations against us are harassment. We can layseventymines for every one of theirs, and we can lay them deeper.Wewillbeginawarofharassmentagainsttheirwarofharassmentataten-to-oneratio.”This optionmust bemade clear to theSyrians,Rabin said, atwhich point hebegan speaking in the second-personplural, as if theSyrians themselvesweresittinginthemeeting.“Youwantasmallwar—wewillrespondwithagreaterblow.”Hesuggestedinflamingtensionsalongtheborderandexploitingthemas
anexcuse to act, anddescribed the increasednumberofborder incidents as a“goldmine.”Eshkolaskedwhatcouldbedoneinthemeantime,includingdefensivesteps.
“Iswhatwearedoingworthanything?Whentherearebordersandthereisanarmy,thearmyprotectstheborders.Butfacedwiththeseactsofharassment,iswhatwearedoingofanyvalue?Ifit isnot,whatshouldwedothatwouldbevaluable, especially in a war? Will we occupy Syria? And what do we doafterward?”Hesuggestedofferingarewardtoterroristswhoturnedthemselvesorothers in.But itoccurred tohimthatperhaps thesepeoplewereacting inaspirit of self-sacrifice and truededication, andhe asked againwhat shouldbedone.Theprimeministercouldnothavemadeitanyclearer: thearmyhadnoanswers.GeneralDavidElazar,headoftheNorthernCommand,wantedtogobeyond
Eshkol’spracticalquestions.Syria,heargued,wastheideologicalforcedrivingthe“popularwar.” It saw itselfasapioneer in thestruggle,and its supportofFatahcompelledothercountriesandorganizationstobecomeinvolvedaswell.And soElazarmaintained that theoriginal sin laywithSyria.Fatah’s successcouldnotbeignored,hecautioned.Inthetwoyearssinceitsformation,ithadconductedapproximatelyseventyoperations.Elazarwas inclinedto ignore theplightandaspirationsofthePalestiniansthemselves;heviewedthemasfightersin the service of Syrian ideology, which opposed what it saw as Israel’scomplicity in imperialism and reactionism. This was why a partial, military,defensive solution was not enough: there needed to be “a total, military,political” solution. Elazar was not talking about war, but he opposed pettyharassment,sincetheSyrianswerebetteratitandtherewasnopointcompetingwith them.He supported the idea of dealing significant blows to the Syrians.“Thetimehascome,”hesaid.InresponsetoaquestionfromEshkol,Elazarsaidhedidnotcompletelyrule
outdefensivesteps.Alotwasbeingdone,hesaid,andmentionedthenocturnalambushes: every night three or four companies lay in ambush in the freezingcold,andsometimestheygotfrostbiteandhadtobeevacuatedtohospitals.Butthishadlimitedvalue,Elazarbelieved,sincetheenemywasthreehundredyardsawayandcouldoftenseetheambushparty.Itwasenoughforasoldiertodrophis Uzi, and the ambush was exposed.* Eshkol had some knowledge oftechniquesandcosts.Heaskedaboutpathsandroads,andwhichwasbetter—dirtroadsonwhichtrackscouldbedetected,orasphaltroadswithfencingandlighting.Attimeshesoundedlikealandownerconversingwithhisguards,notaminister of defense at aGeneral Staffmeeting.Elazar believed itwas best to
invest in sophisticated electronic devices. It was true that no device wasinfallible, he said—in Algeria, people had discovered that radar could bedetected with transistor radios—but he believed it would take time for thePalestinians to develop such skills, and so he rejected defenses that the“primitive” enemy could overcome, such as a fence along the border. EvenFatahwouldfindwaystocutthroughafenceandslippastIDFpatrols,hesaid.He did support building fences around populated areas, however, with goodlighting, and proposed allocatingmoremanpower to accomplish this. Dishonwas fenced, but the soccer field andwater facilitywere outside the fence, hereported.Andnotallsettlementswerefenced,becausenomoneywasbudgetedfordoingso.Eshkolwasastonished:“We’retalkingaboutpennies.Whywasn’tthisdone?Twohundredandtwentythousandliras?”GeneralUziNarkis, head of theCentral Command, offered the assumption
that terrorismwould not stop. “One of the great things theChinese said is tohave patience,” he explained. “They usually have patience. They have tenthousandyears,untilVietnamandalltherestisover.TheArabshavetime,andIthink we do, too. So I say—there’s time. We shouldn’t decide that we’ll dosomething tomorrow and it will be over. It won’t be over.” Narkis believed,however, that the Arabs should be hit repeatedly. “We are dealing with theArabs,andtheArabs,mentally,forthemostpart,whatcharacterizesthemisthatwhentheygethit,theyretreat.”Hegaveabiblicalexample.“Let’ssay,duringtheProphets, that thePeopleof Israelhad trouble.Theystruckablowagainsttheir enemy, and everything was quiet for forty years. In modern terms, twoweeksislikefortyyears....Itsays,anyway,thattheArabs,whentheygethit—they calm down for a while.” Eshkol was dubious. “We’re getting intopsychology. Is that really just theArabs?”heasked.“It’sprettyArab,”Narkisreplied, “it says about the Jews in the Haggadah that the more they wereafflicted,themoretheymultipliedandgrew.”Eshkolwasstillunconvinced.“Atthe moment they’re the ones who are multiplying,” he grumbled, but Narkisheld his ground, offering recollections from the British Mandate: “When theArabs take a hit—I remember this from before therewas a state—they quietdown.It’sallrelative.”NarkisspokepositivelyoftheSamuaoperation.“Ithinkthattodayeveryone
hascometoseethejusticeofthatoperation.”Buttheprimeministercorrectedhim once again: “One could replace the word ’justice’ with the word’effectiveness.’” Narkis responded, “I’ll tell you why I say it was just: therewereconsiderationsandadecisionwasmade,andinmyopinionitwasnotonlyeffective,butalsojust.”HemeantthatHussein,asaresultoftheoperation,had
increased his efforts to prevent Fatah activities.*Narkiswas concerned aboutCentral Command’s limited role in thewar effort; despite the fact that Syria,“the fatherofall sin,”waspulling thestrings in thenorth,hissectorwasalsoimportant,hestressed,andhesuggestedharassmentofthePalestiniansbeyondthe border. “We are far more vulnerable than they are, but it wouldn’t be sopleasantforthem,either,iftwentygroupswentintotwentyvillagesandstoppedthem from sleeping, there’d be explosions, shootings, a couple of guys killedeverynight.Thenthey’druntotheauthoritiescrying,’Saveus!’”Themorethedebatewenton,themorepoliticalandevenfantasticalitbecame.GeneralRehavamZe’evi,fromtheoperationsbranch,knowntoallasGandhi,
proposedall-outwaronSyria.Eshkolattemptedtosteerthediscussionbacktodefensivemeasures.Rabintriedtopreventanargumentbetweenthetwo,buthisown positionwas clear: “I completely agreewithGandhi.” Ze’evi thought interms of overall national security. Everything that could be done against theterrorists’incursionshadalreadybeendone.Therewasn’tacountryintheworldwhosemilitarywascapableofdoingthingstheIDFcouldnot,withthepossibleexception of the USSR. But even then, some people managed to breach theBerlinWall.And so the solutionwas not defensive—that approachhadneversucceededanywhere in theworld.Anyanalysiswould show,Ze’evi said, thattheonlywaytofinishoffawarwastoaddressitscause—inthiscase,Syria.Ze’evigave threereasons thathad ledhimto thisconclusion.First, theIDF
wasnotdesignedforsmallwars.Second,theciviliancommunitiescouldendureonlysomuch.HegaveKfarYuvalasanexample.“AmoshavniklivinginKfarYuval, he hears his tenant farmer digging outside at night and thinks it’ssomeonecometokillhischildren—hecantakeitforaweek,amonth,ayear.Butonedayhe’llhavetovotewithhisfeet.”ThethirdfactorthatledZe’evitobelievethatradicalstepsagainstSyriawereessentialwastheeconomicdamagewreakedbyterror,primarilyontourism.HerecalledtheSinaiCampaign,whichhaddemonstrated to theEgyptians that therewasnosuch thingasahalfwar.“Wecantry treatingthewoundwithdefensivemedicineor limitedoperations,but it needs to be cured by surgery, and thatmeans explaining to the Syrianswhatneedstobeexplainedunequivocally.”WarwithSyria,accordingtoZe’evi,wouldalsosolvethedisputeoverwaterandthedemilitarizedzones,andwouldpreventthespreadofterrorbydeterringothercountries.The IDF had three plans for initiating an attack against Syria, including
Operation Ax, which involved occupying Damascus; Tongs, an intermediateplan to occupy the Golan Heights all the way to east of Kunetra; andConcoction,aplantotakeoverjusttheBaniasarea.25Eshkoltriedtobringthe
debate back to the idea of halting terrorist infiltrations by means of a fence.Ze’evisaiderectingafencewouldsetdownpoliticalfactsinplaceswheretheborderwasunclear,andIsraelmightlosecertainterritories.Besides,bothArabsandJewsmightsimplysneakthrough.FenceshadsometimesfailedinAlgeria,Morocco,andBerlin,hesaid.“IdidnotsuggestsurroundingallofIsraelwithafence,”Eshkolreplied,buthethoughtthatwheretherewerefences,therewouldbelessofaneedformanpower.Rabincametohisaidonthispoint:therewasno doubt that defensive means had prevented terrorist infiltrations, althoughtherewasnoway to tell howmanybecauseonly successful infiltrationswererecorded. Eshkol liked the argument. “It’s almost tricky, it’s a goodexplanation,” he said happily: “You never know what might have happenedwithoutthefence.”Somewhatencouraged, theprimeministerproposedanother idea.“This fear
thattheycansee[ourmen],becausewegooutatsundown,thatthey’reunderarockwatchingus.Wouldn’titbepossibletoswitch[themen’s]positionsassoonas it got dark?”He admitted, however, that hewas not telling his colleaguesanythingnew,andcomparedhimself to the Jewwhocame toMoscowwithanew invention: a bicycle. Rabin explained dryly that if they began shiftingpeople around after dark, as Eshkol suggested, the IDF would have morecasualties than the terrorists. And so Eshkol wondered about night visionbinoculars.Howmany did themilitary have?Howmuch did they cost?Howmanydid the IDFneed?Hewas excited. “It’s clearly aworthwhile idea.”HecriticizedZe’evi’scomparisonwiththeSinaiCampaign.“Firstofall,Iknowalittleaboutgeography.WedonothavethesametypeofsituationwithSyriaaswehad in theSinaiDesert,or thatwehavewithJordan,whereyougo inandthat’sthat.Butyoucan’tdothateverymonth,theworldwouldbeoutraged.”EshkoldidhavesomegoodnewsfortheGeneralStaff.AtareceptioninParis
for the “non-Jewish New Year,” as he called it, President de Gaulle hadapproachedtheIsraeliambassador,WalterEitan,andwishedhimpeace,quiet,andcalm.“Sinceyouare strong,youshouldalsobepeaceful,”deGaullehadadvised,“andinanycasedon’tattackJordan.”ThestatementsurprisedEshkol,who would have expected the French president to be concerned for Syria,consideringthetwocountries’historicties,butthiswasnotthecase.“They’renot theworst,”Eshkolcommented, regarding theFrench, andaskedabout thebinocularsagain.Rabincuthimoff:binocularscouldimprovethesituation,butwouldnotputanend to the infiltrations.Eshkolclung towhat littlehecould,saying an improvement was better than nothing. “Am I asking for a one-hundred-percent solution?” But Rabin said that even 500 pairs of binoculars,
220 infrared sensors, and 60 miles of fence, would do no more than helpstrengthen local residents’ feeling that the IDFwas standingby them.“Tomymindthatisworthmorethananystrikeagainsttheinfiltrators,”Rabinsaid,buttosolvetheproblemtheyessentiallyhadtohitwithinSyria,“atleastinaSamuaformula.” Eshkol said Samua had not provided “a permanent solution” inJordan,andRabinrespondedthattheyhadnotstruckattherightaddress.Eshkolsaid out loud, “Syria? What a thing! We’re not going to kill seven millionSyrians!”Rabinobserved, “But afterSinaiwehad tenyearsofquieton theEgyptian
border.”Eshkol responded, “I’mnot sure if that’s theway to lookat it.OtherthoughtshavecometoNasser. I’mnotsure. It’s impossible toprove.Sameasyou can’t prove that without [defensive measures against terrorism] thingswouldhavebeenworse.It’shardtoprovethatSyriawantstobeaspearheadsomuchasNasserwantstoavoid”beinginthatposition.“I’mnotsayingthissoasnottodoit,”Eshkolwenton.“I’msayingthatanyonewhothinksafewstrikeswillfinishitoff—Idon’tknow.We’llhavetolearnaswego.”HeaddedthatincaseofanattackagainstSyria,“alltheArabstogetherwithJordan”mightuniteagainstIsrael.ButRabinremindedhimthat“Samuadividedthem.”EgyptandSyriahadnotcometoJordan’sdefense.Threeothergeneralsthenspoke—EladPeled,IsraelTal,andAmosHorev—
aswellasthedirectorofweaponssystemsdevelopment,Meir(Munya)Mardor.Only Horev, the deputy chief scientist in the Ministry of Defense, did notpropose major steps against Syria, but instead a significant effort to preventterroristinfiltrations.Terroristscouldplaceabombinamovietheater,hesaid,inwhichcasenotevenaconversationbetweendeGaulleandAmbassadorEitanwould do any good. Eshkol ignored the jab and Horev went on to quoteproposalsforretaliatoryterrorism,suchas“layingminesusingplanes.Letthemget their legs blown off.” He felt that these ideas expressed themood of theGeneral Staff, and suggested another solution: dig a canal along the Syrianborder.And thatwashow themeeting ended.TheGeneralStaff felt theyhadbeen
talkingwith an elderlymanwho had little faith in the power of the IDF.ButEshkolmightwellhavenotedwithrealanxietythathehadbeentalkingtomenwhowerenarrowminded—and,worse,helpless.Whenthegeneralsguaranteed,intheirauthoritativeandopinionatedway,thatwarwithEgyptwasimprobablebefore1970,and that itwasunlikelyEgyptwould interfere if IsraelhitSyria,Eshkol looked at them with his wise eyes and said, in Yiddish, “Tomerefsher”—Maybeso,maybenot,maybeyouarewrong.26
•••
FOR THREE AND A HALF MONTHS, UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF MAY 1967, THE TERRORCONtinued. Israel dealt punishing blows to the Syrian army, and Eshkol andRabin made a series of combative declarations before Independence Day.During those fifteen weeks, Israel suffered thirty-one attacks and attemptedattacks—twoperweek.Half the terroristscrossed into Israel fromJordan,butsome of those may have entered Jordan from starting points in Syria. ThePalestinianslaidminesalongroads(andonebridge);theysetexplosivedeviceson the railroad toBeershebaanddamaged thewater tower inAradaswell aspumpsandpipelines inotherplaces.Four Israeliswere injured,one seriously.WhenEshkolvisitedthenorthernkibbutzim,membersofHa’onandTelKatzirdemanded IDF operations to enable them towork “on all their lands” and toprevent the Syrians from bringing flocks and shepherds onto fields thekibbutzimwantedtofarm.At the endofMarch,Eshkol andRabinhadmade adecision. “Wewill ask
GeneralBulltoexplaintotheSyriansthatwedonotintendtotakecontrolofallthedemilitarizedzones,butthatwewillprotecttheareasfarmedbyourpeople.Wewillhint toGeneralBull thatheshouldfindaway tomake theEgyptiansawareofthesefactsaswell.”ThiswasaformulabothEshkolandRabincouldlivewith.Liorwrote:“FinallyEshkolunderstandsthatthereisnoturningback,and that if farming for political reasons is authorized, it is essential to followthroughalltheway,evenifwehavetouseheavierweapons(tanksandplanes).”Thatsameday inMarch,Rabin requestedandreceivedpermission tobring inarmored tractors near theSyrian border, not far fromKibbutzTelKatzir.Theprimeministershouldknow,hesaid,thatitmightbenecessarytodeploytheairforce.Foreign Minister Eban became suspicious. On April 4, 1967, he wrote to
Eshkol that he was surprised to see almost identical articles about KibbutzHa’on in Ha’aretz and Yediot Aharonot. Ha’aretz had also run an editorialarguingthat“weareobligedtorepelanyattempttopreventJewishfarmersfromworkinglandinIsraeliterritory,includinginthedemilitarizedzones.”AttemptstostoplandwithinIsraelfrombeingfarmedcouldnotgounchallenged,saidthepaper.Thepressreportedprominentlyontheincidentswithinthedemilitarizedzones and took a belligerent tone.Ebanwrote toEshkol, “The fact that thesearticleswerewritten primarily by themilitary correspondents, and are almostidenticalincontent,indicatesthepossibilityofguidance.”Itwasnowonder,hewrote, that even the opposition parties had picked up the impression that
tensions were increasing and had submitted an item for the Knesset agenda.Knesset member Yosef Shofman, of Gahal, spoke sharply. The Syrians hadinfiltrated Israel’s sovereign territory 770 times in the last few months, heclaimed, while Israel sat idly by and watched. He complained about Israel’s“miserablerole”andasked,“WillIsraelconsiderthequestionofthesignificanceof our sovereignty—the sovereignty of the State of Israel—over our nationalterritory?”OnFriday,April7,1967,twotractorsenteredafifteen-acrelot,Number52,
accordingtoplan.TheSyriansopenedfire.TheIDFreturnedfire.“Theirtanks,ourtanks,”wroteLior.Byafternoon,Eshkolhadtodecidewhethertostoptheworkorcall in theair force.Lior, fromhisTelAvivoffice, listened inon thephoneconversationbetweenRabininthenorthandEshkolinJerusalem.Rabinbrokeoffeveryfewmomentstoreportexcitedly,“NowIseeshellsfallingnearthetractors!”Eshkolsaidtheworkshouldgoon,andiftherewasnochoice,theair force should be sent in. Then he added an instruction that no civilians beharmed. Lior suggested sending a helicopter to bring Eshkol to DefenseMinistryheadquartersinTelAviv,whichmadehim“veryhappy.”Bythetimehe arrived, the air force had shot down two Syrian MiGs. Rabin proposedhaltingthework,butEshkoldemandedthatitcontinueuntildark.Bytheendoftheday,IsraelhadshotdownsixMiGs,includingonenearDamascus.*Thepresswaselated.Thiswasthegreatestachievementinthehistoryofthe
airforce,saidYediotAharonot,andreportedhowthekibbutznikshadlefttheirbombsheltersandrunouttowatchtheincrediblesceneof“avengingairplanes.”Maarivwrote,“Thiswasnotan’incident,’butarealwar,”notingthatitwasthelargestbattle in thenorthsince theWarof Independence.“Six inOneBlow!”shoutedYediot Aharonot. At first there had been an air of utter disbelief, thepaper reported, and people had hurried to their telephones to call one anotherandfindoutifthenewscasteronKolIsraelradiohadnotmadeamistakewhenshe announced that six planes had been downed. Ze’ev Schiff declared inHa’aretz, “The Syrian pilots proved that they are little more than airplanedrivers.NotoneofthemeventriedtoofferanyresistancetotheIsraeliplanes.”Theeditorialdescribedtheincidentas“agloriousaccomplishment.”Formanymonths, Israelhadnothad suchcause for rejoicing.SilvieKeshet,whowroteimaginarydialoguesforHa’aretz,gaveoneofhercharacterstheline:“EveninVietnam, I don’t think they take down six in one day.” A French generaltelephoned the IDFattaché inParis to congratulatehim, saidMaariv, becausethe Israeli air forcehadusedFrenchMirage fighters.The assessment inPariswasthatthedefectionoftheIraqipilotwhohadbroughttheMiGtoIsraelmany
monthsearlierhadhelpedinthebattle.“ThereisnodoubtthatIsrael’sprestigehas skyrocketed,” said Maariv. “The Syrians have been stripped of theirillusions.”Thepaperdevotedfivepagestocoverageoftheoperation.One Israeliofficer fromHaifawaskilled in theconfrontation.A fewof the
kibbutzim in theareawerehithardbySyrianbombardment, includingGadot,whichhadbeenfoundedbyHolocaustsurvivorsin1949.Thereweregapingpitsinthekibbutz,andpunched-throughwalls;bombshaddestroyedtheroofofthechildren’shouse, rippedup theplaygroundslides, and left abedcoveredwithshatteredglass.Asecondearliertherehadbeenaroomthere,Maarivrecounted,withavaseofsweetpeas,anAfricanstatuette,anembroideredtablecloth,andabookshelf—a warm oasis, a lovingly tended nest. Now the kibbutz membersrummagedthroughtheruins,retrievinganoldphotographandachild’stoy.Thechildren of Gadot had a beloved, loyal dog named Tzah.When the bombingbeganandeveryonerantotheshelters,therewasnotimetofindTzah,andheranaroundthroughtheexplosions,finallytakingshelterinawarehouse.Ashecowered in a corner, a shell hit the warehouse, shattering a bottle of acid. Itspilled over the dog and after the bombing they found himwrithing, coveredwithburns.Theypouredwateronhim,buttonoavail.Thechildrendugagrave.“TheSyrianledgerisfillingup,”YediotAharonotdeclared.Eshkol,however,
receivedonlyafractionoftheglory:oneortwoparagraphs,withnoheadline.He had been “somewhere out there” during the action, it was said, and hadreceivedupdates.Thereportssaidhehadsharedinthepassionofthebattle,butratherthanshowingexcitement,had“quietlyconsideredthesituationandmadedecisions.”Maariv politely noted that in the past Eshkol had allowed the airforcetotakestepsagainstSyriaanumberoftimes.Thepapertriedtosayafewkindwordsabout theprimeminister,but it isdoubtful that thesecomplimentswarmedhisheart:“AlthoughD.Ben-GurionexceedsEshkolwhenitcomestodecisiveness, theoperations carriedoutduringL.Eshkol’s termofoffice, andthe achievements of the day before yesterday, have proved that the primeminister’spersonalityisnottheonlyfactorthatdeterminesevents,butratherthesituation,theconditions,andthecircumstances.”Rabin,on theotherhand,waspredictablyhailedasapersonalvictor.“Iam
notcertainwhethertheSyriansaregoodstudents,andIamnotconvincedtheywill be capable of learning their lesson in one go,” he said.* A militarycommentatoradded,“Damascusanditssurroundingswillnolongerbeimmuneintheeventofaseriousclash.”HecalledonceagainforIsraeltofarmthelandsit had ignored. “It is important to insist absolutely on this territory we haveneglectedforyears.”EshkoltriedtowrestatleastsomeofthegloryfromRabin,
and three weeks laterMaariv rewarded him with the headline “I Gave theOrder.” It was true: he, not Rabin, had been at the center of command, andMordechai Hod, the commander of the air force, had received the necessaryoperational approvals directly fromhim. In fact, Eshkol seemed to have beensweptupinthecombativeexcitement,allowingHodtoacttoagreatextentonhisowninitiative,accordingtoAmiGluska.This was not the large-scale operation against Syria that the IDF had
demanded, but it did provoke a dramatic escalation of tensions. Eshkol knewthat that was what the army was after, and he could reasonably have beenexpectedtoknowthatitwouldbetheresultofdeployingtheairforce.Hecouldhaveavoidedinvolvingtheairforce;itsdeploymentwouldnotpreventasingleFatahoperation.Eshkolwasinstinctivelyskepticaloftheintelligenceassurancesthat Egypt would not interfere on Syria’s behalf. The excesses of the Samuaoperationwerestillfreshinhismemory.Buthewasneitherstrongenoughnorboldenoughtocurbthearmy,andwasprobablynotutterlyconvinceditwastherightthingtodo.Inthebackgroundtherewasalwaystheneedtoprovethathewasnottheweakmandepictedbyhisadversaries.AndsoEshkolallowedthearmy to accelerate a dynamic that was at odds with Israel’s basic nationalinterest: the prevention of war. Ezer Weizman later recalled Moshe Dayan’sresponsewhentheSyrianplaneswereshotdown:“Haveyoulostyourminds?Youare leading the country intowar!” IsraelLior agreed: “Frommypointofview,theSix-DayWarhadbegun,”hewrote.27
3.CELEBRATIONS:“WHOKNOWSHOWMANY?”
About ten days before the Syrian MiGs were shot down, a guest at theTchernichovsky Writers’ House in Tel Aviv generated great excitement. Theinvitations were printed on glossy paper, as the poet Dalia Ravikovitch laterwrote,anditwasnowonderthatbyeight-thirtythemainauditoriumwasfilledwithdozensofmembersof theWriters’Association, alongwith their spousesand sons, daughters-in-law and grandchildren, interpreters and neighbors.Peopleinthethirdrowworriedthattheywouldn’tbeabletoseetheguest,whowasashortman.Jean-PaulSartrewasushered into theauditoriumandsatbehinda table laid
out with glasses of juice and stale egg-and-tomato sandwiches. “Almostimmediatelyonecould seenothingbutadenseclusterofdignitariesand theirfamilies,eachonetuggingatthehemofthediminutiveguest’sovercoat,tryingtoobtainat leastone threadof the liningasa timeless souvenir,”Ravikovitch
wrote inHa’aretz.ThewriterAzrielUhmaniopened theevent.He toldSartrethathewasinEretzIsrael,thecradleoftheJewishpeople,whosedialoguewithGodhadbeenconductedinitsancientlanguage,alanguagethatnowmediatedbetweentheJewsandmoderntimes.UhmaniinvitedSartretolendahandtothepeaceeffortsof thispersecuted,pacificnation.Thenhe spokeabout thegreatpoetShaulTchernichovsky, hiswriting andhis translations.This long speech,wrote Ravikovitch, “swept away any ignorance Sartremight have had of therenewaloftheHebrewlanguageandtheliteraryendeavorsofTchernichovsky.”Sartre, responding in French, thanked the many writers for their warm
welcomeandsaidhewouldliketheopportunitytostudythecountry’sproblems.Hespokebriefly,wroteRavikovitch.“Hiswordscontainednoflattery,buttheywerecourteous....Ifhechosetodescribethejabbinginhisribsaswarm—henodoubtbelieveditwasthelocalcustom:inIsraelonejabs,muchasinRussiaone hugs and in France one kisses.” The audience shouted out, “Translate,Uhmani,translate!”UhmanitriedtorelayamessagetoSimonedeBeauvoir,butinstead of wishing her a speedy recovery from her troublesome cold, hemistakenly congratulated her on having caught the cold. Yigal Mosenzon,assisted by his own personal interpreter, told Sartre about his playKazablan.Then themasses crowded around the guest for autographs. The singer BrahaTzfiratriedinvaintogetSartre’sattention,andwhenshewasunsuccessfulshesang out in her huge soprano, “Vive la France!” Sartre turned pale, wroteRavikovitch. The writer Ehud Ben-Ezer later tried to excuse Tel Aviv’sprovincialismbycriticizingSartrehimself:hehadnothingtosay,exceptforfiveorsixtriviallinesofniceties.“Somethinglikeaspeechbyaministerforcedtogiveatoastathisdriver’sson’sbarmitzvah.”28*In his meeting with Eshkol, Sartre mentioned how impressed he was that
sincehispreviousvisit,intheearlyfifties,immigrantcampshadvanishedfromthe landscape.Heexpressed strong support for Israel, but saidhe felt that thekey to solving the Israeli-Arab conflict was the return of the Palestinianrefugees. Eshkol replied that the demand to allow refugees to return was nomore thanan indirectwayofdestroyingIsrael. In fact,heexplained toSartre,thenumberofJewswhohadlefttheArabstatesandsettledinIsraelwasalmostidenticaltothenumberofArabswhohadleftIsrael,andsoonecouldsaythatthere had been an exchange of populations. The most just solution of theproblemwastosettletherefugeesintheircountriesofresidence.Sartreshouldknow,saidEshkol,thattheStateofIsraelincludednomorethan20percentoftheterritorywithintheoriginalboundariesofPalestine.30†
MEANWHILE, ESHKOL DEDICATED A MEMORIAL TO A KEY BATTLE OF THE WAR OFIndependence—thebattlethathadallowedtheIDFtoliftthesiegeofJerusalem.Thememorialwaserectedalongtheroadtothecapitalandsuggestednothingsomuch as a launching device for huge, rocketlike arrows.The sculptor,NoemiHanreck,wantedtocreatethesensethatthemonumentwas“builtintothelivingrock of the hillside,” according to the announcement published by the PostalMinistry’sPhilatelicServices,whichproducedanimageofthesculptureontheannual Memorial Day stamp. “And indeed,” the explanation continued,describingthemonument,g“thewallshallbebrokenbythesearms,whichseemasiftheyarecleavingandrupturingit.”*ThreeotherIndependenceDaystampsdepictedplanes representingdifferentperiods in thehistoryof theair force: aBritish Auster, a French Mystère, and a French Mirage. The picture of theMirageshoweditflyingoverthecliffatMasada.†
In theweeks following thedowningof the sixMiGs, theSyrianscontinuedshellingthenorthernkibbutzimandtherewerefurtheractsofsabotage.Bymid-May, therewas a growing sense that the IDFwould soon take broader actionagainst Syria. On its front page Yediot Aharonot reported that “Syria isestablishinganewterroristorganization.”OnMay4,thesecuritycabinetmettodiscuss the situation on the northern border. Chief of Staff Rabin and a fewseniorofficers also tookpart.Theydecided to issueawarning to theSyrians,usingtheUnitedStatesasanintermediary,statingthatiftheydaredtocontinuetheprovocations,Israelwouldrespondwithmilitaryaction.33
The country’s nineteenth Independence Day was approaching. For the firsttimesincetheestablishmentofthestate,theJewishdateandtheGregoriandate,May15,weretocoincide.Traditionally,itwastheseasonfortheprimeministerandtheIDFchiefofstafftoofferdeclarations,andthisyearEshkolandRabinsounded particularly aggressive. Eshkol told his party that it might becomenecessarytotakemorestepsasharshasshootingdownthesixplanes,andhisstatementwaswidely publicized. In an interviewwithBamahane and onKolIsraelradio,hedeliveredawarningtotheSyrians:“Therewillnotbecalmonlyon one side of the border.” He described Syria as the spearhead of hostilityagainstthecountry,andpromisedthat“Israelwillcontinuetorespond.”34Rabinalso addressed the Syrians, as did the head of the IDF intelligence branch,Aharon Yariv, in a briefing for the foreign press. Rabin enumerated Israel’soptions, including the occupation of Damascus. The papers, too, employedemotionallanguagethatstemmeddirectlyfromthevictorycelebrationsaftertheshootingdownoftheplanes.“Itseemstherewillbenoescapingahead-onclashwith Syria in the future,” said Ha’aretz.35 Yediot Aharonot’s military
commentator,ArelGinai,whowasknownforhavingreliablesourcesandwhooften expressed government, Mossad, and military positions, learned fromRabin and Eshkol’s declarations that Israel was laying the groundwork for alarge-scaleoperation.“AftertheclearwarningsvoicedinrecentdaysbyIsraelileaders, first among themMr.Eshkol, there isno longer anydoubt that IsraelwillrespondtotherecentSyrianactionsagainst its territory.”Ginaiwrotethatthe Israeli strikewould be “powerful and impressive,” butwould not involveseizingterritories“thatarefarbeyondtheSyrianborder,”meaning,apparently,that conquering Damascus was not an option. In his view, Russia and EgyptwouldrespondonlyifIsraeliforcesoccupiedDamascus.Maarivconcludedthatsame day, May 12, that a letter sent by Israel to the UN was “a finalwarning.”36*Eshkol attributed great importance to the U.S. position, but the Johnson
administrationhadnoobjectiontoIsraelstrikingagainstSyriaandthereforedidnot demand that he temper his public utterances. In preparation for ameetingwithAbeFeinbergandDavidGinsburg,PresidentJohnsonwasgivenbriefingpapers byWalt Rostow, which included the statement, “We sympathize withEshkol’sneedtostoptheseraidsandreluctantlyadmitthatalimitedattackmaybehisonlyanswer.”AccordingtoRostow,theadministrationwantedEshkolto“thinktwice”beforecommitingtheIDFtosuchanattack,buttheUnitedStatesalsodidnotwanttogivehimreasontoblameWashingtonforhavingheldIsraelback,particularlyifittranspiredthatasmall-scaleattackwasthebestcourseofaction.HalSaundersof theNationalSecurityCouncil reported toRostowthatduringhisvisittoDamascushehadbeentoldexplicitlybySyrianofficialsthatthey intended to disrupt life in Israel to such an extent that Jewswould stopsettlingthereandIsraelismightleave.Saunders’simpressioninJerusalemwasthattheIsraeligovernment,inparticularLeviEshkol,sawPalestinianterrorasthemainthreattoIsrael’ssecurity.38
OntheeveofIndependenceDay,YediotAharonotassertedon its frontpagethattherewas“FearinSyriainLightofIsrael’sWarning.”Onthesecondpageappearedtheheadline“DamascusReassuresItselfThatEgyptWillCometoItsAid.”On the third page, the paper settled scoreswithNasser, calling him “athug.”Eshkol himself hadwords ofwarning forEgypt: “We shall thwart anyattempttohinderfreepassagetoandfromIsraelthroughtheRedSea,whoevertheassailantsmaybe.”Earlier,EshkolhadmockedthedreamofArabunitythatNasser was attempting to realize and had taken a swipe at him over Egypt’sfailuretoprotectSyriafromIsrael.39
A close reading of the Independence Day statements indicates somedivergences.Eshkolspokeoftheneedforpreventativeaction—inotherwords,defense—whileRabinarguedthattheterrorists’activitiescouldnotbestoppedbydefensivemeans.EshkolspokeinthesemiofficialMapainewspaper,Davar,whileRabinmadehisdeclarationsinLamerhav,theorganofthehawkishAhdutHa’avoda. But the general impression was clear: Israel was planning to actagainst Syria, and these belligerent statements were intended to create theappropriate atmosphere.AbbaEbanwrote drily, as only he could: “Had therebeenaslightlygreatermeasureofsilence,ittranspiresthatnothingwouldhavebeenlosttothetreasuryofhumanwisdom.”40
EshkolwasunderparticularpressuretoprovehismettleasIndependenceDayapproached. The Syrian questionwas not the only challenge to his fitness asIsrael’s leader.In thepreviousfewmonthshehadbeenchargedwithanawfulaccusation: thathewas incapableofdefending the special statusof Jerusalemand thedignityof the army, and that this failurewas the reasonwhy the IDFcouldnotholditstraditionalannualmilitaryparadeinthestreetsofJerusalem.
THE PARADE IN JERUSALEM WAS AN ANNUAL ISSUE, OR, AS ONE OF THE U.S.PRESIDENT’S assistants wrote, an “annual hassle.” The cease-fire with Jordanallowedonly a small number of troops to enter the city and prohibited heavyequipment, including tanks.* A parade held in Jerusalem in 1961 led to areprimandofIsraelintheSecurityCouncil,andsincethentheparadeshadtakenplaceinothercities.JerusalemwasthelastrefugeoftheIsraelipatriot.“Accuseyourenemiesof
betrayingJerusalem,andyouareexemptfromanyfurtherargumentwiththem,”wroteUri Avneri; “prove that you are the only personwho truly cares aboutJerusalem,andyounolongerneedtobothertryingtofindrealanswerstorealproblems.” In this spirit, Knesset opposition members and a few editorialistsannuallydemandedthattheparadeshouldtakeplaceinJerusalem,andEshkolwas required to explain why this was not possible. The opposition therebyemerged as the champion of national dignity, while the government wasdepictedasagroupofweaklings,meeklysuccumbingtoAmericanpressure.In1966, the opposition on this issue had been strengthened by the additionalsupportofDavidBen-Gurion,apowerfulorator.Thatyear,theparadewasheldinHaifa,andBen-Gurionannouncedvociferouslythathewouldboycottit.41
Ha’aretzhadcometothegovernment’sdefenseand,inararemoment,evencriticizedBen-Gurion,remindingreadersthatduringhisfinalyearsinofficethe
parades had not been held in Jerusalem either. The director general of theForeignMinistry cautioned that amilitaryparade in JerusalemwoulddamageIsrael’s standing as a country that kept its word, would strengthen thePalestiniansvis-à-visJordan’sHussein,andwouldpushthekingtotakeextremesteps.*Themereholdingof theparadedidnot reinforce Jerusalem’s status asthe capital, anymore thanconducting it inHaifagave that city special status,assertedthedirectorgeneral;butheaddedthatonthefollowinganniversary,thestate’stwentieth,theIDFwouldhavetodemonstrateitsfullpower.Eshkol’s military secretary, Lior, seems to have keenly understood the
domesticdynamicbehindIsrael’sforeignpolicy:theclaimthatEshkolwasnotcourageousenoughtoholdamilitaryparadeinJerusalemwasdamagingtohim,inlightbothofRabin’spopularityandthatoftheentiremilitary,andbecausehewasalso thesubjectof ridicule tosomanyIsraelis.Toprovehisadherence toJerusalem’sstatusasthecapitalofIsraelwithoutprovokinginternationalanger,Eshkoldecidedtoholda limitedmilitaryparadein thecapital,onethatwouldnotoversteptherulesofthecease-firewithJordan.Therewouldbenotanks,noaerial demonstrations. “A miniparade,” mocked Uri Avneri. This decisioncreatedanall-encompassingarrayofpressure:theArabstatespressuredJordan,Jordanpressured theUnitedStates, andHerzlRosenblum, theeditorofYediotAharonot, andDavidBen-GurionbothpressuredEshkol.Rosenblumwroteaneditorialentitled“Scoundrels,”inwhichheclaimeditwastheprimeminister’sweakness that was causing the world powers to pressure Israel. Ben-Gurionprotested against the “phony parade” planned by the government, andannouncedthathewouldnotattenditeither.43Eshkolrespondedheatedly:Hadhe not sent the IDF to Samua? Had he not sent the air force to shoot downSyrianMiGs?Three timeshehadunleashed theair force, and Israelhad shotdownnofewerthanelevenArabaircraftthatyear.TheUnited States, Britain, and France could not ignore the parade, for the
simplereasonthat theyhadtodecidewhether theirambassadorswouldaccepttheinvitationtositonthedignitaries’stage.Thequestionbecamethetopicofavoluminous correspondence, as a State Department official put it. Everyonetreated the subjectwith the utmost gravity, asworld powers had always donewhenever Jerusalem was concerned. Ambassador Walworth Barbour hadattended the dedication of the new Knesset building, and Secretary of StateDean Rusk accompanied this gesture with an internal memo in which hemaintainedthatthededicationoftheKnessetshouldbeseenasaonetimeaffairand that the ambassador’s presence did not change the U.S. position that inprinciple Jerusalem was not a part of the State of Israel. The American
ambassador’spresenceattheparadecouldbehandledinasimilarway,andthiswastheAmericans’intention,butwhenBritainandFranceannouncedthattheirambassadorswouldnotattend,theAmericansalsobalked.AfewadministrationofficialstooktheopportunitytovoicefairlyhostilepositionstowardIsrael.TheU.S.ambassadorinDamascuswrotetoWashingtonthatthetimehadcomeforIsrael tostop leading theUnitedStatesaroundby thenose,as thiswasnotanelection year. OneWhite House official saw the affair as an example of thegeneral problem that characterized relations with Israel: the Israelis were notentirelyhonest.Yes,hewrote,theAmericanambassadorcouldsimplyattendtheparadetobenicetotheIsraelisontheirdayofcelebration,buttheproblemwasthattheIsraelistriedtoturneverythingtopoliticaladvantage,andtheyhadlostallsenseofproportionwithregardtotheparade.44
The Israeli press followed the affair closely.Themilitary correspondent forHa’aretzquoted“securitysources”whosuggested that if theU.S.ambassadordid not attend, Israel should respond with a full military parade withoutobserving the cease-fire limitations. The paper, however, took a moderateposition,arguingthat thepresenceof theambassadorsat theparadewasofnogreatsignificance,anditrepeateditsrebukeofBen-Gurion.45AtsomepointthematterlandedonPresidentJohnson’sdesk.WaltRostowallbutapologizedforthenuisance:inhisview,thequestionwas
trivial, but the president should know that the ambassador’s absence from theparade might cause “trouble,” and he felt obliged to warn him. The issue athand,hecontinued,wasJerusalem’sstatus.TheBritishhadraisedanimportantpoint:therewasnodoubtthattheIsraeliswereusing“salamitactics”—tryingtotakethewholesalamislicebyslice—andmuchasRostowlikedthem,theywereunfortunately not people to content themselves with a friendly gesture. Theywerealwaysdeterminedtogetsomething,alwaysnegotiating.TheIsraeliswerethreateningthattheambassador’sabsencefromtheparadewouldbringaboutacrisisintherelationshipbetweenthetwocountries,butthiswas“nonsense”andtheycouldprobablybetalkedoutoftakingthatline,Rostowbelieved.However,they might interpret the ambassador’s absence as “the kind of aloofness thatdoesn’thelpyouhereathome.”He,Rostow,wouldhatetoseethepresidentgetintohotwaterover this.But thequestionwasnoteasy:was theUnitedStatesprepared to give in to all the Israelis’ demands, or was it still interested inmaintainingadegreeofbalancebetweenthemandtheArabs?TheIsraelisfelttheyhadachievedabreakthroughwith thepresidenton the issueof tanksandplanestheywishedtopurchase,andtheyweretryingto“exploitittothehilt.”The State Department recommended siding with the British and the French,
which necessitated choosing between two options: boycotting the parade orattending.Johnsonultimatelydecidedthattheambassadorwouldnotsitonthedignitaries’stageonIndependenceDayitselfbutwouldtakepartinasoundandlightshowtobeheldintheHebrewUniversitystadiumtheeveningbefore.HeinstructedhisassistantstominimizedamagetorelationswiththeIsraelisandtoinformDavidGinsburgofhisdecision.46
IndependenceDaycelebrationsbeganinthetraditionalway,ontheeveningofMay 14, with a sharp transition fromMemorial Day, with its ceremonies inmemoryof Israel’swardead.Asmourninggaveway to joy, tenmenand twowomenwerechosentolighttorchesbythegraveofTheodorHerzl,representingelevensettlementsfoundedintheNegevattheendofYomKippurin1946,“asettlement operation,” asMaariv characterized it, intended to protest againstBritish rule. At the Hebrew University stadium, President Shazar enteredaccompanied by mounted troops, and then there was a show of torches andlights,standard-bearersandgroupsofsoldiersinformation.Thepresscoverageexpressed the pride of a small state struggling against isolation. Among theguests,notedYediotAharonot,werenotonlyforeignambassadors,butalsothevicepresidentoftheAfricanMalagasyRepublic,whohadcometoIsraelfortheoccasion. Throngs of Israelis went out that night to dance in the streets andcrowdaroundoutdoorperformances.Therewerealsofireworks.*
Themilitaryparadewasheldthefollowingday.UNobserversmonitoredtheevent as if it had the power to determine the future ofworld peace. Some ofthem ascended David’s Tower, within the walls of the Old City, to countpreciselyhowmanyvehicles,howmanysoldiers—bothmaleandfemale—andhowmany flags appeared in the parade. TheUN secretary general, U Thant,lateropinedthattheparadehadtriggeredthedynamicthatultimatelyledtotheSix-Day War. Some 200,000 people crowded the streets of Jerusalem thatmorning. “Itwas not a particularly impressive event,”wroteYediot Aharonot,characterizing it asmore of amarch than amilitary parade.Many spectatorsweredisappointedand leftwithabitter taste in theirmouths.“Alotofpeopleweredepressedbyit,”wroteDavidBen-Gurion.47
IndependenceDaywastheonlysecularholidayinIsrael,exceptforelectiondays.Israeliswenthikingandpicnicking.Studentsreenactedthebattlesof1948.The extreme ultra-Orthodox in Jerusalem, who did not recognize the state,boycottedIndependenceDay.SpottinganIsraeliflagwavingfromaparkedcarthatbelongedtopeoplewhohadcometoJerusalemtowatchtheparade,someofthemtoreitanddrewaswastikaonit.Thecarowner’swife,reportedMaariv,
was a Holocaust survivor. One can imagine how shocked she was at thisbarbaricact,wrote thepaper; thedesecrated flaghadbeenhandedover to thepolice. The winner of the International Young People’s Bible Quiz, YitzhakHagiz,wonfirstprizethankstohisknowledgeofsevenversesthatincludedthephrase“fromDantoBeersheba.”Eshkolwaspresentattheevent,aswasBen-Gurion, who was extremely impressed by the winner’s proficiency. ManyIsraelislistenedtotheannualquizontheradio“withthesortoftensionreservedinmostcountriesforbigsportingevents,”asAbbaEbanwrote.48
Ontheoccasionoftheholiday,Maarivpublishedasortofreportonthestateof the argument between “the two peoples of Israel”—the practical and themessianic,historicallyrepresentedbyMapaiandHerut.GeulaCohen,thehighpriestessoftheGreaterIsraelproponents,conductedadialoguewithDavidBen-Gurion. “The old man,” who demonstrated such fierce patriotism whencompared to Eshkol, appeared, in the face of Cohen’s impassioned vision, aspragmaticandevenlackinginfaith.“Grandpa,”Cohenaskedhim,speakinginthepersonaofhisgrandson,“what
arethebordersofmyhomeland?”Ben-Gurion replied, “The borders of your homeland, my grandson, are the
bordersoftheStateofIsrael,astheyaretoday.”Cohen would not back down. “Grandpa, when did Sinai stop being mine?
Theytoldmethatyouweretherein1956andyoudeclaredtothewholeworldthatallofitwasmine.”Ben-Gurion replied that the Sinai Peninsula had stopped being his at the
momentIsraelwasforcedtoleaveitin1957.Inthatcase,Cohenasked,dobordersshiftwithpower?Ben-Gurionconfirmedthat:“Therearenoabsoluteborders.IftheArabshad
accepted the 1947 UN partition plan, our borders would have been evennarrower.Bordersarenotanabstractprinciple.Historicalbordersareaconceptfor the days of the Messiah.” His practical conclusion was this: “We areinterested inpeacebasedon the statusquo,but if theArabsdesirewar ratherthanpeace,thenwewillfightandperhapsthestatusquowillchange.”GeulaCohenwantedtotalkabouttheMessiah.Hisarrivaldependedonfaith,
longing,andeducation,shesaid.“WouldyouencourageachildlivinginIsraeltodaytowriteasongoflongingforallofJerusalem,includingtheOldCity?”sheasked.“If a child wants to write such a song, he may write one,” Ben-Gurion
responded;“Iwouldnot.”49
AttheendofthatIndependenceDay,Israelisgotjustsuchasong.“JerusalemofGold”uniteditsaudiencewiththeemotionalpowerofanationalanthem.Itoriginated as one of the gimmicks Teddy Kollek excelled at. For Kol Israelradio’s annual Independence Day song contest, known as the Song Festival,MayorKolleksuggestedthattheselectionincludeafewsongsaboutJerusalem.The festival’s producer, Gil Aldema, commissioned the songwriter NaomiShemertowritethelyricsandmusic.*Itwasaverybeautifulsong,performedbyShuliNatan,ayoungwomanwithacrispvoice.Anditwasaverypoliticalsong,inwhichShemerlamentedthepartitionofthecity.ShedescribeditsArabhalfasadesertedwilderness,apparentlyunpopulated:“Where thewaterwellshavegonedryThemarketsquareisemptyAndnoonevisitstheTempleMount/IntheOldCity.”Shemer,anativeofKibbutzKinneret, alwaysdenied thepolitical intentions
attributed to her songs. Before the festival she played the song for RivkaMihaeli,apopularradiohost,whoaskedwhyitwassoshort.“Beforeyouhavetime to cry, it’s already over,” she complained. In response, Shemer said, sheaddedanotherverse,expressinglongingfortheTempleMount.Ha’aretzprintedthe lyrics in its news section, andmany Israelis quoted the song in letters tofriendsandrelativesabroad.“JerusalemofGold”castamysteriousspell.ShuliNatanwassaid tohaveappearedonstage likeapriestess inaholyceremony,andhersongwastheprayerofanation.50
CHAPTER5THREEWEEKSTOWAR:WHATDOESNASSER
WANT?
1.SURPRISE:“IFYOUBLOWSMOKE”
Private216777,Bar-Dayan,Yehoshua,servedasadriverduringhisyearlystintsofreserveduty.Afewhoursaftersayinggood-bye tohiswife,Gila,and theirson, Yariv, at their home in Rishon Lezion, he arrived at the RequisitionedVehicle Base in the south of the country, somewhere between Nitzanim andJulis. He drove there with his friend Uzi Avrahami. They picked up thenewspapersontheway.ItwasMay19,1967,aFriday.Atthebase,hewastoldtopickarequisitionedvehicle.HeconsideredaStudebaker,butthensettledonafamiliarWillys truck in goodworking order. In the glove compartment, Bar-Dayanfoundayear-oldpocketcalendarwithagreenplasticbinding.Thediarybelongedtothetruck’sowner,wholivedonamoshavnamedNetaim.Ononeofthefirstpageshehadwritten,“Aliza,birthday.”Therewasapassportphotoofayoungwomantuckedundertheplasticsleeveontheinsideofthecover.Mostofthe pages were empty, and Bar-Dayan began to use them to record hisimpressions,beginningwiththeeventsofthepreviousday,whenhehadtakenhisSussita foranoilchangewithhisson,Yariv.Over thenext fewweeks,hewrotedaily,oftenhourly, fillingeveryavailablespacewith tiny,barely legiblehandwriting.Hewrote a total of three hundred pages.One of his first entrieswasthequestionpreoccupyingeveryreservist:“WhatdoesNasserwant?”1
AFEWDAYSEARLIER, PRIMEMINISTERESHKOLHADSTOODONHISOFFICEBALCONYwith a glass of orange juice and looked out toward the Hebrew Universitystadium,whichwasfilledtocapacityfortheeventsofIndependenceDayeve.Thestadiumwaslitupwithhugefloodlights,andEshkolcouldhearthecrowdsroaring even from his balcony. His wife, Miriam, was also there with someguests. Before leaving for the stadium, Rabin had come by to tell the primeminister that information from Cairo indicated the Egyptians were movingforcesintotheSinaiDesert.Newsagenciesreportedseeingtroopsontheirway,marching through the streets of Cairo. Eshkolwas surprised, Israel Lior laterwrote, but did not seemworried: despite lingering doubts, he agreedwith thearmy’sassessmentthatEgyptwouldnotinitiatewarbefore1970.Andsothere
was reason to believe, on the eve of the controversial military parade inJerusalem, that Nasser was just flexing his muscles. That Egyptian militaryforcesweremakingtheirwaytoSinaisoopenlyseemedonlytoreinforcethisview.On the day of the parade itself, as the procession was under way, the
telephone rang under the seat of General Yeshayahu Gavish, head of theSouthernCommand.ThecallerwasRabin,whowas sittinga few rowsaheadwithotherdignitaries.HeupdatedGavishabouttheEgyptiantroopmovementsand instructed him to return to his command.2 But the chief of staff was notworriedyet, andneitherwasEzerWeizman, thechiefofoperations.Thiswasnot thefirst timeEgypthadexpandeditsforcesinSinai; thelastoccasionhadbeenonly twomonthsearlier.While themovenecessitatedsome readinessonIsrael’spart,evenalimitedcall-upofreservists,itdidnotnecessarilyimplyanintention to declare war. This was the assessment that was now given to thegovernment.TheEgyptians’intent,Eshkoltoldhisministersinacabinetmeeting,wasto
deterIsraelfromcarryingoutitsthreatsagainstSyria.AddingthatrecentIsraeliwarnings seemed to have alarmed the Syrians, he noted that it was quite anachievementforSyriatohavedrawnEgyptintosupportingitsextremeposition.But at this point, Eshkol did not seem to believe that his and Rabin’sIndependenceDaydeclarationshadinstigatedaprocessthatwouldleadtowar.HefeltthesituationdidnotcallforarevisionoftheviewthatEgyptwouldactonlyifIsraelbeganafar-reachingattackagainstSyriathatincludedseizingandholding territory. ForeignMinister Eban told the government that the UnitedStateswas demanding that Israel not act against Jordan orLebanon, butwithregardtoSyriathey“didnotspeak.”MinisterofEducationAranaskedwhetherpreparations had been made for a possible emergency, and Eshkol replied,simply, “Yes.” Therewas no sense of anxiety at themeeting.Afterward, onecabinetministerwrote that theEgyptianmilitarymovementsmightbeabluff,and thepressagreed.Maariv called themaneuver “a showcase response” andYediotAharonottermedit“awarofnerves.”Ha’aretzalsoviewedtheEgyptianmoveas“ashowofstrength.”3
Just a day later, however, Egypt asked theUN to remove its peacekeepingforce from the Sinai border; the UN Emergency Force, known as the BlueHelmets,hadbeenpostedbetweenIsraelandEgyptroughlyadecadeearlier,aspart of the IDF’s withdrawal from territories occupied during the 1956 SinaiCampaign. Surprise over the Egyptian redeployment turned to shock when
SecretaryGeneralUThantagreedalmostimmediatelytoNasser’sdemand.Thisdevelopment produced piles of paper documenting numerous diplomatic,historical,andlegaldebates.UThantsparednoeffortinattemptingtoconvincetheworld—andhistory—thathehadactedasheshouldhave,bothlegallyandpolitically,ashehadanobligationtoprotecthismen’s livesandremovethemupontheEgyptians’demand.4UThant,aformerteacherfromBurma,wasthusrevealed as aman lacking in initiative, concerned onlywith international lawand not with the real world, as rigid as the UN building in New York.Ambassador Harman later observed, “I am convinced that Hammarskjóld [UThant’spredecessor]wouldhaverespondedtotheEgyptiandemandbysaying,’Slowly, slowly, shwaye,shwaye—I’mgetting on a plane and going toCairo,firstofall, toat least try tobuysometime, try tocalmthingsdown.’”HadUThantbeenmorecreative,moreshrewd,moreopentocriticism,moredaring,hemighthavebeenabletopreventthewar.AsEbantoldthegovernment,Nasserhad not in fact demanded a fundamental realignment ofUN forces, only thattheyvacate theSinai andconcentrate inGaza. In response,however,UThantdemanded an all-or-nothing clarification from Nasser—that the peacekeeperseitherstayorgo—whichlefttheEgyptianslittlechoicebuttoaskfortheirtotalwithdrawal. Eban observed that the secretary general, “a stubbornman,”wasleading thecrisis fromonemistake to thenext,andcalledhis justifications“abunchof insultingnonsense.”At thispoint,Ebansuggestedmakingitclear toNasserthathinderingIsrael’sfreedomofnavigationmeantwar.5
Therewas,ofcourse,anotherway to respond to theproblem,whichwas tomove the UN emergency forces to the Israeli side of the border. Israel’sambassadortotheUN,GideonRafael,wasaskedaboutthisoptionwhenhemetwith U Thant. The ambassador exclaimed: “Ridiculous. Israel is not theSalvationArmyandwouldnotbewilling toacceptUNdiscardsfromEgypt.”The United States tried, albeit rather limply, to convince Israel to accept theidea. The presence of UN forces would have limited Israel’s ability to actagainstEgypt.Butthis,likesomanyotherissues,wasseenmoreasaquestionofnationaldignity:postingtheUNforceontheIsraelisideoftheborderwouldhave been interpreted by the Arabs as a humiliating defeat for Israel, andEshkol’s adversaries would have exploited it. The question was raised in agovernmentmeeting.“WhatwilltheUNforcesdohere,”askedtheministerofjustice,“recitethebookofPsalms?”Ebanreplied,“TheycanplaycardsforallIcare.”6*
EGYPT’SDEMANDTHATTHEUNFORCESBEREMOVEDDIDNOTHELPPRIVATEYehoshua
Bar-Dayan and his friends comprehendNasser.YitzhakRabin, addressing theKnessetForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,seemedequallyuncertain.HedidnotreallyknowwhatNasserwanted,butheassumedtheEgyptianpresidenthaddecidedtoheatupthesouthernbordersothatIsraelwouldnotattackSyria,inthenorth.GeneralAharonYariv,headoftheIDFintelligencebranch,offeredtheGeneralStaffafairlylucidexplanation:“Nasser’smoveisaresultofSyrianpressure,andthelaststrawwastheIsraelideclarationregardingpossibleactionagainstSyriaiftheactsofsabotagecontinue.”IsraelLiorsurmisedthatNasser’smovewasprimarilypartofapsychological
face-off,andbelievedtheprocesshadstartedwiththeairbattlenearDamascuson April 7. That flight had constituted a provocation and, above all, ahumiliatinginsulttoSyrianArabdignity,hewroteinhisdiary.8AfewmembersoftheKnessetForeignAffairsandDefenseCommitteealsofeltthattheApril7incident had caused the crisis, and the most outspoken of these was MosheDayan.Egyptwasresponding toaseriesof Israeliactions,Dayanmaintained,whichincludedtheextensionofmilitaryservice,theApril7incidentincludingtheflightnearDamascus,andtheIsraelipropagandaline,whichblamedSyriaexclusively for the terrorist attacks. He also mentioned the Samua operation.Nassercouldnotremainindifferenttoallthese,Dayansaid,andaddedthathewasnotsurprisedbytheEgyptiandemandtoremovetheUNforce:ifthatstepwasnottaken,Nasser’spromisetoprotectSyriawasworthless.NasserwasnotplanningtoinvadeIsrael,but thestepshehadtakenuptothispointwouldnolongersuffice.Topreservehisprestigeandsecurehisstatus,hehadtotakemoreprovocative steps, which would inevitably elicit an Israeli attack. Dayanmentionedtwopossibilities:bombingthenuclearreactoratDimona,orclosingthe Straits of Tiran. Nasser probably estimated that the Egyptian army couldwithstandanIDFattack,whichexplainedthedefensivealignmentofhisforces.At this point, two days after Egypt’s demand regarding theUN forces had
escalated tensions, therewas already a feeling that Israelwas on the vergeofconflictwithEgypt,andthatthiswasagainstthenationalinterest.“Iwouldliketo maintain the status quo for fifty years,” said Eshkol. Dayan gave theimpressionthathehimselfwouldneverhavegottenintothismess:“Ifyoublowsmoke,youhavetounderstandthattheothersidewillthinkafirehasbeenlit.”RabinandEshkolwerefuriousatDayan.“Whatareyoucomplainingabout?”
Eshkolasked.“ItwasyouwhodemandedagesagothatwedosomethingtogetridoftheUNforce!”DayanhadtakenjabsatNasserinthepast—writing,“Itisdoubtful that any of the other Arab leaders fail to understand that the UNsoldiersareonEgyptiansoilnottopreventNasserfromharmingIsrael,butto
serveasa fig leafoverhisnakedweaknessandhis inability todoso.”Dayanhad believed it was best to remove the UN force. Rabin later recalled “anatmosphere of hostility against the government and the IDF brass” at themeeting.Thesewerethefirstsignsofthepoliticalandpersonalrivalrythatwastoplaysuchanimportantroleinthisdrama.Duringthemeeting,itwasreportedthat two Egyptian MiGs had invaded Israeli airspace; they had circled overDimona,amongotherplaces.9
The fear that theEgyptianswould bomb theDimona reactor or even try toattack itwithparatroopsbecameacentral concern in thedebateover thenextfewdays.AlthoughhestillbelievedtheEgyptianswouldnotattack,EshkolsaidonMay 17, “You never can knowwhatmight happen.” A few days later heconceded,“OnecanassumetheywillhaveaninterestinbombingDimona.”NotallthegovernmentministersbelievedthatastrikeontheDimonareactorwouldjustifyall-outwar,partlybecausetheyfelttheworldwouldsupportEgyptifitdestroyed the reactor. TheUnited States did not discount the bombing of thereactorasapossibility.ByMay21 therewas talkofoutrightwar.According tooneminister, Israel
Galili,anyinfringementonthefreemovementofshippingwouldmeanwar,aswouldanattempttobombDimona.Rabinsoundedconfident.IfEgyptattacked,he said, Israelwoulddeliver “avery severeblow,”although that samedayhenotedthattheresultsofanairwarbetweenthetwostateswoulddependonwhoattackedfirst.10Theassumptionwasthatwhoeverstruckfirstanddestroyedtheenemy’sairforceonthegroundwouldwin.TherewerethosewhosurmisedthatNasserwasactingpartly inresponseto
insultsdirected athimby the Jordanians,whomockedhim fornot coming toSyria’s aid. Eshkol urged King Hussein not to provoke Nasser, as did theAmericans. There was also a theory that the Soviets were to blame. YaacovHerzogassumedfromtheoutsetthatNasserwouldnotriskconflictwithIsraelwithoutRussiansupport,andhetoldEshkolso.11
ForeignMinisterEbanhadinformedthecabinetthatinformationontheIsraelialignment in the north had reached the Egyptians through the USSR, and heblamed the Soviet ambassador, Dimitri Chuvakhin. Eban did not explain thebasisforhisview,butsaidhehadnodoubtofit,andrejectedthecontentionthatIsrael’sthreatsagainstSyriahadcausedpanicinDamascusandCairo.Healsoexpressed his suspicion of the USSR in a conversation with the U.S.ambassador, Walworth Barbour; the accusation was reiterated by an Israeliembassystaffer inWashington,NehemiahLevanon,whowas inchargeof the
struggleagainstoppressionofJewsintheSovietUnion.12
The Israeli press adopted Eban’s version of events almost immediately.“Perhaps this is not merely a theatrical demonstration, but a Russianinspiredoperation,” conjectured Yediot Aharonot on May 17. Maariv concurred: “IfMoscowhasbeenand still ispushing theArabs to thebrinkofwar andevenbeyond,itisbecauseithopes,amongotherthings,thatitwillsucceedinturningtheMiddleEastintoasecondfrontwiththeUnitedStates.”Ha’aretzpublishedthethesisasafront-pagescoop:“Nasser’smovesfitintoapoliticalconspiracybehind which stands the Soviet Union.” The Soviet connection theory wasattributedto“politicalobserversinJerusalem.”This view was ultimately adopted by many historians. TheMossad’sMeir
Amitneverceasedbelievingit.AftercommunismcollapsedinEasternEurope,a secret speechgivenbyLeonidBrezhnev,whohadbeengeneral secretaryoftheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnionsince1964,wasrevealed,inwhichhesaidthat theUSSRhadtoldEgypt thatIsraelwasabout toattackSyria.Othersources confirm this, but do not remove the question marks surrounding thematter:Whatwastheexactnatureoftheinformationandwhatwasitssource?DidtheRussiansgiveEgyptintelligenceobtainedinIsrael,ordidtheypassonwhattheyhadheardinDamascus?DidtheRussiansbelievetheinformationwastrue?Why did they give it to Egypt? In one Israeli governmentmeeting, theviewwasexpressedthattheRussianswantedtoopenasecondfrontinordertoweakentheUnitedStatesinVietnam.Butthisthesisoriginatedwiththeministerofreligiousaffairs,ZerahWarhaftig,andhadnoverifiablebasis.13
TheUSSRhardlyneededan Israelimole, andArabshadnoneedofSovietintelligence to calculate that Israel might attack Syria.What one governmentministercalledthe“abundanceofremarks”byEshkol,Rabin,andotherIsraelispokespersonsbefore IndependenceDay left little roomfordoubt.Eshkolhadbeenexplicit:themainproblemsinrelationswithSyriawerethewaterdispute,thedemilitarizedzone,andtheactsofsabotage,forwhichtherewasnoprovenremedy.Syria,therefore,needed“tobedealtaseriousblow.”AfewdayslaterAbba Eban determined that the “first link” in the chain of events that hadbroughtEgyptandIsraeltothebrinkofwarwasFatah.14
MEANWHILE, LIFE PROCEEDED AS USUAL. PEOPLE WERE PREOCCUPIED BY JUICYREPORTSfromthetrialofadistrictcourtjudge,EliezerMalhi,accusedoftakingbribes, aswell asby theongoingcampaignagainst autopsies.ErichLeinsdorfcame to conduct the Philharmonic in Brahms’s Third Symphony. Yediot
AharonotdevotedafewcolumnstotheGashashHahiver’snewshow.Ha’aretzwasstillbusywithaninterviewYigalYadinhadgiventoMaariv, inwhichhecriticizedtheIDF’sfailuretooccupyBethlehemintheWarofIndependence,afailure he attributed to Moshe Dayan.15 Yadin had good reason to make hisclaimsinpublic:hewasvyingwithDayanfortheleadershipofa“nonpartisan”movement that would act to change the electoral system. Yediot AharonotreportedthatDavidBen-Gurion’smaneuveringtosetupanewgovernmentledbyDayanhadfailed.Thisnewswas important, for it suggested thepossibilitythatBen-Gurionhimself,orDayan,wouldsoonreplaceEshkol.ButthentheshockIsraelishadfeltwhentheylearnedNasserwaskickingout
the UN forces gave way to fear. Nasser might well get involved in a war,maintained Ha’aretz. Nasser’s move might bring about an explosion evenagainst his own will, Maariv added. The military commentator for YediotAharonotwrotethatthewarofnervesbegunbyEgyptcoulddeteriorateintorealwar,and,asiftoremindreaderswhatrealwarmightmean,thepaperpublishedexcerptsfromanewbookabouttheSinaiCampaign.16*ThedayYehoshuaBar-Dayanwascalledupforreserveduty,Eshkoltoldhis
party’spoliticalcommitteethatthesituationwasfarworsethanitseemedatfirstsight.Earlier,atareceptionforthepresidentoftheMalagasyRepublic,Eshkolgave Rabin permission to call up between fifteen thousand and eighteenthousand reservists. By Friday, May 19, more than forty thousand had beencalledup.18YehoshuaBar-Dayanwas no longermerely anxious. For the firsttimeinmanyyears,hewroteinhisdiary,hewasafraid.OnFriday evening, the day after his call-up,Bar-Dayanwasmoved farther
south,towardKibbutzRevivim.Hedidnotknowexactlywherehewasheaded.Hewrotetwonamesinhisdiary:GiliandYariv.NearBeersheba,hesawlongconvoysofmilitaryvehicles.Heranintoanacquaintanceandsentregardstohisfamily.Atfirsthecampedinaeucalyptusgrove,thenatarepairfacilityusedbyan armored corps unit for its tanks, half-tracks, trucks, pickups, “everything.”Bar-Dayanwas troubled by the oppressive heat.At the field showers, hemetsoldiersontheirregulararmyservice.“Kids,”hewrote.Someonewasgivingarunningcommentaryonthesituation,predictingthatNasserwouldcloseofftheStraits of Tiran and the IDF would set out to reopen them by force, withAmericansupport.Oneofficerletslipthattheywereinfor“alittleexcursiontotheSinai.”RafiZur,whoworked for theVeterinary Institute, tried to comforthimselfandhisfriendBar-Dayan:therewouldnotbeawar.“Whowantswar?”wroteBar-Dayan.“We justwant to livequietlyathome.Just live.Gili,Yariv,
whatwillhappen?”LikemostIsraelis,Bar-Dayanhadinfactlivedfromonewartothenext.The
figurespopulatinghischildhoodmemoriesincludedEliyahuGolombandShaulAvigur, founding fathers of Israel’s security apparatus.His parents hadhostedLeviEshkolandEshkol’ssecondwife,Elisheva, in theirhome.OnNovember30,1947,ShukaBar-Dayanwassupposed tohave takenamathexam,buthismotherwoke him during the night and said, “We have a state.” She had justheard on the radio that the UN General Assembly had voted to partitionPalestine.Thefamilywentoutintothestreettodancewiththecrowds,andthenextday,ofcourse,therewasnoschool.Outsidethelocalpolicestation,ShukasawabusstainedwithbloodafterithadbeenattackedonitswayfromNetanyatoJerusalem.Hismothersaidthewarhadbegun;itwouldbelongandhard.Theday independence was declared, the Bar-Dayans went to see the Golombs;Moshe Sharett talked about the struggle ahead. The next day, Tel Aviv wasbombed. Threemembers of Kibbutz Degania went to Tel Aviv to begDavidBen-GuriontosendinlargerforcestodefendtheJezreelValley.Ontheirway,they stopped off to visit their former physician.Bar-Dayan remembered themsittingwithhisfather,lookingworriedandtearful.ShukawentontostudyatMikvehYisrael,anagriculturalschool.Oneofhis
classmates, Roi Rotenberg, later joinedKibbutzNahalOz, in southern Israel,andwasshotinApril1956byArabsfromtheGazaStrip.MosheDayangaveamemorable eulogy at his funeral: “Today, let us not hurl accusations at themurderers.Howcanwearguewiththeirhatredofus?ForeightyearstheyhavebeenlivingintherefugeecampsofGaza,while infrontof theirveryeyeswemake our homes on the lands and villages where they and their forefatherslived.”DuringtheSinaiCampaign,Bar-DayanhadbeenamongthetroopswhooccupiedGazaCity.19
2.TENSION:“YITZHAKWASDEPRESSED”
OnSaturday,May20,EshkolandRabinvisitedtheSouthernCommandoftheIDF.AharonYariv,headof thearmyintelligence,hadreassessedthesituation,and now believed the Egyptians were deployed for offense, rather than justdefense.Thiswasadramaticchange,becauseYarivhadfrequentlyrepeatedhisviewthattheEgyptianswerenotpreparingforwar.“AsheadoftheIntelligenceBranch,Ifailed,”helateradmittedtocolleaguesontheGeneralStaff.“Ididnotanticipatetheeventualitythatbefellus.”Hisrevisedpositionwasbasednotonlyon the tensions created by the IDF along the Syrian border, but also on a
perception that theEgyptianswanted to destroy the reactor inDimona beforeIsraelacquiredanuclearbomb.ItisunclearwhyYarivneededtheconcentrationofEgyptianforcesinSinaitoreachthisconclusion.Inanyevent,Eshkolcouldnotignoreit,butthesuddentransformationofthefundamentalassumptionthathadguidedIsraelforyearsgavehimgoodcausetodoubttheinformationhewasnow receiving from themilitary. The IDF also suffered a loss of confidence:eventsintheSinainotonlydisprovedtheintelligencesector’sabilitytopredicttheenemy’sintent,butalsoexposedtheweaknessofIsraelideterrence.The power of deterrence was supposed to prevent an Arab attack on the
reactor, onmilitary airfields, andon Israeli cities.Virtually the entire strategywas based on the assessment that the Arabs would be afraid to strike.Psychology played an important role. The army had asked repeatedly forpermission to carryoutoperationsmeant to ensure that the IDFwouldnotbe“humiliated”before theArabs, lest theyperceiveweakness.This strategywasnowcollapsing,andpanicwasnotfarbehind.Thecountrywasvulnerable,andthebestwaytoprotectitwastoattacktheEgyptiansfirst.At the end of his tour in the south, Rabin took Eshkol home and told him
abouttheIDF’svariousplans.TheairforcewoulddestroyfirsttheEgyptianairforce,nexttheEgyptianarmoredcorps,andonlythenwouldtheIDFtakeoverSharmel-Sheikh,thesouthernmostpointoftheSinaiPeninsula.Inonevariationofthisplan,code-namedAtzmon,theIDFmightoccupyGaza“fornegotiationpurposes.” The two agreed that it was not yet time to act, because politicalmeansofreducingtensionshadnotyetbeenexhausted.EshkolaskedRabintoconsidertheeconomicburdenofageneralmobilization.20
YEHOSHUABAR-DAYANHADBEENISSUEDAUNIFORM,AHAT,ANDAMESSTIN,ANDHISdiaryentriesbegantoadoptmilitaryslangfor the tanks, trucks,and jeeps thatsurrounded him. One of his friends was given leave to go home and see hisnewborn son, butwas told to return immediatelywithoutwaiting for thebris.Bar-DayanmissedGiliandYariv;hewroteGililettersinwhichhedidnotsayexactlywherehewas.“Onlyheredoyourealizewhathomeis,andabelovedwifeandapreciousson,”hewrote.Hehadalotoftimetothink,andwhathethought about was home. “The balcony doors should be kept closed and thescrews on the bottomofYarivi’s crib need tightening.Check them every twodays.”IfGilineededoranges,hecouldarrangeforafriendfromworktobringheracrateofValencias,and ifsheneededmoney,his fatherwouldgiveheraloan. He had forgotten to pay the municipal tax; the bill was in one of thedrawers in the bureau. He read a lot. Some people had brought English
paperbackstoread.TheNahalentertainmenttroupehadputonashow.21
ATTHEBEGINNINGOFTHESECONDWEEKOFTHECRISIS,ANEWTONEAPPEAREDINTHEmedia,probablybecauseofthenewintelligenceassessment.Ze’evSchiffwrotethat,contrarytowhathehadreportedthreedaysearlier, Israelwasnowunderthreat. The ball was in Egypt’s court, the UN force was no longer there topreventdirectconflictbetweenthetwocountries,andincidentsmightblowupbecause not only were there Egyptian soldiers posted in Gaza, but alsoPalestinians.Theconflicthadturnedintoastruggleoverprestige,andthisphasewasprimarilypsychological.ForNasser, thematterofprestigewasextremelyimportant, Schiff judged, and he quoted Dayan’s words before the ForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,totheeffectthatthehumiliationofNasserhadonly stoked the fire. Israeli leaders had talked too much; their style was tooboastful.Iftheykeptitup,IsraelwouldfinditselffacedwithablockadeoftheStraitsofTiranandafighttoreopenthem.Israelshouldexplainthathinderingthefreepassageofshippingwasacauseforwar,butindoingsoitmustavoidprovocationsandinsults.Eachofthetwocountrieswouldhavetorespondiftheothertooka“provocativestep.”Concernwasgrowinginthesecuritycabinetandthegovernmentasawhole.
Besides thedanger that theEgyptianswould try tohit thenuclear reactor andblockaccesstotheStraits,therewasalsotalkofthepossibilitythattheywouldinitiate a general attack. One minister, Haim Gvati, considered the situation“fairlyserious,”butnooneseemed toknowfor surewhatNasserwantedandhow far theRussianswould go alongwith him.Criticismof themilitarywasincreasingamongsomeof theministers.HaimMosheShapira, theministeroftheinterior,soundeddisgruntled:untiltwoweeksago,thegovernmenthadbeenassured that Syria stood alone and it was therefore time “to teach it somemanners.” Now all of a sudden therewas a danger of war. The inadequatelyprotected borders needed “fifty thousand guards,”meaning reservists. Shapirasaiditwouldhavebeenadvisabletoinvestmoreinprotectivemeanslongago.He was concerned about terrorists, not the Egyptian army’s presence in theSinai.MinisterofEducationAranadded,“Iwillnotagreetoawaroveractsofsabotage.Iamnotreadyfor this,either intellectuallyorspiritually.”MordehaiBentov, the minister of housing, disputed the basic assumption guiding IDFstrategy:“Thetimehaspassedfortheideathatifthereisadangeritisbettertostrikefirst.”Mostoftheministerssawnoneedtoreachanoperationaldecision.Only theminister of transport,Moshe Carmel, believed that Israel should bepreparing for war. His party colleague, Yigal Allon, was not present at the
meetingbecausehewasvisitingtheUSSRatthetime.The ministers tried to set a positive tone. The minister of commerce and
industry, ZeevSherf, said that the state’s food supplieswould last for severalmonths.DeputyMinisterofDefenseZviDinsteinsaidtherewasenoughfuelforlimited consumption for 120 days, but he promised that fuel from Iran couldreachtheportofAshdodbysailingaroundAfrica;fuelcouldbepurchasedfromothercountries,aswell.Israelwaswellpreparedforastateofemergency.Theministerofeducationthereforeproposedthatthepublicbeinformedtherewasnoreasonforalarm,butEshkolobjected:anysuchannouncementwouldhavethe opposite effect. Minister of Finance Sapir commented, “The Israelis arecapable of shifting within a few days from the rooftops to the pits and backagain.”Eshkolwas already hinting at the prime consideration thatwas tomotivate
himlateron:noactionshouldbetakenwithoutpriorpermissionfromtheUnitedStates.EshkolandEbanreportedthatAmbassadorHarmanhadbeentoldattheStateDepartmentthatnothingshouldbedoneagainsttheEgyptiansaslongasthestraitswerenotclosed.TheAmericanssaidthatinanycaseIsraelshouldnotact without “prior consultation,” but Eshkol and Eban understood that in theevent thatEgyptclosed thestraits, theUnitedStatesmightallowIsrael toact,justasithadnotopposedactionagainstSyria.Thiswasagoodreasontowaitandseehowthingsdeveloped.Eshkolsummedup:Israeldidnotwantwar,andthecall-upwasintendedto
prevent it. If Egyptian aircraft entered Israeli airspace and bombed any targetwhatsoever,therewouldbeanimmediateandforcefulresponsebytheairforce.Theinitialfiveminutesofall-outwarwouldbecritical:whoeverhittheenemy’sairfieldsfirstwouldwin.Meanwhile,thesituationatSharmel-Sheikhshouldbeplayeddown.“Let’snotgivetheArabscausetocelebratewhiletheJewsstandby and whine,” he said. The minutes of the meeting include the words“apprehension”and“fear.”Eshkolsaidhewas“praying”thattheEgyptiansdidnot initiateafull-scaleattack.Shapirasighed,saying,“Whoknowswhere thiswillend.”22
INTHEEVENINGOFMAY21,ESHKOLTRAVELEDTOAVIHAIL,NORTHOFNETANYA.THEfoundersofthemoshavhadservedinoneoftheJewishbrigadessetupbytheUnited States and Britain in the First World War, and that evening thecommunity was commemorating the brigade’s fiftieth anniversary. The eventwasintendedasareminderofanoldZionisttruism:onlyIsrael’sstrengthcoulddeter theArabdesire todestroy it. In1918,Eshkolhadenlisted inoneof the
Jewishbrigades.He considered cancelinghis appearance at the event, but thecabinetwantedtoproject“businessasusual.”Some three thousand people filled the local amphitheater, including many
veterans of the brigades. “Decorated with medals and standing tall,” wroteMaarivthenextday,“theynostalgicallyrecalledthegreateraofcomradeshipinarms and the national pursuit of independence.” David Ben-Gurion, also abrigadeveteran,hadspokentothecrowdsearlierintheday.HegavehisspeechinYiddish.23HedidnotattendtheassemblywithEshkol;instead,hemetwithYitzhakRabin,atthelatter’srequest.Ben-GurionsaidhewassurprisedthattheIDFchiefofstaffwantedtoseehim,andfoundRabininneedofencouragementandemotionalsupport.“Ifeltlonely,”Rabinlaterwrote.HefeltEshkolwas“exhausted”andthat“his
wingswere clipped,” partly because of the erosion of his standing. AlthoughRabin said Eshkol knew there was no avoiding war, “he did not have thestrength to impose his authority on the government.” Rabin claimed that he“pitied” Eshkol and felt the armywas not getting clear instructions from thegovernment.Existingdocumentationdoesnotcorroboratethis.Eshkolwasnotyetcertainthatwarwasinevitable,andatthisstagehehadnodifficultyunitinghisministers aroundhim.The armywas givenperfectly clear instructions: bepreparedandwait.Theonewhowas“exhausted”wasnottheprimeministerbutrather Rabin himself. According to Moshe Dayan, “Yitzhak not only lookedtired—whichwasnatural—but alsoconfused, less thanconfident, irritable (hechain-smoked), and extremely unenthusiastic about the battle ahead.” AbbaEbanwrotethatRabinwas“feverishlyirritable.”IsraelLiorreportedtoEshkolthatsomethingwashappeningtothechiefofstaff:“He’snotthesameYitzhak.”Rabin shared the opinion that the IDF’s jobwas to deter theArabs so that
there would not be a war. He knew that he bore a significant part of theresponsibility for the deterrence failures that, in his view, necessitatedimmediate war. As chief of staff, he was accountable for the intelligenceassessment that had dismissed any chance ofwarwithEgypt in the next fewyearsandhadthereforeseennoreasonforrestraintonthenorthernborder.OverandoverhehadlobbiedEshkoltoallowanattackagainstSyria;hehadledthecampaignofthreatsagainsttheSyrians,pullingEshkolalongwithhim.NowhehopedBen-Gurionwouldstrengthenhisresolve.LikemostIsraelis,headmiredBen-Gurion.But theirmeetingwasmiserable, because insteadof encouragingRabin,theoldmanshoweredhimwithaccusationsnotunlikethoseRabinhadalreadyheardfromDayanintheForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee.LikeDayan,Ben-GurionbelievedthatneitherEgyptnorSyria,butIsraelitself,was
responsibleforthiscrisis.ItisuncleartowhatextentBen-GurionblamedRabinandhowmuchofthesituationheattributedtoEshkol.Ben-Gurion explained that the national call-up,which had already involved
seventythousandreservists,was“apoliticalandsocialerror.”Healsospokeof“othermistakes.”Hedenounced theoperation inSamua,“acivilianvillage innonhostile Jordan,” and criticized the April 7 air battle with Syria. He alsoaccusedRabinoftheworst:loyaltytoEshkol.“Itold[Rabin]hewasnottellingmeeverything thatwas inhisheart,becausehehad to followorders from theministerofdefenseandwasnotpermittedtocriticizehim,”wroteBen-Gurion.“Yitzhak was depressed,” he added. According to Ben-Gurion’s biographerMichaelBar-Zohar,healso toldRabin thatEshkolwas“a liarandacoward.”Rabinwasstunned:“Ihadneverfeltsuchadeepsenseofdisappointmentanddistress.”Thenextday,May22,RabinwenttoseekMosheDayan’scounsel.According
toDayan,hetoldRabinthatNasserwouldcloseofftheStraitsandIsraelwouldhavetotakemilitaryaction.Theyspokeaboutvariousstrategicoptions.Rabinsuggested occupying theGaza Strip, but Dayanwas opposed to Israel takingcontrol because of the refugee camps.Rabin said the success of the air forcedependedondeliveringthefirstblow;Dayansaidthegovernmentascurrentlyconstituted would not authorize this. They discussed the causes of the crisis.Rabinseemedtoblamehimself,notonlyforhavingbroughtaboutanescalationoftensions,butalsofornotbeingabletoconvinceEshkoltoattackSyriamoreforcefully.Dayandisagreed:a strongerblowwouldhaveacceleratedEgyptianintervention,andablowstrongenoughtodeterNasserfrominterveningcouldnot be delivered except inwar. “Yitzhakwas unable to saywhatwould haveconstituted a stronger blow, either,”Dayan noted. “Mymain impression fromthe eveningwasYitzhak’s low spirits. If this is apparentwhen he iswith hissubordinates,too,thatisnotgood.”24
AT MIDDAY, YEHOSHUA BAR-DAYAN WAS ORDERED TO DRIVE CAREFULLY, AS THEBRIGADE commander, Colonel Shmuel Gorodish, was coming that evening.“Chilling words; the situation is deteriorating. We will go out to strike anddestroy theEgyptians.”Bar-Dayandocumentedhis response: “Myheart beatspowerfully—Imaynot return fromthis.Whatdoes thishave todowithme?”He had trouble sleeping. He kissed the photo of his wife and son. “Littlemamaleh,”hewrote.25Hesleptintherequisitionedpickuptruck,whichhadatransistorradio.
3.NERVES:“HOWDAREYOU!”
OnthemorningofTuesday,May23,Israelislearnedfromthesixo’clocknewsthatNasserhadblockadedtheStraitsofTiran.“That’sit,”Bar-Dayanwroteinhis diary. “War.Almost certainly.” Themailwould be picked up soon, so hequicklywroteanotherlettertohiswifeandson:“Imissyouverymuchandthatisthemostdifficultthing.IfeelloveandendlesslongingforyouandIpraythatthetensionwillbediffusedandwewillcomehomequickly.”HeremindedGilatodrainthewateroutofthewashingmachine—oneoftheneighborscouldhelp.Iftherewasaproblem,theAmcorapplianceinsurancewasinYariv’sroom,inthecloseton the left,on thebottomshelf. “Blessings toyou,my love, and toyoumylittleboy.”26
OnceIsraeli shippingwasbarredaccess to theStraitsofTiran, IsraelwouldlosethemostimportantadvantageithadacquiredintheSinaiCampaign.EshkolheardabouttheblockadefromIsraelLiorandimmediatelydepartedfortheIDFcommand post in Tel Aviv. Rabin,Weizman, Yariv, andMordechai Hod, thecommanderoftheairforce,demandedactionwithoutdelay.Forthefirsttime,itseems,theywereexplicitandinsistent.Therehadtobe“aseriousblow,”theystressed.Yariv said that if they did not take action, “Nasserwill keep up hisobstreperousnessandtomorrowtherewillbesabotage.”Rabinsaidthedilemmawassimply“tobeornottobe.”Thewarwouldnotendinadayortwo,andonehadtotakeintoaccountthattherewouldbe“massivedestruction”inpopulatedareas.HodpromisedhecouldhandletheSyrianairforce.TheydidnotdiscussalimitedactiontoopentheStraits,butonlyanall-outwar.“Let’sbehonestwithourselves,” said Rabin: “first we will attack Egypt; then we will also attackSyria and Jordan.” From this point on, Eshkol had to repeatedly push backagainst Rabin and his cohort. Throughout the day, Rabin over and overdemanded a preemptive attack, claiming that the Straits would remain closedotherwise. Ezer Weizman tried to scare Eshkol by saying he “hoped” Israelwould be able to destroy the Egyptian air force, “assuming they do not usegas.”*Eshkolsaidaweekwouldpassbefore the first tankerwould reach thearea,
and that time should be utilized for diplomacy. In any case, at the ForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,whichhadconvenedthepreviousday,hehadsaidthesituationinthenorthwasfarmoredangerousthaninthesouthbecausetheSyrianscoulddestroyall theIsraelisettlements.27TheUnitedStatesaskedforaforty-eight-hourmoratoriumonanyresponse,andthesecuritycabinetmetonthemorningofMay23todiscusstherequest.Eshkolwasinfavor,arguing
thattheAmericansmustnotbeallowedtoclaimthatIsraelhad“ruinedthings”byhinderinganattempttoresolvethecrisiswithoutwar.Buthecautionedthatawaiting period might last longer than forty-eight hours. “From two days itbecomestwoweeks,andtwoweekscouldbecometwoyears,”whichwouldbeavictoryforNasser.MinisteroftheInteriorShapiradisagreed:“Ifittakestwoyears, that’s not a bad thing.”Eshkolwas surprised: “Closing the shipping atSharmel-Sheikhfor twoyears?”ButShapiraproposedthat Israelishipscouldproceed to Eilat with foreign warships escorting them. At this point Rabinrevealedafactthatwastopsecret:theEgyptianshadalreadydecidedthatshipsunderAmericanescortwouldnotbestopped.Minister ofTransportCarmel asserted that closing theStraitswas an act of
aggression that necessitated a response. Minister Israel Galili proposed aresolutionthattheclosureoftheStraitsamountedtoadeclarationofwar.Rabinrepeated that if Israel did not respond, itwould lose its deterrence capability.Someoftheministersaskedifpostponingtheactionforforty-eightorevensixtyhours would lessen the element of surprise. “A difficult question,” Rabinresponded,andrefusedtosaythatsuchadelaywouldbecritical:“Idon’tthinkIcan say to you in all honesty that forty-eight hours wouldmake a differencehere.”Butheadded,“Asdifficultasthesituationis,andknowingthatthisisnopicnic,itseemstomethatwearedealingherewithanextremelyseriousmatterfor the security of Israel.”When questioned, he said that in a battlewith theEgyptian air force, Israel would lose fifteen to twenty planes. Sapir said,apparently for the first time since the crisis began, “We are talking about ourveryexistencehere.”Tempersflaredattimes.Galilishoutedthathecouldnotbeheldresponsible
forfailingtorespondtotheclosingoftheStraits;hethenapologizedforraisinghisvoice.Butmostoftheministerswereloathtotakeaction.MinisterofHealthIsraelBarzilai suggestedwaiting two or threeweeks. Shapiramaintained thatEgyptdidnotwantwar.TheyallagreedthatclosingtheStraitswas“anactofaggression” and decided to send ForeignMinister Eban to the United States.Eshkolraisedtheideaofbringinginoppositionmemberstojointhecabinet.28
AFTERTHEMEETING,RABINTESTEDHISFRAZZLEDNERVESYETAGAINANDSATDOWNTOtalkwithHaimMosheShapira.“Ibroughtthedistressuponmyself,”helaterwrote. The leader of the Mafdal party objected to unleashing the IDF inresponse to the closure of the Straits; Rabin tried to soften his opposition,unsuccessfully. “How dare you!” Shapira exclaimed. “How dare you? Ben-Gurion did not dare—howdare you!”According toRabin, Shapira suggested
“hunkeringdown”insteadoffighting.“WarwillriskIsrael’sexistence.”LikemanyIsraelis,ShapirawasthinkingofBen-Gurion’smanagementofthe
SinaiCampaign.“Explaintome,justexplaintome,”hesaidtoRabin,“doyoureallythinktheEshkol-Rabinteamshouldbebolder,morecourageous,thantheBen-Gurion-Dayanteamwas?Why?TheStraitswerecloseduntil1956—diditthreatenIsrael’ssecurity?Itdidnot!”Shapira,whowasinthegovernmentatthetime,remindedRabinthatBen-GurionhadnotgonetowarbeforesecuringthesupportofBritainandFrance;hehadknown thatSyriaandJordanwouldnotintervene.Thecurrentsituationwasdifferent.NoonewasstandingbyIsrael;theUnitedStateswasdemandingthatitwaitatleastforty-eighthours.“Iunderstand—they attack us,” said Shapira, “wewill go out and defend our lives.But tostart awar?To bring this curse upon ourselveswith our own hands?Do youwanttoberesponsibleforputtingtheexistenceofIsraelatrisk?”Themorehespoke,wroteRabin,themoreagitatedhegrew.29
IN THE KNESSET CAFETERIA, THERE WAS TALK OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCYGOVERNment. To forestall any attempt to exploit the crisis and topple hisgovernment,Eshkolmadeadramaticgesture:heinvitedoppositiondelegates—KnessetmemberMenachemBeginandtwoofhispeople,andMosheDayan—to a briefing, where they learned, among other things, of the disagreementbetweenEshkolandRabin.EshkolexplainedthathesupportedtheU.S.requesttowaitforty-eighthours,soasnot togiveAmericaanexcusetorenegeonitscommitmenttoIsrael.WeretheUnitedStatesnotmiredinVietnam,everythingwouldbemucheasier,Eshkolobserved.RabinrepeatedonceagainthatifIsraeldidnotrespond,itwouldloseitsdeterrentcapability,whichwouldleadtowarundermoredifficult conditions.Thewarhewasproposingnowwouldnotbeeasy,either:whatbeganasaconflictwithEgyptmightsnowballintowarwithSyria,andperhapsJordan.But,ashesawthings,therewasreallynochoice.TheEgyptianshadtobehit.Hesharedthewarplanswiththeparticipants.First,therewouldbeasurprise
strike on the Egyptian air force; the aerial advantage gained would then beexploitedinalandwar.BeginaskedRabintoclarifywhetherhewassayingthattheairforcewouldstriketheEgyptianairforcewhileitwasstillontheground.Rabin confirmed that it would. He was convinced they could deliver adevastating blow against the Egyptians. There would be losses, he said, thatmuchwasclear; in thenorth, too.TheSyriansmightbombIsraeli settlementsanditwouldtakesometimebeforetheairforcecompleteditsmissioninEgyptand could turn its attention to suppressing Syrian fire. Some of those present
respondedwithdiscomfort,wanting toknowhowmuch timemightpassuntilthe Syrians were quelled. Rabinwas evasive. Perhaps several hours, he said.KnessetmemberYosefSerlin,whohadaccompaniedBegin,demandedamorespecific answer.Rabin said that the stronger the strike againstEgyptwas, thefreertheairforcewouldbetohandletheSyrians.“Howlongisseveralhours?”Serlinpersisted.Rabinsaid,“Eighttoten.That’sthepicture.”David Hacohen, the chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense
Committee, andKnessetmemberAriehBen-Eliezer, anotherofBegin’sallies,werestunned.Until thatmoment, theyhadbelievedtheIDFcouldfightonallfrontssimultaneously.No,saidEzerWeizman,thatclaimhadneverbeenmade.But the two Knesset members persevered: they had always been given theimpressionthattheIDFcouldrepelamultifrontattack.Thiswasanotherbasicassumption,liketheintelligenceassessmentofnowarwithEgyptbefore1970,andit,too,wascrumbling.Thediscoverybolsteredtheiropinionthatitwasbesttowait,astheUnitedStateshadasked.ForeignMinisterEbanraisedaproposalthathadcomeupearlierthatdayin
thesecuritycabinet,wherebyU.S.warshipswouldescortIsraelishipstoEilat.Begin asked for clarification: Was the foreign minister recommending that?Eban replied that it would be an act of protest—someone had to show thatNassercouldbeoverruled.GoldaMeir,thesecretaryofMapai,objected.Eithertherewasfreedomofnavigationortherewasn’t,sheargued.Dayansaidthatifthe Americans committed to deploying the Sixth Fleet to the area to assurefreedomofpassageinthearea,hewouldnotobject:“IwillswallowmyIsraelipride.”Butheruledouttheideaofescortingeachshipindividually.Hepointedout thatNasserhad in factorderedhis forcesnot to fireon shipsentering theGulfofAqabawithAmericanwarships.Rabin interrupted: “I alert you to thefact that this is extremely confidential material,” he said, but he agreed thatescortsmightprovideanavenuetoresolvingthecrisis.Eshkoltriedtobuildontheidea,graspingatDayan’swillingnesstoputaside
pride. TheUnited States was not suggesting that it would go into Egypt andslaughter twenty million Egyptians, he said, but it might agree to senddestroyers to the Red Sea to escort Israeli ships. It could be a temporaryarrangement—ayear and a half, twoyears.Meanwhile, Israelwould build itsown large naval force and would no longer need American escorts. Dayanrespondedcoolly:“I’mnotapartnertothis.”OneparticipantremindedEshkolthat the United States had not offered such an arrangement, and that in themeantime theywereplaying chesswith themselves. “True,” saidEshkol, “butdon’t put the king in your pocket.”Hewas encouraged by the fact that those
presentdidnotviewtheideaasanonstarteranddidnotrejectitoutright.ButDayanledthemeetinginanotherdirection.Nothingwouldchangeduring
thenext forty-eighthours,hesaid; theAmericanswouldnotsecureSharmal-Sheikh.IsraelwouldgotowarwiththeArabstates.Jordanmightbefirst.Thesituationattheoutsetwasgraverthanin1956,andfarmoresothanin1948.Asanaside,Dayansaid,“WeshouldalsotaketheIsraeliArabsintoaccount.”Overthe next few weeks there were persistent fears that they would aid the Arabarmies.Then thosepresent spokeof theneed toobtaingasmasksand reviewed the
stateofthebombshelters.Warseemedinevitable.Ebanamendedhisproposal:insteadofaskingforescortsforitsships,IsraelshoulddemandthattheUnitedStates “fulfill its promises.”The next suggestionwas equally legalistic: IsraelshouldsendavesselofsomekindintotheGulfofAqaba,butdonothinguntilEgyptattacked it, in case it laterhad troubleconvincing theworld that itwasactingtoassurefreedomoftheseas.Beforethemeetingwasadjourned,Rabinagaincautionedtheparticipantsnot
to reveal under any circumstances the information about Egypt’s order not toshoot at ships accompanied by U.S. vessels. Hours later, he had a nervousbreakdown.
“DURING THOSE FINAL DAYS, WHICH WENT ON WITH NO END IN SIGHT, WITHOUTregularmeals,withlittlerest,Iwassmokinglikeachimney,”Rabinlaterwrote,“butitwasnotonlytheexcessivesmoking.Astrongsenseofguilt,whichhadtroubledmerecently,surgedthatday,May23.Ican’tforgetMinisterShapira’spunishingwords.IhaddraggedIsraelintothiscrisis.Iwasnotable,aschiefofstaff,topreventthedevelopmentofthegreatdangerthecountrynowfaced.”Henotedthathehadpreparedthearmyadequatelyforwar,butwondered,“PerhapsIhadfailedas themainmilitaryadviser tothePrimeMinisterandMinisterofDefense. Perhaps that is the reason Israel is now in such a difficult situation.MaybeBen-Gurionwasrighttosaythatthereshouldnothavebeensuchalargecall-upofreservistsandthatthishadcausedanescalationthatledIsraeltowar.”RabinsummonedEzerWeizman,hisdeputy,andproposedthathestepinas
chiefofstaff.WeizmanlaterclaimedhehadnoticeddaysearlierthatRabinwasgrowing unsteady: “Rabin was spreading a lack of confidence.” At Rabin’shome, Weizman found the chief of staff sitting alone in the living room,“depressedandbroken.”LeahRabin,hiswife,calledadoctor,whogavehimashotthatlefthimincapacitatedforthenexttwenty-fourhours.31
•••
MEANWHILE,WEIZMANATTEMPTED TOHASTEN THE BEGINNINGOF THEWAR. IN THEmorning hours of May 24, war seemed “very close,” an IDF report noted.“Preparationsforstartingwaronthetwenty-fifthofthemontharebeingmadefinal.”Atmidday onMay 24,withRabin still at home in a stupor,Weizmanpresented Eshkol with a plan code-named Expanded Atzmon, whose essencewas destruction of the Egyptian air force and occupation of the Gaza Strip.Contrary to what he had claimed the day before, he now promised that themilitarycouldoperateagainstEgyptandSyriaat thesametime.Whenhemetwith his people before seeing Eshkol, there was talk of the operationcommencing the next day, May 25. With Eshkol, he spoke of “operationalreadiness”onMay26.Accordingtoanothersummary,hesaidactioncouldbetaken“immediately.”Weizman askedEshkol to come to thewar room tomeet the IDFgenerals,
whoalsodidtheirbesttoconvincetheprimeministertostrike.TheyweretoldthatRabinwasathome,feelingunwell.MordechaiHodoftheairforceandtheheadoftheSouthernCommand,GeneralYeshayahuGavish,promisedtheplanwouldsucceed.GeneralDavidElazaroftheNorthernCommandguaranteedthatevenwithout the assistance of the air force he could put a dent in the Syrianartillery, although there was no doubt that Israeli settlements would be hit.General Uzi Narkis of the Central Command, still a minor voice in thediscussion, promised that his forces could also carry out “limited aggressiveoperations.”Theplanswereready,hedeclared.Allthegeneralsemphasizedthatthe operation’s success depended on Eshkol allowing them to act as soon aspossible;otherwisetheywouldlosetheelementofsurpriseandflexibility.Theyalsopointedout that itwasdifficult tomaintaintherequisitelevelofalertnessamong the reservists.Weizman said he would prefer a political solution, butaccording toLior,“theatmosphereat theGeneralStaffheadquarterswasas ifwarwasabouttobeginatanymoment.”32
InfactWeizmanbeganwindingup thewarmachine thatverynight.“We’reonthemove,”YehoshuaBar-Dayanwroteinhisdiary;“agoodfeeling,realistic,confident.”Theyjoinedaconvoyoftanksbelongingtothe79thRegimentandtraveled south with dimmed lights toward Kibbutz Gvulot. There wereShermans,Pattons,Centurions—“aforceofsteelandhumansanddust,”wroteBar-Dayan.“I issued orders to the Southern Command to move units and divisions,”
Weizman later wrote, and claimed that none of the officers asked where the
chiefof staffwasorquestionedWeizman’sorders.But someof themthoughtWeizmanhadlosthismind,becausethereseemedtobenoreasonforhisordertomoveunits fromonepoint toanother. Itwas“amad raceofuncoordinatedforces,”ArielSharonlaterrecounted;“IhadnoideawhethertheGeneralStaffknewwhatwasgoingon,andwehadno ideawhatwasgoingonat the top.”SharontriedtogetholdofRabinbutwastoldhecouldnotspeakwithhim.“Ithink the army is really sick,” he wrote to a colleague, AvrahamYaffe, whoreplied,“Yesterdaythewarwasdirectedbyourmutualfriend,anditshowed.”AccordingtoGeneralGavish,“Itwasnoeasytasktomoveall thetroopsin
onenight just becauseofoneman’s craziness.”Hedemanded thatHaimBar-Lev replace Weizman as deputy chief of staff. Herein, apparently, lay theprimary motive behind Weizman’s entire futile exercise: Bar-Lev wasthreateninghisdreamofbecomingthenextchiefofstaffandhewantedtotakeadvantageofRabin’sabsencetodemonstrateleadership.33
PRIVATE YEHOSHUA BAR-DAYANWROTE A LETTER TO HISWIFE, ASWAS HIS CUSTOMeverymorning.Whenhewrote toGili, itwas likebeingwithher,whichgavehim somecomfort.The conditionswere fine, he assuredher.He continued tosleepinthepickuptruck’scabin,curledupinablanketandasweater.Therewasnodangerwherehewas,hepromised.Onlyhemissedhersomuch,whichwasnotsomethingyougotusedto.Theblindshadtobefixed.“TherearesomanythingsIdidn’ttakecareofwhenIwashome,andhereitreallyannoysme.”HemetwithUziAvrahami andRafi from the institute.They’d already had threeentertainment troupes, and a movie. There were books and newspapers. Thepaperswereunequivocal.“Nasserwantswar,”assertedMaariv.Ha’aretzwentastep further: “Nasser Declares War on Israel.” Everyone was talking aboutrevisiting1956.34
Onlyanextremelyexperiencedman,determinednottolosecontrolofevents,could havewithstood such pressure as the country stood on the brink ofwar,with a chiefof staff recovering fromemotional collapse andanout-of-controlacting chief effectively forcing him intowar despite the government decisionthathadjustsentAbbaEbantoWashington.Eshkolboresomeresponsibilityforthesituation,sincehehadallowedthemilitarytodraghimtowardanattackonSyria.Hehadnotofferedanyprincipledobjection to themilitary’sdemand torespondwithforcetotheclosingoftheStraits,buthestillhopedtoresolvethecrisis without war. Above all, he believed Israel should not act against U.S.opinion.For themoment,hewasunbroken.Areportcompiledby theGeneralStaff summed up the drama in a few words: “It is reported that there is no
chanceofadecisionbeforeSaturday,May27,1967.”35
THEHEATWAVESUBSIDEDALITTLE.YEHOSHUABAR-DAYANDIDNOTDOMUCH.HEreadandnowfeltafraid.“Welackconfidence,hope,andinitiative,”hewroteinhisdiary.RafifromtheVeterinaryInstitutehadastrokeofluck:thevehiclehehadchosenhadnofront-wheeldrive,soitseemedhewouldnotgooutwiththerestoftheforce.“Strange,”Bar-Dayanpondered,“onlyafewdaysago,Iwasbusypackingoranges.”He spokewithGilaon thephone. “Myheart is lighter,”hewrote.Andhestartedgettingusedtotheideaofwar:“Increasingly,Irealizethatwecan’tescapefighting.Itisourdestiny,whichhasbroughtustothisplace.”36
CHAPTER6ELEVENDAYSTOWAR:NOA’SFATHERIS
WAITING
1.EXPLORATORYMOVES:“YOU’RETHEONLYONE”
OnthemorningofMay25,PrivateYehoshuaBar-DayanwokeupinhistruckcabinintheJuliscamp,insouthernIsrael,andquicklywrotealettertoGiliandYariv.Heaskedhiswifetobuyhimanewpairofsandals,sohecouldsteprightinto them as soon as he got home.Therewere some great guyswith him, hewrote; they helped one another ease the loneliness and cope with thehomesickness.Hewouldhavegivenanythingtobeabletohugandkisshiswifeandson,buthewaswherehewassothathecoulddosointhefuture,andtherewerethousandsuponthousandsofothersalongwithhim.AfewhourslaterhewasabletotalkwithGilionthephone,andhedetectedextremeanxietyinhervoice.1
The mass call-up disrupted life in almost every household. Buses ran onreducedschedules; theschooldaywasshortened.Itwassuddenlyeasytofindparking in frontof theCalifornia restaurantat lunchtime.The fewcarson theroad had their headlights painted blue, so they could drive during blackouts.Menofeligibleagewhohadnotbeencalledupwereashamedtobeseenonthestreets.MassesofIsraelis,includingschoolchildren,volunteeredtodigtrenches,fillsandbags,sortmail,distributemilk,driveambulances,workinhospitals,anddo guard duty on kibbutzim. “Eve-of-war tension,” wrote YosefWeitz in hisdiary.2Most Israelis assumed thatwarwas inevitable, and a growing numberconcludedthatLeviEshkolwasincapableofleadingthecountryatsuchatime.They demanded a national unity government under David Ben-Gurion. Thedemandwasspontaneous,anauthenticexpressionofthesensethatthecountrywasteeteringonthebrinkoftheabyss.RafaelHalevi,aninth-graderfromRamatHasharon,wrotetoBen-Guriontwo
daysafterNasser’sdemandtoremovetheUNforces.“Theenemyisreadyforbattle,”Rafaelwrote,andbeggedBen-Guriontoreturntoleadthecountry.Overthenext fewdays,Ben-Gurionwas inundatedwithsimilar letters.“You’re theonlyonewhocould,today,withalightningattack,turnthismiserablemomentintoahistoriccrossroadsandcreateauniquechance fornormal life,”wrotea
citizennamedYaakovBermes.HesuggestedseizingtheOldCityandexpellingthe country’s Arabs, who would receive financial compensation. A group ofanonymoussoldiersfromthesouthernfrontsentalettersignedonlywiththeirinitials, emphasizing that they were voicing the anguish of hundreds of theircomrades:“Weareaskingyou,greatcaptain,toliberatetheshipofthePeopleofIsrael, which has run aground, and lead it to safe shores.” Letters to thepresident, the primeminister, andMosheDayan also demandedBen-Gurion’sreturn.Somewroteoutofgreatdistress.“Myhusbandgoesfromonehospitaltothenext,I’vethreesonsinthearmy,I’maloneandlivinginterriblefear,”wroteBatyaGotlieb fromTelAviv; she beggedBen-Gurion to join the governmentimmediately. “A depressed and fearful man is writing to you,” wrote HaimElimelehOhon.Manyothersexpressedsuchfeelingsaswell,andsimilarlettersflooded the office of the chairman of theKnesset. “Say yes to the oldman,”wroteonecitizen.3Almost all thewriters askedBen-Gurion to take charge asthe head of state and lead Israel to victory. They did not know that he wasopposedtothewar.According to Rabin, Ben-Gurion did not believe that the IDF could win.
RabinattributedthisviewtothefactthatBen-Gurionwasbehindthetimesandhis ideas were old-fashioned. Ben-Gurion thought that getting rid of the UNforcesandclosingtheStraitswouldbeenoughforNasser,andthathewouldnotallowPalestiniansinGazatocarryoutterroristattacksinIsrael.Yetheviewedthe situation as “an unprecedented and difficult test.” He supported limitedactiontoopentheStraits,butthoughtthatanystepsshouldbetakenonlyaftersupportwasassuredfromtheUnitedStates,Britain,andFrance,oratleastfromoneofthem,asintheSinaiCampaign.Hewasconcernedprimarilybyweaponssupplies, and believed that without support from the great powers, the IDFwouldfail.“Itwillbetheend.Ourarmyiswonderful,butthesedaysonecannotfightthewayDavidfoughtGoliath.”4
Ben-Gurionwasnot alone inhis skepticism.GeneralYehoshafatHarkabi, aMinistry ofDefense staffer at the time, believed thewar should somehowbedelayed.HarkabifearedthedeathtolleveninanIsraelivictorymightbeashighas10,000,whileadefeatwouldbringaboutthe“decisiveandfinal”destructionoftwomillionIsraelicitizens.Hesuggestedwaitingsixmonths.“Whatwillbedifferent in sixmonths?” Ben-Gurion asked, andHarkabi replied, “Theywillattack and then we will defend ourselves.” He was probably surmising—orperhaps he knew—that Israel was close to a dramatic improvement in itswarfare capabilities. Parts of Ben-Gurion’s account of this conversation areclassified, and many of the classified sections in his diary concern the
developmentofnuclearweapons.5
Over the next few days, the political system seemed stricken by frenzy.Everyone ran around frenetically, swept up in a storm of initiatives andproposals,plotsandconspiracies,trickeryandpoliticalmaneuvers,awhirlwindof contradictory interests and massive egos; Israel had never known suchfeverish activity. The question of whether the war could be prevented waspushed aside, the focus having shifted to how to get rid of Eshkol and whowould replace him.The two central figures in this dramawere ShimonPeresandMenachemBegin.Asoppositionmembers,theybothwantedEshkolgone.Peres,amemberofRafiwhosharedBen-Gurion’sassessment,wasalsohopingtopreventwar.Heagreedthat theyshould try todelaythewarforat leastsixmonths and spend the interval in preparation.Heknew,however, that a delaymightbeevenmoreshockingtoIsraelisandunderminetheirconfidence,andhebelievedthattheonlypersonwhocouldmanagethesituationsuccessfullywasBen-Gurion. He should therefore return to the prime minister’s office andEshkolmovedtoadifferentposition.“Inouropinionthecountryisintheworstsituationsinceitsestablishment,”Perestoldmembersofhisparty.“Thereisnoclear-cut solution.The central thing required is leadership that can handle thesituation.”Begin also demonstrated responsible statesmanship at that time, despite his
imageasatown-squaredemagogue.“Ifthisgovernmentweretoresigntonight,IwouldrecommendtothepresidentthatheappointBen-Guriontoformanewgovernment” and lead the country as it prepared for war or, as Begin put it,“bloodshed the likes of which we have never seen.” He too was apparentlyunawareofBen-Gurion’soppositiontowar.Together,PeresandBegin tookuponthemselvesanextremelydifficult task:
PeresagreedtoaskBen-GurionwhetherhewouldserveinagovernmentledbyEshkol,andBeginagreedtoaskEshkolwhetherhewouldstepdownasprimeminister, or at least asminister of defense, in favor ofBen-Gurion.ButBen-GurionrefusedeithertojoinEshkol’sgovernmentortoacceptEshkolinanewgovernment of his own. He would, however, support Eshkol remaining in agovernmentledbyDayan,buthehimselfwouldremainoutside,hewroteinhisdiary. Nonetheless, Begin went to Eshkol to persuade him to act as Ben-Gurion’sdeputy,claimingBen-Gurionhadsanctionedtheidea.“Whotoldyouthat?”Eshkolasked.HesuspectedPereswasbehindit,andsowasskeptical.IftheideahadbeenDayan’s,hemighthaveputsomestockinit,hesaid.It isunclearwhat ledBegin toclaim thatBen-Gurionwaswilling toaccept
Eshkol as his deputy. Perhaps he was trying to mislead Eshkol; perhaps hehimself had been misled by Peres. Rafi members also heard from Peres thatBen-Gurion had agreed to take on Eshkol as his deputy. Either way, theconversation was friendly. Begin and Eshkol were old acquaintances. Beginthanked him once again for allowing Jabotinsky’s remains to be brought toIsrael, andsaidheknew the riftwithBen-Gurionwasmorepainful toEshkolthanitwastoBen-Gurion.Eshkolsaid,“I’vealreadygotitoutofmysystem,”butaddedbitterly,“OverthelastdecadesIhaveperhapseducatedafewyoungboysandgirls toadmireBen-Gurion.”Whichwaswhyhenowbithis tongue,hesaid;onceinawhilesomethingnegativeslippedout,andheregrettedit,butgenerallyhetriednottogetdraggedintorespondingtoBen-Gurion’sslanderousremarks.Astothematterathand,hesaidtherewasnoonewhocouldsucceedasBen-Gurion’s deputy.Hewas notwilling to be a secondMoshe Sharett—referring to the foreign minister and prime minister whom Ben-Gurion hadpushedaround.ButBeginwouldnotletitgo:“Afterall,it’smethatBen-GurionmakesouttobeaHitler,notyou,”hesaid.“Hespokeverynicely,inaPolish,gentlemanlyway,”Eshkollatertoldthecabinet.Buthisresponsetotheproposalwasunequivocal:“Outofthequestion.Thesetwohorseswillneveragainpullthesamecart.”HeassuredBeginthat“thefoolsittingbeforehim”wascapableofleadingthecountryevenwithoutBen-Gurion,andtoldhimaboutthestepshehadtakentostrengthentheIDF.“Wewillbeabletosustainthecampaign,”hepromised.6
Onedaylater,ShimonPeresspokewithMeirYaari,theheadofMapam.AsYaari’sassociateYaakovHazanrecalledit,PeressaidthatIsraelwasnotreadyforwar and that the countrywasunder the threat of a “trueholocaust.”Yaariquickly called Hazan, and Hazan called Peres to hear from him first-hand.According toHazan,Peresadded furtherdetails thatmade the situationsoundutterlydire.HazanaskedtospeakwithGoldaMeir,thesecretaryofMapai,andwithinfifteenminuteshewasinheroffice.TherehefoundShaulAvigur,whowaswidelytrustedinmattersofpolitics,security,andcovertoperations.Avigursaid he had been with Ben-Gurion that day, and he wanted to talk with themilitary leaders before decidingwhether to return to the government; but onething Ben-Gurion knew: if he came back into the government, Eshkolwouldhave to leave. Avigur had reportedly told Ben-Gurion to forget about hiscontempt for Eshkol, but Ben-Gurionwas insulted: he didn’t need to be toldwhattorememberandwhattoforget.GoldaMeir told her colleagues that Paula Ben-Gurion had phoned her and
said, inEnglish, “Come toBen-Gurion, he loves you.”ButMeir’s colleagues
agreedwithherthatEshkolshouldnotbereplacedandthegovernmentshouldnot be expanded to include Ben-Gurion’s party. Thematter was closed,Meirtherefore decreed. The important decisions should be left to the IDF chief ofstaffandthegovernment,ledbyEshkol.Ben-Gurionhimselfdidnothavemuchfaithintheproposaltobringhimin,forhehadpredictedthatGoldaMeirwouldopposeit.7
Anintriguingquestionremainsunanswered:hadBen-Gurionreturnedto thegovernment, would he have been able to prevent the war, or at least restrictIsrael’sgoaltoreopeningtheStraits?Anotherquestionleftunanswerediswhichofthesetwohorses,EshkolorBen-Gurion,shouldhaveplacedthepreventionofwaraheadofhisownego.
SHUKABAR-DAYANCOULDSCARCELYBELIEVEHISEARS.“WE’REGOINGTOTELAVIV,”announcedayoungofficernamedYoram.Shukawas sureYoramwaspullinghisleg,butitturnedouttheyweregoingtotheTelHashomerarmybasetobringback spare parts,whichmeant hewould be able to go home.Bar-Dayanwasthrilled. When they stopped for lunch in Ashkelon, he was so excited hecouldn’tswallowhisfood.InRehovothedroppedintogivehisfatheraquickkiss, and thenwent tohisapartment.Gilawaswearingpink.TheyexchangedkissesandhurriedtoYariv’skindergarten.Itwasthefirst timeBar-Dayanhadvisitedhis son there, andhewas chokedup.Theboycame tohimhesitantly.“Dad,areyouhomefromthearmy?”“No,son,notyet—lookatmyboots,mylittlesonwhomIlovesomuch.”Hedidn’thavemuchtime.HekissedGilaandwasgone.“Thevisithomewasadream,”hewrotelater,“I’llneverforgetit.”8
HebroughtsomenewspapersbackwithhimtoJulis,andsataroundanalyzingthesituationwithhisfriends.Theyallagreedthatwarwasinevitable,andthatitwasallbecauseof theRussians.Preparations in thecamphad intensified toabuzzing swarm of tanks and cannons. Bar-Dayan met a young man, CaptainYohanan, who had also been born in Afula. He was cheerful but taciturn,confidentandenergetic.Bar-Dayanfelthecouldbetrusted.Yohanansaidtherewould be casualties. “GoodGod,”wroteBar-Dayan, “I could die.And neveragainseeGilaandYariv.Eachmantohisownfateandluck.God—tolive!Tolive!”Hewasnolongerafraid,hewrote,becausehehadbecomerealistic.Buthekissed thepicturesofhis lovedonesagainandagain.“It’snotsuperstition,but Ihope theybringme luck.”Heconsoledhimselfwith the thought thathewasnotonthefrontline:hewouldbedrivingbehindtheforwardtanks.
THE PAPERS WERE CALLING FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO EXPAND. SOME SAID THERE
shouldbeabroadnational-unitygovernment,othersanemergencygovernment,andMaariv simply called for “a war cabinet.” The press was impatient andbluntlyintolerantofthenegotiationsthatweresupposedtoleadtoanexpandedgovernment. Instead of “petty accounts and partisan calculations,” Maarivdemanded thata“war leadership”besetup,composedof figures representing“experience and strong leadership, personal prestige andpublic backing.”NotLevi Eshkol, in otherwords—or, at least not him at the helm.*Other papersmadesimilardemands.“Thereisnoneedtosayverymuchaboutthenecessitytoliftthenation’sspiritsatthismoment,”explainedHa’aretz.9
2.DIPLOMACY:“ALLTOCREATEANALIBI”
Spirits were indeed at a low point. Even those who had access to accurateinformation, including the former head of the Security Service,AmosManor,began digging trenches around their homes. General Uzi Narkis told ColonelMordechai Gur that in Tzahala, the residential neighborhood for the seniormilitary ranks, they were digging trenches. Gur himself, a regimentalcommanderintheparatroopers,dugatrenchtoprotecthiswifeandchildren.10But Manor apparently did not know how to prepare a trench, so one of hisneighbors,anAmerican,helpedhimout.TheAmerican,however,notedthatthewhole effort was superfluous: if there was a war, Israel would win, perhapswithinsixortendays.Heclaimedtoknowthisforsure,andindeedhedid.HisnamewasJohnHadden,andhewas theCIAstationchief in Israel.His
mainjobseemedtobespyingontheprogressofIsrael’snuclearproject.Hewasonce observed wandering around the Dimona reactor’s employee housing,copying down residents’ names from mailboxes. When asked what he wasdoing,heclaimedhewaslookingforaMr.Tzafriri.Anexperiencedspywithasenseofhumor,hebeganeachdaywithanattempttolearnwhatwasgoingonin Israel by studying the well-known caricaturist Ze’ev’s daily cartoon inHa’aretz.He knew a littleHebrew; at theMossad hewas referred to as “thebastard.”11
When he told his neighbors there was no need for trenches, Hadden wasreflecting an assessment prevalent in Washington and accepted by theadministration. U.S. analysts gave Israel complete military superiority overeverycombinationofArabforces,andtheyassumedthisimbalancewouldholdfor at least another fiveyears.At the same time, theview inWashingtonwasthatIsraelexpectedtoneedanatomicbombwithinafairlyshorttime,andwasplanningforthiseventuality.12Ayearearlier,theAmericanshadpredictedthat
Palestinian terrorattacksmight lead towar. In thatevent, theybelieved, IsraelwoulddestroytheEgyptianairforceand“withindaysorweeks”wouldoccupyareas of the Sinai, the West Bank including East Jerusalem, and the GolanHeights—all, evidently, taken as bargaining chips. There would be heavycasualties,butIsraelwouldwin.13
THE DAY AFTER INDEPENDENCE DAY, PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD MET WITH DAVIDGINSburgandAbeFeinberg,whohadjustreturnedfromIsrael,todiscusstheaidpackage Israel was requesting. Ginsburg and Feinberg mentioned specificnumbersandcosts;theIsraeliambassadorhadsimplybeentoldthatthepackagewould substantiallymatch Israel’s requests.WaltRostowhadadvised Johnsonto tell his guests that a “miscalculation causing a Mid-East blowup” at thiscritical time“wouldmake lifeawfullyhard” forhim.14Aweek later, Johnsondecidedtosell IsraelahundredAPCs,sparetankparts,expertiseforrepairingHAWKmissiles,surplusfood,andmore,foratotalofover$72million.15
Meanwhile,thecrisiswasdevelopingontheEgyptianborder.Asitunfolded,themost important contacts between Israel and the United States weremadethroughJewishandintelligence(meaningMossadandCIA)channels.ThroughaphonecallfromRostowtoFeinberg,JohnsonconveyedhisrequestthatIsraeldelayforforty-eighthoursanyactioninresponsetotheclosingoftheStraits.16RostowalsocalledGinsburgandasked,onbehalfof thepresident, thathedowhathecan tocooldownU.S.publicopinion“fora shortwhile.”The Israelienvoy toldGinsburg to reply that this requestwas “unrealistic.”17 In fact, theIsraeli embassy in Washington had already begun to implement instructionsfromJerusalem:“Createapublicatmospherethatwillconstitutepressureontheadministration in thedirectionofobtainingourdesiredgoals,without itbeingexplicitlyclearthatwearebehindthispubliccampaign.”MosheBitan,directorof the North America department in the Foreign Ministry, suggested“organizing” letters, telegrams, editorials, and public statements aimed atdifferent parts of the administration, “in a variety of styles”; they should alsocriticizeUThantanddepictthedangersinvolvedinasurgeofNasser’sprestige.“Our purpose is to create a public atmosphere (Jews and non-Jews) that willstrengthenourfriendswithintheadministrationandlessentheinfluenceofthosewho treat uswith distance and disdain (for instance, Zevulun).” ZevulunwasSecretary of State Dean Rusk’s code-name. “The main thing is that Issahar[Johnson] himself is influenced by themany communications sent to him, sothat he feels that despite his troubles inVietnamhemust pay attention to thedangerous situation developing in the region,” wrote Bitan, and he explained
thatthedangerwouldaffectnotonlyIsraelbutalsoAmericaninterests.18Israeldemanded that theUnitedStates act to reopen theStraits, and threatened thatotherwise it would take action itself.19 Some Israeli emissaries spoke inextremely emotional terms, emphasizing the fear in Israel. Eban called theatmosphere “apocalyptic,”whileEvron declared, “For us it is not amatter ofprestige,butoflifeanddeath.”20
“YesterdaywegaveinstructionstoHarari[Ginsburg],”onetelegramreported.“Hehappened tohavebeenhostingHaim last night. . . .Harari feels that theproblemisZevulun,whoseattitudetousismorethanaverse....Haimsaidhewould recommend to Issahar that he—Haim—go immediately to meet withYehuda and with the Kitchen Ruler.” “Haim” was Vice President HubertHumphrey; “Yehuda”wasEshkol; the “KitchenRuler”wasNasser.21 ForeignMinister Eban instructed Evron to invite “Andre”—Feinberg—toWashingtonand show him a letter from Eshkol to Johnson, so that he could explain toJohnsonthathisreplywascritical.22
Atthispoint inthecrisis theAmericanswerestill tryingtoprevent thewar.TheysaidtheGulfofAqabawasaninternationalshippingchannel,whichEgypthadnorighttoclose.ButtheydidnotwantwartobreakoutoverthematterandhopedthatinsteadtheUNwouldbeabletobrokerasettlement.Theyalsospokeofestablishingan“armada,”an international fleet thatwouldpass through thegulf to demonstrate support of freedomof the seas.23*But thatwould not beenough.BeforehiscrucialmeetingwithPresidentJohnson,Ebanexplained toadministrationofficialsthattobeabletoholdoffthehawksinIsrael,hehadtogohomewitha realpromiseofAmerican steps to reopen theStraits.25Ashewas preparing for hismeetingwith the president, the Israeli governmentwasalreadydiscussingbringinghimhome.AharonYarivmaintainedithadbeenamistaketosendEbantoWashingtonin
the first place. Israel should start thewar immediately rather thanwastemoreprecioustime.AsimilarattitudeprevailedintheMa’arah’spoliticalcommitteeand in the Foreign Ministry. Adi Yaffe, Eshkol’s assistant, told the directorgeneralofhisoffice,Herzog, that theprimeministerhimselfwouldbeglad ifEban’smeetingwithJohnsoncouldbecanceled.“ThetemperatureinTelAvivhasrisen,”saidYaffe,referringtothemilitary’sincreasingpressureonEshkol.Rabinhadrecoveredfromhisbreakdownandwasbackatwork;Eshkol,inhiswisdomandhumanity,hadrejectedhisoffertoresign.26
OnthemorningofMay25, twodaysafter theclosingof theStraits,EshkoltookanothertourofthesouththatincludedavisittoArielSharon’scommand.
SharonassuredhimthatthecrisiswouldenabletheIDFtodestroytheEgyptianarmy: “This is a historical opportunity.”LaborMinisterAllon,whowas backfrom the USSR and traveling with Eshkol, proposed “inventing a pretext” toallow Israel to claim that theEgyptians had started thewar.A long argumentensuedover thebestway todo this.Amitof theMossad suggested sendingaship through theStraits so that theEgyptianswouldattach it.Yariv cautionedthat theEgyptiansmightrespond,conversely,bybombingtheDimonareactor.Themoretheytalked,themorethemenworkedthemselvesupandgeneratedaclimateofwar,as if itwere inescapable.27 In thatclimate,EshkolsentEbanatelegram,inwhichheclaimedthat“therehasbeenafar-reachingchange”inthesituation: theEgyptianswere reinforcing their troops in theSinai; theSyrianswere concentratingmost of their army along the Israeli border; Iraq,Kuwait,and Jordan were also redeploying, and the Egyptian minister of war was inMoscow. It was therefore possible that the Arabs were about to initiate acomprehensive attack. Every passing hour strengthened their forces andincreased their appetite, audacity, andboldness. In light of all this, itmust bemadecleartoJohnsonthattheissuewasnolongermerelythereopeningoftheStraits, but first and foremost a threat to Israel’s very existence. Hemust beasked what practical steps he was prepared to take “at the eleventh hour” topreventanimminentexplosion.In theeveningofMay25,Eshkolbecamepartofamove that,according to
ForeignMinisterEban, reflected“momentous irresponsibility.”28 Itbegan inadiscussionintheTelAvivofficeoftheministerofdefense.Yarivsaid“allsignsindicated”thattherewasachancethattheArabswouldofferaprovocation,andthis eventuality was “becoming increasingly likely.” Rabin said, “We’reapproaching themoment of explosion.” He suggested demanding a clear andpublic commitment from the United States that any attack against Israel wastantamount toanattackon theUnitedStates itself. If Johnsonagreed tomakesuchastatement,Rabinexplained,“We’velostoutonhavingthewar”;ifhedidnot,therewouldbenochoicebuttoact.Rabinpreferredwaroverastatement:“It’sobviousthattheIDFwilltakecareofitbest.”The director general of the ForeignMinistry, Arye Levavi, offered to wire
AmbassadorHarmanthatIsraelwasabout to initiateanall-outassault.Eshkolrespondedwith his own proposal: “Better say there is danger of an attack onIsrael.”Rabindevelopedtheidea:“We’llsaythereisdangerofacomprehensiveEgyptian-Syrian attack on Israel. I want the record to show that, before weacted,wedideverythingwecouldtoexhaustdiplomacy.”HerzogexplainedthatJohnsonwouldnotbeabletodeliverthestatementRabinwasaskingforevenif
he wanted to, as the U.S. Constitution prevented him from doing so withoutauthorization from Congress. But Eshkol responded, “That’s all right. If thepresidentcannot[offerthecommitment],thenwe’llhavetoexplaintohimthathemustunderstandwehavenochoicebuttoact.”ThediscussionresultedinasecondtelegramtoWashington.29
AddressedtoAmbassadorHarman,thistelegramtookanevenmorealarmingtone than the one Eshkol had sent to Eban a few hours earlier: “ImmediateimplementationoftheAmericancommitmentisessentialwithadeclarationandimmediate—repeat, immediate—action, namely, an announcementby theU.S.governmentthatanyattackonIsraelistantamounttoanattackontheU.S.Thisannouncement should be accompanied by instructions to U.S. forces in theregion to coordinate action with the IDF against any possible attack.” Thetelegramreiteratedtheassertionthattherewasadangerofanall-outEgyptian-Syrian attack on Israel. This development, Eshkol said, had arisen in the lasttwenty-fourhours, sinceEban’sdeparture. IfEbanhadarrived inWashington,Harmanshouldcoordinatewithhim,butifhewasstillenroute,theambassadormustactalone,“becauseoftheurgencyofthesituation,”andrelaythemessagetothepresidenthimselfor,inhisabsence,toSecretaryofStateRusk.30
EbanconveyedthecontentofthetelegramtoRusk,whohurriedtotheWhiteHouse, which ordered an intelligence reassessment. Eban “stronglyrecommended” revealing to the Americans the source of the information onwhich the telegrams were based, but the Americans, relying on their ownsources,determinedthattheIsraelis’claimswereunfounded,andthatEgyptwasnot about to attack. They did, however, agree to caution the Egyptianambassador.31WaltRostowtoldJohnsonthattheIsraeliintelligenceassessment,whichhadalsobeensenttoCIAdirectorRichardHelms,reflectedtheexplosivegrowthofIsraelianxieties.32
Eban was stunned when he received the messages from home. “I found itdifficult tocomprehendhowsucharadicalchangecouldhaveoccurred inourmilitary situation since I heard the reports fromour generals inTelAviv,” hewroteintheHebreweditionofhismemoirs,addingdiplomaticallythatitmightbe worth examining the meaning of the sudden nervousness reflected in thetelegrams.IntheEnglishedition,heattributedthetelegramtoRabin’snervousbreakdownanditsinfluenceonthedecisionmakers.33“Icannotoveremphasizetheimpressionthisaffairmade,”AmbassadorHarmanlaterrecalled.Itwasasif“‘everything is lost,we’re like lambs to the slaughter.’... Terrible panic, trulyterriblepanic.BecausewhatitreallymeantwasthatonlytheAmericanscould
save us.”34 The telegrams disrupted the plans for the Johnson-Eban meeting.Instead of asking for a few vessels, the Israelis were now speaking asrepresentativesofanation facingaholocaust, saidHarman.Lookingback,hethoughtthatEshkol’stelegramsreflectedthehysteriainIsrael,butthatinordertoascertainwhoreally“cookeduptheaffair,”itwouldhavebeenbesttosetupacommissionofinquiry.35
The Israeli intelligence assessment of the same eveningwas fairly differentfrom what had been wired to Washington: “There are initial signs that theEgyptians may be preparing not only a holding action but also an assault.”Nothing was said about a dramatic change in the deployment of Syrian andJordanian forces.Nordid thepossibility that Israel’s existencewas threatenedoccur to the intelligence agents.36 Eshkol knew that no such danger hadsuddenlyemergedover thepast twodays.Hewasobviously trying tomisleadEban,andthroughhimPresidentJohnson,inordertoensureU.S.support.37OnacopyofthetelegramtoHarman,Eshkoladdedinhisownhandwriting:“Alltocreateanalibi.”At thenextgovernmentmeeting,AryeLevavi explained that the telegrams’
purpose was to put pressure on the Americans: “The demands to the UnitedStateswereintentionallyphrasedinanextremeway.”Theintentwaspartly toenableIsraeltotakeindependentaction,withoutPresidentJohnsonbeingabletoprotest. Some of theministers demanded to know how truthful the telegramswere. Aharon Yariv and Rabin were forced to admit that they did not knowexactly what the Egyptians were planning. Coordination between Egypt andSyriahadincreasedsincetheshootingdownoftheMiGsonApril7,saidYariv—meaning,notnecessarilyinthepastforty-eighthours.Theministersnoticedthathemadefrequentuseoftheword“perhaps.”HiscentralstatementwasafarcryfromthepanickedcertaintyofthetelegramstoEbanandHarman:“Beforethis whole affair began, Nasser was unwilling to go to war with Israel andunreadyforsuchawar;inthelastfewdays,hehasmovedfromthattoastateofunwillingnesstoinitiatewar,butareadinesstoacceptit...astateofreadinesstoenter into all-outwarwith Israel, and perhaps even—perhaps; I’m not sayingcertainly—perhapseventoinitiateitbymeansofaprovocationatatimeofhischoosing.”Rabin said that at the moment there were only “signs” indicating “the
possibility”ofanattack.“I’mnotwillingtosaywithcertainty that there isanintent to launchanoverallattackonIsrael.”Shapirawouldnot lethimoff thehook: “Is there information that they are about to attack us at anymoment?”
Rabinwas evasive: “I wouldn’t suggest addressing that.” Eshkol came to hisrescue: “We sent the telegram . . . on the basis of an intelligence assessment.Obviously,Nasserisnotgoingtotellusaboutithimself.”38
InaconversationwiththeeditorsofthevariousdailieswhenhereturnedfromWashingtonafewdaysbeforethewarerupted,Ebanhintedthathedidnottrusttheintelligence.AharonYarivsenthimanoteofapology,claimingthatheandRabinhadnotseenthetelegramsbeforetheyweresent.YaacovHerzogquicklydisputedthis:notonlyhadYarivknownaboutthetelegramtoEban,buthehadtakenpartinphrasingit,ashadthechiefofstaff.YarivandRabindeniedthis,but Herzog repeated his version in some detail. Rabin looked dazed, Herzogwrote in his diary, and said he might have forgotten. Eshkol listened to theargument and observed that perhaps, under different circumstances, this tooshouldbeinvestigated.39
ThemostcurrentIsraeliresearch,basedpartlyonEgyptianmaterialseizedbyIsraeliintelligence,assertsthatontheeveningofMay25,theEgyptianmilitarydidauthorizeaplanforanairattackonthesouthernNegevstartingonMay27.ThatYarivcouldhaveknownaboutthis“isextremelyquestionable,”concludedabookpublishedbytheMinistryofDefense.40
“I’MINTHEBESORAREAOFTHENEGEV,”WROTEYEHOSHUABAR-DAYAN.“NIRYitzhak,Tze’elim.Fieldsofripegrain,bowingdowninhopefortheharvest,flourishing.WhatIwouldnotgivetotakeapairofshearsandgoouttotheorchard,pruneandgatheritup,asinthepast, insteadofbeinginthiswar.”Hecouldnotfallasleepinhistruck.“Thinkingabouthome,hearingtherhythmicpumpingofthesprinklersquenchingthethirstofaNegevorchard.Sonearandyetsofar,beatafterbeat.Thoughtsswirlaroundme,andhopes, togohomealive toGiliandYariv.”41
AFEWHOURSBEFOREEBANHADBEENDUETOMEETWITHJOHNSON,JOHNHADDENOFtheCIAcametoseeMeirAmitoftheMossadathome;therewereraisedvoices,Amitrecalled.HeandDavidCarmon,thedeputyheadofmilitaryintelligence,tried to convince the CIA representative that the situation had changeddramatically.TheEgyptianshad reinforced their troops in theSinai; theentireArab world was offering to help. Twenty-four hours earlier, Amit had stillbelieved that the Egyptians did not want war; he now thought they did. ThechangehadoccurredbecauseIsraelhadnotactedassoonasthecrisisbegan.HefurtherrevealedtoHaddenthattheMossadsupportedimmediateactionandhe
tried to convince theAmerican that the Russianswere behind the crisis. Thefires had spread and needed to be put out right away; otherwise Israelwouldloseitsdeterrentcapability.Furthermore,thereservecall-upcouldnotbedrawnoutindefinitely.The Arabs and Nasser also believed war was inevitable. “We have it from
confidentialsourcesandithasbeenpublishedinAl-Ahram,”Carmonsaid.Hesaidhewasbasinghis informationonwiretapsof telephonecallsmadebyanIraqi diplomat in Cairo. This was not enough for Hadden. He knew that theIsraelishadgrownupwiththegrandlegacyofMasada.Atthispointtheywereno longer just thinking about the Egyptians, but about a full-scale conflict.Hadden said Israel should help theUnited States help it by sending a ship toEliat,forexample.IftheEgyptiansshotatit,Israelwouldhavecausetoattack.“Giveusagoodreasontotakeactiononyourside,”herepeated,andaddedathreat:“Ifyouattack,theUnitedStateswilllandforcesinEgypttoprotectit.”Amitdidnotbelievethethreat,butHaddenstoodhisground:agoodcauseforattack “is what will determine whether the United States stands by you oragainstyou.”Haddendemanded that Israelnotactbefore theendof thewaitingperiod it
had agreed to. “It’s better to be slightly in thewrongbut alive thandead andinnocent,” said Amit, but Hadden was familiar with this rhetorical style andrepeatedhisthreat:“It’simportantforyoutoensurethattheUnitedStatesisonyourside,noton theotherside.”Amitwanted toknowwhatwasgoingon inWashington. Hadden said he was up-to-date: if Israel acted without cause,JohnsonandtheUnitedStateswouldsupportEgypt“alltheway.”HecautionedAmit against surprising the United States. Amit said surprise was one of thesecretsofvictory.Hadden kept threatening: “I don’t know how important American aid is to
you.”Hethenadded,“Donotcreateasituationwherewe’llhavetoactagainstyou.” Amit and Carmon said that action against Israel would damage U.S.interestsintheMiddleEast,andsotheUnitedStateswouldnottakethatroute.ButHaddenresponded,“Wewillact.”Amitaskedwhethertheywerepreparedforsuchaction;Haddenreplied,“Iassumeweare.”42
This was an explicit threat, mere days after Johnson had authorized agenerous aidpackage to Israel.Eban, already inWashington,had traveledviaParis and London, where President Charles de Gaulle and Prime MinisterHaroldWilsonhadgivenhimno reason tohope theywouldact to reopen theStraits.EverythingdependedonJohnson.
Thearmywasexpecting thewar tobeginatany time.YehoshuaBar-Dayanwrote,“Theenginesareroaring,wemustbegoingsoon.Ahugenoiseofsteelenginesandhumanhearts.”43Butthewardidn’tstartthistimeeither.AtaboutnineintheeveningofMay25,accordingtoamilitaryreport,ittranspiredthatanattackhadbeenpostponed.AseniorofficerontheGeneralStafftelephonedtheSouthernCommandandreported,“Noa’sfatherisgatheringhisfriendsforameeting,tomorrowatnine.”Thereferencewastothegovernmentmeeting;Noawas Eshkol’s eldest daughter.44 The next day, Moshe Dayan revealed animportantsecrettoBen-Gurion:therehadbeenorderstostormtheGazaStrip—buttheyhadnowbeenchanged.45
SHUKA BAR-DAYAN AND HIS FRIENDS PREPARED FOR THEIR SECOND SHABBAT ONRESERVEduty.Hewas theoldest in thegroupandhadbecomea father figure.Thiswasnotonlyaquestionofage,hethought,butalsoofpersonality:“Igetmy own spirits up, and then theirs go up, too.” He made sure the men hadnewspapersandcigarettes.Peoplecametotellhimtheirtroubles.OneofthemwasBenjamin,whosesonhadbeenbornaweekearlier.“He’sgoingthroughthewholeprocesslikeIdid,becomingarealist—whateverhappens,happens,”Bar-Dayanwrote.Shukaconsumedtheweekendpapers.“Myconclusionissimple—realistic.Wewilldefinitelygotowar.Today?Tomorrowatdaybreak?”46
CHAPTER7TENDAYSTOWAR:WHATDOESAMERICA
WANT?
1. PRESSURES: “NO ONE CAN ASK ME TO BECOME ADOORMAT”
On Friday, May 26, at the government meeting, Rabin asked a clear-cutquestion:Arewe launching an attackon theEgyptian army, and if so,when?Minister IsraelGaliliproposedauthorizingEshkolandRabin to initiateactionwhen they saw fit. The Mafdal ministers, Moshe Haim Shapira and ZerahWarhaftig, were strongly opposed. “We must not attack first,” Warhaftigcautioned. Rabin responded, “The first one to attack creates an aerialadvantage.”This was a conflict between the military and the political ranks—soldier
againstcivilian.Previously,themilitary’sdemandtoattackSyriainresponsetoterroristinfiltrationshadbeenatoddswiththeministers’insistenceondefensivemeans. Now, too, the debate over the crisis with Egypt emerged as a clashbetween the perfect, upright “new Hebrew” of Palestine and the “old Jew,”whom many Israelis of Rabin’s generation derided. Rabin was a strong,handsome forty-five-year-old, secular, redheaded, in charge of the army. Heincarnated the narrative of Israel’s courageous fight for independence. ZerahWarhaftig,aHolocaustsurvivorfromPolandwhospokewithaheavyYiddishaccent,was a short sixty-one-year-old, a politicianwearing a black yarmulke,theministerofreligiousaffairs.Tothearmygenerals,hesymbolizedDiasporameekness,cowardice,hesitation,andtheannoyanceofIsraelipolitics.Evenhisname prompted scorn: “All sorts of Warhaftigs,” said Rehavam Ze’evi, anofficer of Rabin’s generation, when he wished to express the sense ofrepugnancehefelttowardtheministersinEshkol’sgovernment.1
Dr.Warhaftig,ajurist,hadbeeninvolvedinwartimeeffortstosaveJewsfromtheNazis, andwasamong the signatories to theDeclarationof Independence.Hewasawiseman,whose lifeexperiencehad lefthimwitha tendency tobecautious in his deliberations. “I am a father of four children,” he said at themeeting.“Twoofthemareonthefrontlines,paratroopers.Idonotknowwhatwe are heading into.” The minister of health, Israel Barzilai of Mapam,
suggested not bringing personal considerations into the debate: “We all havesonsinthearmy.”Warhaftig,however,wasspeakingnotonlyofhimself,butof“the nation’s future.” He felt the situation demanded more responsibleleadership,andheheatedlydemandedtheappointmentofDavidBen-Gurionasministerofdefense.Ifthiswasnotfeasible,thejobshouldgotoDayan.ThefirstmantospeakwithEshkolabouttheneedtoexpandthecoalition“in
light of the grave situation” seems to have been Haim Moshe Shapira. TheministersfromthereligiouspartieswantedtopreventthewarandassumedthatBen-Gurion could stand up to the military. If there was no avoiding war, itwouldbebetter tohavehim leading thecountry, insteadofEshkol.Theotherministers objected; most of them were still not convinced that a preemptiveattackonEgyptwasrequired.Oneminister,MordehaiBentovofMapam,saidthat expanding the government would indicate that it had lost itsmind; evenBen-Gurion “is no longer the same Ben-Gurion,” he asserted, and suggestedsettingupaforumofformerchiefsofstaff(Dayan,YigalYadin,HaimLaskov),togetherwithYigalAllon,toactasconsultants.Butcalmshouldbemaintained:“To immediately panic and expand the government—this is uncalled for.”Shapirainterruptedhim:“Howmanypeoplehavetodie?”PinhasSapirsaidhewould also oppose handing over decision-making authority to an eighty-one-year-old man, and he proclaimed that those who talked of expanding thegovernmentwereinfactplottingtoreplaceit.MinisterofPoliceSassonsaidanewministerofdefensewouldnotsavetheday.MinisterofAgricultureGvatiwasalsoopposed,althoughheacceptedthemilitary’sestimatethatthesituationnecessitatedanattackonEgypt.Theminister of education,ZalmanAran,whowas at the forefront of those
objectingtowar,saidtherewasnoreasontoenlargethegovernment:thewholeideawasnothingbutarusetorestoreBen-Gurion,whichwouldbetantamountto establishing a dictatorship. “What has the government done wrong that itshouldbereplaced?”heasked.Whilethemeetingwasinsession,twoEgyptianMiGs infringed Israeli airspace again. Eshkol grumbled, “Egyptian planes arephotographingDimonaandwe’re sittinghere talkingaboutBen-Gurion.”Theproposal to bring Ben-Gurion into the government offended him. “I will notcoexist inagovernmentwithhim,”hedeclared.Ben-Gurionhadcalledhimacheatandaliar—howcouldtheymanageawartogether?“Noonecanaskmetobecome a doormat,” Eshkol said. The meeting went on for five hours, andaccordingtoMinisterGvati,itwas“veryharsh.”Thatmorning,Eshkolstillhadareasonabledegreeoffaiththathiscolleagues’
support would assure his continuance in office as both prime minister and
ministerofdefense.Soon,however,hehadtocontendwithanotherattempt toimposeimmediatewaruponhim.Rabin, who left the governmentmeeting to look into the reports about the
Egyptian planes, returned and asked Eshkol to step out for an urgentconsultation. “We’ve picked up aworrying and strange transmission,” he toldEshkol. It seemed to indicate “some sort of deployment” of the Egyptian airforce.“It’sstillunclearwhatitis,”Rabinsaid,buthedidnotruleoutanattackonDimona.HehadbroughtEzerWeizmanwithhim.The chiefofoperationsknewnomore thanRabinabout the incident,butassertedunequivocally:“Allsigns indicate that the Egyptians are planning to attack Dimona today.Therefore, there is no choice but to attack theEgyptians today.”The demandcould hardly have been stated more urgently: Weizman wanted the primeministertoagreethattheywouldgotowarimmediately.Eshkol,asheoftendidatthatpoint,preferredtorelyonhisintuition,which
advisedhimnottolosesightofthemainissue,themeetingbetweenEbanandJohnson.Rabinagreed,andalthoughWeizmanwasforcedtoconcur,hesaid,“Isuggestthelatesttimeforactionbesetfortomorrowmorning.”Uponreturningto the meeting, Eshkol observed that Rabin was usually more “gellasen”(“calm,” in Yiddish), while Weizman was “temperamental.” He told theministersthatthetwohadmadeitclearthattheairforcecouldnotprotectthereactorcontinuouslyaroundtheclock,becausethatwouldwearouttheplanes.Hequotedthemassaying,“Thereisalimittoourerosioncapacity,”butdidnotadd thatWeizmanhaddemanded that Israel act that sameday.TheEgyptiansdidnotattackDimona,andEshkolcouldaddthisepisodetothelistofmattersdemanding“investigation.”2
JOHNSON TRIED TO AVOID EBAN, POSTPONING THE MEETING SEVERAL TIMES, UNTILEbanannouncedhewouldhavetoreturntoIsraelforthegovernmentmeetingscheduled for Saturday night. Walt Rostow telephoned the Israeli envoyEphraimEvronandtoldhimthepresidentwasangry:heresentedbeingpushedaround.*Johnson,meanwhile,wasconsultinghispeople.AbeFortassuggestedthatthepresidentguaranteethepassageofanIsraeliship,butJohnsonrefused.4Laterthatday,hereceivedawrittenproposalfromDavidGinsburg:toopentheStraits,twoAmericanmerchantshipsortankerswouldentertheGulfofAqaba,one heading toward Eilat, the other to Aqaba. The ship to Eilat would becarrying oil, the one toAqaba food. Theywould not be armed.According toGinsburg,hehadnot cleared theplanwithEbanorwithanyoneat the Israeliembassy, and so did not knowwhat their responsewould be. Itwas far from
whatEbanwashopingtotakehome,butitwasapossiblesolution.Ginsburg’sletterwasshelved.5
While still waiting for the meeting, Eban heard from top officials in theadministrationthattheUnitedStateswouldacttoreopentheStraitsofTiran,butnotrightaway,notalone,andnotatanycost.ThesecretarygeneraloftheUNwas on hisway toCairo and everyone shouldwait for the results of his trip.There must be international action. Under no circumstances would theAmericansgiveIsraelthecommitmentEshkolhaddemandedinhistelegrams,but the Israelis had no reason for concern—they would win anyway. “You’llwhipthehelloutofthem,”Johnsonhimselfsaid.6
The military attaché in Washington telegrammed the IDF chief of staff toinform him of assessments he had heard: there was almost no chance ofindependentAmericanactiontoopentheStraits,andthemilitarypeopleweren’tevensuretheywouldhelpifIsraelcameunderEgyptianattack.GeneralEarleG.Wheeler,thechairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,feltthatIsraelwascapableof beating the Egyptians even if it suffered the first airstrike. The attachéreportedavoteofconfidenceinthepoweroftheIDF.TheonlythingworryingthePentagonwastheneedforIsrael tobackupitsactionswithargumentstheworld would find convincing.7 But, as Johnson himself repeatedly stressed,Washingtonwasnotspeakingwithonevoice.Thereweredovesandhawks,theformernearlybullyingIsrael in theirattempts tokeepit fromattackingEgypt,thelatterallbutencouragingittodoso.ArthurGoldberg,theU.S.ambassadortotheUN,urgedEbantokeepinmindthatonlyonemanreallycalledtheshotsintheUnitedStates,andthatwasthepresident.8
Johnson let Eban speak first when their meeting finally materialized. Thediscrepancybetweenthetwomen’sstyleswasnolessprofoundthanthechasmbetween Rabin and Warhaftig. The Israeli foreign minister, a Cambridgegraduate, viewed diplomacy as a vocation and an art, andwas known for hispolishedlanguageandelitistpomposity.Addicted to thepleasureofwords,hedetailedthechainofeventsatlength,assertingthattheUnitedStateshadatonetime committed itself to ensuring the free passage of ships in the gulf, andemphasizedthatthesituationwasnolongeraquestionofIsrael’swelfarebutofits very existence as a country. Johnson, who reiterated the Americancommitmenttounobstructedpassagethroughthegulfandpromisedtoworktorestoreit,barelydeviatedfromwhatEbanhadalreadyheardfromhisstaff;onlyhischoiceofwordswasmorecolorful.“Weshouldnotjump,”hesaid,andthatwastheessenceofhismessage.Hesaidhewasnotakinginhiscountry,and
that commitments theUnitedStateshadmade in thepastwerenotworth fivecentswithout reauthorization fromCongress.Norwashe a feeblemouseor acoward,hesaid,buttherewasnopointjumpingthegun,incasedoingsoonlyincreasedNasser’sstanding;hedidnotwant“tocallNasserandraisehishand.”He also toldEban that according to his intelligence therewas no chance thatEgypt would attack Israel in the immediate future, contrary to the telegramsEbanhadbroughttohisattention.Johnsonwasessentiallysayingthathedidnotbelieve Israel. Eban asked him to at least clarify whether the United StateswouldinterveneifIsraelwasattacked.Johnsonnodded,althoughheseemedtobesaying,“Thatwon’thappen,anyway.”Attimeshereadfrompreparednotes.He cautioned Israel against initiating an attack on Egypt. His key statement,formulatedbyDeanRusk,comprisedbotha threatandapromise:“Israelwillnotbealoneunlessitdecidestodoitalone.”9
TheIsraeliaccountofthemeetingdiffersfromtheAmericanminutes,partlywith respect to the last portion of the conversation, when Johnson and Ebanspokeoftheneedtoestablishanapparatusformilitarycoordination,includingjoint intelligence assessments. According to the Israeli version, Johnson saidthat Ambassador Goldberg had expressed doubts about the reliability ofAmerican intelligence. The president did not discount the possibility that theUnitedStatesmightbewrong—afterall,GeneralDouglasMacArthurhadbeenmisled into thinking the Chinese would not invade Korea. And so he hadinstructedthatallIsraeliintelligenceclaimsbeexaminedontheassumptionthattheywerecorrect.Itturnedouttheywerenot.Egyptwasnotabouttoattack.The president walked Eban to the elevator and asked how he thought the
Israeli government would respond to their conversation. Eban said it alldependedonwhathecould tell thegovernmentabout thepresident’sposition,andaskedagainwhetherhecouldreportthatthepresidentwoulddoeverythingpossibletoassurefreedomofpassageinthegulf.Johnsonsaidyes,andshookEban’shandsovigorouslythatEbanthoughthemightlosetheuseofit.“Itwasundoubtedly a disappointing conversation,” said Ambassador Harman. “TheIsraeliswerehopingformore.”10
Johnsonwassatisfied.“Theycameloadedforbear,”hesaidimmediatelyafterthemeeting,“butsowasI. I let themtalkfor thefirsthourandI just listenedand then I finished it up the last fifteen minutes.” His assistants were alsoextremely impressed, the president boasted: one of them said it was the bestmeetingofitskindhehadeverattended.SecretaryofDefenseMcNamarawassoenthusiasticaccordingtoJohnson,“hejustwantedtothrowhiscapupinthe
air.”11JohnsonseemstohavefeltthathehadgotoutofatraptheIsraelishadsetforhim.HelatermimickedEban’sstuffystyleofspeech,sayingheactedlike“amini-Winston Churchill.” But essentially, Johnson assumed he had not beensuccessful atpreventing thewar: the Israelisweregoing to attack,he figured,andtherewasnothinghecoulddoaboutit.12
2.MISGIVINGS:“MOSHEDAYAN,MOSHEDAYAN”
While Eban and Ambassador Harman were meeting with Johnson on Fridayevening,itwasalreadytwoA.M. inIsrael,ontheSabbathmorning.Becauseofthe tensions, theprimeministerandhiswifewerestayingat theDanHotel inTel Aviv. Just before three, Eshkol was awoken and informed that DimitriChuvakhin, theSovietambassador,waswaiting in the lobbyand insisting thathe seeEshkol immediately.Eshkolaskedhiswifewhat todo; she said, If theambassadorwantstoseeyouinyourpajamas,lethimcomeup.Theambassadordelivered a fairly restrained letter from Premier Alexey Kosygin. The USSRdeclared once again that it was interested in peace, and called on Israel toresolvethecrisiswithoutwar.Eshkolpromisedtherewerenoconcentrationsofmilitaryforcesinthenorth,andofferedagaintotaketheambassadortothefieldtoseeforhimself.HealsosuggestedameetingwithKosygin.13*
ITWASALMOSTDAWN.ABBAEBANWASONAPLANEONHISWAYHOME.SHUKABAR-Dayan traveled again to a nearbyworkshop for spare parts.He showered andshavedintheKibbutzTze’elimcowshed.Soldierscrowdedaroundthekibbutzpayphone.Bar-Dayantriedtocallhome,buttherewassomethingwrongwiththephone.Afewgoodbangsanditstartedworking.Giliwasn’thome,buthermotherwasthere.Atleasthe’dbeenabletogetintouch.Suddenlyhespottedacivilian car: it belonged to LeviYitzhaki, a greengrocer fromRishonLezion,whowasvisitinghisson.Bar-DayansentanotehometoGilawithhim.Backtothetanks.Lotsofrumorsflyingaround.Therewasatargetfortheiroperation:thevillageofKhanYounisintheGazaStrip.Theairforcewouldstrikefirst,toweakenresistance.Shukawouldnotbeinthefirstlineofassault,butwhatiftheairstrikeledtothembeingcutoff?“Troublingthoughts.Wewillhopeandpraythateverythinggoeswell.”
ESHKOLCONVENEDHISPEOPLEANDTOLDTHEMABOUTHISNIGHTTIMEMEETINGWITHChuvakhin.Rabin,Yariv, andWeizmanwere present.Eshkol repelled anotherattempttotakeasteptowardwar:MinisterofLaborAllonrestatedaproposaltoauthorize Eshkol and Rabin to go to war. Rabin supported it: “There is no
escaping action.”He had received new reports saying that theEgyptian armyhadbeendeployedsoas tobesiegeEilatand thesouthernNegev.Hebelievedthe war would start that same day, and proposed a feint: announce that thegovernmentwouldwaituntil thenextdayatnoon tohearEban’s report.Thiswould give the impression that they were still temporizing. Minister Sapirobjected:First let’shearEban,hesaid;and thatwaswhat theydid.Theyalsodebated what to do with Moshe Dayan, who wanted to return to the army.Eshkolofferedhimmembership inaspecialministerialcommittee,butDayanrefused.A fewdays earlier,Eshkol had agreed to letKnessetmemberDayan take a
touroftheIDF,inuniform,andmeetwithcommanders,whichhenowfeltwasamistake.Asthedaysofwaitingforwarpassed,Dayanhadgainedtheauraofasavior andahero: themilitary leaderof theSinaiCampaignhadheldhimselfabove politics. Chasing power, women, and money, infinitely egocentric,cynical, and unstable, Dayan was loyal only to himself. His tour created adynamic that could hardly be forestalled any longer: he was making acomeback.
•••
WHILE MEETING WITH SENIOR OFFICERS, POLITICIANS, JOURNALISTS, AND OTHERPUBLICfigures,Dayanranintothemanhecalled“hisArab,”AmosYarkoni.ThemeetingoccuredinBeersheba,intheeveninghours.Dayanhadgoneoutaloneforabreathof freshair,whensuddenlyacarstoppedandflashed its lights tosignal him to approach. “I was very surprised,” he wrote later; “how couldanyonerecognizemein thedark,whiledrivingathighspeed?”But thedriverwhohadstoppedforhimcouldhavespottedalmostanything:hewas thebestscout Dayan had ever known, a Bedouin whose birth name had been AbdelMajidKhaderal-Mazarib.Dayan had knownAbdelMajid since childhood,when his tribe had settled
nearDayan’smoshav,Nahalal. Hewas a smart boy, a shepherd, a few yearsyoungerthanDayan,andtheybecamefriends.DuringtheArabriotsagainsttheBritishand theZionists that ragedduring the secondhalfof the1930s,AbdelMajid was an expert at blowing up oil pipelines, but he was suspected ofbetrayinghisfellowsandwasthrownintoadeeppit.Hemanagedtoescapetonearby Nahalal, where he sought refuge with his childhood friend, who hadmeanwhile become a commander in theHagana.When the IDFwas foundedduringtheWarofIndependence,AbdelMajidenlistedin itsminorityunitand
wasgivenacovername:AmosYarkoni.DuringseventeenyearsofIDFservice,herosetotherankoflieutenantcolonel.Thatnightin1967,DayanwentwithYarkonitohishome,wherehemethis
fourchildrenandhiswife,whohadconvertedtoIslamfromChristianity.Theytalked about the adventures of the daring religious leader and Arab guerrillafighterIzzal-Dinal-Qassam,inwhomDayanwasinterested.HehadbeenkilledbytheBritishandbecameaPalestiniannationalsymbol.AbdelMajidpromisedtoarrangeforDayantomeetaveteranwhohadfoughtalongsideal-Qassam.Dayan’sdiaryprojectsaromantic,paternalistic,almostcolonialistapproachto
AbdelMajid,whohadearnedhisadmirationbybetrayinghisownpeopleandlinkinghisfatetothatoftheJews.“Hewasasweetboy,shortforhisage,whoplayedtherecorderandeagerlyawaitedthebreadandjamwewouldgivehimfromourmeals.”Inthe1930s,heandAbdelMajidhadbothbeenimprisonedinAcre,wheretheywereheldbytheBritish,oneforoperationsagainsttheJews,the other for targetingArabs.According toDayan, he bore no grudge againstAbdelMajidthen,andevengavehimsomemoneyforcigarettes.Aschiefofstaff,Dayanhadpinnedtheofficer’sstripesontheshoulderofhis
distinguished protégé.He could not hide his excitement: herewas a boywhohadneverbeen to school,but thanks tohisnatural intelligencehad learned toreadandwriteHebrew.DayandoubtedAmosYarkonihadalsointhemeantimelearnedtoreadandwriteArabic.“Ihoped—andindeedIwasnotdisappointed—that Western education had not caused him to forget his natural trackingskills, and thathecould still follow the tracesof stolencattleevenon rocks,”wroteDayan,andadded:“Isawitwithmyowneyes.”Afterthevisittohishome,AbdelMajidtookDayanbacktotown,wherehe
wandered through the streets. Young men and women standing outside cafésrecognized him and called out, “MosheDayan,MosheDayan!” and a trail ofpeoplefollowedhim.Anolddrunkcameuptohimandasked,withtearsinhiseyes,ifhecouldkisshim.ApolicemanhelpedDayanescapetheman’sgrasp.Hisdriverbroughtthecarandtookhimbacktohishotel.15
ON FRIDAY, MAY 26, DAYAN HAD MET WITH BEN-GURION AND TOLD HIM ABOUT HISDEsiretoreturntothearmy.Ben-Gurionsaidheunderstood,andthatifhewereyounger he would also volunteer. He also tried, unsuccessfully, to persuadeDayan that war right now would be a disaster. Although Dayan agreed thatIsraelwasresponsibleforthecrisis,hethoughttherewasnolongeranywaytoavoidgoing towar,andhewasalreadythinkingahead.Tomake thewar look
likeanefforttoreopentheStraitsofTiran,IsraelmuststageanattackonSharmel-Sheikh,butthemaingoalwouldbetodestroytheEgyptianmilitary.Havingaccomplishedthat,theIDFwouldtakeovertheStraits.Dayanremarkedthatnoattempt should bemade to occupy theGaza Strip,whichwas populatedwithrefugees;hedescribeditas“aswarmofbees.”HealsothoughtIsraelshouldnotseizetheSuezCanal,forifitdidsoitwouldangerthecountriesthatreliedonthecanal,whichhedescribedas“awasps’nest.”16
Eshkolandhiscolleagues found itdifficult todecide,onSaturdaymorning,whether to enlistDayan in the army or invite him to join the government. Ineithercase,theywerenotsurewhethertheywouldbecallingonhimpersonallyor as a member of Rafi. Some were afraid of him. “Before you put him inuniform,askhimhereforameeting,”GoldaMeirsuggested.17
That same afternoon Dayan returned to Ben-Gurion’s home to meet partymembers. The question was whether to join the government. Dayan wasopposed: the goal should be to replace the government, not reinforce it.Ben-Gurion also objected, suggesting that Dayan become the prime minister andminister of defense, while he himself could act as adviser, if Dayan wished.ShimonPeres brought information that thewarwould begin the next day.HetookBen-GurionintoanotherroomandsuggestedappointingMosheDayanaschiefofstaff,notministerofdefense, so thathecouldpostpone thewar forafew days. “I would not agree to this,” Ben-Gurion wrote.18 If Ben-Gurion’saccount was accurate and he was not confused, as he sometimes was at thattime, then Peres’s proposal was yet another indication of the generalbefuddlementthathadtakenovereveryone,becauseDayanwasinfavorofthewar.In the course of the discussion, Ben-Gurion told those presentwhatDayan
had revealed to him the day before—that there had been an order to occupyGaza,but that ithadbeenrevoked.At thispoint,Dayangrewfuriousand lefttheroom.Hehadpassedontheinformationinconfidence,andBen-Gurionhadpromisednottorepeatit.“Isupposethatistrue,”Ben-Gurionconceded,“butIdidn’t remember.” The first IDF chief of staff, YaakovDori, followedDayanand tried toconvincehim tocomeback,butDayan refused.Hewent tomeetwiththeeditorofMaarivandthatnighthedrovesouth,tovisitthe7thBrigade,under thecommandofShmuelGorodish.19He foundGorodishaddressinghissoldiers,oneofwhomwasPrivateYehoshuaBar-Dayan.
“SOMETREMBLING,”WROTEBAR-DAYANBEFOREGORODISH’SSECONDVISIT. “I’MNOT
surewhy,butheisthemanwhocontrolsourfateandthefateofvictory.MayGod—ifheishere—leadhimtosuccess.”JeepheadlightsilluminatedGorodishasheaddressedhissoldiers.“Short,stocky,sunglasses,firmasarock,confidenttalk, a certain crudeness,” Bar-Dayan noted. He recorded his commander’swords:“Thiseveningistheeveofbattle.Tomorrow,thebattle.ItsimportanceisevengreaterthantheWarofIndependence.Ifwedon’twin,wehavenowheretocomebackto.Nasserwantstodestroyus.We’lldestroyhim.YouarethefastestbrigadeintheIDFandI’mcountingonyou.Yourmissionisextremelydifficult.Westorm theRafiahpostsatdawn.Thebattlemustbedecidedwithin twentyminutes. I want to see their tanks [become] flaming torches. Don’t wastemunitions on infantry.They should be runover rightwhere they are.Kill theenemy.Kill them.Wewon’t repeat themistakesofSinai,whenwedidn’t runthemover.Thebrigadewillbehelpedbygunnersandwe’llproceedtovictory,hopingtherewon’tbeadelay.We’llmeetattheradios.”Heleftthetroopsinsilence.Bar-Dayanlookedaroundatthechemistfromthe
WeizmannInstitute,atthehighschoolliteratureteacher.Parentsofchildren,likehimself.“WhatthehellamIdoinghere?”hewrote.20
BEN-GURIONRECEIVEDASECONDVISITTHATSATURDAY,FROMMENACHEMBEGINANDafewofhispeople.OnlythesensethatIsraelwasfacingcalamity,coupledwithasearinghatredofEshkol,couldhavepromptedsuchavisit.PaulaBen-Gurionwas verymoved.Ben-Gurion toldBegin that Israel shouldwait until it couldcoordinatewiththeUnitedStates,andonlythencarryoutarestrictedoperationto reopen the Straits. This seems to have beenBegin’s first inkling thatBen-Guriondidnotsupportanimmediatewarandwasopposedtoafull-scaleattackonEgypt.HeandhismendecidedtheywouldnotsupportBen-Gurion’sreturnto leadership; instead, they would push for Moshe Dayan, as Haim MosheShapirawasdoingaswell.21
These conversations reflected panic and confusion. People bandied aboutBen-Gurion’s andDayan’s nameswithout knowing exactlywhat the twomenthought. Yigal Allon was also mentioned as a candidate to replace Eshkol.ShapirawaswaryofAllonbecausehesupportedthewar,andyethisdemandtoappointDayanhelpedtohastenthebeginningofwar.“YouwantDayanbutyoudon’t want war?” Eshkol asked him, and told his friends that Shapira was“torturing him.”22 Shapira apparently assumed Dayan would follow Ben-Gurion. Like others, he acted “according to my heart,” as he told Eshkol.*PinhasSapirlaterjudgedthatsomeministersfearedDayanbecauseofEshkol’sweakness; they were also wary because of Rabin’s breakdown. According to
Sapir,hehadheardfromRabin’sphysicianlongagothatRabincouldnotbeinchargeifacrisisdeveloped;thiswasnotawell-keptsecret.“Thiscrisisseemstobe too much even for the chief of staff,” Zalman Aran told friends. “Thesituation is that thechiefof staff,who is supposed tobemadeof steel, isnotmadeofsteel.”24Shapirafelt theneedfor“nationalunity.”Thiswaspartlyanemotional position, rooted in his religious conviction, and not the result of arational examination of the best way to prevent war. This was also why hewantedBeginincludedinthegovernment.MostIsraelisatthetimealsowanted“nationalunity,”butunlikeShapira,mostIsraelisthoughtthecountryshouldgotowar.25
•••
ABBAEBANLANDEDATLODAIRPORTAFTERTENONSATURDAYNIGHTANDWASTAKENdirectlytomeetwiththecabinet.OnthewayheheardaboutRabin’sbreakdownfor the first time. His impression was that the atmosphere was “approachingpanic.” Before his arrival, Rabin had told the ministers that “the noose istightening.” Eban gave a detailed report on his meetings with President deGaulleandPrimeMinisterWilson,andreadlongexcerptsfromthetranscriptofhisconversationwithPresident Johnson.HeemphasizedJohnson’spromise toact toreopen theStraits. InWashington,hesaid, therewasanairofsuspiciontoward Israel, as if it were intending to entangle the United States in a war.Eshkol said he had no faith in Johnson’s promises, because what the UnitedStatesactuallydidwasuptotheStateDepartment.Rabinsupportedtheideaofexhaustingthediplomaticavenues,butrepeatedoverandover that thisshouldbedoneasquicklyaspossible.Nineoftheministerssupportedhisposition.Attimes, the discussion slipped into self-examination of an almost existential-historicaltenor.Yigal Allon feared a comprehensive attack by the Arab states, perhaps
coordinatedwiththeUSSR.Herejectedtheviewthatnoactionshouldbetakenwithoutsupportfromthegreatpowers.Hadwegoneitalonein1956,hesaid,wewouldhaveaccomplishedmore.TheIDFcouldactonitsown.Hesuggestedtakingactionthenextday.IsraelGalilifelt thatyearsofaccomplishmentwerebeing undermined; he was concerned about the IDF’s deterrent capabilities.Minister of Transport Carmel said any future war would be waged under farmoredifficultcircumstances.HealsowarnedthatIsrael’sdeterrentabilitymightcollapse, and pointed to the danger that the Egyptians would bomb Dimona.“Whoeverclaimswewillnotbeabletowithstandthebattlemightaswellclaim
wehavenorighttobehere.”Thequestion of theStraitswas secondary, saidMinisterGvati, seeing it an
opportunity. He assured his colleagues that war would not lead to a loss ofWestern support, but rather the contrary: the West did not want Nasservictorious. IsraelYeshayahu, thepostalminister,observed that thepublicnowhad the impression that the government could notmake up itsmind. Shapirasaid the government should not act on the basis of public opinion. Israel hadnever initiated an attack alone. He believed the Americans’ assurances morethanhebelievedintheIDF’spower.HedidnotthinkNasserwouldattack,andinhisviewareopeningoftheStraitsbytheUnitedStateswouldhurthimmorethan a defeat at the hands of Israel. The United States should be trusted torestore freedomof navigation. “It’s never too late to fight,” said Shapira, andmeanwhile Israel could grow stronger. Warhaftig also said he believed theAmericans would help. He called the notion of acting against U.S. opinion“adventurism,realadventurism.”AranspokemainlyofthelossesIsraelwouldsuffer.Theministeroftourism,MosheKol,saidthatwithoutfriendsIsraelcouldnot last long.MinistersMordehaiBentovandIsraelBarzilaimaintainedthat itwas sufficient for Israel to break the blockade.Therewas no need for all-outwar.Eshkol said they had to decide in whose hands to place the fate of that
generation: America or Chuvakhin. If Israel avoided taking action againstEgypt,itmightalsobeaskedtoexerciserestraintwithSyriaandtheterrorists:“And fromnowonwewill sit as quiet aswater and low as the grass.” Sapirremarkedthat“togetacountrywasverydifficult.Toloseitmaybeveryeasy.”Aran exclaimed that they were in a no-win situation, and Haim Moshe
Shapirasighed.“Howwillweholdoutagainstall theArabstates?”heasked.IsraelYeshayahu,whosupportedthewar,raisedanewargument:“Whatwillwetellthearmy?’Gobackhome.Itwasallforshow’?”26
Ateleveno’clockthatnight,whiletheargumentwasstillgoingon,thephonerang at David Ben-Gurion’s house. It was the editor in chief of Ha’aretz,Gershom Schocken. He asked to see Ben-Gurion. “Why so late?” Paulaprotested, but Schocken said it was important and Ben-Gurion agreed to seehim.A native ofGermany, the owner and editor of the newspaper for almostthirtyyears,SchockenshowedBen-Gurionaneditorialhewasplanningtorunthenextday.Dr.ShlomoGross,aseniorcommentatoratHa’aretz,hadwrittenthatevening
thattherewasnolongeranypointinwaiting:Israelmustactimmediately.“On
the one hand I, too, was of this opinion,” Schocken later recounted. “On theother hand, I thought back to the group we used to belong to, in WeimarGermany.Weweremembersofasetthatwasantiwar,pacifistic,andthemostunacceptable thing, the worst thing, was incitement to war. And here I was,calling forwar. Itwasdispiriting.”Ben-Gurionwas, asSchocken saw it, “thegreatestmilitaryleaderofthepeopleofIsrael,”andso,althoughthetwohadnotalwayshadagoodrelationship,hedecidedtoshowhimthedraft.*“Ben-Gurion was lying in bed in a very dreary room, reading a book in
EnglishaboutGreekphilosophy,”Schocken recalled.Hequickly read throughthe editorial and handed it back without a word. “What do you say?” askedSchocken.Ben-Gurionrepliedthathehadonlyonerequest:takeoutthedemandthathereturntothegovernment.Schockenaskedwhathethoughtaboutthewar.Ben-Gurionsaid,“Ithinkit’sadisaster,butthat’syourbusiness.”Schockenhadno idea before then thatBen-Gurion opposed thewar.He hurried back to thepaper,where,hesaid,he“weakened”theeditorial.27
THE SOLDIERS SERVING WITH SHUKA BAR-DAYAN HAD TAKEN TO CALLING ONEANOTHER “sweetie.” Strange,wrote Bar-Dayan.He drew encouragement fromtwo soldiers in their twenties, “the tank kids,” as he dubbed them:Arieh andLeon.“Boldmen,cool-tempered,fearfulbutconfident,proud,andrealistic,”thetankkids liftedhis spirits.Hehugged themandgave themsomecigaretteshehadbeenkeeping incasesomeoneneededthem.Thenhekissed thephotosofGiliandYarivandfellasleep.28
THE CABINET MEETING WENT ON INTO THE SMALL HOURS. EBAN SUGGESTEDADJOURNingthediscussionforforty-eighthours,andlefttobriefmembersoftheKnesset ForeignAffairs andDefense Committee, whowere convened on thefloorbelow.Whenhereturnedhefoundthatthecabinethaddecidedtoputoffthe decision only until noon the next day.Nineministers said they supportedimmediate action, including Eshkol, his party colleagues Yaakov ShimshonShapira, Israel Yeshayahu, Eliyahu Sasson, HaimGvati, and Zeev Sherf, andthree other ministers from Ahdut Ha’avoda: Israel Galili, Yigal Allon, andMosheCarmel.Ninewantedtowait,includingEban,ZalmanAran,andPinhasSapir (Mapai); Haim Moshe Shapira, Yosef Burg, and Zerah Warhaftig(Mafdal); Israel Barzilai and Mordehai Bentov (Mapam); and Moshe Kol(IndependentLiberals).Novotewastaken.IfEshkolhadwanted to leadIsrael towar,hewouldprobablynothavehad
much trouble convincing one of theministers opposed to change his position
that night, or at least to remain silent, just as, in 1948, Ben-Gurion couldprobably have rallied the support had he truly believed that the West Bankshould be occupied. Eshkol did not yet support immediate war, but in astalemate between the supporters and the objectors, he risked nothing byaligningwith theformer.Perhapshewasconsideringhishistorical imageasapatriot.Morelikely,hewasthinkingofapossibleleaktothepress.Ironically,heopposed thewar for thevery same reasonasBen-Gurion:hebelieved thatIsraelshouldnotgotowaraslongastheUnitedStateswasopposed.AharonYariv formulated the followingassessment: “TheAmericansviewa
preemptivestrikeonourpartasreasonable,aslongastheythemselvesarenotrequiredtotakeaction.Theywillactonlyinthecaseofadefeatofourside.”But at this point Eshkol no longer had reason to believe the IDF intelligencebranch’s political judgments, once again preferring his gut feeling andEban’sreport:theUnitedStateshadnotyetauthorizedIsraeltogotowar.29
ThepressesatHa’aretzhadstartedspittingouttheearlyeditionsofthepaper.“The editorial was printed as proposed,” wrote Ben-Gurion in his diary,disregarding Schocken’s last-minute changes. The editorial asserted that stepsshouldbetakentoreopentheStraits,butdidnotcallfor“immediateaction.”Itarguedthattheschedulemustnotbedictatedby“Israeliimpatience”butbythecountry’s military and political leadership. The paragraph pertaining to Ben-Gurionwaswordedvaguely:SchockendidnottellhisreadersthatBen-Gurionopposedthewar.“Inlargepartsofthenationthereisasenseofmistrusttowardthe government as currently constituted. . . . To the people and to theworld,Ben-GurionembodiesIsrael’sdeterminationtofacethemostdifficulttrials.Hehas proved more than once that he is cautious when the occasion demandscaution.”Itwasfourinthemorning.Thecabinetwasabouttodisperse.EzerWeizman
wasclaimingthatarmymoralewasdeteriorating.Heviewedanypostponementasa lackofconfidence in theair forceandapersonal failure,hesaid,but theministersweretootiredfor thissortofargument.“WhenIgothome,daylightwasbreaking,”wroteHaimGvati inhisdiary.“Despitemyweariness, Icouldnotfallasleepandhadtotakeapill.”30
CHAPTER8NINEDAYSTOWAR:ATERRIBLESITUATION
1.ANXIETY:“KEEPUPYOURAPPEARANCE”
The fear triggered by Nasser’s acts, beginning on Independence Day, rapidlyescalated into panic. “We are in a cold war, with the hot war close on thehorizon,readytoeruptatanytime,”wroteYosefWeitzinhisdiary.“Thepeopleof Israel are in a state of anxiety.” The publicwas demanding the immediateappointment of awar cabinet, he noted, but theministerswere negotiating asusual to expand the coalition. He thought this was madness. It was hard forWeitz to work in his garden, hard not to be involved. He felt as if he wereoutsideofthings.ButhisgrandsonNirwascalledupandNir’swife,Mira,wasgoing tovisithimin theNegevwithfreshsocksandunderwear.She left theirtwo-year-old son,Amir,withWeitz,whowentwith his great-grandson to thepark, played ball with him, and took him to the supermarket. “A nice boy,intelligent,perceptiveandtalkative,”henoted,tryingtoconsolehimself.1
“Thechildrenknoweverydetailandatschooltheyhavepreparedthemforastateofemergency,”wroteRikiBen-Ari fromTelAviv toher relatives inLosAngeles.ManyIsraelisweregoingoverseas.“EverydaypeoplecallmeandsaySo-and-Sohasleftthecountry,”Ben-Ariwrote;thoseleavingincludedwomenandchildren.2 “Planes arrive empty and take off full,” reportedHa’aretz.Theconductor Erich Leinsdorf canceled his concert and fled, like most tourists.Accordingtoareportgiventothechiefofstaff,thesouthernmostcityofEilatwasemptyingout;thousandshadalreadyleft.TheIDFfearedthattheEgyptiansor the Jordanians might attack the city and cut it off from the rest of thecountry.3
Peoplehoardedfood;therewerebuyingpanicsalmosteverywhere.“Mothersandwiveswhoareordinarilywise,moderate,andcapablewomenarerushingtothegrocerystores in loudconfusion,buyingup invirtualhysteriawhatever isneededandwhateverisnot,”wrotetheJerusalemauthorYeshurunKeshetinhisdiary. Grocery stores stopped extending credit. “What will happen if, Godforbid, there isn’t anybreadorwaterordairywhen thewar reallydoesbreakout?”wroteKeshet;hehadnodoubtthatitwould.“Theyarenottobeblamed,Iguess,”wrote Edith Ezrachi of Jerusalem to her relatives inNashville, NorthCarolina; she assumed they were “remembering their suffering and near
starvationin1948.”Shealsowentoutandboughtrice,noodles,andsugar,andshefilledasparebucketwithwater.*Anxietytookoverthekibbutzim,too.OnYehiamtheypreparedfortheworst,partlyundertheswayofrecollectionsfromtheWarofIndependence.Theydugdefensivetrenchesbetweenthehouses,asifexpectingtheenemytoinvadekibbutzterritory.“Ifyoutakeshelterinahouseorahut, seekcoverbeneathabed, table,etc.,”memberswere instructed.Theshelterswereforthekibbutzchildren.5
YehoshuaBar-Dayan’s impressionwas that the situation on the home frontwasworsethanwherehewas,andmanysoldierssharedthissense.“Thecalmandconfidenceinthemilitaryarecompletelydifferenttothesenseofpanicfeltby the littleman,”wroteonesoldier ina letterhome.Anotherwrote,“Ineverimaginedthesituationwasasterribleaswhatyoudescribedtomeinyourlastletter....Ifwhatyouwroteistrue,aboutwomencryingalldayandrunningtoget in lineearlyat thegrocerystore incase,Godforbid, there isno food left,thenallthenicestoriesinthepapersandontheradioaboutpeoplevolunteeringarejustthat—nicestories.”6
Thenewspapers tried to lift public spiritswith reports of unity between thepeopleanditsarmy,withaccountsofsteadfastnessandwillingnesstosacrifice.Thiswas Israel’s “secretweapon,”Maariv believed: the Israeli. Suchwas thestoryofakindergartenteacherfromthesouthwhotookherclassofthirtyonaday trip. They happened on an encampment of reservists. The five-year-oldsstartedclamberinghappilyonthemilitaryvehicles.Someofthesoldiershoistedthem onto their shoulders. One soldier was equipped with a recorder and aharmonica,andhegatheredthechildrenintheshadeofatenttoplaysometuneswhiletheysangalong.Othersoldiersgavethechildrencookiesandcandyfromtheirbattlerations,andletthemdrinkoutoftheircanteens.Finallytheyallsangsongs together.One of the boys recited: “Soldiers, take care of us and of thecountryandofourflag.”Hewasshoweredwithkisses.“Thesoldiers,mostofthem fathers, seemed to enjoy the visit evenmore than the children,”Maarivconcluded.ThepapertoldofashoemakerfromNessZionawhowantedtogiveallofhis
savings to the IDF; the army refusedhis donation.An elderly couple donatedtheirpensionstotheIDF.TheHelenaRubinsteincosmeticscompanypromiseditsIsraelicustomersitwasdoingeverythingpossibletokeepproductiongoing.“Our duty and yours in these days of emergency is to stay level-headed andcontinueourdailyactivities,evenstepthemup,andnottogetintoabadmoodor fall into panic,” declared the company. Its advice to the women of Israel:
“Keepupyourappearance,putonmakeup,lookbeautiful,andsmile,evenifittakesaneffort.”7
Letters sent overseas also reflect an attempt to repress anxiety, but itnonethelesswasoftenvisiblebetweenthelines.There’snothingtoworryabout,everyone is healthy, we feel fine, spirits are up, it all looks worse from theoutside,wroteonewomanfromTelAvivtorelativesinBoston,probablytryingtoreassureherselffirstandforemost,but theopeningwordsofher letterwere“TakingadvantageoftheFriedmans’leavingIsrael,I’mwritingyouthisletter,”as if she feared itmightbeher lastopportunity tomakecontact.Some letterswerewarmandcalm,thewritersseemingtohaveinternalizedtheofficialspiritofresolve;otherswereofficialandcheery.“Themainthingisthegreatnessofthepeopleatthishour,whichprovesoverandoveragainthatthesparkexistsineachandeverypersonfromIsraelandbecomesagreatflameofdedicationandaloveofIsrael,”wroteYoskehShapiratooverseasdelegatesoftheBneiAkivamovement.“WearekeepingcalmandtrustingHimwhodwellsintheheavens,”wroteparentsfromKibbutzEinHanatzivtotheirdaughterinLosAngeles.Thekibbutzmemberswerecollectingunderwearandtowelssothesoldierscampednearby could shower and change,wrote themother: “A spirit of volunteerismandgenerosityprevailsinthecountry;everyonelooksoutforeveryone.”Onthebalcony at Café Roval in Tel Aviv they set up a blood donation station. Theowners offered donors complimentary coffee and drinks.8 Penina Axelrod, inBoston, received letters from her family assuring her that the mood wascheerful, but she also got a request from her sister to send their father’smedicationquickly:“Idon’twantDadleftwithoutasupply.”9
But the letters fromWeizmannStreet inRishonLezionshowedhowhard itwastosticktoaroutine.Rinaandherbabymovedinwithherparentswhenherhusband, David, was called up for reserve duty. The toddler made everyonehappy.Areallittleboy,ashisgrandmotherwrote,hewasstartingtowalkandchatter, saying everyword twice.He could recognize his grandfather and say“Saba,”themischievouslittledevil.Buthealsocalledoutforhisfatherallthetime, saying, “Come, come.” His grandmother wrote, “It breaks your heart.”Uri,theyoungbrother,nowinhighschool,keptuphisgoodgradesanddidhishomework “tip-top, as if nothing is going on.” But his father, who remainedunwell,“feltthesituationkeenly,”wrotehiswife.“IneverimaginedIwouldgothroughthishorroragaininmylifetime,”hewrotetohisdaughter,whowasstillinManhattan butwas now thinking of coming back. “Everyone has betrayedus.”Theparentsrefusedtoadvisetheirdaughtertocomehome.TheyknewnomorethanshedidfromthepapersinNewYork,theywrote.ButonMay28the
mothersaid,“Father’sopinionisthatyoushouldn’tsendyourthingsoveryet.Ifyouhaven’tsentthem,waituntilthesituationbecomesclearer.”10
Riki Ben-Ari, a fashion commentator whose drawings appeared inMaariv,founditdifficulttoconcentrateandwasdoingalmostnowork,butshewrotetofamily that shewasmore optimistic thanmany because she believed in fate:“You could die by accident, too.” While weeding his garden, Yosef Weitznoticed an unusual silence that had settled on Hahalutz Street. Almost novehiclesweregoingby,hewroteinhisdiary.“Everyonelooksupattheskyasifplaneswillappearatanymoment.”11CivildefenserepresentativeswentthroughhousesinRehaviatocheckonthebasements(whichservedasbombshelters),Edith Ezrachi told her relatives in Nashville. “It’s hard to say there’s a goodmood.”Thecivildefenseauthoritiesinstructedresidentstobuyblackpaperandtapetodarkentheirwindows.Acrossthestreet,Ezrachinotedinanotherletter,wastheGymnasiaRehaviahighschool,itswindowspiledhighwithsandbags.“It’saverysadsight.”Thefirstvolunteerssoonbegantoarrivefromoverseas.“It’swonderfultosee
them,”YediotAharonotwrote cheerfully. Some celebrities came, too, to showsolidaritywith the embattled country, including thepianistDanielBarenboim.Foreign reporters also started arriving, among them the grandson ofWinstonChurchill,whowenttoseeBen-Gurionalmostassoonashelanded.12
As tensionsmounted, so did the fear of IsraeliArabs. The crisis sharpenedsuspicions that always hovered over Arab laborers, and the number of JewstravelingtopredominantlyArabNazarethdropped.Thepolicedenied,however,thatArabswere distributing anti-Jewish leaflets. The authorYeshurunKeshetthoughtaboutIsraeliArabsthatweek.Therewerenoassurancesoftheirloyaltytothestate,hewroteinhisdiary:“Thesouloftheeasternmanisadarkabyssand his thoughts are a mystery.” Naturally, “the voice of blood and racialbelonging” drew IsraeliArabs to theArabworld, andwere stronger than thematerialadvantagesIsraelofferedthem.ItfollowedthatnoarrangementintherelationsbetweenJewsandArabsinIsraelcouldbenaturalorsustainable.“Thisis not a temporary problem, but a curse for generations.” Keshet had nodelusions:“Nofinalsolutionisfeasible.”13
Eshkol’smilitarysecretary,IsraelLior,hadmetwiththeheadoftheSecurityService,YosefHarmelin,andsuggestedheheightenthestateofalert.Harmelinproposed“preparingactionsagainstthelocalpopulation.”Itwasdecidedthatinthe event of war, military supervision over Israeli Arabs would be renewed;amongotherthings,overnightcurfewswouldbeimposedandBedouinresidents
wouldbemovedfromthenorthofIsraeltothesouth.AfewdozenArabswerearrestedundermilitarydirectives.Themilitaryadvocategeneral,MeirShamgar,however, cautioned against a secondKafrKassem, anArabvillagewhere, ontheeveoftheSinaiCampaign,severaldozenresidentshadbeenshotdeadaftercurfewhoursbyIsraeliBorderGuardpolice.“Curfewviolationisnotcauseforopening fire.Use of firearms is permitted onlywhen engaged inwar. Peoplewhoarelategettingtotheirvillageswhenacurfewisinforcewillbeallowedtoreturnhome;ifnecessarytheywillbearrested.Undernocircumstancesshouldtheybehurt.”FausiAl-AsmarwenttovisitafriendonKibbutzGalon,butnosoonerhadhe
reached her room than she was called to the kibbutz secretariat. When shereturned,shetoldhimthekibbutzhaddemandedthatheleaveimmediately.Hemightbeanenemyspy,thekibbutzsecretaryhadexplained.Whatcouldhebespyingon in the kibbutz? shehad asked.He could tell the enemy that all theyoungkibbutzmembershadbeencalledup,andalsothattherewerenotenoughbombshelters.Thearmy,whichcontinuedtomonitorArabactivities, reportedenthusiastic expressions of identification with Nasser and hopes that Israelwouldbedestroyed,particularlyamongMuslims.14KibbutzLohameiHagetaot,conversely,sentoutanewslettertoitsactive-dutymembersreportingthatArabsfromthesurroundingvillageshadcometohelpthekibbutzwiththefarmwork.They came with their families, and looked sad and tense. “We set up lovelytablesfortheminthediningroom,”thenewslettercontinued.“Wetriedtohonorand appreciate what they were doing, and they spoke of work and peace.”Ha’aretzreportedthattheGalileeArabswereafraidofthecomingwarandweredepressed. There were also reports of Arabs offering to donate blood andmoney.15
ProfessorAkibaErnstSimon,a longtimememberof themovement infavorofabinationalArab-Jewishstate,andUriDavis,aleaderofthestruggleagainstmartial law, were among the signatories to a petition published in Ha’aretzcallingonIsraeltowaitbeforegoingtowar:“Hewhogainstimemayalsogainpeace.”16* But these voices were lost in the consensus of anxiety. AmnonZihroni,anattorney,reexaminedhisworldviewasapacifistanddraftresister;in1954, he had held a prolonged hunger strike to force the government torecognizehisrighttoconscientiousobjection.InMay1967,hestillbelievedhedidnothavetherighttokillahumanbeing,inaccordancewiththeprinciplesofpacifism.Whileheblamedthegovernmentforthecrisis,henonethelesswrotetoEshkolaskingtobeenlisted“insomedefensivecapacity,”suchasamedic.17
Though always a positive thinker, even Edith Ezrachi was losing hope. “ImustadmitthatupuntilaboutFriday...Iwasstillfairlyoptimistic,”shewrotetoNorwalk,Connecticut.“Iwasstillalmostconfidentthatsomewaywouldbefound toavert amilitaryconfrontation.ButbySaturday Iwasgraspedby thenightmarishrealizationthattheremaybenowayout.”OnSunday,herhusband,Eitan, was called up. She tried to amuse her relatives in America withdescriptionsofhis efforts to fit intohisolduniform.He lookedas if hewerebackintheBoyScouts.Shelaughedathisappearance,butreallyshewantedtocry. “Our anxiety is very great and very grave and our incomprehension ismaddening.”18Thiswasafearofdestruction,and itssourcewasrooted in theHolocaust.
2.HOLOCAUST:“NASSERISHITLER”
During the first years of Israel’s existence, the events of the Holocaust wasshroudedinagreatsilence,makingthetopicvirtuallytaboo.Parentswouldnottell theirchildrenwhathadhappenedto them,andchildrendarednotask.ButaftertheApril1961kidnappingofAdolfEichmannandthetrialthatfollowed,IsraelisbecamemoreopenwithrespecttotheHolocaust,ultimatelymakingitapartoftheiridentity.19
Inthemiddleof1966,someyoungIsraeliswentonatourofthedeathcamps.Oneofthem,MordehaiKremnitzer,wroteanarticleaboutthe trip.“Israelis inAuschwitz.Tearsintheireyes;gloomy,silent.Wantingvengeance.Promisingtoremember and not to forget—Israelis who feel they are the children of thosewhoweremurdered,whofeeltheyareJews,Jewsatthegravesoftheirfathers,thegravesof theirbrothers.And therewasalsoasenseofvictory:weare theliving.”ThethreeweeksspentinCzechoslovakiaandPoland,wroteKremnitzer,turned these young people into proud and sensitive Jews, but also into betterIsraelis:“EverywhereIwent,theword’homeland’calledouttome.”20
Thesewerethefirstvoicesinafairlyslowlearningprocess.Israelisbegantointernalizethefoundationsoftheirpast,includingtheirhistoryintheDiaspora,andgradually stoppedbeingashamedof it, unlike thepreviousgeneration.Atthe culmination of the process it would be hard to find a young Israeli whowould use the nameWarhaftig as an insult. In January 1967, a few hundredstudentsattheLadyDavisschoolinPetachTikvagatheredtohearimpressionsof the young Israelis who had been to Poland. Their elderly teacher told thechildren not to forget theHolocaust, and the next speaker explainedwhy thiswasimportant:sothattheywouldbestrong.21
Thiswastheemergingattitude,lucidlyexpressedina1963letterwrittenbyayoungman,OferFeniger,tohisgirlfriendfollowingtheEichmanntrial.“Ifeelthat from all the horror and the helplessness, a hugely powerful strength isgrowinginme.Strongtothepointoftears;sharpasaknife;quietandterrible;that’showIwanttobe!Iwanttoknowthatneveragainwillholloweyeslookout frombehind electric fences! . . .Not if I am strong! Ifwe are all strong!Strong,proudJews!Neveragaintobeledtotheslaughter.”22*Politicians, educators, andmedia figures repeated the lesson often.A small
minoritytendedtoemphasizetheuniversallessonsoftheHolocaust,suchasthedutytoprotectdemocracyandhumanrightsandtheobligationtofightracismandrefusemanifestly illegalorders.Thiswasyetanotherarenaof theconflictbetween“thetwopeoplesofIsrael.”
THESTORYOF ISRAELISANDTHEHOLOCAUSTALTERNATESBETWEENTRUEEMOTIONandmanipulativeargument,whicharenotalwayseasilydistinguished.Assoonas the crisis ofwarbegan, thepressbegancomparingNasser toHitler. In thepast,otherArableadershadbeencomparedtoHitler,butthishadbeendonetoinsult them, not as part of the situational assessment and a reason to attack.“Nasserspeaksclearly,asHitlerdidontheeveoftheSecondWorldWar,”wroteZe’evSchiff.Nasser’s speeches,RadioCairo broadcasts, and the anti-Semiticcartoons in theEgyptian press prompted this assertion.Ha’aretz published anarticlebyEliezerLivnehcalled“TheDangerofHitlerIsReturning.”Livneh,aformer Knesset member for Mapai, also sent a note to Eshkol: “Nasser isHitler.”24
ManycomparedIsrael’ssituationtoCzechoslovakia’spriortoWorldWarII,when it was abandoned to the Nazis. They recalled that the British primeminister,NevilleChamberlain,hadforsakentheCzechs in theMunichaccord,and they likened his appeasement policy to Eshkol’s approach.25 Letters andarticlestothiseffectwerepublishedinYediotAharonotandMaariv.Oneeditor,ShalomRosenfeld,readabookaboutthedismantlingofCzechoslovakiawrittenbyIsraelihistorianDavidVital,andbecamesoworriedthathecouldnotsleepallnight.26
DavidBen-Gurion said, “None of us can forget theNaziHolocaust, and ifsomeoftheArableaders,withtheleaderofEgyptattheirhead,declaredayandnight that Israelmust be destroyed . . .we should not take these declarationslightly.”27ThiswasalsoIsrael’sofficialpropagandaline.TheForeignMinistryinstructedtheIsraeliembassyinWashingtontoaskforanurgentmeetingwith
JamesReston,associateeditoroftheNewYorkTimes,topersuadehimthattheonlydifferencebetweenNasserandHitlerwasthatHitlerhadalwaysclaimedhewanted peace, while Nasser was explicit about his aim of destroying Israel.MinisterMordehaiBentov askedEshkol to set up a “center for psychologicalwarfare”thatwouldfocusonthecomparisonbetweenHitlerandNasser.28
Baruh Nadel, a prominent journalist at Yediot Aharonot, publishedimpressionsfromavisittoreservesoldierspostedintheNegev.Onesoldierhemet,apparentlyaHolocaustsurvivor,wassittinginthelastrowoftrenches,“alittle Pole, illuminated by red twilight, his black shadow cast far back to thehills,where the tanks, hiddenunder netting, point their threateningmouths ofsteel towardGaza.”Nadel returned home calm and reassured.29 Thiswas theHolocaustaspropaganda.*
•••
BUT THE EXISTENTIAL ANXIETY THAT GRIPPED ISRAELIS WHEN THE CRISIS ERUPTEDWAS real. Someone no doubt organized citizens to send care packages tosoldiers,perhapstounitethepeoplearoundtheirarmy,butthereisnoreasontoassumethatanyonesolicitedtheletterwrittenbyawomanwhosentapackageof goods to the soldier Arnon David Grabow. She told him she had been inAuschwitz,where her husband and four childrenweremurdered.Aftermanytribulations,shehadreachedIsraelandmanagedtostartanewfamily.Shehadsmallchildren,andshetrustedtheIDFandprayedforitswelfareeverynight.32There isalsono reason todoubtwhatmembersofKibbutzLohameiHagetaottold their sons in a newsletter for enlisted soldiers. While digging defensivetrenchesonthekibbutz,themembersrecalleddoingthesamethingin1939,inpreparationfortheNazis’invasionofPoland.TheybelievedtherewasnochoicebuttogotowarwithEgypt.WhenthesituationwasexplainedtoyoungAmosi,oneofthe“secondgeneration”kibbutzchildren,heresponded,“ThismeansthatifNasserwins,wewereallborninvain.”33
“The situation is terrible,” wrote Naomi Shukri from Ramatayim to aclassmatelivinginLosAngeles.“Youcannotimaginehowluckyyouarenottobe in Israel right now.” Itwasn’t the recession, shewrote, itwasn’tmoney, itwaslife.Peoplewerewalkingaroundhunchedover,thestresswasexhausting.Whocouldthinkofwork?Thecountrywasparalyzed.“Nooneknowswhatwillhappen tomorrow, in the next hour, the nextminute. People keep asking eachother:Whatwillhappen?Whatwillhappen?OnlyGodknows.”Sometimesshethought shewas having a nightmare, that shewouldwake up and everything
wouldbebacktonormal.Butno,shewrote,thiswascruelandterriblereality,andithadbeengoingonforalmosttwoweeks.“IsupposethisisthefateoftheJews,eveninourtime,inourland.Willwealsobeagenerationofwar?”Herletterwasnotwritten topersuadeJamesReston. Itwaswritten from theheartandsoulofNaomiShukri,andsheexpressedthefeelingsofcountlessIsraelis.“Who would have believed it?” she continued. “Who? Who could haveimaginedthatallthestoriesaboutthefearbeforewarwouldhappeninourownlives?”Herhusbandhadbeencalledupforreserveduty.“Don’tevenaskhowIstoodthereandpackedhisbag.Mayyouneverknowsuchathingyourwholelife. Your whole life.” Shewanted to believe that if, God forbid, “somethinghappens,”theycouldrelyonthearmy;but,sheenjoinedherfriend,“Don’tdareregretnotbeinginIsrael.”34
Rabin,whobelievedthatIsraelfaceditsmostdifficult trialsincetheWarofIndependence, instructed schools and other public buildings to be readied toserveashospitalsandcasualtycenters.ZerahWarhaftiglaterrecalledaskingthechief of staff howmany deaths he thought the IDFmight sustain, andRabinestimatedperhapstensofthousands.TenrabbisfromthechiefrabbinateandtheTel Aviv Hevre Kaddisha went through the public parks sanctifying them toserve as cemeteries.Only a societydrenched in thememoryof theHolocaustcouldhavepreparedsometiculouslyforthenextone.35
ALL AT ONCE, IT HAD BECOME CLEAR HOW VULNERABLE AND DESPERATE ISRAELISWERE. ItwasnotNasser’s threats thathadbrought thisabout—or,at least,notonly his threats—but the quicksand of depression that had pulled so manypeopledownforsomanymonths.Itwasthedisappointmentandthefeelingthatthe Israeli dream had run its course. It was the loss of David Ben-Gurion’sleadership,thefatherofthenation,coupledwiththelackoffaithinEshkolandthegeneralmistrustofpolitics.Itwastherecessionandtheunemployment;thedecline in immigration and themass emigration. Itwas thedeprivationof theMizrahim,aswellas thefearof them—thefear that theywoulderodeIsrael’sEuropeansocietyandculture,thattheythreatenedtheAshkenazielite.Itwasthedifficulty communicatingwith the younger generation. Itwas the boredom. Itwas the terrorism; the sense that there could be no peace. All these feelingswelledupintheweekbeforethewar,sweepingthroughthenationinatideofinsanity.ThepeoplehadnotfeltthiswretchedandisolatedsincetheHolocaust.And so the ideas being put forth in themeantime bymore stableminds in
Israel,Washington,andNewYorkneverhadmuchofachance.Therewereafew proposals, all meant to provide a two-or three-week cooling-off period,
duringwhichitwassuggestedthatIsraelnottrytomoveshipsbearingitsflagthrough the Gulf of Aqaba, and that Egypt not hinder the passage of otherships.36ArthurGoldberg,U.S.ambassadortotheUN,suggestedasettlementtoJohnson that could bothmaintainNasser’s standing and assure the passageofships to Israel: Israelwouldstopsailingunder its flag,andNasserwouldstopconducting searches of ships making their way to Eilat under foreign flags.Israelwouldhaveadifficulttimeacceptingthis,theambassadorwrote,butonemustrememberthatinanycaseoilwasshippedtoEilatintankersthatdidnotbearIsraeliflags.37TheStateDepartmentsuggestedasimilarplan,pointingoutthatoverthepasttwoandahalfyearsonlyonemerchantshipflyingtheIsraeliflaghadgonethroughtheStraits.38
The majority of Israelis knew nothing of the proposals to end the crisiswithout war. They listened to the Voice of Thunder fromCairo, an EgyptianradiostationthatbroadcastpropagandainHebrew.*“Yourleaderswillnothelpyou—theywill bring aHolocaust uponyou!” roared the broadcaster.OneTelAvivwomanwrote to Boston that “anyonewho can pick upCairo televisionmusthavebeenwetting themselveswithfearover thepast fewweeks.”ManyIsraelis felt they should believe the broadcasts, just as people should havebelievedHitler.†Countless letters from Israelis to friends overseas, aswell asletters written by soldiers at the front, reflect a desire to avoid war. But themilitary leaders insisted there was no way out of it, and they were the onlypeoplemostIsraelisstilltrusted.
CHAPTER9ONEWEEKTOWAR:
THEGENERALS’REVOLT
1.STAMMERING:“THEWAR’SNOTGOINGANYWHERE”
Sunday,May28,beganinafeverofanxietyforShukaBar-Dayan.Everythingwassoquiet.Therewasstillnowar.“Iwish itwouldstartalready,sowecanrelease the tension, andwhateverhappenswill happen.”Hedrankwarm sodaand gobbled crackers, and then someone came and handed him a gas mask.“Lookslikethey’regoingtogasus,”hewrotehurriedly,hisdiaryfunctioningasabarrierbetweenhimselfandhisfear.1Anoticecirculatedamongthereserviststhatweek including the following guidelines: “An IDF soldier taken prisonermustactproudly.Hemustnottrytoingratiatehimselfwithhisinterrogatorsandmust not be self-deprecating in front of his captors.” The notice described asoldier named Jibli,whohadbeen captured andmanaged towithstand torture“until his captors gave up trying tomake him talk.”2 “DearGili,”wroteBar-Dayan to hiswife, “I’m here simply becauseNasserwants to destroy us andthrowus into the seawithour children.And theworld standsby silently.Wewillsmashhisplanswithimmenseforce.That’swhyyouaregoingthroughthis—and us, too.” He could not help but feel homesick; he prayed for Gili andYariv,hoped theywere takingcareof themselvesandnotpanicking.“Endlesslove,”heconcluded,“DaddyShuka.”3
A few hours earlier, the Israeli envoy in Washington had contacted WaltRostowtoaskforpermissiontobrieftheIsraelipresscorrespondentsintown,amove initiated by Foreign Minister Eban. In advance of the day’s cabinetmeeting,Ebanhoped themorningpaperswould project a degree of optimismabout the chances that the United States would reopen the Straits of Tiran.Rostowconveyed the request to Johnson.The embassywould sayonly a fewwordstothereporters,hepromised,andJohnsonagreed.ButPrivateShukaBar-Dayanwasnotimpressedwithwhathereadinthemorningnews:“NasserisoutofcontrolandJohnsonisnotstandingbyus.”4
AT FIVE-THIRTY THAT MORNING, AMBASSADOR BARBOUR HAD DELIVERED A LETTERfromPresidentJohnsontoEshkolinTelAviv.TheRussianswereclaimingthat
Israelwasabouttoattackitsneighbors,Johnsonwrote.Asafriend,hewasonceagain cautioning Israel that it “just must not take any preemptive militaryaction.”Barbouraddedasharpermessage:anyunilateralactbyIsraelwouldbeirresponsibleandevendisastrous.5
ThecabinetreconvenedasscheduledatnoononSunday,May28,ashadbeenarranged when the previous night’s meeting had ended before dawn with astalemate:nineministers supported immediatewar;ninewanted towait.Ebanassured theministers that Johnsonwas trying to put together an internationalcoalitiontoreopentheStraits,andthatifhewasunsuccessful,theUnitedStateswould act alone. Johnsonwas “steady as a rock,” Eban promised—hewouldbring in theSixthFleet ifhehad to.Thishadbeenconveyedonbehalfof thepresidenttoAmbassadorHarman,followingEban’smeetingwithJohnson,Ebanclaimed. He had reexamined the minutes from that meeting and repeatedlyasserted that he had no doubt: theminutes contained an explicit commitmentthatiftheUnitedStateswasunabletocoordinateinternationalaction,itwouldactalone.Thiswasuntrue,evenaccordingtotheIsraeliversionoftheminutes.While Johnsonhad firmlypromised tomakeeverypossibleeffort toopen theStraits,hehadnotexpresslystatedthattheUnitedStateswouldactonitsowntothatend.Thecabinetdiscussionrepeatedpositionsalreadylaidout:Eshkolunderstood
that theAmericans’ communicationmustnotbe ignored;heproposedwaitingfor twoor threeweeks.Rabin said thatpostponing theattackwould set Israelbacktothesituationitwasinbefore1956.HedidnotbelievetheworldpowerswouldreopentheStraits.Intwoorthreeweeks,Israelwouldbefacingthesameproblembutunderworseconditions.Meanwhile, theIDF’sprestigewasbeingdamaged.Heregrettedhavingtosayit,headdedasifapologizing,butthiswassimplythewayhesawthings.Thiswashissenseandhisbeliefandhehadtospeakhismind.EshkolinsistedonrebukingRabin—perhapsanexpressionofanewattitudetowardthemilitary’sassessments—tellinghim,“Idon’twanttodowhatI’vedonewiththeothers,backyouintoacornerandaskasimpleyesorno question [on whether to defer to Johnson]. Even if you say yes, I’m notinterested.”Similarly, Eban rejected the need to considerwhatRabin described as “the
army’s prestige,”maintaining, “There are nowidows or orphans of prestige.”Thedovesweresettingthetoneofthehour.EvenAllonnowsupportedadelay,albeit reluctantly, as he feared the Americans would demand internationalsupervision over Dimona in return for their help. Minister Gvati said thatcompliance with Johnson’s demands would mean delivering Israel’s fate into
Americanhands.“We’ll justbepatronageJews,”hesaid;buthe,too,votedinfavorofwaiting.OnlyCarmelstoodhisground:“Thegovernmentisinastateofseveredelusion.”Thecabinetdecidedtoavoidmilitaryaction,pendinganewdecision, tobemadewithinthreeweeks.Theministers’willingnesstocomplywithJohnson’srequestwasbasedontheincorrectinformationEbanhadgiventhem.EbanhaddonetothempreciselywhatEshkol,Rabin,andYarivhaddonetohimandAmbassadorHarmanwiththeirtelegrammedreportsofaworseningsituation that threatened Israel’s existence. Eban had not believed theirtelegrams;buttheministers,conversely,believedhisreport.The decision draftmade reference to President Johnson’s “commitment” to
ensure freedomof shipping in theGulfofAqaba,butamoreguardedofficialdeleted that word and replaced it with “promise.” The stated reason for thegovernment’s decision was the “chance” that the United States would act toreopentheStraits“togetherwithothergovernmentsoronitsown.”“IdonotknowwhetherIwasendowedwiththepersonalcouragetosendour
young men to war,” Minister Aran said two days later, “but I had enoughcouragetonotsendthematthatparticularmoment,giventheoverallassessmentofthesituation.It isverypossiblethatwewillbeblessedfornothavingdoneso, and for having deflected the hell asmuch aswe could.”According to theminister,hehadnoillusionsthatthewaitingperiodwouldpreventthewar,buthe thought they could not pass up the possibility: “The war isn’t goinganywhere,”hesaid.6
“TheGeneralStafftookthedecisionverybadly,”wroteGvatiinhisdiary.Hehimselfhad“aheavyheart”andwasnotatpeacewithhischoice.“Iamafraidour decisionwaswrong and itmay cost us dearly,” hewrote.7Within a fewhours,afterhearingPrimeMinisterEshkol’sradioaddress,mostofthecountryagreedwithhim.
EVERYONEWASEXPECTINGESHKOLTOGIVEANADDRESSTOTHENATION,BUTINSTEADhe simply read the government’s decision over the radio. It was phrased inclumsy,near-legalisticlanguage,meanttoberead,notspoken.Atthatpoint,lifewasmore or less paralyzed. In almost every household, peoplewereworriedabout their loved ones on reserve duty—fathers, husbands, sons. Eshkol’sannouncementofferedneitherreassurancenorwarmth,notevenaChurchillianblood,sweat,toil,andtearstypeofencouragement.The first line of the resolution’s second page included one handwritten
change,made by one of Eshkol’s assistants. Eshkolwas not prepared for the
change,whichreplaced“retreatofforces”with“shiftofforces.”Eshkolbecameconfused as he read the paper. He stopped, whispered to his assistants, andmumbled something. On live radio. His horrified assistants desperatelymotioned for him to keep going. Reading the next line, Eshkol began tostammer.8
MiriamEshkolwasonherwayfromJerusalemtoTelAvivwhensheheardherhusbandontheradio.Shewasgrippedwithasenseofdisaster.Shedidnotknowwhatexactlyhadhappened,but realized immediately that theresultwasterrible.Shehurriedto thestudioandfoundit filledwithforeignreportersbutalmostnoneoftheprimeminister’sassistants;theyhadfledlikemice,shelatersaid. Eshkol explainedwhat had happened, rubbing his eyes; he had recentlyundergonecataract surgery.Shewasbesideherselfwith fury.Thiscouldhavebeen avoided if Eshkol had recorded his speech, or at least waited a fewmomentsforafreshtypescriptwithouthandwrittencorrections.9
Someofthecabinetministersfelttheradiobroadcastwasacentralfactorinthe subsequent fervor. “Never was a country’s political life changed sodrastically because of a stammer,” saidZalmanAran. “I realized immediatelythatEshkolhadmadeamistake,possibly a fatal one,”wrote IsraelLior,whohad been with him in the studio. “For many days afterward, I kept hearingstoriesofsoldiersandofficersintheNegevburstingintotearswhentheyheardEshkol’s stammeringvoiceon their transistor radios.The lowmoraledroppedeven lower.” General Yeshayahu Gavish of the Southern Command said thewholethingwasfrighteningandextremelydepressing.HehadheardthespeechonthewaytoameetingwithEshkolandtheGeneralStaff.ArielSharonhearditon the way to the same meeting, and said it only heightened his sense offoreboding.10*
2. THREATS: “YOUR HESITATION WILL COST USTHOUSANDSOFLIVES”
The meeting was tough; rage was in the air. Eshkol found himself facing afierce, confrontational General Staff, worked up to the point of hysteria andparticularlyrude.Someoftheofficerswerethreatening,claimingthatthestate’sexistence was in danger. Eshkol put them in their place, but was evidentlydeeplyshaken.Aharon Yariv told those present about a few Egyptian officers who had
defected to Israel,andsaid the information theysupplied“basicallyconfirmedourintelligence.”Hedidnotsaywhether,accordingtothesoldiers,Egyptwas
about to attack. Next he reported that the “prevailing wind” in the Jordanianrefugee camps was that “Palestine will soon be returned.” Then Yarivsummarized a statementNasser had given to the press.At this point,GeneralGavish said, “Tomorrow is the last chance.TheEgyptians are blocking everyaxis.TomorrowwecouldswallowanEgyptiandivision.”TheminutesnotethatGavishwas speaking toMinisterAllon,who had arrived at themeetingwithEshkol.No one seems to have askedGavishwhy the next daywas their lastchance.Eshkol told thoseof thegeneralswhohadnotheardhimon theradioabout
thegovernmentdecision,addingthatsincehehadbeenreadingfromaprepareddocument,hemightnothavemanagedtoexplainhimselfproperly.Thenatureofthedecisionmightmakethegenerals“uncomfortable,”heconceded,buttheyshould remember that only a day earlier he had been one step away fromdeciding on war. Now there were “diplomatic problems” that necessitated adelay. “We’re not alone in the world,” he said. He spoke at length of hisnighttimemeetingwithChuvakhin,andreportedconfidentiallyonthemessagehehadreceivedfromJohnsonthatmorning.HesaidJohnsonhadwarnedthatapreemptive strike by Israel would bring about “a holocaust.” Eshkol wasembellishing somewhat. Secretary of State Rusk had instructed AmbassadorBarbour to caution Israel against bringing on a “catastrophe,” but he had notused the word “holocaust,” and the president himself had not warned of a“catastrophe.” Following Eban’s lead, Eshkol repeated the Americancommitmentthatiftheyfailedtoorganizeinternationalaction,theywouldgoitalone.The decision not to go towar had been preceded by lengthy deliberations,
Eshkolsaid.Atthispointtheminutesaddaparentheticalquestion:“Moralones,too?” It isunclearwhetherEshkol spoke thesewordsorwhether theyexpressthe note taker’s reservations. Eitherway, Eshkol described the decision as anexpressionof“politicalmaturity.”Gavish said that in twoweeks the Straitswould still be blockaded and the
situationwould beworse. RehavamZe’evi said that the IDF’s plan of actionmighthavebeen leakedby then.Eshkol replied that if it transpired that Israelhadbeenmisled,itwouldact,butthatonthebasisofhispersonalacquaintancewithJohnsonhebelievedthepresidentwouldkeephispromise.Ariel Sharon said: “Today we have ourselves chopped off the IDF’s
deterrencecapability.Wehavechoppedupourmainweapon—thefearofus.”HesaidIsraelwascapableofdestroyingtheEgyptianarmy,butiftheygavein
on the question of free navigation, “we will open the door to Israel’s totaldestruction.”LikeYigalAllon,SharoninvokedtheSinaiCampaignandclaimedthat cooperation with the British and French had been to Israel’s detriment.TodayIsraelwascapableofdemolishingtheEgyptianarmyonitsown,hesaid,butitwasclearthatanydelaywouldmeanpayingahigherprice“forsomethingwe’llhavetodoanyway.”UptothispointhehadbeenspeakingasSharonthesoldier;fromhereon,hebecameSharonthepolitician:“Wealsohavetokeepinmind the domestic consideration of not undermining the people’s morale bydecidingtowait.Thepeoplearereadyforajustwar.Allofourpleadingmakesusseemweak.Thepeopleunderstandthisandfeelthatthey’regoingtohavetopaytheprice.Wehavetofightforwhatisessential.”Sharon’s use of the word “pleading” reflected a Sabra’s scorn for the old-
fashionedJewishwayofconductingbusinessintheDiaspora,andwasprobablyintendedtoinsulttheprimeminister.Hecautionedthatdelaymightreinvigorateterrorismandthe“problemoftheArabminority.”Hisconclusionwasdramatic:“Theproblem isnot theStraits—theproblem is thePeopleof Israel and theircontinuedexistence.”NotjusttheStateofIsrael,but“thePeopleofIsrael,”inits entirety. Eshkol tried to show that Sharon was being unreasonable, butSharon interrupted him: “Inaction on our part shows powerlessness. We’remaking ourselves look like an empty vessel, a desperate state. We’ve neverbefore been so humiliated.” Then hewent even further: “Your hesitationwillcostusthousandsoflives,”hetoldtheprimeminister.Itwouldhavebeenhard to put the casemore hurtfully, butEshkol showed
restraint.HedidnotaskSharon to leave,nordidhehimselfwalkoutorevendemand an apology. “You are greatly exaggerating,” he told the generals, andasked them to “take a deep breath.” The cabinet had considered all thearguments.TheybelievedthegreatpowerswereconcernedforIsrael’swelfare.Destroying the Egyptian military would not be the end of the story; Egypt’sarmywouldberebuilt.Israel,ontheotherhand,couldnotexistwithoutoutsidehelp. Ifwarcouldbeaverted, theneverythingmustbedone toavert it.TherewashopethatBritainandtheUnitedStateswouldtakeactioninIsrael’sstead,for the sakeof their own interests. “IDFgeneralsmust understand the roleofstatesmanshipandnotallowtheirdiscontent to tip thescale.There isnoroomhere for selfimmolation,” Eshkol rebuked the generals. The government,conversely, had to consider the whole picture—“the problem of blood, theproblemofproperty,thedamagetothemilitary.”Eshkolthenlostthethreadofhisargument,asheoftendid.“PerhapsinfifteenyearstherewillbeadifferentArabgeneration,onethatwillkissus.”
The generals kept up their onslaught. Avraham Yaffe said they were“disappointed”becausethegovernmenthaddeclaredinthepastthatiffreedomof the seas was hindered, it would bring in the army; he spoke as if thegovernmenthadgonebackonacommitment.ThearmythatEgyptwasbuildingwith thehelpof theUSSRwas intended foronepurpose,Yaffecontended: todestroyIsrael.AndherewastheIDF,readyandwilling,butwithitshandstied.“No one will help us if we don’t help ourselves. If we’re still pleading withFranceandtheUnitedStateswhentheEgyptiansattack,we’remarchingtowardaholocaust.”Yaffewentontoaccusethegovernmentofviolatingthepeople’sright to employ their army. “Asmilitarymen, we feel the army is not beingallowedtofulfillthetaskitwasestablishedtodo.Butthearmyhasarear,whichisthepeople.Andthegovernment’sdecisiontodaywillhurtit.Peoplealongtheborder, and not only there,want the IDF to defend the State of Israel and itsdignity.”Hepraised“thewonderfulnation,”arguedthatthepeoplehadnotlosthope,butdeclared,“Thewonderfulspiritofthepeopleisbeingdestroyed.”Hewarnedthatthepeoplewouldbeprovokedtorebel.“Itisinconceivablethatourfeelings will not spread. We won’t leave this room with happy faces. If wepretend, they’ll say we lied.” Ezer Weizman declared, “Our leaders areincapableofforgingnationalunityinthefaceoftheArabdanger.”Awhiffofmutiny,almostofamilitarycoup,wasintheair,andsowhenthe
nextgeneralspokehefeltitnecessarytosay,asifitwerenotobvious,“Idonotdispute the government’s right and obligation to make decisions.” This wasIsraelTal, commanderof an armoreddivision.Buthe also claimed theywerecontendingwith “the state’s very existence.”He tried to persuadeEshkol thatthere was no assurance that the United States would reopen the straits. Tal’sforces could destroy a significant part of the Egyptian army, which woulddamageNasserandmightassurepeaceforthenextfifteenyears.QuartermasterGeneralMatityahuPeledalsofelttheneedtostressthathewas
notquestioning thegovernment’sdecision.Hehoped toconvinceEshkolwitheconomicarguments.Therewasnopossibilityofextendingthereservecall-upmuch longer, which meant that Israel would soon face the Egyptians with asmallerarmylackingresponsecapabilities.“Everyhourthatgoesbymayhastenthe destruction of the Third Temple,” Peled said; was this the government’sintent?Hecouldnotcomprehendthedecision,andaskedforclearinstructions.*General David Elazar, of the Northern Command, also tried to soften the
effect of Yaffe’s outburst, saying his comments should be viewed as“information,”not“criticism.”Hementioned theneed forasurpriseattackonthe Egyptian air force and concluded: “If the enemy achieves an aerial
advantage,theIDFwillnotwin—or,ifitdoeswin,thecostwillbedevastating.”GeneralNarkisoftheCentralCommandharkedbacktotheSecondWorldWartoprovethattheRussiansweredeceitful.Hethenwentonasifhewereactuallytrying to help Eshkol: “Discontent in the IDF is a very serious matter”—butaddedavaguethreat:“Thearmywon’ttrustusifwesaywe’redoingnothing.”It’s not themen in the roomwhomEshkol should beworried about, he said:“We’re not the problem. You can talk to us. The problem is the youngsters.Nothing we say here will leave this room, but everyone believes the war isstarting tomorrow. It’ll be hard to explainwhat happened.”According to thisargument, the countrywas supposed to go towar so as not to disappoint the“youngsters.” “I don’t know what you think of the military,” Narkis saidpatronizingly to theprimeminister. “Allofusherehavebeen in thearmy fortwenty years or more, and I want to tell you—it is a fantastic army. There’snothingtoworryabout.”Justtoremoveanydoubt,NarkisaddedthattheArabshad not changed: “They’re a bubble of soap, and with one pin-prick they’llburst,”hebragged.
THEGENERALSWEREINTHEIRFORTIES,FAMILYMEN,BUTTHEYCLUNGTOTHEISRAELIcultureofyouth;theywerelikeadolescentboysorbullsinrut.Theybelievedinforce and they wanted war.War was their destiny. Almost twenty years hadpassedsincethearmyhadwongloryintheWarofIndependence,andtenyearssince the victory in the Sinai. They had a limited range of vision and theybelieved that war was what Israel needed at that moment, not necessarilybecause they felt the country’s existencewas in danger, as theywailed in analmost “Diaspora” tone, but because they believed it was an opportunity tobreak theEgyptian army.And they thought that anydelaywould increase thenumberofcasualties.TheyknewnomorethanEshkoldid;and,unlikethem,Eshkolwasinvolved
in the international repercussionsof thesituation.AsIsrael’s leader, itwashisresponsibility to do everything in his power to prevent war. With a head ofintelligenceadmittingthathehadbeenwrong,achiefofstaffrecoveringfromanervousbreakdown,andthepeculiaroutburstsofEzerWeizman,Eshkolhadnoreason to privilege the generals’ statements over the other factors that hadguidedhim,usually successfully, throughouthis life: experience,wisdom,andintuition.Eshkolknew,of course, as everyonedid, that Israelhad“a fantasticarmy,”andthatveryfactwasagoodreasontotakeadeepbreath,ashehadputit.Hedisputedthearmy’sbasicpremise.Israelhadmanagedforyearswithoutthe Straits, he reminded the generals; and, he asked rhetorically, “What ifwe
hadn’tgottentheStraitsintheSinaiCampaign?”HealsorejectedthethesisthattheEgyptianarmy’spresenceintheSinainecessarilycalledforwar.Onlytwoor three months earlier, the Egyptians had moved forces into the Sinai, andIsraelhad feltnoneed to start awar then. “Itneveroccurred tome that largeEgyptianforcesnearthebordermeantweshouldgetuponenightanddestroythem,”saidEshkol,andasked,“Mustwelivebytheswordforever?”Eshkolhadgiventhegeneralseverythingtheywanted,hesaid,soundinglike
afatherspeakingtohisimpetuoussons.“Youwantedahundredplanes?Yougotthem.Andyougottanks.Yougoteverything,sowecanwinifwehaveto.Youdidn’tgetallthatmatérielsothatonedaywewouldgetupandsay,Nowwecandestroy the Egyptian army—so let’s do it.We were brought up not to wagepreemptivewar.” Eshkol was extremely angry at this point. “There’s nothingworseformethantohearyouallspeakingthiswayandfeelingasyousayyoudo.What you’re really telling me is, Give us a chance to blow up Egyptianaviation.Whydidn’tweattackthemtwomonthsago?Three?Wecandoittwomonthsfromnow,too.Justlikethat.Fornoreason.”IsraelLiorfearedthatthediscussionwasabouttoexplode,asenseapparently
shared byMinisterAllon,who suggested suspending the conversation so thattheycould “comebackand talk about theproblemnextweek.”13On hiswayout,EshkolstoppedtotalktoSharon,andtoldhimhewasunderheavypressureto appointMosheDayanminister of defense. “For all I care, you can appointBebaIdelson,”Sharonreplied,meaningthattheappointmentwouldnotchangethewayheandhis soldiers fought.14His answerwasextremely insulting: thewoman whose Diaspora name he had thrown out was a leader of theMapaiparty; he might as well have said “Zerah Warhaftig.” Eshkol was “torn andwounded,”hismilitarysecretarywrote.15
AFTERESHKOLLEFTTHEMEETING,THEOFFICERSCONTINUEDTOSTOKEONEANOTHERupwith speculations on the dangers Israelmight face, including an attack onDimona. As far as the minutes show, none of them referred again to theHolocaust or the destruction of the Third Temple. In fact, a suddenpronouncement byUzi Narkismight have interested Eshkol: “I don’t believeNasser’s about to strike.” Rabin expressed his hope that Nasser, “out ofdrunkenness,”mightmake amistake that would let them go towar after all,before the two-weekwaiting periodwas up.But in themeantime they had todecide what to tell the soldiers and, perhaps, start discharging some of thereservists,whohadheardEshkol’sspeechandknewtherewasnotgoingtobeawar for now. General Tal suggested telling them exactly what the military
believed: that the danger had not passed but that, for political reasons, thegovernment was stopping the IDF from acting. That was how they shouldexplain it, he said bitterly.16 Meanwhile, Shuka Bar-Dayan was washing hissocks.
3.NEWDEVELOPMENTS:“NOWHUSSEINISOURENEMY,TOO”
Bar-Dayanhadtroubledecidingwhichwasworse:thetensionortheboredom.“Anotherdayhaspassedwithnonews eitherway—a realwarof nerves,” hewrotetoGili,andtoldherheneededhisgasmaskbecausehissockssmelledsobad.Thiswashiswayoftellingherthatheandhisfriendshadbeentrainedtoprotectthemselvesincaseofagasattack.“Whattodo,mylove?Thisisourfateinthiscountry.”Hehadjoinedhisunitunwillingly,buthewoulddowhathehadto,allso“wewillbefreemenandnotslaves,”andforGiliandYariv.“They’vesimply imposedawaronus, andwehavenochoicebut towin. ItwillbeanevenmoreimportantwarthantheWarofIndependence.”ThepapersreportedonBegin’sefforts toformanationalunitygovernment.
“Welldone,Begin,atruepatriot,”Bar-Dayanwrote.Topassthetime,hegavehisfellowsoldiersaten-minutelectureononeofhisinterests:thehistoryoftheCrusaderKingdomofJerusalem.HisconclusionwasthatNasserwasnoSalaha-Din,theMuslimleaderwhohadtrouncedtheCrusaders,andhewouldnotbeabletodestroyIsrael.“MydearYariv,Ihavenotseenyoufortwoweeks,exceptforonequickglimpse.TheinkiswetwithtearsasIwritetheselines,Imissyoumy son, I loveyou somuch, and I’m sure Iwill comehome toyou after thevictory.”17
At dawn on Wednesday, May 31, Bar-Dayan’s brigade left the sands ofHalutza and returned to the unit workshop. “It’s like America,” wrote Bar-Dayan, because he could finally take a shower.They campednear a groveoftamarisks that he knew well: as a student at the Mikveh Yisrael agriculturalschoolhehadhelpedtoplant it.Hestartedgettinglettersfromhome.Histwobrothers,NissanandAli,hadalsobeencalledup.Thefirstletterfromhiswifewasheart-rending.Hehadalwaystriedtonurtureherpatrioticloyalty,hewrotein his diary, and now, when crisis struck, it turned out she was feeling deepresentment.Shewrotetohimaboutmenwhohadnotbeencalledupforactiveduty and did not have the guts to volunteer (“bastards”). She wrote aboutofficers’ wives (“hypocrites”) whose only concern, even now, was that theirhusbands were coming home too late in the evening. “I was very, very
depressed,withoutanyabilitytocomfort,tosupport,toencourage,”wroteBar-Dayan. “There’s no justice in the world: I’m on the front line, and they, myneighbors,aresittinginthesunontheirbalconies,complacent.”18
KolIsraelbeganbroadcastingadailycommentarybyGeneralHaimHerzog,thebrotherofthedirectorgeneraloftheprimeminister’soffice.Irishborn,withhis British accent, Herzog projected cool sobriety and familiarity with thesituation.On June1 he said something that later became an Israeli classic: “Imust say in all sincerity that if I had to choose today between flying in anEgyptianbomberboundforTelAviv,oractuallybeinginTelAviv,Iwouldoutof purely selfish desire for self-preservation opt to be in TelAviv.”19 Herzogfavoredthewar—inthishewasunlikeBen-Gurion,buttheysharedasimilarity:Herzog,too,mighthavebeenabletoconvinceIsraelisthatitwouldbebesttoturn aside from the war. People believed him. “With his level-headedness hereally improves our mood,” wrote Bar-Dayan. Glued to his transistor radio,“drawingstrength”fromHerzog’scommentary,Bar-DayanrememberedthatinhisyoutheverybodyinthemoshavusedtogooutandgreetHerzog’sfather,thechiefrabbi,whenhevisited.20
Bar-Dayan asked his wife to send him two undershirts, two pairs ofunderwear,shavingcream,andasmallbaroflaundrysoap.Heassuredherthattherewasmoneyinthebank.“WhenIgethomewewon’tspendevenaminuteapart,”hewrote.Helistenedtotheradioalot.“Theeveningnewsisdistressing.HusseinflewtoseeNasserandsignedadefensepactwithhim.NoweventhereasonableHussein isourenemy, too. It complicates things,but let’shopewecandealwiththeJordanianstoo.”21MinisterGvatialsofoundthenewsoftheEgyptian-Jordanian defense pact “very depressing,” viewing it as “anothervictoryforNasser.”The“nooseistighteningaroundourneck,”hewrote.“Whatare we waiting for?” Gvati had just visited Kibbutz Lehavot Habashan. “Ishudder to think that in a few days the kibbutzmight be a pile of ruins,” hewrote,butadded,“Therearealotoftroopsinthearea,andwehavetohopethatthey’llrepelallattacksandconquertheGolanHeights.”22
INHISMEMOIRS,EZERWEIZMANRECONSTRUCTEDHISMOODINTHEDAYSBEFORETHEwar. He visited army units in the south, where he found “tigers.” Thecommanders he met with, including Ariel Sharon, were “burning” with onedemand: “to do something, to act.” Uzi Narkis “pumped him up” with thedemand“todosomethinghugewiththeJordanians.”*WeizmanalsometwithGeneralAmosHorev,thedeputychiefscientistoftheIDF,andaskedhimwhathethoughtwasthebestrouteintotheSinai.Horevrepliedthattheidealsolution
totheStraitspredicamentwastoliberatetheOldCityofJerusalemandtheWestBank.Inadiscussionwiththechiefofstaff,HorevrepeatedthattheWestBankshouldbeconquered.Weizmansharedthisview,grumblingthatRabinwastheonly one who thought differently. He felt that Rabin was always hesitating,tormenting himself with vacillation and doubt. He asked himself whether heshould not have taken advantage of Rabin’s nervous breakdown—“shown amore modest degree of friendship” and a greater degree of “responsibilitytowardthebigissue”—andassumedtheroleofchiefofstaff,whichhewantedsobadly.24
ThedefensepactthatJordansignedwithEgyptonMay30motivatedtheIDFtoprepare to attack andoccupy theWestBank and to shift its priorities fromEgypt, thenSyria, thenJordan toEgypt, thenJordan, thenSyria.OverseveralGeneral Staff meetings, those officers thinking of conquering theWest Bankconsidered, as they had in the past, the possibility that Hussein would eitherattackIsrael,withorwithoutassistancefromIraqi forces,or thathewouldbeousted.NoneofthemassumedthattheIDFwouldwaitforaJordanianattack,whateverthecircumstances,andsoplannedfortheeventualityofinvadingtheWestBanktopreventJordanfrommovingonJerusalem.TheyassumedthattheWestBank could be conqueredwithin forty-eight hours, and theywould thenuseitasadefensivezone.Asonegeneralput it,“Historically,weshouldtaketheWest Bank, because it ismoreworrisome than the Sinai.” EzerWeizmansaid, “We are on the brink of a second War of Independence, with all itsaccomplishments.” The last few words are underlined in the minutes of theGeneral Staff meeting, apparently to stress that this war would be unlike thefirst,withall its flaws, including the failure tooccupy theWestBankand theOldCity.Onewayoranother,thewarwasgoingtotakeplace,saidWeizman,“otherwise there is no State of Israel.” He repeated his assertion that everypassingdaystrengthenedEgypt,buthealsosaidsomethinghehadnotvoicedinfrontofthecabinetministers:asaresultofwaiting,“thefruitsofvictoryandtheinternationalsupportwillbethatmuchgreaterandmoresecure.”Eshkolhimselfcouldnothaveputitbetter.Thediscussionswerepractical,operational,virtuallydevoidofanypatriotic
orreligioussentiment.ThegeneralsarguedoverwhethertoconquerJerusalemor whether they should limit themselves to “grabbing” territory in the WestBank.TheydidnottalkabouttheproblemsinvolvedinconqueringtheOldCity.One generalmentioned that taking control of theWestBankwould require aplantoestablishamilitarygovernment,butaccordingto theminuteshispointwas drowned out with calls of “no need.” Somewhere in some drawer there
wereplansforthateventuality,butatthispointtheIDFdidnotseemtoexpecttoholdontotheWestBankforverylong.As was the practice, the debate went through various stages before finally
reaching the chief of staff, atwhich point he shared his great dreamwith hiscolleagues.“Israelhasnotbeenforsaken,”hesaid,quotingJeremiah.Thenheborrowed from the Passover Haggada: “If there were any assurance that wewouldcomethroughabattleinpossessionoftheWestBankandtheGazaStrip,andhavingdefeatedtheEgyptianairforce,dayenu”—thatwouldbeenough.Hebelieved these goals were attainable, but the main task was to crush Nasser.“The plan for conquering theWest Bank should not divert us from themainissue,” he stated. The plan, code-named Whip and dated June 1, involvedconqueringthecityofJenin,butleftopenthequestionofwhattodoabouttheJerusalemarea.25Onedayearlier,ColonelMordechaiGurhadbeenonatourofJerusalem,wherehehaddiscussedwithhiscolleagueshowtobreakthroughtoMountScopus.Gur,whosemenweredesignatedtoparachuteintoAlArish,intheSinaiPeninsula,raisedthepossibilityofseizingtheOldCity.“Everyonewasenthusiastic about the idea, but it is doubtful they put much faith in it,” hewrote.26
The IDF intelligence branch had meanwhile prepared a paper on theimplications of the decision to postpone the attack on Egypt by two to threeweeks; it enumerated a long series of dangers, including the possibility thatEgypt would use “primitive radioactive weapons, accompanied by advancedpsychologicalwarfare.”ThepaperstatednobasisforthesuddenrevelationthatEgypthad“primitiveradioactiveweapons,”nordiditexplainwhatexactlytheseweaponswere.Thedocumentwasdesignedtoservethearmy’sposition,didnotmaketheclaimthatIsraelwouldbeunabletodefeatEgypttwoweekslater,andit completely ignored the possibility that the risk ofwarmight diminish as aresultofadiplomaticsettlement.27
4.SHAREDDESTINY:“IAMJEWISH”
President JohnsonspentMemorialDayweekendonhis ranch inTexaswithafew guests, includingArthur andMathildeKrim. Theweek before,Dr.KrimhadbeenaguestattheWhiteHouse,spendingthenight,asusual,onthethirdfloor.28OnthewaytoTexasonAirForceOne,JohnsontoldtheKrimsabouthismeetingwithEban, andagainboastedofhis listening skills: “Listening is thesmartestthingonecando.”29*Arthur andMathildeKrimwere among the chosen few to fly in theprivate
sectionof the plane, aswell as in Johnson’s helicopter.Thepresident andhisguests had a pleasantweekend. Johnson tended to his deer and discussed theelectricitysystem,theplumbing,andfertilizerswithhisranchstaff.Hedressedlikea rancher and rodeabicycle.TheKrims spent almost everywakinghourwith him andLadyBird, and ate everymealwith them.OnSunday, Johnsontook another guest, the important Democratic donor Mary Lasker, up in hishelicoptertoshowherthearea.JohnsonflewhertoseetheKrims’ownnearbyranch,andshowedhertheirhouseasifheownedit.Thepresidentmadeafewpublicappearances;localresidentsgatheredtowatchhishelicoptertakeoffandland.Therewere journalists, too.OnenewsagencymentionedthepresenceofArthur andMathildeKrim, prompting Johnson angrily to instruct a staffer tofindouthowtheinformationhadleaked.ArthurKrimandJohnsondiscusseda fund-raisingdinnerbeingheld for the
president the following Saturday inNewYork,whichKrimwas in charge oforganizing.TheWhiteHouselogalsonotesthatJohnsonspokewiththeKrimsaboutthesituationintheMiddleEast.SecretaryofStateRuskcalledtoupdatethepresident.30*He saidAmbassadorArthurGoldberg had called to say thatIsraelmightactalone,either“forpsychologicalreasons”orifitconcludedthattimewaspressing.JohnsonsaidIsraelhadtomakeupitsownmindwhattodoand whether it really could not wait any longer. “Menashe” (AmbassadorGoldberg)reportedthisconversationto“Andre”(Feinberg),whopasseditalongtoIsraelienvoyEphraimEvron.32Thismarkedthefirstcrackinthepresident’soppositiontoIsraeliaction.OnSunday,May28,JusticeFortasphoned thepresident’s ranch.Thatsame
day,healso spokewithAmbassadorHarman.There isno reason todoubt thesincerityof“Issahar,”thejudgetoldHarman.HewasencouragedbynewsthattheUSSRwasnowwillingtorestrainNasser,butaddedsomefriendlyadvice:undernocircumstancesshouldthematterbedrawnoutfortoolong,lestIsrael“dallied,”astheambassadorputit.HerewasanotherhintthattheUnitedStateswouldnotopposeactionifitsowneffortstofindasolutionfellthrough.Aftermentioning to Ambassador Harman that their conversation must be keptcompletely secret, theUnitedStatesSupremeCourt justice agreed to hear thedraftofaletterEshkolproposedtosendthepresidentlayingoutIsrael’spositionfollowing the cabinet’s decision that day. “llan” not only heard the messagedraft, but suggested revisions. He recommended that the letter emphasize thepressingtimefactor,aswellasthefactthattherewasnoknowingwhatNassermightdo.HeproposedthatEshkolshouldsaythathewouldconsiderwhatstepsto take depending on developments. It should be especially stressed that the
government’s decision to postpone a strike was based on the absolute trustEshkolplacedinJohnson.33
More up-to-date than perhaps any other diplomat in Washington, EphraimEvronwasabletoreportonthenewsfromtheranchtoJerusalem.AbeFeinberghadheardfromKrimthatJohnsonhadlookedandsoundedveryworried;hewasmaking desperate efforts to organize an international action to reopen theStraits.34*Moreimportant,WaltRostowhadphonedtotellEvronthatwhenthepresident received Eshkol’s letter, he had been “troubled” by one particularparagraph,whichimpliedthattheUnitedStateswouldactonitsowntoreopentheStraits.ThephrasingmayhavebeenanattempttogetmoreoutofJohnsonthanhehadgivenEban.OrperhapsEbanwas trying to create a commitmentthatdidnotexistbuthadalreadybeenreportedtohisgovernment.Eitherway,theAmericansmightwellhaveseentheletterasconfirmationofasuspicionthatIsraelwastryingtoentanglethem.RostowreiteratedthatthepresidenthadnotgivenEban any such commitment, nor did he have the authority to do so, asEbanknew.Evronappliedasmuchpressureashecould,sayingthattheIsraelgovernment could no longer withstand the public demand to act against theEgyptians.Rostowpromisedonly to report their conversation to thepresidentimmediately.36
When he did so, Rostow took the opportunity to tell Johnson how Israel’sdecisiontopostponeastrikehadcomeabout.HarmanandEvronhadbelievedthattheUnitedStateswasdeterminedtoreopentheStraits,evenifitultimatelyhadtodosoonitsown.AccordingtoEvron,EshkolwasnotledtobelievethatJohnsonhadsaidthisexplicitly;rather,theyonly“shoulderedtheheavyburdenof giving the government their assessment” of Johnson’s intent. Evron addedthat he himself was considered a hawk in Israel, so that his judgment wasthereforegivenspecialweight.RostowthensaidthatEvronhadexplained,withtearsinhiseyes,howimportantitwasthatJohnsonnotdestroyIsraeliministers’faithinhim.“Somuchhingesonthisman,”EvronhadsaidofJohnson.RostowhadexplainedtoEvronthatthepresidentwantedtheIsraeligovernmenttofullyunderstandtherestrictionsimposeduponhimbytheU.S.Constitution,andthatEshkolmustbecautiousinhispronouncements,includinghisplannedspeechintheKnesset the followingday.37 Israel sentWashington the textof the speechEshkol was planning to give, and Secretary of State Rusk sent it back withrevisions.38
•••
THE WHITE HOUSE, MEANWHILE, WAS INUNDATED WITH LETTERS FROM CITIZENSCALLingonthepresidenttostandbyIsrael.AtleastsomeofthelettersprobablyresultedfromtheIsraeliembassy’sattempts to“organize”awritingcampaign.ManyofthewritersidentifiedthemselvesasJewish.Afewtriedtoconvincethepresident that itwas tohispolitical advantage to support Israel.Oneof them,Bill Moyers, the publisher of the Long Island newspaperNewsday and untilrecently theWhiteHousespokesman,wrote that supporting Israel“providesareal opportunity tomake some points onVietnam. . . .We have a chance tosilencesomeofthecarpingcriticismfromtheJewishpress.”TheWhiteHousehadalsothoughtofthis.39
Some of the letters came from a group of children in California. “DearPresidentJohnson,PleasehelpIsraelifshehastofightawar.Egyptisgoingtofight a war with Israel. Don’t let her,” wrote BonnieWeitzman, aged seven,fromShermanOaks.“IhopethereisnomorewarinIsraeloranywhere.Ihopethereispeace,”wroteStevenTurner,agedsevenandahalf.“IwishIsraelwinsthewar,butIreallywishthattheydon’thaveawar,”saidHowardRothbloom,agedsevenandahalf,fromNorthHollywood.Theirclassmate,six-and-a-half-year-oldStephenBresnick,askedhispresident,“HowcantheUnitedStateshelpIsraelnot fight? Ihopeyouknowhow.”Mrs.Maizlish, thechildren’sHebrewschoolteacher,sentacovernotesayingshehadhelpedonlywithspelling,notwith ideas. The White House received many hundreds of similar, almostuniform,letters.40
The most dramatic letter President Johnson received came from SheldonCohen,theIRScommissioner,writingthedayafterHusseinandNassersignedtheirdefensepact.CohenhadbeenbornanAmericancitizen“by thegraceofGod,” hewrote, “and the foresight ofmy grandfather,”who hadmanaged toimmigratetotheUnitedStatessixtyyearsearlier.Thoseofhisrelativeswhohadremained inEuropewere eithermurdered and sent to theNazi crematoria, orelse had beenmiraculously spared and found refuge in Israel. The ones whomadeittoIsrael“nowfaceanewtyrantwithanewcrematorium.”Butthistimethey had nowhere to go.WhenCohen thought about Israelis, he saw himselfamong them, as did his wife, Faye, and their children. As an American, hebelievedtheUnitedStatesmuststandbytheonlydemocraticstateintheMiddleEast. “We must find a way to help Israel defend itself—hopefully withoutbloodshedorharmtoanyofitsneighbors,butaggressionmustbestopped.”41
This sense of solidarity was reflected elsewhere. Sue Sacks, a student atUCLA,wrote from Jerusalem to her sister inCalifornia. She knewMomandDadwouldbeveryangry,butshehaddecidedtostayinIsrael,eventhoughshe
mightbekilled.Shesenthersisteralongexplanation,whoseessencewas:IamJewish.42TheU.S.embassyinIsraelwasmakingpreparationstoevacuatesuchAmerican citizens. TheAmerican consulate in Jerusalem sent an architecturalconsultant to the synagogue at Hadassah Medical Center to examine thefeasibility of evacuatingMarcChagall’s famous stained-glasswindows calledTheTwelveTribesofIsrael.43
CHAPTER10FIVEDAYSTOWAR:THEDUSTER
1.INTRIGUES:“DROPSOFVENOM”
WhenEphraimEvrontoldWaltRostowthattheEshkolgovernmentwasunderheavy pressure from the Israeli public, he was not misleading him. But thepeople were not only demanding war: they wanted a new government. ThecampaignhadbegunevenbeforeEshkol’sstammeredradioaddress.“GiveUsanEmergencyGovernment,” demanded an unidentified “citizen” on the frontpage ofHa’aretz. A letter to the editor demanded that Ben-Gurion rejoin thegovernment.1ThepoetNathanZach,thejournalistAmosKenan,andagroupofprofessors from the HebrewUniversity’s chemistry department, including thehuman rights activist Israel Shahak, also called for a national emergencygovernment.2 Expanding the government, wrote Maariv, should not beconstruedasavoteofnoconfidenceinthecurrentleadership,butassomethingsimilartothecall-upofreservists.“Thismaybeyourfinesthour,leadersofthepeople,” claimed Maariv, pointedly deploying Winston Churchill’s wartimerhetoric.3Thedayafterthestammeredspeech,Ha’aretzwroteofEshkol:“Heisnotsuitedtobeprimeministerandministerofdefenseinthecurrentsituation;hismanygoodqualitieswerenotdesignedforthistest.”4TheeditorsofMaarivproposedthatinthefuture,theprimeminister’sstatementsshouldbereadbyanannouncer.5
Therewas a putschlike atmosphere in the streets,Eshkol later commented.6ThewriterandtranslatorAharonAmirwrotetoYediotAharonotsuggestingtheformationofa“militarygovernment”withYitzhakRabinat thehelm,assistedbyMosheDayanandYigalYadin,theformerchiefofstaff.7Yadinhadavisitfrom Professor Benjamin Akzin, a university colleague who taught law andpoliticalscience,hadbeenclosetoZe’evJabotinsky,andwasoftenmentionedasapossiblecandidateforpresident.Akzincameto“feelout”thepossibilityofa “military putsch.” Yadin told him to forget it.8 Yadin himself enjoyedtremendousprestigethankstohishistoryasageneraluntaintedbypolitics,andasthearchaeologistwhorevealedthegloriesofMasada.Not for the first time, David Ben-Gurion feared that the IDF might seize
controlofthecountry,whichledhimtoissueanextraordinarypublicstatement.
“The army in a democratic country does not act of its own volition or at thebehestofitsmilitarycommanders,butratheronthejudgmentandtheordersofthe civilian government,” he said, as if this assertion could not be taken forgranted. He emphasized that an army alone could not protect the state—diplomacyalsoplayedanecessarypart.“Wehavemanyimportantfriends,andwise and consistent work is required to maintain these friendships.” In otherwords, Israel should not go to war without either the consent of the UnitedStatesoratleastoneoftheEuropeanpowers.9
AlthoughEshkolwasincompleteagreementwithBen-Gurion,comingfromhim the statement would have been seen as evidence of fearful defeatism. AspeechEshkolgaveintheKnessetonMay29wasfirmerthanhisradioaddress,and it included repeated praise for the army.10 Only those who knew of thefermentinthemilitarycouldhaveappreciatedthepoint;mostIsraelisdidnot.But Ben-Gurion did not go so far as to express open support for Eshkol’s
government. “As long as Eshkol remains in power, we will tumble into theabyss,”hewroteinhisdiary.HeseemstohavebelievedthatEshkolshouldbereplacedinparttowardoffthedangerofamilitarycoup.“Thepartywantsmeto replaceEshkol asprimeminister andMoshe tobeministerofdefense,”hewrote.“IsupportmakingMoshebothministerofdefenseandprimeminister,ormaking someone else fromMapai primeminister.”11 Fear of a military coupmight have also been the reason behindMafdal’s demand for changes in thegovernment. “Shapira spokeabout themilitarycommandwithgreat concern,”wrote Yaacov Herzog, as he praised Ben-Gurion’s statement.12 At times, thecabinetseemedtobeaswaryoftheIDFastheEgyptianarmywas.“Thearmyisrebelling,” wrote Minister Gvati in his diary, while Minister Aran said thesituationinthearmyhadreachedaboilingpoint.13MinisterGalilidescribedameetingwithseventyreserveofficersasavisit“tothelions’den”;mostoftheofficersdemandedaction.“Theyaskedwhether thegovernmentwasamanornot,”Galilirecounted.14
The turmoil among the generals continued. “I left with a bad feelingyesterday,”oneofthemsaidaftertheirstormymeetingwithEshkol.Othersfeltthattheministers“don’tunderstand”thesituation,andstarteddiscussinghowtomakethemchangethedecisiontowait.“Wehavetofindawaytobringaboutadecision,”saidEzerWeizman.“There’snoguaranteethatintwoweekswe’llbeabletoscrewtheEgyptians,”saidRabin.“TheAmericanswillplaceanembargoonus,”hethought.Nonetheless,hepromisedtomakeanotherattempttochangethegovernment’sposition.15
AtleastonegeneralspokeopenlyofthepossibilitythattheIDFwouldgotowarwithoutgovernment authorization.ThiswasArielSharon,who recountedthestoryhimself.HepresentedhisplanofactiontoRabin:“Wegetupandsay:’Youlistennow,yourdecisionsareputtingthestateofIsraelatrisk,andsincethesituationisnowcritical,we’reaskingyoutogointothenextroomandwait.AndthechiefofstaffwillgoovertoKolIsraelandmakeanannouncement.’”SharondidnotrememberRabin’sreaction,buthethoughttheministerswouldhavebeen“relieved.”16
As members of the same establishment and sometimes even the samefamilies, the generals were in close contact with the cabinet ministers andKnessetmembers.UziNarkiswasmarried to thedaughterofDavidHacohen,the chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. “Thegovernment made no decisions without first listening to the generals, and IcannotrememberasinglecasewhenwedeniedtheGeneralStaffpermissiontodowhateveritwanted,”YigalAllonrecalled.Duringthewaitingperiod,hemetwith several officers, including the air force commander and General DavidElazar.“YouhavetogetusauthorizationtotaketheGolanHeights,”ElazartoldAllon.SharonphonedAllon,urginghimtogetthegovernmenttohurryupandgotowar.AllonhimselfaskedRabintohelpconvincethegovernmentthatwarwasessential.ButRabin thought that theofficers’ impatiencewasa cause forconcern.WhenAllon toured thefrontwithEshkol,he told theofficershemetthatanotherdayhereor therewasnotwhatwouldseal thecountry’sfate.Theofficerstrustedhimasoneoftheirown,Allonsaid.17
TheunrestinthearmywasexacerbatedbythesuddenappointmentofHaimBar-Levasdeputychiefofstaff.Bar-LevhadbeencalledhomefromaleaveofabsenceinParis,inthewakeofRabin’scollapseandWeizman’sattempttostartthewar.Weizmanhadconsideredresigninginresponse,butwaspersuadedbyMenachemBegin to remain in thearmy.“Iwaswalkingaround feeling likeabeatendog,”hewrote.18
•••
CITIZENANDPOLITICIANMOSHEDAYAN,MEANWHILE,WASALLOWEDTOCONTINUEhistoursofthearmyandreceiveintelligencereports.OnepersonhemetwithwasMeirAmit,theheadoftheMossad,whowasabouttogototheUnitedStates.ThetwooftenengagedinwhatAmitdescribedas“hearttohearttalks”lastingwell into the night, inwhich they discussed “theworld and everything in it.”Dayan’soutlookonthesituationhadevolvedintoastraightforwardstancethat
Amit described as: Let’s go towar! “As he often did,Dayan quickly lost hispatience,andeachnightIsawhistoleranceleveldrop,”Amitwrote.19Moreandmorepeople, including journalists,were subjected toDayan’s opinionson thebest course of action. One night he invited thewriter EphraimKishon to hishome.Kishonwrote apolitical column inMaariv thatwaswidely influential,mostly because of hiswit.They sat talking until oneA.M.; ShimonPereswasalsothere.Peres,whowasforty-fouratthetime,sufferedfromthevastgapbetweenhis
accomplishmentsandhispublicimage.Polish-born,hehadcometoPalestineatthe age of eleven.He had endured a great deal as a result of his desire to beacceptedamongIsraelisasanequal.Hisfailure todosostemmedpartlyfromhisaccent,whichalwaysgavehimaway.Hewasaddicted topolitics fromanearlyage,somuchsothathegainedareputationasaslyfoxalwaysuptosomeintrigue.This tendency also distancedhim from theNewHebrewsofRabin’sgeneration, who loathed politics and words in general; Peres read books andwrotepoetry.ManyenviedthetrustBen-Gurionplacedinhim.WhenPereswastwenty-nine, Ben-Gurion appointed him director general of the Ministry ofDefense,despite—orperhapsbecauseof—hislackofmilitaryexperience.Thislackearnedhimderisioninmanycircles.Peresturnedouttobeabrilliantmanofaction,coldandanalytical,whotook
charge of setting up Israel’s military industries and the nuclear reactor inDimona.Atirelessdealmaker,nevertoolazytovisitthemostremotebranchofthe party, he had a rich imagination, broad horizons, and an expansiveappreciationofthelargerworld.20AmemberofBen-Gurion’soppositionparty,he made every effort to bring about the ouster of Levi Eshkol. He spreadrumors, forgedalliances,weaved intrigues, lobbied journalists.ThiswasPeresthe politician. “Ministers and others told me that their positions had beeninfluencedtovariousdegreesbythesmearandwhispercampaignorchestratedby Shimon Peres,”wroteYitzhak Rabin. “Perceived by himself and others—thankstohisclosetieswithBen-Gurion—asasecurityexpert,hewentarounddripping venom in every available ear, saying, We must not fight, we mustsimplyhunkerdown,theIDFisnotreadyforwar,Israelcannotwithstandthiskindofwar,andothersuchlearnedopinions.”EshkoldespisedPeresandmadenoefforttoconcealhisopinionfromhisfriendsinthegovernment.Hewasnotpresenting an ultimatum, he saidwhen discussion began about expanding thegovernment,buthewouldfinditveryhardtoworkwithPeres.21
But there was also Peres the statesman, and he did in fact believe that
reopening the Straits called for thorough consideration; every decision had toinvolve long-termplanning. “Wecan’tgo towarnow,”he toldBen-Gurion.22Peres agreed with Ben-Gurion and Eshkol that Israel should not go to warwithoutpriorcoordinationwiththeUnitedStates.But,notunlikeHaimMosheShapira,hisschemestooustEshkolandappointDayaninhissteadeffectivelyhastened the war. Perhaps, like Shapira, he was afraid that the army mightrevolt;unlikeShapira,however,hecannothavebelievedthatDayanwouldacttopreventwar.HisinterestwastorestoreRafitopower.ThatnightatDayan’shomewithEphraimKishon,Peresaskedthecolumnist
tojointhedemandtoappointDayan.Kishon,writingashethoughtanobjectiveobserver from themoonmight, saw the logic: “The peoplewant themilitaryleaderoftheSinaiCampaigntobetheministerofdefense.”23
SOMEWHERE ALONG THE SINAI BORDER, PRIVATE YEHOSHUA BAR-DAYAN FOLLOWEDTHE news in Ha’aretz and felt “profound disappointment.” He did notunderstandthem,thesepoliticians.“Isthisthetimeforcoalitioncalculations?”hewrote.“Whydon’ttheyjustbringinRafi,Begin’sGahal,andanyonewho’sreasonable, if that’s what will save even one casualty? Is this the time forsettling accounts? Is this the time to waste the talents of David Ben-Gurion,Dayan,andPeres?”Hethoughtthefailuretoexpandthegovernmentwas“morethan a crime.” Above all he was angry with GoldaMeir, who was opposingchanges in the government. He was a die-hardMapainik, but now he wrote:“Am I really finished with this party of old people that I’ve supported foryears?”24
Thedaybefore,GoldaMeirhadtoldhercolleagues,“Thismorningmydrivergot a call, then my son, and they were told that I shouldn’t leave the housebecause thepapers said that Iwasblocking thewholenational solution to thecompositionofthegovernment.”OfthepossibilitythatDayanandBeginmightjoin, she said, “Wewouldn’tbe the first socialistparty tohandoverpower tofascistswithoutastruggle.”ShewasreferringtoGermany.25Aboutahundredwomen gathered in front of theMapai offices demanding thatMeir “stop thehate.”Eshkollaterdescribedthemas“theMerryWivesofWindsor,”promptingDayantoobservedrylythattheywereanythingbutmerry.26
2.TUMULT:“IT’LLBEHELL”
OnTuesday,May30,a fewhoursafterKingHusseinmadeasurprisevisit toCairo to sign theEgyptian-Jordaniandefensepact,Eshkolwaswarned thathe
faceda“blow-up,”sincealmostall theMa’arahKnessetmembers thought theDefenseMinistryshouldbehandedovertosomeoneelse.Fromapoliticalpointof view, the crisis was entirely personal and without reason. No one couldexplainwhy a newminister of defensewas so essential. The assumptionwasthat this was the price to be paid for the parties entering an “emergencygovernment,”butnoonestoppedtoaskwhyGahalandRafishouldbebroughtinto the government at all. To go to war? To avert war? At this point, thequestionwashardlyrelevant.“There isapsychosisaboutanewgovernment,”oneKnessetmember said, adding, “The situation of the people is not good,”althoughhewasactuallyreferringtothegovernmentandtheparty.Thepeoplesimplydidnotwant“fraternalconflict”andtherewas“intensedemandforwar.”OnlyappointingDayanwouldcalmthepublic.SomeMa’arahmembers tried topreventDayan’sappointmentbyproposing
YigalAllon.Theministeroflaborwasforty-nineatthetime,withroughlytwodecadesofpoliticalexperience,butunlikeotherpoliticianshehadmanagedtopreserve his image as a military man. In 1945 he had been appointedcommander of the Palmah, and during the War of Independence he waspromotedtogeneral.Twentyyearslater,hestillhadadmirers.“Allonisadream,heisalegend,”saidoneKnessetmember.27HeviewedtheMinistryofDefenseasastepping-stonetobecomingprimeminister.AccordingtoAllon,Rabinwasalsoinfavorofhisappointment,andbelievedthattheywould“worktogetherinharmonylikeasymphonyorchestra.”28
Some time before the crisiswith Egypt,Allon had developed a theory thatIsrael’s strategic circumstances necessitated a preemptive attack. In his 1959book,AScreenofSand,hedescribed ingreatdetail thedanger that theArabsmight destroy Israel’s air force on the ground. In an interview that was notsupposedtobemadepublicformanyyears,heclaimedhehadwrittenthisonlytoavoidcomplicationswiththeIsraelicensor:infact,hehadmeantthatIsraelshould destroy the Arab air forces. He called this “active defense,” or“preemptive counterattack,” and hemaintained that “there is no substitute foraggression,inthepositivesenseoftheword.”29
Eshkolproposedanideathathadbeenraisedincabinetmeetings:anationalsecuritycouncilcomprisingthethreeformerchiefsofstaff,YigalYadin,MosheDayan,andHaimLaskov,plusafourthmember,Allon.OneMa’arahmembersaiditwastoolittletoolate;onlyDayanwoulddo.“You,Eshkol,decidewhichminister he’ll be, but hedoesn’twant theMinistry ofReligiousAffairs,” saidDeputyMinisterArieLovaEliav.PostalMinisterIsraelYeshayahusaid,“Ihope
it’snotthePostalMinistry.”TheargumentescalatedandEshkollefttheroom.The meeting notes state that he “slammed the door.”30* Before going home,Eshkol spokewithHaimMosheShapira,who repeatedhis firmdemand for anationalunitygovernment.Thatnight,afewministerscametospeaktoEshkolabout agreeing to at least shiftAllon from theLabor to theDefenseMinistry.DeputyMinisterEliav,whowasclosetoEshkol,accompaniedhimtoTelAvivthenextday,May31,andinthecartriedtoconvincehimtogroomDayanashisheir.Eshkolsaidtherewasnodynastyandhedidnotwishtoappointanheir.HehadtoldthesamethingtoAllon,hesaid,whohadfounditinsulting.TheMa’arahministerswerewaitingforEshkolintheMinistryofDefenseto
pickup theconversation.Theywereunited in theirview thatAllonshouldbemadeMinisterofDefense.Eshkolaskedbitterly,“Andwhat’sleftfortheprimeminister?”ButtherealquestionwaswhatposttogiveDayan.“Thepeopleareveryanxious,theyseeMosheDayanastheirsavior,”wroteGvatiinhisdiary.32
Evenatthispoint,still tryingtopreventthewar,EshkolwasconcernedthatRafi might rob Ma’arah of the glory of victory. He warned his colleagues,“They’llsay theysaved thecountry,but itwillbewithour forces, thatwesetup.” He tried to project a bellicose tone. The situation was serious now thatJordanwasinvolved.“Maybeweshouldsettle thescorewithJordanonceandforall.”HerestatedJohnson’spromisethattheUnitedStateswouldreopentheStraitson itsown, if needbe, andhedidnot forget tomentionHitler. Just aspeopleshouldhavebelievedHitlerthen,soIsraelhadtobelieveNassernow,hesaid.* Eshkol said he was willing to continue in both capacities, as primeministeranddefenseminister,butthathewouldpreferAllontoDayan.HewaspreparedtofindawaytoincludeAlloninsecurityaffairsevenifhecontinuedasministeroflabor.Butthepartymembersrejectedthatidea.Theinclinationtoreplacetheministerofdefensewasahealthyone,saidZalmanAran,althoughthenotionthatthenewministerhadtobeDayan,ofallpeople,wasmad.AndsohetoobackedappointingAllon.KadishLuz,thechairmanoftheKnesset,alsosupported Allon. “I’m a little afraid of Dayan,” he admitted. He demandedcensorship of the press to stop the campaign against Eshkol. “Yoel Markuswrote the most shameful things yesterday in Ha’aretz,” said Abba Eban,quotingmilitarycirclesinParistotheeffectthatNasserhadmovedbecauseofEshkol’sweakness.EzerWeizmanwastorepeatthisargumentatalaterdate.33Eshkol fumed. “The primeminister has to have a job, too,” he said, and hisfriendsdiscernedathreattoresign.IfEshkolresigned,Allonsaid,Nassermightattacktheverynextday.
And so the ministers flexed their political creativity, tossing out more andmore ideas and suggestionsand solutions to aproblem thatnowseemedevenmore urgent than the war itself: what to do with Dayan. Eshkol suggestedappointinghimministerof thearmies.“What is that?”askedGoldaMeir,andEshkol admitted, “I don’t know.”But he tried to improvise: “Theminister ofarmies gives advice about the armies.” Meir wouldn’t give in: “What is hesupposedtodo?”ShaulAvigur,theparty’strustedadviser,didnotlikethisideaeither.“Dayanisaverycomplexmanandit’llbehell,”hesaid—noonewouldknowwho the armywas taking its orders from. Better that Dayan should beministerofdefense thanministerof thearmies,heargued,butEshkoldidnotwanttohandoverthedefenseportfolio.Thedebatecontinued,backandforth.EventuallytheydecidedtosendAvigur
toaskDayanifhewouldagreetoserveasdeputyprimeministerandmilitaryadviser to the prime minister. Allon would be the minister of defense. ButAvigurdidnotwanttospeakwithDayan,andneitherdidEshkol.Theyarguedabout who would ask him, and eventually agreed to do it together. Dayanrefusedtobedeputyprimeministerwithoutanoperationalposition.Heaskedtogo back to the army to command the southern front, above General Gavish.Typically,hesawnoneedtodiscussthiswithGavish.*Dayansaidhewasnotaconsultantbuta“doer.”WhenheheardthatAllonwouldbeministerofdefense,hebecame“enraged,”Eshkol recounted. “Moshe says theblood rushed tohishead,”ShimonPeresrelatedthenextday.35
Dayanargued thatYigalAllonwasmoreofanadviser thanhewas.Eshkolpersisted:“Let’ssaywemeeteverytwodays,me,Dayan,Allon,andEban,foraconsultation.”Dayan said that after the consultation theotherswould eachgobacktotheirofficesandhewouldhavenothingtodo.Theproblem,hesaid,washowtowinthewarwithaminimumofcasualties.Theconflictwouldbequick,butevenharderthanthebattleofElAlamein.Hewantedthejobandbelievedhe could handle it. And he did not want to be foreign minister. If he wasappointedministerofdefense,hesaid,hewould leaveTelAvivanddirect thewarfromtheNegev.TheMa’arahministersthendiscussedamongthemselvesDayan’ssuggestion
thatwereheappointed,hispositionbekeptsecret,soasnottoprovokeNasser.TheMa’arahministerswereinpressingneedofsomegoodpublicity,however,whichledtoalengthydebateoverhowtoformulateanannouncement.Eshkolnoted that if Dayan were appointed commander of the southern front, therewouldbenoneedtotaketheDefenseMinistryawayfromhisowncontrol.That
decision could at least be postponed. “But I can see that you’re people whoreally love to make decisions,” he said bitterly. Golda Meir wanted to keeptalking about Dayan, apparently afraid that he would take over the army. “Icautionyouagainstbringinghimin,”shesaid.Allon,forhispart,askedwhetherDayanwassupposedtoreplaceGavish.AvigursaidtheideawasforGavishtoreporttoDayan.ThentheyrealizedthatnoonehadspokentoGavish,norhadtheytoldRabin.Naturally,DayanhadsaidnothingtoRabineither.Rabin was horrified, but promised to consult the General Staff. Gavish
threatenedtoresignandtheothergeneralssawtheproposalasanouster.Rabinhimself offered to resign so that Dayan could take over as chief of staff, butDayansworehehadnointerestinthepost.RebelliousvoiceswerenowcomingfrommembersoftheMapaisecretariat,moreandmoreofwhomwantedDayanasdefenseminister.36 “I amdeeplyupset,”wroteGvati; “insteadof preparingforwarwe’rebusywithcivilwar.”37
Acabinetmeetingfollowed,hurriedlyconvenedattherequestofHaimMosheShapira,whohadheardthatEshkolwaswillingtogivethedefenseportfoliotoAllon. IfDayanwere not given theDefenseMinistry, he said,Mafdalwouldleavethegovernment.Aturbulentmeetingensued,fullofemotionandmutualaccusations.Aharshexchangeofwords ledShapira tosay toEshkol,“NasserandHusseincanexchangekisses,butyouandIcannotcometogether?”ShapiraandZerahWarhaftigwereafraidoflosingcontrolofthearmy.“Wearemissingthe boat,” said Shapira. “The things the people are saying and the things thearmyissaying—Idon’tknowhowmuchlongerwecanlastasagovernment.”Warhaftigtalkedabouthisrecenttourofthemilitary.“Theofficersaresaying,we’re all fine, if only thegovernmentwasdoingaswell.”Hebelieved that ifDayan did not join the government, “there’ll be riots in the street, the sort ofthingthatbordersontreason.”GalilisaidpeoplewereworriedaboutNasser,butShapirainterruptedhim:“It’sthisgovernmentthey’reworriedabout.”Voiceswere raised again. Eshkol told Shapira he could leave if he did not
want tobeinthegovernment—ifallhewantedwasaget,adivorce,hecouldhavejustsentaletter.“I’llwritealetter,”saidShapira,andthreatened,“We’llgototheKnessetandgetitoverwith.”Feelingsranhigh.Peoplewerefuriousthat thewar had beenpostponed, saidShapira. “Wehaven’t seen themotherswhosesonsaregoingtobekilled,”Eshkolstruckback.Itwasallverypersonal,and often in Yiddish. “It breaks my heart that the defense portfolio is beingtakenfromme,”Eshkolsaid,butaddedthathedidnotwantanymorearguing.Hewantedthistobeoverwith.ThemeetingendedatoneA.M.38
3. SURRENDER: “HISTORY, WHATEVER YOU’RE GOINGTODO—DOITQUICKLY”
EshkolgaveupataroundnoononThursday,June1.AttheMapaimeetingthatmorning,GoldaMeirpresentedthesituation:GahalwouldjointhegovernmentifRafialsojoined.RafiwouldjoinifDayanbecameministerofdefense.Mafdalwas threatening topulloutof thecoalition if thatdidnothappen.EshkolsaidMafdal was fighting for Dayan as if in a holy war; he used the Arabic termjihad.Eshkol almost certainly understood by then that hewas being deposed.He
toldthosepresentthathewouldspeakasahistorian,andmuchofhisstatementdid sound like chapter headings for a future biography.When his intelligencepeople had said war would not be an issue before 1970, he said, he had notbelieved them. How could they be so confident, he had asked—what if warcameayearsooner?Accordingly,hehadpreparedthearmy.HeinsinuatedthatShimon Peres had limited Israel’s arms purchases to France, while Eshkolhimselfhadopened thepath todealswith theUnitedStates.He then revealedconfidential information: therewas talkof Israelbuildingplanesand tanks. “Iaskyou,Iimploreyou,ifthefutureofthePeopleofIsraelisdeartoyou—ifyoufeel it is worth a single penny—do not make this information public.” HedisclosedthatIsraelhadaskedtheUnitedStatesforenginesto“revolutionizeitstanks and build airplanes.” One Knesset member protested: “Why are youtelling us this? It will leak to the press.” Golda Meir took advantage of theopportunity to scold those present because every word always showed up inYediotAharonotevenbeforethemeetingswereover.EshkolwentontojustifyEban’striptotheUnitedStatesandthedecisionto
postpone an attack onEgypt.He gave the impression that at least twoweekswouldgobybeforewarbrokeout.Hehimselffeltnogreatneedtoexpandthegovernment,hesaid.AbroadgovernmentwouldbasicallybeasecondKnessetand everyonewouldwant to have a say. If the partymemberswere stronger,madeofsteel, iron,andstone,thenperhapstherewouldbenoneedtoenlargethecoalition.Butsometimeshethoughthecouldhear theoppositionspeakingthrough his own friends. He did not know how the idea of handing over theMinistryofDefensehadcomeup.Hewasinsulted,butwasnonethelesswillingtoexpandthegovernment.Rafi’sresentmentwasfargreaterthanthatofGahal,buthewaswilling to try,hesaid,and left themeeting.Hewasgoing tomeetBeginandotherGahalmembers.GahalwasalsopressingforDayan’sappointmenttotheDefenseMinistryand
demandedtoknowwhyEshkolobjected.Inresponse,EshkoltoldajokeaboutaJewwhowantsadivorce.The rabbi askshimwhyhewants thedivorce.Themansays,“HowcanIspeakillofmywife?”Aftertheygetadivorce,therabbisays,“Nowcanyoutellmewhyyouwantedthis?”Themananswers,“HowcanIspeakillofastranger?”Similarly,EshkoldidnotwanttorevealthenatureofhisaversiontoDayan.“Iamafraidtotellyou,”hesaid.“Imayhavetolivewithhim.Hemayjointhegovernment.WhyshouldIgiveyoureasons?Ihavemyreasons.”
AT MAPAI, MEANWHILE, PARTY MEMBERS WERE THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: THEYwantedDayan,notAllon.Rafiwasplottingacoup,onemembersaid,andonlytheappointmentofDayancouldpreventitandsavedemocracy.Somesuggestedleaving the decision to Eshkol, but no one explicitly recommended that hecontinueasministerofdefense.39
The decision was made at this stage, according to Eshkol’s assistant AdiYaffe.Yaffe himselfwent to have lunchwith a reporter fromTimemagazine,Israel Shenker,whowaswriting a cover story onEshkol.Yaffewas gone forabouttwoandahalfhours,andbythetimehereturnedthingshadchanged.Inhis absence Eshkol had been besieged by ministers, Knesset members, andothers,alldemandingthatheappointDayan.RabinhadspokenwithEshkoltoo,and explained that the idea of giving Dayan the Southern Command wasmeetingwithresistanceinthearmy.Hehadbeensentbysomeofthegeneralstopass on their “strong, intense, and angry objection” to giving Dayan theSouthern Command. Yadin appealed to Haim Moshe Shapira to demandDayan’sappointment,andShapirarespondedbyaskingYadinwhetherhewouldtakethepositionhimself.Yadindidnotruleoutthepossibility,butrepeatedhisviewthatitwouldbebettertoappointDayan.ChoosingYadinwouldprobablynot have prevented the war, since he too believed Israel should attackimmediately.40
After Yadin came Ezer Weizman. There are at least two versions of whathappened next. According to Israel Lior, Weizman “burst into” the primeminister’soffice,wherehefoundEshkolhavinglunchwithMinisterofJusticeShapira.Weizmanwept infrontof theprimeminister,accordingtoLior.“Thecountryisbeingdestroyed,”hewailed,“everythingisbeingdestroyed.”EshkolandShapirawerestunned.“Eshkol—givetheorderandtheIDFwillgotowar,”Weizman yelled. “Why do you needMosheDayan?Who needsYigalAllon?Wehaveastrongarmyandallit’swaitingforisyourorder.Giveusanordertogotowarandwewillwin.Wewillwinandyou’llbetheleaderofavictory.”At
thatmoment,wroteLior,Shapiraalsoburstintotears.AccordingtoWeizman,hetoldEshkol,“Ifyougivetheinstruction,you’llgo
downinJewishhistoryasagreatleader.Ifyoudon’t,historywillneverforgiveyou.” Yaacov Herzog wrote in his diary that the precise words were,“Commander—give the command and you will go down in Jewish history.”LiorthoughtthatasWeizmanlefttheroomhetriedtotearhisgeneral’sinsigniaoffhisshoulder,buthewasnotcertain.“Thetruthis,Idon’trememberexactlywhathappenedafterward,”hewroteinhisdiary.“Itwasaneventthatishardtodescribeinwords.”Weizmanconfirmedthatsomethinglikethisdidhappen:“Iwasfuming.WithmyrighthandIremovedtheinsigniafrommyleftshoulderandthrewthemontothetable.”Butheclaimedthatthisoccurredonadifferentoccasion,and emphasized that, contrary to other reports, he did not throwhisinsigniaontoLeviEshkol’sdesk.41
“THE CONSTANT TRICKLE,”WROTE ADI YAFFE, “ONE PERSON COMING IN BEFORE THElast had even left,”waswhat tipped the scales.He believed that had he beenthere,hemighthaveat leastprovided somebalance, although this isunlikely.Eitherway,atfour-fifteenEshkolofferedMosheDayantheMinistryofDefense.Hedidso,saidYaffe,thinking,“I’msickofthispressure.Ifthere’snochoice,let it be Dayan.”42 Dayan asked whether he was being invited alone or as amemberofRafi, althoughhewasperfectlywilling to accept evenwithouthisparty’sapproval.“BetterastheRafirepresentative,”Eshkolsaid,“sotheywon’tsendmeShimon,too.”Eshkol convened theMa’arahministers and announced his decision. Allon
said he was withdrawing his candidacy. Eshkol thanked him, saying that hehimselfcouldhardlybear topartwith theportfolio.“Myonlyreward is that Iamcausingpaintosomeoneelse,”hejoked,meaningAllon.ThenhereportedWeizman’soutburst.Talkingtohisparty,Eshkolsaidhehaddecidedthatitwasbesttoputanend
tothemaneuverings.“Imadeadecision:History,whateveryou’regoingtodo—doitquickly.”Helateraddedthat thiswasasayingofLeonTrotsky’s.Thewholethinghadbeen“athorninhisside,”hesaid,andgavethemsomemorenews: Hussein was planning to close off the Mandelbaum Gate and therebyaccesstoMountScopusinJerusalem.ThemembersofMapaitoldhimhehaddoneagreat thingandgavehimaroundofapplause.TheywantedtoapplaudGoldaMeir too, but she cut them off: “I’m not dead yet.”43 Eshkol still hadseveralphonecallstomake;Ben-Gurionhadnotyetagreed.
Notall theRafimemberswere in favorof joining thegovernment.Knessetmember Yosef Almogi suggested that without Ben-Gurion, the party shouldremain in the opposition. “Whatwill the country gain fromDayan becomingminister of defense in a jungle with Eshkol in charge—a quick shot ofmorphine?Sopeoplewill think this isasolution?”ButPeresargued that theyshouldfirsthearwhatBen-Gurionhadtosay.44AccordingtoPeres,Ben-Gurionwasfurious,andheonlycamearoundforthesakeofnationalsecurity.ButBen-Gurion set one condition: Peresmust tell Eshkol that although the party wasjoining his government, Rafi still believed he was not fit to serve as primeminister.“Ifeltwretchedthewholeday,”Pereslaterwrote,butheaskedEshkolfora
privatemeeting.Hesaid,“Asyouknow,wehavestatedthatyouareunfittobeprime minister. Our opinion has not changed. Of course, after we join thegovernment we will act with complete loyalty and all the old scores andpersonaldifferenceswillbeputaside.”Peressaidhewasflushedandperspiringwhenhesaidthesethings,butEshkolrespondedgenerously,sayingheknewoftheiropinion,butperhapsitwouldchangeintime.PereshurriedtoBen-Gurion’shouse,butonthewayhestoppedatacaféand
phonedEshkol.Whatnow?askedtheprimeminister.Peressuggestedthathegoto see Ben-Gurion himself. It was time for a reconciliation, he said, andsuggestedsendingBen-GuriontotheUnitedStatestoexplainthenewsituation;thismayhavebeenPeres’sattempttopostponethebeginningofthewar.Eshkolwas afraid that Ben-Gurion would refuse to see him and that he would behumiliated,butheaskedfortimetothinkitover.Intheevening,hetoldPereshehaddecidednottogo.Maybeanothertime.45*
THENEWGOVERNMENTWASSCHEDULEDTOMEETATTENTHATNIGHT.ESHKOLlookedpale and tired; Yaacov Herzog noted in his diary that the prime ministerappearedwrappedinakindof“lassitude.”Herzogformulatedanannouncementand scheduled a breakfast the next day with Yadin to discuss setting up a“committee” to facilitate relations betweenEshkol andDayan. “A great thinghasoccurred in Israel,”HaimMosheShapiraannounced.“Theprimeministerhas acted with restraint.” The ministers praised Eshkol, who proclaimed anationalunitygovernment.Rabinandafewofficerswerewaitingoutside.“Thechiefofstafflookstiredandstunned,”wroteHerzog.Rabinsaidthathadtheyactedatthebeginningoftheweek,theymightalreadyhavebeenattheStraits.Herzogrecountedthechainofeventsthathadledtoapostponement,andthenBegin arrived. He embraced Rabin, slapped his back, and declared, “We’re
proud of you!” He also embraced Herzog and reminded him of their firstmeeting,twentyyearsago,whenHerzoghadaccompaniedhisfatheronavisittoBeginwhenhewasintheunderground.Beginthankedhim,sayingheknewHerzoghadhelpedtobringhimintothegovernment.Dayanarrivedlate,walkedin,andshookeveryone’shand.Rabinaskedtobe
excusedfromgivingthecustomaryupdate: itwaslateandhestillhadalotofwork that night.But theministerswanted to hear fromhim.Dayan sat at theotherendoftheroom,nexttothemilitarymaps.“Thereisamarkedchangeinthechiefofstaff,”Herzogwrote.“Forthepasttwoweekshehadbeenspeakinghesitantly and always looked as if he was buckling under the burden of hisresponsibilities. None of his recommendations were given firmly. His self-confidenceseemedshattered,hiseyeshadlosttheirusualspark.Hiswordsandhisordersseemedtocomenotfrominside,butratherasaconditionedreflex.”But now, wrote Herzog, for the first time, Rabin was standing upright andspeakingclearly.OnceinawhilehelookedatDayan,andaccordingtoHerzogitwas clear that the newminister’s presence gave him confidence: “His facesuddenlyfilledout.”RabinrepeatedthathadIsraelattackedfivedaysearlier,itwould now have a clear advantage.47 Dayan demanded to know what theministerswanted:iftheywantedtoattack,theyhadtodosoimmediately;ifnot,theyhadtopreparefordefense.Theydecidedtodiscussitthenextday.
ON JUNE 2, THE DAY AFTER ESHKOLWAS DEPOSED,MAARIV WROTE THAT THE PRIMEminister was making frequent jokes in Yiddish, looking “as if he has beenreborn.” In fact, his authorized biography later stated, he felt injured andbetrayed.Hisremovalremainedanopenwoundthat,accordingtothoseclosetohim, never healed.48 He approached Dayan with suspicion. “The ’Arab’ hasalreadystarted,”hesaidtoYigalYadin,meaningthatDayanwasalreadyputtinghis people in charge of the ministry. Yadin, meanwhile, was working on anagreement to demarcate the lines of authority between Dayan and Eshkol.Dayancouldnotdeclarewarorexpandthescopeofawar,norwashetobombmajorArabcitiesonhisowninitiative.“Eshkoliswaitingforthemomentwhenhe can return to a government without Moshe,” wrote Yadin.49 The solejustificationforEshkol’sremovalwasthepublichysteria.Dayan revealed himself to be precisely theway hewas described by those
whoknewhim:ruthlessandhungryforpower.HisappointmentdealtablowtoGolda Meir and an entire generation of veteran leaders. They had tried topreservetheirstandingbypromotingtheirownmilitarist,YigalAllon,butatthemomentoftruthit transpiredthatmostIsraelisdidnotsharetheadmirationof
Allon’s friends. The chasm between his image as a fabled Hebrew warriorprinceandtherealityofhis lifeasamediocrepoliticianmadehimseemquitepathetic.MenachemBegin’sentranceintothegovernmentbrokeataboo.Themanwho
untilnotlongagohadbeeninsultedasaHitlerhadbeenlegitimized,andMapailostitsmonopolyonpower.Begin’slegitimationwasalsoasteponthewaytoasocial and cultural revolution. Although part of the Ashkenazi establishment,Begin the opposition leader, long deprived of influence, had leaned on thesupportofmanyMizrahim,cultivatingasortofallianceoftheunderprivileged.Onthenighthesatdownatthegovernmenttable,theroadtopoweropenedfortheMizrahim.Fewpeopletooknotice.ThesongwriterHaimHefer,whorespondedtoday-
to-dayeventswithversespublished inYediotAharonot, saw thegovernment’sexpansion as a late victory for the Palmah: warriors had triumphed overpoliticians. “Thosewho lived through the lastweekAnd sawhowDayanandAllonstoodtallThosewhosawthenoiseandthefuryThewheelinganddealingandthewarmongeringThosewhowatchedforamomentfromtheside/Knewthatthesetwoblossomedfromaspecial,specialroot.”50
Heferwasright,inthattheSix-DayWarsuppliedIsraelipoliticswithanewreservoir of ministers and leaders. Of the eighteen generals serving on theGeneralStaffatthetime,eightwentontoentertheKnesset,andsomeassumedgovernment positions.Rabinbecameprimeminister, as did twoother officerswho shone in the Six-Day War, Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon. The freneticwhirlwindandthe to-and-froingof thedaysprecedingthewar—thepanic, thethreats,thedeals,andthespin—elicitedthefollowingcommentfromtheeditorof Yediot Aharonot, Herzl Rosenblum: “Long live the people’s fightinggovernment!Long live the IDFand its invincible commanders!Long live thefree State of Israel! Long live justice, trampled by thugs and tyrants and theheirsofHitleristanti-Semitism!TherewillbenoTreblinkahere!This timeitsarchitects will be drowned at sea!”51 Shuka Bar-Dayan was pleased with theturnofevents.“ThankGod,”hewroteinhisdiary,“they’redonefightingonthehomefront....Securitymaybeinbetterandmoreexperiencedhands.”
BAR-DAYANHADNOWBEENONRESERVEDUTYFORTWOWEEKS.YARIVMISSEDHIMSOmuch,asdidshe,Gila said ina letter.He tried toconsoleherwitha joke:heknewitwashardforher,ofcourse,butitwasalsohardforhimtogowithoutwashing thecarordoing thedishes.He toldherhowall theguysconfided in
himandcalledhimDad.Oneman,athirty-one-year-oldbusdriver,showedhimapicture of his son and startedweeping.Bar-Dayanhad trouble calming himdown. It was the same with all the tough guys, he told Gila. Almost all thenonsmokershadstartedsmoking,apartfromhim.HehopedtheslideshehadtakenonIndependenceDayhadcomebackfrom
overseas.52Theheatwavewasrough:hesweatedalot.Peoplewerestartingtogoonleave,butnothim.Rumorscirculatedamongthesoldiersconstantly,onlytogivewaytonewones.Sometimestheyhadorderstostartupthetanks,andtheythoughttheywereonthemove.Thentheordercametoturnthetanksoff.Morewaiting.ThecomediansUriZoharandShaikeOfirhadcometoperform.“Welaughedalittle,”wroteBar-Dayan,buthishomesicknessforGiliandYarivwasoverwhelming.“Ipraythatwereturnhomehealthyandinonepieceaftervictory.Amen,mayitbeso.”Hesuddenlythoughtofhismother.“Pleasereturnme tomysonandwife,”hewrote inhisdiary.His friendUziAvrahamigavehimreasonforgreathope:maybe,justmaybe,Giliwouldbeabletovisit.
CHAPTER11THREEDAYSTOWAR:THEDECISION
1.PROPOSAL:“TOPSECRET”
AccordingtoIsraelLior,thedecisiontogotowarwasmadeonFriday,June2.EshkolmetwiththeGeneralStaffagainthatmorning,andthistimehebroughtten ministers with him, including the newly appointedMenachem Begin andMosheDayan.ByLior’saccount,thegeneralsberatedtheministersrelentlessly:“Iwonderedattimesiftheymeanttobringtheministerstotheirkneesorreducethemto tears.”1Theminutes,however,donotconfirmLior’s impression.Thegenerals repeated their demand to go to war immediately and a few spokedisrespectfullytotheprimeminister,butEshkol,thoughdowncastanddejected,unflinchinglyrefused topromisewar.Hewaswaitingfor thegreen light fromtheUnitedStates.ZalmanAransaidafterwardthatthevisitto“thepit,”astheGeneral Staff’s command postwas known,was convincing, but theministershadnonethelessposedsometoughquestions.Aharon Yariv spoke vaguely, as usual, repeating that every passing day
“greatlydiminished”Israel’schancesofaerialsupremacyandincreasedtheriskoftheEgyptiansbombingthereactoratDimona.Heclaimedthat“manypeoplein important places in the United States” would view an Israeli strike as aconvenient way “out of this whole mess,” because the Americans had nointentionofbreakingtheblockadethemselves.Heprovidednorealinformationand there was no discussion of the possibility of getting “out of this wholemess”withoutresortingtowar.Rabinopenedwitharatherpeculiarstatement:theEgyptianarmyatthisstage
was “perhaps in a defensive orientation only,” but he could not say that “thiswaswhere thingswouldend.”Hewenton just asvaguely: “I thinkwemightfindourselves in a situationwherewe’ll losemuchof our advantage, andwemightreachasituationthatIdon’twanttodescribetooclearly,butitwillposeareal threat to Israel’s existence, and thewarwill bedifficult and savage,withmanycasualties.”Hespokeasifhehadnoobligationtomakethegovernmentawareof thedangerheperceived.He thensaid:“Now thatwe’vewaited,andtheArabshavedefinedtheirpoliticalgoalasareturnto1948,andthisisclearlydefined,wemustnotwaituntilthere’sasituationthatmakesthingsdifficult,ifnot worse, and I don’t want to say anything explicitly, in case we don’t act
immediately.”Again,noonepressedRabintosaywhatexactlyhepreferrednotto“stateexplicitly,”andthedimthreatcontinuedtohangovertheroomlikeadarkandterrifyingcloud.Rabin was essentially telling the cabinet that the ministers must not wait,
whichwastheopinionofthesixteengeneralsatthemeeting.ArielSharonwasjust as vocal as he had been in the past, stating that not since the War ofIndependence had Israel been in such a dangerous situation. He repeated hisscornfuldismissalofIsrael’s“scurrying”amongtheworldpowersforrescue.“Iwon’t use the word ’pleading,’” he said, taking a jab at the prime minister.Sharon maintained that Israel’s goal should be the total destruction of theEgyptianmilitary,sothatforthenexttenortwentyyearstheEgyptianswouldnot think of fighting Israel.He had beenwith the troops in the south for twoweeksnow,andheknewthatthearmywasmorereadythanever,withafirst-rate fighting spirit. The people on the home front were also “wonderful,” hesaid.Heaskedtheministersforrespect:“Who,ifnotus,isauthorizedtotellyouthat the army is ready for war?” The government had to make a “quick andbrave”decision.“Youcanleavetheresttous.”Matti Peled, the quartermaster general, also spoke boldly. He said he
understoodwhyNasserhaddecidedtoactnow,ratherthaninayearandahalfastheintelligencehadestimatedoriginally:“Inmyopinion,hewasrelyingonthegovernment’shesitancy.Heactedoutofconfidencethatwewouldnotdaretoattackhim.”NothingduringthatweekirkedEshkolmorethanthisclaim.AsPeledhadsaidbefore,prolongingdelaymightdestroytheeconomy.“TheStateof Israel does not have unlimited resources.” There were now approximately100,000soldiersonreservedutyonanygivenday.2“Wedeservetoknowwhywearesufferingthisdisgrace,”Peledsaid.“Nowmightbethetimetoexplainwhatwe arewaiting for.”MordechaiHod andYeshayahuGavish assured theministersthatthearmywasreadyandstrong,andthatitwouldwin.Theministerswerenotsoeasilypersuaded.“Yousaidthataweek,two,three,
or four could be decisive,”Eshkol confrontedYariv. “But there’s a differencebetween one week and three or four.” He was surprised that none of theministers had raised this point.Rabinburst out, “I’m saying that everyday ismoreofaburden,makingoperationsmoredifficult andmorecostly.”Shapiraasked,“Inyouropinion,havetheyconcentratedalmostalltheirmilitaryforcesin theSinai?And if so,what’s thedifferencebetweennowandaweekor tendaysfromnow?Becausethey’realreadythere,afterall.We,ontheotherhand,may loseon thediplomatic front ifwe takeaction immediately.Sowhat’s thedecisivefactorhere?”
GeneralPeledresponded:“Perhapsyoucantellmewhatwe’rewaitingforonthisdiplomaticfront?”Hewasextremelyannoyed,andawhiffofrebellionwasagainintheair.“WhathastheIDFdonetodeservethisskepticism?Whatdoesan armyhave to do, besideswin everybattle, to gain the government’s trust?Thequestionswe’vebeenasked,nowandbefore,indicatealackoffaithinourability.”MinisterAranwantedtoknowhowmanyairplanesIsraelcouldexpecttolose
inanattackonEgypt.GeneralHodrepliedevasively:“InVietnam,therateoflossesisnowatfourpercent.Ibelievethatthesoonerwestrike,thesmallerthelosses.” He said it was impossible to defend the country against airstrikes;rather,theenemy’sbomberswouldhavetobehitontheground.Thenheaddedcasually,“Wecancarryoutourmission.AndIbelievewecandoitevenwithadelay, but we’ll have to invest more effort, more time, and absorb morecasualties to reach the same goal we can reach today or tomorrow.” Suchstatements could only make the ministers more skeptical of the military’surgency.MosheDayanlaterwrotethatthegeneralsfailedtocommunicatetheproblem
well,thattheirapproachwastoopolitical,sohe—thepolitician—decidedtotalktactics.But he too added no particularly convincing information.None of theministers,includingBegin,foundthearmy’sargumentspersuasive.Allofthemreliedonthesameinformation.Theministers,withEshkolastheirhead,werereckoningwithbroaderconsiderationsthanthearmywas.Eshkolrespondedasastatesman.HehadwrinkledhisnosewhenSharonused
the term “pleading,” and also rejected Sharon’s description of Israel as“scurrying.”Everything“wehaveintermsofmilitarystrengthcomesfromthisscurrying. Let’s not forget that. . . .” Eshkol assured the General Staff thathearing them “chastise the government”was always important. “But let’s saythatwebroketheenemytoday:tomorrowwe’dhavetostartrebuildingourownstrength, because we too will lose forces. Even if we start building our ownaircraft,wecan’tbuildenginesthatquickly.Andifeverytenyearswehavetofight,wecan’t justsaythatwedon’tgiveadamnaboutallies.”ThiswaswhyIsraelshouldwait.TheefforttoconvincetheworldthatNasserwasactinglikeHitleralsotooktime,Eshkolsaid.GeneralMattiPelederuptedagain:“Weasked foranexplanation!Whatare
wewaitingfor?”Eshkolputhiminhisplace:“Ifit’sstillnotcleartoyou,I’mnotgoingtoexplainanyfurther.”Butheadded,“IwanttodrillitintoJohnsonsohedoesn’tsaywecheatedhim.Wemaystillneedhim.Ihopewedon’tneed
himinthemiddleofthewar....Militaryvictorywillendnothing.BecausetheArabsareheretostay.”3
Abba Ebanwas noticeably silent at themeeting. The evening before, afterDayan’sappointmentasministerofdefense,EbanhadchangedhismindaboutgoingtowarandtoldRabinthatdiplomacyhadrunitscourse.Inhismemoirs,aswell as in a letter to theAmericandiplomat andhistorianWilliamQuandt,Eban claimed that he revised his position after hearing a report on aconversationwith a seniorU.S. administration official. Sensitive to language,Ebannoticedthatthereportdiscussedthewaitingpolicyinthepasttense,whichled him to believe that the Americans now agreed that Israel should act toreopentheStraits.Thereport,byDavidGinsburg,wasquotingClarkClifford,anassociateofPresidentJohnson’sandasupporterofIsrael.4
EbanwasalsoawareofwhatMeirAmithadheardfromsomeadministrationofficials in theUnitedStates.“Myconclusionsat theendof the first round inWashington are that we should wait a short while longer for an internationalarmada,andthenfindawaytostrike.[U.S.]publicopinionisinfavor...IthinkthatMcNamaradoesnotobject,either.Theonlyonesopposedatthispointarethe people in the State Department,” Amit reported.5 Eban might also haveconcludedthat,withDayan’sappointment,warhadbecomeinevitable,andthathisownoppositionmightharmhimpolitically.
WHENTHEEXCHANGECONCLUDED,ESHKOLCONVENEDDAYAN,EBAN,ANDALLONandafewoftheirstaffers.Thenextevening,theywouldhearfromAmit,whowasabout to return fromWashington. At that point, they would have their “finaldiscussion,” Eshkol said. He asked for the ministers’ opinions. Dayan,predictably,said thewarshouldstart immediately.Hisplanwas todestroy theEgyptian air force and occupy the Sinai, but not the Gaza Strip or the SuezCanal.Allon,who also considered himself a strategist, had his own plan.Hesuggestedapproachingthecanal,threateningtocloseit,andtakingadvantageofthe threat to transferhundredsof thousandsofPalestinian refugees fromGazawestwardoverthecanal.Dayansaidthatdeportingtherefugeesmightturnintoan “incomparably barbaric and inhumane” operation. Returning to his ownvision,heproposedatimeline:agovernmentdecisiononSundaymorning;waronMonday.SensingthatEshkolnowsupportedstartingthewar,Dayanleftforlunch.Eshkolwenthome,butnotbeforeasserting,as recordedby IsraelLior,that “we have basically done all we can do politically. We can’t wait anylonger.”6
Butatleastonemanstillbelieved,eventhatFriday,thatIsraelshouldavoidwar. Shimon Peres had a proposal that, had it been accepted,might have setMiddleEasternhistoryonadifferentcourse.Hesuggestedconductinganucleartest,ademonstration,thatmighthaverestoredIsrael’sdeterrenceandpreventedthewar frombreakingout.Peres’spsychological reasoningwasnotunlikehisproposal torestoreBen-Guriontotheprimeminister’soffice: themovewouldalarmtheArabs,whilesoothingthefearsofIsraelis.7
THAT FRIDAYAFTERNOON,DAYANGAVEAN INTERVIEWTOTIMEMAGAZINE. THENHEREceived a visitor with a wonderful name, he wrote: Winston Churchill, thegrandson.ChurchillcameonbehalfoftheBritishNewsoftheWorld.Hewasacute youngman, Dayan said, so the minister of defense was surprised whenChurchill asked him bluntlywhetherwarwould break out in the next day ortwo,orwhetherhemightaswellstophangingaroundinhishotelandgohome.DayantoldChurchillhecouldgohome,hewouldn’tmissathing:itwaseithertoolateortooearlytoinitiateanattack,andIsraelstillhadtopursuediplomacy.“Iwassorrytomisleadhim,”helaterwrote,“butinmyheartItookcomfort:ifhe was the loyal friend to Israel that he said, it was fitting for him to helpmisleadtheenemy.”8*LaterthatFridaynight,Dayantookpartinadiscussionwiththechiefofstaff
and a few generals. Gavish presented two plans of action, one that involvedtakingGaza and one that did not. The generals argued the point. Rabin,whoonly a few days earlier had thoughtGaza should be captured as a bargainingchip, had meanwhile shifted to Dayan’s position, whereby Gaza wasexpendable. Others argued that conquering Gaza would protect Israelisettlementsalongtheborder.Onegeneralsaidsimply,“Itwouldbeapitytolosetheheadline’GazaIsinOurHands.’”ButDayanexplainedthattakingGaza,atleastinthefirststage,wouldmeanhavingtodealwiththerefugees.“Wehavetoletsomeoneelsetakecareofthem,”hesaid,referringtotheUN.HealsosaidthatoccupyingtheSuezCanalcouldonlycauseharm.Thecabinet,havingheard repeatedly that Israel’s futuredependedona first
strikeagainsttheEgyptianairforce,wouldhaveprobablybeenamazedtohearDayan’s next statement: “We’re working on the assumption of a surpriseairstrike,but it’spossible that thingswon’tgoexactly thewayweexpect, forexample,ifthere’sanaerialbattle.Inanycase,Egyptwillneverhavetheaerialadvantage,evenifthingsdon’tstartoffwithanIsraelisurpriseintheair.”10
It was close to midnight when Dayan arrived at Shimon Peres’s house to
celebratehisnewjobwithafewfriends.Ben-Gurionwasthere.TeddyKollekwasalsothere,reportingthatDayan’sappointmenthadledtothecancellationofahugedemonstrationplannedinthecapital.11
2. GREEN LIGHT: “A WEIGHT IS LIFTED FROM MYHEART”
OnSaturday,June3,whilethegovernmentwaswaitingforAmittoreturnfromWashington, Yehoshua Bar-Dayan was waiting for his wife. It was his thirdSabbathon reserveduty.Gilihadpromised tocomeeven if shehad to takeataxithewholeway,andhewasasexcitedashewasontheirfirstdate.SheandUziAvrahami’swifemanagedtogetasfarasRevivim.Bar-Dayantookajeepand went to pick them up. She was wearing pink. They kissed and huggedexcitedly. He told her his life was in no danger; in his diary he added inparentheses,“ifonly.”Gili told him someone had refused to give her a ride, saying that to do so
would ruinhisSabbath.Bar-Dayanwas furious: “Never in Israelhave so fewdecent people taken risks and sacrificed somuch, and theirwives suffered somuch,whileothersaremeanandheartless.We’llsettlethescoreoneday.”Hefelthisneighborscouldatleasthavevolunteeredforsomething;“parasites,”hecalled them. He and Gili drove to Beersheba to have lunch at Morris’srestaurant.Ontheway,theysawahugepicnicgoingonamongsometreesnexttoamemorialforsoldierskilledintheWarofIndependence.Throngsofcitizenshad come to visit their soldiers.Morris’s was packed with soldiers and theirwivesandchildren.“Ihadalumpinmythroat.GiliandIlookedateachothersorrowfully, longingly, and lovingly, hoping everything would end peacefullyandwecouldgoback toournormal lives.”Gilibrought theslidesShukahadaskedabout.He lookedat thepicturesofYarivioverandover,hardlyable tostop, but he was worried that his brigade might move on that afternoon andleavehimbehind.Theysaidgood-bye.Thebrigadehad indeedstarted tomove,andheonly justcaughtupwith it.
ThecommanderhadnoticedBar-Dayan’sabsenceandsentajeepouttolookforhim.ButevenifhehadgoneAWOLforafewminutes,itwasforGili.Thatwasunderstandable. Theywouldmove at night.Dark, dust, a black convoy.Theydroveforthreeorfourhours.Bar-Dayanmadeawrongturnandtookawholestringofvehicleswithhim,buthewasabletobacktrack,andhefeltgreat.HelovedGilisomuch.12
DURING THE SABBATH, ESHKOL TOLD ISRAEL LIOR: “THERE’S NO REASON TO WAIT.Theycan’thelpus,”referringtotheAmericans.“Wehavetomakethedecisionasearlyastomorrowmorning.”DayancalledapressconferencetomisleadtheEgyptians. He spoke of “a month, two months, six months.” War was notimminent,hesaid.13
Amitarrivedthatnight,bringingAmbassadorHarmanwithhim.Theydrovestraight fromtheairport toEshkol’shouse inJerusalem,where theyfound theministersshowingsignsoftherecentstress.Theywere“bleary-eyedfromlackof sleep, their movements irritable and impatient.” Eban passed a note toHarman:“Theythinkwe’vegainednothingbywaiting.”Amit’striptoWashingtonhadbeeninstigatedbyAharonYariv,anditsmain
purpose was to find out, through intelligence channels, what the Americanswould really do if Israel attacked Egypt. Amit later wrote that he had neverbeforeleftIsraelfeelingsodistraught.“Thehelplessnessandinactionatthetop”angeredhim.TheflightattendanthadtoldhimthatplanesoverthelastfewdayshadbeenfullofIsraelisleavingthecountry;hesaidtheymadehimsick.Amitreplied,“It’sallright—ifpeoplewanttorunaway,letthem.”Heconsideredtheeventsasifhewerethenation’steacher:hethoughttheterriblecrisiswoulddotheIsraelissomegood.Thingshadbeentooeasy,andpeoplehadgottenspoiled.“Whatever we’re left with will be healthier,” he wrote.When this crisis wasbehind them, Israelis could begin a different era, a different reality, a newchapterinhistory.TheCIAstationchiefinIsrael,JohnHadden,wasalsoonhiswaytoWashington,butnotonthesameflight.The first person Amit met there was James Jesus Angleton, the head of
counterespionage in the CIA. He was a controversial figure, obsessed by thebeliefthattheUSSRwasthesourceofallevilintheworld.“Inhisimagination,everythingthathappened,everyevent,everyincident,”wroteAmit,“wastintedby his suspicion and was somehow connected to his theory.” CIA peoplemockedhim,butAmitdidnotmind:“Angletonwasanextraordinaryassetforus.Wecouldnothave foundourselves abetter advocate.”*AngletonupdatedAmit on the goings-on inWashington and conveyed a few snippets of localgossip;thenAmitwenttomeetwiththeheadoftheCIA,RichardHelms.Thetwowere old friends: Helms and his family had visitedAmit at his home inRamatGan,andAmithadvisitedHelms’shome.Amitsaidthatovertheyearstheyhaddevelopedacloseandhonest relationship, soheassumed thatat thiscriticalhourhewould“reapthefruitoftheseedshehadplantedyearsago”andhear reliable information from his colleague. He wanted to know the precisetimeline for deployment of the multinational naval force that would break
throughtheStraits,buttohissurprisehelearnedtherewasnone.Accordingtohisaccount,hewas“stunned,”asthisrevelationwas“thepolaroppositeofallofEban’sreports.”Thiswasinaccurate.Ebanhadnotclaimedthatsuchaforceexisted;hehadreportedthatonewasplanned.HelmsarrangedforAmittomeetwithSecretaryofDefenseMcNamara,and
inthemeantimeintroducedhimtoseniorCIAstaff.Amitreportedlyexplainedtothemthatthemoretimewentby,thegreatertheneedforU.S.intervention.IftheUnitedStateshadallowedIsraeltoacttendaysago,therewouldbenoneedfortheirinterventionnow.Hestillspokeintermsofamultinationalnavalforce,but in fact he was suggesting that Israel be allowed to act alone. Israel wasaskingtheUnitedStatesfornothingbutarmsandpoliticalsupport,whichwouldinclude an effort to prevent interference by the USSR. The question of theStraitswas secondary,Amit told hisCIAcounterparts: themain questionwas“What will the Middle East look like?” He warned against a domino effect,using the favored termdeployedby theCIAin its justifications for thewar inVietnam. Pro-American countries, Amit said, were falling one after the otherintoNasser’snet.HeappealedtotheCIAstaff’sconscience,arguingthatthankstoAmericanpressure staying Israel’shand, thecountrymustnowprevail inacruelandbloodyclash.Thecasualtieswouldbetheirresponsibilityandontheirheads.“Theentirestaffsathunchedoverandloweredtheireyes,”Amitreportedwhenhereturned.Inallhismeetings,includingtheonewithMcNamara,Amitemphasizedthe
economic burden of the generalmobilization.He repeated that Israelwas notasking the United States for anything but freedom of action. He heard noobjections from McNamara, who asked how long the operation would take(Amitsaidoneweek)andhowmanycasualtiesIsraelwouldsustain(Amitsaidfewer than in theWar of Independence—less than six thousand).WhenAmitmentioned the multinational fleet, McNamara responded skeptically. Duringtheir meeting, the secretary of defense was handed a note informing him ofMosheDayan’sappointment.Amit reported that“McNamarawasverymovedand almost kissed me,” and that the secretary said of Dayan, “I admire thisman.”AmitreportedbacktoIsraelthathisimpressionwasthattheAmericanswouldgive theirblessing toanIsraelistrike“crushingNasser.” In response toEshkol’s question, Amit said they might even assist Israel in such a strike.McNamara was called out of the meeting twice to talk with Johnson on thephone.HetoldAmitthatthepresidentknewhewasthere,andpromised,“Ireadyouloudandclear.”14
McNamara found Amit’s arguments persuasive, and he conveyed them to
Johnson the same evening. The president understood that Israelwas going toact;hesetupaspecialtaskforcetohandlethesituation,headedbyMcGeorgeBundy. JimAngletonwas enthusiastic: for the first time in the history of theMiddleEast,therewasthepossibilityofsolvingtheregion’sproblems,makingit less vulnerable to intrigue and extortion, safer for capital investment anddevelopment. The new situation must be quickly exploited. Helms hadmadesure Israel’s positions were reflected in the CIA’s recommendations to thepresident.Angletonstressedtheissue’sdelicacyandaskedtopreservecompletesecrecy.15
AmbassadorHarman latercommented,“Iamcertain that they toldJohnson,The Israelis can do the job, you don’t have to worry.’ Clearly, the Presidentwouldhaveasked,’Andwhatif theEgyptiansattackthem?Willtheycometoustorescuethem?Idon’twanttobeinvolved.’Andtheywouldhavesaid,’Youcan rest easy. Amit says they can finish it off themselves and do it quickly.That’s the truth.Allyouhave todo ismakesure theRussiansdon’t interfere.Youhavenothingtoworryabout.’”16
Amit also posited that the Americans had given up on organizing amultinationalfleetandtheyunderstoodthatunilateralactionbyIsraelwouldnotimplicate them. Furthermore, it transpired that in 1957 theUnited States hadassuredIsraelthattheStraitsofTiranwouldremainopen.“TheAmericansstillseemedtoattributeacertainvaluetomoralconsiderations,”wroteAmit.Buthealso identifiedmorepragmatic reasons forU.S. support. JimAngleton,whomAmit described as “the biggest Zionist of the lot,” had intimated that theAmericans“wouldundoubtedlylookpositivelyonaknockout,”thatis,anattackonEgypt.Amit reported that theotherpeoplehemetwithhad “downplayed”this view, but they nonetheless shared it.17 Johnson’s weekend guests at hisranch might have helped to persuade him, and perhaps also Dayan’sappointment.OneStateDepartmentstaffermaintained,contrarytotheviewputforward by Ambassador Barbour, that Dayan was a short-tempered militaristwhodidnotunderstandpoliticalcomplexityandwhoseappointment increasedthechancesofwar.AmbassadorHarmanfeltthatitwasAmithimselfwhohadeffectedthechangeintheU.S.position,anassessmentconfirmedbytheMossadrepresentativeinWashington.Amit laterwrote thathis flighthomewasoneof thestrangesthehad taken.
He was on a huge jumbo jet full of military equipment, with only twopassengers: himself and Ambassador Harman. They flew via London andFrankfurt,wheretheyloadedupwithgasmasks.*Peoplewerewaitingforthem
impatientlyatEshkol’shouse;Dayanwasamongthem.19
“TheUnitedStateswon’tgointomourningifIsraelattacksEgypt,”Amitsaidon his return. His official report states: “The Americans will hesitate to actagainst us and there is reason to hope that they will even support us.” Herepeatedlysuggestedgivingthemanotherweek,andmeanwhilesendingashiptotheGulfofAqaba,expecting—orhoping—thattheEgyptianswouldfireonitandIsraelcouldthenactwithouthavingtakenthefirstshot.Hepointedoutthattherewassomedissentamong theAmericans.AmbassadorHarmansuggestedconsidering theStateDepartment’s position, too.Before leaving for Israel, hehad met with Secretary of State Rusk, and had allowed himself a fairlyundiplomaticoutburst.ThosewhoboretheresponsibilityforIsrael’sfatewouldnot accept another Munich, he had said; “Must Israel have to accept tenthousandcasualtiesbeforetheU.S.willagreethataggressionhasoccurred?”20BackinIsrael,Harmanalsothoughtthattheyshouldwaitanotherfewdays,soasnot to loseU.S.support.HeurgedDayantoconsider that theUnitedStatesmight force Israel to stop the war within 24 hours after it started, and thenIsrael’s situation would be even worse. Unlike Amit, he still believed in themultinationalfleet,andobservedthatJohnsonunderstoodthathewouldlosethenextelectionifhedidnothelpIsrael.21
Dayanrespondedfuriously:“Andaftersevenorninedays?We’llsendashipthroughtheStraitsofTiran,andthenwhat?”YaacovHerzogrecordedonemorepanic-strickenremarkbyDayan,orperhapsitwasmeanttomakeeveryoneelsepanic:“AnyonewaitingfortheAmericanstoopentheStraitshastoknowthatthiswaywe’dbelosingthewholelandofIsrael.”YigalAllonsaidthatsendinga ship through the Straits as bait would alert the Egyptians that war wasimminentandthearmywouldlosetheelementofsurprise.Dayandemandedtoknow what any of this would mean regarding the concentration of EgyptianforcesinSinai,andHarmanrepliedhonestly,“Ihavenoanswer.”HetoldthemwhattheStateDepartmenthadaskedhispeople:“DoesthefactthatNasserhasjumpedoffthecliffmeanyouhavetofollowsuit?”Eshkol tried toget through toDayan:“We’ll senda ship.They’llopen fire.
Thenthere’llbeacauseforaction.”Rabinrepeatedthateverypassingdaymadeit harder for the IDF to act. The Arab armies were getting stronger. TwobattalionsofEgyptianparatroopershadarrivedinJordan.Dayansaidtheycouldtake Eilat. “We’ll be busy with El Arish and they’ll occupy Jerusalem,” hecontinued. “If we wait for seven to nine days there will be thousands ofcasualties. Itmakesnosense towait. I’d ratherwestart first.We’ll strikeand
then we’ll take care of the diplomatic aspect. We have to do it, despite thepoliticaldisadvantages.”Hepromisedaneasywar.“Withintwoorthreehourswe’llhaveahugeaerialachievement,andwithinthefirstday,byevening,otherforceswill alsomakesignificantheadway.Within twodays,wecan reach thecanalarea.”AmitrepeatedhisopinionthattheAmericanswouldbepleased:theywanted
Israel to release them from the obligation to send a fleet. Yigal Yadincontributedhisownreassuringthought:“Noonewillbeabletoprovethatourplaneswent in first afterwe start spreading theword thatwe arebesiegedbyenemiesonallsides.”EvenAmbassadorHarmannowchimedin:hisideawastodispatchAbbaEbantoNewYorkasadiversion.Dayanmademorepromises:“Aftertheairforcestrike,theEgyptianswillbewithoutanairforceforatleastsix months.” He quoted an assessment that it would take three days for theEgyptianstorecoverfromanairattackanddeploytheirinfantry.Eshkolwasnowconvinced.Hewantedtoknowthesoonestpossibledatefor
theoperation.DayansaidhehadgivenorderstoprepareforMonday.“Canwedo it thismorning?”Eshkolasked,andDayansaid itwouldbedifficult: therewere some constraints.22 Meir Amit’s report from Washington had relievedEshkolofhislingeringqualms;hefeltthatIsraelhadbeengiventhego-ahead.No one had a better appreciation of Israel’s connections in America. Theimportance Eshkol attributed to the United States was his contribution to theprocess ofAmericanization that had begun to change life in Israel.Weapons,money,Jews,politicalsupport—herightlyperceivedalltheseasmoreimportantthan the claims made by the army in recent weeks, often with muchexaggeration, sometimes hysterically. Amit’s report greatly diminished thegamble Eshkol now had to take, and he relied once again on his intuition:whatever the Americans would accept in a week, they would just as easilyaccept in two days. Even an urgent communiqué from President Johnsonpromising continued international efforts would no longer make much of animpressiononhim.Eshkolemergesasastatesmanwithnervesofsteelwhowithstoodallpressure
untilhecouldachievecoordinationwiththeUnitedStates.ItisdoubtfulwhetherhebelievedIsrael’sexistencewastrulyindanger,andequallydoubtful thathewasconvincedEgyptwouldattack.Heknewwhatthearmyknew:thatevenifEgypthadattacked,Israelwouldwin.ButunlikeBen-Gurion,orperhapsevenDayan,Eshkolwas not themanwho could lead the Israelis to decide againstwar.Hisweakness ate away at him, particularly after being forced out of theMinistryofDefense.Hewantedtoberememberedasapatriot,andatthispoint
the public equated patriotism with war. He also agreed with Dayan and themilitarythatawarmightimproveIsrael’ssituation.23
ATSHUKABAR-DAYAN’SCAMP,TWOTANKSFLIPPEDOVER.HEMANAGEDTOCALLGILAand she cried over the phone, wrenching his heart. He spoke to Yariv, whoasked,“Shuka,where’syourUzi?”Yarivpromised tobeagoodboyandBar-Dayanwrote,“Theworryand thehomesicknessareawful.Oneof thehardestdays.”Hehadapopularsongstuckinhishead:“Coulditbecoulditbethatit’salready simply tomorrow?” But who knew what tomorrow would bring, hethought. “I hope therewill be nowar.That our statesmen,MosheDayan andBegin,willknowtoattacksomeothertime.”Hesuddenlythoughtbacktoadaywhenhewasaboutelevenandhismotherhadrefusedtobuyhimanicecreamcone. Itwas a sad day, she said, becauseDevorahDayan’s son,Moshe, fromNahalal,hadbeeninjuredandlosthiseye.Bar-Dayantoldhimselfhewouldbeall right.Maybe he just needed a good night’s sleep. Hewouldwrite to Gilitomorrow.24
•••
THE FORMAL DECISION WAS MADE THE NEXT DAY, SUNDAY, JUNE 4. EBAN GAVE HIScolleaguesadditionalinformationthatleftnoroomfordoubt:theUnitedStateshadgivenitsconsentforIsraeltogotowar.Hebasedhisreportonhiscontactwithamanwhosenamehedidnotspecify,althougheveryoneknewitwasAbeFortas,whomBeginreferredtoas“themysteryman.”TheU.S.SupremeCourtjusticehadaskedIsraeltowaitjustonemoreweek,andthreedayshadpassedsince then. Fortas had given only one injunction: “Do not fire the first shot.”Ambassador Harman told the ministers this was a central issue, bothdiplomaticallyandemotionally.Israelhadtoappeartobedefendingitself.Ebanasserted:“Ifthestrikeisdefensive,thenAmericaisonourside.”Anotherurgentmessage from Johnson had arrived, promising continued international efforts.Eshkol relied onhis intuition, believing that “in his heart,” Johnson’s opiniondifferedfromwhattheUnitedStatessaidofficially.IfJohnsonreallyintendedtoreopenthestraitsandtrulywantedtorestrainIsrael,hewouldhavesentintheSixthFleet.Hadhedone so,Eshkolwouldhave suggestedwaiting.But therewasnosignofAmericanvesselsintheregion.Inanycase,Dayanwasnot impressedby theUnitedStates’militarymight:
“HalfamillionmarinesinVietnam,withthebesttoolstheyhave,areunabletodefeat 200,000 Vietcong fighters in three years.” This was one of the main
lessonsDayan had brought home from his trip toVietnam.Earlier, Eban hadreported that McNamara had told Ephraim Evron that Dayan’s reports fromVietnamcontainedthemostreasonedassessmentsheeverreceived.AharonYarivtoldtheministershewasinpossessionofEgyptianordersthat
indicated a planned assault before June 5, meaning the next day. “I am notsaying [an assault is] certain,” he said, ever cautious, but Dayan was nowpushinghard.Iftheydidnotactimmediately,Israelmightlosethewarandtherewould be thousands of casualties. He insisted that Israel should no longercomply with Fortas’s request, particularly as the week he had asked for wascomingtoanend.“TheAmericansaren’tgoingshootatus,”Dayanpromised,and described the demand to keep waiting as “stupidity.” Begin suggestedsending Johnson the speech given by President Kennedy during the Cubanmissile crisis. Minister Yosef Burg brought up Chamberlain and Hitler, andAllon said,predictably, “Better theycondemnusalive thaneulogizeusatourgrave.”DayanreportedthattheEgyptianswereplanningtoseizeEilat:“Ifinditvery
difficult to see howwe will stand up to that.” Nasser was now essentially apresenceinJordan,too.TheJordaniansmightinvadeJerusalem.“WhatiftheysendacommandobattaliontocarryoutcarnageintheheartofJerusalem?”Ashedeliveredthisdramaticscenario,shotswereheardthroughthewindow.TheJordanians had opened fire on an Israeli plane that, according to Eshkol,wasflyinginIsraeliairspace.Shortlythereafter,theJordaniansfiredontheMusraraneighborhood;noonewashurt.EshkolnowconcurredthatifIsraeldidnotact,theycouldexpect“slaughter.”
Withahintofremorseheevensuggested thatperhapshadIsraelacted twoorthreedaysago,everythingwouldnowbeeasier.HaimMosheShapiraandZerahWarhaftig still pushed for a postponement, as did Menachem Begin,surprisingly.Shapirasaidthatevenafterallhehadheard,hewasnotconvincedthe Egyptians could attack in the next few days. He believed they expectedIsraeltoattackfirst.HesaidthattwodaysearlierhehadmetwithBen-Gurion,who had insisted that Israelmust not strikewithout the assistance of anotherpower.Dayan responded derisively: “If we take a hundred of their planes out of
commission,that’sworthmorethananyadditionalarmsthattheministeroftheinterior or Knesset member Ben-Gurion can get hold of in six months.” Heremindedthemthatover the last fewweekshehadconsistentlybeenright:hehad predicted that the Egyptians would kick out the UN forces, and he had
knowntheywouldblockadetheStraits.BeginsuggestedsendingMeirAmitonanothermission,toParis,London,and
Washington,toexplainIsrael’spredicament.Althoughhesupportedthewar,hedidnotbelievethatafewdays’delaywoulddoanyharm.Buthedidnotinsistonhisposition.WarhaftigaskedDayanhowtheycouldpresentan Israeli firststrike as a response, andwonderedwhether they could stage something. “Weneedanalibi,”saidMinisterBentov.“Ihaven’tgotanytricksotherthantakingaction.Ifsomeonehassomeothertrick,I’llbuyit,”repliedDayan.RegardingthepossibilityofsendinganIsraelishiptotheGulfofAqabaasaprovocation,Dayan said, “Absolute suicide.” Allon thought the prime minister couldannounce to the world’s heads of state that the Egyptians had attacked, andminuteslaterIsraelwouldrespond.Theprimeministerwouldriskalie,butonlyhistorianswouldknowthetruth.“Idon’tthinktheAmericanswilldigaroundtocheckuponwhatexactlyhappened,”Allonsaid.Eshkol pointed out that their actions would be judged by history. The
resolution that evolved asserted that Israel was acting against “the ring ofaggression tighteningaround it.”EshkolandDayanwereauthorized todecideonthetimeofaction.“Aweightisliftedfrommyheart,”wroteMinisterGvati.Almost everyone was in favor. Only the Mapam ministers proposed waitingawhile longer, and said they could not vote in favor of war before receivingauthorization from their party leaders, Meir Yaari and Yaakov Hazan. Ascamouflage for the meeting, the cabinet approved additional resolutions:participation inadiplomaticconference inSweden,andapprovalofaculturalagreementbetweenIsraelandBelgium.25
Years later,YigalAllon said that fromamilitaryperspective, a singleweekwouldnothavesealedIsrael’sfate.Thegovernmentandthemilitarywereafraidthatpostponingthewarmightincreasethenumberofcasualties,buttherewasno existential danger to the state. “The only crisis was psychological,”Allonsaid.Itwasnotthesituationonthefrontthatwasthemaincauseofwar,butthelossof faith in thegovernment.“To thisday Iwonderwhether, ifnot for thatstammered speech on the radio, things might have developed differently.”26Obviously,Israelwastooweaktoavoidwar.
GILIBAR-DAYANSATATHOMEINRISHONLEZIONANDTHOUGHTABOUTHERHUSBAND.“Youhavenoideahowterribletheworryingis,”shewrotetohim.“ThenewsissodepressingandIdon’tknowwhatwillhappen.Takecareofyourselfforus,becauseweloveyousomuchandsowanttoseeyoubackhealthyandwhole...
.Yourfathercalledbeforeandsenthisregards....Comehome—ImissyousomuchandwantyouwithmeandwithoursweetYarivi.Whoneedsthesewars...?”27Herhusbandfelt thesameway,butby the timehegother letterhewasalreadyinSinai.
CHAPTER12DAYONE
1.THEFOGOFWAR:“BINGBANGBOOM”
OnMonday, June 5, at 7:45 A.M., Private Yehoshua Bar-Dayan wrote in hisdiary:“Ibelievethewarhasstarted.TwoMystèresquadronsflewbylow.”Bythetimehemadehisnextentry,forty-fiveminuteslater,thewarhadbeenallbutwon: theplanesflyingoverheaddestroyedhundredsofEgyptianaircraft,moststillgroundedattheirbases.Bar-Dayan and his fellow soldiers in the 7th Brigade took the camouflage
nettingsoff the tanksandprepared tomove.Someonewentaroundgivingoutsyringes in case the soldierswere attackedwithgas.The syringesmighthavebeenamong theequipmentdelivered twodaysearlieron theplaneMeirAmitandAmbassadorHarman had flown back on, or perhaps they came in on theCIA agent’s flight.Then everyone received a proclamation signed byGeneralIsraelTal,commanderofthearmoreddivisionnicknamedtheSteelDivision.“Todayweshallgoouttocrushthehandthathadreachedouttostrangleus,”
declared Tal, hurling accusations at the Egyptians. “This is a battle that theenemywantedandtheenemybegan;wewillstriketheenemytwiceashardashehitus.”Hestressedthattheywerefacingalongwar:“Forthethirdtime,theEgyptiandaggerhasbeenbrandishedatus.For the third time, the enemyhaserredinitsmaddelusionofseeingIsraelbroughttoitsknees.Withblood,fire,andiron,thistimeweshallpurgethisplotfromtheirheart....”TalpromisedthatIsraeldidnotintendtomakewaronEgyptiancivilians:“Wedonotcovettheirland or their property.Wehave not come to destroy their country nor to takepossessionofit.”TheIsraelishadcome“todefeattheplotofdestruction,”andthey would win. “Today the Sinai desert shall know the force of the SteelDivision. And the land will shudder at its coming.” Tal was a man whoappreciatedqualitywork:theauthorofhisproclamationwasAmosOz.1
Bar-Dayanwrote:“Ihopewewin,thatitwillbequick.MyGod,protectmeandmy family.”Hemade sure he had a jack and a lugwrench for changingtires,andhekissedhisweddingring.At David Ben-Gurion’s house in Tel Aviv, a senior officer sent by Dayan
cametoinformhimthatthewarhadstarted.“Therewasnoneedforthis,”Ben-
Gurion wrote in his diary. He remained steadfast in his view of the war: “Ibelieveitisagrievousmistake.”DayanwantedBen-GuriontoknowthatinthenextfewhourstheIDFwouldstormthetownshipsofKhanYounisandRafiah,southofGaza.2
FortheEzrachifamily,inJerusalem,thedaybeganlikeanyother.Fatherwasonreserveduty,butthechildrenwenttoschool.EdithEzrachiwentouttothepostoffice.YosefWeitz,meanwhile,waslookingforwardtoaproductiveday.HewaswritingabookonthehistoryofforestationinPalestine,andhadbeenagonizingforseveraldaysoverthefirstparagraphinthechapterontheCarmelforests.Thatmorninghefoundtherightwordsandforgedahead.3
Bar-Dayan saw his brigade commander,Gorodish, driving by in a jeep.Hewaved tohis friendUzi.Dozensof tanks andhalftracks startedmoving innoapparentorder.Theywereon theirway toKhanYounis.Hedrovehispickupandwrote fragmentary diary entries during the frequent stops: “After thewarwe’llcomehereastourists”;“Theycametodestroyus—andsowewilldestroythem.”ThenhethoughtaboutYarivagain.“Thereisgreatexcitement.Thereisnofear.Iamintherear.”Sounds of explosions and gunfire thundered from every direction. The
vehicles traveled throughburning farmland.A shell landed twentyyards fromBar-Dayan’s pickup, showering itwith shrapnel.Hewas not hurt. “We’re notgoingtodiethatquickly,”hewrote.Thiswasuntrue:onemanhadalreadybeenkilled, Yossi Algamis, twenty-three, of Jerusalem, an officer in the armoredcommando unit. His vehicle had been hit by a sniper serving in one of thePalestinianunitsintheEgyptianmilitary.4
APatton tank broke down and got stuck, andBar-Dayan’s team hurried torepair it. They drove through an orchard. “Young, beautiful, fresh graftings,second year, blooms and heartwarming growth,” he noted with professionalexpertise,andadded,“Whatashametoloseit.Thefaultisnotthefarmer’s,butNasser’s.”They passed a villagewhereBar-Dayan saw laundry hanging on aline.Thevillagershadfled.“Thepoorpeople.Nottheirfault.”TheairforcehadmeanwhilecompletedthedestructionofmostoftheEgyptianairforce.OnlyafewIsraelisknewthis;mostwereenduringhoursofterror.GilaBar-DayantookYarivandwenttostaywithhermother.Shefeltparalyzedwithfear.
AT TEN PAST EIGHT, KOL ISRAEL RADIO ANNOUNCED THAT THE EGYPTIANS WEREATtacking Israel. Soldiers on leave were instructed to return to their unitsimmediately.EdithEzrachi heard an air-raid siren, butwasn’t sure if itwas a
realwarningoranothertest.Sherushedhome.A ForeignMinistry official called the head of the UN observer team, Odd
Bull,andaskedhimtohurrytotheministry.Thegeneralsaidhecouldcomeatten-thirty but was told it was urgent, so he left immediately. The ministryinformedhimthatat tenpasteight thatmorning,Egyptianplaneshad invadedIsraeliairspace.TheyaskedhimtogiveamessagetoKingHusseinofJordan:aslong as Jordan did not attack Israel, it would not be attacked. If Jordan tookaction,Israelwouldrespondwithfullforce.ThedecisiontowarnHusseinhadbeen made at the cabinet meeting a day earlier. General Bull perceived thewarningasathreat,andheheldthattheUN’srolewasnottocarrythreats.Heneverthelessconveyedthemessagetoitsintendedrecipient.AsimilarwarningwasdeliveredtoJordanviatheU.S.embassy.5
Atten,RuhamaWeitzaskedherhusbandtogoto thesupermarketwithher.“Assoonaswegot there,werealizedsomethingwasgoingon,”Weitzwrote.“Alonglineofhousewivesandmenoutsidethedoorway,everyonetryingtofillup their baskets.” It was a “distressing” scene; many vehicles loaded withsoldiersweredrivingthroughthestreets.ThatwashowWeitzfoundoutthewarhadbegun.Theyboughtsomefoodandwenthome.Andthentherewasanothersiren.*
THEFOREIGNMINISTRYREPORTEDTOTHEEMBASSYINWASHINGTONTHATATAROUNDten-thirty thatmorning,gunfirewas exchangedalong theborder in Jerusalem,and at eleven—“Bing, Bang, Boom,” as Edith Ezrachi later wrote—theJordanians started shelling Jerusalem. Civil Defense people appeared on thestreetsandnotified residents that itwas time toprotect theirwindshieldswithtapeandshadetheirwindowsathome.Ezrachiquicklyfilledafewbucketswithwater. Her hands were shaking and her heart trembling, she wrote. Theexplosionswereveryloud;shefeltasiftheywerecomingfromherbackyard.Itwasharrowing.About a dozen residents were killed, including two children, and a few
hundred were injured, according to Mayor Kollek. Many buildings weredamaged,includinghospitals,schools,theIsraelMuseum,thepresident’shome,theKnessetbuilding,andthehousenextdoortoEshkol’s.Afewstoresburneddown.IntheBiblicalZoosomeninetyanimalsdied.Therewasheavydamagetostreets,andtreeswereburned.7
YEHOSHUABAR-DAYANANDHISFRIENDSSAWTHEIRFIRSTDEADBODIES.THEYWEREIN
anabandonedvillage.Onlyafewcacklingchickenswereleft,andablindfoldeddonkey dragging a thresher through a granary of barley as if nothing hadhappened.KhanYouniswasalsodesertedwhenBar-Dayanandhisunitreachedit.Accordingtohisdiary,thatwasbeforenoon.
JUSTBEFORENOON,RUHAMAANDYOSEFWEITZLOCKEDUPTHEIRHOUSEANDWENTdowntothepublicbombshelter.ItwasunderanewapartmentbuildingwhoseconstructionhadnecessitateduprootingafewofthetreesWeitzlovedsomuch.Theshelterwasasquareroomofrawconcrete,justoverfiftysquarefeet.Whentheywalkedin,theyfoundthreewomenalreadythere,oneinanadvancedstageofpregnancy,onewithatwo-year-old,andanotherwithaseven-year-old.Thewomenhadatransistorradio.Weitz’ssonRa’ananalsocame,andanothertwowomenandthreechildren,whobroughtmattresses,food,andmedicine.Water,electricity, and tools had been prepared a few days earlier. The mood wasgloomy,wroteWeitz.Nooneknewwhatwashappening.EdithEzrachi’ssonshadbeenmovedintotheschoolbombshelterwithallthe
otherchildren.Theolderchildren, includingIlanEzrachi,wereallowedtorunhome.Thelittleones,includinghisbrotherAmiri,hadtostay.Hismothercouldnotbearthethoughtofhimsittingthereinadarkairlessshelter,hungry,soshewenttofetchhimhome.Theterriblenoiseofshellsandgunfirewentonandon.Noneofthemcouldsleep,exceptforAmiri.Hehadnervesofsteel,hismotherwrote.8
Letters written from the bomb shelters depict a profoundly disturbingexperience. “Wewere terribly afraid,” wrote Dalia Herzog from Tel Aviv. “Icannot describe the worrying. It was intolerable. We were really losing ourminds.”Thefeargaveeveryonestomachcrampsanddiarrhea.AlittlegirlwrotefromthebombshelteratKibbutzEinHanatziv,“Thesituation ishorrible.AsiandYairhavebeencalledup.”9
The night before the attack on Egypt, Dayan had ordered the censor tomaintain“a fogofwar”until theevening.“For the first twenty-fourhourswehave to be the victims,” he said. As long as the world thought Israel wasdefending itself and fighting for its life, therewould be no pressure from theoutsidetostoptheattack.Thelackofinformationgreatlyincreasedthepublic’sanxiety: as far as the people in the shelters knew, Arabs might burst in andslaughter them at any moment. The radio reported only enemy action. “TheVoiceofThunder” fromCairoclaimed, inHebrew, thatTelAvivwasburningandPalestinianfighterswereroamingthestreets.“Theyarenotafraidofdeath,
theydispensedeath!”screamedtheannouncer.MostIsraelishadnoothersourceofinformation.
SOME DID, THOUGH. NEVER BEFORE HAD THOSE AMONG THE “ARISTOCRACY OFsecrets”beenmoregratefulfortheirstatus.Atnine-thirty,tworeportersforKolIsrael reported that the Egyptian air force “had suffered a devastating blow.”Their report was not broadcast, but rumors began flying from ear to ear:switchboard operators, secretaries, producers, correspondents, editors,technicians, cafeteria workers, gatekeepers, drivers—they all had friends andrelativesandneighborswhowereconsumedwithworryanddesperatetoknowwhatwashappening.EzerWeizman telephoned his wife, Reuma, at ten and announced, “We’ve
won the war.” A few minutes later, the IDF spokesperson briefed militarycorrespondents, who were not permitted to reveal the news. At ten-thirty, anassistanttotheministerofdefense,theformerchiefofstaffZviZur,calledBen-Gurionandinformedhimthat137Egyptianplaneshadbeendestroyed,andonlysixorsevenIsraeliplaneshadbeenlost.Justbeforeeleven,Dayanspokeontheradio.HedidnotreportthedestructionoftheEgyptianairforce,butateleven,Kol Israel announced inArabic that 120Egyptian planes hadbeendestroyed.The furious censor called, demanding to know how this revelation hadhappened. He was told that Arabic programming was a separate kingdom.Around the same time, someone calledMinisterGvati and told him that 150enemyaircrafthadbeendestroyed.Meanwhile,Maariv issued its thirdeditionof the day, with a headline based on Kol Israel’s Arabic broadcast: “120EgyptianPlanesDestroyed.”SomeonefromtheIsraeliembassyinParisleakedtoReutersthattheairforcehaddestroyed117Egyptianplanesontheground.AreporterforHa’aretzinnorthernIsraelheardthenewsfromapoliceofficer
inAcre:224planes.Thereporter,YehudaAriel,alsoworkedforaGermannewsagency.HehurriedtothepostofficeinNahariya,manyofwhoseresidentswereofGermanorigin.Dr.FritzWolfwasfillinginforthepostman,whohadbeencalled up. When he read Ariel’s telegram, he initially refused to transmit it.“This is not possible,” he said in German. “Who would even believe such athing?”HethoughtArielhadgonemad.Anotherclerkspreadthenewsaroundtown.President Johnson’sadviserHarryC.McPherson, Jr., came to seeEshkolat
aroundnoon.Whilehewaswaitingoutsidetheprimeminister’soffice,helatertold Johnson, anair raid siren suddenlycameon.McPhersonaskedworriedlywhether they shouldn’t all go down to the bomb shelter, but the intelligence
officeraccompanyinghimsaid,“Itwon’tbenecessary.”McPhersonunderstoodfrom this that Israel had won.10 Yehoshua Bar-Dayan wrote: “We’re takingRafiah.”
BYTHISPOINT,BAR-DAYANHADSEEN ISRAELIS INJUREDANDKILLED.HISFRIENDUZIWAS transporting a wounded soldier in his van. “He suffered serious headwounds,”wroteBar-Dayan,“the thunderofcannons, shellsaroundus, Idon’tknow if they’re the enemy’s or our own.Smoke is rising from theposts.ThecommandergaveustenminutestofinishwithRafiah.Itseemstobeabitmoredifficult.Someone’sbeen injured. I’mopposite theRafiah train station.We’redyingtofindoutwherethere’samedicoradoctor.”Uzi’svancamebackwithUzi lying in the back, wounded. His head was bleeding. “The guys say it’snothing serious,” wrote Bar-Dayan. “He gestured with his hand. I hope it’snothing.IthinkaboutOraandthekids.Where’sthedoctor?Iprayhegetsoutofit.Atleasthe’sdonewiththewar.We’vebeenfightingforRafiahforanhournow.”Bar-Dayan’s next diary entry came at twelve-forty. Scouts reported that the
battleforRafiahwasoverandtheEgyptianswerefleeing.“ThepostsofRafiahareablaze,”hewrote.“They’rebringingoutcasualtiesfast.Wherethehellisthedoctor?Anotherunitispassingby,theguysallgivingthethumbs-up.Egyptiansoldiers’corpsesalongthesideoftheroad.Toourleft,cannonsroaring.Isthisanewbattle?”Thenhesawhisbrigade’stanksdrivingbackoutontotheroadtokeep fighting. “May the God of the armies of Israel be with them. Gili andYariv,don’tworry.Theguyswhocamebackfrom the front linesaidUziwasonly lightly injured. He’ll probably be home in a few days.” A vehicle wastaking away wounded and dead soldiers. “The injured guys are naked, theirfaces burned and dusty. Gunfire has started up again in the field. Shellsexploding and clouds of smoke. We heard Eshkol on the radio.” The primeministergavea radio address atnoon.Hedidnot reveal that theEgyptianairforcehadbeendestroyed.
2.VICTORY:“AMAZINGANDWONDERFUL”
Attwelve-thirty,EshkolmetwithDayan;Rabin,Allon,Yariv,andYadinwerealsopresent.ThesituationreportwasthatIDFarmoredandinfantryforceswereadvancingintotheSinai.DayanhadchangedhismindabouttheGazaStripandhadallowedunits tostartoccupyingGazaCity.TheairforcewasstillstrikingEgyptianairbases.UNobservershad tried,unsuccessfully, tobroker a cease-fire in Jerusalem. The IDF was still returning fire. The Jordanians expanded
theirfire,threateningRamatDavid,themainairforcebaseinthenorth.DayansuggestedprotectingthebasebyinvadingtheareaaroundtheWestBankcityofJenin. “We won’t take the city,” he said. Eshkol agreed, but stressed: “Ifpossible, leave the city.”According toDayan, he had already given orders tooccupyJeninbeforethemeetingwithEshkol.HehadalsoorderedtheairforcetostrikeatJordanandSyriaandfortheIDFtostarttheoperationtoseizeMountScopus.EshkolauthorizedDayan’sorders.11
Themeetinginvolvedoneofthemostimportantdiscussionsheldduringthewar.Onthesurface,itwasonlyamomentinthecontinuousmanagementofthesituation;infact,itledtoconqueringtheWestBankandJerusalem.AccordingtoIsraelLior,Dayansaid,“Isuggestweavoidgettinginvolvedintwowars,”asifcautioningagainstawarwithJordan.ButLiorwasawarethathewasplayingadoublegame.“Damn.WhatdoesMosheDayanwant?”hewondered.Dayanalso suggested seizing Latrun, a “grab” that had been planned long before.Yitzhak Rabin, who was reluctant to occupy the West Bank, said, “We’rescrewing their air force,why dowe need to take land at this stage?” Earlier,RabinhadrefusedtoauthorizeGeneralNarkis’sCentralCommandtostrikeattheJordaniansinresponsetotheirbombingofJerusalem.12
KINGHUSSEINOFJORDANWASWELL-KNOWNINISRAEL.YAACOVHERZOGHADSEcretlymetwithhimforthefirsttimesomethreeandahalfyearsearlier,andtherehadbeen a few more meetings since then. Roughly two years before the war,Hussein had also met with the then foreign minister, GoldaMeir. Israel andJordanmaintainedunbrokenties,bothdirectandindirect,partlyviatheUnitedStates.*TheliaisonwithHusseininLondonwasthroughhisJewishphysician,Dr.EmanuelHerbert.13
Sometendaysbeforethewarbegan,andagaintwodayslater,theIDFofferedthe assessment that the Jordanians would attack only if the situation on thesouthern front deteriorated and theEgyptiansmanaged to “nail” Israel.Rabinestimatedthattheoppositewasalsotrue:“If[Hussein]seesthatNasseristakinga beating, he’ll keep quiet.” Yariv commented, however, that Hussein wouldhaveto“dosomething,”oratleastappearto.Theassumptionwasthattoholdon to power, Hussein would have to participate in the Arabs’ war effort andperhapsevenintheirdefeat.YarivhadrestatedthisassessmentinthediscussionwithEshkolatmiddayonJune5.14
Hussein did in fact “do something”: he began shelling Jerusalem and otherplacesalongtheborder.OneshelllandedindowntownTelAviv.15Israelcould
haverespondedbydefeatingtheJordanianarmywithouttakingtheWestBankandJerusalem.ItwouldhavebeensufficienttodestroytheJordanianairforce,andperhapscarryouttheland“grabs”inLatrun,MountScopus,andtheArmonHanatziv area. But Rabin’s reservations about the West Bank and Jerusalemwere not shared by everyone on the General Staff. EzerWeizman’smemoirsreflectextremehostilitytowardthe“chirping”comingfrom“thelittleking,”ashecalledHussein.For some reason itwas important toWeizman tohumiliateHussein. “At leastNasserwas a realman,” hewrote—hehad attacked,whileHusseinhadwaiteduntilNasser“filledhisheadwithrubbish,”claimingthatTelAvivwason fire and that Israelwasabout to collapseand that itwas time todivvy up the spoils. “He heard ’spoils’—and the blood rushed to his head,”wroteWeizman.“Hecametoclaimhisshareoftheremains,togethiscutofthecorpse’sflesh.”Inretrospect,Weizmanhadnoregrets.Hesaid,infact,thathehad hopedHussein would fight: “If we’re destined to fight this war anyway,then I want to be able to slip a note into the cracks of the Western Wall.”According toWeizman, itwasHusseinwho gave thewar its historic-nationaldimension,thedreamofreturningtogreaterJerusalemandthebiblicalareas.16
AfterthenoonmeetingwithEshkol,RabinaskedDayaniftheJeninoperationshouldincludethevillageofYabedintheDotanValley.Itwasalargevillage,andRabinprobably felt they shouldnot seize it, just as they shouldnot seizeJenin.ButDayanwantedYabed. “Ithasahistory,”hewrote: itwas theplacewhere Jacob’s sons had sold their brother, Joseph, and it waswhere anArabwoman gathering firewood had discovered the cave hideout of Izz al-Din al-Qassam,thePalestinianrebelwhohadfoughtagainsttheBritish.Atthree,Dayanconvenedtheeditorsofthedailypapersandtoldthem—not
yetforpublication—thatIsraelhadnowdestroyedfourhundredArabaircraft.17
AT AROUND THE SAME TIME, GENERAL ODD BULL GOT THE SURPRISE OF HIS LIFE:JORdanian soldiers were coming in through the fence surrounding hisheadquarters atArmonHanatziv.Bull hurried out,met the commander of theJordanianforcehalfwaybetweentheentrancegateandthebuilding,andaskedwhathethoughthewasdoingthere.Theofficer,amajornamedDaoud,toldhimhehadorderstoseizethesite.Bulltookhimtothegarage,wherehetelephonedhiscontactsintheJordanianarmytoprotesttheinvasion,butMajorDaoudwasreceiving orders over his radio to enter the building itself. There were manypeople there,Bull recalled—UNworkers, a fewof them Jordanian, and somewomen and children.Daoud suggested evacuating them, butBull refused.HetookthemajorintohisofficeandcalledtheJordanianarmyagain.Hehadnever
been so angry, he later wrote. He threatened the soldiers that if they did notleave the building, he would telephone King Hussein himself. This made animpressiononDaoudandhequitthebuilding,buthissoldiersremainedonthegrounds and started shooting toward Israeli Jerusalem. Bull called the IsraeliForeign Ministry, reported the situation, and insisted that IDF soldiers notapproachthearea.HetriedtophonetheJordaniansagain,butthelinehadgonedead.HegotintohiscartotryandreachsomeoneontheJordanianside,butatthatmomenttheIDFstartedbombardingthesite.Bullstayedwherehewas.TheIDF entered the area a fewminutes before four. The building and a few carswere damaged in the exchange of fire, and Bull’s residential quarters burneddown.TheIsraelisdemandedthatheandhispeoplerelocate.Havingnochoice,Bullobeyed.Hisofficerswerehousedinahotel.UziNarkis later said that the Jordanianpresenceat theUNsitehadput the
residentialneighborhoodsinsouthwesternJerusalematrisk.“TheenemycouldeasilyhavereachedtheKatemonarea,”hesaid.TheU.S.consulquotedGeneralBull’s expert opinion: “The Jordanians handled themselves very amateurishlyandtheIsraelisveryprofessionally.”BullhurriedtotheIsraeliForeignMinistryfor the second time that day, to complain, among other things, that the IDFsoldiers who had entered the building had cut off radio contact with UNheadquartersinNewYork.18
DAYLIGHTWAS JUSTBREAKING INTHEUNITEDSTATES.A FEWPEOPLEHADALREADYBEguntograspthattheMiddleEasttheythoughttheyknewwhentheywenttobed had changed. President Johnson’s telephone had rung at four-thirty A.M.WaltRostowwasontheline,reportingthefirstdetailsofthewar.Johnsonmaynothave found thenewssurprising:onSaturdaynighthehadbeenat a fund-raising dinner, where he sat next to Mathilde Krim. At a certain point AbeFeinberg came over, leaned down, and whispered to the president that theIsraelishaddecidedtogotowar.Feinbergwasinapositiontoknow.19
TheWhiteHouselogcarefullydocumentswhatthepresidentdidaftergettingupon themorningof June5.Heshowered, shaved,anddressed, then left thebedroom and had chipped beef, a grapefruit, and a cup of tea for breakfast.Consideringthismeticulousaccount,thelackofdetailaboutwhatthepresidentdidataroundsevenA.M.isratherstriking.Hewentuptothethirdfloorwithtwobodyguardsandknockedon thedoorof room303.MathildeKrimopened thedoor in her nightgown. “We have a war,” said Johnson, and turned and leftwithoutwaitingforherresponse.Johnsonwasangry.Totheendofhisdays,heneverbelievedthattheIsraeliresorttowarwasanythingotherthanablunder.20
“Whatacrazysituation,”Krimthought;whensherecountedtheepisodelater,shefounditdifficulttodecidewhatwascrazier:thewar,orthefactthatshehadlearnedaboutitfromthepresidentoftheUnitedStatesasshestoodbeforehiminhernightgown.“Thetruthis,itwasalittlebizarreofhimtocometomelikethatandtellmeaboutthewar.Heprobablyfeltheneededalittleunderstanding,alittlesympathy.”ThehistorianWilliamQuandtsuggestedthatatthetimetherewere probably only three peoplewho spokewith Johnsonon the phonemoreoftenthanMathildeKrim:WaltRostow,DeanRusk,andRobertMcNamara.TypicallyforrelationsbetweenJerusalemandWashington,theJewishchannel
rushedwithactivity.IsraelichiefjusticeShimonAgranat,anativeofLouisville,Kentucky,phonedhischildhoodfriendArthurGoldberginNewYork;thetwohadbeenactivetogetherintheJewishstudentunion.AgranataskedGoldbergtogive Johnson amessage fromEshkol: the primeminister hoped the presidentunderstood Israel’smotives,hoped theUnitedStateswouldnot restrain Israel,and promised there would be no need for American intervention to open theStraits.Goldbergwas alarmed:Agranatwas speaking over an open telephoneline.HeaskedthatEshkolnotusethischannelofcommunicationagain.21
YEHOSHUABAR-DAYANSUMMARIZEDTHENEWS:“HUSSEINANDTHESYRIANSAREONArampage,attackingciviliantargets.Theydidn’tmentionusatall.”Thisannoyedhim.“We’rewaitinganxiouslyfor therestof thebattle inourarea,”hewrote,munchingonanapple.TheywerestillnearRafiah.Agroupofhismenwentofftorepairatank.Theturretofoneofthetanksthatpassedbywasdamaged,butwhenhepointed thisout,his commander respondeddismissivelyand said theEgyptianswerefleeing.Zvikaarrived inUzi’svanandsaid thatUzihadbeeninjuredbecausehewasn’twearingaflakhelmet.Bar-Dayanknewverylittleofthearmy’sprogressintheSinai.Rumorshadit
thattheywerehavingtroublereachingElArish.Andsothemenwaited.FifteenEgyptianprisonersweremarchedinwiththeirhandsup.“Willtheykillthem?”Bar-Dayanwrote.Theywalkedbetweentwotanks.“TheheroesoftheEgyptianarmy are coming toward us, the sons of bitches.Yes, I hate you,”Bar-Dayanadded.Oneprisoner,alarge,clumsyman,drewupinavehicleandsteppedout.He had three stars on his shoulder: a colonel, the guys determined. He kneltdownwiththeotherprisoners,puttinghisfaceinthesand.Ajeepcametotakehimaway.“TheguysarestartingtowalkaroundwithCarlGustafsubmachineguns that belonged to the Egyptians,” wrote Bar-Dayan. “One guy has anEgyptian radio. He says: Let’s call Nasser! Smoking Egyptian Piccadillycigarettes. The commander just went by. The guys’ spirits are way up.” Bar-
Dayan felt strong and confident and prayed the Egyptian air force had beenparalyzed.TheypickedupthemovementtowardElArish.“Twoofourhalftracksonthe
way.Directhits.Piecesofhumanfleshhangfromthem.Godhelpus.”Arumorcame through that the air force had demolished 180 planes on the ground.“Goodjob.We’remuchsafer.”Blacksmokewascomingfromthebattlefields.Green,red,andyellowplumesofsmokeroseuplikesignalsforthehelicopters.“Onthewayoneofourhalftracks,burnedwithitsmen.Theyliethereburned,headless.We salute them.Adepressing andhorrifying sight.Gili andYariv, Ikissyouonmyweddingring,wewillseeeachotheragain,Iamsurethat thefightingwillbeoverintwodays.”AtsevenP.M.hewrote,“TwilighthasfallenontheSinaiDesert.”22
Around the same time, news reached the Jerusalembomb shelterwhere theWeitz familyhad taken refuge:157enemyplaneshadbeendestroyed.23MostIsraelisstillhadnoideawhatwashappeningandwereasfrightenedasbefore,planning to spend thenight in the shelters.MinisterHaimGvati spent severalhoursintheshelterwithhisneighbors,thenleftfortheKnesset.Bythetimehearrived, the Jordanians had renewed their bombing. Everyone in the Knessetbuilding crowded into the bomb shelter. It was an extraordinary scene,wroteGvati.Eshkolwaslate.AllonandBeginalsohadtroublecomingfromTelAviv:theygotstuckinatrafficjamofmilitaryconvoysjustoutsideJerusalem.Theministers crowded into a small room in the shelter and heard a report
from Rehavam Ze’evi. El Arish had been conquered. The entire Gaza Strip,apartfromGazaCity,wasinIsraelihands.Thearmoredcorpswasprogressingas planned in three separate thrusts, commanded by Israel Tal (north), ArielSharon (central), and Avraham Yaffe (south). In Khan Younis, an entireEgyptiandivisionhadbeencrushed,itscommandertakenprisoner.Theairforcehad demolished 362 planes, 300 of them Egyptian, the rest Syrian andJordanian.Essentially,theairforcesofallthreecountrieshadbeentakenoutofcommission. Military experts agreed that this was an unprecedentedachievement. The Jordanians had bombed several towns, while the Syrians,oddly,weredoingvirtuallynothing.Gvaticouldbarelycontainhisexcitement:whowouldhavebelievedthis?WhenEshkolfinallyarrived,hewaswelcomedwithcheersandelation.The
cabinetmeetingwasshort,Gvatinoted.“AproposalwasmadetotaketheOldCity of Jerusalem. Since a forcewas on itsway to secure the road toMountScopus anyway, the political implications were quickly analyzed and it was
agreed that the General Staff should decide on the basis of the militarycircumstances.”TheideaoftakingtheOldCityhadbeenbroughtupbyYigalAllon and Menachem Begin. Their reasoning was primarily patriotic, notmilitary;theJordanianattackontheIsraelipartofthecitymerelyprovidedanexcuse. Some participants suggested considering the legal and politicalcomplications of conquering the city, including the holy sites.MinistersAranandShapirasuggestedthattheIDFseizethecityandturnitovertointernationalrule.MinistersKolandBentovsuggestedpostponingthedecisiononJerusalem,or alternatively, delegating authority to the primeminister and theminister ofdefense.EshkolwantedtheOldCity.HewantedtheWestBank, too,buthebelieved
theworldwould force Israel towithdraw from both.He suggested a peculiarresolution: “In light of the situation that has evolved in Jerusalem,becauseoftheJordanians’bombingandafterthewarningsthatweresent,wemayhaveanopportunity to enter the Old City.” Allon added this gloss: “The governmentdoesnotobjecttoseizingtheOldCityifitbecomesmilitarilynecessary.”DavidBen-GurionwasalsointheKnessetthatevening.HesupportedtakingtheOldCity.Afterthecabinetmeeting,theKnessetsworeintwonewministers,Beginand
Yosef Sapir. Dayan was there for the swearing-in, but the ceremony wasdelayed,andhelosthispatienceandwentbacktoTelAviv.“Theoccasionwasunforgettable,”wroteGvati.“Itembodied theunityof thenationdefending itsexistence at a time of unprecedented danger, and its pride in the IDF fordemonstratingitsimmensetalentandcapability.Thespontaneoussingingofthenationalanthemthatbrokeoutattheendofthesessionexpressedonlyafractionofthefeelingsofthosepresentatthisgreatoccasion.”Gvatiwenthomethroughdarkstreets,tothesoundofshellsthundering.Back
inthebombshelter,hetoldhisneighborswhatKolIsraelhadnotyetreported.Thenhewentup tohis apartment,but thewalls shookandhe returned to theshelter.24
YEHOSHUABAR-DAYANMANAGEDTOGETTWOHOURSOFSLEEP,BUTATTWOA.M.HEwasawokenbyafriendwhotoldhimRabinandHodhadjustbeenontheradio:fourhundredplaneshadbeendestroyed.Itwasthebroadcastthewholecountryhadbeenwaitingfor.“Amazingandwonderful,”wroteBar-Dayan.“Thenewsis spreading fromone truck to thenext and jolting the soldiers awakeas theytakeintheenormityoftheaccomplishment—theycan’tcontaintheirjoy.”
Hodalsoreportedthat theairforcehadlostnineteenpilots:eightkilled, therest missing, perhaps captured. David Ben-Gurion received a more extensivereportoncasualties—fortykilled,fourhundredinjured.Bar-Dayanwrote,“Fourofourfallensoldierslieonthegroundnearthetank,asiftheyareasleep.”Henoticedthatoneofthemwasfair-hairedandworeparatroopers’boots.25
CHAPTER13DAYTWO
1.ELATION: “MYGOD!THECOUNTRY IS SUDDENLYSOLARGE”
The7thBrigadeandGeneralTal’sotherarmoredunitskeptmoving,asdidallofArielSharon’sandAvrahamYaffe’sforces.FightingalsocontinuedintheGazaStrip. Yehoshua Bar-Dayan and his friendsmoved down the desert along thecoastalroute.Onthewaytheysawanarmoredcommandojeepwiththreedeadsoldiers inside. The vehicle had been hit head-on. The dead men were stillseated in theirpositions,onewithhisgreeneyesopen.Oneof themhaddiedclutchingthewheel,hisgazefixedonthewindingstripofasphaltahead.Alongthe road Bar-Dayan also saw the bodies of Egyptian soldiers. Two IsraeliMirages flew overhead, apparently chasing down the last few survivingEgyptianaircraft.1
AtaroundtwoA.M.onthemorningofJune6,EshkolhadauthorizedDayan’spriorities for the rest of the war: destroy the Egyptian armored corps; seizeSharmel-Sheikh,theLatrunRoad,theOldCity,andtheentireWestBank;seizetheBaniasintheGolanHeights,TelAzaziat,andthedemilitarizedzonesontheSyrianborder.ThebattlefortheroadtoMountScopushadalreadybegun.2
GeneralOddBull toldhis superiors inNewYorkaboutanexchangeof firealongtheIsraeli-Syrianborder.HereportedthattheSyrianswereshellingIsraelicommunities.Still exiled fromhis headquarters,Bullwasusing theAmericanconsulate in Jerusalem as a base of communications.3 Aharon Yariv told thegovernment that theSyrian attacks on a few townships in the northwere lessseverethanexpected.4
Justbeforedaylight,AbbaEbanlefthishouseincentralJerusalem.HewasonhiswaytotheUNGeneralAssemblyinNewYork,withtheaimofdelayingacease-fire resolution for as long as possible: the IDF neededmore time.5 Hiswife,Suzy,walkedhimtothecar.Theyhugged,andwhentheypulledbacktheyfeltsomethinglikeagustofwindpassbetweenthematfacelevel.AccordingtoEban,itwasabulletorapieceofshrapnel.6
Atfourinthemorning,YigalAllonheardonBBCRadiothatthewarwould
soonbeover.HewasafraiditwouldendwithouttheconquestoftheOldCity.HetelephonedEshkol,whotoldhimtocometohisoffice.WhenAllonreachedthebuilding,he foundMenachemBegin there, too.Beginhadheard thesamenewson theBBCand, after speakingwithDayan,hadcalledEshkolwith thesamequestion:“WhataboutJerusalem?”AllonandBeginwentintoseeEshkoltogether and declared ceremoniously: “It is time.” Allon later recalled thatEshkol responded positively and told the two ministers the topic was to bediscussedatthecabinetmeetinglaterthatday.7
YEHOSHUA BAR-DAYAN AND HIS COMRADES REACHED THE JIRADI THATMORNING, ASEriesofEgyptianstrongholdsonthewaytoElArish.Fortunately,theareahadbeen seized by advance forces after a tough fight.ElArish itselfwas alreadytaken.Therewasadamagedtankwhosecommanderhadbeenkilled.Theturretwas coveredwith blood and human flesh. Someone pulled out a blanket andwent into the tank tobringout thebody.Twofemalesoldierswere there, too.“Golden-hairedgirls, not yet nineteen,walking among the tanks and thedeadsoldiers,”Bar-Dayanwrote.8*Bar-Dayanandhisfriendsspreadoutandwaited.Anotherpickuptruckwas
parkednext tohisown.Thedriver,ayoungsoldier,couldnotstopcrying.“Itreally isveryhardnot tocryhere.MyGod, let itbeover,”wroteBar-Dayan.Thesobbingdriverstartedbeatinghisfistsagainsthishead,histearsturningtowails.Thetwowomensoldiersneartohimdidnotsayaword.AnofficeraskedBar-Dayan to try and calm the young soldier because he was damaging themorale of the others.His namewasSander; hewas amilitary driver, and hisbosswasthemanwhosebodyhadjustbeenextricatedfromthetank.Bar-Dayanwasshockedtodiscoverthatthedeadmanwasaregimentalcommander,notatankdriverashehadpreviouslythought.ItwasEhudElad:heandShukahadjust eaten lunch together at Morris’s in Beersheba. They had gone tokindergartentogetherinKfarSaba.HehadbeenapatientofShuka’sfather,thelocalphysician.MajorElad,originallyEidelman,aresidentofAshkelon,wasthirty-onewhen
hedied,leavingbehindhiswife,Hava.HewasthecommanderofaregimentofPattontanks.“Wewerefriends,”ShmuelGorodishlaterrecalled,andsaidEladhadapowerfulsenseofpatriotismandawarmheart;hewasstrongandknewexactlywhat hewanted from himself, his subordinates, and his commanders.Tall,bespectacled,“veryimposing,”hewasastrappingmanwholookedtoughon the outside, but one IDF publication said that he was not really that wayinside.Helikedtakingphotographs,heplayedtennis,hedreamedoftravelingto
Europe.AccordingtoGorodish,helovedhisPatton.*Elad’stanktookadirecthitinthebattleforJiradi.Hehadbeeninhisusualposition,hisheadandtorsoprotrudingfromtheturret,andwaskilledinstantly.Atfirst,thecommandertriedtorepressthenewsofElad’sdeath,fearinghissoldiers’reaction.ItwasnoteasytoquietSander thedriver.Bar-Dayan toldhimEhudwouldwant him tobe aman,nottocryduringbattle.Heslowlycalmeddown.The convoy was still parked, waiting for orders. Big flies buzzed around.
“Thedistinctivesmellofburnedcarsandscorchedbodiesstayswithus,”wroteBar-Dayan.Hesawafewprisonersandpickeduparumor:theMirageshehadseenbeforehadalreadyshotdowntwoMiGs.Twolargetransportplanesflewlowoverheadandtheguysintheplaneswaved.Thesunbeatdownandthefliesharassed them. Gili had left him some packaged moist napkins. Refreshing.Breakfast:cannedcorn,peasoup,peanuts,Valenciaoranges.Moreburnedhalf-tracks,bothEgyptianandIsraeli;morethunderingexplosions.Atten-thirty,Bar-Dayanheardonthetransistor thatLatrunandJeninhadbeencaptured,andhewrote, “Hussein started it, the fool, and now the scoundrel has gotwhatwascomingtohim.”TheLatrunregionoverlookedtheroadfromTelAvivtoJerusalem.Thefailed
attemptstocapturethisareaduringtheWarofIndependencewereimprintedinIsraelimemoryasoneofthemoretraumaticlossesinIDFhistory.Themissionremainedtobeaccomplished,whetherbymeansofa“grab”orotherwise.11Theconquest of Latrun, therefore, had great secular symbolic significance—muchlikeArmonHanatzivandMountScopus.“Youstandinthishistoricalsilenceandpinchyourself—isthisnotadream?”
wrote Menahem Talmi inMaariv. “Is my mind playing tricks on me?” Heremembered theWarof Independence: “You see thebattlefields from ’48 andtheyliebeforeyoulikealivingmonument.Intheattempttoreachtheplaceinwhichyoustandtoday,manyhundredsofIsraelifightersdied;theirbodieslayscattered over this westward-sprawling expanse and bloated in the terribleburningheat....MyGod!Thecountryissuddenlysolarge!”12
Fighting in Jerusalem continued; just before noon, Dayan reached MountScopus.“NoconquestinSinaiwouldhavemadeupforthelossinprestigehadIsraelfailedtotakeMountScopus,”UziNarkissaidafterward.DayanreachedMountScopusviatheLatrunRoad.Hetooknoteofthedate:June6,D-Day.13EzerWeizmantraveledwithhim.OnthewaytoMountScopustheystoppedatalocalhotel,theAmbassador.Weizman,somewhatchildishly,tookafewpiecesof thehotel stationery“forhistory’s sake.”They toured theabandoned lecture
halls and labs of the old Hebrew University campus. “Time seemed to havestoodstill:theclockhadstopped,”wroteWeizman.Theywentintothelabonceusedbyhisuncle,Moshe,achemistryprofessor.Onthedeskhefoundnotesinhisuncle’shandwriting,ontheblackboardanannouncementofhisnextlecture,in 1948.Weizman imagined he could detect a strong odor of chemicals. Hissister, Yael, had studied here. Someone found one of her old notebooks.Weizmanthoughtofherson,David,whowaswithSharon’stroopsonthewaytotheSuezCanal.LookingoutoverthebreathtakingviewfromMountScopus,Weizmancontemplatedhissisterandthegreatfamilydramashehadtriggered.EzerandhissisterwerethenieceandnephewofChaimWeizmann,theleader
oftheZionistmovementandthefirstpresidentofIsrael.Inheryouth,YaelwasinlovewithHaimLaskov,whohadeventuallyreplacedMosheDayanaschiefof staff. The youngEzer, at thirteen,was also enamored ofLaskov,whowasseventeen at the time. He wrote that Laskov had stolen a place in his heart:“muscular,healthy,strong,theepitomeofsportsandyouthinPalestine.”Laskovwas“agod”tohim,andEzer“wasdrawntohimwithabondoffriendship.”Sohewassorrywhenhissisterbrokeupwithhim.Andthena tragedyoccurred:Yaelfell in lovewithaBritishofficer.Weizmanreferredtohimasa“gentile”andfelt thatYaelandfatehaddealt thefamilyadreadfulblow.“Iwasallfireandbrimstone,”hewrote. “Father—hisworldcollapsed.”His statusasChaimWeizmann’s brother enabled the father to arrange theBritishofficer’s transferout of Palestine, but Yael’s love for her captain only deepened. Her fatherthreatened: “If youmarry that goy, itwill be your bitter end andmean beingtotallycutofffromthishouseandfromthispeople,likeatraitor.”Ezerwasalsohurt:“I thoughtshehadbetrayed theJewishpeople,Zionism,ourparents,ourhome,Israel,andme.”YaelandtheBritishcaptainmarriedanyway.Onlyonemaninthefamilydidnotcutheroff,andevenhelpedthecouple:Yael’suncleChaim,presidentoftheWorldZionistOrganization.Yael’sson,David,wasbornin1945.AtfifteenhehadcometovisithisuncleEzer,nowaseniorcommanderintheairforce,andatseventeenhemovedtoIsraelandenlistedinthearmoredcorps.OnMay15,1967,hewasfinishinganofficers’trainingcourse.WeizmanaskedShmuelGorodishtogiveDavidapistolthathisfatherhadlefthimwiththeinstructiontogiveittothefirstgrandsontobecomeanIsraeliofficer.“Whata crazy world,”Weizman thought. “How history turns out! Where is it, thatinvisible computer,which computes thesewhims and oddities, sticks togethertheendsandjoinsthelinks,whereisit?”WeizmanhimselfeventuallymarriedMosheDayan’swife’ssister.Nowhesat
withhisbrother-in-lawandNarkisonMountScopus,theOldCitybeforethem,
hisheadintheclouds.14
BEFORE THE IDF’S ENTRY INTO THE OLD CITY, UZI NARKISWAS A FRUSTRATEDMAN,constantlyfightingforstatusinthearmyandhisshareofglory.Inhismemoirs,he complained about the Central Command’s low rank in Dayan’s list ofpriorities; the forces at his disposalwereminimal and insufficient. There hadbeennoplanningfortheWestBankorEastJerusalem;italljustsnowballed,heclaimed,as ifhewereunaware thataplanhadexisted.Amanwithacademicpretensions and, later, political aspirations, Narkis commanded the NationalDefenseCollegebeforethewar.HewasamongthePalmahalumniwhofounditextremelydifficulttocometotermswiththefailuresofthearmyintheWarofIndependence, including its unsuccessful attempt to occupy the Old City. In1948,NarkishadledanefforttobreakthroughtotheOldCity’sJewishQuarterand rescue the residents, who were besieged by the Jordanians. Its failurehauntedanentiregenerationofIsraelis,andwasgreatlyassociatedwithNarkis.Nowhefelthewasgettinganotherchance.“We’rehopingforaction,”hewrotetohissoldiers,andtoldthemthepeople
ofJerusalemrememberedtheOldCityandwantedtoreturntoit.15Accordingtohis diary,Narkis toldTeddyKollek, “Youmay yet be themayor of a unifiedJerusalem.”Thatwasonthefirstdayofthewar,attenminutespastnine.Afewhours later, Narkis ordered Mordechai Gur to break through to the route toMountScopus, takeover theRockefellerMuseumarea inEastJerusalem,andpreparetotaketheOldCity.“TodayJerusalemwillbeliberated,”heannouncedtohis troops.“TodaytheIDFwilleraseastainleftonthemapofourcountrytwentyyearsago,whenourholyandancientcapitalwastornfromtheheartofthenation.”HedescribedhissoldiersastheheirsofthezealouswarriorsfromthetimeoftheSecondTemple.“ThesoldiersoftheCentralCommandhavethegreatfortunetobeentrustedwiththeliberationofthecityofeternity,thecityofDavid, thecityof thepastand the future.Today theystandat theheartof thecountry,theheartofthenation,theheartofhistory.”TheconquestoftheWestBank, Narkis said, would fulfill the command’s “deep longings.” But DayandeniedNarkispermissiontotakeovertheOldCity—“thatVatican,”hecalledit—andorderedthatitbeencircledinstead.16
ByJune6,thewarinJerusalemhadclaimeddozensoflives.InbattlesfortheJordanianofficers’schoolandafortifiedtargetknownasAmmunitionHill,notfarfromtheborder,manysoldiershaddied.Somewerekilledbyfriendlyfire:theyweremistakenlytargetedbytheairforce.Narkiswrote,“Itisveryeasyto
make suchmistakes.”He putmore pressure on theGeneral Staff, saying thatIsraelwouldhaveonlyitselftoblameiftheWallremainedinJordanianhands.17
King Hussein requested a cease-fire, even begged for one. AmbassadorBarbour sent the Foreign Ministry the four telegrams he had received fromAmman, the first at 5:25 that morning. In it, Hussein had announced thatwithout an immediate cessationof fire, his regimewas finished.Half anhourlater,asecondmessagearrived,sayingthatthekingwasnotrequestingaformalcease-fire,butmerelyimploringIsraeltostopwhathedescribedasitspunitiveactionagainsttheJordanianmilitary.Justbeforeseven,heagaincautionedthathemightlosecontrolofevents.Theking’smessagesreachedJerusalemateightin the morning. They presented an opportunity to stop—before hundreds ofthousands of Palestinians came under Israeli control. Dean Rusk instructedAmbassadorBarbourtoconvinceIsraeltoeaseupmilitarilysoasnottobringdown the king, but he did not demand that Israel refrain from occupying theWestBank.BarbourconveyedtherequesttoEshkol,buthisimpressionwasthatit was too late: Israel no longer had any interest in keeping the king on histhrone,notafterhehadbombedJerusalem,KfarSaba,Netanya,andothertownswellwithinIsrael.NeitherEshkolnorDayanwantedacease-fire.Notyet.18
HenRonen,amedicfromKibbutzYehiam,rememberedanearliertimewhenhehadbeenpreparingtooccupytheOldCitywithhisunit.Atthelastminute,that operation had been canceled.He recalled himself and his fellow soldierswaitingnear theMandelbaumGate.“Iwas justakid then,withoutawifeandchildren.Iwasafighter.Buttoday?TheOldCity?”Theideathathewouldbeone of the soldiers who conquered Jerusalem frightened him. The alleywaysweresonarrow:“Someonecouldpourboilingwateronyoufromthewindowandgetyouthatway.”Still,headmitted,Jerusalemwasadream.19
YEHOSHUA BAR-DAYAN’S CONVOY WAS MOVING “METER BY METER,” AS HE WROTE.TheyhadreachedElArishandheadedsouth, towardBirLahfan,aplaceBar-Dayan remembered from theSinaiCampaign tenyears earlier.He recognizedthe open-air cinema that had served as a canteen. Nearby were dozens ofoverturned railway cars.Hewas impressedwith the area’s development sincehislastvisit;nowtherewerefieldsofcasuarinas,olivegroves,andgreenery.Hesawtwocrashedplanes.Theystoppedoften,meetingothersoldierseverywhere theywent.“Where’s
thefighting?”askedBar-Dayan.Hewasafraid,kissinghisweddingringoften.HesawmoreandmoreEgyptianprisoners,hundredsofthem.Manyhadputon
blueandgreenpajamasovertheiruniforms,inanattempttodisguisethemselvesas civilians; somewore only their underwear, andmanywere barefoot. Theywalkedwith their hands up in the air, frightened.Bar-Dayan said to them, inArabic,“WeinhuaJamalAbdelNasser?” (Where isNasser?)Thenhehurledsome juicy Arabic curses their way. Some of the Israeli soldiers took theprisoners’watchesofftheirwristsandstartedfightingovertheloot,somethingBar-DayanalsorememberedfromtheSinaiCampaign.OnesoldiergotholdofaRussianassaultrifleandproceededtobangitagainstatraincaruntilitwentoffand he got a bullet in the face. An Egyptian tank that looked abandonedsuddenly came to life and leaped toward an IDF vehicle in a sort of suicidemission,injuringseveralpeople.Itwasdemolishedatcloserangewithmachine-gunandbazookafire.Theyrepairedthetankofthedeadregimentalcommander,Ehud.Itwasnotbattle-ready,butwouldkeepgoinganyway—“ahorsewithnohorseman,”asBar-Dayanwrote.20
•••
MANY ISRAELISWERE STILL SITTING IN BOMB SHELTERS, BUT NEWS OF THE ARMY’Sprogresshadtraveledquicklyandfedtheday’sheadlines.“Tuesdaywasadayof increasingly joyful news,” wrote Yosef Weitz. “There is a noticeableinclination to conquer theWest Bank.” Life in the bomb shelter was settlingdown. The neighbors set up a “commune” and ate theirmeals together. “Thechildren are amusing themselves. Two-year-old Danny keeps everyone busy,whetherwithhisscreamingorhisdancing.Theolderboy,aroundten,followstheIDFmovesonamaphehungonthewall,markingeachspotintheSinaiandJordanasitfalls.”Weitzhimselfcouldscarcelytearhiseyesoffthemap:“IseeinmymindthatwesternEretzIsrael isbeingunifiedandthe longingwehavehad since 1948, to reach the Jordan River, is about to come true. A greathappinessfillsmyheartandsoul.”HehopedtheArabswouldfleethistimetoo,butfeareditwouldnothappen,andwroteworriedly,“Howwillwetakeinthismass?”21
InthebombshelteratKibbutzAyeletHashahar,thechildrenheardaboutthecaptureofJeninandtheDotanValley.Theywereveryexcited,eventhoughtheSyrians had bombed their kibbutz earlier that day. They had just learned inschoolabouthowJoseph’sbrotherssoldhimintoslavery.“Theywantustocallthearmyandaskwhetherthey’vefoundthepitJosephwasthrowninto,”wrotekibbutzmemberRuthGeffenDotan.22AwomaninthebombshelteratKibbutzEinHanatzivwrotetoherchildreninLosAngelesthattherewasnolongerany
reasonforangeratEshkol.Everythingwasfallingintoplace.23
2.AGAMBLE:“IADMITIWASACOWARD”
Thecabinet convened in theafternoon.First theministersheard that thepopehadaskedforJerusalemtobecomeanopencity,whichconstitutedyetanotheropportunitytoavoidtheconquest.AccordingtoIsraelLior,however,itwastoolate:“Thatday,itwascleartoall theministersandeveryIDFgeneral that thewheelofwarcouldnolongerbeturnedback.”Itseemsthat,unlikeNarkis,Liorsawnot“snowballing”butratherareasonedandpragmaticresponse:“Husseinmadeahistoricerror,andwewillexploititfully.”24
ThisdiscussionwasverydifferentfromtheonepriortothedecisiontoattackEgypt;itproceededwithoutfear.TherewasnomoretalkofthethreattoIsrael’sexistence;on thecontrary, theministersheardencouragingreportsfromYariv,whosaid theEgyptianarmywas incompletedisarray.ThedirectorgeneraloftheForeignMinistry,AriehLevavi, reportedonHussein’s telegrams, themostrecent of which had arrived half an hour earlier. Hussein was prepared for acease-fire,preferablytobekeptsecret,buthewouldacceptapublicstatementifnecessary.His petition necessitated a decision overwhether to seize theWestBankornot.HavingsettledinPalestinemorethanfiftyyearsearlier,LeviEshkolfoundit
easy to view the nineteen-year-old Green Line as a temporary, artificialarrangement, the result ofmilitary failure.His address to the cabinet that daywascharacteristicallyineloquent:“Giventhenewsituationthathasemergedwemustcontemplatenewdefinitionsofour securityandpoliticalgoals,which inmy opinion must be directed toward changing the nature of Israeli-Arabrelationsastheyhaveexistedsince1948,andinlightofthedefeatoftheArabarmies we must form a plan that will assure Israel’s proper standing in theMiddleEast,whileachievingpermanentpeaceandbordersecurity.”EshkolwasfamiliarwiththediscussionsconductedbytheMossad,theIDF,
and theForeignMinistry following theSamuaoperation.TheyhadconcludedthatIsrael’snationalinterestlayinallowingHusseintocontinuetheprocesshehad begun—to destroy Palestinian identity by integrating Palestinians intoJordan and encouraging them to emigrate.Eshkol knew that taking control oftheWestBankwouldplaceamillionPalestiniansunderIsraelirule, inevitablydeepening their national identity and posing a danger to Israel’s Jewishcharacter. But to guide his government to decide not to seize theWestBank,Eshkol would have had to know, or at least presume, that Israeli rule would
remainforalongtime.Didhehaveanywayofknowingthat?Perhapsnot.Onlythenightbefore,hehadexpressedtheviewthatIsraelwouldhavetogivebacktheWestBankandJerusalem.PerhapshethoughttheWestBankwouldserveasabargainingchip.Hemayhavehopedthebargainingwouldleadtopeace,withbetterbordersandaccesstotheWesternWall.Inlightofthepast,hemayhavebeenanticipatingamassflightofPalestinians.Meanwhile,theconquestwasprogressingrapidlyandwithrelativeease,and
therewasevergreatertemptationtotakeovertheareasBen-GurionhadfailedtoseizeintheWarofIndependence.ThedestructionoftheEgyptianairforceandthe initial successes in theWest Bank had produced ecstatic headlines in thepapers. “WithAllForces ofBody andSpirit—toVictory!” declaredHa’aretz.“WellDone!WellDone!”praisedMaariv.25
AttimesEshkolseemedlikeagamblerinacasinowhotellshimself,“Icanstop any time Iwant”—and keeps on gambling.The party, the press, and theranksofHolocaust-hauntedIsraeliswhohad taken theDefenseMinistryawayfromhimbecausehehadhesitatedtosendtheIDFtowarwouldnotforgivehimnowifhedenied themthisgreatvictory.Fromhisvulnerableposition,Eshkolwas already thinking of the next round: the war over fame. Yaacov Herzogobserved that he spoke slowly and indistinctly. He was faced with threeministerswhoseinfluencewasgreaterthanhisown—Allon,Begin,andDayan.Allon offered the government an entire philosophy, evidently formulated
before the war. They should strive to negotiate with Hussein. If that did notsucceed, they should turn the West Bank into an autonomous region witheconomic ties to Israel.Meanwhile, theOldCity shouldbeconqueredbutnotformallyannexed.TheSyrianbordermustbeamended,whichmeantcontrollingtheBanias. Israelshouldholdall the territoriesuntilapoliticalsettlementwasreached,“evenformonthsoryears.”TheyshouldnotgiveupGaza,butlookforwaystogettherefugeesoutofthere.Begin said that taking theWest Bankmeant “liberating the eastern part of
western Eretz Israel,” and demanded expanding the conquest to include theJordanRiver,butnot thelandbeyondit.HeassertedthatIsraelshouldcontroltheOldCity, andwasquick to suggest that theentiregovernment, alongwiththe two chief rabbis, should go to theWesternWall and recite a prayer. “TheChristianworldwillunderstandthat,”hesaid.Beginalsoaddressedtheissueoftheresidentsof the territories,whomheclearlywantedto leave.Buthespokecautiously, saying Israel must do everything possible so that “the Arabs aremovedinahumaneway.”
DayansuggestedtakingSharmel-Sheikh,occupyingtherangesofhillsintheWestBank(butwithoutdescendingtotheJordan),andencirclingtheOldCitybut not entering it immediately. In response to an objection from Begin, headded, however, that the IDF could enter the Old City at any time once thegovernmentgavetheword.Dayanalsohopedthatfightingcouldbeavoided.Hebelievedthatthepeopleofthecitywouldraisewhiteflagsandaskthearmytoenter.“Jerusalemhasseenalotofwaranddestructioninitsday.Wemusttry,asmuch as possible, to take the city peacefully,” he wrote. According to Ben-Gurion,Dayan did not believe Israelwould be allowed to keep theOldCity.“Moshedoesnotwant to takeitbecausehedoesn’twant tohavetogivebacktheWesternWall,”hewrote;hehadheardthisfromoneofDayan’sassistants.26Inhisownmemoirs,Dayanclaimed thequestionwasnotwhether to conquerJerusalem,buthowandwhen.27
Thiswas the decisivemoment. IfEshkol truly believed that conquering theWestBankmadesensesoas togainabargainingchip,heshouldhave in thatcasestoppedshortoftakingtheOldCity.HeshouldhaveknownthatnoIsraeligovernment,certainlynothisown,wouldbeabletogiveuptheOldCity,andthattherewasnochancethatHusseinwouldgiveuphisownclaim,either.TheseizureofJerusalemthreatenedtoreturnthesituationtothestalematethathadprecededthewar:onceagain,therewouldinfactbenothingtooffertheArabs.But Eshkol and the ministers did not ask themselves why, exactly, it was toIsrael’sbenefit tocontrol theOldCity,as if thatpointwere takenforgranted.HaimMosheShapiraandZalmanAranfearedthatIsraelwouldfinditselfinadifficult position, particularly in relation to the Christian world, but no onerejected the dream.At the center of the debatewas not political logic, but aneruption of feelings, as if those present had suddenly found the light hiddenwithin,hadsuddenlyseen the truthandgraspedwhat theyhadalwaysknown,whether secularor religious: that theOldCitywas the trueZion, thegrail forwhichthenationhadyearnedfortwothousandyears,therockofitsfoundation.IsraelLiornotedthat thewholediscussionproceededinanimprovisedway,
withnoorganizedorsystematicprocess,withnoworkingpapers.Theministersdidnotexamineallthealternatives.Theycould,forexample,haveconfinedtheIDF toopening the route to theWallwithout seizing theentirecity; this, theycouldhaveclaimed,wasinaccordancewiththe1949truceagreement.Mindfuloftheirplaceinpoliticsandhistory,someoftheministerswhohad
supportedwaitingnowtriedtojustifytheirhesitancy.“IadmitIwasacoward,”saidShapira,butclaimedthatthedelayhadstrengthenedIsrael’spositionwith
Johnson.Dayanadmittedthatthepostponementwasperhapsablessing,buthadthe Egyptians begun thewar and bombed Israel’s air bases, seizing the Sinaiwouldhavecost“notthousands,buttensofthousandsoflives.”Althoughhehadjoinedthegovernment,Dayanhadnotchangedhisview:he
believedEshkolshouldnotbeprimeminister.DayanhadlittlefaithinEshkol’sability torun thecountry.“Itwas thefirst timeIhad toactwithouthavinganauthorityaboveme,”hewrote.Hewassubjecttothegovernmentandtheprimeminister,and,ashesaid,“securitydecisionsdependonpoliticaldecisions.”Butin reality, “and especially morally speaking,” Dayan identified a profounddifference between his role as chief of staff in the Sinai Campaign and hiscurrentstatus:then,hehadansweredtoBen-Gurion.28Now,Dayandidnotfirstconsult Eshkol about every move, and once or twice he sought governmentapprovalforactions thathadalreadybeentaken;hesimplykeptEshkol in thepicture. Herzog noted that Dayan was irritable and rude during the cabinetmeeting. He dozed some of the time, then gave vent to an angry outburst inwhichhe toldhis colleagues that thiswasno time for a symposium.Atothermomentsheseemedreasonableandconsiderate.AriehLevavipassedHerzoganotesayingthatDayanwaslikeDr.JekyllandMr.Hyde.Dayansatattheendofthetable,atadistancefromtheotherministers.Whetherheintendeditornot,he left the impression that he did not consider himself part of the group,accordingtoHerzog.Themeetingendedwithnoclearconclusion,buttherewasa sortofunspokenagreementwithDayan’sposition.Noonehaddisputedhisideas.Before leaving the meeting, Shapira asked to issue a special instruction to
soldierstoexercisecautionindealingwithArabciviliansandtheirproperty.Hereminded the government of the Kafr Kassem incident during the SinaiCampaign.Dayanrejectedtherequest:aspecialinstructionwouldbeinterpretedasanadmissionthatthesoldierswerenotactingproperly,hesaid;thenheleft.Eshkol askedDayan to come back and said he agreedwith the request to beespeciallystrictaboutappropriatebehaviortowardArabcivilians.HenRonenfromKibbutzYehiamwasalreadyinthecenterofRamallah.“No
onereturnedourfire,”helaterrecounted.“Theyhid.Whiteflagseverywhere.Afeelingof surrender.Therewouldbenothing to tell.The radio station:now itwas ours. And it was so easy. We didn’t do any work!”29 The takeover ofRamallah’spopularradiostationpromptedparticularexcitementinmanyofthesoldiers,symbolizingasitdidasecularimportancesimilartoArmonHanatziv,MountScopus,andLatrun.Onesoldierrecalledthatwhilestillpreparingforthe
operation,theyhadbeenlisteningtoaparticularlycaptivatingJordanianDJasshe accompanied Adamo’s “Tombe la Neige” with her silky whisper.30Meanwhile,fightingaroundtheOldCitywallswasinfullswing.HaimitoMosowitz,alsofromYehiam,wasaparatrooper.Heandhisfriends
had been assigned to occupy ElArish, but insteadwere brought up from thesouth to Jerusalem. They penetrated the eastern part of the city, near theMandelbaumGate.“Itwasalittlechaotic,”Mosowitzrecalled.Hewascold.Heaskedtheothermeniftheyalsofeltthecold,buttheydidnot.Itmusthavebeenfear. Mosowitz was with the forces that broke through the Jordanianfortifications in the area of Ammunition Hill. He remembered one injuredsoldieralmostentirelycoveredwithblood.His facehadbeenhitandhischinwas coming off. “Our flak helmets had this kind of strap that protected yourchin. So I put it on his chin. I held the flesh in place, put the strap on it andstartedcrawlingwithhim.”Theycrawledalongthatwayforfiftyyardsorso.“Itoldhim,Don’tbenervous,everythingwillbefine,calmdown—hewasprettynervous,didn’tknowwhattodo.Hethoughthewasgoingtodiesoon.”Mosowitzstartedtalkingto
him,and thesoldieraskedwherehewas from,having recognizedMosowitz’saccentasSouthAmerican;hehimselfwasfromUruguay.“Weweresohappy,”Mosowitzrecounted.Bombswerefallingallaround.Theycrawledintoatunnelandfoundamedicwithaneyeinjury.Mosowitzbandagedthemedic,thenwenttogetastretcher.Helaidhiswoundedsoldieronthestretcherand,togetherwithtwo othermen, took him to a car thatwas evacuating casualties toHadassahHospital.Thecarwasfullandtheybarelyfoundroom.Mosowitz kept on fighting. There were snipers everywhere. “I threw my
bazooka away because I had no rounds left. I took an Uzi and some handgrenades.I tookanammunitionclipfromaninjuredsoldierandwent tocleanoutsomehouses.”Mosowitzdescribedhowthiswasdone:“First,whenyougointothehouse,youopenthedoorandthrowinagrenade.Imean,notrightawaylike that, because we had defense grenades, meaning four-and-a-half-secondfuses.Andit’sprettydangeroustothrowthembecauseifsomeone’sinside,hecan throw them back out and we could get killed.” He went into one of thehouses,waited a little, and threw the grenade. “Iwent in, of course I fired around, and then I saw a pair of elderly Jordanians, dead. Well, of course itwasn’tpleasantformetoseethatandofcoursethatwasn’tmyintentionand...well.”31
Besides seizing the hills in the West Bank, Bethlehem, and Ramallah, the
government also decided on various “land grabs” in the demilitarized zonesbetween Israel and Syria, without violating the international border.32 Dayanruledoutoccupationof theGolanHeights, including theBanias, for fearof aSovietresponse.PoliticalconsiderationsalsomotivatedhimnottoapproachtheSuez Canal. The ministers continued to monitor responses in Washington.Levavi concluded that theAmericanswould allow Israel to “finish the job.”*Ben-Gurionwasalsoreceivingconstantupdatesonthedevelopments.“AmericawantsustofinishoffNasserquickly,”hewrote.33
BUT“AMERICA”WASNOTSPEAKINGWITHONEVOICE.ATTHEBEGINNINGOFTHEWAR,theUnitedStateshaddemandedtoknowwhohadfiredthefirstshot.EbanandAmitliedandclaimedtheEgyptianshadstartedit;theliemayhavebeenmadewith a nod and a wink.34 Either way, “the great lie” that most troubled theAmericanswasnot this,but rather theArabclaim thatU.S.aircrafthad takenpartintheassaultonEgypt.Thetelegramsexchangedonthisissuereflectpanicandaconcertedeffort toshowtheArabsthat theaccusationwasunfounded.35Israeliintelligencepickedup,recorded,andpublishedatelephoneconversationbetweenNasserandHussein,inwhichthetwocoordinatedastorywherebytheUnited States and Britain had participated in the attack. The conversationtranscriptwastruncatedanddidnotproveunequivocallythatthestatementwasalie: inanycase, inlightofthemagnitudeoftheirdefeatNasserandHusseinmay well have truly believed that Israel had not acted alone, as even Dayanconceded.36
Dean Rusk tried to effect a cease-fire in theWest Bank, if possible beforeJerusalemwasconquered,butevenas thebattles raged,heaskedAmbassadorBarbour what kind of settlement he thought Israel would agree to. Would itaccept an agreement over traffic through the Straits of Tiran?What were itsobjectivesinGaza?AndintheWestBank?AttheStateDepartment,proposalswerealreadybeingdrafted.37
Johnson himself was troubled by an announcement issued by the StateDepartmentonthefirstdayofthewar,sayingthattheUnitedStateswastakinganeutralposition“inthought,word,anddeed.”TheannouncementprovokedastormofprotestbecauseitreadasiftheUnitedStateshadabandonedIsraeltoitsfate,andRuskwasforcedto“clarify”it.Johnsonlatersawfittoincludethisepisodeinhispresidentialmemoirs.Itmarkedthebeginningofawaveofpublicpressure to stand by Israel. At no other time could Johnson have been morecertain that when it came to Israel, there was no distinction between foreign
policy and domestic policy.38 For no sooner had the State DepartmentspokesmanfinishedhisneutralityannouncementthanJohnsonreceivedapieceoflegaladvicefromafriend:DavidGinsburgcalledtodirecthisattentiontothefact that invocationof theNeutralityActwouldbar Israel fromraisingmoneyfor its war effort in the United States.39 The president’s advisers quicklycontactedsomeofhisJewishsupporters.40
John Roche, a Boston professor described as Johnson’s intellectual inresidence, sent him a firm letter that opened with a quote from the Book ofIsaiah:“Iffavorisshowntothewicked,hedoesnotlearnrighteousness;inthelandofuprightnesshedealsperversely.”TheneutralitydeclarationhadproventoRochethatStateDepartmentofficialswantedto“kisssomeArabbacksides.”Hefound this tobe“worse thanunprincipled—it isstupid.TheArabshave tohateus—andtheroughertheIsraelisareonthem,themoretheywillhateusNOMATTERWHATWEDO.Theymust create themyth that theUnitedStates,not Israel single-handed, clobbered them.”TheAmericans’ “sweet-talking” ofthe Arabs would only make them view the United States with contempt andalienateAmericanJews.41
Johnsonhatedbeingpressuredinthisway,accordingtoRoche.42TheWhiteHouselogdocumentsthepresident’sresponsetoacommentaryheoverheardona specialCBSbroadcast, inwhich the analyst took a pro-Israel position. “It’seasy to tell thathehassomesortof Jewishbackground,”Johnsonobserved.43Levinson andWattenberg, two Jewish assistantswho advised the president toissue an announcement of support for Israel, got an earful from him in thehallway. “You Zionist dupes!” he yelled at them and raised his fist. “You’reZionist dupes in the White House.”44 By the evening of that day, he hadreceived 17,445 letters and telegrams from citizens responding to the war.Ninety-eight percent of them supported Israel, approximately two percentwarnedhimagainstinterveninginthewar,andonlyahandfulexpressedsupportoftheArabs.45
INISRAEL,NIGHTHADFALLENONTHESECONDDAYOFTHEWAR,ANDDAYANsummedupthesituation:SharonandYaffe’sforceswereprogressinginSinai.AlongtheElArish-BirLahfanaxis,onwhichYehoshuaBar-Dayanwasmoving,therewasheavy fighting. The Egyptians had lost about three hundred tanks. On theJordanianfrontthewarhadessentiallybeenwon.Onlythreecitieshadnotyetbeencaptured—Nablus,Hebron,andJericho—buttheywereencircled.Theairforce had shot down twenty-three more planes, about half Egyptian and half
Iraqi,andhadlostfiveofitsown.ThenumberofIsraelideadhadreached460:225inthesouthand235ontheWestBank.46
The commander of Southern Command distributed General Order No. 2amonghistroops:“Neverbeforehavesofewpilotsdestroyedsomanyaircraftin such a short time.”Heurged them to keepup the goodwork: “Follow theenemyandstrikehimdown,hithimagainandagain,untilheisdefeatedbytheswordofthefightersoftheSouthernCommand,”hewrote.47
CHAPTER14DAYTHREE
1.TEARS:“I’MTOUCHINGTHEKOTEL!”
Thesunroselargeoverthelowhilltopsintheeast,wroteYehoshuaBar-Dayanon themorningof his thirddayofwar,Wednesday, June7.He looked to thenorth—home.Theyhadcoffeeandchocolatewafers forbreakfast;hegobbleddownaboutfifteen,callingthem“theIDF’ssecretweapon.”Theyhadstoppedacross from Jebel Libni, just before Abu Agila. On the way there, he hadwitnessedasceneunlikeanythinghehadeverseenbefore:dozensofEgyptianvehicles, tanks,APCs,and long-barreledcannons,explodingandburning.Theroadsidewaslitteredwithpilesofdiscardedshoes.“TheseareNasser’sheroeswhowantedtodestroyus,”hewrote.SincetheSinaiCampaign,theabandonedshoesofEgyptiansoldiershadcometostandasasymboloftheirmediocrity.Bar-Dayanmoved in a small convoy of tank repairmen. A convoy coming
towardthembroughtthenewsthatthedefeatedEgyptianswerestillfighting,thebastards. Suddenly a rumor went around: someone swore he had seenparatroopers.Thesoldiers tookuptheirpositionsandwaited.Twoplanesflewover; Bar-Dayan was not sure whether they were Israel’s or the enemy’s.Nothing happened. He listened to the radio with a fellow soldier, BenjaminCohen.TheSecurityCouncilhadproclaimedacease-fire,whichwaswelcomedbyAbbaEban.Therewasnodemandforawithdrawal.ThismadeBar-Dayanandhisfriendhappy.“Ihopeitisover,”hewrote.1
When Menachem Begin heard about the Security Council resolution hephonedEshkolagaintoaskabouttheOldCity.EshkolcalledDayan,andsoonBegindidthesame.Dayanrepliedimpatientlythathedidnotneedtheiradvice;the IDFwasdoingall itcould.Thatmorning,heordered that theOldCitybetakenasquicklyaspossible.2
Mordechai Gur’s paratroopers had already reached the Mount of Olives,seizedthestonetowerofAugustaVictoria,builtbythelastGermankaiserforhis wife, and shelled theMuslim Quarter inside the Old City. The battle forJerusalem involvedmanymishaps that led to IDFcasualties.Gurwrote inhisdiary that he receivedorders to enter theOldCity through theLions’Gate at8:04. At 10:00 he announced, “The Temple Mount is ours!” His radio code
namewas“Student.”3
Thefirst thingGursawat theTempleMountplaza, totherightof thegold-domedbuilding,wasamotorcycleblockingtheway.Behinditweretheyellowtents of a Jordanianmilitary camp.He did not knowwhether therewere anysoldiersinthecampnorwhatthemotorcyclewasdoingthere.“Willitblowusallup?”hewondered.Thecorrectresponsewouldhavebeentostopthecarandcheckoutthesituation,butwhattheconqueroroftheOldCitydidwastypicalofthewholeoperation.“Ben-Zur,go!”heorderedhisdriver.Theylookedeachother in the eye, Gur wrote later. “His eyes glittered with determination andexcitement.We’reonthemotorbike.Oureyesareshut.Anexplosion?Thehalf-track shudders—but only from the impact. We hear the motorbike draggingbeneaththehalf-track’swheels.”ThesoldierswhofollowedGurcouldnotrestraintheirjoy.“Hugging,yelling,
overwhelmed, slapping each other on the back. Laughing, shouting, huggingagain,”wroteGur.“Ifeelathomehere.Theobjectofourlonging.TheTempleMount! Mount Moriah. Abraham and Isaac. The Temple. The Zealots, theMaccabees,BarKokhba,theRomansandtheGreeks.Theyalltumbledtogetherinmymind.Butthefeelingissteadyanddeeperthananything.WeareontheTempleMount!TheTempleMountisours!”SomeoneclimbedtothetopofthebuildingandraisedtheIsraeliflag.Others
rantofindaccesstotheWesternWall.Theyspiedaspiralstaircaseandclimbeddown,andthenthecallrangout:“It’stheKotel!It’stheKotel!”Theystopped:to their right rose up amassive wall. “Huge stones sprouting bushes,” wroteGur.“Thewallofprayer,thewalloftears.Wearedreaming....”Theylookedforawaytoreachthetopsotheycouldflytheflagthere,too.TheywentbacktotheTempleMountplazaandrantotheleft,searchingfortheway.Whentheyreached a gate, they broke through.Ayoungman appearedwith twowomen,onewhiteandoneblack; themanwasaJewwhohadconverted to Islam.Hedirectedthemtothetopofthewallandtheystakedtheflag.Anofficerpulledoutabottleofwhiskey.“He’dthoughtaboutitaheadoftime,”wroteGur.Theyopened the bottle andmade a toast, passing the whiskey from hand to hand.“L’haim!TothestateofIsraelandtheWesternWall!”4
AMONG THE SOLDIERS WHO ENTERED THE OLD CITY WITH GUR WAS HAIMITOMosowitzfromYehiam.“Wesawnoenemytroopsbecausethey’dallrunaway.Onlyafewsniperswereleft,andafewwhobehavedlikemenandfoughttotheend.Theotherspickedthemselvesupandfled.Andtheoneswhocouldn’tget
away dressed up as civilians.We saw their mortars with all their explosivesreadyforafight,butnoonewasthere.They’dlefteverythingandran.Almostatthelastminute.Becausewesawtheexplosivesjustthrowndownnexttothemortars.Theydidn’tevenloadthem.”5
UziNarkisandHaimBar-LevhurriedtotheOldCityinajeep.OnthewaytheysawGeneralShlomoGoren,thechiefrabbioftheIDF,onfootwithafewofhismen,carryingaTorahscrollandashofar.Theyallwent in through theLions’Gate. “IgrabbedanArabkidandaskedhimhow toget to theTempleMount,” Narkis recounted. The motorcycle Gur had trampled was still there.TheypassedbyamonumentinmemoryofAbdelKhaderHusseini,aPalestiniancommanderkilledin1948;Narkishadbeentheonewhofoundhisbody.Theyreachedthewall,wheretheydrankwhiskeyandsang“Hatikva.”Gorenblewtheshofar and kissed Bar-Lev. When Narkis asked how the kiss was, Bar-Levreplied,“I’vehadbetter.”Manyofthemenwerecrying,includingtheKolIsraelbroadcasterRafiAmir.“Iamnotareligiousman,andIamtouchingtheKotel,”hesobbedintothemicrophone,“I’mtouchingtheKotel!”6
HaimitoMosowitzrecounted:“OfcourseIwenttotheWesternWalltoseeit.AndassoonasIgothere—IseeRabbiGorenwithaTorahscrollinonearm,abottleofwine in theother,andhe’sdrinkingand toasting I’haim.Sohappy. Ireallywasn’tpleased, Ihadno ideawherehe’dcome from.Wewere the firstforcesthere,ofcourse,withthehalf-tracks,andthensuddenlyIseehe’sturnedupat theKotel,cryinganddrinking, reallyhappy. I saw that thereweresomesoldierscryingatthewall.Religiousones.Theywerepraying.Iwasveryangry.Ifeltnothing.Ithought,Becauseofthissomanypeoplehadtodie?Thentohellwith all the religious people. I wanted them all to die. Because I was veryupset.”Then therewas the“game,”Mosowitz said:hunting forprisoners.Hecame
acrossamanwearingcivilianclotheswithmilitaryboots.ThemanspokealittleHebrew, and he said toMosowitz, “Don’t be scared, I won’t do anything toyou.”Mosowitzthoughthehadmisheard.“He—he—was tellingme!I lookathim,Idon’tknow,whatacharacter:hesaysthattome!AndmewithanUziandhimwithnoweapon.Ichecked.”Mosowitzorderedhisprisonertoputhishandsup,butthemankepttellinghimnottobeafraidbecausehewouldn’thurthim.“ThenIstartedlosingmytemper.Itoldhim,Comeon,putyourhandsup.Andhewasstilllaughingatme,doinglikethis—scratchinghishead.SoItookmyUziandwiththebuttIhithimonthehead.Hefellover.OfcourseIdidn’tmeantohithimthathard.Hewasinjured.Ibandagedhimandtookhimaway.”7
DAYANINFORMEDESHKOLABOUTTHECAPTUREOFTHEOLDCITY.ESHKOLWENTINTOconsultation and said themilitary operation Israel had initiated had saved thecountry.Inhismemoirs,Dayancouldnotrestrainhimself:“WhenEshkolsaidthat,withpathosandpride,Iwonderedtomyselfwhetherherememberedthatonlythreedaysbeforethemilitaryaction,hehadexplainedtotheGeneralStaffall the virtues of waiting.”8 The Knesset Foreign Affairs and DefenseCommitteeheard similar statements fromEshkol, aswell ashis expressionofhope that the conquered territories would open up “political horizons” thatwouldimproveIsrael’spositionintheMiddleEast.Eshkolgatheredthemembersofhisparty’spoliticalcommittee.“We’vebeen
givenagooddowry,”hetoldthem,referringtotheterritories,“butitcomeswitha bridewedon’t like”—thePalestinians.Therewasno choice but to give thePalestinians “special status.” At that point he was ready to keep Gaza underIsraelicontrol.“IhaveagreatdesireforGaza,”hehadsaidwhilethewarwasstill raging, “perhaps because of Samson and Delilah.” But Gaza too, in hiswords,was “a rosewithmany thorns.”9 A committee of experts was alreadylooking for areaswhere refugees could be settled.Of theWest Bank, Eshkolsaid that the border would be at the Jordan River, and without peace Israelwouldnotbudge.Theministersreachedtwodecisions:toseizealloftheWestBanktotheJordanRiver,asBeginhaddemanded,andtotakethedemilitarizedzones along theSyrianborder.Eshkol said repeatedly that he alsowanted theBanias.“Therewasastormyargument,”wroteHerzog.10
Butbeforeopening the third front in thenorth,Dayanwaswinning thewaroverhistory.IsraelLior,alwaysloyal,wantedEshkoltovisittheWesternWallrightaway,butwastoldbyDayan’sofficethatitwastoodangerous:thereweresnipers,itwasimpossibletogetthere.Meanwhile,DayanrushedtoJerusaleminahelicopterandmadesuretheIDFphotographerimmortalizedhisentranceintotheOldCitywithRabinandNarkis.ThephotographerlaterrecalledthatDayanhad staged the picture carefully, attributing great importance to it—just likeAllenby,theBritishgeneralwhohadwrestedJerusalemfromtheTurksin1917.“Wehave returned to themost holyof our places,” saidDayan at thewall.
“Wehave returned, never to part from them again.”The soldiers, and quite afewcivilianswhohadmanagedtoreachthesite,welcomedhisstatementwithroarsofhappiness,thephotographerreported.Heconfirmedthattherewerestillexchangesofgunfireinthearea.11MeirShamgar,themilitaryadvocategeneral,directedDayan’s attention to the flag flying over theDome of theRock, andDayanorderedthatitberemoved.12
Lior, like Eshkol, was extremely angry: “Dayan stole the glory and it wasimpossibletoerasethatfromthepagesofhistorywritteninJerusalemthatday.There was nothing to do. Eshkol was left with a minor role.” Lior was alsoangryathimselfforhisownnaïvetéinfallingforDayan’stricks.“Heleftnotasmidgenoffameforanyoneelse—notevenforYitzhakRabin,whowasthereinthephotosandatthespeecheslikeaback-seatdriverinthechariotofhistory.”Eshkolarrivedlaterthatevening.Thousandsofcitizenswerealreadyswarmingthearea.EshkolsaidhesawhimselfasanemissaryoftheentireJewishpeople.“The photographers took pictures,” wrote Lior, “history recorded Eshkol’swords—buttheyweremerelyafootnote.Dayantookusforaride.”*Therestofthecabinetwasalsofurious.14
Ezer Weizman missed the historical photo op, too. That morning, he washopingtoreapthegloryofcapturingSharmel-Sheikh,guardingtheentrancetothe Straits ofTiran and thus the reason for thewar, so he joined upwith theforceson theway there.Whenhearrived,hewas“unbelievably surprised” tofindthatthenavyhadbeateneveryonetoitandtheareawasalreadyemptyofEgyptians, who had all fled. Weizman could scarcely conceal hisdisappointment,buthetriedtocontactDayantoconveythenewsthattheStraitswere in Israel’shands,open to Israeli shipping.Hewas told that themessagecouldnotberelayed;DayanwasattheWesternWall.“I crashed,”Weizman later wrote. “This time I really crashed.” He said to
someone at his side, “My lousy luck!For years I’vebeengoingon about theKotel. For years I‘ve dreamed of it. And now, at this great historicmoment,wheneveryone’sat theKotel,whereamI?Stuckat thefarthestoutpostof thewar....IlostoutononeofthegreatestmomentsinIsraelihistory—amomentIdreamed of more than the others, who’ve all had their pictures taken by theKotel.”15
GeneralYeshayahuGavishwasalsoupset.Whenheheardontheradioaboutthe conquest of Jerusalem,hewas somewherenear remoteBirGafgafa in theSinai;hegotoutofhiscar,satdownonarock,andshedafewtears.“Theystoletheshow,”hesaid.Thenhespurredhissoldierson:“Tothecanal!”16
2.PRISONERS:“THEYLIETHERE,CUTDOWN”
While at Sharmel-Sheikh,Weizman sawmanyprisoners ofwar: “I see theseEgyptianswiththeirhandstiedbehindtheirbacks,crouchedontheirkneesontheground.Patheticenemysoldiers,beatendown,humiliated,lonely.It’sasadsight,”hewrote.Heorderedhismentogive themfoodandwater.Oneof the
prisoners caught his eye and Weizman asked that his hands be untied. “ASudanese, he was. Tall, strong, kind of solid. He had interesting features, alldark brown.” He drank, ate, and looked at Weizman, who thought, “Whatbusiness does he have with this war? Why is he here?” The prisoner wasemotionalastheyspoke.Hetookoutaphotographofhiswifeanddaughterand,hesitantly, unsure ofWeizman’s reaction, held it out.Weizman looked at thepicture. “A tranquil calm, beyond thewar, the general of the victorious armystandsinfar-offSharmandrestshiseyesonapictureofthewifeanddaughterofabeaten,defeatedSudaneseprisoner.”Sometimelater,WeizmanvisitedaPOWinternmentfacilitywithRabinand
saw the man from Sharm. “I stop. I look again. It’s him, dammit. Tall,handsome,dark.”Heaskedforthemantobebroughttohim.“Ihavesomesortof connection with him, beyond the fog of war, beyond all the wars, all thehatred, all the animosity between peoples. We almost embraced—almost,because thousands of eyes turned to us from every direction.”Weizman wasgladtofindthemanunhurt.HeaskedWeizmanwhetherhecouldbeassignedtoakitchenjob.“Iarrangedit,”Weizmanwrote.Themanthankedhim.“Thewordofadefeatedcorporal,”Weizmanwrote.17*ManyIsraelisoldiersandofficersdescribedpersonalencounterswithenemy
soldiers.The reports express a rangeof feelings fromcompassion tohostility,contempt,alienation,and,inparticular,indifference.TheIsraeliswereoftenableto view the men as not merely “the enemy,” but also as human beings,remindingthemselvesthatthedefeatedsoldiersbeforethemwerenotpersonallyresponsible for their leaders’ initiation of the war. They often described theprisoners’wretchedness, not only as captives but also as fighters.HenRonenfromYehiam told of four prisoners he saw in theWestBank. “Hands tied attheir backs, feet bound, led like dogs to interrogation…. They’re terriblecowards. They’re terrible sycophants. Youmeet this creaturewho is just likeyou, after all… and his hands are tied behind his back….”19UriChizik, alsofromYehiam,wrote,“WhereIwas, their treatmentwascertainlydecent.Theygotwater andcigarettes, a little food—whateverwecouldgive them.”ChiziksawthemintheSinai.“Thousandsofsoldierswanderedonfootinthedirectionofthecanal,allatriskofdeathfromdehydration.Alltheabandonedcarsalongtheroadhademptyradiators.TheEgyptianshadtakenthewatertodrink.”20
Thecaptivesbegan to takeupan increasinglycentral role inYehoshuaBar-Dayan’s war experience. “The Egyptian soldiers who hadn’t been killed andhadn’tabandonedtheirtankstookofftheirshoesandstartedrunningacrossthe
sand,”hewrote tohiswife.“If theyhadanysense, they turned themselves inimmediatelyasPOWs,andthereareseveralthousandofthem.Buttheoneswhotried to escape on foot, orwhoweren’t taken prisoner during the battle, keptmoving barefoot toward the canal. The heat and the thirst finished them, andtheystartedstreamingtowardourcars,ourtanks,flocksuponflocksofpeoplecomingdownfromthesandyhills.”Inhisdiary,Bar-Dayanwrote,“GoodLord,whatarewegoing todowith them?”They lookeddepressed,apathetic; somecrawledon all fours; he saw them in the internment camps too, fainting fromthirst,evendying.The low point came on Friday. “After five days of hunger and thirst, the
soldiersandofficerswerecallingoutfromeveryhilltop,theyhadnostrength—water, water, water.” According to Bar-Dayan, the soldiers gathered theprisoners, searched them, and took their papers. He heard some of them say,“Water—get it from Nasser, he’ll give you some.” He wrote, “They see ourwatercanteensandlosetheirminds.It’saterriblethingtosee.”Bar-Dayanandhisfriendsdidnothaveenoughwaterthemselves.Therewasa
heat wave, and they were often thirsty. The Egyptians were close to death.“Dozens of young and not so young men yelling, ’Water!,’ writhing in theirholdingpens—’please,captain,alittlewater.’”Soldiersgaveouttincanistersofwater. Some of the prisoners were first required to curse Nasser, and somecursedhismothertoo.Bar-Dayannoticedoneprisonerwhokepthiswitsabouthim and seemed to lose not a trace of dignity. He positioned himself as theleader,making requests on everyone’s behalf, passing thewater can to othersbeforedrinkinghimself.Bar-DayansawamanwhohadbeenwithhimandGilawhentheyatelunchin
Beersheba—hewastheonewhoatericebecausehehaddiarrhea,heremindedGila inhis letter.Theman’s truckwasnowbeingused to transport prisoners.Bar-Dayan went over to say hello. There was an Egyptian nearby, wearingbrown civilian pants. “A sweet, handsome youngman,writhing thisway andthat, he lifted his undershirt,wailed and shouted in every directionwithwhatlittle strength he had left.” The Egyptian addressed Bar-Dayan in English:“Captain,please,givemesomewater.I’mdying.Ihaven’thadadrinkforfivedays. I’m not a soldier, I’m an engineer. Twoweeks ago I came home fromEngland,pleasehelpme.”Hewastwenty-fourandstudiedmineengineeringinLancashire. Bar-Dayan pictured him taking part in the Arab students’ union,slanderingIsrael,probablysupportingresolutionscallingforIsrael’sdestruction.Heknew them, theArabstudents inEngland.Buthe told theprisoner thathehadalsobeen inLancashire, and they swappedmemories.Bar-Dayan founda
can full of sand, cleaned it out, filled it with half the water from his owncanteen,andgaveittotheyoungman.Whenheturnedtoleave,themancriedout, “Captain, please give me some more if you can, just another bit.” Bar-Dayangavehimanotherbit.“Isavedhislife,”hewrote.Bar-Dayandescribedaguardwho“wentnuts.”Firstheboundtheprisoners’
wristssotightlythattheircirculationwascutoff.Thenhepickedupabayonet,killed one man and injured two others. “Everyone was shocked,” Bar-Dayanwrote.“He’llcertainlybebroughttotrial,butwhenyouseethousandsofdeadpeople—suddenly lifebecomescheap, to thepointwhere it’shard todescribehowcheapitis.”21Inhisdiary,Bar-Dayanwroteaboutothersoldierswhokilledprisoners.Hesawbodies.“Theyliethere,cutdown.”Someofthesoldierstoldhim,“Anyprisonerwho
showsup—that’sit,he’sdead.”22
“Itwasperhapsthecruelestpossiblewar,fromourpointofview,”UriChiziklatersaid.“Oursoldiersweresenttoscoutoutgroupsofmenfleeingandshootthem. That was the order, and it was done while they were really trying toescape. If they were armed, they got shot. There was no other option. Youcouldn’tevenreallytakeprisoners.Andsometimesyouhadtofinishpeopleoffwhen theywere lying on the groundwith their heads on their hands. Simplyshootthem.”Chizikrecalledthatthementalkedaboutthisevenasthewarwasstill going on, trying to explain to themselves why they had to kill Egyptiansoldiers who were trailing them just for water. “They may not have beendangerous militarily, but they were desperate and dying, and a dying man iscapable of anything.” They found it difficult to define for themselves themoment when a soldier became a prisoner, and they knew that sometimesEgyptian soldiers surrendered but then attacked their captors. “Therewas oneprisonerwhoputuphishandsandthenthrewtwogrenadesandkilledeightofour men,” Chizik said.* He said that some of the Palestinians serving in theEgyptianarmy“wereexecuted.”TheseweremensuspectedofpriorattacksonIsrael.24
Gabi Brunn, a reporter for Yediot Aharonot, witnessed such an episode. Itoccurred at the El Arish airport, where Israel Tal’s division—Yehoshua Bar-Dayan’sunit—hadsetupitsheadquarters.Some150POWswerebeingheldinan aircraft hanger surroundedwith sandbags.They sat huddledon the groundwiththeirhandsatthebacksoftheirnecks.NotfarawaywasadeskwheretwomeninIDFuniformweresitting.Theyworesteelhelmetsandtheirfaceswerehiddenbydustgogglesandkhakibandannas.Everysooftenthemilitarypolice
wouldpickoutaprisonerfromtheholdingpenandleadhimtothedesk.Brunncould not hear the brief exchange, but he saw that when it was finished, theprisonerwasledaboutahundredyardsbehindthehangerandhandedashovel.“Iwatched themandiga largepit for about fifteenminutes,”Brunnwrote.
“ThentheofficerstoldhimtothrowawaytheshovelandoneofthemaimedanUzisubmachinegunandfiredtwoshortburstsattheman,threeorfourbulletseach.Theprisonerfelldead.”Thenmoreprisonerswerebroughtoutandshot.Brunnsawroughlytensuchexecutions.AnofficerwhoseidentityBrunncouldnotrecallthenexplainedtothehorrifiedreserviststhatmilitaryintelligencehadidentifiedsomePalestinianterroristsamongthePOWsintheholdingpen,menwhohadkilled Jews.Theyhaddisguised themselvesasEgyptian soldiers andfledtheGazaStrip.*Brunn only published this storymany years later, when it accompanied an
accountof the same incidentby thehistorianAriehYitzhaki.26But rumorsofprisoner killings were circulating within days. “We’ve turned the SinaiPeninsula into a valley of death, into one big cemetery,” wrote soldier KobiRabinowitz, from Kibbutz Na’an, to his girlfriend. “Unarmed men, prisonerswith their hands above their heads, cut down against orders…. I’ve seen toomany murders to shed any tears.” Yet he was clearly shocked, writing:“Apparently it doesn’t take years of Nazi education to turn people intoanimals.”27
Ten members of Kibbutz Ga’aton, near Yehiam, turned to Meir Yaari, theleaderofMapam,whomtheyconsideredamoralauthority.Theywrotetohimabout soldiers home from the war who told stories of systematic killings ofenemyprisoners,particularly in theSinaiDesert.Thestorieswerepreciseandcame from reliable kibbutz members. They also told of tens of thousands ofpeople wandering through the desert without food or water, destined to diehorribledeaths“thatonlyHolocaustsurvivorscandescribe.”Yaariadvisedthemnot tomake toomuchof these tales.Hehimselfwasnot indifferent tohumanrights, he promised—for example, he had interferedwith amilitary governorwhohadexpelledagroupofpeople,leavingthemwithoutfood,andthankstohis intervention thedecreehadbeen rescindedand thepeoplehad returned totheirhomes.“Ineverywarthereareaberrations,”heconcluded,explainingthatat least some of these “aberrations” occurred in response to mine-laying andsnipingfromcover.“TherearestillEgyptiancommandosaroundandtherearecaseswhenthelocalpopulationgivesthemcover,”hewrote.Thiskindofthingcalledforadrasticresponse.“OneshouldassumethatinSinai,too,therewere
isolated cases of mistreated Egyptian soldiers,” Yaari continued, “butgovernment policy was to feed them and give them water and move themtowardthecanal.EventheRedCrossaffirmsthis.Onthecontrary,itseemsthatEgyptistheonethatrefusestoletrefugeescrossthecanal.”Eitherway,“Thingshave worked out in the meantime, and the campaign to provide relief to thesoldiersiscomingtoanend.”Headdedareprimand:“Thearmyshouldnotbeaccusedofmassacres.Weareveryawareof theaberrantbehavior in thedaysafter thewar,butonemustalsobecarefulnot toblackenthe imageofJewishsoldiers.”28
Accounts of Egyptian soldiers lost in the desert were brought up in theKnesset, whereDayan denied that Israel hadmaliciously caused their deaths,sayingmost had died because they tried to reach the canal on foot instead ofturningthemselvesintotheIDF.InhisbookaboutthewarheassertedthatsomesixteenthousandEgyptiansoldierswerekilled,“mostoftheminretreat.”Rabinnoted in hismemoirs that hegaveorders that prisoners not bekilled, and theoperationalordersdoindeedstatethatprisonersweretobetreatedinaccordancewiththeGenevaConventions.29
PRIVATEYEHOSHUABAR-DAYAN,MEANWHILE,HADRUNINTOAPROBLEMOFHISOWN,for the first time since his call-up. His commander, First Lieutenant NahmanWagner,wasthreateningto“screwhim”afterthewar.ForsomereasonhehadsuddenlyrememberedthatSaturdaywhenBar-DayanhadcomebacklatefromBeersheba.Wagner called him a deserter. “I hope he doesn’t giveme troubleafter thewar, so I cangoback tomy family andmy job like everyone else,”wrote Bar-Dayan. But he prepared his defense: “Do I look like a deserter? Ihopeheonlycalledmethatasa joke.Amanlikeme,asoldier likeme—I’veneverrunandneverwould.ButGilawassobbingthatSaturday—howcouldIleaveherinthelurch?”The imagesof scorched IDF tanks anddeadbodieswouldnot leavehim in
peace. “May Nasser burn,” he wrote. They were still driving, always in firstgear, asoneofhis friends read fromHa’aretz andDavar.Bar-Dayanwas notpleased:“Thedescriptionsofourfightingareincompleteandbad.”Ahelicopterlandedtopickuptheirmail.“DearGiliandYariv,”hewrote.“WedefeatedtheEgyptianarmy;theirweaponsofwar,whichtheywantedtodestroyuswith,areburning like torches. They’ve got thousands of casualties. Nowwe’re on thewaytoIsmailia.PicturesofNasser,thedog,decorateallourvehicles.There’safeelingthatthewholething’sover,praiseandthankstoourpilotsandmeninthetankswhodid the job—thepilots coveredus and savedus all.”He told them
howhehadconstantlykissedtheirpicturesandhisweddingring,andpromisedtheyhadnothing toworryabout:hewas in a safeplace.Thewarwasalmostover.HewroteaboutUziAvrahami’swound, a smallpieceof shrapnel in thebackofhisneck.HewaskeepinganeyeonUzi’svehicleforhim.Helistedthepeoplehehadmet,sentregardstohisfather,andfinishedwitharequest:“HoldYarivi up high and dance with him.” He signed off, “Daddy Shuka.”30Meanwhile, thehelicopterwaitedandthepilotwentaroundpickingup letters.“Inwhatarmyintheworlddoesapilot,acaptain,standinfullbattlegearandwait to pick up soldiers’ letters?” Bar-Dayan wrote. The pilot was MarioShaked, fromRamatHasharon.He usually flew aMystère, but his plane hadbeenhitbytheEgyptiansnearthecanalandhehadbeenforcedtobailout.Hehadbeenrescuedbyhelicopter.Later,ontheroad,Bar-Dayanwroteinhisdiary,“There’snocauseforworry.
Theskiesareclear.TheEgyptiansarefleeingtowardthecanal.We’renotlettingthem.Wewant to kill them.Hewho rises to kill you, rise and kill him first.Tomorrow or the day after, Gili will get the letter.We’re getting desperatelyshortofwater.Ihopetheysolvetheproblem.”Suddenlyheheardshoutingfromthe vehicle behind him. The enginesmade it difficult to hear, and at first hecould not believe it, but someone was screaming, “The Old City is ours!”“Sharmel-Sheikhisours!”Thetransistorbatterieswerealmosttooweakforthesoldiers to make anything out, but there was Rabbi Goren’s voice, and RafiAmirreportingfromthewall.Therewasthesingingof“Hatikva.”YehoshuaBar-Dayanandhissixfellowsoldiers,withoutreallyknowingwhat
theyweredoing, instinctivelystoodupandjoined inwith thenationalanthemcomingovertheradio.Oneofthem,anelectricianfromTelAviv,sobbedwithexcitement.And so these sevenmen stood in thedesert singing“Hatikva,” astheirvoicesechoedandpassedfromtheirtrucktotheoneinfront,whereothersjoined in, and the singing went from one vehicle to the next, from trucks totanks. Suddenly, four Egyptian soldiers appeared in the distance, wanting tosurrender.One laydownand themenshothim.Theothersputup theirhandsandthemenrantothemandgrabbedthem.Chaostookovertheconvoyandtheroutewasblocked.Bar-Dayanvolunteeredtodirecttraffic.The radiobroadcast thechiefof staff’s statement tobereaved families.Bar-
Dayan was moved and wrote in his diary, “A great man, Rabin.” Later thateveninghewrote,“AncientJerusalemisinourhandsagain.TohaveitandalltheconqueredJordanianterritory.WeheardthatGushEtzionisoursagain—oursecondMasada,it’scomebacktous.IhopewedonotgivebacktheGushandthe Kotel, but there are endless foreseeable political problems.” As a history
buff, Bar-Dayan decided that if he could, he would go to see RockefellerMuseum,wheresomeoftheDeadSeaScrollswereondisplay.31*HenRonenandhisfriendssang“JerusalemofGold.”Theywereontheirway
toRamallah.Ronenrecounted:“Wesangthesongoverandoveragain.Dozensof times.Everyone singing and singing. It sweepsyouup.Hearing the shofarblownattheWesternWall.Theparatroopers.WeknewwehadsevenguysfromYehiam there.Wewere reallyworried.Had anything happened to them?Wasanyone injured or killed? For some reason I was terribly provincial. I wasconcerned for those closest to me. An uncle, a brother-in-law, the kibbutzmembers.Icouldn’tseefurtherthanthat.Butthat’sthewayitis.’JerusalemofGold,’andagain,’JerusalemofGold.’”33
SOMEWHERE INANARCHIVE,TWOTELEGRAMSFROMTHE ISRAELIAMBASSADORSTOBritainandFrancearefiledaway.TheBritishhadofferedtotakeadvantageofHussein’spleasforacease-firetomakehimsignapeacetreaty.TheambassadorinLondon,AharonRemez,whohadbeenthefirstcommanderoftheIsraeliairforce,recommendedgivingthisatry.AmbassadorWalterEitan,aseniorIsraelidiplomat, cabled fromParis: “I suggest immediatelyacceptingHussein’sofferof a cease-fire and asking for a personalmeetingwith him to offer an Israel-Jordanpeacetreaty.Husseinfearsforhisregimeanyway.Wecangivehimfullsupport, ask for the U.S. and Britain to get involved and put pressure onHussein, to convincehimof the logicofouroffer.”Theambassador assumedthatthechancesofatreatywereslim,buthebelievedtheyshouldstilltry.“Wemust act quickly, beforewe get into the thick of the political and diplomaticarguments.” What he meant was that, if negotiations were held at all, theyshouldtakeplacebeforetheconquestofJerusalem.34
3.LEGENDS:“THEPEOPLEAREDRUNKWITHJOY”
“Thefeelingwasfantastic,”UziNarkissaidlater.ThatWednesdaymorningattheTempleMount,hereceivedthefirstofaseriesofpreposteroussuggestionsthatcameupoverthenextfewdaysandweeks,apparentlyundertheinfluenceofthatsame“fantasticfeeling.”GeneralGoren,thechiefrabbioftheIDF,toldNarkisthatthiswasthemomenttoblowuptheDomeoftheRock.“Dothisandyouwillgodowninhistory,”Gorensaid,andexplainedthatsuchathingcouldonly be done under cover of war: “Tomorrow might be too late.” Narkisthreatenedtothrowtherabbiinjailifhedidnotdroptheidea.35
Ataroundthesametime,DavidBen-GurionhadavisitfromYosefSapir,one
ofthenewministersintheunitygovernment,whoaskedhim,“Whatshallwedowith theOldCityand thewestbankof theJordan?”Ben-Gurionsaid theymust first consolidate their victory. They still had to deliver a fatal blow toSyria.TherewereroughlyamillionArabslivingintheWestBank,Ben-Gurionsaid.“Wedon’tneedthemontopoftheIsraeliArabs.”InGazathereweresome200,000 refugees from1948, he noted: “Itwon’t be easy to get rid of them.”Thatevening,Ben-GurionwenttoJerusalemandtoldTeddyKollektheyhadtostartsettling theOldCity’sJewishQuarter immediately.Kolleksaidhewouldtalk to Eshkol, but Ben-Gurion asked him not to mention his name. He alsowantedtodiscussthematterwiththeministeroftheinterior,butShapirawasinTelAviv.WhenhecametoBen-Gurion’shousetherethenextmorning,thefirstthingheheardwas,“We’vealready lostaday.”Ben-Gurionwanted to talk toMosheDayanaboutsettlingtheJewishQuarter.WhenhewastoldtheministerwasinJerusalem,hedrovebackthereyetagain.Ben-Gurionwasaccompaniedbyhiswife,Paula,EzerWeizman,Mordechai
Hod,andShimonPeres.Weizmanrecalledthatontheway,Ben-GurionpokedfunatEshkolandEban.Theywerecheeredandapplaudedbysoldiersenroute.Thescentofwarwasstillintheair—amixtureofgunpowder,sweat,anddust,asWeizmanwrote.“Andthatsmellcallsout,voicelessly,withthestoryofthebattlesandtheheroismandthededication,andpoursagravityintoone’ssoul,even in moments of elation.” At the Western Wall Ben-Gurion immediatelynoticed some structures the Jordanians had built. “I was astonished that noorders had been given to destroy these buildings,” he wrote in his diary. Hestormedahead;hisbodyguardshadtroublekeepingupwithhim.Weizman recalled coming to the site as a youngman, in a Britishmilitary
uniform.HeusedtogointotheDomeoftheRock,alwaysfearinghewouldbeidentified as Jewish. And now he was here, Jewish and victorious. “Weapproach theKotel and I feelhowmyheart andmybloodandmybreatharepoundingandcomingfasterandfaster.Ihavenocontrol.Thisisthehistoryofmypeople,breathinghereitsbreathofthousandsofyears.”Thereweresoldiersputtingontefillin,someprayingwithgreatintensityandextraordinarydevotion,Weizman observed. “Each Jew bound to every other Jew. Whole groups.Swayingclustersofhandsandfeetandheadsandbodies.”Andtherewerethosewhodid not knowwhat to dowith themselves, hewrote: “nailed to the spot,perhapsnotevenfeelingthetearsrollingdowntheircheeks.”Weizmanwantedtorejoicewithalltheothers,buthisriotousjoywasmarredbyathoughtthathecouldwellhaveaddressedtoBen-Gurion,amongothers:“Wherewereyoufornineteen years, when it was forbidden to say a word about the enormous
importanceoftheemotionalbondbetweenanentirepeopleandthisholywall?”Ben-Gurion noticed a street sign in Arabic and English that read
“Alborak”—“SupposedlythiswaswhereMohammedmettheangelofGod,”hewrote in his diary.According toMuslims,Alborak (Lightning),Mohammed’shorse,brought theProphet inonequick leap fromMecca to Jerusalem,whereMohammedtiedhimtothewall.LikeallstreetsignsinEastJerusalem,thisonewas ceramic, painted blue and green, handcrafted by Armenian artisans.According to Weizman, Ben-Gurion said, “Take it down,” with the decisivediction that always made people obey him. A soldier by the name of DavidKolitz jumped up to carry out the order. He climbed onto the shoulders ofanothersoldierandtriedtoremovethesignwithastick.Thatdidn’twork,sohesmasheditwithasmallhammer.Ben-Gurionsaidnothingfurther,butWeizmanhadthefeelingthatthecommandto“takeitdown”expressedaneedtowipeoutnineteenyearsofallthatAlborakrepresented—nineteenyearsofregret.Forallthattime,Ben-GurionhadbornetheblameforfailingtocapturetheOldCityin1948. Itwasa terrible indictment, rivaled ingravityonlyby theclaim thathehad neglected to rescue Jews during the Holocaust. It is doubtful whetheranything upset Ben-Gurion more than the fact that the Old City was finallyconqueredduringLeviEshkol’spremiership.HechosetofocusallhisfervoronthecampaigntopopulateJerusalemwithJews,andwhenheheardfromTeddyKollek that Arabs were currently living in the former Jewish Quarter, heresponded,“Theymustbeexpelled.There’snoneedforanylaw.Occupationisthe most effective law.” The symbolism of shattering the street sign with itsMuslimresonance touchedWeizman, too.“In thosefewsecondsI felt thatwewerestandingatthegateofanewera,havingournationalreckoning.”36
NOTSINCETHESTATEWASFOUNDEDHADISRAELISBEENSWEPTUPINSUCHAWAVEOFexcitement, wrote a veteran Jerusalemite in his diary. “The people are drunkwith joy,”wrote the poetNatanAlterman.37 Everyonewent searching for themost elaborate superlatives; no flowery phrase or cliché was left unused,includingtherepeatedclaimthatwordscouldnotexpressthefeelingsinone’sheart. Exclamation points worked overtime. Even the most prosaic writersturned to poetry, and die-hard secularists unearthed Jewish sources. “TheMessiahcametoJerusalemyesterday—hewastiredandgray,andherodeinonatank,”wroteGabrielTzifroniinMaariv.38
YaffaYarkoni,asingerwhohadbeenentertainingthetroopssince1948,sang“JerusalemofGold”attheWesternWall.Itwasadecidedlyseculargesture,butMaarivcalledit“pureprayer.”Thepaperhadprintedthesong’slyricsinlieuof
aneditorial.NaomiShemerhurriedlyupdatedthesongwiththefollowingverse:“Wehavereturnedtothewaterwells,themarket,andthesquareAshofarcallsattheTempleMountintheOldCityInthecavesoftherock,thousandsofsunsshine / Once again we shall go down to the Dead Sea, by way of Jericho.”HaimitoMosowitzdescribedavictoryrallyattheMountScopusamphitheater,where the singerNehamaHandel tried to sing “Jerusalem ofGold” but burstintotears,alongwithallthesoldiers.39
The capture of theOldCitywas described as the correction of a historicalerror.TheCentralCommanddecreedthatithadbeen“seizedbytheenemy”andthat “IDF soldiers restored the stolen holy site to the people.”40 “AncientJerusalemhasbeenliberated,”saidDavar.TheBiblewasalsodoingovertime.Maarivreported,inbiblicalterms,thattheIDFwasat“theheightsofLatrun.”41UziNarkis’sactionreportnoted,“ThegatesofJerichohavebeensurrounded,itswallshavefallen.”OftheconquestofHebronandBethlehem,thegeneralsaid,“TheTombofthePatriarchsandRachel’sTombareinthehandsofthesonsofAbraham,Isaac,andJacob.”42TheeditorialinHa’aretzboretheheadline,“CryAloudandShout,ThouDwellerofZion!”andproclaimed,“TheWesternWallshallneveragainstandabandonedandsilent;thegloryofthepastwillnolongerbe viewed from afar. Henceforth it will be part of the new Israel, and itssplendorshalldisperseitsraysoverthebuildingofaJewishsocietythatisalinkin the long chain of the nation’s history in its land.” The press described thepreviousfewdaysas“daysofmiracles.”“Wewerelikethemthatdream,”theywroteagainandagain.43
Israeliswritingtofriendsandrelativesabroadrespondedspontaneouslyinthesamespiritandwithalmostthesamewords.Justastheanxietytheyexpressedbefore thewarwassincere,as if theyhadalways feared that theArabswoulddestroyIsrael,theynowwrotewiththesuddenrealizationthataneternaldreamhadcometrue.TheconquestoftheOldCityemergedasfarmorethananeventin the news—more, even, than mere history: it was a profoundly personalexperience.“We are very confused.The radio is on twenty-four hours a day.Yesterday
wasGrandfather’smemorialatFather’s,andwewere togetherwhenweheardthe shofar being blown from theKotel.We sang ’Hatikva’ together and criedlikelittlechildrenwhenweheardkaddishrecitedthereforthefallensoldiers,”wroteawomanfromTelAvivtohersisterinBoston.44“Itfillstheheart,arealmiracle,” wrote Riki Ben-Ari from Tel Aviv to Los Angeles, minutes afterhearingon the radio about the conquest of theOldCity. “I amproud tohave
beenborninthisgenerationandtohavelivedtoseetherevivalofIsrael:suchafightingspirit,suchheightsofgreatness—muchwillbetoldofthisintheyearstocome.”45AnotherwomanwrotetorelativesintheUnitedStates,“PraiseGod,praiseGod,agreatmiraclehasbefallenusand theentirepeopleof Israel.”AmanfromTelAvivwrote,“Thegreatmiraclethathashappenedsurprisesusall.We were so certain of destruction.” The people who had watched the Arabtelevision broadcasts had been most afraid: “The fear was awful,” someonewrote, adding, “imagine now that Kol Israel is being broadcast fromRamallah.”46SomewrotetotheirfamiliesthatthewarwouldnowcontinueinAmerica.TheywerereferringtoPresidentJohnson’sMiddleEastpolicy.47
ONTHETHIRDDAYOFTHEWAR,ALREADYSWEPTUPINTHEINTOXICATIONOFVICTORY,LeviEshkolmockedLyndonJohnson,“leaderoftheworld,amanofnosmallaccomplishments,”whohadmadegreatpromisesofwhichnothinghadcome.Forty-fivecountriesweresaidtobejoiningtheinternationalfleet thatJohnsonhad promised to send to the Gulf of Aqaba, but when Israel looked at hispromiseclosely, it turnedout therewere just two: theUnitedStatesandIsraelitself.“It’spossiblethat,intheend,Johnsonwouldhavegottenoutofthegametoo,becausehehasinternationalinterests,”Eshkoltoldhispartysecretariat,andaddedthatingeneral,theycouldnotrelyonthepromisesoftheU.S.president.Whatwouldhappeniftheyneededhimurgentlyandhehappenedtobeawayfortheweekend?The White House was furious at this kind of talk. Ambassador Harman
reported that Walt Rostow had phoned him, “extremely angry,” to say thatEshkol’scommentswere“explosive.”AbeFeinberghadalsocalled,“inarealpanic.”Harmanhadanothercallfrom“Ilan,”AbeFortas,whoremindedhimof“the special sensitivityof Issahar”during thisperiod, and asked that Israel beconsiderate. “Over the last few days, the president has showed particularsensitivity and is not pleased with the Jewish pressure on him,” reportedEphraimEvron.48
At the moment of the conquest of the Old City, Mathilde Krim was stillstayingattheWhiteHouse.Shehadseenthepresidentinrecentdays,andhadtalkedtohimonthetelephonefromherroomonthethirdfloor;sometimesshecalledhim,sometimeshecalledher.ShelobbiedhimtostandbyIsrael;inthis,she was apparently acting in coordination with the Israeli embassy. Thatmorning,shewaspreparingtoleavetheWhiteHouse.Johnsonwasstilleatingbreakfastandshedidnotwanttodisturbhim,sosheleftamessage.Shewrote
that she thought the president was underestimating the lingering Israeliresentment of the U.S. neutrality statement. She had reports from Israel ofsevere anti-American feeling. The Israeliswere saying that they hadwon thewarnotthankstotheUnitedStates,butratherdespiteit.TheAmericanJewishcommunitywasfindingitveryhardtounderstandtheadministration’sposition.Thepresidentshouldknowthat theJewshadadeeppersecutioncomplex,andthatbeforetheyknewtheywouldwin,ithadseemedasiftheUnitedStateswasabandoningthemtoNasser’saggressions—andthey lookedatNasser likeatasecond Hitler. Many people, including her husband, had tried their best toexplain the State Department’s position, Krim wrote, but unsuccessfully: themanonthestreetstillfeltresentful.Amass rallywasbeingorganized inWashington for the followingday, and
KrimfeltthatitmightwellbecomenotashowofsupportforIsraelbutaprotestagainstJohnson.EphraimEvronwasdoinghisbesttopreventthis,butevenhefearedthateventsweregettingoutofhand.Krimthereforeurgedthepresidentto issue a pro-Israel statement that same day. Shemade it clear that shewasspeaking forherhusbandand forothers.First, thepresidentmustdeclare thattheUnitedStateswouldnotmaintaindiplomaticrelationswithEgyptaslongasNasser was in power, because of “his attempts to provoke a majorconflagration.” Second, the president must say that this was the time to takeaction to allow Israel to live inpeacewith its neighbors.Krim suggested thatJohnsonannounceapeaceconference.Suchastatementwouldhelphim“regainthesympathyhelost”frombothIsraelisandAmericanJews.*DavidGinsburgcalledtosaythatthekeynotespeakeratthenextday’srally
wouldbeMorrisAbram, thepresidentof theAmericanJewishCommittee.“Itwillbeokay,”Ginsburgsaid;hehimselfhadreviewedthespeechdraft.Besidesexpressing solidarity with Israel, Abram would assert that the president wasdoing amagnificent job in the current crisis.50 Levinson andWattenberg, thetwo “Zionist dupes,” reported to Johnson, on behalf of the Anti-DefamationLeague, thatU.S. Jewswere particularly afraid that Israelwould be forced towithdrawfromtheareasithadseizedwithoutachievingapeacetreatyfirst.TheADL asked the president to send a statement of some sort to be read at therally.51 Someone went to the trouble to carefully count and sort the letterscoming into theWhite House. There were 5,241 that day: ninety-six percentsupported Israel, 3 percent called on theUnitedStates not to intervene in thewar,and1percentsupportedtheArabs.52Israel’srepresentativesintheUnitedStatesweresatisfied.“NeverbeforehasAmericanJewryunitedaroundanissueasithasnowaroundIsrael,”wroteone.Hewasconcerned,however,thatU.S.
JewsmightalsouniteyetagaininoppositiontothewarinVietnam.53
CHAPTER15THEFINALDAYS
1.NIGHTMARESI:“MISSION:DAMASCUS!”
On Thursday, June 8, Shuka Bar-Dayan had been on reserve duty for threeweeks.Hethoughtbacktothedaywhenhehadtakenthecarforanoilchangewith Yarivi. His letters home continued to express endless love andhomesickness. He tried to sound optimistic. The fighting was over; drivingaround now was just like being on vacation, the desert was wonderful, theweatherwas pleasant, he felt great.Might it never be anyworse.At night helookedforthenorthstar:thatwasthedirectionwhereGiliandYarivwere.1Butforthefirsttimesinceleavinghome,hislettersandhisdiarybegantodiverge.Thediarynowdescribedachilling,blood-soaked,macabreroutine.Bar-Dayanwrotetohiswifethattheconvoysofburned-outvehicleslookedlikemillionsofsculpturesbyYigalTumarkin—theIsraeliexpressionistartist—buthecensoredthetruehorrors,voicingthemonlyinhisdiary.Ambulanceskeptemergingfromwithin theblack smoke, carryingwoundedmen,deadmen, including someofhisfriends.TheroadsideswerelitteredwithhundredsofEgyptiancorpses;thedesertheatwasmakingitselffeltandtheflieswereswarming.ThatThursday,at5:15 P.M., he wrote, “Now we are driving—good lord—over human bodies,Egyptians, over limbs, another and another and another.God—weare drivingoverahumanface;onlyhisnosesticksup.Hiseyesareopen.Theguysinthetruckbedarenauseated.Someofthemarelaughinghysterically.”2
ANAMERICANSPYVESSEL,THELIBERTY,WASSAILINGOFFSHORENEARELARISHTHATday.ItwasattackedbyIsraeliairforceplanesandnavytorpedoboats.Thirty-fourcrewmemberswerekilled,171injured.Washington,initiallybelievingtheRussians had attacked the ship, sent in fighter planes, and the two countriescameclosetoconflict.TheincidentthreatenedrelationsbetweenIsraelandtheUnited States. Israel apologized immediately. Ambassador Barbour cabledWashingtonwithinminutestosaythat“Israelisobviouslyshockedbytheerrorandtenderssincereapologies.”Herecommendedthatpublicitybeavoided,lestthe presence of theAmerican ship near Gaza “feedArab suspicions of U.S.-Israelcollusion.”3Theambassador’s recommendationwasfollowedbyseveralinstructionsmeanttopreventthestoryfrombecomingpublic.
Over theyears, Israeland theUnitedStateshavedeclassifiedmany,butnotall, of the documents related to the incident; some lingering question marksremain. The secrecy prompted countless conspiracy theories that have yet todissipateevenfourdecadeslater.ManyhavetriedtoprovethatIsraelbombedthe Liberty intentionally to keep some secret from the Americans—perhapssomething todowith Israel’snuclearcapabilities, its intention toattackSyria,perhapsamassacreofEgyptianprisoners,orpossiblysomethingelse.4PresidentJohnson,CIAdirectorRichardHelms,SecretaryofStateRusk,andtheheadsoftheDepartment of Defense disbelieved Israel’s version too—or, at least, theynevershookthesuspicionthattheLibertywasbombedintentionally.5ButeventheycouldnotsaywhatcouldhavemotivatedEshkol,Amit,Dayan,orRabintoordersuchanact.Whenthesecuritycabinetmetthatday,EshkolreportedthattheLibertyhadbeenstruckbymistake.Begincommented that inVietnamtheAmericanshadmistakenlybombedtheirownshipsanumberoftimes.*Thewaraboundedwithoperationalerrors,andso longas there isnoclearevidenceofmotive,onecanassumethattheLibertywasbombedinerror.
A FEW HOURS AFTER THE LIBERTY INCIDENT, THE SECURITY CABINET DISCUSSED APROposal to seize the Golan Heights. That morning, Ha’aretz published aneditorial entitled “Finish the Job,”which discussed Syria. “It is time to settleaccounts with that country,” the piece said, and called for the defeat of theSyrianarmy inorder to create “borders appropriate forourneeds.”Thepaperdid not say exactly which territories should be conquered, but demanded“geographical and strategic realities that will afford long-term effectiveprotectionofthelivesandpropertyofthecitizensofIsrael.”Ashort-liveddailynewspaper started byUriAvnery,Daf, published a huge headline on its frontpage:“Mission:Damascus!”7
“Finishing the job” was not the sole point of action against Syria. TheconquestoftheSinaiwastheresultofasurpriseattack,andtakingcontroloftheWest Bank could be seen as a large-scale land-grab operation; but Syria hadbeenconsideredtheprimarysourceoftroubleevenbeforethewar.Rabinandafewseniormilitary figureswerenowdemanding that theybeallowed toseizetheGolan,as theyhadwished todoas farbackasearlyJanuary.AndEshkolwasstilldreamingofcontrollingthesourcesoftheBanias.*Thedebate thatpreceded theoperationon theGolanHeights resembled the
one that led to the attack on Egypt. The principal argument against it waspolitical,butthistimeitwasnottheUnitedStatesthattheobjectorsfeared.Onthecontrary:asearlyasWednesday,June7,MeirAmitreportedthattheUnited
StateswouldacceptanattackontheGolan.EbanlaterrecountedthatMcGeorgeBundyhadphonedhimand“hinted”thatitwastimetoactagainstSyria,thoughwithoutgoingasfarasDamascus.Butafewoftheministerswereapprehensiveabout the USSR. Some of them had also objected to the attack on Egypt,includingtheministersfromMapamandMafdal.Amongthesupporters,YigalAllonwas once again at the forefront.Dayan, in contrast, demanded restraintthis time.He did not viewSyria as a strategic threat.Before thewar, he hadbelieved that Israel was responsible for the escalation of tensions along thenorthernborder. “Iwas afraidof theSoviets’ response,”hewrote. “SyriawasundertheUSSR’sprotection,andtheymighthavecometoitsaid.”Atfirst,hepermitted the IDF only to take control of the demilitarized zones, withoutcrossingtheinternationalborder.Ashehadbeforeandduringthewar,hewasonceagainabletoimposehispositiononEshkol.RabinarguedwithDayan:therewasnopointinstoppingatalimitedactionin
the demilitarized zones and theBanias area, he said, nor should they contentthemselveswithTelAzaziat,oneoftheSyrianstrongholdsdiscussedinrecentdays.OnelocalcommunityleaderfromthenorthlaterrecalledhearingrumorsthatDayanhadclaimedtheoperationontheGolanHeightswouldtakethelivesofthousandsofsoldiers,butintheNorthernCommandtherewastalkofamassresignationofofficersinprotestagainstthegovernment’shesitationtotaketheGolan.ThemainpressuretoseizetheGolancamefromGeneralDavidElazarofthe
NorthernCommand,knowntohisfriendsasDado.Inthetwoyearsprecedingthewarhehadbroachedthematternotonlywithhissuperiorsinthemilitary,butalsowithEshkolandafewministers,includingAllon,withwhomheevendiscussedthepossibilityofoccupyingDamascus.Allonobjected.Elazarsentafriend,UziFeinerman,tolobbyDayanabouttheGolan.Feinermandeployedanemotionallyandhistoricallychargedphrase:ifIsraeldidnottakeadvantageofthewartooccupytheGolan,theresultwouldbe“weepingforgenerations.”On Thursday morning, the air force bombed the Golan Heights. Rabin
claimed itwas an“error.”TheSyriansbombed several Israeli communities inresponse, and Eshkol authorized the evacuation of children from the region.ElazarandhismenpushedkibbutzmembersintheGalileetoexertpressureonthe government to take the Golan, recruiting Allon to their efforts. Allonorganized a kibbutz delegation to go to Tel Aviv and arranged ameeting forthemwithEshkol,who,inanextremelyraregesture,agreedtoletthemspeakatthe cabinet meeting that day. Perhaps he was hoping their appearance wouldfacilitate a decision to at least seize the Banias, despite Dayan’s position, or
perhaps he only invited them out of sympathy and identification with theirplight: theywere friends, agriculturalists,members of the labormovement. “Ibriefedthemonwhattosayandhowtosayit,”Allonrecounted.Thekibbutzmembersdescribedtheirlivesasanightmare.KibbutzGadotlay
inruins,theyreported.Onedelegate,ShalomHablinofKibbutzHagoshrim,hadcomestraightfromguarddutyandapologizedbecausehehadnothad timetochangehisclothes.Hehadbeen living in theGalilee for thirty-fouryears;hischildren and grandchildren had been born there. One of his sons was in theSinai;asecondhadbeeninjuredbyashell.Thegrandchildrenwereinthebombshelters,whilehehimselfwasonguarddutythewholetime.Theycouldn’tbearitanylonger.Eshkol,himselfamemberofKibbutzDegania,rememberedthatduringtheWarofIndependenceadelegationfromDeganiahadgonetotalktoBen-Gurion,totryandpersuadehimtoassignmoreforcesfortheirprotection.*Themeeting’sirregularandemotionalbeginningwaseffective.Nerveswere
onedge.AllonbeganbysayingthataslongastheSyrianscontrolledtheGolanHeights, theywould shell the communities to their south and terroristswouldcontinue to slip across theborder. Israelwouldhave to respond, anddoing somight complicate things with the Soviet Union. He did not believe that theUSSRwouldbreakoff relationswith Israel,buteven if itdid,hepreferred tohave the Golan Heights without a Soviet embassy than a Soviet embassywithouttheGolanHeights.Hecouldnotseewhythedisputedbordershouldberespected, nor did he understand why the Sinai and theWest Bank could beseizedbuttheGolanHeightscouldnot.*ZerahWarhaftigreplied,“Ithinkwemusttakecarenottogetcaughtupinthe
intoxicationofvictory.”If theUSSRcut tieswithIsrael, the tenotherEasternBloccountieswoulddosotoo,additionalcountriesmightfollowsuit,andwhoknew—IsraelmightfinditselfoutsidetheUN.TheregionwasSyrian;italwayshadbeen.TheSecurityCouncilhadcalledforacease-fire.IfSyriaviolatedit,therewouldbeawar.Butwhyinitiateone?MinisterofEducationAran,whohadobjectedtotheattackonEgypt,sounded
different now. “For four thousand years we have discussed the akeida—thesacrifice of Isaac—which did not ultimately take place. Here in thesecommunitieswehavemen,womenandchildrenthreatenedwithsacrifice.Itisanintolerablesituation.”Dayan first refused to explain his position, and only following lengthy
persuasiondidhespeak.TheoccupationoftheGolanwouldcomplicateIsrael’sposition not onlywith respect to theUSSR but also vis-à-vis France, Israel’s
mainproviderofaircraft,and“thesituationintheairforceisnotgood.”Healsofeared a combined attack by the air forces of Syria, Iraq, and others. Theconquest of the Golan would require a complex operation, and it was of nobenefit:theSyrianswouldneverstopfighting.Dayanspokeemotionally,sometimesangrily,asdidothers.IsraelLiorwrote
thatDayanonce again soundedmenacing. Ingeneral,Dayan said, hewasnotwilling tohaveeverymilitaryactioncomebefore thegovernment foradvanceauthorization. Although ZerahWarhaftig supported his position, Dayan chosetheminister’snametoexpressthedepthofhisscornforhiscolleagues:“WhenmyroleandWarhaftig’sdecisioncarrythesameweight,andamajorityoftwovotesdecideswhetherwegotowarovertwomorekilometers—Idon’tbelievethisisthewaytomanageacomplicatedwar.”Dayanwaslikeagodjustthen,andthatwashoweveryonetreatedhim,wrote
Lior:“Theproposal thatmilitarymattersnotbesubject to thedecisionsof themajority was the demand of a tyrant, not of a minister in a democraticgovernment.”Then Dayan said some of the harshest words ever spoken in a cabinet
meeting. “This eveningwe’veheard thekibbutz delegationgive an emotionalpresentation.AndIhavetobetheonetotellthem,staythereandsuffer.Inmyopinion,it’sbettertomovetenkibbutzimfifteenkilometersoutofthewayandsaythatwe’renotdealingwith[theGolan]now,ifwe’renotableto.”Itwasasiftheministershadbeenstruckbylightning,Liorwrote.Allonand
Eshkolwere quick to respond. “I cannot imagine evacuating kibbutzim,” saidAllon;“thatwouldmeangivinguppartofthelandofIsrael.”Eshkolwasalsoshockedbythenotion.“TheSyrianswouldrequirenogreatervictory,”hesaid,andadded,“Couldsuchathingbedoneafterconsultationwithonlytwoorthreepeople?”Eshkol was alluding to Dayan’s demand that the conduct of the war be
removedfromthegovernment’spurview.Typically,however,EshkolfoundthewordsthatallowedhimtoacceptDayan’sposition:“Justaswarsaren’tfoughtsimply because the commanders want to, one can also say that wars aren’tfoughttomakelifeeasierfortenkibbutzim.”Dayanwon: the cabinet decided to postpone the decision for a day or two.
Thechiefofstaffwouldbringthemaproposal,andinthemeanwhilehe“wouldmakeaneffortnot toprovoke theSyrians.”Thenextmorning,DayanphonedGeneralElazarandonhisowninitiativeorderedhimtocommenceanincursionintotheGolan.Elazar,wroteYitzhakRabin,“almostfelloffhischair.”Hewas
nottheonlyone.8
2. NIGHTMARES II: “THE HANDS ON MY WATCHSTOPPEDMOVING”
AccordingtoDayan,hehadfoundoutearlyonFridaymorningthattheSyrianforceswerecrumblingandwouldbeeasytodefeat,althoughSyriawasabouttostopfighting,asEgypthadalreadydone.HisinformationcamefromatelegramsentbyNasser to theSyrianpresident,NurAl-DinAl-Atassi,whichhadbeeninterceptedby Israeli intelligence. “Lastnight Ididnot thinkEgypt andSyria(the political leadership)would collapse like this and abandon the rest of thebattle,”wroteDayan toEshkol, “but if this is the situation, it should be fullyexploited.Agreatday.”“What a despicable man,” was Eshkol’s reaction. Intuitive as he was and
always thepolitician, henaturally felt thatDayanwas stealinghis thunder onthis front, too,whichhadgreatpoliticalvaluebecauseof thekibbutzim.Afterall,Eshkolhadbeeninfavoroftheoperation,andonlyunderDayan’sinfluencehad he convinced the ministers to wait. Now it would look as if Eshkol’sgovernmenthadonce again tried to curb the armyand thatDayan, the Israelihero, had once again taken it upon himself to do the patriotic thing. Eshkolfumed.ButtherewasnopointinrevokingDayan’sorder,particularlysincehesupportedit.9
It is possible that Dayanwas telling the truth and that he had changed hismindinlightofnewinformation.Perhapshegotcaughtupintheuncontrollablefeeling that it was now or never, which to a great extent had prompted theconquest of Gaza, theWest Bank, and the Old City—the urge that impelledIsrael to act quickly, before the rest of the world could stop it. “Has Israelreceived official notice of Syria’s decision to cease fire?” Dayan asked ofYaacovHerzog.AtsuchmomentsDayantendedtoforgetthatnoteveryterritorythatcouldbeconqueredshouldbeconquered.Heoftenreversedhispositions,capriciouslyandattimesspitefully.“I came to understand that whatever I proposed, Dayanwould propose the
opposite,” Yigal Allon later said. On Thursday, Yigal Yadin had observed toHaimBar-LevthatDayan’sstancecamefromadesiretoprovewhowasboss.AllonclaimedthatthegovernmentwasinanycaseabouttodecidetoseizetheGolan; this, according to Allon, was reason enough for Dayan to beat theministerstoit.*YitzhakRabinwrotethathedidnotunderstandDayan’sbehaviorduringthese
events. In a conversation with Yaacov Herzog, he described Dayan as “apeculiarman.”A book about the history of thewar, published by the IDF inconjunctionwiththeMinistryofDefense,leftthequestionofDayan’smotivesopen,commentingonlythathadDayanrealizedSyriawascollapsingandreadyforacease-fire,hecouldhavejustaseasilyseenthisasreinforcinghisoriginalpositionthattherewasnoneedtoattack.11
THESECURITYCABINETCONVENEDATNINEONFRIDAYMORNING.DAYANANNOUNCEDthathehadorderedtheseizureofnotonlythenorthernpartoftheGolan,buttheentire Golan Heights. He explained what he had just told Eshkol: Syria’swillingnesstoacceptacease-firehadcreatedanewopportunity.HeemphasizedthatEshkolhadgivenhisauthorization.Shapira proposed canceling the operation, saying the arguments against it
madebyDayanhimselfthenightbeforewereverypersuasive.Iftheoperationendedatonce,therewouldbelessbloodshed.Hewasfurious:“Iwanttoknowwhoisresponsiblefortheviolationofourdecisions.”Beginsaidthattherewasindeedan“aestheticflaw”inthefactthatDayanhadactedagainstgovernmentdecisions, but he offered a precedent from Austria under Empress MariaTheresa:whenasoldiercommittedadisciplinaryoffensethatentailedanactofheroism,hereceivedbothareprimandandamedal.Eshkolexplainedhisdilemmatothecabinet:althoughhecouldnotclaimto
have been asked, he was still in favor of the operation, and did not think itshouldbestoppednow.Hispositionwasaccepted.Shapiraretreated,avoidingavote on his proposal: “I don’t want to seem like the last of the just.” ZerahWarhaftigwasabsent.Thatmorning,beforehelearnedoftheordertostrikeatthe Golan, he had headed north hoping to meet his son; on the way hedistributedtosoldierscopiesoftheBookofPsalms.In the evening, Dayan reported to Eshkol that some difficulties had arisen
with seizing the Golan, despite his original expectations. The Syrians werefighting boldly andwere holding up respectably against the air force; but theIDFwould take theBaniasareabymorning.YaacovHerzog,somethingofanIsraeliSirHumphrey,describedtherestoftheconversationasifitwerestraightoutofanepisodeofYes,PrimeMinister.Ofcourse,saidDayan,itreallywouldbe preferable for the IDF to seize themountain ranges to the south, but thatwould be impossible if they had to halt their efforts in the morning. Eshkolwondered out loud: “Sincewe’ve already begun, perhapswe could go a littlefarther in themorning?”Dayan quickly agreed: “Why not, if that iswhat thePrimeMinisterdirectsus todo—certainly.”Eshkolcontinued,“Wecan’thave
theSyrianswalkingawaywithavictory,withIsraeldefeatingalltheArabstatesbut this one.” There was still time before the UN Security Council wouldconvene.Meanwhile,ElazarwasleadinghisNorthernCommandforces.“Itwasasif,”wrotehisbiographer,“atautspringwassuddenlyreleasedandflewoutlikeawildthing.”12
“ITWASAHORRIFYINGASCENT,”RECOUNTEDHAIMBROMOFYEHIAM,WHOTOOKpartin theconquestofTelAzaziat.“Therewasasmellofburning,andnot justofthings.Thesensewasthatitwaspeopletoo,thesmellofpeople....Anyway,itwassomethingIhadneversmelled.Thepeoplewhocamelaterdidn’tnoticeit,maybe they just saw the scorched halftracks, but that smell, it gets into yourbrain.Wesawthebodiesofourownguys. . . .Itwasabrutalbattle.”13 IsraelHuberman,fromHaifa,asoldierintheGolaniBrigade,wasridinginahalftrackwhentheSyriansshelledit:“Everythingbecameterriblyfoggyallatonce,”herecalled later. “I sawfireandsmokecoming from theengine. I thought Iwasaloneinthehalftrack.Ijumpedoutandstartedrunning.SuddenlyIheardshoutsfrom behind: ’Help! Help!’ I turned around and saw that the driver and thegunner,MosheDrimer,hadbeenhitandwerestuckinthedriver’scompartment.Thedriverwas lyingon thewheelandnotmoving.Drimerwaswrithing.Hisfacewascoveredwithblood,hewasbleedingeverywhere.Hetriedtogetout,but the machine gun was in his way.” Huberman acted instinctively. He ranback,openedthedoor,andtriedtogetDrimerout.“Hekeptmumbling.Ithinkhewassaying,’Mom,Mom.’Ithinkhehadbloodinhiseyesandcouldn’tsee.Therewas fireall aroundus.”Huberman learned later thathemanaged togetDrimerout,butjustthenasecondshellhitthevehicleandignitedthefueltank.“Therewas an ocean of flames. I suddenly felt very hot. Iwas burning up, Icaught fire.” He ran without knowing where. He was told he looked like aburningtorch.Anofficerranafterhim,knockedHubermantotheground,andstartedputting the flamesoutwithwater.Huberman screamed that therewerestillpeopleinthehalftrack.Theofficersaiditwastoolate,therewasnothingtobedone.14
SINCEBECOMINGMINISTEROFDEFENSE,DAYANHADPRESENTEDPERSUASIVEREASONSFfornotcapturingtheSuezCanal:controlofthecanalmightcomplicateIsrael’srelations with the countries that used it, he thought. But he had also arguedagainstconqueringtheGolanHeights,andtheGazaStrip,andhadthenreversedhimself.Similarly,hesuddenlyfavoredtheconquestofthecanal.Heretoo,thestoryisperplexing.
RabinwrotethatDayanhadorderedtakingthecanalafterNasserdeclaredhisacceptance of a cease-fire. It is possible, then, thatDayan had yet again beenseizedbyalast-minute“nowornever”stateofmind,andthatheauthorizedthemove in a sort of snatch-and-grab frenzy, at odds with his own reasonedperspective.Hethenapparentlychangedhismindyetagainandorderedthattheforcesstopsometwelvemilesshortofthecanal.OnFriday,YeshayahuGavishannouncedtoRabinthathismenhadreachedthebanksofthecanal,andlaterhecommendedhissoldiersforarriving“upright,battlevictorious,andproud.”ButDayan,whohadonlyrecentlybeenwillingtoforceGavishoutandtakeoverhiscommand, threatened to court-martial the general as though he had brokenthroughtothecanalagainstorders.15
A FEW HOURS AFTER THE START OF THE COMBAT IN THE GOLAN, YONINA BEN-ORobtainedthebattleissueoftheofficialAirForceJournal.On thesecondpageshefoundaninterviewwithMajorArieh,asquadroncommander.“Thistimewefeelthatwe’refightingforoursacred,historicalland,”hesaid.“Eachoneofusfeelsadeepsenseofconnectiontoourtargets.It’saprofoundexperiencetoflyoverJericho,Bethlehem,Hebron,andAshkelonofthePhilistines.”Arieh’stonewas described as “awestruck.” The major went on to compare the IDF’sconquestofJerichotothebiblicalvictoryofJoshua.“We’lldoitagain,”hesaid,thrilled and unabashedly emotional. “Maybe even I myself didn’t realize thedeepfeelingsburiedinsidemetowardtheJewishpeople’shistoricalplaces.Twothousandyearsofhistoryhavesprungtolifebeforemyveryeyes.”Hesaidtheenemyarmywasfleeing,“justlikeinbiblicaltimes,aftertheJewishvictories.”When she read this,YoninaBen-Or later recalled, she felt shewas not just
readingprintedwordsbuthearing thespeaker’svoice.Thepilot,MajorArieh,was her husband, an archaeology buff. The Air Force Journal quoted himsaying:“IwantmychildrentolearnaboutEretzIsraelnotjusttheoretically,inschool, but in real life. I want them to be able to visit the places where theJewish people lived, the places they fought for and built generations ago. Iwouldliketovisitthemafterthewar.”YoninaBen-Orwasbesideherselfwithexcitement: “My templeswere pounding. Togetherwewill go there, you,meandthegirls,”shethought.Atjustaboutthesametime,AriehBen-Or’splanetookadirecthit.Theplane
crashedandBen-Orwaskilled.“Aki”Urbach,ashehadbeencalledinchildhood,wasborninHerzliya.His
widow later recounted that in October 1948, when he was ten, his fatherpunishedhimbecauseheranouttoseetheremnantsoftheplanebelongingto
ModiAllon,commanderofthefirstfightersquadronintheairforce;Allonhadcrashed at the Herzliya airport. Arieh and Yonina went to elementary schooltogether. She had been born in a Polish village that later became part of theUkraine.DuringWorldWarII,shehadbeensent toaghettowithherparents,and then to a forced labor camp. She came to Israel at the age of twelve, in1950.She andArieh alsowent to high school together inTelAviv. “Itwas awonderfulschool.Itwasn’tafraidoftheword’Zionism.’Itgaveusvaluesandtaughtus to love thiscountry.”Theymarriedat twenty-two.Hewasalreadyafighterpilot,andhadtakenpartintheSinaiCampaign.He served in the regular air force as apilot trainer, amongotherduties.He
usually flew the newMirages, but in early 1967 took command of a Fougasquadron.Shewasanelementaryschoolteacher.Theyhadtwodaughters,ArzaandMihal. They lived on the TelNof air base, near the runway.At first shewouldalwayslookoutthewindowwhenAriehtookoff.“Myheartwouldswellwith pride and contract with worry and then swell and contract again,” sherecalled.Later, she stopped looking. “Youcan’t standat thewindowforeightyearsandwatchAriehtakingoffandlanding.Atsomepointyoustop.Hegoes.He takes off. He lands. He comes back.” He would say good-bye to hisdaughtersandseethemattheendofthedaylikeanyfathercominghomefromwork, she said, but he often leftwhen the girlswere still asleep and returnedafter they’dgone tobed. Itwasn’teasy.Hewasdevoted tohis job,she to thefamily. “It was typical of pilots’ wives. We live our husbands’ lives.” Herpurposewastoenablehimtodedicatehimselftotheairforce.Onceortwiceayeartheywouldgoonapicnic.Prior to thewar, she hardly saw him.One night he came home just before
midnight.Hewokethegirlsupandhuggedthem.Arzawassixandahalf,Mihalwas three. The next day, they thought they had been dreaming. Theirmotherwasworried:“Yearsspentwithafighterpilotandinfamilyhousingonthebasemakesthewifeasemi-expert, too,”shesaid.“TheFougaisnotabattleplane.It’sslow.Itsperformanceislimited.It’satrainingplane.”Herhusbandtriedtoreassureher,adding:“Yousee,thedecisiontostayintheairforcewassowise.Icouldn’tforgivemyselftodayifIwasoutsideallofthis.Icouldneverforgivemyself.”Shewasnotreassured.When thewarstarted, thepilots’ familieswereevacuatedfromTelNof toa
military convalescent home in Netanya. Yonina Ben-Or shared a room withanother pilot’s wife and the two girls. “The atmosphere was electric withanxiety.ItstartedwiththeannouncementthatfourFougashadbeenlostonthefirstday.Who?Who’sgone?”MajorBen-Orledaquartetofplanesinanattack
on Jordanian tanks east of Jerusalem, for which he received a posthumouscommendation from the chief of staff. He just had time to celebratewith hismen,andthenhewassenttotheGolan.On Thursday evening, her mother and mother-in-law were visiting. “Why
don’tyoueat,Yonina?”Arieh’smotherasked.“Whyhaven’tyoubrushedyourhair?You’llgohomeandAriehwon’trecognizeyou!”SherepliedthatuntilthebusinessontheGolanHeightswasover,shecouldn’teat,brushherhair,orgetdressed.Shesimplycouldn’t.Shefollowedthewarontheradioandpickeduprumors.On Friday evening, after reading the interviewwith her husband, thefamilies lit theSabbathcandles and sang somesongs.Therewasabigdinnerwithpilots’wivesfromanotherbase.YoninaBen-Orfeltsadandconfused.Herhusband’scomrade,ArnonLivnat,hadbeenkilledonthefirstdayofwar.Hiswidow,Hava, askedher to comeandvisit. “I couldn’t. I thought, ’Howcan Italk to her when her husband is gone and mine is alive?’ I was very upset.PerhapsIshouldhavegonetoseeher?”*Shewenttobedearly,tense.Atnine-thirty,someonecalledforherroommate.
Ben-Or was happy: she thought her roommate had gone to speak with herhusbandonthephone,andaskedhertosendherlovetoArieh.Afewminuteslater, a soldier came together, too.Nowshewasevenhappier:herewasherown phone call. It was dark. The blackout was still in effect. She had oftenwonderedwhat itwould be like if shewas ever notified thatArieh had beenkilled.Howwouldshereact?Wouldsheevergetoverit?Theactualeventwascompletelydifferentfromanythingshehadimagined.“Iwenttotheotherwingofthebuilding,wherethephonewas.Peoplewerewalkingaroundthecourtyardwithflashlights.Someonecameovertome,puthisarmthroughmine,andsaid,’My name is Dr. Baruh. Your husband has fallen in the course of duty.’ Itrembledlikealeaf.Ifought.Tonotfalldown.Notslip.Notcollapse.Ithoughtthiswasbeyondbearing.Ithoughtnowomanhadthestrengthtobearthis.”Oneofthelasttimestheysaweachother,Ariehaskedhernottobreakdown
ifhewerekilled.Shesawthatashiswill.Shewentbacktoherroomanddidnotcry.“Iwasinavacuum.Thehandsonmywatchstoppedmoving.Iwasn’tthere.”
•••
THAT NIGHT, YAACOV HERZOGWENT TO SLEEP IN ESHKOL’S TEL AVIV OFFICE. WHENYigalAlloncameinlater,henoticedthatHerzog,whowasOrthodox,hadnotturned the lights off, in observance of the Sabbath. Allon turned them off
himself and lay down on the floor to sleep. Just before four in themorning,Eshkol andhis advisers came in.Theydecided tocontinue the fighting in theGolan at least until midday. Herzog and Begin went on a Sabbath walk andtalkedabouttheJewishpeople.Herzogsaidtheyweretheonlynationinhistorythat had managed to control time: the Christian and Muslim rest days wereinspiredbytheJewishSabbath,andthatwashowtheJewshaddeterminedtheweeklyorderintheworld,unchangedforsomefourthousandyears.Beginwassad,Herzogwroteinhisdiary.HefelttheGolancampaignshouldhavestartedonWednesdayorThursdaydespiteDayan’sobjections.NowSyriawasurgingtheUNtoarrangeacease-fire,andIsraelwouldnothaveenoughtimeto taketheentireGolan.AccordingtoHerzog,BeginalsocondemnedDayan’sbehaviorinthecabinetmeetings.
YONINABEN-ORWAITED FOR THEGIRLS TOWAKEUP. THEN SHE TOLD THEM, “GIRLS,DaddyflewinhisplanetogetridoftheSyrians; theybrokehisplaneandhisplanefellandDaddywaskilledandhe’snotcominghomeanymore.”Thegirlsrefusedtobelieveher.ShetookthemtoherparentsinHerzliya.ShecouldnotbringherselftoseeArieh’smother.Sheaskedthefamilyphysiciantobreakthenewstoher.16
ESHKOLWENTONATOUROFTHENORTHANDMETWITHDAYAN.HISIMPRESSIONWASthat the IDF was having great difficulty gaining control of the key town ofKuneitra. At this point, the Golan was a race against time. Eban telephonedEshkol’shousetoinformhimthattheUNSecurityCouncilhadissuedacease-fireresolution,andsothefightinghadtostopimmediately.SinceEshkolwasinthe north, hiswife took the call. Later Eshkol phoned her, full of enthusiasmabout theview from theGolan, thewater, thegreenery.ShegavehimEban’smessage and Eshkol shouted, “Hello? Hello? I can’t hear you. There’ssomethingwrongwiththeline,Ican’thearyou.Hello?”Herepeatedthisoverandover,untilsheunderstoodthathedidnotwanttohear.17
A few hours later, Kuneitra fell. Lior was with Eshkol when he heard thenews.“Eshkolwasaverysensitiveman,”hewrote,“but Idon’tbelieveIcaneverrecallsucharesponse:hehuggedandkissedtheofficersnexttohimlikeayoungman.Itwouldn’thavetakenmuchforhimtostartskippinganddancing.”HaimBar-Levwas among the first to enterKuneitra. “The town itselfwas
intact,butitlookedabandoned,”herecalled.“Thesignsoflifethereuptothatmorning were visible in every home.” The town reminded him of BeershebaduringtheWarofIndependence,exceptthatthedesertionoftheGolanHeights
wasmoreabrupt.Buttheresidentshadnotleftbeforethewarbegan:EliElad,areporterforHa’aretz,couldseelonglinesofvillagerswalkingeast.Uri Chizik, of Yehiam, found himself in the village of Pik, also deserted.
“Whatmadethestrongestimpressionwasthatthepeoplelefttheirhomesjustasthey were, they took their personal belongings and fled. You could see babycribsoverturnedanddamaged in thebombing—somewerebloodstained.Thatmadememiserable,somuchsothatevenifIcouldhavetakenhomeagiftorsomeloot—well,Icouldn’thavetakenanythingfromthere.”*Rafi Rubinstein, also from Yehiam, remembered seeing a wounded Syrian
soldierontheroad.Hisbackwasinjuredandhewasstillalive,butdying.“Wegobywithourjeepsandnotoneofusdaresgetdown,”Rubinsteinrecounted.“Not to kill him, nor to take him for treatment. No one dared do anything.Myselfincluded.HemusthavebeenoneoftheSyrianswho’dbeenhit,maybeinthebombing,who’dmanagedtomakeittotheroadtoaskforhelp.Hewassprawledoutwithhishandsup.Itwasasifhewasasking,withhishands,tobetakensomewhere.Andwe justdroveby. I rememberwedrovearoundhim inthemiddleoftheroad,noonewentoverhim,noonedaredmovehimtothesideoftheroadoranything.Ican’tquitetakeitin,butit’safact.”For the first time,Rubinstein could see Israel fromhigh up, from the other
sideof theborder. “I sawourkibbutzim, sobeautiful, so lush, and, really—itwasbeautiful.Youseeallthatfarminglandandyouseewhatakibbutzis.Andwith them, everything’s so neglected, poverty, so much poverty, barbed-wirefences and ditches.”Hewas convinced that the view from theGolanHeightshadfueledtheSyrians’hatred.“ItmustgettotheArabs.I’malmostcertainthatwasoneofthereasonswhytheykeptshootingatus.”RubinsteinandUriChizikreachedEl-Hama,orHamatGader,inHebrew,in
thesouthernGolan,acomplexofhotspringsprizedfortheirhealingpropertiessince antiquity. There were the ruins of a Roman theater and a synagogue.Rubinsteinfoundtwolargebottlesofbeeratthesiteandpromptlygotdrunk.Hejumpedintoahotspring,Chiziksaid,andstartedswimmingandyelling,“I’mHerod,I’mHerod,I’mHerod.”18
YAACOVHERZOGSPENTTHESABBATHINPRAYERANDREST,ANDWHENHERETURNEDto the prime minister’s office he found that Dimitri Chuvakhin had come toinformEshkolthattheUSSRwasseveringdiplomaticties.Eshkolpromisedtheambassador that Israeldidnot intend to attackDamascus.Eban later said thattheambassadorwept,eitherbecausehewasreluctanttoleaveIsraelorbecause
hefearedthewelcomehecouldexpectathome.*DayanagreedwithOddBullonacease-firethatwouldtakeeffectatsix-thirty
thatevening.ThecabinetreconvenedinTelAviv.WarhaftigandShapiracamein from Jerusalem, even though the Sabbath had not ended. The IDF heldpositions in the northern and southernGolan. Dayanwanted a decision as towhether to seize the areas between those positions. Shapira opposed anycontinuation of the fighting, andMinisterYosef Sapir askedwhy the soldiershadtoreturnfireeverytimetheywereshotat.DayaneruptedthattenthousandorderscouldnotstopIDFsoldiersfromrespondingtofire.Eshkolreiteratedhisposition: he really only wanted to control the northern Golan and the watersources.Inthemiddleofthediscussion,YigalYadincameinandannouncedthatthe
IDF now controlled the entireGolan,which put an end to all the talk.Beginaskedthathisopinionberecordedintheminutesanyway:hadhebeengiventhefloorbeforereceivingthenews,hewouldhavespokenagainstongoingfighting.The international situation was extremely tense. Sometimes militaryconsiderations took precedence; at other times political considerationsoutweighed them,and theGeneralStaffhad tounderstand this.Dayansaidhewassurprisedathiscolleagues:theyshouldbecelebratingtheoccupationoftheGolanHeights.Hesuggestedhavingadrinkandtoastingtheirvictory.DuringthemeetinganotewashandedtoYaacovHerzog:ItamarWarhaftig,
the minister’s son, had been taken from the battlefield with a head wound.Following surgery, he was now out of danger. Zerah Warhaftig nonethelessremained steadfast in his opposition to the attack on the Syrian front. Yearsafterward, he wrote that had Israel not attacked Syria, and had Syria notresponded,EgyptwouldhavebeenangryatSyriafornotcomingtoitsaid,Arabunity might have crumbled, the Communist world might have maintaineddiplomatic ties with Israel, and peace with Egypt might have been achievedpriortoAnwarel-Sadat’svisittoJerusalemin1977.20Ben-Gurionwasalsonotpleased. Inhisopinion, Israel shouldhave respected thecease-firewithSyria.“WehavenoneedfortheGolanHeights,becausewewillnotremainthere,”hewrote.ButoneofDayan’saideswarnedBen-GurionnottoarguewithDayanorelsehemightresign.Heneededencouragement.21
Dayan,aswashiswont,wasthinkingofhistory.HesentYigalYadinanotesaying, “I think Eshkol started to say something about denying that heauthorized theSyrianoperationyesterdaymorning. . . .Perhapsyouwouldbewillingtotalktohimaboutit,topreventanyunpleasantness.”Yadinconfirmed
that Eshkol was told about the order only after it had been issued; however,sincetheoperationhadnotyetbegun,hestillcouldhavestoppedit.22
3.EXPULSION:“TEARSOFTHEINNOCENT”
On Saturday evening, when the Sabbath was over, fifteen veteran Jerusalemcontractors arrived at the Western Wall with bulldozers and other heavyequipment.Oneofthemshouted,“Onthywalls,Jerusalem!”Hisfriendsstoodandprayed,andtheywept.Theydecidedtoholdahavdalahceremony,markingtheendof theSabbath.Somesoldiersgave themwine for theblessing.Whentheceremonywasover,theybegantodestroytwopublictoiletsatthesite.ByearlySundaymorningtheywerecallingthemselvesthe“Koteldetail”andhaddecided to commemorate the historic occasion annually.23 Meanwhile,bulldozershaddestroyed135homesthathadstoodinfrontofthewall.TheMugrabihouses,astheywereknown,wereaslum.Whilethecontractors
knockeddownthepublictoilets,anofficeronreservedutywentfromhousetohouse,orderingtheresidentstoevacuate.Hepromisedtheywouldbegivennewhomes. The people sobbed and wailed, and begged for time to remove theirpossessions, to which the officer consented. And so, wrote the journalist UziBenziman, “with the contractors still busy smashing the toilets, the peoplestruggled tomake theirway toagatheringpointnearZionGate.Theycarriedpersonalbelongingsandhouseholditemsontheirbacks.”Somerefusedtoleavetheirhomes.Thebulldozersapproachedandtheweepingresidentsdepartedonlyafter the walls of their houses began to come down. Floodlights lit up thedarkenedarea.Oneelderlywomanwasfoundbeneaththeruinsofawall.Shewas unconscious and clearly dying, although there were no external signs ofinjury.Shewastakenoutoftherubbleinherbedandeffortsweremadetohelpher,beneaththefloodlights,amongthecloudsofdustraisedbythebulldozers.Bythetimemedicalhelparrived,thewomanhaddied.One of those forced out, FarjAbdelBalas, later listed the items in his two
rooms:twowoodenbeds;aFormicawardrobewithmirror;armchairs;achild’sbed; a Formica table and chairs; a large heating stove; winter and summerclothes,includingacoatandawoolsuit;kitchenitems,includingcopperbowlsandpots,plates,mugs,glassware,knives,spoons,andforks.Inthecellarhehadstored rice, sugar,oil, flour, tea,andcoffee.Hemadehis livingselling touristsouvenirsatthewall.Whenhishousewasdemolishedhealsolostcamerafilm,pictures,andwoodencrucifixes.24
The first person to complain about the public toilets near the wall had
probablybeenDavidBen-Gurion.TeddyKollekpromisedhim theywouldberemoved. The house demolitions were done to create an open area for massprayers on the upcoming Shavuot holiday. Uzi Narkis authorized thedemolitions.Inhismemoirs,hewrotethatthehouseshadbeenbuiltoriginallyto limit Jewish visitors’ access to the wall. But he knew the operation wasproblematic, so he consulted neither Rabin nor Dayan. “If I ask forauthorization,I’llgetanegativeresponse.OrelseIwon’tgetanyresponse.Orelsethey’llaskmetowait.Incertainsituations,youdon’tneedtoinvolvetheupperranks.”Hetooktheresponsibilityuponhimself.ChaimHerzog,soontobecome the firstmilitary governor of theWestBank,wrote in a similar vein,“Hadwewaitedforthenecessarypermits,nodecisionwouldhavebeenmade.”Like Rabbi Goren, who demanded that Narkis blow up the mosque, Herzog“understoodthatafewdayslateritwouldbetoolate.”TheynaturallyapproachedMayorKollek,whosummonedanarchitectandan
archaeologist.TheytouredtheareaonFridayanddrewupplans.Kollektalkedtotheministerofjustice,whoresponded,“Idon’tknowwhatthelegalstatusis.Do it quickly and may the God of Israel be with you.” Given the legal andinternational sensitivity involved, the operationwas carried out swiftly, underthe cover of night, and with sufficient obfuscation to claim that neither themilitary nor the municipality had demolished the houses, but rather thecontractors’ association, a private organization. As everyone was aware, thestrugglebetweenJewsandArabsovercontrolofthewallhadbeengoingonforyears;in1929ithadledtothemurderofdozensofJewishresidentsinHebronandJerusalem.Narkisdetailedinhismemoirsaseriesofunsuccessfulattemptsmade by Jews starting in the nineteenth century to purchase the wall and itssurroundings.“Nowwehadbeengiventheopportunitytocreatenewfacts,”hewrote.“Those who orchestrated the destruction of the neighborhood,” wrote Uzi
Benziman, “believed that their work was not related purely to security orplanning: that night they acted out of a near-mystic sense. In their eyes, theywere representatives of the Jewish people who had come to establishsovereignty over their most sacred site. The officers and the contractorsconsidered themselves emissaries, come to renew Jewish statehood as it hadbeen1,897yearsearlier.Atthatmomenttheyhadnointerestinthefateofthe135Arabfamilieswhobecamethevictimsoftheselongings.”25
WHENYOSEFWEITZLEFTHISBOMBSHELTER,HEFOUNDTHATTHREEOFTHETREESINhisyardhadbeendamagedinthefighting.Thelargecarobandonepinehadlost
some branches, and the Jerusalem pine was entirely knocked down. Weitzstartedclearingitawayfromtheotherplants.Hisgrandson,Nir,wasstillintheSinai. There was no news from him, andWeitz was worried. He read in thepaperthatBen-GurionconsideredtheconquestofJerusalemthesecondgreatestdayofhislife;thefirstwasthedayhehadcometoPalestine.Weitzsenthimahurried letter:What about theday independencewasproclaimed?Ben-Gurionquickly replied:Thatwas a day of greatworry, but his visit to theKotel hadfilledhimonlywithjoy.“Perhapsthat’snottherightwordforthedeep,thrillingexperiencethatfilledmywholebeingwiththewonderful,swiftvictorytheIDFhas given us,” he wrote. “I had just such a profound experience on my firstnight, after I arrived in Petach Tikva and heard the jackals crying and thedonkeysbraying,andfeltthathereIwas,inournation’sresurginghomeland,nolongerexiledinaforeignland.”26
Everyonewaspreoccupiedwiththequestionofwhattodonext.Ben-Gurionclaimedthatthegovernmentwouldnotknowhowto“consolidatetheconquest”inJerusalemandHebron.Inbothplaces,theyshouldestablishgreatcentersofJewish population, he told HaimMoshe Shapira andMenachem Begin, as ifforgetting his earlier opposition to the war. The West Bank should not bereturnedtoHussein,althoughitsannexationwouldaddamillionArabstoIsrael,which posed a grave danger. There was also the problem of the refugees inGaza.BeginsuggestedmovingthemtoElArishandleavingthemthere.“It isdoubtfulwhether theywillwant to go,”wroteBen-Gurion.Begin agreed thattheWestBankshould remainpartof Israel.Ben-Gurion tried to recruitBeginandShapira inawaragainstEshkol.Clearly,Eshkolwasnotadequate for theimminentdiplomaticstruggle.“FromShapira’sresponseitwasobviousthathedid not want another battle with Eshkol. Begin did not answer,” wrote Ben-Gurion.27
Eshkol,meanwhile,was sharing his initial thoughtswithHarryMcPherson,President Johnson’s special envoy in Israel. Perhaps there would be aprotectorateintheWestBank,neitherJordaniannorIsraeli,underinternationalrule,hesuggested.McPhersontoldJohnsonthatonthefirstdayof thewarhehadawokentothesoundofshellsfallingonNetanya,ameresixmilesfromtheAmericanambassador’shome,wherehewasstaying thatnight. In thatareaatleast, he wrote to the president, there was a clear need to expand Israel’sterritory.28
Ashe repaired thedamage inhisyard,YosefWeitzwaxednostalgic for theearlydaysofthestate:“IarguedandworkedagainstthereturnoftheArabswho
hadfled,”herecalled.EarlyintheeveningofSunday,June11,EshkolphonedtoaskWeitztocometohishouse.Likeeveryoneelse,hewantedtodiscussthefutureof the territories.At the cabinetmeeting that sameday, he saidhewasremindedofKingSaul,whohadsetofftosearchforhisfather’sshe-assesandhadendedupfindingakingdom.29
THEROADSOFTHEWESTBANKWEREFILLEDWITHLONGPROCESSIONSOFREFUGEES.“You see here how the war has destroyed the lives of thousands of families,uprooting them from their homes,”wroteMinister ofAgricultureGvati in hisdiary.30 Many people saw the refugees, and articles about them appearedfrequently in the papers. “It was terrible,” said Lieutenant Colonel AharonShtengl in a military summary of the war. “Two-year-old children, motherswithoutanywater,dreadfulscreamingallalongtheroad.”HewasremindedofaversefromapoembyNatanAlterman:“ThejudgmentofswordshadnofaultButwhensheddingofbloodisspentItleaveslikeatasteofsalt/Thetearsoftheinnocent.”31
Ze’evSchiffdescribed theway therefugeescastoff theirbelongingsby thesideoftheroadtolightentheirloadintheoppressiveheat.“Bundlesofclothesmark the roads,” hewrote, alongwith suitcases and other items.On the roadnearMa’alehAdumim,someonehaddiscardedaprostheticleg.32
OneofDayan’sassistants,AriehBrown,wrotethatDayaninstructedthearmyto takecontrolof theWestBankwithoutharmingcitizens,butasserted,“Anycitizenwhowantstomustbeallowedtoescape.”33WhenDayanheardthattheresidentsofTulKaremwerefleeing,hewelcomedthenewsandinstructedthatalltrafficarterialsremainopen.34BeforethebridgesovertheJordanRiverwerebombed, Rabin explained to the government that the IDF was leaving themalone so that anyonewhowanted to could leave.35 Shortly before seizing theOldCity,Dayan ordered that all its gates be left open.UziNarkis explained:“Wecertainlyhopedtheywouldflee,likein1948.Butthistimetheydidn’t.Wemadebusesavailable.Whoeverwanted tocouldgo to theAllenbyBridge.Atfirstsomeleft.Thenfewerandfewereveryday,untiltheystopped.”36
On the thirddayof thewar,Wednesday, June7, IDF forces stoppedon thewaytoJericho.UziNarkis’sdiaryreads,“ItturnsouttherewasadecisionnottotouchJerichofora fewhours, to let the refugeescross to theeastbankof theJordan.”37TheAmericanembassyinAmmanheardfromUNeyewitnessesthatthe IDFhadbombedrefugeecamps in theJerichoareahousing refugees from1948.OthersourcessaidtheIDFhadfiredatprocessionsofrefugeeswhohad
found themselves sharing the road with Iraqi soldiers trying to reachJerusalem.38MosheSasson, a seniorForeignMinistry officialwho toured theregionshortlyafter thewar, reported,“Themassiverefugeecamplooks likeaghost town…. Empty streets. Shuttered houses. Stores and cafés closed. Thehealthclinicisempty.”39
AccordingtotheU.S.consulateinJerusalem,90percentofthe1948refugeeslivingintheJerichoarealefttheirhomes,atotalofapproximatelyfiftythousandpeople. Shlomo Gazit, the newly appointed coordinator of operations in theterritories, estimated that the number of 1948 refugees who fled the JordanValleyduringthe1967warreachedseventythousand.40Theyhadbeenbroughtup on horror stories repeated, in part, to justify the original flight during the1948war,andwhichincludedaccountsofmassacres,rape,andtorture.“Wedidnotencouragethemtoleave,buttheyweresimplyafraid,”saidthesoldierRafiRubinsteinfromYehiam.41The1948refugeesweredescribedthereafteras“oldrefugees,”whilethosefrom1967were“newrefugees.”TheU.S.embassyinAmmanreportedthatIsraelivehicleswithloudspeakers
were going throughWest Bank villages, announcing that as long as residentsmaintainedordertheywouldbeallowedtostay,andthatanyonewhowishedtoleave would receive assistance. A car with loudspeakers went throughBethlehemtoo,callingonresidentstoleave.DanielRubinstein,stationedinthecity,sawtheloudspeakers.42TheAmericanconsulateinJerusalemreportedthatsome 7,000 of Tul Karem’s 25,000 residents had been forced to leave theirhomes.43
Ranan Lurie, awell-known cartoonist, told the journalistGideon Levy thatduring his active service as an officer in Anabta village on the West Bank,commercialIsraelibusesarrivedtofindresidentswaitingonthesidewalkswithmattresses.Lurie’sdirectsuperiortoldhim:“Youhavetoloadthemallontothebuses.We’removingthemtoJordan.”Lurierefused,andsomeoneelsedidthejobinstead.44HaimBrom,ofYehiam,sawrefugeesfromKalkilyadrivingbyintrucks“filledtocapacity,withbabiesandwomenmainly.Becausethereweren’tanymen.Therewerebusestoo.”Onesoldierthrewsomeofhisbattlerationstothe refugees. “Itwas dreadful to see. They fell upon them… and that reallyshockedme.”45
TheKalkilyaresidentshadlefttheirhomesbecausetheIDFcalleduponthemtodoso.“Thepeoplefrompsychologicalwarfareturnedupinthemiddleofthenight with loudspeakers,” recounted Colonel Ze’ev Shaham in an officialinquiry. “I sent them to theKalkilya area…. Thatmade [the residents] really
afraid.Theywere toldall sortsof tall tales.Theygotupenmasseandstartedleaving town. The men from psychological warfare told them about an Iraqiattack that would hit them there. That helped a lot.”46 Shaham later wrote:“Kalkilya sat there for all thoseyears,breathingdown theneckofKfarSaba,givingitnorest.Manyterroristunitshadcomefromthere,spreadingterroranddeath.Theinstructionswereclear:evacuatetheresidentsanddestroytheplace.Partof thecitywas in factdestroyed.”Kalkilya’smayor recalled that soldiersputhiminajeep,gavehimapieceofpaperwithArabicwriting,andtoldhimtoinstructtheresidentstoleavetown.TheUNrepresentative,Nils-GöranGussing,determinedthatsome850ofthetown’s2,000housesweredemolished.Dayanconfirmed the details of the destruction but claimed to have had no priorknowledgeofit.47
EzerWeizmanattributedtheevents inKalkilyato“theunwelcomeinitiativeofafewcommanders.”Dayan,saidWeizman,wasfuriouswhenhefoundoutabout thedestruction;hewent therehimself,withWeizman in tow.“Weweregreeted by one of the saddest spectacles of war. A city abandoned but notdestroyed. An entire city, apart from a few houses with holes made by tankshells,desertedby its residents.All thestoreswerebroken into,mostof themlooted,andoneoldmanrivenwithageanddesperationwanderedaroundwithaglazedlook.Andafewchickenswhohadnotobeyedthemarchingorders.Andonedumbdonkey.”48
Dayan remembered the Kalkilya refugees camping in some olive grovesnearby. “Were Kalkilya not right across from us, with its ruined houses, onemighthavethoughtitwasalargepicnic,”hewrote.“Iknowthathadtheirhopescometrue,hadtheArabswonthewar,theywouldhavedestroyednotonlyourtownsandcities,butwouldhaveslaughteredusall.”AccordingtoDayan,itispossible that the Arabs indeed perceived the destruction of their homes asinevitable,but“whattheywouldhavedonetous”cannotbeaguidelineforIDFconduct.UnwillingtotellthePalestiniansthatheregrettedwhathadhappenedandwasashamedofit,Dayansaidnothingfurther.49
Two villages near Hebron were destroyed—Beit Awa, with some 2,500residents, and Beit Mirsim, with a population of 500. In both villages, themethodwas identical: soldiers came early in themorning, located the villagemukhtar,orderedthroughhimthatallweaponsbeturnedin,theninstructedtheresidentstoleave.Theywereallowedtotakeonlyfood.Almostallthehousesinbothvillageswerefirstblownup,afterwhichresidentswereallowedtoreturntotheruins.ThemukhtarofBeitAwatoldtheUNrepresentativethattheIDFhad
accusedthevillagersofassistingFatah.Dayanlaterclaimedthatthevillagesweredestroyedontheorderofanofficer
whowanted toexpel the residents.Narkishimselfclaimed thecredit.Dayan’sthoughts on the events led him to historical contemplation: “Every generationanditswars.Everygenerationanditsdestructions.Butevenwhengardensareuprooted and people are killed and exiled, the stones remain. They will begatheredfromoldruinsand,fortheumpteenthtime,setdown,onebyone.”50
OnJune25,Dayan reported to thegovernmenton the circumstancesof theWestBankresidents’departureforJordan.51Firsthereadaletterhehadsenttothechiefofstaff,inwhichheaskedwhohadorderedthedemolitionofhousesinKalkilyaandwhy.HealsowantedtoknowwhohadtakenyoungmenoutofTulKaremandwheretheywere.RabinrepliedthatthetroopsabouttooccupyKalkilyahadmetwithresistanceandhadactedinaccordancewiththedirectivetoblowupanyhousefromwhichshotswerebeingfired.Thentheordershadchanged and they only blew up houses fromwhich firewas being continued.According to Dayan these were “specific actions that might bring about thedepartureofpeople”andtheyceasedonthethirddayofthewar.Otherpeople,Dayan explained, left their homes of their own freewill. He numbered thosewholeftat50,000fromamongthe65,0001948refugeesresidingintheJerichoarea.ManyapparentlyfledbecausetheyfearedtheywouldlosetheirpermanentUNRWAaid had they stayed.Manywere dependent onmoney from relativeswho worked in Arab oil countries. Some were employees of the Jordaniangovernment—clerks,teachers,hospitalandclinicstaff,andtheirfamilies—andfeared losing their jobs. Among those who fled were also Jordanian soldiersdisguisedascivilians.OneparticipantinthecabinetmeetingdidnotbelieveDayan.Anoteamong
YaacovHerzog’spapersreads,“Yesterdayheexplicitlyexplainedthattheywerekeepingupthepressurebydoingnightsearchesandallsortsofpettynippingatthem,’sothatthey’llgetthehint.’”52
Israelmadeeveryefforttoemphasizethatthemajorityofthosewholeftdidsowillingly, anddeniedhaving forcedpeople to leave.Thisversionofeventswasofteninthepress.AccordingtoMaariv,therefugees“chosetodeparttheirhomes.”Ze’evSchiffmaintained,“Theyareallwillingrefugees,mostlybecauseof theirdesire to rejoin their familieson theotherside.”53AForeignMinistryreportfoundthatinadditiontothedestructionofKalkilya,therewasdamagetofive other villages. The ministry advised Israel’s representatives around theworldtopointoutthattherewereathousandvillagesintheWestBank,andif
onlysixofthemhadbeenaffected,thiswasasignthatIsraelhadbeencarefultopreventpainandsufferingamongcivilians.54
During the cabinet meeting discussing the refugees, Dayan expressedsatisfactionwith thefact that100,000hadcrossed theJordan.“Ihope theyallgo. If we could achieve the departure of three hundred thousand withoutpressure, that would be a great blessing. If we could achieve hundreds ofthousands fromGazacrossingwithUNRWAapproval,wewouldbeblessed.”He reported that approximately a thousand refugees were leaving every day.Conceding that the situation was “awkward from a public relations point ofview,” he suggested bringing back the Kalkilya refugees, to which thegovernment consented.They also discussed refugeeswhohad fled theLatrunarea;Dayanproposednotbringingthemback,andtheministersdecidednottodecide.A sort of deal had been struck betweenDayan and his colleagues: hewouldagreetothereturnoftheKalkilyarefugees,whiletheywouldagreenottoreadmitthosefromLatrun.55
TherewerethreepopulatedvillagesintheLatrunarea:Imwas,Yalu,andBeitNuba.NearbywasDirAyub,abandoned.Theresidentswerefirsttoldtoleavetheirhomesandgather inanopenareaoutside thevillages.Ataroundnine inthemorning,theywereinstructedoverloudspeakerstomarchtowardRamallah.Thereweresomeeight thousandof them.56 In thegeneralorderdistributed toCentralCommandsoldiers,ImwasandYaluwereassociatedwiththefailuretotaketheareain1948andweredescribedas“termsofdisappointment,termsofalongandpainfulaccount,whichhasnowbeensettled to the last cent.Housessuddenlyleft.Intact.Withtheirpottedgeraniums,theirgrapevinesclimbingupthebalconies.Thesmellofwood-burningovensstill in theair.Elderlypeoplewhohavenothingmoretolose,slowlystragglingalong.”57
DayanlaterclaimedthattheJordanianshadbeenfiringfromtheLatrunareatowardLodAirport.“ThefellahinintheLatrun-areavillageswerecertainlynottoblameforthis,butforusitwasnotaquestionofpunishingtheguilty,butofdoing what was necessary for Israel’s security,” Dayan wrote.”58 Nils-GöranGussingreported thatDayantoldhimsomeof thevillagehouseshadbeenhitduring the fighting, and that he had ordered the rest destroyed because of thearea’sstrategicimportance,givenitslocationbetweenJerusalemandTelAviv.59Oneeyewitness,thejournalistAmosKenan,whowaspresentasasoldier,heardthe sameargument from the companycommander in chargeofdestroying thevillages. The commander gave two more reasons: “To punish these nests ofmurderers” and to prevent the houses from becoming terrorist bases in the
future.Beit Nuba had beautiful stone houses, wrote Kenan, some of them grand.
Eachhousewassurroundedbyagardenwithtrees—olives,apricots—vines,andornamentals,suchascypresses.Theplantsgrewonsmallmounds,andthetreesstoodamongwell-manicured,weeded,andtilledgreenery.Kenanandhisfellowsoldiers’ job was to comb the houses and make sure they were empty. TheyfoundaninjuredEgyptiancommandoofficerandafewelderlymenandwomen.Atnoonthefirstbulldozertoarriveimmediatelydroveuptoahouseattheedgeof the village. First it uprooted a few cypresses and olive trees; then itdemolished the house itself. Within ten minutes, the house was in ruins,includingthefewitemsleftinside.Thenagroupofrefugeessuddenlyappeared,village residents.Someonehadapparently told them tocomeback, anda fewhadevenheardontheradiothatIsraelwasnotdeportingrefugees.Kenanandhisfellowsoldierspreparedtodefendthemselvesandthoseamong
themwho spokeArabic approached the refugees. “Therewere elderly peopletherewhocouldbarelywalk,”Kenanwrote.“Mumblingoldwomen,babiesintheirmothers’ arms, small children. The children cried and begged forwater.The procession waved white flags.” The soldiers told them to go to anothervillage,BeitSira.“They toldus theyhadbeenkickedoutofeveryplace theywent.Theyhadbeenwalkingforfourdayswithoutfoodorwater,andsomehaddied.Theyaskedtocomebacktothevillageandsaidthey’dbebetteroffifwekilledthem.”Somehadgoats,sheep,camels,ordonkeys.“Afatherchafedafewgrainsofwheat in thepalmofhishandandgave them tohis fourchildren toeat.”Anotherprocessionwasvisibleon thehorizon.Kenandescribed it: “Aman
walks, onhis back ahundred-pound sackof flour.That’s howhewalks,mileafter mile. More old women, more mothers, more babies. They collapsed inexhaustionwhereverwe told them to sit. Somehad a cowor two, a calf.Alltheirworldlypossessions.Wedidn’t let them return to thevillage toget theirbelongings,becausetheorderwasthattheywerenotallowedtoseetheirhomesbeingdestroyed.”Thechildrencried,andsomeofthesoldiersalsowept,wroteKenan. They couldn’t find water to bring the refugees, so they stopped amilitaryvehicle,tookoutajerrycan,anddistributedthatwater.Theyalsogaveoutcandyandcigarettes.Moresoldiersstartedcrying,andafewofthemaskedthe officers why the refugees were being moved around and kicked out ofeverywheretheywent.Someoftheofficersrepliedthatthiswasthebestthing:“WhyworryaboutabunchofArabs?”
Moreandmoregroupsarrived;therewerealreadyhundredsofrefugees.Theycouldnotunderstandwhytheyhadbeentoldtocomebackbutwerenotallowedtoenterthevillage.“Theirpleadingwasunbearable,”wroteKenan.“Onepersonaskeduswhyweweredestroyingthehouses—itwouldbebetterifwelivedinthemourselves.”Thecompanycommanderdecidedtogotoheadquarterstofindout whether there were instructions on how to handle the refugees, where tosendthem,andwhethertherewasanypossibilityoforganizingvehiclesforthewomenandchildren,andsomefood.Hereturnedsayingtherewerenowrittenordersandthatthepeoplemustbedeported.“Wedeportedthem,”wroteKenan.Intheevening,hefoundouttherefugees
had been lied to: bulldozers had started demolishing houses inBeit Sira, too,where they had been sent. According to Kenan, “Most of the soldiers werefuriousandmostoftheguysdidnotwanttodothejob,”butnoonerefusedtheorder. The soldiers stayed there that night to guard the bulldozers, and in themorningtheyweretransferredelsewhere.“NoneofuscouldunderstandhowJewscoulddo this,”Kenanwroteat the
end of his report. “Even those who approved of the operation argued thattemporarycampscouldhavebeensetupfor thepeople,afinaldecisionmadeaboutwheretoputthem,andthentheycouldhavebeendriventherewiththeirbelongings.Nooneunderstoodwhy these fellahincouldnot take theirPrimusstoves,theirblankets,andtheirsupplies.”Kenanwasfortyatthetime,awriterwithacolumninYediotAharonot,andaformativefigureinIsraelicultureandtheemergingHebrewlanguage.Almosttwentyyearsearlier,in1948,asaLehimember,hehadbeenwoundedinthebattlefortheArabvillageofDirYassin,on the outskirts of Jerusalem. That operation had ended with a massacre ofciviliansandcausedthousandsofArabsfromallover thecountrytoflee theirhomes.60KenanconcludedhisLatrunreport:“Thechickensandthedoveswereburied under the ruins. The fields turned desolate before our very eyes, andchildrenwalked down the road sobbing.”As he saw it, when the next roundcame,nineteenyearslater,thesechildrenwouldbetheterrorists.“Thatwashowwelostourvictorythatday,”heended.61
Atameetingofofficersafewmonthsafter thewar,MosheDayansaid thatthe destruction of the villages had been done with “Zionist intentions,” withwhich he was entirely in agreement “within the complex framework of theunpleasant and unpopular aspects of fulfilling Zionism.” But he added thatvillagesshouldbedestroyed“up toacertain limit”only,which inhisopinionmustnotbebreachedunderanycircumstances.62
According to Israeli estimates, the war produced between 200,000 and250,000refugees.Morethanhalfleftduringandimmediatelyafterthewar,andthe rest in the following months. Thousands were housed in tent camps, inconditionsdescribedinaspecialreporttoPresidentJohnsonas“appalling.”63
LOOTING, BY BOTH SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS, WAS WIDESPREAD. THEY BROKE INTOhouses and shops, stealing furniture, jewelry, electrical appliances, and oftenevencars.“Forawhile,mostofourOldCityfriendswentaboutonfoot,”wrotetheAmericanconsul inJerusalem.64The lootersalsorobbedArmonHanatziv.Twodaysafter itsseizure,MichaelPragai,aForeignMinistryofficial, learnedthat “an abundance of articles had disappeared” from the site. Food andbeverage storehouses had been emptied; communications equipment had beendismantledandremoved.ThenPragaiheardabouta“rampage”inGeneralOddBull’s private residence and he went to see for himself. The officer whoaccompaniedhimsaidthatwhatwasgoingonthere“exceededanyreasonablerules.” In response, Pragai wrote, General Uzi Narkis agreed to conduct a“campaigntosmooththingsout”beforeBullreturned,tocreatetheimpressionthat fighting, rather than looting, had caused the damage. Meanwhile, Bullinquired about his apartment several times; among other things, he wasconcernedaboutapipehehadleftthere.Pragaitoldhimithadbeendamagedinthefighting,andthedismayedgeneralrepliedgraciously thatheunderstood—afterall,therehadbeenawar.65
ShukaBar-Dayan’sfellowsoldiersalsodidalotoflooting.Atfirsttheytooksouvenirs from the convoys of burned-out Egyptian tanks. “It’s as if somepeoplearebewitchedanddon’tknowwhattotake.Theyseeahandgrenade—theytakeit,”wroteBar-DayanonthemorningofJune8.Afewhourslaterhewrote, “Everyone’s looting. They’ve got a real lust to loot. They’re pinchingsoldiers’backpacks,socks,wallets,andlotsofletterswithpicturesofgirlfriendsand mothers.” He thought this was very human: after all, the Egyptians hadforced them into this lethalwar.The next day hewrote, “Everyone’s under aspell...intheeveningtheythrowawaywhattheylootedthatmorning.”66
Soldiersonotherfrontsdidthesame.OneYehiamsoldierbackfromthebattleon theGolan recounted, “Our soldierswent in and basically took everything,everydagger,everyshinyobject.Allatonce,theyfellintosomekindoflootingfrenzy.”67 Civilianswho heard similar accounts from soldiers, or even visitedtheGolanHeightsthemselvesshortlyafteritscapture,describedthelootingintheir letters. “The division of the spoils went like this,” wrote one woman.“Theyaskedeachsoldierhowmanykidshehad,andeachonechoseagiftfor
everykid.”Herboygotsomelovelythings,shewrote.AnIsraeliwhowantedtovisitKuneitrafoundaccessbarred.“Theguysinthereweredoingagoodjobofgrabbingeverythingtheycouldlaytheirhandson,”hewrote.68“Oursoldiers,”saidHaimBrom fromYehiam,“not everyone,butquite a lotof them, treatedthispropertyinahumiliatingway.Theylooted,andtheynotonlylooted—theysmashed,theydestroyed.Theywantedtobeheroesbutnotinbattle.”General Yeshayahu Gavish found it necessary to devote an entire general
ordertothephenomenon.“Thereisgreattemptationinthecircumstancethatweareavictorious,conqueringarmy.Therearemanyenchantingitemsinsidethestoresandthehouses.Itrequiresanemotionaleffort,maturity,intelligenceandawareness,aswellasself-controltopreventthedisgraceoflooting.”Hecalledupon the stronger soldiers to help their comrades in moments of weakness.“Robbery, plundering, rampaging, and harming peaceful civilians—all theseharm and destroy the effort and the goal of maintaining normalcy in theconqueredareas.Theydistractsoldiersfromtheirprimarymission,whichistofightandstrikeattheenemyanditspositions.”Everylittlebreak-incouldleadto gross rampages and indiscipline, Gavish asserted, and warned that he wasdeterminedtopunishanyinstanceofrebelliousness,looting,orthefttothefullextentofthelaw.69Thenextdayanotherannouncementwasdistributedamongthesoldiers,remindingthemthatundermilitarylaw,lootingwaspunishablebyup to tenyears inprison.“Ourvictoryandouraccomplishmentaredear tousand they are pure. Let us not sully them,” said the announcement.70 Otherofficialdocumentsconfirmthegravityoftheproblem.A Foreign Ministry official told the U.S. ambassador that General Chaim
HerzoghadbeenappointedmilitarygovernoroftheWestBank,partlytoputastoptothewaveoflooting,ashewasknownformaintainingdisciplineamonghistroops.71Herzogwasindeedtroubledbylooting,whichheattributedtothereservistswhohadreplacedtheparatrooperunits.72FromNewYork,AbbaEbanwrote to Eshkol about the political damage resulting from the news of thedeportations and looting. Others voiced similar concerns. The phenomenonworriedEshkol himself.73Rabin reported that an investigationhad resulted intherecommendationthatthoseresponsibleforthelootingatArmonHanatzivbereprimanded. A kibbutz newsletter recounted one officer’s method: “ThecommandertookaBiblefromhispocketandreadusthechapteraboutlootingfromtheBookofJoshua.Whenhe finished,all thesoldierssilentlyputdownthethingstheyhadtaken,collectedeverythinginapile,pouredlighterfluidonit,andburnedit.”74
4.FINALPARADE:“THESEAREMYSONS”
OnMonday,June12,ShukaBar-DayanspottedthefamousentertainersShaikeOfir, Uri Zohar, andArik Lavi. Hewent up to Lavi, introduced himself as arelativeofthesingerRemaSamsonov,YehiamWeitz’swidow,andaskedifhewouldpossiblyputinacalltoGili.ThenewspapersarrivedfromthepreviousFriday, informing the troops that the Western Wall would soon be open tovisitors.Valenciaorangeswerebroughtin,andBar-Dayanrecognizedacratehehadpackedwithhisownhandsmeantforexport.Hewasproudofthefruitsofhislabor:theorangeslookedfreshandfirmandthesoldiersgobbledthemup.Atractor startedpilingmoundsof sandoverEgyptian soldiers’bodies: “buryingtheEgyptianarmy,”Bar-Dayanwrote,“soneveragainwillitrisefromitsdesertgrave.”HisbrigadewasnowencampednearBirGafgafa.The tankswerepreparing
forthefinalparade.Shukawrotealonglettertohiswife.Everymorningwhenhewokeupandfoundhewasstill there,hegotabitofashock,but itpassedafter a second. “To hell with everything, the main thing is that you’re alive,alive,alive—thatyou’vecomeoutof this thing,of thiswar,unhurt,withoutascratch—thatyou’llgohome toGili andYariv,”hewrote toher.The thoughtgave him the strength for another day in the desert. He reminded Gili ofsomethingshehadsaidtohimthatSaturdayoverlunchinBeersheba:“Idon’tcareifyoustayabitlonger,oralotlonger,aslongasyou’realive,aslongasweknowyou’ll comeback.”And thatwouldhappen,hepromised, itwould.Butthereweremanywhowouldnotbegoinghome.“Magnificentyoungmenwhosacrificed themselves in theenemy’s fires.”Heknewseveralof them.Hewasstillconstantlykissinghisweddingring, theamulet thathadbeenwithhiminthemostdifficultmoments.“KissYarivi formeandhaveYarivikissyou,”heasked.Hehad reached the “guest house,” a camp that hadbeenbuilt forEgyptian
officers.Eventhetransistorradiosoundedbetterthere.Heshavedandshoweredfor the first time, after eight days without water or soap, and changed hisunderwear. “I started shouting and floating on air like a helicopter.” Hismustachehadgrown,his stomachwas flat,he feltwonderful.Hehada lotoftime;hewas rereadingsomepaperbacksother soldiershadbrought.Everyonekept repeating the sameword:“freedom.”*“God, Iwish thedaywouldcomealready,” he wrote. “A three-hour drive and I’m home.” He hoped Gili hadreceivedallhisletters;hehopedArikLavihadcalled.Hetoldher,forthefirsttime, about his diary: “Iwrote it during battle, under fire.”He could see the
SuezCanal from afar.He had become very friendlywithBinyamin, a youngsoldierofIraqioriginwhohadnotyetseenhisownnewbornson.Theymadetea together. “This war, Gili, was more than a war of independence. Thepreciousbloodspilled in theWarof Independencepales incomparison to thiscrimsonblood,ifonecansaythat—becausethisonewascruelerandinvolvedterribleweaponsofdestruction.I’llhavealotofslidesfrompictureswe’vebeentaking, and we’ll prepare lectures and go and talk to young people and toadults.”76
IN AN IDF DISCUSSION OF THE LESSONS OF THE WAR, UZI NARKIS SAID, “WE WEREwarned about a terrible enemy. It turned out to beworthless. That’s the onlylesson.”Rabinlistedinhismemoirsaseriesoftoughbattles,butmaintainedthatthe IDF could have conquered Cairo and Amman and, without much effort,Damascustoo.77ThemilitaryattachéattheBritishembassy,aColonelRogers,thoughtthatIsraelhadexaggeratedindescribingthebattles.Hewrotethatmostwere not that fierce. The IDF had enjoyed continuous air supremacy and hadfoughtfifth-classforcesthathadretreatedquickly.TheIDFexcelledatoffense,but the British colonel wondered whether it would have fared as well in adefensivewar.78
Threedaysafter theendofthewar,DayanwentbeforetheKnessetForeignAffairs and Defense Committee and reiterated his claim that Eshkol’sgovernmenthad causedwar tobreakout by exacerbating tensionswithSyria.ThegamblethatEgyptwouldnotinterferehadbeenamistake,ashadthebeliefthat the United States would open the Straits of Tiran and that there hadthereforebeennoneedtorespondimmediatelytotheirclosure.Dayansaidtheairforcewasill-equipped,withaninsufficientnumberofplanes.Eshkolfumed:“Dayanwalks inoneminutebefore theplaystarts, thenheclaims thedirectorand the actors wereweak, the theater was dirty, and the audiencewas lousy.Whatishethinking?”Dayanfailedtomentionthatroughlysixmonthsearlierhehimselfhadwritten
inMaariv thatEgyptwould not allowSyria to drag it into awar.Nor did hementionhisownpart in theevents that ledup to thewar, includinghis claimthat one more week of waiting would lead to the country’s annihilation. Heneglected tomention his warning regarding the danger that the USSRwouldinterveneifIsraelseizedtheGolan.79Thewaitingperiodlefthistorygrapplingwithadifficultquestion:animmediatemilitaryresponsetotheStraitsblockademighthave limited thescopeof thewar, therebypreventing theoccupationoftheWest Bank. Eshkol observed later that had his government acted sooner,
theremighthavebeennoneedforthenationalunitygovernment.80
Approximately340IsraelisoldierswerekilledintheSinaiandroughly300inthefightingintheWestBank,including183inJerusalem.FourteenresidentsofIsraeli Jerusalem were killed, and approximately 500 were wounded. In theGolanHeights,141Israeliswerekilledandsome2,500wounded.Afew laterdied of their wounds, bringing the total deaths to 800, far below the fearfulpredictionsbeforethewar.81
AN ORANGE BLAZE SLOWLY SET AT THE EDGE OF THE DESERT, WROTE SHUKA BAR-DayanonJune12,andacoolbreezebegantoblow.Peoplehuddledaroundthejeeps, tanks, and halftracks, trading stories while they waited for the finalparade.TheytalkedaboutEhud,theregimentalcommander,andothermenwhowere killed. A tape recorder played military marches. They waited for thedivisionalcommander.Amakeshiftstagehadbeensetuponapilferedvehicle,decorated with a large Star of David and lots of flags—green and black, thearmoredcorpscolors,aswellasblueandwhite.Thereweredozensoftanksandothervehicles,andthousandsofsoldiers.UriZohar,ArikLavi, andShaikeOfirgotup toorganize a sing-along.The
greatChaimTopolwas also there. They sang “Nasser IsWaiting forRabin.”The soldiers didn’t sing much. Shaike Ofir read out Israel Tal’s originaldirective,writtenbyAmosOz.Theentiredivisionstoodatattention.UriZoharrecitedYizkor,thememorialprayer,fortheroughlyseventysoldiersofthe7thDivisionwhohadfalleninbattle.Yaffa Yarkoni, the legendary wartime singer, sang “Bab El-Wad,” a song
memorializingtheconvoysthathadbrokenthroughtoJerusalemintheWarofIndependence. “A hand reaches out from the convoys of 1948 to the divisionfighters near Ismailia,” wrote Bar-Dayan. Then the commander’s convoyarrived.Gorodishworedarkglasses, as he alwaysdid. “My friends andbrothers—I
amboth humbled and proud to be your commander—you fought like lions—yourheroismrivalsthatoftheHasmoneans—youhavewrittenagloriouspagein the history of our nation—our hearts are with the families of the fallensoldiers—we fought because there was no other choice—you, my gloriousbrothers.”Bar-Dayanwrotedownonlyfragments.HaimHeferread“TheParadeofFallenSoldiers,”astoryinversedescribinga
meetingofsoldiersinheaven—strong,bronzedmenwhoemergefromdownedplanes and burned-out tanks and ascend to the angels. Up above, they hear
familiarvoicescryingdownbelow.“TheylookhometoDadandMom,tothewives, the children and the siblings Their faces fall still and they standawkwardlyThenoneof themwhispers:’I’msorry,butwehadtoAndwewonthebattlesandnowwecanrest.’”As theystandwith the lighton their faces,God comes and passes between them. “Andwith tears in his eyes, He kissestheirwoundsAndsaysinatremblingvoicetohiswhiteangels,/‘Thesearemysons,thesearethesons.’”It was moving, Shuka wrote in his diary. He looked around for Arieh and
Leon, two young tank commanders who had befriended him before the war,whenhe,thesoldiers’“dad,”hadgiventhemcigarettes.HefoundArieh.Theyhugged.HeaskedaboutLeon.Leonhadbeenkilled inJiradi.AriehremindedShuka of the Patton tank, with a soldier in torn clothes lying on top, allsplatteredwithblood.Shukahadnotrecognizedhimatthetime.ItwasLeon.Hewas devastated, and no longer heardwhatwas being said on stage.He
went tositalone inhis truck.But thenYaffaYarkoniclimbedupon thestageagain, embraced a twenty-two-year-old soldier, and performed what she hadsungtwentyyearsearliertofightersintheWarofIndependence,backwhenthesoldiershenowhuggedwasaninfant.“Believeme,thedaywillcome/Itwillbe good, I promise you I will come to hold you And make you forgeteverything.” The atmosphere was electric. Shuka wrote to Gili, “They begansingingtheirlungsandheartsoutintheirthousands.Iwasreallytremblingwithexcitement—unbelievable.”Thentheyallsang“JerusalemofGold.”Shukawasovercomewithlongingforhome,buthekneweverythingwouldbefine.82
CHAPTER16ANEWLAND
1.MOURNING:“WHYDIDYOUMARRYAPILOT?”
ThebodyofMajorAriehBen-Orwasrecoveredfromthewreckageofhisplanea few days after the crash.Many people attended his funeral, at themilitarycemetery inHerzliya.His bodywas interred in awooden casket.Yonina, hiswidow,didnotask to see it anddidnot troubleherselfwith thoughtsofwhatremained of her husband. They were secular people; they did not sit shiva,thoughnumerousvisitorspaid their respects.MosheDayan sent a condolenceletter.It took time forYoninaBen-Or to come to termswithher husband’sdeath.
HardestofallwasthefirsttriptotheirapartmentinTelNof.Forher,thiswasthe most concrete encounter with the tragedy—harder than the burial, harderthan thememorialservice thirtydaysafterhisdeath.Shecried thewholewaythere. “I go into the neighborhood and it’s like it used to be: nothing haschanged. Children ride bikes. Women shake out rugs. Laundry hangs on thelines.Everything Iused tobe.And I’mno longerpartof it.BecauseArieh isgone and I ampart of this life only thanks to him.”Before thewar, theyhadplannedtomovetothebaseatHatzerim,inthesouth.Nowshedecidedtomoveelsewhere.“Lifeisstrongerthanweare,”shesaidafewmonthslater.“Igoon.Ilive. I keep busy with the same thousands of trivialities. Shopping, cooking,washingthedishes...Idothingsmechanically.Afterall,thegirlshavetogotokindergartenandschool.Youhavetogetup.Youhavetolive—becausethey’reliving.”Itwasnotforgetting,shesaid.Itwasrepression.Escape.Andshewasarealistic woman: as soon as the war was over, she sought emotional supportfrom friends.Even strangers seemed to drawclose, and shewasgrateful.Butshe knew that this timewould pass and friendswould go onwith their lives.Otherpeoplewerehappy;shewasnot.Theywereentitledtobehappy;theyhadreasontobe.Historianswroteofthecountry’s“hugevictory,”perhapsaddingastatistical note about the “low cost.” But for Ben-Or, the cost was not low.“There is a terrible void, and nothing can fill it. An endless struggle to livewithoutArieh.Forthegirls.”Mihal,atthree,drewapictureforherdaddy.Sheaskedwhenhisplanewould
comeback andhewould stepout of it. “No,Mihal, that’s not how it is,” her
motherhadtosay.“They’vealreadybroughtbackhisplaneandyourdaddywaskilled.Hewasahero.Hedroveout theSyriansand theyshothisplanedownandhewaskilled.”Thegirl said, “Mommy,youknowwhat? I’ll get a reallyreallybiggunandI’llgo toDaddyandgivehimthegunandhe’llkillall theArabsandthenhisplanewillcomeback,becausethere’llbenomoreArabsinhis way. Okay, Mommy?” Six-year-old Arza asked, “Mommy, why did youmarryapilot?Why?I’llnevermarryapilot.Apilotcouldgetkilledinthewar,likeDaddy.I’llmarryadoctor,oramechanic.”Andhermotherhadtoexplainsome things toheraswell: “Whenyou love someone, itdoesn’t reallymatterwhat he does. When you love someone, you tie your lives together. And Imarriedyourdaddynotbecausehewasaheroorbecausehewasapilot.Ijustlovedhim.”AfewmonthsafterBen-Or’sdeath,hiswidowtoldaninterviewerfromMaariv thatsometimessheandthegirlstalkedaboutAriehasifhewerestillalive.2
THE ISRAELICULTUREOFMOURNINGWASWELLDEVELOPEDBYTHISPOINT,WITH ITSceremoniesandsymbols, its rhetoricofprivateandpublicconsolation,and itsspecial rights for thosewhowere left behind. Israel embraced the families offallensoldiersand,attimes,exploitedthem.ManyIsraeliswroteaboutthecasualtiesofthewarintheirletters,evenwhen
they themselves were not directly affected. For a time, mourning was at thecenterofIsraeliexperience.“Thereissuchheartacheoverthefallen,eachoneissoprecious tous.ThankGodeveryone inour familycamehomesafe,”wroteRivkaCohen.EdithEzrachiofJerusalemwrotetoNorwalk,Connecticut,“IfeelsosadanddepressedaboutthesacrificeinvolvedthatIhaven’tbeenabletoliftmy head and try to understand and accept what has been achieved somiraculously.”Thesewerenotmereplatitudes:griefwasaconcretepartoftheIsraeli routine, at leastwhile people daily encountered the names of the deadthat appeared in black mourning notices in the newspapers. A significantnumberof Israelis at least knewsomeonewhoknewsomeonewhohad lost arelativeorafriendoranacquaintance,andeventheseindirectconnectionsweretroubling.“It’s terriblewhenyouwanttocomfortsomeoneandyouknowyoucan’t and you leave exactly as you came,” wrote one kibbutz woman to herdaughterinLosAngeles.ManyIsraelis,notsureabouttheproperwaytobehave,wrotetoHanaBavli,
whose etiquette column inHa’aretz performed a public service. Should onegreetmournerswiththeusual“Shalom”whenenteringandleavingtheirhomes?Was shaking hands in order? Bavli ruled against “Shalom,” but approved of
shakinghands.One readerwrote thathehadgone tovisit anacquaintanceonbusiness and found the household inmourning over a family friendwho hadbeen killed. What should one do in this situation? Bavli advised that at themoment it would be prudent to inquire about the situation before visiting,throughmutualfriendsorrelatives.Ifthatwasimpossible,itwasbesttosimplytake the risk andgo.Never hesitate to visit or postpone it—preciselybecausetheremighthavebeenatragedyinthehousehold:“Thereisnothingworsethanfeeling indifferenceand loneliness.”Other readerswanted toknowwhether toinvite to their daughter’swedding close friendswho had lost their son in thewar. Bavli asserted, “You must not isolate parents in mourning. A routineinvitation is inappropriate here, but you must find a way to share yourcelebrationwith them. Perhaps theymight like tomeet the couple in amoreprivatesetting?”3
Bereavementrenewedoldtiesandforgednewones.YitzhakKnafo,ateacher,wrotetohissister,Odette, inFranceaboutthedeathofadistantrelative,MaxBen-Ezra.Knafo,whowasborninMorocco,hadbeeninIsraelforelevenyearsandhadnevervisitedtheBen-Ezras.“Idon’tknowanythingaboutthem.IknownothingaboutpoorMax.Idon’tknowwhetherhewassingleormarried,orifhehadchildren.”Butthedeathseemedtobringthefamilysuddenlycloser;Knafogrieved,becausebackinCasablanca,Maxusedtotalktohimabouthisstudies.*Nationalmourningmade thewarseemlarger,commensuratesomehowwith
both the immenseanxiety thathadpreceded it, andwith themagnitudeof thevictory. The greater the feeling of bereavement, the less Israelis wonderedwhethertheirprewarfearshadbeenwarranted,andwhethertheperilsfacedbythe country justified the occupation of the captured territories. Death, in thecontextofwar,wasoftenportrayedasagreatprivilege.ATelAvivhighschoolprincipalwrote to the parents of a graduate killed onduty, “Whowouldhavethought that Amiramwas destined at such a young age to attain the greatesthonoramancanachieve:topaywithhisyounglifeforthenationandthestate.”Itwascustomarytosaythatthesoldiershadnotbeenkilledinvain,butina
justandinevitablewar—indefenseofthecountry,oflifeitself,andofpeace—andthatIsraelwasdoingeverythingtomakesurethatthiswouldbethelastwar.Thegeneralviewwasthatthesoldiershadnotgonetowarjoyously, thattheyhadnot foughtwithhatred, and that in their deaths theyhadbequeathed theirpeople life. The fallen soldierswere often endowedwith the qualities societyvalued and nurtured: a close bond with the country, its land and landscapes;courage, a willingness to sacrifice, team spirit, levelheadedness, sociability,helpfulness; a deep connection to their parents, the ability to love, a sense of
humor, a joy both inwork and in recreation, like sports, hiking, photography.Thedeadwereoftensaid tohaveheldpoliticalopinionsthat justifiedthewar,theconquests,andevendeathitself.“Duringhisbrieflife,hedisplayedloyaltyanddedicationtohisfriendsandagreatloveofhiscountry,”readsthebookInMemoriam,publishedbytheMinistryofDefense,inadescriptionofonefallensoldier.Thepassagegoeson toquote theyoungman:“Iamstillyoungand Istill have time to learn a lot. But first, I owemy time to the army.”Anothersoldierreportedlysignedupformedicalschool,“becausetheparatroopersneeddoctors.”Ofathird,thebooksaid:“InhisdeathwhilefulfillinghisdutyontheShechem-Ramallahroad,heprovedhisloveofthecountryinwhichhegrewupandforwhichhefought.”The soldier Yehoshua-Mordehai Azriel Diamant, known as Shaia, had
apparentlyaskedacomradeinarmstotellhisparentsnottogrieve,becausehewasgladtohavehadtheprivilegeoffightingtoliberateJerusalem.YoelYinonfrom Jerusalem wrote to Vardit and Adir Zik in Los Angeles about Shaia’smemorial service, a moving and painful event. The men stood up one afteranother and talked about Shaia as a leader in the national-religious youthmovement,BneiAkiva, andabouthis trainingas a tourguide.His sister readfromapostcardhehadwritten,whichprovedthathefeltsomethinggreatwasabout tohappen.Onefrienddescribedhim inhis roleasasquad leaderandafighter during his final battle. Other friends spoke; a rabbi offered scripturalteaching in Shaia’s memory; “and everything everyone said gave such acompletepicturethat itreallybroughthimtolife,”Yinonrecounted.“Andit’salwaysthatway,”hecontinued.“Whenyoulivewithapersonyoufeelallsortsofthingsabouthim,butyoudon’tactuallysaythem.Eitherbecauseyoudon’treally think about them or because you don’t like to be so emotional andsentimental.Onlywhen,Godforbid,a tragedyhappensandthe timecomes togive a eulogy, you see that all the flowery expressions are not so empty, andthat, in fact, you don’t have thewords to express your feelings.”He told theZiks that theeulogieshadbeen tape-recorded,and theycouldhear themwhentheycamehomefromAmerica.4
YEHOSHUABAR-DAYANWASRELEASEDFROMACTIVEDUTYATTHEENDOFJUNE,BUTbefore then, he got a forty-eight-hour leave. He told Gili and everyone elseabout thewar,andplayedatsoldierswithYariv,whoputonhisfather’sarmyberet.Bar-Dayanwroteinhisdiarythatthelittleboyfeltlikearealsoldier.“It’sdishearteningtogoback,”hewroteafterward.HewasstillpostedatBir
Gafgafa in theSinaiDesert.The repair shopswere full of vehicles now, both
damagedIDFmachinesandcapturedvehiclesmadeintheSovietUnion.Almostthree weeks after the war, Bar-Dayan happened on the body of an Egyptiansoldier lying under the radiator of an abandoned vehicle.Hemust have beenhoping to find water. The first Israeli visitors began arriving in the Sinai,including women and children; some were bereaved families wanting to seewheretheirlovedoneshadbeenkilled.OnJune29,justbeforemidnight,Bar-Dayanreceivedhisdischargenotice.Before leavingthedesert,hehad tohosethemudoffthecommandeeredpickuptruckthathadbeenhishomeforthepastfortydays.Itsownerhadalreadybeenbytocheckuponit.Onhiswaynorth,Bar-Dayan passed through Gaza. Children lined the streets, waving andshouting, “Bread, bread!” Sprinklers were watering the cotton fields as Bar-Dayan drove past his old kibbutz, Erez, which was quite close to the barrierbetween Israel and the Gaza Strip. “Let’s hope it’s never closed again,” hewrote.ThenextdayhewasinRishonLezion.Ashenearedhishome,hecouldseeGiliandYarivonthebalcony.Yarivwasplayingwithanewtoytank.*
•••
THEBURDENOF PUBLICGRIEF SOONMADEWAYFORTHE INTOXICATIONOFVICTORY,althoughatfirsttherewassomeminglingbetweenthetwo.“Everyonealternatesbetweentearsandlaughter,”wroteonewomantoAmerica,“joyandsorrowarewoven together.”Many letters reflected a confused sense of time and generaldisorientation.“It’slikewe’vetakendrugs,”onesaid.ScoresofIsraeliswenttosee thecaptured territories.“Thewholecountry iscelebratingand taking fieldtrips;all theliberatedareasarefullofcuriousIsraelisshopping,”onewrotetofriendsinLosAngeles.“TheJewsareonthemove,”wroteYosefWeitzafewdaysafter thewar,ashewatchedconvoysofvehicles filledwithday-trippers.“Everythingismoving,shifting,inafrenzy.”6
2.EXCURSIONS:“THISISMYJOYINLIFE”
IsraeliscametoseetheWestBankasthetrueEretzIsrael,thelandofbiblicalpromise,andinthefirstfewweeksafterthewartheycrosseditlikeadventurousexplorers who have landed on a yearned-for continent, long forbidden andbeyondreach.Theybroughttheirvastcuriosity,andinmanycasesnostalgiaandhistoricalromanticism.Manywerecaughtupinreligiousfervor.Therushtotheterritories fulfilled a need to break through Israeli insularity, like travelingabroad. Israelis flooded the Arab markets. Many searched for acquaintancesfrom the Mandate era: neighbors, landlords, employees. While some were
uncomfortablewiththeirnewstatusasoccupiers,manyresentedtheArabsandapproached themwitharrogance,gloating,and thepossessiveauthoritarianismofthevictor,theessenceofwhichwas:We’reback.Soldiers were taken on outings to the territories as a perk. Hen Ronen
recountedhisfirstvisittooccupiedKalkilya.HisparentswerefromamoshavinthenearbySharonregion.“IknewKalkilyafrommyschooldays.Backthen,Iwouldgothereandbewelcomedlikeaprince.Afterall,Iwasmyfather’sson.Hewas in charge of all the orchards there.”He remembered a tombstone thechildrenhadlikedtoseeonschooltrips;itwasstillthere,justliketwentyyearsago.“I’velivedmywholelifeaboutthreemilesfromKalkilya,andnowI’msoexcited.IknowKalkilya.Itwasfullofallthosebastardswhousedtobotheruswhenwewereworkinginthefields.Andtherewerefriendsthere,too.Itwouldhavebeeninterestingtomeetsomeofthem.Butthey’regone.Noonewasthere.IwasdyingtoseeoneofthelittleguysIusedtofightwith,wethrewstonesateachother.Theyweregone.”*“Wehavethemostwonderfulcountry,andthemoreyouget toknowit, the
greateryouloveitandfeelattachedtoit,”wroteYitzhakKotler,asoldier,tohisgirlfriend.“Ifoundplacesthatformewerepartofmylife’sdreams,placesIhadlonged togo tooneday; Ihadnever imagined thedreamwouldcome truesosoon.”HerememberedthetwoofthemlookingouttotheWestBankfromtheIsraeli side of the border. They would often point to Nebi Samuel, nearJerusalem, and talk about it.Now hewas about to find himself “right on theNebi,” as he wrote, with all of Jerusalem at his feet. “A dream, an absolutedream!”HewasamazedbythebeautifulpalmtreesonthebeachinGaza,andthemonasteriescarvedoutofcliffsintheJudeanDesert.Hewasdrawntotheterritories by “an inner pull,” perhaps an “emotional need.”Hewanted to seemoreandmore.“Thisismyjoyinlife.”8
MosheDayanmarveledatthespringtimeblossomsthatwelcomedhimontheoutskirtsofHebron, andwas inspiredby Jericho, the“CityofDates.”“It is awonderfulcity,”hewrote.“Toreallyseeit,youhavetocloseyoureyes.”Theoldestcity in theworldsatat the lowestpointonearth,hewrote.“Everythingaroundisdry,desolate,whiteaschalk,butthecityisrichwithgardens,storiesandlegends—fromRahabtheprostituteinherwindow,totheChariotofIsraelanditshorsemenrisinguptotheheavens.”Noconquerorhasnotcrosseditbutno war can destroy it, wrote Dayan; Jericho had always been rebuilt. “TheJordan, the sweet water, the fertile valley—they are stronger than anydestruction.”
EzerWeizmanwas oftenwithDayan. He had the peculiar sense of havingwoken from a nineteen-year slumber to find himself, when opening his eyes,backagainunderBritishrule,withthesamenarrowroads,thesamelandmarksand the signs, the same vineyards, watermelon fields, and fragrant orchards.“For someonewho grew up under theBritish, this is not just the land of theBible,”wroteWeizman.“AsItraveledtheroadsoftheliberatedlandofIsrael,Ikept thinking a British policeman would appear from around the bend on amotorcycle,stopme,andgivemeaspeedingticket.”9
Civiliansneededanarmypermit tovisit the territories; in the firstdaysandweeks after the war, there was no document more sought-after. The permitstestifiedtoaperson’sstatus,tohisconnectionsandhispartinthevictory.Oneman called his duty commander, the other knew the general’s aide; this onetalkedtotheCEO’sbrother-in-law,andthenextgothispermitfromtheheadofhis yeshiva. David Bartov, an administrator in the court system, wrote to hisbrother, Haim Israeli, assistant to the minister of defense: “You’ll surelyunderstand that the status of a Supreme Court justice, equal to a minister,entitleshimtoapermanentpermitratherthanthetemporaryonethathastobeperiodicallyreplacedorreissued.”HedidnotexplaintheurgentneedforjudgestovisittheWestBank;itwassimplyamatterofentitlementandrespect.Somepermitswerevalidonly forvisiting specificplaces inSinai, theWest
Bank, or in the Golan Heights. Some limited visits to a few hours, with orwithoutprivatevehicles,withorwithoutanescort;otherswerebroader.Somewerecollective:duplicatedonmimeographmachinesandfilled inbyhand,ortyped.Theywerewhiteandblue,pinkandgreen,squareorrectangle;everysooftenthepermitformswerechangedandreplacedwithothers.10Manypeoplesimplyignoredtheneedforapermit,andfoundthatnoonetriedtostopthem.Themembers of KibbutzYehiam set off for theWest Bank in five yellow
buses. “The road is hilly and reminiscent of familiar landscapes,” wrote onemember,“withonedifference:themountainagricultureherehasbeencaredforwonderfully.Therearevineyards,terraces,andfieldsasfarastheeyecansee.Everything is neat, cultivated, clean, and pleasing. Here and there, wheat isreapedwithsicklesorpulledup(mostlybywomen)byhand.”Seeingagroveofpines in Gush Etzion, the tourists called out jokingly, “The Jewish NationalFund!”TheydidnotknowthatthetreeshadinfactbeenplantedbytheJNFintheforties.Yosef Weitz was also impressed by the quality of Palestinian agronomy,
calling ita lovinglycultivated“lifesupport.”AshenearedHebronhisdelight
grew: “The more I look closely, the more ashamed and embarrassed I feelcomparing‘our’JerusalemmountainstotheirHebronmountains.We,whousesteel(largetillingmachines),havetraining,hugebudgets,andexpensivewater,have not achieved anything so flourishing. We are culturally and practicallyinferiorbycomparison,andallbecausetheyarepeoplewhoworktheland,andthatlandistheirsolelivelihood,andwearefarfrombeingthat.”This was one of the surprises awaiting Israelis who visited the territories,
becausein“Homeland,”asgeographyclasseswerecalled,theyweretaughtthattheArabsneglectedtheirland:theydidnotrepairthestoneterracesbuiltbytheHebrews two thousand years ago, and they allowed the earth to erode andexposetherock;theirgoatsdestroyedtheancientnaturalforests;theyneglectedtoweed the streams, so that vegetation clogged them; they stole stones fromancientsitesandusedthemtobuildhouses.Israeligeographybooksfrequentlyquoted a British official who had concluded that “the Bedouins are not thechildrenof thedesert, but rather its creators.”A fewdays after thewar, signsappeared in the Occupied Territories, cautioning against harming animal andplantlife.TheNationalParksAuthorityandtheNatureReserveAuthoritywereasked to include theWest Bank and the Gaza Strip in their activities, whichincluded“theimprovementofIsrael’slandscape.”“Visitors were thrilled to see Israelis showing such sensitivity to the
landscape,evenattheheightofacruelwar,”wrotehistorianMeronBenvenisti.Upon returning fromavisit to theBaniasestuary,YehudaYostwrote, “It is areal pleasure to come to such a placeweeks after the conquest and see signswarning people not to despoil the environment and to respect the place as anaturepreserve.”TheSyrians,henoted,haddonenothing toopen thearea tovisitors. “But this sensitivity,” Benvenisti continued, “had another purpose aswell:tostakeaclaim.Thelandscapeisprecioustousbecauseitisours.Thetestofaproprietaryclaimisintheextentofourcaring.Andofcoursethereistheflip side of this approach: neglecting the country, as others have done, isdecisiveproofthattheydonotcare,andthereforehavenorighttotheland.”Israelisfloodedtheterritories,asiftheyfeltaneedtotakethelandagainand
again.“Ourtriptotheconqueredterritorieswasfantastic,”wrotetwoIsraelistofriends abroad. “It’s hard to describe the amazing landscape, particularly thedesertandwhat’sbeenleftonthebattlefields.It’simpossibletotakein.Simplyadream,andall this insixdays.”11Theheapsofabandonedweapons that thearmyhadnotyet cleared away stood likemonuments tovictory, especially intheGolanHeights.“Theentirevalleylookslikethepalmofyourhand,”wroteone IDF officer. “On one hand there’s great concrete slabs (which now stink
because of the quantities of urine left by Israeli hikers) and on the other, thefarmed fields.Andperhaps there’snogreater contrastbetweenwar andpeacethanthisscene.”YosefWeitz noted a sense shared bymanywho visited theGolan: “Aswe
stood next to the Syrian and Russian posts we understood full well howimportantitisfortheGolantobepartofthecountry,forthesecurityofpeopleintheHulavalleyandatLakeTiberias.”However,hethoughtitunnecessarytoholdonto theentireGolan: theoutskirtswouldbesufficient,andIsraelmightobtainthosethroughapeaceagreement.LikeEshkol,hewasalsoentrancedbythe source of the Banias: “It is important to us that this spring be inside ourborders.”*Many Israelis experienced religious exaltation when they visited the
territories. In its intensity, this feeling rivaled the existential anxiety that hadpreceded thewar.YehudaYost from Jerusalemwrote toAdirZik that he hadbeen to the Sinai, theWest Bank, and theGolan, but nothing could comparewithhisvisitatRachel’sTombandtheTombofthePatriarchs.“Allthethingsyoureadabout in theBibleandinhistorybecomerealrightbeforeyoureyes;readingtheBiblenowhasacompletelydifferentmeaning.”RivkaCohenwrote,aftervisiting theTombof thePatriarchs, “Therewas suchexcitement thatwehad tears in our eyes, and Bina cried hysterically and I could not calm herdown.”Othersdescribeda“strangehappiness,likewakingupafterafaint.”13
The encounterwith the holy places exposed the gap between religious andsecular Israelis.MosheDayanwasnot particularly impressedby the ancestralsites.TheTombofthePatriarchswas“atypicalHebroncave,carvedoutofthegray rockof themountainside,with fieldsofbarleybelow.”YitzhakKotler, asoldier, admitted, “To be honest, I’mnot so excited about having all the holysites,liketheWesternWall,theTombofthePatriarchs,orRachel’sTomb.”TheYehiamnewsletterdescribedRachel’sTombwithsomescorn:“Anofficerintheparatroopers wages a hopeless war against Jewish women who insist onsuffocatinginthecrowded,smokyroom,longsincefilledbeyondcapacity,andhe lookshelpless in thiskindofbattle,whichhe isnotused to fighting.”NorweremembersofYehiamparticularly fondof thePalestinian souvenir sellers.“Thewaytheydobusinessisdemandingandaggressive.It’snotenoughforyoutowalkawayfromthem.Theyplantthemselvesinfrontofyournoseandoffertheir wares again and again, tug at your sleeve and even curse at pictures ofHusseintopleaseyou,anythingforbusiness.”14
Somedenounced“thesecondconquestoftheWestBank,”astheytermedthe
tourists’eagerspending.“TheArabshavequicklylearnedhowtosellmetsiyes[“bargains”inYiddish]totheJews,allforalira.. . .ThescourgeofshoppinghashitIsraelishardandisgivinggeneroussupporttopeoplewhoonlyyesterdaywantedtomurderandrobus.”WeitzdescribedsimilarscenesinGaza:“Thecityis bustling with Jews. The streets are full of them, buying all sorts ofhaberdasheryandfabrics.”Israelis frequently talkedof their trips to theWestBankwithoutmentioning
the thousands of Palestinian refugees who continued to wander on the roads.“Arabfamiliesthrongtothebridgewiththeirchattels,”wroteWeitz.“Wedonotlinger here. The scene is disheartening.” Deputy Minister Arie Lova Eliavwrote, “Likemanyofmygeneration,wehavedevelopedablindnessof sorts,the skill of not seeing living people, living Arabs: not them, and not theirproblems.”ButEliavfelt,intheterritories,asifheweretwentyyearsyounger:“SomethingbetweenaBoyScoutandasoldier.”Weitzalsofeltreinvigorated.Hestillhadthesenseofbeing“disconnectedfromthepulseoflife,”buthistripsin the territories and the discussionover their future seemed to give himnewenergy. A few ministers, including Yigal Allon, asked for his opinion onproposalstheywerepreparingforthegovernment.Heorderedmapsandbeganthinkingaboutthefutureborders.“Itisnotatalleasy,”hewrote.Twodaysafterthewar,Weitzcouldalreadydiscern“ahugedesire”toholdontotheWestBankandGaza.ThatIsraelshouldkeepthem“seemstobeanacceptedopinion,”hewrote. He quotedMaariv, which was aware of whatWeitz described as “thequestionofthemillion,”meaningtheonemillionArabslivingintheterritories,but the paper’s solution was simple: to counter the million Arabs in theterritories,IsraelwouldbringamillionJewsfromtheDiaspora.Weitzfoundthisdifficulttoaccept.HereckonedthattogetherwiththeArabsalreadywithinthestate, therewouldnowbemanymore thanamillionArabs living in Israel,asagainstfewerthantwoandahalfmillionJews.Inlightofthebirthrate,beforelonghalf thestate’spopulationwouldbeArab.“There isaglint in theireyes,certainlynotfromloveforusorservility,andtheproblemdistressesme,stiflinganyjoyandcertainlyanydesiretocelebrate,”hewrote.15
Three days after the war, Weitz took a tour of Gush Etzion, south ofJerusalem.Hisson,Raanan,headoftheJewishAgency’ssettlementdepartment,organized a bus for some forty people, including JNF and Jewish Agencyofficials and a few veterans of the four Gush settlements the Jordanians hadoccupiedintheWarofIndependence.WeitzwentasadelegateofEshkol.Theprimeministerhadcalledhimunexpectedlythedayafterthewarended.
WhenWeitz went to see him at home that evening, Eshkol wanted to know
whethertheGushcouldberesettled,explainingthattheheadofMafdal,HaimMoshe Shapira, was already pressuring him: three of the original Gushsettlements had been religious. Weitz had brought his son to the meeting.Raanan was a former assistant to Eshkol and his successor in the settlementdepartment. Eshkol’s appeal to Weitz did not seem to be coincidental.HumiliatedbyhisoustingfromtheDefenseMinistry,disappointedinhispartycomradeswhohadnotstoodbyhimontheeveofthewar,andfeelinggenerallyisolated,Eshkolsaw theelderly forester,oneofhisgeneration,asapartner inthe worldview that had guided him for half a century: the State of Israeldepended on settlement; Israelis must populate as much territory as possible,withasfewArabsaspossible.Weitz opposed a renewed settlement movement in Gush Etzion. First, he
explained, there was the danger that Jewish refugees returning to their oldhomes would bolster the Arab demand to allow refugees to return. Second,Israel should not establish facts in the West Bank before deciding what itwanted:Annexationofalltheterritories,alongwiththemillionArabswholivedinthem?Arealignmentoftheborders?GushEtzionmightnotremaininIsrael’spossession.Thewholesituationrequiredsomeconsideration.EshkolagreedthatwithrespecttotheWestBankandGaza,waitingmadesense,butthatnodelaywaspossibleregardingthefutureofJerusalem.RaananWeitzsuggestedthatthecity’sboundariesshouldstretchfromKalandiainthenorthtoGushEtzioninthesouth. His father thought this too broad, and Eshkol agreed. Raanan alsoproposed defining the Gaza Strip as Israeli territory. Eshkol asked what heproposedtodowiththePalestinianpopulation.Raananrepliedthatpartof theSinaishouldbeannexedalongwiththeGazaStrip,andthepopulationshouldbetransferredthere.Hisfatherobjectedtothistoo:IsraelhadrepeatedlydeclaredthatitdidnotintendtoannexArabterritories,andSinaibelongedtoEgypt.Nopart of it shouldbe annexed.Eshkol agreed, saying that for this same reason,Israel should not annex the Golan Heights; they should only ensure that theGolandidnotserveasabaseforSyrianaggression.“Sowhatdowedonow?”heasked.TheWeitzesreiteratedthatadetailedstudyoftheterritoriesandtheirinhabitantswasrequired.EshkolagreedandsaidhewouldtalktoDayan.Nineteenyearshaddonenothingtoerasethecountry’sgeographicalintegrity
fromWeitz’smind.Tohim,theGreenLinerepresentedatemporaryexpedient,which had now been revoked. He came to Gush Etzion like a landownerreturning to inspect his property after a relatively brief absence. He had notroublelocatingapieceoflandthattheJNFhadbeenabouttopurchasein1947,shortly before the UN partition resolution. The plan had been to establish
“lookouts” in the area, communication outposts meant to help protectsettlements.AccordingtoWeitz,thetransactionwashaltedbecauseBen-Gurionhadobjectedtoit.TheoldresidentialbuildingsintheGushsettlementshaddisappeared.Intheir
placewerePalestinianrefugeehomes,surroundedbylittlegardensofvinesandtomatoes.Weitzsurveyedthecropswithaprofessionaleyeanddeterminedthatthey were properly cultivated. Most of the current residents had fled to themountainsduringtherecentfighting.WeitzalsofoundthepinegroveplantedbytheJNFintheforties.OnememberofhistourgroupfoundanArabguardwhohadworked for the Jewish residentsbefore1948.“Themeetingwaswarm, tothepointofembracing,”wroteWeitz.ThentheIsraelissatdowntodiscussthefutureintheshadeof“thetree”:everyoneknewtheancientoakthathadservedasaconnectingpointofthefoursettlements.AvrahamHerzfeld, seventy-nine at the time, a labormovement activist and
JNF leader who had been instrumental in establishing many settlements inIsrael, said that the children of the original Gush settlers should returnimmediately;someofthemwereonthetour.OthersarguedthattheWestBankshouldbeheldascollateraluntiltherewaspeace.RaananWeitzsaidtheyshouldprepare settlement plans and wait for a government decision. The discussionitselfmadeWeitz senior angry: an entirely new situation had developed, andthesepeopleweretalkingabouttwoorthreesettlementsinsteadofconsideringthelargerproblemoftheWestBank.Hegotupandmeasuredthetrunkoftheoaktree;itscircumferencewasoversixfeet.“Thetreeisveryoldandhasseenmanychanges,”hewrote.WeitzwasimpressedbyBeitJalla,aflourishingvillageofstonehousesbuilt
inmagnificentArabstyle.Thevillagevineyardsgaveitavernallivelinessthathe found charming. But the heatwas oppressive, hewas thirsty, and they alldecidedtogobacktoJerusalem.Onthewaytheypassedheavytraffic—touristsand hikers.Weitz assumed, correctly, that the peoplewere rushing to see theterritories,inthebeliefthattheywouldnotremainunderIsraelicontrol.“Inthefirst week after the war,” wrote one of the young men named after the firstYehiam,“wemanagedtogetapermittotravelaroundtheareaandwewentallovertheWestBank,becauseweweresurethatinaveryshorttimeitwouldallbe given back.”But onewoman reported in a letter to theUnited States thatwithin a fewdays, someone had changed one of the yellow signs bearing thewarning“Caution,BorderAhead”toread“NoBorderAhead.”16
3.PARTITIONS:“BALADNA—BALADKOM”
OnWednesday,June14,theholidayofShavuot,accesstotheWesternWallwasopenedandroughlyaquarterofamillionIsraeliscame.Underheavysecurity,theycrossedMountZioninalongline,walkingalongwhatwasknownasthePope’sRoad,ajointIsraeli-Jordanianventure,builtforPopePaulVI’svisit toJerusalemin1964.Theythencrossedtheoldborder,wentdownalongsidethewall, and entered the Old City through the Dung Gate to arrive at the largesquare in front of theKotel. The eventwas both a traditional pilgrimage andvictorycelebration.Manyofthevisitorsweredevoutandwantedtopray,butotherscameincars
andcarriedtransistorradios,violatingtheSabbathandholidayprohibitions.ThemajoritywereseeingtheKotelforthefirsttime,especiallytheyoungerIsraelisandtherecentimmigrants.SomehopedtorevisittheKoteltheyhadknowninthepast,beforethedestructionoftheMugrabihouses,andweredisappointedtofindthehugeemptysquare.“Intheopenspacethatnowsurroundsit,thewalllosesitssorrowanditsairofweeping,”wroteWeitz.“Inmyopinion,theKotelwasatitsgreatestwhenitwasanenclosedarea,accessibleonlythroughnarrowalleyways; itscaptivityevoked itsantiquity,exile,anddestruction.Nowit sitsidlyintheopen.”SomeonestandingbehindWeitzcommented,“ItisnolongertheKotel,butjustawall.”Therewasacruelheatwave,anddustrosefromtheroad and the square. The odor of perspiration still mingled, at times, with astrongsmellofcorpses,reportedonepaper.Uponleavingthesite,thethrongsofvisitorsreachedtheopenareainfrontof
theJaffaGateandhadtheirfirstglimpseoftheArabcityitself.Theshopsandcafés had been shut bymilitary order, and strips of white fabric hung in thewindows. “The children stood on the balconies; men and women looked outthroughthewindows,practicallyhiddenfromthepassersby,”reportedHa’aretz.“Evenso,theycouldhardlyavoidthecontemptandmockeryofthecrowd,whoonly a week ago had been huddled in shelters in fear of the bombardmentsfallingonthecity.”ThedayafterShavuot,tensofthousandsmorecame,andbytheendoftheweektherehadbeenalmosthalfamillionvisitors.17
The crowds visiting the Kotel threatened to co-opt the site as a nationalsymbol, expropriating it from religious Jews. A few rabbis protested thedesecration of the holiday and the Sabbath. Israel’s chief rabbi, Isser YehudaUnterman,demandedthattheKotelbeclosedtovisitorsontheSabbath.YosefWeitz,incontrast,dislikedtheworshipersmorethantheregularvisitors;“mostof themareMizrahi,” he noted,whokissed the stones andpushednoteswithappeals toGod through the cracks—“anact of idolatry.”ProfessorYeshayahuLeibowitz, the Orthodox scientist and philosopher, wrote a scathing letter to
Ha’aretzon thematter.Hewas furiousat theway theWesternWallhadbeenturnedintoasymbolofconquest;hesawthisasidol-worshiping.“Hereismyproposal,” wrote the professor. “The square in front of the Kotel should berevamped as the largest discotheque in the State of Israel, named the DivineDisco. Thiswill satisfy everybody.”Ha’aretz printed his letter under the title“DisKotel.”*Attempting to integrate the Kotel’s dual identity, the editors of Maariv
declared:“Jerusalemisours,rootedinthecollectivesouloftheJewishpeopleand stampedon its consciousness.”Theywere referring to the entire city, notjusttotheWesternWall.18
This view represented a wide and virtually unchallenged consensus. EvenGabriel Stern, a veteran of the Ihudmovement,which had supported Jewish-Arabcoexistenceinonestate,wassweptupintheexcitement.“Isthisreal,oristhemindplayinggames?”hewondered.“ThescenerywassofamiliartomeandyetIwanderedaroundinadaze...asifIhadsuddenlyseentheothersideofthemoon.”HeviewedtherenewaloftheKotelasapossiblesteponthewaytobinational existence. “May we, the two peoples of this city, this country, befortunate enough now also to tear down the partitions that still separate ourhearts, for the fruits of a new peace,” he wrote hopefully. But even he, anavowed and courageous humanist, was unmoved by the destruction of thehousesinfrontoftheKotel:“Theyhadnohistoricalorreligiousvalue.”19
Sternwasprobablyunawarethataministerialcommitteewassecretlymeetingat that verymoment to consider the bestway to “tear down the partitions”—namely,toannextheArabcity.The cabinet supported annexation unwaveringly, although a few members
werewaryof“explosivedeclarations” thatmight turn theentireworldagainstIsrael and even revive the idea of international rule in the city. Therewas nowayofknowingwhatmighthappenintheworld,warnedWarhaftig.DeanRuskaskedIsraeltotakenostepstowardannexation.AbbaEbanwishedtopostponethe decision until after the annualUN assembly in the fall. The questionwaswhether the eastern part of Jerusalem could be annexed without any kind ofdeclaration.MenachemBegin cautioned against using theword “annexation,”suggestingthatthecity’sbordersbeexpandedin“completesilence.”Meanwhile, aministerial committee was discussing the possible borders of
annexation. The goal, wrote General Rehavam Ze’evi to Minister of JusticeShapira,wastoturnJerusalemintoametropolis.DayanaskedZe’evitodrawupamapofanexpandedJerusalemandthensentitbacktwiceaskingthatitssize
be decreased to reduce the number of Arabs within the city boundaries. Theapproach was secular: Rachel’s Tomb in the south was excluded, but a longnarrowcorridorwouldleadtotheairportinthenorth.Beginproposedcamouflagingtheannexationwithinalawthatwouldapplyto
theentireWestBank.Theministerswonderedwhether itmightbepossible toproceedwithoutlegislation,butMinisterofJusticeShapirainsistedonKnessetapproval. The least dramatic method they came up with was to hide thelegislation in three amendments to existing laws. These would be phrased inlegalese,implyingthattheymerelyaddressedadministrativeissuesthatappliedto the entire country. The word “annexation” did not appear, nor was thelegislation listed as a proposed bill on the Knesset agenda. Rather, it wasintroduced for a first reading immediately before deliberation on it began.Eshkol was intentionally absent. The legislation was passed on to theappropriatecommitteesandsentbackforsecondandthirdreadingsandthenforavote,allinthesameevening.Therewas“nocommotionandnorejoicing,”asMinisterGvatiwrote.AlmostalltheKnessetmembersvotedinfavor,includingUriAvneri;onlytheCommunistsobjected.TheForeignMinistryinstructeditsrepresentativesto“minimize”thepolitical
and historical significance of East Jerusalem’s annexation, depicting thelegislation as an administrative step necessary to facilitate water and powersupplies, public transportation, and health and education services. Inspired byBegin, theministry told its staff touse thephrase“municipal integration”andavoidtheterm“annexation”wheneverpossible.20
TWO DAYS AFTER THE KNESSET APPROVED THE ANNEXATION, FREEMOVEMENTWASpermitted between the two parts of the city. Crowds of Arabs flowed intowestern Jerusalem,promptingGabrielStern toenthuse:“Baladna—baladkom,wa’baladkom—baladna,” he wrote in Arabic: “Our town is your town, yourtownisourtown.”ThesceneduringthemiddayhoursofJune29wasdescribedbyHa’aretzasa
“mutual invasion,” a festivedischargeof the stressofwar, the intoxicationofvictory,andtheshockofdefeat.JewsandArabsmingledinboththeeasternpartofthecityandinthewest.IsraelispouredintotheArabmarketsandcamebackwith umbrellas from Japan, American cigarettes, rugs, canned food fromLebanon,pencilsmadeinChina.“ThecrowdsintheOldCitymarketsmadeitalmostimpossibletowalk,andyouwouldhavethoughttherewererationingandstarvationinthenewJerusalem,”reportedonejournalist.“Peopleboughtthingsthey would never otherwise have bought, believing they were getting good
prices(eventhoughtheywerebeingtakenforaride),”wroteAvigailandYoelYinontofriendsinLosAngeles.“They’reembarrassedtocomehomefromtheOldCityunlesstheyhaveabasketfulofrags.It’sreallysickening.”*TheArabscametoseethetraffic lights; therewerenoneintheirpartof the
city.Therewasalsoexcitementovericecreambars.Israeliboyswereinterestedin the Jordanian license plates on theArab cars.TheArabs visited the publicparks,andsomewenttothemovies.Manywentthatsamedaytoseethehousestheyhadlostin1948.“There’sgoingtobetrouble,”GabrielSternpredicted.21
The idea of allowing free movement throughout Jerusalem had originatedwithMosheDayan.Thenecessityseemedtoarisefromthechangeinthelawsgoverning the eastern part of the city, butmanywere fearful and opposed it.“Who knewwhat smoldering hatredsmight flare up?” TeddyKollek recalledthinking.Hethoughtthecityshouldopenupgradually,atfirstforjustanhourortwoaday.“Anyotherwayseemedawildrisk,”hewrote.HebroughtDayantomeetwith theministerof the interior,a fewIDFofficers,andpeople in theShabak, theSecurityService,ontheterraceoftheKingDavidHotel.Theyallopposedtheidea.Dayanputhisfeetuponthetableandinsistedontheneedfor“anewreality.”Ithappenedquickly,asthreecommuniquéspublishedinthepressmadeclear.
MayorKollek invited Jerusalem residentswho owned property in the easternpartofthecitytocometothecityofficesandregistertheirownership,onformsfilled out in duplicate. This was solely for the purpose of a census, heemphasized,buttheannouncementincludedaphraseborrowedfromscripture:“Blessed be he who sets a boundary for Jerusalem.” A local airline, Arkia,offered sightseeing flights over Jerusalem. And the Postal Ministry notifiedstampvendorsthatiftheywishedtostocklargequantitiesofenvelopeswiththestampofthenewpostofficeinEastJerusalem,theywouldneedtorequesttheminadvance.22
YOSEF WEITZ AND HIS WIFE DROVE TO THE JEWISH CEMETERY ON THE MOUNT OFOlives. Itwasnot easy to find their sonYehiam’sgravestone.The Jordanianshadbuiltahotelandpavedaroadonthemount,shatteringmanygravestonesintheprocess.“Utterdestruction,”wroteWeitz,andthereandthenheformulatedan argument against handing the city over to international rule: the UNobservers had witnessed the barbaric desecration of the cemetery and donenothingtopreventit.Theywerenotworthytoprotectholysites.“UncertainwhetherweweretreadingonYehiam’sgrave,wefeltnoflutterin
ourhearts,”Weitzwroteinhisdiary.“Twenty-oneyearshavepassed.Changesuponchanges,untilone’sheartisparalyzed.”Butthemagnificentviewof“thecity joined as one” plunged him into contemplation of Jerusalem’s past andfuture.“ThereisagreatlongingtorestoreittoitsancientgloryintheKingdomofIsrael,andthestrugglebeforeusisvastanddifficult.”Fornow,aweighthadbeen lifted: his grandson Nir had telephoned, and he was fine. His unit wasencampedsixmilesfromtheSuezCanal.23
CHAPTER17VICTORYALBUMS
1.IMAGES:“WARBRINGSOUTTHEBESTINPEOPLE”
TheeveningbeforefreemovementbeganbetweentheeasternandwesternpartsofJerusalem,somethreethousandguestsfilledtheamphitheaterattheHebrewUniversityonMountScopus,wherehonorarydoctorateswerebeingawardedtothepresidentandtoafewlesssignificantdignitaries,includingamajordonortothe university. The highlight of the evening was the honorary degree beingbestowedonYitzhakRabin.HisacceptancespeechformedamilestoneinIsraelipoliticalculture.Intheconflictbetweenvaluesystems—between“thetwoPeoplesofIsrael”—
theuniversitycommunityactedas if ithadamonopolyon“Jewishmorality.”Nathan Rotenstreich, the rector, had led a protest against the air forcerecruitmentslogan“Thebest jointheairforce,”withtheaimofplayingdownthemilitary’sroleinshapingsociety’sfundamentalvalues.ButRabin’saddresspresumedauniversal recognitionof the IDF’smoral superiority—almost as iftheuniversityhadsignedadecreeofcapitulation.Rabinbeganbysayingthathestoodbefore“theteachersofthegeneration”with“reverence,”andwentontoexplainthathesawtheoccasionasa“deeprecognitionoftheuniquenessoftheIDF,whichisnothinglessthananexpressionoftheuniquenessofthePeopleofIsrael.” Thiswas an army like no other, he continued: it pursuedmissions ofpeace,to“glorifythestrengthofthenationculturallyandmorally.”HenotedtheIDF’s role in a number of educational enterprises, such as sending femalesoldierstoteachinnewimmigrantcommunities,butassertedthatthesewerenotthe reasons for the university’s respect for the army, evident in the honorbestoweduponthemilitary.Insodoing,theuniversityhad“acknowledgedtheIDF’s spiritual and moral advantage in warfare itself.” Rabin described thefighters’courageandtheirdedicationtotheirmission,aswellastooneanother,asa“humandisplayofbrotherhoodandcomradeshipandevenidealism.”Theconquestof theOldCity,hesaid,hadstirredthesoldiers to“wellsofemotionandspiritualelevation.”Acknowledging the value system of the academic elite, but positioning the
IDFalongsideit,Rabinarguedthatthearmydidnotsharethe“joyofvictory”feltby“theentirenation.”Thesoldiers’celebrationsweremingledwithsadness
and shock, he said, “and there are even some who do not celebrate at all,”becausetheyknowthecostofvictory.Thenewhonorarydoctorofphilosophythenproposedahistoriosophicexplanation:“ItispossiblethattheJewishpeopleneverlearnedtofeelthejoyoftheconquerorandthevictor,andsotheseeventsaremetwithmixedfeelings.”Headdedthattheterriblepriceexactedfromtheenemyhadalsodeeplytouchedtheheartsofmanysoldiers.Rabindescribedthesoldiers’heroismas“abraveryof spirit.”When they fought, “a fewagainst amultitude,” they did sowith “all the resources of spiritual strength.” Even astheywatched their friends fall beside them, themilitary unitswere fueled by“moral values, spiritual reserves, not by weapons or combat strategies.” Theslogan “The best join the air force,” he explained, referred notmerely to thesoldiers’ technicalprowessbut to“valuesofmoralgoodness,valuesofhumangoodness.”*Rabinconcluded,“Thisisanarmythatcomesfromthepeopleandreturns to thepeople, apeople that rises above itself in thehourofneed, andthat, when tested, can defeat any enemy thanks to its moral, spiritual, andemotionalsuperiority.”Israel’s chief education officer, Mordechai Bar-On, who wrote the speech,
introducednoideasthatwerenotalreadyacceptableinIsrael.ButasthechiefofstaffstoodonMountScopus,“inthisancientandsplendidsitethat looksoverour eternal capital,” heofferednotmerely self-flattery, but also a basicmoralandpoliticaldeclaration: thearmywas thesourceofmoralvalues, thewaranexpressionofhumangreatness.ManypeopleheardRabin’swordsasjustifyingtheoccupation.Therewas a political background to this symbolic and emotionally charged
embrace between the academy and the military. According to Rabin, theinitiative for awarding this honorary degree had come from Eshkol’s adviserProfessorYigalYadin.MosheDayan,amanofletters,anamateurarchaeologist,and a world famous decorated hero, might have been a more appropriatecandidate and more effective in public relations and fund-raising for theuniversity. But Yadin thought poorly of Dayan the archaeologist; moreover,Dayan represented Rafi, Ben-Gurion’s party, and the Rector Rotenstreich hadbeenamajoradversaryofBen-GurionduringtheLavonaffair.Ben-Guriondidnotattendtheceremony,butheheardRabin’sspeechonhiscarradioandsenthimacongratulatoryletter.Rabinhimselfwrote,“Ifthereisanyrewardforthelongnightsof apprehension, for the terrible sense thatyouare sendingyoungpeopletofacedeath,fortheheavyburdenofresponsibilityonyourshoulders,Ihavereapeditat thestandatMountScopus.”HischoiceofwordsevokedthefamiliarHebrewphrasefor therevelationof theTorah toMoses,“thestandat
MountSinai.”The author AharonMegged wrote that Rabin had spoken for all the other
militarycommanders,andthatnootherarmyintheworldspokeinsuchavoice.“ItisthevoiceofthetrueIsraeli,aracethathassprungfromthiscountry,anditisthatrace,morethananything,thatbroughtaboutthisvictory.”2
A FEW DAYS AFTER THE WAR ENDED, THE CHILDREN’S MAGAZINEDAVAR LEYELADIMbegana“HelicopterCampaign,”inwhichyoungreaderswereaskedtosendintheir pocket money to raise funds for a military helicopter to be used forevacuatingwoundedsoldiers.StudentsattheAdihuschoolinBeitShemeshsent160liras,whilestudentsatDruyanovinTelAvivraised640.TheirlettertothebraveIDFsoldiersread,“Weareveryhappyforyourvictory.”Theyhopedthehelicopterwouldbeusedforpeacefulpurposesonly,andsignedtheletter“withblessingsofvictory.”Thepapers celebratedwith a torrent of articlesglorifying the IDF.Someof
thecommandersweredepictedasmythicalfigures,largerthanlife.“Yitzhakhasaphenomenalmemory,”Maariv quoted oneGeneral Staff officer speaking ofRabin, and reported that everyone who worked with him joked that if theircomputers crashed,nothingdisastrouswouldhappenbecause they’d still haveYitzhakRabin.“When he sits at his desk, he looks huge,” wrote one paper of Shmuel
Gorodish. “He walks with a threatening animal spring in his step.” ShabtaiTevethcomparedGorodishto“alegendarygiant,”althoughhewasofaverageheight,asTevethhimselfnoted;YehoshuaBar-Dayanrepeatedlyobserved thathiscommanderwasashortman.Journalistscouldnotconcealtheiradmirationof the commanders they interviewed. “Raful, Raful—worshipped, legendary,”wrote one of Rafael Eitan. “I am among those who admire Arik—a rarecombinationofbattlespirit,strengthandhumanfeeling,”wroteanother,ofArielSharon. To speak to Sharon, wrote Geula Cohen, was to “interview a livinglegend . . . a legend in uniform.”He “gives you the feeling that he is just anordinaryperson,butlargerandwiserandhandsomer.”Shemarveledathissilverhair,hissturdyshoulders,hischest,hiseyes,andhissmile.“Warmandinnocentandclearlikeachild’s,asmilethatpausesbrieflyasitemerges,likesomeonewhoknows that not everything is clear and innocent, but then it reaches you,still warm, still clear, but now a little harder, hinting at the scent of thebattlefield.”Thiswasnot the first time shehad interviewedanofficeronly tohear him talk of faith and spirit, shewrote; she should have been used to it.SharonhadtoldherhefeltnoguilttowardtheArabs,andrecountedhowwhen
he had visited the Kotel he had worn tefillin for the first time since his BarMitzvah.3
Thegeneralswerefetedascelebrities,sought-afterguestsatpublicandsocialevents,fromrestaurantopeningsandfashionshowstogalasandcocktailparties.Everyone wanted them at their weddings and Bar Mitzvahs. Their picturesappearedondishes,mugs,keychains, children’sgames,watches, andholidaycards.Othercelebritieshadtheirpicturestakenwiththem—LeonardBernstein,DannyKaye,SeanConnery,RichardNixon.Moreandmorevictoryballswereheld. IDF officers, among them Mordechai Hod, Ariel Sharon, and othergenerals, appeared on American television and at fund-raising events in theUnited States. But when the United Jewish Appeal invited Yitzhak Rabin tospeak at a fund-raiser, a protest erupted, as if the occasion were somehowbeneathhisdignity. Ina letter toEshkol,a sixteen-year-oldgirl repeatedwhatshe had read in an article written by Elie Wiesel. It was one thing to sendministers toevents, sheexplained,“butnotourChiefofStaff, theheroof theSix-DayWar.”The admiration of the armywas also embodied in the popular demand for
military decorations. Firefighters, El Al employees, Kol Israel radio staff,yeshiva students, Egged bus drivers, and postal workers—they all wanteddecorations. And the country was soon flooded with the coffee-table booksknowninHebrewasalbomim,albums.They appearedby thedozen, in every size and shape.Somewere elaborate
two-volumesetswithvelvetbindings,goldengraving,magnificentphotographs,and captions in Hebrew, English, and French. Others were hastily assembledbookletsofphotographscopiedfromnewspapers.TheMinistryofDefenseandtheIDFissuedwaralbumsandhelpedsoldierspublishalbumsabouttheirunitsand battles. Therewere books in black andwhite, books in color, somewithmaps,withorwithoutintroductionsbyLeviEshkolorMosheDayanorYitzhakRabin,andafewinYiddish.*Mostofthebooksfeaturedtheword“victory”intheirtitles,butfewusedtheword“war.”Thosethatdidreferredto“theWarofVictory,”“theWarofRedemptionandPeace,”or“theWarforPeace.”ThetitleofalargealbumissuedbytheIDFeschewed“war”entirely:SixDays.Onemightoccasionally findapictureofEshkol,usuallywearingkhaki,but
moreoftenthannotthealbumscelebratedvictorywithoutanypoliticalcontext.Theyneveraskedwhetherthewarhadbeeninevitable;thiswasagiven.TheynevermentionedthequestionofwhethertoholdontotheOccupiedTerritoriesor withdraw. There was virtually no reference to IDF casualties. The widely
projectedviewwasthatthevictoryhadcreatedanidealsituation.Thecaptionswereformulatedinquasipoeticlanguage,repletewithmeaningfulellipsesattheendsofsentences.Allthealbumsreflectedvaryingdegreesoffierypatriotism,inthespiritoftheera.“TheIDFisabetterarmythanthecontemporaryGermanmilitary,”MaarivproudlyquotedanAmericangeneralfromonealbum.Theyallunderscored thehistoricaland religiousattachment to the territories,andoftentheyexpressedcontempt for theenemyarmiesandcondescendingmockeryofthePOWs.“Theheatandthethirstsparedasignificantamountofammunition,”said one album in both Hebrew and English, beneath a picture of Egyptiansoldiers’corpsesintheSinai.AnotherpictureinthesamealbumdepictedadeadEgyptian soldierwith his arms spread out, and the caption “Even in death heraisedhishandsinsurrender.”Thealbumswereextremelypopular.Israelisboughtthemforthemselvesand
gavethemasgiftstofriendsandrelativesbothathomeandabroad.5Afterthealbumscametherecordsandplays.Themilitarytroupesworkedovertime,asifthewarwere still raging.Sooncame themovies, among thema few features,suchas IsTelAvivBurning?The IDFproduced itsown films, someofwhichinvolvedreenactmentsofbattles,includingtheconquestoftheOldCity;forthispurposetheyemployedairforceplanesandallegedlyalsocalledupreservists.6
The media cultivated the image of the civilian volunteer. The Ministry ofEducationportrayedsuchciviliansinaspecialeditionofapublicationfornewimmigrants,writteninsimplified,vowelizedHebrew.“Aneighty-year-oldmancame to see the townmarshal. ‘I cannot fight, but I canmake coffee for thesoldiers,’hesaid,andwenttooneofthearmycamps.”Anotherstorytoldofamoshavmemberwhotookalltheblanketshecouldfindathome,loadedthemon his tractor, and set off. “I’m bringing the blankets to our soldiers on thenorthernborder,”hesaid;“it’scoldthereatnight.”AndonemanwithaweakheartdrovehiscartoanIDFcamp.“Ican’tfight;myheartisnotworthmuch.Butmycarengineworksgreat.Won’tyoutakeit?”Davar wrote, in quasi-biblical style, “A great spirit has touched the entire
nation—and it shall be purified.”Yediot Aharonot quoted a psychologistwhoclaimedthat“warbringsoutthebestinpeople.”Dozensofbooksaboutthewar,inadditiontothealbums,voicedsimilarsentiments,andmanyofthembecamebest sellers.7 Every Israeli became a strategic expert: “We are blessed by thequalityofourpeopleandespeciallyourcommanders,whosesloganisnot’Go,go, go,’ but rather ’Follow me,’” wrote one woman knowledgeably. EstherMandelbaumfromTelAvivwrote,“ItisthankstotheIDFthatwearealive.”8
THEHIGHREGARDFORTHEIDFSPILLEDOVERTORENEWTHEPRESTIGEOFTHEKIBBUT-zim. The kibbutz was rehabilitated, once again acclaimed as an ideal thatdefined the values and image of the state. This happened primarily becausekibbutzmemberswere represented among thewar casualties at a rate almostfive timeshigher than theirproportionof thepopulationasawhole.Almostafifth of fallen soldiers came from a kibbutz, although kibbutz residentsrepresentedonlyabout4percentof thepopulation.Almost every thirdofficerkilledinthewarwasakibbutzmember.Butmanykibbutzimwereaversetothemilitaristicrevelry,adoptinginsteada
different image of the victor. TheYehiam newsletter announced, “The libraryhasdecidednottopurchasewaralbums.”Atthemembers’assemblytherewasaprincipled debate: “In light of what we have been through, should we allowguns,tanks,andothermilitarytoysintothechildren’shousesandplayrooms?”9
2.SOLDIERSTALK:“AHOLYBOOK”
A fewweeks after the war, a kibbutzmovement official invited AmosOz, ateacher onKibbutzHulda, to his office. Oz had begun to emerge as amajorwriter. The official also invited Avraham Shapira from Kibbutz Jezreel, whodivided his time between agricultural work and editing the literary andintellectualjournalShdemot.Thetwowereaskedtoeditacollectionofkibbutzmembers’war experiences.Theyknew from the start that any such collectionwouldgivevoicetoasenseofunease,evendistress.Thiswouldnotbeavictoryalbumoravolumeofheroism,theydecided.They traveled among the kibbutzim, recording hundreds of hours of
interviewswithpeoplewhorecountedtheirexperiencesinthewarand,insomecases, their views on the future of the Occupied Territories. Most of theinterviewswereconductedingroups.Inall,therewerethirtyconversationswith140 participants, the majority of whom were officers. Only a fraction of thehugequantityofmaterialwastranscribed;fromthetranscripts,OzandShapiracompiledoneofthemostimportantbookseverpublishedinIsrael.SoldiersTalkwasnotimmediatelyreleasedforsaletothegeneralpublicbut
wasdistributedsolelyamongkibbutzim.However,rumorsofitsexistencesoonspread, enveloping it in a cloakofmystery, as if it expressed anundergroundtruthtowhichonlyafewwereprivy.Thetextfounditswayintothepressandeventuallythebookwasissuedforsale.Roughly100,000copiesweresold,anastronomicalfigureatthattime.Onlyoneotherbookachievedsimilarsuccess:Exposed in theTurret, ablockbusterepicabout theheroicwarof thearmored
corps,written byShabtaiTeveth.Like the victory albums,Teveth’s bookwasconsidered the polar opposite of the refinedSoldiersTalk, whose subtitlewasEpisodesofListeningandObservation.HaimGouri thought thebookhad thepowerto“moldthesoulandconsciousnessofanentiregeneration.”GoldaMeirdecreedit“aholybook.”Sheechoedapopularsentimentwhensheadded,“Wehave been blessed to have such sons as these.” The Foreign Ministryincorporated thebook into itspublic relationscampaign. Itwas translated intoseveral languages, including Swedish and Yiddish, and excerpts weredramatizedandperformedinNewYork.*The book surprised many of its readers. Kibbutzniks were considered
introvertedpeoplewhodidnotdisclose their feelings.EvenYitzhakRabin, inhisspeechonMountScopus,observedthat“Sabrayouths,particularlysoldiers,tend not to be sentimental and are ashamed to reveal their emotions.” ButSoldiersTalk reflected an emotional need to talk about the experience ofwarandtoexposefeelingsandthoughts.Theinterviewparticipantsseemedgentle,peace-loving, awkward, thoughtful, sad, sensitive to human rights, andtormentedbyquestionsabout thenecessityof thewarand thecostofvictory,just as Rabin had described them.* Theywere identified by their first namesonly,whichmadethemseemlikeclosechildhoodfriendsofthereaders—andoftheentirecountry.Thesoldiers recollectedhowtheyhadgone towarenthusiasticallyandhow
they had learned to hate it. They spoke of fear and of how they overcame it,partlybecausetheywereafraidofwhatpeopleonthekibbutzmightsayaboutthem.Theylookedbackinamazementattheprocessbywhichtheyhadbecomepartofthewarmachine,automaticallyshootingathumanbeings.Theytalkedofdeath,ofhowtheysealeduptheirfeelingsandcametoholdhumanlifecheap,eventuallydevelopingadisregardevenfortheirownlives.Theyspokeatlengthabout the brotherhood among soldiers and about the difficulty of returning toroutine.SoldiersTalkwasreceivedasacompleteandauthenticdocument,anIsraeli
truth-tellingworthyofpride.Buttherawmaterialcollectedbytheeditorspaintsa different picture. A Ph.D. dissertation written by Alon Gan, at Tel AvivUniversity, shows that to a great extent the finished book presented adeliberately constructedmyth. Some responseswere censored, at times at theparticipants’ownrequest.Partsofthetranscriptswerealtered,inafewcasestothepointofdistortion,beforethebookwenttopress,inordertosuitthewordsto the image of innocent young soldiers, humanists in distress. The approachmightalsohavebeenpartofthegeneraltendencytoshedapositivelightonthe
waritself,andtherebyontheannexationofsomeoftheterritoriesoccupiedinitscourse.Thepubliclyissuedversionofthebookomittedsomeoftheaccountsincludedintheinitialversion.AccordingtoGan,“extremelygraphic”testimonyabout war crimes was dropped; he mentioned only some of these in hisdissertation.NahumandTikvaSarig,ofKibbutzBeitHashita,and theirsonRanandhis
wife, Ora, refused to allow the editors to identify them by name, and theirremarkswerenotpublished.NahumSarig,afoundingmemberof thePalmah,was one of the most revered commanders in the War of Independence. Randescribed theoccupationof theWestBankas thecompletionofamissionhisfather and his generation had left undone, prompting the “weeping forgenerations,”andinsodoing,heseemedtodiminishthegloryofthefoundingfathers.TikvaSarigtoldofhow,whenthewarbrokeout,sheprayedtoherdeadparents and asked them to protect her two sons. Threeweeks later, shewentbacktohermother’sgravetothankherforsendingeveryonehomesafely.Sheasked that this account be left out of the book, fearing the kibbutz memberswouldmockher.Oneparticipant, amember ofKibbutzEinShemer, asked the editors not to
publishhisdoubtsconcerningtheZionistideaitself.“Ifeelincreasingdespair,”hehadsaid,andwondered,“WhynotgotoCanada?”Hewentontoexplainhisdespondency:“Withus,everytenyears...everysooften,we’llhavetohaveawar....Itwon’tbeasafehavenfortheJewishpeople....IfullyadmitthatIdon’twant to live in a country destined to fight awar every ten years, and IidentifywithandunderstandalltheJewsintheworldwhocangivemoneytoitbutaren’twillingtocomeandliveherethemselves.”The editors excluded content they recorded in a conversation with some
religiouslydevoutsoldiers,studentsattheMercazHaravyeshivainJerusalem,knownevenbeforethewarforitsnationalismthatincludednostalgiaforthoseareasofPalestineunder Jordaniancontrol.Theyeshiva students seem tohavebeenleftoutnotnecessarilybecause theywerereligiousorbecause theywereinsufficiently humanistic, but primarily because they did not share the uneaseaboutvictoryandoccupationthatplayedsuchacentralroleintheemotionalandpoliticalworldofthekibbutzmembers.Theeditorswereapparentlyconcernedthat the vehement nationalistic messianism the students expressed wouldovershadowthekibbutzniks’ambivalence.*One participant talked about his feelings at seeing the bodies of Egyptian
soldiers.“AndI thinkat thatpoint,when thepricestarted toseemcheap, that
waswhenwe stopped calling out, ‘Look, there are two dead lying here,’ andinsteadwesaid,’Look,therearetwostiffshere.’...Thepricebecamecheap.”Thesewordswereomitted,aswerestatementsaboutthesuperiorqualityofthe“humanmaterial”onthekibbutzim,whosemembersdidnotengageinlooting,unlike the city boys. The editors also left out remarks attributing greaterbrutality and lower ethical standards to the Mizrahim than the kibbutzniks.“Some very negative things are revealed,” one speakerwas quoted as saying,wheninfacthesaid,“Someterriblynegativethingsarerevealed.Whenyouseesoldiers shooting at defenseless civilians . . . elderly people.” The editorsattributedtoanotherkibbutznikthefollowingremark:“Andtherewasakindofunleashing. . .unbelievable,really. ...”Theactualstatementwas,“Unleashingthatreallyborderedoncruelty...Iknowthatonesquadcommander...someguy,aroundforty,puthishandsup—soheshota round intohisstomach. . . .Therewasakindofunleashing. . .grenades inall thehouses. . . justburninghousesfornoreason....”Another statement left out was from a speaker who believed that kibbutz
members were not suitable for carrying out acts of occupation: “Maybe theBorderPatrolisbetter...maybethepolice...maybetheydoitmorequietly.”As a rule, remarks that included the word “expulsion” or “evacuation” wereomitted.Onespeakerwho talkedabout theoccupationofGazawasquotedassaying, “Therewasno law.”Whathe actually saidwas “Wehad to takeverydrasticmeasures . . .blowinguphousesandsearchinghouses. . .andextremethings. . . .Therewasasituationwherehuman lifeplayednorole.Youcouldkill.Therewasnolaw.”Another soldier recalled that he andhis friendswereordered tokill anyone
comingfromtheeasternbankoftheJordanRiver.Thebookeditorsreplaced“tokill”with“topreventthecrossingof.”Thesameorderwasdescribedelsewhere:“Therewasanexplicit,writtenorder...asoftoday,whoevercrossestheJordan—shoot.Doesn’tmatterwhoheis,whatheis,howorwhy.”InSoldiersTalkthesame reference reads, “Therewas an order not to permit anyone to cross theJordanexceptoverthebridges.Iknowthatwecarriedoutthespiritoftheorder,withouthurtingpeople.”Infact,accordingtothissoldier,hiscompanydidnotobeytheordertokill.AmemberofKibbutzYifattoldofawoundedSyriansoldierhisunitfoundon
theroad.Therewasanargumentoverwhethertokillhim.Suddenlyoneofthesoldiers held his rifle to the wounded man’s head and fired, killing him. InSoldiersTalk the same story endswith thewords: “Oneguy suggestedkillinghim.Ofcoursewewouldn’tallowit.”Acommanderquotedinthebookrecalled
hisresponseafterthesoldierskilledanArabfarmer.“Whatmayhaveaddedtothe terrible feelingwas how impressed I was by the soldiers withme on theambush,whoendedupkillingtheman.”Hisactualwordswere“Whatmayhaveaddedtotheterriblefeelingwas,maybe,thatIwasimpressedbythegreatgleeofthesoldiersontheambushwithme,whoendedupkillingthatfellah.”Some of those interviewed spoke of their compulsive desire to see dead
bodies. The editors cut a detailed description of soldiers getting out of theirvehicletophotographcorpses.Thefollowingwordswereomitted:“Ineverhadadesire toseedeath,andhere itwas, thiskindof insatiabledesire.”Onemanaskedhimselfhowhecouldkillpeople“justlikeIkillfliesonascreen”;thesewordswereleftout.Mostoftheintervieweessaidtheyfeltnohatredfortheenemy,thattheysaw
“theArab” ashuman.Theyappeared tobe sincerelypainedwhen they talkedabout hurting civilians. “I think that forme this was a terrible thing,” said ayoungmannamedShai in a conversationwithAmosOz. “Childrenmy son’sagewalkingwiththeirhandsup.Irememberthatelderlypeopleorwomenhadtocomeandbeg.Itwasaterriblefeeling,horrible.”Ozasked,“Ifyouhadbeengiven a direct and personal order to shoot people in a way that seemedcontradictory to thingsyoubelieve in, tohumanism, toyoureducation,wouldyou refuse such an order at any cost?Under any condition?” Shai replied, “Iwouldrefusetheorderatanycostandunderanycondition.”10
The editorswere careful to avoid distancing the speakers from the nationalconsensus—rather, theydid just theopposite,placing themat its forefrontandcenter. The soldiers had wept like everyone else when they heard about thecaptureoftheOldCity.Theencounterwiththe“landoftheBible”filledthemwithasenseofbelongingtotheirpeople.TheyspokeabouttheHolocaust:forthefirsttimetheyhadlearnedtoseeitaspartoftheiridentity.ButsomesoldierslikenedIDFoperationsagainstcivilianstoNaziacts.“IfeltlikeamemberoftheGestapo,” saidone; thiswas leftout.Othersequated themselveswithSSmenfollowingorders.“Everysoldierouttherecreateda’concentrationcamp,’”oneyoung man said. House searches, in the soldiers’ slang, were aktziot, aneologism borrowed from the German word for the Nazi arrests anddeportations.Allthiswasomitted.*SoldiersTalkmetaprofoundneedamongmanyIsraelistobenotonlystrong
andvictorious,butalso just. In letterssentabroad,peopleexpressedhope thatthewarwouldconvincetheArabstomakepeace.“Weareapeoplewhohavesuffered somuch throughout history—why can’t they let us live?”wrote one
manfromTelAviv.12Theywentbacktorecountingfamilynewsintheirletters:celebrations and worries, children, illnesses, work, gossip. But much like thedepressionandanxietyevidentpriortothewar,“thesituation”continuedtobepartoftheirdailyroutine.“Rochellefeelswell,”wroteRivkaCohentohersisterinAmerica; “she’s already eightmonths pregnant and feels heavy.Let’s hopeshegivesbirthsafely.It’sagoodthingthewarisover.Wewereworriedabouthergivingbirth.Nowwejusthopeforpeace.”13
3.DELUSIONS:“ONCEINATHOUSANDYEARS”
Afewmonths after thewar, aparapsychological societybecameactive inTelAviv.Atameetingjustoverayearlater,thesocietyreportedtoits188membersthat it had held no fewer than three hundred lectures, almost one a day. Thesociety’s books and archives document its emergence throughout the country.Membersgavefrequenttalksonkibbutzimandinprivatehomes,andsometimesin public auditoriums, before crowds of up to a thousand people. Studentsthronged to hear them,Knessetmembers and businesspeople took an interest.Thesocietychargedentrancefeesandspeakerhonoraria,generatingsignificantincome.Everyone talked about the special skills of the society’s chairwoman,MargotKlausner:shecouldtalkwiththedead.This cultural heroine,more than anyone else, embodied the great delusions
that tookholdofIsraelis intheaftermathof thewar.Infrequentcoverage, thepressapproachedherwithamixtureofskepticismandastonishment,mockeryand reverence. The society’s archives reveal that she offered Moshe Dayan“information” that reached her from the world of truth, including a warningaboutanewwarthatwouldbreakout,shesaid,inthefallof1969.Dayansentheratleastthreepolitethank-younotes.Klausnerwasinhersixties.ShehadcometoPalestinefromBerlin in1926,
andtheHabimaTheater,whichshemanaged,oweditsexistencelargelytoher.Shewrote severalbooks, includinga fewnovels, and in1933 sheproducedamovie.In1948,shefoundedafilmstudioinHerzliya.Herinterestintheoccultandthesupernatural,whichextendedtodreaminterpretationandreincarnation,prompted curiosity amongnewspaper reporters. In the fall of 1954, twoyearsbeforetheSinaiCampaign,Ha’aretzpublishedinformationKlausnerclaimedtohave received through direct contactwithBenjaminDisraeli. She said he hadtoldher that in thenextwar,BritainandFrancewould support Israel; this,ofcourse,iswhathappened.In January 1968, Klausner was involved in the efforts to find an Israeli
submarine, theDakar, that had disappeared somewhere in theMediterranean.ThewifeofthesubmarinecommanderandthefatherofacrewmembercametoKlausnerandshe“summoned”thesubmarinecrewtoaséance.Shesatwithherguests in a darkened room and proceeded to use a Ouija board to describevarioustechnicalaspectsofthelostsubmarine.Toherlisteners,sheappearedtobecommunicatingwiththevesselitself.Shewaslatercontactedbythefatherofasoldierfromakibbutzwhohadbeenkilledinthewar.Shepromisedtotryandmake contact with the son. She was also able to communicate with a well-known Episcopal bishop from California, James Albert Pike, who had gonewanderingintheJudeanDesertanddiedthere.Afewsenior Israeliarchaeologists, including representatives from the Israel
Museum’santiquitiesdivision,accompaniedKlausnerwhenshewenttosearchfor the treasures of the Second Temple. The official report of the excursionshows clearly that everyone treated the task with the utmost gravity. Theyworkedwithmaps,andonememberofKlausner’ssocietycameequippedwithapendulum hanging from a string. During repeated attempts, the pendulumhoveredoverthemapsandkeptstoppingatthesamepoint,nearthewallsoftheOld City. Everyone set off for Jerusalem, and the pendulum led them to theTempleMount,where it started to twirlwildly.According to the report, “Thevigoroftherotationssurprisedeveryone.”Andthentheyknew:thiswaswherethetreasureswereburied.Theparticipantsconcluded:“OnemustassumethereisasubterraneantunnelleadingfromtheTemple’sfoundationstothewallsandending at the Kotel itself, at the point looking over the steps of Zachariah’sTomb. In this tunnel, specifically in the place where it ends at the wall, thetreasureweseekishidden.”KlausnermadefurtherinquiriesandsuggestedthattheplaceindicatedbythependulumalsoconcealedtheHolyArk.Shewasnotalone inherendeavors:massesof Israelisbecamepassionatelyaddicted to thesupernatural,untilitseemedtheentirecountrywashearingvoices.*
THEPROPOSALBYGENERALSHLOMOGOREN,THECHIEFRABBIOFTHEIDF,TODESTROYtheDomeoftheRockhadnotbeenpublicized,butanideaproposedbyDavidBen-Gurionwaswidelydiscussed.HesuggesteddestroyingtheOldCitywallsso that Jerusalem,modern and ancient, would become one city. This was nomomentaryaberration:Ben-Gurionwroteofthisplaninhisdiaryandrepeateditoften, both publicly and in writing. “The walls have no sanctity and nonecessity,”hewrote,notingthat theyhadbeenbuiltbyanOttomansultan.“Aunitedcityrequiresthedestructionofthewalls.”Inanotherletter,headded,“Inourdays,theIDFisIsrael’swall.”*
MosheDayanopposeddemolishing thewalls, but hedid suggest opening anewgatetosymbolizetheconquestofthecity,tobenamedtheGateofReturn.Eshkoldidnotwantanewgate;itwouldprobablybeknownasDayan’sGate.HisideawastobuildinJerusalemareplicaoftheArchofTitusinRome,whichbearsareliefdepictingRomansoldierswiththeirspoilsofwar,amongthemthemenorahfromtheTemple.EshkolwroteanutterlyseriouslettertoDayanaboutthis.HewasundecidedastowhetherthearchshouldbeerectedinWestorEastJerusalem,orperhapsonahighhilltopoverlookingthecity,buthehadalreadythoughtofthearch’sinscription.IncontrasttoJudeaCapta(“JudeaCaptured”),the phrase engraved on an ancient Roman coin, they would write “JudeaLiberated.”Eshkolwantedtoformaplanningcommittee.“Theprimeministeriscertain that such an archwill fill the hearts of Jews everywherewith joy andpride,”wroteoneofhisaides.“LetusgoandbuildavictoryarchforthesoldiersoftheIDF,”proposedan
organization of Bulgarian immigrants. The Tel Aviv architect Zvi Heckerproposedanarchthirtystorieshigh.HetoldcriticsthattheconstructionoftheEiffel Tower in Paris had also produced heated controversy. A group callingitselftheSocietyinDefenseoftheDignityoftheDepartedofIsraelinitiatedacampaign to locate the remainsofpeoplewhodied in theuprisingagainst theRomans, so that they could be properly buried. The president, the primeminister, and a series of other officials addressed an initiative to addretroactively the name of Chaim Weizmann, the first president, to theDeclarationof Independence.Somepeoplesuggested turningArmonHanatzivintothepresident’sofficialresidence,andTeddyKollekwantedtomovetheUNheadquarters from New York to Jerusalem.16 This swirl of activity wasaccompaniedbyanongoingdebateoverthenameofthewar.Thequestionhadcome up as early as June 11, in a cabinet meeting, at which Minister ofEducationAranhadsuggestedcallingittheIsraeliWarforSurvival.Eshkol’s office was flooded with suggestions: “the Peace Campaign”; “the
WarofHeroism”;“theWarofLife”;“theWarofVictory”;“DefenderofPeace”;“Zion”; “Shai” (from the Hebrew acronym for “Six Days”); “Moshe” (theHebrewacronymfor“WarforStatePeace”);“theJerusalemWar.”TheKnessetchairmanreceivedmanymoreproposals.AmongtheideassenttoMaarivwasthewry“Rabin-HodCampaign.”Thepresshadbegunreferringto“theSix-DayWar” as soon as the fighting ended, and in late July, Eshkol informed theMinistryofDefensethatthiswashischoice.*Therewassomethingbusinesslikeaboutthename,statisticalalmost,andyetitalsoevokedthesixdaysofcreation,inthespiritofthemessianiceuphoriathathadspreadthroughthecountry.Inher
articleonArielSharon,GeulaCohenwrote,“AnationthathassuchArikscannotonlysleepsafelyatnight,freeoffearofenemies,butcanachievewondersandvictories—suchasinthewarofthesixdaysofcreation.”17
Everyone had an opinion about symbols. Some suggested changing thenational anthem. Instead of the lyrics “Our hope is not yet lost,” onewomanoffered“Ourhopehascometobe.”Othersthought“Hatikva”shouldsimplybereplacedby“JerusalemofGold.”18
Shortlyafterthewar,arumorwentaroundthatNaomiShemerhadborrowedthemelodyfor“JerusalemofGold”fromaBasquelullaby.“Iwasveryangry,”wroteShemer,anddemandedthatpeople“stopthisnonsense.”Butafewdaysbefore her death, in June 2004, she revealed the truth. In themid-sixties, sherecalled, she used to spend time with Nehama Handel, a singer for whomShemerwrotemanysongs.Theywould laugh,sing,cook,andeat together.“Imade her couscous and soup,” Shemerwrote in a letter to a friend. “Nothingwas ever written down or recorded; I don’t think I had a tape recorder backthen,”shestressed.“Isupposethatduringoneofthosemeetings,NehamasangthatBasquelullabyforme,anditwentinoneearandouttheother.WhenIwaswriting ’Jerusalem of Gold,’ the song must have come to me without myrealizingit.”Butan“invisiblehand”guidedhertomakechangestotheoriginal,although she was not conscious of this either, she said. “The transition to amajorkeyinthefourthbar,thirdsequence...andtheending.Itturnsoutthatsomeone seemed to be protecting me and providing me with my eight bars,whichgivemetherightstomyownversionofthesong.Butallthiswasdone,asIsaid,unwittingly.”AlthoughatthetimeShemerdeniedtheclaimthatshehadnotcomposedthe
music,sheknewthetruth:“IrecalledwithafrightthatNehamahadindeedsungsomething like that to me, at the time. I was so panicked that I could onlyrememberthefirstnote.”Twodecadeswentby,andthenareporterfromYediotAharonotbroughthertheoriginalBasquesong.ButShemeronceagaindeniedany familiaritywith it. “Iconsider thewholebusiness a regrettableworkplaceaccident,soregrettablethatperhapsitiswhyIbecameill,’sheconfessedshortlybeforeherdeath.“ItellmyselfthatperhapsitwasaMarranotune,sothatIwassimplyrestoringitwhereitbelonged.”19
THE GIDDINESS RELEASED BY VICTORYWAS ALSO EVIDENT AMONG CERTAIN POLICYmakers. Yigal Allon continued to promote the idea of independence for the150,000Druze living in the south ofSyria. In a confidentialmemorandum to
Eshkol, Allon explained that there was generally tension between the Druzeleaders and Damascus, and so the Druze might revolt to establish their ownsovereign state. “A condition for this, of course, is that they receive politicalguidanceandmilitaryassistancefromanexternalactor,”Alloncontinued,andsuggested that Israel take this role. “They are known as good fighters,” hepointedout,andaddedthatIsraeliDruze,particularlythosewhohadservedinthe IDF, might also constitute an important factor in the project, as would“Jewishofficers and agents.”ADruze statewouldbe a buffer betweenSyria,Jordan,andIsrael.Jordanwouldnotobject.AmutualdefensepactbetweentheDruze state and Israel would assure Israel’s permanent hold on the Golan.Moreover, a successful Druze uprising could bring about the collapse of theSyrian regime, which would limit the scope of Soviet involvement. Allontherefore suggestedsettingupa special staff, comprising theShabak, the IDF,and theMinistry of ForeignAffairs, to plan and implement the idea.He alsosuggestedestablishingaministerialcommitteemadeupofEshkol,Eban,Dayan,Begin, and himself. Eshkol replied that the matter was “being explored andhandled.”IsserHarel,theformerheadoftheMossadandanadvisertoEshkol,wanted
to head an operation that would result in the assassination of Nasser. DavidHorowitz,thegovernoroftheBankofIsrael,suggestedthatIsraelbuytheSinaiPeninsula from Egypt. He raised the idea inWashington, D.C., whereupon aBritish diplomat commented that no doubt Horowitz had the Louisiana andAlaska purchases “fresh in hismind” when he arrived in the United States.*Meanwhile,theBankofIsraelwasissuingoccupationcurrency.
•••THIS WAS A PECULIAR UNDERTAKING, TYPICAL OF THE GROTESQUE NATURE OF THEemerging occupation apparatus: improvised, rushed, secretive, wasteful,grounded in government decisions and an endless series of injunctions,ordinances, and regulations. The subject of an occupation currency was firstdebatedasearlyasthethirddayofthewar.ThegovernoroftheBankofIsraeldiscussed the matter with the acting minister of finance, Ze’ev Sherf. Thecurrencywas intended to ensure control of the economy in the territories andpreventthemfrombeingfloodedwithEgyptian,Jordanian,andSyriancurrency;itwasalsoprobablymeant toemphasize thedifferencebetweenIsraeland theterritories.Two graphic artists from Tel Aviv, Gad Rothschild and Zev Lipman,
submittedthefirstsamplesdaysafterthewar.ByJune23,theyhadproduceda
revisedproposal.Theytriedtostayascloseaspossibletotheexistingcurrency,butwerecarefulnot toviolateEgyptian,Jordanian,andSyriancopyright.Thepalm tree the artists incorporated, they explained, appeared repeatedly in theKoran as a symbol of prosperity. The currency was intended to please thepopulation, and so it was also illustratedwith camels, ornamental arches thatsuggestedapalacefromtheArabianNights,andotherOrientalmotifs,aswellasanimageofDavid’sTowerinJerusalem.Thereweredifferent-sizedbills,andthe bank also beganminting coins. The bills bore thewords “IDFCommandForces” in Hebrew, Arabic, and English, and they were signed by thecommanding officers of the Sinai, theWest Bank, and the Golan. A veteranworkerattheBankofIsrael,DovGnichovski,latertalkedaboutthemassesoflegal opinions and injunctions produced in preparation for the currency issue,oneofwhichwas“aslongasabook.”OnJuly21,aministerialcommitteeoneconomic affairs decided to print twomillion “Jordanian dinars,” onemillion“Egyptianpounds,” and100,000“Syrianpounds.” Itwas a large commission,and the government printer in Jerusalem could not fill it in time. ThegovernmentrushedurgentorderstoprintersinHollandandBelgium,andflewthebillstoIsraelwithgreatsecrecy.Nooneneededthismoney,andnoonewantedit.Thehundredsofthousands
ofIsraelisfloodingthemarketsintheterritoriesbroughttheirowncurrencywiththem. The Bank of Israel and the Treasury reconsidered and ultimatelyconcluded that “occupation currency” carried unwelcome associations andmight bemisinterpreted in the international press: someonemight even thinkIsraelhadplannedtheoccupationinadvance.Andsothemillionsofbillswereput away in a basement and the questions ofwhat to dowith them andwhowould cover the printing costs remained. Someone suggested paying for theproduction expensesby selling a limitedquantity to collectors.Bankof Israelofficials went to ask the German-born state comptroller, Dr. Yitzhak ErnstNebenzahl, an Orthodox and honest man. He decreed it would not benefit acountrylikeIsraeltomakeanyprofitableuseoftheoccupationbills.Andsotheheadofthebankinstructedthatthebillsnotbedistributedinanyway,noteventobedisplayedinthebank’smuseum.*OnOctober15 a truck left thegovernmentprinter in Jerusalemwith thirty-
three sacks full of the occupation currency. They were taken to a plantsomewhere on Israel’s coastal plain, where the bills were shredded. Themillwas unable to destroy them all, however, so most lay forgotten in the bankbasementuntilsomeonedecidedtogetridofthem,manyyearslater.Inathickfile documenting the affair, there is a letter fromGadRothschild, the graphic
artist, asking whether the bank would be kind enough to give him and hispartner, Lipman, two or three samples of their design work. “To design anoccupationcurrencybill—that’ssomethingagraphicartistgetstodoonceinathousandyears,”heexplained. In themarginof the letter, someonewrote thatDr.Nebenzahlwouldhavetobeaskedaboutthematter.21
CHAPTER18THEENLIGHTENEDOCCUPATION
1.GUIDELINES:“THEMASCULINITYOFTHEARAB”
NotfarfromJerichowasamodelfarmusedtoteachagronomytothechildrenof Palestinian refugees from 1948. Musa Alami, the founder, had been aprominentfigureinPalestine.Inthe1930s,hehadmetwithDavidBen-Gurionseveral times to discuss the future of Jewish-Arab relations. Ben-Gurion’saccountoftheirconversationswaspublishedafewmonthsbeforetheSix-DayWar.Whenthewarbrokeout,theelderlyAlamiwasinLondon.Ben-Gurion,inbothphonecallsandtelegrams,urgedhimtoreturn:“ThereisauniquechancetoconcludepeacebetweenIsraelandherneighbors;yourpresencenowisvital.”TeddyKollek thought Ben-Gurion had erred in his judgment, explaining thatAlamicouldnotcomehomebypersonalinvitationwhilethousandsofrefugeeswere prevented from returning. To make things worse, the invitation waspublishedinthepress.*KollekhimselfeventuallymetwithAlamiandproposedthat he return to become the leader of the Palestinians. Alami was notenthusiastic,butheaskedKollek tohelpprotect the farm.Kollekpromised tousehisconnectionstodoso.1
ThedesiretoprovetoPalestinianArabsthatIsraelisweredecentandpeace-lovingwasanchoredinthefoundationsofZionist ideology:fromthedaytheybegansettlinginPalestine,Zionistshadinsistedtheywerebringingsuccessandprosperity to all the land’s inhabitants. Following the Six-Day War, IsraelisidentifiedtheoccupationasanotheropportunitytoprovetheirgoodintentionstotheArabs,totheworldatlarge,and,aboveall,tothemselves.Theysoonbegantorefertothe“enlightenedoccupation.”TheeagernessdemonstratedbyTeddyKollekinattemptingtowinMusaAlami’scooperationalsomarkedtheeffortsofaKnessetmember,FrijaZuaretz,tohelparesidentofthevillageofSebastia,nearNablus.AfewweeksaftertheIDFoccupiedSebastia,KnessetchairmanKadishLuz
received a letter in Arabic. The letter was translated and typed for him: “I,Muhammad AbdullahMukhaimer, from the village of Sebastia, ask for yourhelpingettingtreatmentatHadassahHospitalinJerusalem.”Themanhadbeenillforsomefouryearsandhadfoundnoonewhocouldcurehim,andsohewasaskingfortheKnessetchairman’shelp.Hewaswillingtobearalltheexpenses,
he wrote. “I own ten dunams of land planted with trees and I amwilling totransfer their title to the State of Israel after I leave the hospital. I thank thegovernmentofIsraelforitshelptopoorpeoplelikemeandIhopethatyouwillrespondtomyrequestsoon.”The request necessitated further inquiries. Luz, a seventy-two-year-old
originally fromRussia, handed thematter over to Zuaretz.A native of LibyawhohadcometoIsraelonlyin1949,ZuaretzhadbeenelectedtotheKnessetasaMafdaldelegatewhilestilllivinginatransitcamp,wherehewastheprincipalofanelementaryschool.Hehadwrittenafewbooks,includingoneonJewishwomeninLibya.ZuaretzchairedtheKnesset’sPublicPetitionsCommittee,andthe Palestinian from Sebastia was now considered a member of the publicentitledtoassistance.“Perhapsyoumightbeabletorespondtothisman’srequest,andthiswillalso
sanctify the name of Israel,” wrote Zuaretz to the director general of theMinistryofHealth.ThesecretaryofthePublicPetitionsCommitteesentapoliteletter to Mukhaimer, in Hebrew, informing him that his request had beentransferred to the Ministry of Health. The director general of the ministryrespondedninedays later thathe“wouldbehappy” tohandle the request,butasked for a medical opinion from Mukhaimer’s attending physician. ThecommitteeforwardedhislettertoMukhaimer.Twomonths later,Mukhaimerwrote to theKnessetchairmanagain,andhis
letterwasonceagaintranslated.HeexplainedthathehadalreadywrittentothechairmanandaskedtobeadmittedtoanIsraelihospital.Hehadnoonetohelphim:histwosonsworkedinKuwaitandhehadnotreceivedapennyfromthemsince the beginning of the Israeli occupation, because there was no postalservice between Sebastia and Kuwait. He asked that they treat him with theutmostmercy and transfer him to an Israeli state hospital, or at least pay hissubsistenceexpensessothathecouldeatanddrink.Finally,hewishedtothanktheStateofIsraelforitscompassiontowardthedisabled.Summerandfallcameandwent.Thecommitteesecretaryattemptedtoclarify
the situation to the honorableMr.Mukhaimer: he hadwritten explaining thatMr.Mukhaimermustsendamedicalopinion,buttheletterhadbeenreturnedtotheKnessetby thepostoffice,becauseapparently theaddress inSebastiawasnotaccurate.HewasthereforesendingMr.Mukhaimeracopyofthatpreviousletter.TheMukhaimer filegrew thickerand thicker, and inmid-Decembera letter
arrived from the manager of the Jerusalem post office to Knesset member
Zuaretz,promisingthathisletterhadbeendeliveredtoitsintendedrecipientandthat he, the manager, regretted that the first letter had not reached Mr.MukhaimerinthevillageofSebastia.Mr.Mukhaimerwasatirelessman.Inanotherlettertotheministerofhealth,
heexplainedthathehadbeenillforseveralyears,andthathehadaskedforthemedical opinion, but the doctor who came to the village once a week, Dr.MuhammadKilani,demandedthathepayonedinar,andMr.Mukhaimercouldnotpayevenapenny.AndsohewasaskingthehealthministerandtheprimeministertotreathimwithsympathyandmercyandtosendhimtoahospitalinIsrael.Again,hewaswillingtobearallthecosts.The minister of health passed this letter to Knesset member Zuaretz, who
recounted the saga in a letter to Haim Israeli, the omnipotent director of theofficeoftheministerofdefense,apositionhehadoccupiedsincebackinBen-Gurion’s days. The question, wrote Zuaretz, was whether there was anyobjectiontothemanbeingtreatedinanIsraelihospital.“Wearewillingtohelpif you respond positively.” TheMinistry of Defense did not try to evade itsresponsibility. Israeli repliedwithin sixdays thatordershadbeengiven to themilitarygovernmentintheWestBanktoarrangeforamedicalopinion—atitsownexpense,ifnecessary—sothatMuhammadAbdullahMukhaimercouldbehospitalized. But Israeli also requested clarification: “Who will bear theexpenses?Isyourwillingnessto’helptheman’tobeinterpretedasanabilitytocoverthehospitalizationexpenses?”At thispoint therewasnothing in the fileabout theapplicant’sbackground,
noraboutthenatureofhisillness.AllthatwasknowntothekindIsraeliswhoso eagerly came to his aid was that he was a Palestinian now under theirresponsibility, and that he was asking for help. The secretary of the PublicPetitionsCommitteecalledaround;thenhecalledaroundsomemore;andafterafewdaysKnessetmemberZuaretzwasabletoreporttothedirectorgeneraloftheofficeoftheministerofdefensethat,accordingtoanassistantofDr.Mani’s,from themilitary government in Jerusalem, hospitalization “will obviously bearrangedattheexpenseoftheMinistryofHealth.”Summer came again, almost a year had passed since the war. Muhammad
AbdullahMukhaimerwroteagaintotheKnessetchairman,introducinghimselfasanoldacquaintance.HeexplainedthathecouldnottraveltoNablustoseeadoctorbecausetheleftsideofhisbodywasparalyzed.Herewasafirsthintatthenatureofhisillness.Hedidnothaveanymoneyforataxi.Therewasnoonetotakecareofhimandnoonetosupporthim.Hewasaskingforhospitalization
in Israel because in his country there were no experienced Arab doctors. Heneededhelpbefore his life came to an end, andhewaswilling to pay all theexpenses.OnJune11,1968,thefirstanniversaryoftheendofthewar,Knessetmember
ZuaretzhimselfwrotealettertothehonorableMr.Mukhaimer.Theofficeoftheminister of defense hadmade such and such promises, he explained, and themilitarygovernmenthadmadesuchandsuchassurances,andhe,thechairmanof the Public Petitions Committee in the Knesset of Israel, wished Mr.Mukhaimerthebestofluck.Zuaretz’sletterwaswritteninArabic.Moreandmorelettersandtelegramspiledupinthefile,includingamedical
opinion,which found thatMr.Mukhaimerhadbeenparalyzedonhis left sidefor seven years and that both limbs were atrophied, but he did not requirehospitalization. An identical opinion was given by Dr. A. Mani, the medicalstaff officer—the representative of the Ministry of Health in the militarygovernment.2
THEFOUNDATIONOFMARTIALLAWINTHETERRITORIESHADBEENLAIDYEARSBEFOREthe war. In December 1963, Chief of Staff Zvi Zur had appointed GeneralChaimHerzog asmilitary governor of theWestBank in the event that Israeloccupiedthearea.Thearmyissuedseveralhandbooksforfuturegovernors,containingawealth
ofinformationaboutthelegalbasisandtheorganizationalstructureofamilitarygovernment,aswellasaseriesofguidelinesforhandlingcivilianpopulations.Theassumptionhadbeen thatmostof the residentswouldneither fleenorbedeported. The governors were to treat them according to the GenevaConventions,whichwas also provided in aHebrew translation.According toShlomoGazit, thecoordinatorofoperations in the territories, thearchitectsofthemilitarygovernmentderivedsomeassistance fromabookbyGerhardvonGlahn,anAmericanexpertoninternationallaw,butasignificantportionoftheinstructions were rooted in the British Mandate. The future governors alsolearned from the brief Gaza occupation after the Sinai Campaign. ManymembersofthemilitarygovernmentstaffintheterritorieshadpreviouslybeenpartofthemartiallawapparatusthathadoverseentheArabcitizensofIsrael.3
The military government was ready to begin operations even before thefightingwasover,withthepublicationofproclamationsandordinancesthatitspeoplebroughtwith them to theOccupiedTerritories.OrderNo.1declaredacurfew,whichwasaimedatpreventingresistance,sabotage,andlooting,andit
also empowered themilitarygovernment to implement its initial organization.Thegovernors’handbookdefinedtheirpreliminaryassignments,mostlyrelatedtosecurity, thecollectionofweapons, theclearingof landmines, thearrestofhostilepersonsonthebasisofliststhearmyhadprepared,andtheburialofthedead.Thegovernorwastobeginoperatingintelligenceunitsthatwouldgatherinformationabout thearea, includingits topography,roadsandstreets,squaresandparks,postofficesandindustrialplants,schools,holyplacesandmosques,museums and libraries, printing houses, cemeteries, and, at least according toonehandbook,brothels.TheworkingassumptionwasthattheIDFwouldremainintheterritoriesfora
prolongedperiod.Themilitarygovernment’spurposewastorestorecivilianlifeto normal as quickly as possible. The handbooks for enlightened occupationexpectedthegovernorstodisplayadministrativeskills,politicalinstincts,andanunderstandingof Israeli foreignpolicyconsiderations.Thegovernorwas tobeeconomist,educator,legislator,andjudge.Themilitarygovernmentwasinstructedtocreateaportraitofthepopulation’s
character. The handbooks gave basic information: The Arab population isaccustomedtohoardingfoodsuppliesandwillbeabletowithstandafewdaysof full curfew if security needsnecessitate it.Thegovernormust identify keyfigures in every area and make an effort to immediately locate potentialcollaborators.Accordingly,hemustenlistthemayorandthelocalauthorities.*Commanderswereinstructedtopreventactsoflawlessnessandcrueltytowardthe localpopulation,and topunish soldierswhoengaged in looting. “Soldiersmustabsolutelyavoidcontactwithlocalwomen,duetothedangerofsexuallytransmitteddiseases,whichareextremelycommonintheenemycountries.”Inan effort to prevent unnecessary bloodshed, the guidebooks explained that“carrying arms is one proof of an Arab man’s masculinity and a means ofelevatinghisstatus.”Withinasshortatimeaspossibleafteroccupyingatown,itwasadvisableto
conductademonstrationofarmor,artillery,andaircraft, thehandbooksstated.These forceswere topass through thecenterof townseveral times,makingaloud noise as they came from different directions. “Such a display of powershould have a significant effect on the inhabitants.” There were also to bepatrols,searches,andblockades.Someoftheseweredescribedinthehandbooksin great detail. “During the search one must constantly observe the people’sresponses; thesewilloften serveasa reliableguide for those searching.”Andfurther, “Walls and floors are often hiding places. Therefore, searchers mustknockoneverywallandfloorandlistentothesound.Adullechoindicatesthe
possibility of a hiding place.” Each group was to include one soldier “withexperience in conducting searches,” the handbooks said, although it did notindicate where soldiers were to acquire this experience. Either way, soldiersweretobringtheirpersonalweaponsandbeequippedwithhandgrenades,axes,ironrods,andflashlights.Whenapartywascarryingoutanightsearch,vehicleheadlightsshouldbeusedtoilluminatethesurroundingarea.Allthisandmuchmorewasbasicadviceforthebeginningoccupier.Members of themilitary governmentwere cautioned against displaying “an
unnecessarily hostile attitude.” A governor’s success in local politics could“reduce alienation and suspicion toward the occupying country and set thebackgroundfornormalrelations.”Governorsweretomakesurelocalauthoritiesrepresented “moderate factors among the public,” and that the drivingconsiderationfortheiroperationswastobethewelfareofthepopulation,whileaccepting IDF authority. Itmight be possible to replacemembers of the localcouncils. All action must be taken with extreme prudence and after carefulconsideration. “Hasty appointments may disrupt the authority of localinstitutions.”The governorwas tomake an effort from the very beginning totake control of the population registry, and perhaps conduct a new census.Before allowing schools to open, the governor must “closely examine thecurriculum and the textbooks” and, if necessary, prepare alternative texts on“sensitive topics,” as well as “train a staff of supervisors proficient in thelanguage and culture of the occupied territory.” The governor was alsoresponsible for disseminating appropriate propaganda. He was instructed to“explain” to the population the shortcomings of the previous regime andconvincethemthattherewasnochanceofdefeatingtheIDF.The governor would oversee the economy and was to “continue collecting
taxes and conductingother fiscal andmonetary activities.”Hemust “plan theadaptationof theagriculturaleconomyto thenewmarketconditions,”overseeindustry,andensurearegularsupplyofconsumergoods“atreasonableprices.”Thegovernormustinitiatepublicworksinordertoreduceunemployment.Thisapproachwasmoredesirable thanhandingoutwelfare,andwouldalsobe“animportant tool in calming tempers and reducing incitement.” The extent of agovernor’ssuccessintherealmofsocialwelfare,includingthecontinuationofinternationalwelfareorganizations’activities,wouldinfluencethepopulation’sattitude toward him. Themilitary had a strong interest inmaintaining propersanitation and preventing the outbreak of epidemics. When necessary, thegovernorshouldensurethevaccinationofresidents.Thegovernorwouldbeinchargeofoperatingreligiousservicesandensuring
access to holy sites and mosques. He would have to make arrangements toguarantee“controlledaccess,includingtoJewishholysites.”Hewouldneedtoensure postal and communication services, including phone service, “whileimplementingmeticulouscensorship.”Thegovernorwouldnaturallycomeintocontact with citizens of foreign countries: UN workers, the staff of welfareorganizations,clergymen,diplomats,foreignjournalists.Hemustrememberthat“thereisapoliticalinterest”inhavingsuchpeopleconveyapositiveimpressionofIDFoperationstotheircountriesandtopublicopinion.Thiswas“awisepolicy”ofrewardsandpunishments,avoidingmilitaryforce
whenever possible while always ensuring consideration of “the humaneprinciples accepted amongcivilizednations,” theguidebooks asserted.And insummary, “themilitary governormust learn to find the goldenmean betweensecurityandpoliticalneeds,andtheneedtorestorecivilianlifetonormality,intheeventthatthereisaconflictbetweenthetwo.”Therestorationofthelegalsystemwassaidtobe“notoneoftheinitialessentialmattersthattheIDFwillhandle.” Courts were allowed to operate, but the governor was permitted torevokeexistinglawsandenactothers.4
THEFIRSTGOVERNOROFHEBRON,ZVIOFER,REMEMBEREDTHATATSOMEPOINTINHISstudiesattheCommandandStaffSchooltherewassometalkaboutoccupation,but it was negligible. “It is true that there was a brief chapter on militarygovernment,”hesaid,“butwhenthatchapterwasbeingdiscussed,thatseemedtherighttimetorunerrandsandsoon,becausewedidn’tviewitasimportant.Itwas a bit of a fantasy: why would we suddenly be governing towns orterritories?”ButOferalsodescribedhisprinciplesofoccupationasareflectionofhisbasicdecencyasanIsraeli,anditwasimportantforhimtoknowthattheresidents respected him for this. “One of the things that impressed the localpeoplehappenedwhena three-year-oldgirlwas injured,”he recollected. “Myoperationscommander...wenttovisitherandevenbroughthersomecandy.Thatreallyimpressedthem,andtheechoesthatcamebacktousafterthatwerevery positive and showed us, in fact, in our true colors.” It was important toremember,Ofercontinued,thatthisoccurredafterthelocalpopulationhadbeenfed all sorts of stories for twentyyears, about “howwe’d rape themandhowwe’dmurderthemandhowwe’dstealfromthem.”Ofer saw himself representing a society thatwasmore fair than Palestinian
society, andhewanted to imposehisvalueson the latter.Whenhedemandedthat hospital doctorsmake house calls to civilians during curfew, hewas toldthatamongPalestiniansitwascustomaryforthepatienttocometothehospital
orclinictoseethedoctor,asamatterofrespect.“ForanArabdoctortogotosomeArabhouseinthekasbah,tovisitapatient?That’sbeneathhim!Itwouldbemoreconvenientforthedoctorifthepatientdied,ratherthanlowerhimselftogoamongthepeopleandexaminethepatient,”saidOfer.Heneededsomeoneto help keep records on any infectious diseases in town, as instructed in theoccupier’shandbook.Heaskedadoctorwhorefusedtomakehousecallswherehehadstudied:England.Oferaskedwhathisspecialtywas: internalmedicineand heart disease. “Is your diploma from a good school?” he asked, and thedoctorsaiditwas.Oferthentoldhim,“Fromnowonyourdiplomawillbegoodforwashingdishesandcleaningoutsewage.”Thegovernorremindedthedoctorthathehadswornanoathtohelpanyonewhoneededit,nomatterwhoorwhathewas.“’Soeitheryoustartmakinghousecallsand reporting tome,oryourdiploma will be good for cleaning out latrines,’” he decreed. “And then thedoctors started rushing around the houses and the neighborhoods, visiting themukhtars, to get reports on the health situation. Before that, they didn’t eventhinktheyneededtodoit.”5*ShlomoGazitrecountedeventsdescribedbythegovernorofJenin,areservist
namedAmnonBronstein.Becauseofthewar,thevillagersinJeninwerecutofffromtheJordaniansideoftheriverandwouldnotbeabletoharvesttheircropsintimeusingtheirtraditionalmethods.AndsoBronsteinenlistedfivecombinesfromJewish farms in the JezreelValley to replace the tractors thatused tobebroughtinfromtheJordanianEastBank.Gazitquotedoneofthetractordriverswhotookpartinthisproject:“Iwasoneoftheoccupiers.Wearenotcapableofbeingoccupiers.OnlyamonthagoIriskedmylifehereandnowI’mcomingtohelpthemharvesttheircrops.”In the first few months of the occupation, Israelis wrote to friends and
relativesabroadaboutvisitstotheterritories,mainlytheWestBank,wheretheycould drive for hours without seeing any military personnel or vehicles. Themilitarygovernmentemergedfromsuchdescriptionsasaninvisibleforce.ThiswastheessenceofthepolicyShlomoGazitcreditedtoMosheDayan:Israelwasnot imposing itself on the Arab population, but rather granting it maximalfreedomtoconductitslife,includingopencommunicationwiththeArabworldandfreedomofthepress.6LikesomeothersensibleideasthatDayanespoused,thisoneremainedonpaper.
2.INITIATIVES:“WEFELTLUCKY”
ChaimHerzogclaimedthathespenttheyearspriortothewarpreparinghimself
adequatelyforhisduties.“WestudiedJordanianeventsindepth.ImadesurewereceivedthedailynewspapersfromJordan.ThebasicideawastokeeptheteammembersuptospeedonlifeinJordan.”Beforethewar,hisbrother,thedirectorgeneral of the prime minister’s office, who dealt extensively with relationsbetweenIsraelandtheChristianworld,cautionedhimagainstbombingtheOldCity. Chaim Herzog reassured him: he had a detailed map indicating all theChristianholysites.7
Buttheearlystagesoftheoccupationwereextremelydisorganized.“Itwouldbedifficulttoexaggeratewhendescribingthechaos,”wroteaveteranmemberof the military government. A colleague added, “Everyone was wanderingaroundinadream.”HerzogsetuphisheadquartersintheAmbassadorHotel,inEastJerusalem,whileUziNarkiswasstillbasedinBinyaneiHauma,theWestJerusalem convention center. Hundreds of reserve officers—some volunteers,some called up for active duty—scurried between the two. They carriedhandgunsanddidalotoftalking,butnoneofthemknewwhattheyweredoing.They blamed the confusion on Chaim Herzog, whom they perceived as aBritish-stylegovernorwhostoodonceremony.Itdidn’ttakelongforDayantoget rid of him. Herzog was replaced by three long-standing members of theNationalDefenseCollege:UziNarkis,RafaelVardi,andShlomoGazit.8
Themilitary and civilian presence in the territories rapidlymutated into anendless labyrinth of headquarters, commands, branches, departments, units,wings, bureaus, authorities, administrations, and outposts—a giant warren ofcountless officers, soldiers, and civil servants. Their work consisted almostentirelyof inventingmoreandmorereasons to interfere in theresidents’dailylives, which they accomplished by means of laws and regulations andordinances and injunctions that, like some of the bureaucratic whimsies thatruledIsraelicitizens,reflectednoclearpolicyoracalculatedstrategybutrather,above all, arbitrariness. The mountains of paperwork this system produceddocument innumerable duplications, conflicts of interest, and confrontationsbetween egos, both personal and institutional, not only between the securitysystem and the government offices, but also among various military sectors,betweenthemilitaryandothersecurityarms,suchastheShabakandthepolice,withinthosesectorsthemselves,andamonggovernmentministries.Theseparatemilitary government systems for Sinai, Gaza, theWest Bank, and the GolanHeightscreatedevenfurtherduplication.The organizational chart of the military government staff at the Central
Commandheadquartersincluded,inJuly1967,sixgroupsofjobholdersanda
totalofsixty-onegovernmentmechanismsandpositions,includingstaffofficeroftourism,staffofficerofarchaeology,andstaffofficerforinsurance.Aboardofdirectorsgeneralofgovernmentministries,setuptohandlecivilianmatters,comprised thirty-onemembers, including the director general of the office ofYosefSapir,aministerwithoutportfolio.Thisboardwasoneofamultitudeofnew committees, including one comprising Hebrew University professors, aswell as a variety of teams charged with conceptualizing, planning,implementing, and monitoring.9 The civil servants did their best to keepthemselvesbusy.TheMinistry of Religious Affairs representative prepared a detailed list of
dozens of Jewish holy sites, including some graves that required historicalglosses because few people had ever heard of their occupants. Atniel BenKenaz, for example, was the son-in-law of Caleb Ben Yefuneh, one of thetwelve scouts sent into Canaan ahead of the children of Israel. When heconqueredKiryat Sefer,Caleb gave himhis daughter,Achsa, as hiswife.Allthiswasexplainedinthereport.Theministry’sofficialsalsolocatedthetombsofRuth theMoabiteandYishai, the fatherofKingDavid,aswell as thoseofNathantheProphetandGadtheSeer,fromtheBookofSamuel.Andthereweremanymoreyettobefound,notedonemilitarygovernmentmemberinhisdiary.TheMinistryofTourism representativewasasked toput together a restaurantguidefortheWestBank.10
The need for government officials clearly arose because the military alonecouldnotfillthevoidleftbytheJordaniangovernment.Noneoftheofficershadbeen trained in pest control or knewhow to calculate the requisite amount ofmilkforinfants.Butthemassesofcivilservantswhopouredintotheterritoriesdid not come simply because the military government needed them. Eachgovernmentministrywaseagertograbapieceof themassivebountythathadfallen into Israel’s hands. Theminister of religious affairs protested toDayanabouthisinterferenceinmattersinvolvingtheTombofthePatriarchs,anissuethat shouldhavebeenwithin theministry’spurview.Dayan repliedcurtly thatresponsibilityforthecavelaywiththemilitaryrabbinate.Hesuggestedthatinthe future, instead of protesting and airing his grievances in the press, theminister should speak to him directly, and then he might learn that he waswrong.Countlessotherquarrelsbrokeoutamongcivilianentitiescalledupontohandletheterritories.11
As they expanded the scope of their activities, the ministries also grew inimportanceandenlargedtheirbudgets.Clerksbrought to theterritoriesaburst
ofenergyandavisionarysenseofadventure—theZionistenterpriselivedagain,andsafefromthewatchfuleyesofthestatecomptroller.*ShlomoGazit complainedabouthowdifficult itwas to findgoodpeople to
agreetoleavetheirpositionsingovernmentofficesandworkintheterritories.Manyofthosewhocamewerenotamongthemostcompetent,andtheyhadtobe lured with power, salaries, and titles that they would probably not haveattainedon the civilian track.Moreover, it becamedifficult toget ridof thembecausetheyrefusedtotakeastepbackward.SomewantedtofillpositionsintheterritoriesbecausetheyperceivedanopportunitytotakeadvantageoftheirknowledgeofArabicandgetahead.13
The involvement of the military and civil service in people’s daily livesbecame evermore entrenched. “Military commanders need to be deployed sothatfactoriesproducingsoap,cigarettes,andarakcangetbacktowork,”wroteMajorMosheGoldenberg,theadministrationofficerofthemilitarygovernmentstaff atCentralCommand headquarters. The representative of theMinistry ofCommerce and Trade in the Golan Heights was tasked with compiling aconsumer price list that would be posted in every shop and to whichshopkeepers and customers would have to adhere. The Ministry of FinancerepresentativeintheGolanreporteddifficultiescollectingincometax.“WehavenotyetbeenabletofindtheSyrianlaw,”hewrote,“andsoithasbeendecidedto invite a fewArabic-speaking Israeliworkers to sort through the heaps andheapsofdisorganizedinformation.”TensofthousandsofGolanresidentshadlosttheirhomes,yetCaptainMihal
Cohen, from the Northern Command headquarters, found time to send theminister of defense a detailed report on an investigation into complaints fromtheDruze village ofBukata:HassanYusufAbu Shahin’smuleswere grazingunsupervisednearthecease-fireline,andtheymighthavecrossedintoSyria.AcomplaintlodgedbyAliMukhassanTarabiaaboutthelossofamulewasalsounderinvestigation,aswashisclaimthatthemulehadbeenseenwitharesidentofTiberias.A flatbedbelonging toToufikHassanAma’ahhadbeen foundonone of the kibbutzim.Themissing horses of twoother residentswere locatedafter an extensive search and returned to their owners.* The militarygovernment regulated telegrams sent toWestBank residents and arranged forschoolbusesintheGolan.ThelifeguardsontheGazabeacheshadtocometoTel Aviv to appear before aMinistry of Labor committee. If they passed theIsraelilifeguardtests,theyweregivencertificates.14
Many former Jordanian government employeeswent towork for the Israeli
military government, which had to determine their terms of employment andestablishapayscaletocalculatewagesforguards,messengers,cleaners,cooks,laundresses, gardeners, electricians, sanitation workers, midwives, and socialworkers.They reviewed the systemofmeasurements andweights, removed afew traffic islands that were slowing down traffic in Al Arish, and replacedlicenseplates.TheypermittedthedistributionofsixHebrewbooksintheWestBank, aswell asHa’aretz.Ameeting of district physicians in theWestBankdiscussedaplantoadministerpoliovaccines.*Thethirty-onedelegatestotheBoardofDirectorsGeneraldiscussedsesame
andlegumecrops.Havingconsideredthemattercarefully,theyconcluded,“Tocreate an incentive for farmers in the territories to plant more sesame andlegumes, reducing foreign imports, we have resolved to allow freer trade oftheseproductsbetweentheterritoriesandIsrael,inbothdirections.Thecustomsrate on imported sesame and chickpeas will be determined by the relevantoffice.”Onefilecontainsadocumentthatbegins:“IsraelDefenseForcesIDFForces
CommandintheWestBankRegionTobaccoLawNo.32for1952OrderNo.31(10)BythepowersvestedinmebytheordinanceconcerningappointmentsaspertheLawsofCustomsandExcise(WestBankRegion)(No.31),5727-1967,andArticle 40 of theTobaccoLawNo. 32 for 1952 (herein below), I herebyorder . . .”What followedwere twenty-two clauses and subclauses regulatingthe price of cigarettes and tobacco.The order distinguished between productspackaged in paper (with or without cellophane wrapping) and in cardboardboxes; with or without a cardboard bottom; with or without a hinged lid.Particularaspectsof thepackagingwerespecified inEnglish, forclarification.Includedwerecigarandpipetobacco,withorwithoutexternalpackaging.TheordinancewassignedbyY.Peleg,towhosenamewasappendedthesomewhatmysterioustitleof“Commissioner.”†
SOMETWOWEEKSAFTERTHEWAR,AFEWSOLDIERSPATROLLINGTHE JORDANRIVERnoticedsuspiciousmovementsouthofKibbutzTiratZvi.AccordingtoMichaelShashar, a military government staff member who described the affair in hisdiary, a few Palestinian farmers were trying to take a crate of tomatoes orcucumbers to the eastern bank of the river, Jordanian territory. The soldiersrespondedleniently,providingthefarmerswithappropriatetravelpermits.Thepermits confirmed thatMuhammadSo-and-Sowas allowed to take a crate oftomatoes toJordanand return to theWestBank,andwere signedbySergeantSuch-and-Such. Headquarters got wind of this, wrote Shashar, and thought it
was a good idea. This was the beginning of the “open bridges policy” ofmovement across the border,whichMosheDayanwould later take credit for,callingit“oneofthemostrevolutionaryinnovationsweinstituted.”Itwasagoodyear forWestBankfarmers,withsurplusesof20,000 tonsof
tomatoes, 15,000 tons ofmelons, and some 50,000 tons ofwatermelons. Theproblem was where to market the produce. Israel was out of the questionbecause of Israeli growers’ objections.A plan to sell the produce to theU.S.Navycommand inNaples seemed impractical.A few farmerswent toAmnonBronsteinandtoldhimthatalthoughtheriverbridgeshadbeenbombed,itwasstillpossible todrive trucks intoJordan.Asanexperiment,Bronsteinallowedthree trucks tomake a round-trip.The produce reached Jordan and the truckscame back. Bronstein told a few of his colleagues about the exercise; DanBawlyofthemilitarygovernmentlaterrecalledthatitwasatthehomeofZe’evShaham,thegovernorofSamaria.BawlyandBaruhYekutieli,aseniorofficialatBankLeumi,werebusy formulatingeconomicpolicy for theWestBank.Aprominent Jerusalem attorneywas present, Erwin Shimron,whoBawly notedwas“inchargeofsocial issues in theWestBank.”Thegovernor’sagriculturalofficer,EitanIsraeli,wasalsothere.Itwasalovelyevening,Bawlyrecalled.“Wewereatthemilitarycampinthe
DotanValley, sittingon abalcony lookingwest, letting the light breeze touchourbarefeet.”Thegovernorserveddeliciousfood.“Wefeltluckytobethere,inthose jobs, taking part in building this challenging, important enterprise.”KnowingDayan,themenweresurehewouldauthorizethesaleofagriculturalproduce in Jordan only if he believed he himself had come upwith the idea.They organized a field trip for Dayan; when he saw the trucks crossing theJordanRiver,hegavehisapproval.Fromthenon,the“openbridgespolicy”wasidentifiedwithDayan’s fair andwise approach to Israeli-Palestinian relations.FormerministerMordehaiBentovlaterclaimedthatinfactwhenDayanlearnedthattruckswerecrossingtheJordanRiverhewas“alarmed”and“didn’tknowwhattodo.”Haltingthetrafficwouldhavemeantcallingin“halftheIDF”andperhapsevenopeningfireonthefarmersandtruckers,whichwouldhaveledto“extremelygravepoliticalcomplications.”Thenthedecisionwasmade“tograntthem free passage.” The policy was not the result of “ingenious planning,”Bentovwrote,merelyawayoutofadilemma.15
Theopenbridgespolicymadelifeunderoccupationeasier,andmadeiteasierforIsraeltorule.Asforthesaleoftomatoesandwatermelons,thepolicymightbeviewedasproofofthefreemarket’spowertoovercomepoliticalstumblingblocks.Butthepolicyhadimplicationsbeyondeconomics,becauseiteffectively
opened the door to themovement of people between the territories, includingEast Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, and the Arab world. Residents werepermittedtocomeandgoandtosendfundstostudentsoverseas;studentswereallowed back to the territories for summer visits.16 These factors gave theoccupationagreatdealofpower,becauseIsraelcouldclosethebridgesatanytime.TheopenbridgeswerealsogoodforIsrael’simageworldwide.ThedirectandstraightforwardcontactbetweentheterritoriesandtheArabworldnurturedthe hope that the occupation would facilitate a “reality of peace,” andstrengthened the illusion that there was no need to rush to find a politicalsettlement.*
APARTFROMTHECONSTANTCONCERNABOUTSECURITY,NOTHINGPREOCCUPIEDTHEmilitarygovernorsmorethantheeconomicsituationintheterritories.EconomicproblemswerealsofirstontheagendafortheBoardofDirectorsGeneral.Themaindifficultywasthatuntilthegovernmentdecidedwhatitwantedtodowiththe territories, it was impossible to adequately plan their economies. Everydecision was supposedly short-term, just until the end of the occupation. Inreality, though, the administrators began tying the territories’ economies toIsrael’salmostimmediately.Israeli banks were allowed to open branches in West Bank cities within
weeks,andtheyoperatedalongsidetheArabbanks,whichwerealsoauthorizedto reopen for business. Israeli companies began export-import trade withcompanies from the territories. In mid-December, the supervisor of miningfoundthatthestoneindustryintheOccupiedTerritorieshadmanagedtolargely“take over” the Israeli constructionmarket.Laborers from the territories soonbegancommutingtoworkinIsrael.TheWestBankpopulationcouldsupplyacheap workforce for the Israeli textile and confection industries, wrote onemilitary administrator in his diary as early as July 26. Theminister of labor,YigalAllon, tried toblock this trend, as didMinister ofFinanceSapir.Arabsfromtheterritoriesworkedforlowpayandunderexploitativeconditions,wroteAllon toDayan. Sapir correctly feared that Palestinian laborwould acceleratetheeconomic integrationof the territoriesandIsrael,makingwithdrawalmoredifficult.ThiswaspreciselyDayan’sintention,andheprovedthatSapirhimselfhadallowedArabsfromtheterritoriestoworkwithinIsrael.18Eshkoldecidedtomake the Israeli lira legal tender in the West Bank, alongside the Jordaniandinar. The government discussed the question of currency frequently, oftenreversingitspriordecisions.*In earlyNovember, the requirement forpermits to enter theWestBankand
theGolanHeightswas lifted. InJanuary1968, theministerof the interiorandtheminister of defense decided that residents of theWestBank and theGazaStripwouldreceiveIsraeli identitycards.Aweeklater, theBoardofDirectorsGeneralreportedthatithaddecidedinfavoroffulleconomicintegrationoftheGolan Heights within the Israeli economy. Customs stations establishedimmediatelyafter thewarstilloperatedat transitpointsbetweentheterritoriesandIsrael,butinFebruary1968theywereshutdown.19†
3.CONTROL:“WHIPANDCARROT”
OnthemorningofMarch20,1968,MosheDayantookafewhours’leavefromhis office and went to an excavation site in Azur, near Tel Aviv, wherebulldozerswerediggingupdirtinpreparationfornewroads.Dayanhadcometo search for antiquities, illegally. On other occasions, he had found five-thousand-year-oldtombstonesatthissite.Hewasaccompaniedbyanexpertonlocal archaeology. Spotting a few interesting shards at the top of amound ofearth,hebegantoclimbupitandwasalmostkilled.The landslide occurred in two stages, he recounted later. The first layer of
earthtocollapseburiedhalfhisbody.Thentheupperlevelcollapsedandcavedinonhim.“Thisistheend,”hehadtimetothink,unabletomove.Anotherheaplanded on his head.Themanwho had comewith him called for help.A fewpeoplewholivednearbybroughtshovelsandstarteddiggingDayanout.Hehadinjured two vertebrae, broken some ribs, and torn a vocal cord. He washospitalized for threeweeks.According toAvnerFalk, a clinical psychologistwho wrote a biography of Dayan, “The correct psychiatric term for whatoccurred is ’unconscious suicide attempt.’”Dayan’s sister, AvivaGeffen, hadkilledherselfsomefourmonthsearlier.There is nothing surprising about the desire to put Moshe Dayan on the
analyst’scouch.Hewasadifficultmantodecipher,andmanytried.“Everyonewants to ’understand’ him,” wrote the journalist Amos Elon, who alsowondered,“WhatinGod’snamedoeshewant?”Elonhadnoanswer.“Dayanisthemysterious Cyclops of Israeli politics.” The black patch over his left eyeevokedheroismandsacrifice.Butitalsoarousedavoyeuristicstreak:whowasnot temptedbyfrighteningfantasiesaboutwhatDayan looked likewithout it?There was something almost pornographic about what it might conceal.Ha’aretz was explicit: Dayan had sex appeal. The eye patch made himimmediatelyidentifiable,andadvancedhiscareer.“Hewouldneverhavegoneasfarashedidifhe’dhadtwoeyes,”hisrivalsclaimed.20*
Dayan was a lonely man. He found it extremely difficult to forge genuinerelationships.Hehadnofriends;hisfamilylifewasunstable.Drivenentirelybyimpulse, he could commit neither to a woman, nor to a worldview, nor to aparty, the law,or the truth, as ifhewerebeyond themall.Awizardofpublicrelations, he sold himself as the embodiment of Israel’s mythos: Dayan wasassociatedwithallitsaspects—loveofthehomeland,youthfulness,masculinity,thenewHebrewstrength,theBible,DavidBen-Gurion,theIDF,and,aboveall,thewar against theArabs.BornonKibbutzDegania in1915,Dayancameofagewith thefirstconflicts in thestruggleover the land,againstshepherdsandfarmers and Palestinian neighbors. The Six-Day War positioned him at thecenterofacultofadmiration. InDayan,Israelissawtheir fateandeverythingtheywishedtobe.ChaimHerzoglikenedhimto“anemperorreturningtoRomeafter a greatmilitaryvictory.”Dayan’s biographerShabtaiTevethwrote: “Hisone eye glimmered with an enormous lust for life, his other eye wasextinguished beneath the black patch, dead.At times he seemed to symbolizeIsrael itself, in which life and death are close partners, and which draws itscouragefromitsverywillingnesstodieinordertolive.”Intelligent, cold, and arrogant, hungry for power and with no respect for
limits,Dayanseemedtheveryoppositeoftheagingpoliticalestablishmentandthe entire party system. For this reason he frightenedmany Israelis too: theybelievedhewantedtotakeoverthecountry.MenachemBeginthoughtDayan’sconductwasreminiscentofamilitarydictator.Butinretrospect,Dayaninfactemergesasamanwhorecoiledfromtakingultimateresponsibility.Throughouthis lifehebuilthimselfupunder theauspicesofstronger figures:DavidBen-Gurion, Golda Meir, Menachem Begin. He always took care to obtainpermissionandsupportforhisdecisions,evenifafterthefact.Andsotherewasneverreallyanydangerthathewouldtakeoverthecountry.TheSix-DayWar,however,deliveredastageforhislustforpower:hebecamesolerulerovertheterritoriesandtheirmillionsubjects.“DayanwasapeculiarJew,”saidRehavamZe’evi,“Onedayhewantedtokill
alltheArabs,thenextdayhewasthedefenderofIslam.”21Hiscapriciousness—doubtless an aspect of his reluctance to commit—makesDayan’s regime inthe territories hard to grasp.His policy drewon at least four sources: lessonslearned during British rule; the restrictions imposed upon Israeli Arabs bymartiallaw;theIsraeliruleofGazaaftertheSinaiCampaign;andimpressionsfromhisvisitstoVietnam.LiketheArabcitizensofIsrael,theArabsoftheterritoriesweretobecomea
populationthatIsraelwouldhavetolivewithonapermanentbasis.Unlikethe
Arabcitizens,however,theresidentsoftheterritorieswerenotgoingtobecomeIsraelis.Theywere not required to prove their loyalty to Israel, but simply toobeyit.AnaptdepictionofDayan’sruleintheterritorieswasoffered,probablynot coincidentally, by the British ambassador to Israel, Michael Hadow. HedescribedDayan’sattitudeas“essentiallypaternalistic,”notunlike,say,thatofaPashtun-speaking British colonial administrator in an Indian province. Dayanenjoyedtendingtotheneedsof“his”tribe,wroteHadow,protectingthemfromunnecessaryinterferencebyothermilitaryadministrators.Butthemomenttheytook somuch as a small step beyond the line he hadmarked in the sand, hewouldusethestick—“quickly,effectively,anddrastically.”When he first went to Saigon, Dayan felt as if he had been there before.
Everything looked familiar. Even the soldiers posted behind sandbags atintersectionswerenotnewtohim,hewrote:thiswashowtownsinPalestine—Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa—had looked during British rule. Like the Britishcolonialists—and unlike the French—Dayan had no interest in imposing hisnation’s culture on the Palestinians. He could not understand why it wasimportanttotheAmericansthatthechildrenofSaigonplaybaseball,hewrotewhen he returned from Vietnam. He told the American generals he met thatwhentheIDFhadcontrolledGaza in1956,hehadassured themayor that thearmywouldnot forceopenschoolsor shops. If the residentswanted togoonstrike,letthemstrike.Theywereonlyhurtingthemselves.Indeed, the most precise expression of the policy in the territories seized
during the Six-DayWar appears in theminutes of governmentmeetings heldafter the occupation ofGaza in the Sinai Campaign. Ben-Gurion, not Dayan,was the speaker. Foreshadowing Dayan’s position prior to the Six-Day War,Ben-GurionhesitatedtoauthorizetheoccupationofGazain1956.Whenitwascaptured,he told thegovernment thatannexationwouldbeadisaster,becauseIsraelcouldnotabsorb300,000Arabs.ButhefearedgivingtheGazaStripbacktoEgypt,oreventurningitovertoUNcontrol,incaseitturnedintoaterroristbase.And soheproposedat first doingpreciselywhat Israel eventuallydid adecadelater:taking“temporarydefactocontrol”foranunspecifiedperiod.Theterritories would be bound to Israel through close economic ties, but theirinhabitants remainedwithout civil rights. Ben-Gurion had also demanded the“normalization”oflifeinGaza,includingarenewaloflocalauthority.The British era, martial law, the first occupation of Gaza, and the trip to
Vietnam taught Dayan that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, tocontrol another people and crush a national uprising. It is in the occupier’sinterest to create favorable living conditions, but the slightest display of
rebellion must be put down with an iron fist. Furthermore, the civilianpopulationmustbepressured to take itsown steps against rebellious factions.This was the “whip and carrot” method, as Dayan called it—retribution andreward.22*
MICHAELSHASHAR, INTHEMILITARYGOVERNMENT,DESCRIBEDTHEOPENINGOFTHEpost office in Hebron, in July 1967, as a “carrot.” Israeli flags adorned thebuilding, and armed soldiers patrolled nearby roofs. “We convinced ourselvesthat theatmospherewasfestive,butit isdoubtfulwhetherthelocaldignitariesfelt thatway,”Shashar observed.Thegovernor ofHebron,Major Israeli, saidthatopening thefirst Israelipostoffice in theWestBankwasanotherstage inthe restoration of civil services. He expressed his hope that the peopleappreciated the steps the military government was taking for their benefit.Colonel Eliezer Amitai, military commander of the Jerusalem region, whichincludedHebron,said,“Letusmakeanefforttolivetogetherinpeace,forthesakeofthepeoplewhohistoryhasdeterminedmustliveinpeaceinthisregion.”Shashar commented, “A very diplomatic choice of words from an officer.”AmitaispokeinHebrew,andhisspeechwastranslatedintoArabic.The elderly mayor, Sheikh Muhammad Ali Jaabari, welcomed the guests
warmly,thankedthemforopeningthepostoffice,andgavetheaudienceashorthistory lesson.Hehadbeen ayoungboywhen the first post officeopened inHebron,duringTurkishrule.HehadalsoopenedtheBritishpostoffice.AndhehadopenedtheJordanianpostoffice.ItwascleartoShasharthatdeepdownthesheikhbelievedtheIsraeliregimewouldalsocomeandgo.Meanwhile,JaabaricalledupontheArabstatestopermitpostalcommunicationwithHebron.ThenAmitaigavehimthekeytothebuilding.Thesheikhhandedittothemanager—oneofhissons—andwentinsidetosendatelegramtoPresidentZalmanShazar.Onbehalfof the localpeople,heexpressedhisgratitude for the IDFsoldiers’fine conduct, hewrote.Therewas a reception, and refreshmentswere served:fruitandcucumbers.Therewerenotenoughchairsforalltheguests,soJaabariasked a few of the town dignitaries to leave so as tomake room for the IDFofficers.*The “stick” was brandished in, among other places, Nablus, as part of an
effort to force thePalestinians to reopen schools after thewar.Dayanhadnotforgotten the lesson he tried to give the Americans in Vietnam: it hardlymatteredwhetherornotthechildrenofNabluswenttoschool.Buthecouldnotignore the political resistance implied by keeping the schools closed. Nablusorganizedatradestrike,too,and,thenightbeforewidespreaddisciplinaryaction
was taken, Border Patrol jeeps were fired on by machine guns, and handgrenadeswerethrownatthem.Thepunishmentwasdesigned to affect everyone.The intentionwas tohurt
their pocketbooks and their dignity. A curfew was imposed on the city, busservicewas halted, twenty randomly selected storeswere forcibly closed, andthetelephonenetworkwasshutdown.Soldierswereorderedtoharassresidentswithhouse searches.Variouspublic figureswerearrestedandhumiliated.Themovement of goods between Nablus and Jordan was frozen. Benefits wereofferedtoHebrontradesmen,competitorswithNablusmerchants.WithinthreeweeksNablussurrendered,inafairlyhumiliatingmeetingwithDayanhimself.Themayorpromisedtocooperate.24
ThecollectivepunishmentwasreminiscentofBritishmethods,aswereothermethodstheIDFinflictedonresidentsof theterritories,usually inresponsetoacts of rebellion.They included searches, arrests, torture during interrogation,deportation, and, evenback then,housedemolitionsaspunishment foractsofsabotage.All these actswere allowedunder emergency laws instituted duringBritishrule,and,asundertheMandate,theywereoftenimposedarbitrarily.InearlyNovember,a reporter forHa’aretzdescribeda routinesearch in the
GazaStrip.Fivearmedjeepsroareddownthedirtroads.AnArabmancarryingalargebundleof twigsonhisheadleapedaside,staringafter theconvoy.Thejeepsspedpast,raisingahugecloudofdustastheydrovearoundanabandonedpacking house, and stopped noisily in front of a group of shacks. Soldiers industy uniforms, armedwithmachine guns, burst into the shacks, yelling, andordered the inhabitants outside. As infants cried and chickens screeched, themenweregatheredunderapalmtreewhilethewomenandchildrenwaitedbyawallofpricklypears.Ayoungprivatewatchingthemtookabananaoutofhispocketandproceededtoeat it,“slowlyand indifferently,”his loadedgunheldlooselyinonehand.The frightened residents pleaded with the soldiers, swearing they were
innocent and had not violated a single rule. The soldiers were looking forweapons.Theysearchedclosetsand trunks, tossedasideblankets,pulledbacksheets,movedmats, dug throughpockets.They foundnothing suspicious andwentbacktotheirjeeps.Twoelderlypeopleaccompaniedthem,blessingthemin the name of Allah. The women went inside and started picking up theblanketsandmattresses.*Someofthemilitarygovernmentofficerswerehousedininstallationscalled
Tegart forts, afterCharles Tegart, aBritish expert on quashing civil uprisings
whohadbeenbroughttoPalestineinthe1930stosuppresstheArabrebellion.Backthen, theBritishparatrooperssent toquell riots inPalestinewereknownby the Jews as Kalaniot (“Poppies”). Now, Israeli paratroopers in red beretswere sent to put down demonstrations in theWestBank.Dayan had been anadmirer of Captain Orde Wingate, a disturbed British officer who employedparticularlycruelpunishmentsagainst theArabpopulation.IsraeliofficersandShabak interrogators similarly referred to themselves as “Captain,” using theEnglishword,and thatwaswhat theArabscalled them.Gazit recollected that“DayanoftenmentionedtheBritishcaptainwhowouldgointoanArabvillage,notfarfromwheretherehadbeenanactofsabotage...andwithhisofficer’sbatonhewouldpointarbitrarilytothreehousesandtheywouldbedemolishedthen and there.” Wingate was a great believer in the effectiveness of housedemolitions.*Thehousedemolitionswerepartlyintendedaspsychologicalwarfare,which
wasthespecialroleoftheIDF’sUnit640.Theideawastoconvincepeoplethatitwasnotintheirbestinteresttoengageinhostilities,andtoencouragethemtocollaboratewiththeIsraeliregime.Theworkingassumptionwasthatrebellionand terrorism arose from uncertainty: the inhabitants did not know whetherIsraelwouldholdontotheterritoriesorleave.Theywereintenselynationalisticand influenced by hostile propaganda and rumors. To demonstrate Israel’spower, the psychological warfare officers proposed holding air shows andparatrooper displays nearGaza and Jericho.They also suggested organizing atourofIsraelforWestBankdignitaries,sothattheycouldbeholdthecountry’sscientificandtechnologicalsuperiority.Appropriatefilmsandbooksweretobedistributed. They also suggested bringing the dignitaries to visit the EgyptianPOWswhohadnotyetbeenreturned,andshowingthemthepilesofwarbooty.ToconvincethepopulationthatIsraelwastheretostay,militarypsychologistssuggested sending Israeli hotel owners to theWest Bank to discuss vacationpackages with Jericho hotel owners, as well as having wealthy Israelis,includingArabs,gotheretotalkaboutbuyingrealestate.27
•••ROUGHLY SIXMONTHS AFTER THEWAR, THE IDF DESTROYED THE SEMI-ABANDONEDVILlageofJiftlik,betweenNablusandtheDamiaBridge.Dayancited“securityand sanitary considerations.” The residents, he said, had been transferred“elsewhere”intheWestBank.28*Themilitarygovernmentpreparedasurveyonthe condition of the nine thousand Latrun refugees, two thousand of whomremainedintheWestBank.Afewwereallowedtoworksomeofthelandthey
hadpreviouslyfarmed.Somemovedintohousesabandonedbyotherresidents,in Ramallah and the surrounding area. Others were living with relatives, inpublicbuildings,stablesandpens,andundertrees.30
It was not long before the first irregularities occurred. Two Border Patrolpolicemenmurderedtworesidents,apparentlyinthewakeofadisputebetweendrivers.ThepolicemenwerebroughttotrialandIsraelpromisedtocompensatethevictims’families.Therewerealsounpublicizedmurders.Aseniorofficerinthe paratroopers shot dead six suspected Palestinian terrorists, after theysurrenderedandhadbeentakenprisoner.31
SHLOMOGAZIT,THECOORDINATOROFOPERATIONSINTHETERRITORIES,PRAISEDTHEoccupation.The IDFwasconsiderateof thePalestinians’needs,goingbeyondtherequirementsofinternationallaw,hewrote.“Withnoresidualhostility,theIsraelishavelistenedtothedesiresofthepopulation,offeredassistancetosolvehumanandeconomicproblems,repairedhousesdamagedinthewar,andalmostimmediately consented to the return of various people who abandoned theirhomes.”ConsideringthechallengeofthewarandtheabysmalhatredprojectedfromeveryArabcapital,Gazitadded,theIsraeliresponseshouldbeviewedas“anamazingmetamorphosis.”32
MosheDayandidinstructthatKalkilyaresidentsbeallowedtoreturntotheircity,andhehelpedthemrebuildtheirhomes.Butafewmonthsafterthewar,healsosaidthatifhehadtochooseanoccupationforcefromamongthenationsoftheworld,hedoubtedhewouldchooseIsrael.33
•••WHILEHEWASHOSPITALIZED,DAYANHADAVISITFROMHAMDIKANAAN,THEMAYORofNablus.Afewdayslater,themayorcameback,withanattorneynamedAzizShehade.DayanaskedaboutthefamilyreunificationprogramthatwouldpermitthereturnofPalestinianstotheirhomesontheWestBank.WhenKanaantoldhimpermitswerenotbeingissuedquicklyenough,Dayanpromisedthatifthematterwasnotdealtwithby the timehegotbetter, “headswill roll.”HealsowarnedthatifHusseindidnotreininFatah,theIDFwouldcrosstheriverandseizeJordanian territory.Kanaansaid thatas longas thefundamentalproblemwasnot solved—referring to the greaterPalestinian question—therewould benoendtotheactsofsabotage.*Dayan described the Palestinians who came to see him in the hospital as
“Arab friends anddignitaries.”Hewas especially touchedby a visit from themayor of Kalkilya, who brought a cluster of oranges complete with their
delightfulbranchandleaves.“FromthetimeourforcesdestroyedKalkilyaandIpersonallyhandleditsreconstruction,apersonalconnectionwasforgedbetweenus, a bond between human beings who, together, care for the needs of thepopulation—theirbread,theirhomes,theirjobsandtheirhealth,”Dayanwrote.“It is a very different bond from the expected administrative relationshipbetweenanArabmayorandaJewishministerofdefense,whorulesoverhimthroughthepowerofhissoldiers.”35
ThiswasthevoiceoftheIsraeliwhowantedmorethananythingtobelovedfor his kindness. It was the voice of the master who needs the love of hissubjects—who, as Dayan suggested, might even rape them into loving him.“Thesituationbetweenus is like thecomplex relationshipbetweenaBedouinman and the young girl he has taken against her wishes,” Dayan told thePalestinianpoetFadwaTukan.“Butwhentheirchildrenareborn,theywillseethemanastheirfatherandthewomanastheirmother.Theinitialactwillmeannothingtothem.You,thePalestinians,asanation,donotwantustoday,butwewillchangeyourattitudebyimposingourpresenceuponyou.”36
Dayan’s approach toward both death and land, including his attraction toarchaeology, reflected something intensely sensual, almost erotic. Alwaystempting death, he described war as rebirth. “Death in war is not the end ofwarfare, but its pinnacle,” he said once, “and sincewar is a part of life—andsometimes its entirety—death too, when it is the pinnacle of war, is not thecessationoflife,butitsultimateexpression.”37
Dayan visited the territories often, and oneOctober night he joined a forcesettingouttoambushterroristsintheJordanValley.Hewaswithaunitoffoursoldiers,ledbyacorporal.Theynoticedafewfiguresandopenedfire.“Onthepath from themountains to the Jordan lay the bodies of three youngArabs,”wroteDayan.Itstartedtodrizzle.Hestayedwiththesoldiersuntilmorning,butnothing much happened. He soon stopped thinking about the encounter andallowedhimselftobelostinreminiscence.Helookedupatthecloudsdriftinginthewind,listenedtothesoundsofthenight:crickets,grasshoppers,mosquitoes,nocturnalbirds,dogsbarking fromafar, snakes rustling in thegrass.All theseremindedhimofhisyouthinNahalal.“Ilikedsleepingoutsideinthesummerand falling asleep in a hallucinatory statewith thevelvetywind caressingmyface.”Hewasnolongeraseventeen-year-oldboy,butfortyyearslaterhewasintoxicated by the nightwith its smells andwhispers and the close sky. “ThegunshotandthedeadArabsweresecondary,external,”hewrote.“WhenIcurledupundermycoatinthecardrivingtoJerusalemanddozedoff,Itookwithme
thesenseofthewarmearth,theceaselesswhisperandthecalmingtouchofthewind.”38
4.EDUCATION:“AFUNDAMENTALQUESTION”
Near summer’s end, the government had to decide whether to recognize theJordanianandEgyptianschoolcurricula,orsupplytheschoolsintheterritorieswith the curricula used in Israeli Arab schools. It was a political question,discussed by a ministerial committee set up to handle internal security. Thedebate reflected the drama of the “enlightened occupation,” including theaggressive competition between various government offices. The decision toprepareacurriculumforthefollowingschoolyearagainindicatedthattherewasnointentionofwithdrawingfromtheterritoriesintheforeseeablefuture.The Ministry of Education naturally took upon itself the education of the
approximately200,000studentsinthe900-oddpublicschoolsintheWestBankandGaza.Theysentsupervisors,dubbed“educationofficers,”totheterritories,wheretheylearnedthatsomeofthetextbooksusedintheschoolsweredesignedto instill a virulent hatred of Israel.39 Some of the grammars for elementaryschools were based in part on speeches given by Nasser. The ministrydistributedsamplesofthebooksinHebrewtranslation.Undertheheadline“WeShall Not Forget,” one text read, “Zionist gangs stole the precious land ofPalestineandbanisheditspeoplefromtheirhomesandproperty,butthenationof Palestine will not be silent about its loss of rights and its anger will notsubside....WeshallnotforgetthelandofPalestineanditslossandthedayofMay 15, 1948, the day our beloved Palestine was stolen.” Other textbooksincludedsimilarpassages.40
Theoptionsweretodisqualifythebooksandreplacethem,ortocensoronlycertain passages. At first the ministry was inclined to impose the Israelicurriculumandtextbooksontheterritories,but thearmyobjected,fearingthatthe residentswould refuse to open the schools.GeneralUziNarkis recalled adebatewiththeministerofeducation,ZalmanAran.NarkiswasaccompaniedatthismeetingbytheattorneyErwinShimron.“Shallweteachourowncurricula?Bialik, Tchernichovsky, Sholom Aleichem? The Bible? What shall we do?”askedNarkis.Aran,aseventy-year-oldnativeoftheUkraine,askedthegeneralwhetherhespokeRussian.WhentheJerusalem-bornNarkisrepliedthathedidnot,AranaskedwhetherhespokeYiddish,andNarkisagainrepliedthathedidnot. “Oy vey,” the minister murmured, according to Narkis, and reluctantlyresortedtoHebrew.“Wedidnotneedthiswar.Ithasalreadybroughtustrouble
anditwillbringusworsestill.”Intheabsenceofanypracticalsolutionsfromtheminister,Narkisdecidedtoappointhisowncommitteeofexperts.41
Dayan acted as if it were beneath him as a warrior and an enlightenedoccupier to deal with children’s grammar books. But some Ministry ofEducationofficialsnonethelesssuspectedthemilitarywasschemingtorobthemoftheirrole.In this particular competition, the Education Ministry seemed to have
examinedthebooksmoreclosely,andAraninsistedthatbooksbeusedonlyifthey were absolutely free from anti-Israeli material. The ministry expertsdisqualified49textbooks,butDayanorderedShlomoGazittoreexaminethem,and Gazit reinstated 17. A ministry official appealed the decision and Gazitasked him to prepare a new list, but Aran forbade this.42 The topic waseventually brought before a ministerial committee, which instructed furtherexamination, with the aim of allowing the original textbooks “to the greatestpossible extent.”This timeonly8of the150 schoolbooks inuseon theWestBankwere disqualified; 47 of thesewere amended. In theGazaStrip, on theotherhand,only24ofsome160bookswereapproved.*TheministryreplacedthedisqualifiedbookswithtextsusedbyArabstudents
inIsrael,entailingahugelyexpensivepublishingoperation.Theapprovedbookswerestamped,inHebrew,“ThisbookisauthorizedasatextbookbytheMilitaryCommander.” It was decided that theMinistry of Educationwould prepare anewcurriculumforthefollowingschoolyear.Schoolsdidnotopenintimeforthisnewschoolyear.Theyremainedclosed
forseveralweeks,inoneofthefirstactsofcivildisobedienceintheterritories.Leaflets addressed to students denounced teachers who went to work ascollaborators,“traitorswhohavestabbedthehomelandintheback.”44SchoolsinEast Jerusalemalso remainedclosed.Unlike the restof the territories, theywereorderedtoinstitutetheArabIsraelicurriculum,butthestrikeleftnoroomfordoubt:itwouldnotbeeasytosplitoffEastJerusalemfromtheWestBank.
CHAPTER19TEDDY’SPROJECT
1.ANNEXATION:“ITWILLONLYCOMEBACKTOHAUNTUS”
About twohoursafter theseizureof theOldCity,TeddyKollekarrivedat theheadquartersofthemilitarygovernor,ChaimHerzog,intheAmbassadorHotel.Snipers were still shooting intermittently, and Kollek was exhausted, havingbarelysleptsincethebeginningofthewar.ButaccordingtoHerzog,themayor“burst in” tohisofficeanddemanded immediatearrangements fordistributingmilktotheArabresidents.Thisalluringtalehastakenitsplaceamongsimilaranecdotesintheabundant
folkloreofJerusalem,whichportrays theoccupationof theeasternpartof thecityasaimedsolelyatalleviatingtheeverydayproblemsoftheresidents,bothJewishandArab,andimprovingtheirqualityoflife.Kollekhimselfdidmuchtocultivatethismyth.NootherpersonsoexcelledatpresentingtheoccupationofJerusalem as a humanitarian, almost religious mission, undertaken for thebenefitofallmankind.Israelis,forthemostpart,wereonlytoohappytoconcur.“The name ’Jerusalem’ inspires awe throughout the world, and whoever
controls Jerusalem takes on a duty of loyalty toward a significant part ofhumankind,”wroteHa’aretzthedayaftertheannexation.“Wemustfulfillthisdutymeticulously.”Thepaperacceptedanobligation,asifonbehalfofthestateandtheentireJewishpeople:“Thiswepromise:JerusalemunderJewish-Israelicontrol shall be an exemplary symbol of freedom of religion, of study, ofresearch,ofhumanebehaviortowardmembersofallreligions.”Israelirulecombinedthecovetousnessoftheoccupierwithreligiousfervor:a
barelycontrollableurge impelled themto“establishfacts”withextremehaste,beforeitwastoolate.Attimesthiswasdonewithanironfistandevencruelty.Buttheoccupierswerealwaysawareofbeinginafishbowl,underthewatchfuleyesoftheentireworld.Andsotheyalsodisplayedresponsibility,goodwill,andoccasionalcompassion.ThedirectorgeneraloftheInteriorMinistrydeterminedthateverythingmust
be done in accordance with Israeli law. “We don’t care what kind of
arrangements existed before,” he said. But he cautioned against creating “apopulation of embittered souls” in East Jerusalem, and urged awareness ofhuman needs and public relations.1 Both these considerations suited Kollek’sskillsandinclinations.Ayearafterbecomingmayor,Kollekwasboredandfrustrated.Hehadnoone
interesting toworkwith, he grumbled toBen-Gurion.Divided Jerusalemwastoosmallforhistalents.KollekwasborninHungaryandgrewupinawealthyhousehold inVienna,where he drank in the cosmopolitan air of the city afterWorldWar I: he was a liberal and a pragmatist. In the mid-1930s he settledbrieflyonKibbutzEinGev,ontheshoresofLakeTiberias.LikeShimonPeresand Moshe Dayan, he was a follower and an admirer of Ben-Gurion in hisyouth,andwith thesemenhefoundtheability to translateBen-Gurion’sgreatnational vision into practical accomplishments. DuringWorldWar II, Kollekwas involved in Zionist attempts to rescue Jews, even meeting with AdolfEichmann.After thewarhe tookpart inefforts toacquirearms inpreparationfortheWarofIndependence,andwiththeestablishmentofthestatehebecameadiplomatinWashington.Kollekhadaninnateabilitytocharmandimpresspeopleandwintheirtrust.
Livelyanddemanding,heknewhowtoenjoyagoodmeal,goodwine,andgoodcigars,inthecompanyofbeautifulwomenandwell-knownartists,writers,andmusicians.HisloveofthegoodlifeandhisimageasamanoftheworldgavehimameasureofdetachmentandevenalienationfromtheIsraeliestablishmentwithitsEasternEuropeanprovincialism,itstroublinginsularity,anditsconstantgrumbling.Kollekmadenoparticulareffort toadoptthenewHebrewidentity.Bucking the nationalist imperative, he kept his European name and neverpolished his flawed Hebrew. He thought in Viennese German and AmericanEnglish. Despite his foreignness, and perhaps because of it, the state’sparochialism did not bother Kollek: his world was London, Paris, and NewYork, anywhere he could raise funds. Indeed, Kollek was an unrivaled fund-raiser.He set up a special foundation for the city, andwhenmembers of themunicipality demanded a supervisory role, he threatened to dismantle it. Hisfoundationhadonlyoneruler.A master of public relations, he constantly invented headline-grabbing
gimmicks,butwasalsoguidedbyabasicsenseofdecency—thegenerosityofthegreat—andapaternalsenseofhumor.EveryoneknewhimsimplyasTeddy,and he was well liked. A strong man with blond hair, he was dynamic,spontaneous, impatient, often capricious and impetuous, frequently crude andeven insulting. He despised bureaucracy, legal restrictions, paperwork,
arguments, and speeches. He projected an authentic quality, and an apoliticaltrustworthiness.Kollek was a partner in Ben-Gurion’s national dream, but it was the Old
Man’senormouspowerthatfascinatedhim.Asthedirectorgeneraloftheprimeminister’s office, he was empowered to shape a new approach to the Zionistenterprise,drivenbyresults.Beyondideology,beyondpolitics,beyondambitionandpersonal intrigue,Kollek tended toviewthestateasonehugeproject.Hewasaworkaholicandsethimselfasinglestandardforsuccess:todoasmuchaspossible.TheoccupationofArabJerusalemfinallyturnedthecityintoaprojectthatKollek found challenging.Mayor of the unified city, he instantly became“Mr.Jerusalem,”andhisnamewasknowntheworldover.Ashecameandwentamongtherichandfamous,heexploitedthecity’semotionalpower,justashehad taken advantage of Ben-Gurion’s energy, all in the service of improvedperformance.2
A few days after the occupation, Kollek visited his Jordanian counterpart,Rawhial-Hatib.Al-HatibofferedhisownchairtoKollek,whorepliedpolitelythathehadcomeas aguest.Coffeewas served; theatmospherewas friendly.Butwithindays,al-Hatibwassummonedtoalocalhotel,theGloria,whereanIDF officer recited orders to dismiss him and disperse his city council. Theofficerwrotetheordersintranslationonahotelnapkin.Kollekwas soon able to articulate his fundamental approach to Jerusalem’s
Arabs,and itwasnotunlikeBen-Gurion’sbasicattitude toward IsraeliArabs.LikeBen-Gurion,andlikemanyZionist leaders,Kollekwouldhavebeengladto see the city empty ofArabs.Had he been able to, hewould have acted toremovethem.Asarealist,heknewthatthiswasnotpossible.“TherearepeoplewhobelievethatifweharasstheArabs,theywillleave,”hesaid.“Well,believeme,theArabsofEastJerusalemwillnotleave.TheyareconnectedtoJerusalemnolessthanweare.Nothingwedotoharassthemwillmakethemleave.Ifthereweresuchathing,Iwouldbewillingtopurchaseit.”HewentontoexplainwhytheArabsmustnotbemade second-class citizens: “Itwill only comeback tohauntus.”3HesawunifiedJerusalemasatestofJews’andArabs’abilitytolivetogether.Heassumed that the Jewswould remain in themajority and that theArabswouldaccepttheirrule.Theannexationentailedamultitudeofcomplexproblemsthatrequiredlegal,
administrative,andpoliticalresolutions,andoftencalledforimprovisationandsensitivity. Would the residents of East Jerusalem be made Israeli citizens,entitledtovoteandrunfortheKnesset?Orwouldtheybemereresidents?The
answer was not obvious. “We did not grant automatic citizenship to IsraeliArabs,”one speaker saidat apreliminarymeetingon thematter. Israelhad todecidewhetherresidentsofEastJerusalemhadtherighttoreclaimpropertyinthewesternpartof town lost in1948—or,moreprecisely, Israelhad to findalegalbasistopreventthemfromdoingso.*TheministerofjusticesuggestedappointingafewArabrepresentativestothe
citycouncil.Kollekobjected,fearingtheywould“makeallsortsofstatements”againsttheoccupation.Heproposeddesignatingtheeasternpartofthecityasaborough,withsomesortof“advisoryboard”composedoflocalresidents.†Thegovernmentrejectedthisproposal,soasnottoplant“aseedofsomethingelse”inthecity.Ultimately,noneoftheArabcandidateswouldagreetobeappointedtothecitycouncil.Countlessotherdifficultiesarose.The70,000residentsoftheeasternpartof
thecity,whobroughttheoverallpopulationofJerusalemto265,000,hadbeenreceiving services—education,welfare,publichealth,utilities, and registrationofbirthsanddeaths,forexample—fromtheJordanianmunicipality.Thesewereservices that Israeli residents received from the Israeligovernment,and itwasunclear who would provide them after the war. Kollek asked about closingstoreson theSabbath:would themunicipalbylawonthismatteralsoapply toOldCitymerchants?6
Kollektookonthemanagementoftheoccupationwithgusto.Heorderedtheimmediate demolition of the ugly cementwalls that had divided the city.HisdeskwassoonpiledwithdevelopmentplanswhosepurposewastoenlargetheJewishpopulation and isolate theArabs from theWestBank.New residentialneighborhoods were planned, along with rebuilding in the former JewishQuarteroftheOldCity.Kollek’soperationaleagernessinfectedhisassistants,too.MeronBenvenisti,
appointedtosuperviseEastJerusalem,wroteabouttheformerJordaniansideastheZionistfoundershadwrittenaboutEretzIsrael—asifthecityitselfhadbeenyearningfortheprogressthatIsraelwasabletobring.ThewallsoftheOldCityweresomewhatneglected,evenhousingGypsiesinthenorthernparts;footpathshadtobepavedforvisitorstowalkaroundthecitywalls;loudneonsignshadtobe removed,as theymarred someof themostbeautiful city streets; televisionantennashadtobebannedandthetelephoneandpowerlinesburied,Benvenisticoncluded.TheoccupationofEastJerusalemdidnotmeanparityofservices.Attheend
of June, a government committee dealingwith Jerusalem affairs decided that
East Jerusalem would receive only the services previously provided by theJordanians, at the same level and with the same scope. The municipalityprotested. “We cannot operate two levels of service in one city,” wroteBenvenisti. Still, the committee instructed governmentministries “tomake aneffort” to provide “as soon as possible” equal services required by law,whileotherservicesweretobegiven“inaccordancewiththepossibilitiesavailabletoeachindividualministry.”7
Kollekmighthavebeen“Mr.Jerusalem,”butheneverthelesshadtocontendwith a plethora of authorities and offices also demanding their say. For amomentitevenseemedasiftheIDFmightreoccupythecity.ThishappenedinSeptember.TheannexationofEastJerusalemwassupposedtobringitwithintheregular
purviewof thegovernmentministriesand themunicipality, just likeanyotherIsraelicity.Butthemilitarydecreedthatthecity’spolitical,security,economic,andreligiousproblemscouldnotbeaddressedseparatelyfromthoseoftheWestBank.Thelineonthemap“doesnotautomaticallycreatefactsinthefield,”UziNarkis’sCentralCommandheadquartersclaimed,asiftheKnesset’sannexationdecisionhadneverbeenmade.Aworkingpaperproducedbytheheadquarterssought to regulate almost all areas of life in the city. It demanded stricterenforcementof thebanon smoking in theareaof theTempleMount, and therequirementthatfemalevisitorsdressmodestly:no“barearmsandminiskirts”there. The document was decidedly political, asserting that “not even theslightestconcessioncouldbemadeindemonstratingexclusiveownershipoftheKotel area.” The paper also addressed archaeological plans: “We recommendpostponing implementation until next season.” Narkis’s headquarters alsowanted to handle local media, including television, which was not evenbroadcastingyet.Italsofeltaresponsibilityforschoolcurricula.In different circumstances, the army’s interference would have been fairly
scandalous,butinJerusalem“everyonethoughttheyhadtosticktheirbignosesin,” asKollek put it. Authorities and offices battled one another boldly, as ifeveryordinanceandregulationwasdestinedtoleaveitsmarkforthenexttwothousand years. Kollek denounced them all. “This government has utterlyfailed,”hedeclaredninemonthsafter theendof thewar,andclaimedhewaslivingina“bureaucraticjungle”thatwasdelayingthecity’sreunification.8
Meanwhile,Kollekhadinitiatedaseriesofcolorfulfestivalsandeventswiththeparticipationofinternationalluminaries.Thecitywasbustlingwithtourists,asleepingbeautyawakenedtodailyglorificationandburdenedwiththeheavy
load of historical significance. Every “first” produced prominent newspaperheadlines:CelinaSassoon, awealthyBritishphilanthropist,wasburiedon theMountofOlives, the first burial there in twentyyears;ArielZviBenYehudaHacohenwasthefirstchildtobecircumcisedinEastJerusalem.9
2.EXPROPRIATIONS:“RESTORINGITTOITSFORMERGLORY”
Withinweeksofthewar’send,variousJewishinstitutionsandindividualsbeganaskingforpermissiontoreturntotheOldCity.ThedirectorsofthePorathYosefyeshiva toldEshkol thatback in1911, theyhad“redeemed”a lotopposite theKotelandbuiltagrandiose“compound.”DuringtheWarofIndependence,theyeshiva had been “under siege,” wrote the directors, but had defended theJewishQuarter“rightuptothelastminute.”Theyeshivahadbeenplanningtobuildanewcompound in thewesternpartof thecity,butnow that Jerusalemhad been “liberated,” the directors saw a “holy purpose” in reviving the oldruins and “restoring” the site “to its former glory.” Countless people andorganizationssentsimilarrequests.10
The frequent references to “restoring” things “to their former glory,”whichechoedtheessenceoftheZionistvision,werenotcoincidental.Everythingwassupposedtoreturntowhatithadoncebeen;thepastbecametheideal.Eventhebus route toMountScopuswas ceremoniously reassigned thenumber9,withwhich it had been designated before the city was divided.Maariv reported,“AdvertisingsignsinHebrewhavereturnedtotheOldCity,”asiftheareausedtobeanIsraelishoppingmall.Everyoneseemedtobeinagreathurrytoactontherightofreturn.“AgnonReturnstotheKotel,”“YaakovAlsheikhReturnstotheOldCity,”“MichaelLuzReturnstoAtarot,”theheadlinesannounced.11
The Jewish Quarter was to be a part of this return. The first task was toremovetheArabresidents,whohadsettledtherestartingin1948,followingtheexpulsionoftheJewishresidents.SomeeightyArabfamilieslivedinbuildingsthat had formerly served as synagogues. Over the next eighteen months,approximately eight hundred peoplewere removed from the quarter, vacatingthree hundred rooms. They were given compensation.Ha’aretz reassured itsreaders: “The tenants of the former synagogue were transferred to modernapartments equipped with hot and cold running water, indoor bathrooms,electricity and tended gardens.” Many of these apartments, in the village ofSilwan, in fact belonged to peoplewhohad been absent from their homes onJune15: theywereconsidered“abandoned”andcouldbe legallyexpropriated
andgiventoothers.YehudaTamir,whowas in chargeof restoring the JewishQuarter, assumed
that only 15 percent of the houses had formerly belonged to Jews.The intentwas to house two thousand people, mostly—but not all—Orthodox.Construction had already begun on official residences for the deputy primeminister,andthestatecomptrollerwasbuildingahousenearby.Eshkol was intensely involved in populating “Greater Jerusalem,” as the
governmenthaddecidedtocallit.Themoodincabinetmeetingswasimpatient.“I’malltoofamiliarwiththeTurkishbukra—tomorrow.It’sbeenthreemonthsalready.We have to decide.Go and seewhat’s happening,” Eshkol urged hisassistants.InSeptember,heapprovedaplantosettletensofthousandsofJewishfamiliesinJerusalem.HetookpartinmanydiscussionsabouttherestorationofMountScopus.Soonafterthewar,theHebrewUniversitybeganpreparationstorenew activities on the site it had been forced to abandon in 1948. TheinstitutionwassoonfloodedwithdonationsandbeganplanningthenewMountScopus campus, one of the largest construction projects ever undertaken inIsrael.12
MinisterofJusticeShapiraandChiefSupremeCourtJusticeAgranatlookedintousingtheJordaniancourthouse.Itwasahandsomeandimpressivebuildingfrom the outside, and the interiorwaswell laid out, “although in poor taste,”Shapira reported. Itwasa two-storybuildingwithfivecourtroomson thefirstfloor and two auditoriums and several offices on the second. He suggestedaddingathirdfloorfortheSupremeCourt.Shapiraalsosupportedmovingthepresident’sresidencetoEastJerusalem.Populating thecitywasa slowprocess.On the first anniversaryof thewar,
Eshkol reported to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee thatconstructionhadbegunonsevenhundred three-andfour-roomapartments,butonly forty-two Jews had rented existing apartments in East Jerusalem, withgovernmentassistance.Inthecomingmonthstheirnumberwouldreacheighty,Eshkolpromised.RoughlyeightyIsraelistudentswerelivinginArabhotels.13
THEDEMANDTOJUDAIZETHECITYBECAMEAPOPULARSIGNIFIEROFPATRIOTISM.BUTtheprocessrequiredrestraint,caution,andintelligence,soasnottoanger“theworld”—meaning the Vatican, the U.S. State Department, the UN, or, Godforbid,theNewYorkTimes.Israeloftentriedtomislead“theworld.”MinisterofJusticeShapiraoncesuggestedannouncingthattheJewishQuarterhadnotbeen
expropriatedbutratherevacuated“forsurveyneeds.”Theworld,includingtheUnited States, was indeed opposed to the annexation of East Jerusalem.Administrationofficialssaidsomorethanonce,andtheU.S.consulatemadeapointofdemonstratingitspositionbyoccasionallyholdingseparatereceptions,someforguestsfromthewestandsomeforthosefromtheeast.TheAmericansmonitored the expropriation of land and houses and sometimes conveyed theprotests of Palestinians with American citizenship whose homes had beenseized.
One of Eshkol’s assistants pointed out to him that pressure from thesuperpowers and international factors might result in a UN Security Councilmeeting,andtherewasnodoubtthatthecouncilwouldpassaresolutionagainsttheannexationpolicy.“Sinceourdesireistodeveloptheeasternpartofthecitymore than to talk about it,” the assistant conveyed to other governmentdepartments,“theprimeministerasksthatneighborhoodsintheeasterncitybehandledinabusinesslikemanner,withoutdrawingtoomuchattention.”14
Themilitarywassupposedtobegivenabuildingthathadbeenintendedasaschool,aplanthatdidnotcasttheoccupationinagoodlight.ItwasdecidedtowaituntiltheannualUNGeneralAssemblysessionwasover.Eshkolsupportedpostponing theexpropriationof theschooluntilafterhis returnfromavisit tothe United States. He agreed to move the police headquarters into a collegebuilding,butmaintainedthatiftheministerofpoliceortheministerofdefenseinsisted,hewouldbewillingtoauthorizetheexpropriationofahospitalforthepurpose.ForeignMinisterEbanstronglyprotestedthesuggestion.“Itisamatterof supreme political sensitivity,” he wrote to Eshkol, noting further that “theU.S. ambassadorwill be visitingme tomorrow.”And so the primeminister’soffice tried todressup thepoliceheadquartersmoveby issuing the followingguidelines:“Onthedaytheexpropriationismadepublic,wemustmakesurethenewspapersprintstoriesaboutArabpatientsinJewishhospitalsinJerusalem,aswell as a story about our offer that the A-Tur hospital use the state hospitalcurrentlyunder construction in thenorthof theOldCity.Theoffer shouldbemadetotheArabsbeforetheexpropriationismadepublic.”Government clerks formulated similar guidelines before the confiscation of
eighthundredacresoflandtobuildtheneighborhoodthatwouldeventuallybecalledRamotEshkol.Athirdof the landwasprivatelyownedbyPalestinians.The expropriation required the signature of the minister of finance, and theMinistryofFinancespokesmanwasassignedtobriefthepress,asifthiswereanordinary land deal devoid of political significance. He too was instructed to
avoidtheterm“expropriation”andreplaceitwith“purchaseforpublicneeds.”HewasalsoaskedtohighlightthatmostofthelandbelongedtotheJordaniangovernment, while some was owned by Jews. The expropriations excludedpropertiesbelongingtochurchesor to theWaqf, theMuslimreligioustrust. Inany case, the governmentwas following amaster plan authorized back in theBritishMandateera;therewasnothingnewhere.Thetendencytocamouflagetheseprojectsoftengavethemanairofasecret
operation.Italsorestrictedappropriatepublicdebate.Anexpropriationplantoallowfortheconstructionofsevenhundredapartmentsstated:“Therewillbenoannouncementuntilanexpropriationorderisissued.”*Infact,theworldquicklyunderstoodthatIsraelsawthepermanentoccupationofEastJerusalemasadonedeal.ThiswastheprimaryconclusionofErnestoThalmann,aspecialenvoyoftheUNsecretarygeneraltoJerusalem.Andsotheworldmadedowithinsistingthattheoccupationnotinvolveexcessivelycrueloppressionorviolatefreedomofreligion.Theseconditionswerenotverydifficulttomeet.TeddyKollekwasable to forge good relationships with the Christian patriarchs in the city, andevenconvinceda few to sell, lease,orotherwise transfer lands theyowned toIsraeliparties.†
TheUnitedStatesdidnot takeactionagainst thedefactoannexation, tryingonlytodownplayitasmuchaspossible.TheAmericanswantedtomoderatethecelebrationsonthefirstanniversaryofthecccupation,andEshkolinstructedthemunicipalityofJerusalemtoholdthefestivitiesindoors.HethoughttheideaofaparadeofOrthodoxyouth“definitelysuperfluous.”Evenbeforethewarwasover,Abe Fortas had suggested that Israel be restrained in its response. “Ilanwarnedagainstvictorytrumpets,”reportedAmbassadorHarman,andaddedthathecompletelyagreed.“Itisimportantthatwenotappearininternationalpublicopinionasvictors,butrathermaintainourstatusasself-defenders.”16
Againstthisbackground,IsraelwasaskedtogiveArmonHanatzivbacktotheUnited Nations. This was one of the many issues charged with symbolism,nationalism,andego.Israel held that the1949 truce agreementhad ceased to applywith theSix-
DayWar,andwishedtoknowwhytheUNstillneededtheArmoncompound.International lawexperts laboredover thequestionofwhoactuallyowned thebuilding that had served the high commissioners during British rule. Britishconsulateofficialstookpartintheexercisewithexceptionalglee.Israelwasalsorefusingtogivebacktheareasurroundingthebuilding.Everyone involved treated the matter with the utmost gravity. The United
States considered it a nuisance and pressured Israel to put an end to thewrangling.AbbaEbansaw itas“central” in the international struggle.Duringthe cabinet debate, Dayan agreed to give back theArmon so as to remove athorn in the side of Israeli-U.S. relations. Allon asked whether it might bepossible to give back just one floor, andEshkol inquired about housing someJewishinstitutionorotherthere.17
If Israel returnedArmonHanatziv to theUN, itwould be the first piece ofoccupied territory foregone by the country, and the recipient was consideredhostile, especially sinceSecretaryGeneralUThanthad rushed to removeUNforces before the war. “This building is a symbol, and symbols are notinsignificantorwithoutgravity:thisnationhascomealongwayonthestrengthofsymbols,”wroteprotestersagainstthereturnoftheArmon,whocalledforarally.“Thebuildinghasalwaysstoodforforeignandhostilerule,”arguedoneopposition Knesset member, and said he feared its return would presagewithdrawalfromotheroccupiedareas.18
Negotiations with the UN were torturous and exhausting. The struggleultimately came down to oneword that theUNdemanded be included in thesettlement, despite Israel’s objections: “return.” Israel prevailed and the wordwasomitted.TheUNaccepted11outofthe43.6acresithadownedbeforethewar,aswellaspermissiontooperatetwotransmissionfacilitiesoutsidetheareathathadbeenrestoredtoitsownership.19*
ISRAELNEEDEDTODECIDEHOWTOREFERTOJERUSALEMINARABIC,FOREXAMPLEINKol Israel radio broadcasts. The choices proposedwere “Urshalim” and “Al-Kuds,”Arabic for“theHolyOne.”Thiswasyetanotherquestion loadedwithsymbolism, emotion, and politics. Immediately after the occupation, officialIsraeli spokesmen began saying “Urshalim.”ForeignMinisterEban,whowasfluentinseverallanguages,elucidatedtheoriginsofthetermforEshkol:itwasnot Arabic or Hebrew, but rather a New Testament translation of the name“Jerusalem.” Israel had used it after the War of Independence to distinguishbetween“ourJerusalem,”asEbanwrote,and“Al-Kuds,”ArabJerusalem.“Atthat time they sought a short name for the purpose and came up with‘Urshalim,’”Ebanrecounted.OnceJerusalemwasunified,therewasnolongeranyneed todifferentiate the twoparts of the town, andone could simply say“Al-Kuds,” which was the name used by the Arabs. Eban told Eshkol that“Urshalim” had no Islamic or Arabist significance. “No Arab uses the name’Urshalim’(notevenChristianArabs).Theyalluse’Al-Kuds.’”
Meron Benvenisti claimed that the name Urshalim was completely“fabricated”andprovoked“furiousridicule”amongArabresidents.Andsoheinitiated a “secret agreement”with the editors ofArabic programming atKolIsrael, instructing themtosay“Al-Kuds,”which theybegan todo.Heviewedthis as a simple gesture that had no real cost and that might mitigate theresidents’bitternessandperhapsincreasetheirtrustinIsraeliradiobroadcasts,asteponthewaytothedesirednormalization.Predictably,acontroversyensued.Theuse of theArabic namewas interpreted by somepatriots as underminingJerusalem’s status as an Israeli city:whatvaluewas there to theunification ifKol Israel itself did not recognize it? As usual, the dispute moved from thenewspaperstothegovernment.ForeignMinisterEbanwrote:“Inmyopinionareturntothename’Urshalim’willonlyexposeourinsecurityaboutthevalidityofourpositiononJerusalem.”MinisterWithoutPortfolioIsraelGalilicameupwith a compromise: “Urshalim Al-Kuds.” Postage stamps and the officialweatherforecast,however,continuedtoreferto“Urshalim.”21*
3.RETURN:“ARARELIGHTANDMANYCOLORS”
Thatsummer,Israelperceivedtheoccupationasaremarkablesuccessstory,andincreasingly Jerusalem was seen as a laboratory of Jewish-Arab coexistence.IsraelisflockedtoArabrestaurantsinEastJerusalem;Palestinianchildrensoldnewspapersinthewest,andsomeevencametovisittheIsraelMuseum’sYouthWing.ThecivilstatusgrantedtoEastJerusalemresidents,andtheArab-Israelieducationalsystemimposedontheirchildren,strengthenedtheimpressionthattheyhadbecomeIsraeliArabs.Therewerevirtuallynoviolentincidentsatfirst.AmbassadorBarbourreportedtoWashingtonthatHa’aretzwasconductinga
new “crusade” to promote equality and peace between Jews and Arabs inJerusalem.HequotedarticleswrittenbyAmosElonandAmnonRubinstein,inwhich theyargued that theoccupationofEast Jerusalemofferedopportunitiesforahistoricalrapprochement,withoutIsraelhavingtogiveupcontroloverthecity. This could occur, they said, if Israel approached the Palestinians withgenerosity. Israel should compensate those who had owned property in thewesternpartofthecity;institutewidespreaduseoftheArabiclanguage;findaway to includeArab representatives on the city council; and pay comparablesalariestoJewsandArabs.Manypeoplebelievedthatthiswasthewaythingswere heading. “It is doubtful whether territories occupied by a foreign armyhave ever been restored so quickly and so effectively to a peaceful routine,”Ha’aretzwroteinaneditorial.
Justbeforethefirstanniversaryofthewar,animprovisedArabmemorialfortheunknownsoldierappearedneartheformerMandelbaumGate.Awareofthepower of symbols, and seizing an opportunity to demonstrate enlightenment,TeddyKollekpermittedanofficialmonumentcommemoratingtheArabskilledin thewar—indemonstrativecontrast to thedesecrationofgravestoneson theMountofOlivesthathadoccurredduringJordanianrule.23
Butcoexistencewasafalseperception,oranopticalillusion:Jerusalemwasfarfromachieving“apeacefulroutine,”notonlybecausetheArabsopposedtheoccupationbutalsobecausemostIsraelisdidnotwantthemthere.Inasurvey,themunicipality found that approximately 85 percent of Jewish Jerusalemitesbelievedtheoccupationoftheeastwouldmeananincreaseincrimeandcreateseveresocialproblems.Seventy-fivepercent feared thatunificationof thecitywould result inmixedmarriagesbetweenJewsandArabs.More thanhalf (54percent)wouldnotagree to send theirchildren to schoolswithArabchildren.TheyhadapooropinionofArabs:theprimarycharacteristicstheyattributedtothem were “hypocrisy,” “poverty,” “cowardice,” “primitiveness,” and “poorhygiene.”FewJewsconsideredthem“peaceful”or“educated.”AlmostnineoutoftensaidJewsshouldbeallowedtoliveinEastJerusalem,butnearlysixintensaidArabsshouldnotbepermittedtoliveinthewest.ApproximatelyeightoutoftensaidJewsshouldbeallowedtoworkintheeast,butsevenoutoftensaidtheywouldnotagreetoworkinanArab-ownedfactory.AbouthalfsaidArabsshouldbeallowedtoworkinWestJerusalem,whilesevenoutoftensaidtheywouldnotemployanArabmaid.Manyrespondentswereafraidtheoccupationwouldbeaburdenonthecity’s
economy. Less than half believed unification would lead to economicimprovement,and42percentsaiditwouldcauseunemploymentinbothpartsoftown.RoughlyhalftheresidentssaidArabsfromEastJerusalemshouldnotbeallowed to vote in municipal elections. The survey also exposed significantdifferences between Ashkenazis and Mizrahim, the latter expressing greaterhostilitytowardtheArabs.*Thesurvey’sresultswereoverwhelminglynegative.Theprimeministerwas
distressed by the findings, and Kollek, agreeing with Eshkol in his concernabout the destructive potential of the survey, instructed that all copies bedestroyed,withtheexceptionoftwo,oneofwhichheleftwithEshkolhimself.Letters written by Jewish Jerusalemites also expressed discomfort at thepresenceofsomanyArabsnowwalkingthecity’sstreets.EdithEzrachifounditdifficulttoadjust:shehad“comeallthewayfromAllentowntoliveinaJewish
state,”asshewrote.24
YEHUDAAMIHAIWROTEAPOEMINSPIREDBYAVISITTOTHEOLDCITYONYOMKIPPUR.Wearing“darkholidayclothes,”hestandsforalongwhileinfrontofanArabshopneartheDamascusGate.Theshopsells“buttonsandzippersandspoolsofthread,”andAmichaisees in them“arare lightandmanycolors, likeanopenArk”inthesynagogue.HedoesnotspeakwiththeArabmerchant,butsilentlytells him that his father also owned a shop that sold thread and buttons. “Iexplained to him in my heart about all the decades and the causes and theevents, why I am now here andmy father’s shopwas burned there and he isburied here.” In these words, Amichai, a German-born teacher, voiced thesentiments of many Israelis: if only they could “explain” to the Arabs thehistorical circumstances that had brought them to Palestine, including theHolocaust.BythetimeAmichaifinishes“explaining”himselfinhispoem,theYomKippurprayers aredrawing toanend.TheArab lowers the shutters andlocksthegate,“andIreturned,withalltheworshipers,home.”EastJerusalem,Amichaiimpliesinthisboldline,isnothishome.*
Israelis sometimes encountered old Arab acquaintances—friends and evenrelatives. “Ezra and Shehada renew their friendship,” reported one newspaperhappily, andMaariv discovered Samika Nashashibi in the Old City; she hadbeen born Erika (Esther) Wiener, and was the niece of S. Y. Agnon.25 Thedaughters of thewell-known Palestinian authorKhalil Sakakini,who lived inRamallah, went to see the house their father had abandoned in 1948 in theKatamonneighborhoodofJerusalem.TheyalsowenttotheNationalLibrarytolook for theextensivecollectionofbooksSakakinihad left.TheynevercamebacktoJerusalemagain.
THEFIRSTSIGNSOFRESISTANCEAPPEAREDONTHESTREETSWEEKSAFTERTHEWAR,AND at the end of July there was even talk in the government of a “civiluprising.”Minister of Justice Shapirawarned that guerrilla operations againstthe occupation would plunge Jerusalem into “the Vietnamese era of itshistory.”26
Postersputupinthestreetsledtoastrikeintheschoolsandtheshops,aswellas one by public transportationworkers. Lawyers alsowent on strike. Protestpetitionswere sent to foreign consulates and internationalmedia;women andstudents demonstrated. One poster was signed by the “Union of Palestinian
Suicides.”27
Thefirst shopkeepers’ strike took theauthoritiesbysurprise.Policemenandsoldierswalked through the emptyOldCitymarket and spray-painted circleswithan“X”insideontheshutteredblinds,tofrightenthemerchants.UziNarkisissued injunctions ordering some store owners to shut their shops. MichaelShashar described in his diary how Narkis’s advisers prepared for a meetingwith a delegation from theArab chamber of commerce,who came to ask forpermissiontoreopenthestoresthathadbeenforcedtoclose.Theydecidedthatthegeneralwouldnotshakethedelegates’hands,andtheypurposelyprovidedaninsufficientnumberofchairs—letthemstand.TheArabsprobablyregrettedcoming,asShasharwrote.ThemeetingwithNarkisrecalledtheBritishera,andnot by chance: the meeting format, including the arrangement of forcing theArabstostand,wasanideaproposedbyMenachemBegin,akeyadversaryoftheBritishMandate.Narkis,formaltothepointofrigidity,askedeachdelegationmembertocome
upbeforehimandgivehisname.Thenhe told them—inHebrew—that Israelhad not responded to the strike with mass arrests or expulsions, nor had itopeneddetentioncamps,meansthatwerecommonduringtheBritishMandateand legally available to Israel. But like the British general Barker, who hadrecommended that hismen “hit the Jews in their pockets” as punishment forinsubordination, Narkis threatened the Palestinian merchants that if theycontinued to strike, “we’ll open a couple of supermarkets and sell everythingourselves.”28 Some Arab leaders were in fact deported from Jerusalem tovariouslocationsaroundthecountry.On September 19, an explosive device blew up in the former Fast Hotel,
whichhadbeena luxuryhotelduringBritish rule.ThebuildingwasdamagedduringtheWarofIndependence,andwhenthecitywasdivideditremainedonthe Israeli side of the border and became a crowded and poverty-strickenresidentialbuilding.Afewtenantswereinjuredintheexplosion,andtheChenprinting house was completely destroyed. The Chen may have been the realtargetoftheattack,asitproducedtextbooksforuseinWestBankschools.29
PoliceandShabakinvestigationsresultedinthearrestoftwoyoungmenwhoadmittedaconnectiontotheoperation,butsaidtheyhadnotactuallycarrieditout.Theysignedconfessionsbutpleadednotguiltyincourt,claimingtheyhadconfessed only after being beaten and tortured. One of them, Abdul RazzakQutub,a twenty-year-oldpresser inan Israeli laundry,was theeldest sonofawidowwhoworkedtosupporthisninesiblings.Hewasdescribedasamanof
limited intellect, embittered and withdrawn, living on the margins of society,whohadgottenmixedupintheaffairhopingtoearnrespect.Thesecondman,AbdulMan’imJibril,recountedatragiclifestorythatembodiedmanyelementsoftheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict.HewasborninJaffaandwassixyearsoldin1948when his familywas exiled.As they fled, his parents either lost himorabandonedhimbeneathatreeinanorchard.AnotherArabfamily,alsofleeing,tookhiminandraisedhimintherefugeecampinJericho.Ateighteenhewentto Kuwait to make his fortune, enlisted in the Palestinian Liberation Army,reached the rank of sergeant, and shortly before the Six-Day War wastransferredto theJerichoarea.AfterhisconvoywasbombedbytheIsraeliairforce,hemanaged towalk toAmman,wherehe joinedFatah.Hewas sent toNablus,whereheclaimedtohavereceivedordersfromYasserArafat.30
ThetrialwasheldinamilitarycourtinLod,andwasopentothepressandthepublic.The twoyoungmenwere accusedof violating the emergencydefenseregulationsthatIsraelhadinheritedfromtheBritish.Themaximumpunishmentfortheircrimeswasdeath.TheyhadIsraelidefenseattorneys,oneappointedbythecourt.ThehearingswereheldinHebrewandtranslatedintoArabic.Beforethe main trial, a “preliminary trial” was held, in which the defendants werepermitted toclaimthat theyhadsignedtheirconfessionsunderduress.Oneofthemwasallowedtotakeoffhisshirtinthejudges’chamber,toshowevidenceof abuse. The judges, who were military officers, were unconvinced; theyaccepted the confessions given by the defendants to the police and convictedthem. Qutub was sentenced to twenty years in prison, Jibril to twelve. Theprosecutorexplainedthathewasnotseekingthedeathpenaltybecauseneitherof the men had actively participated in laying the explosive device, and thedeath sentence should be employed only in extraordinary cases. In fact, thegovernmenthadresolvedthatprosecutorsinmilitarycourtscouldnotaskforthedeathpenalty,partlyoutoffearthatinternationalpressurewouldpreventitfrombeingcarriedout.32*AfewdaysaftertheattackontheFastbuilding,IsraeldeportedSheikhAbd
al-Hamidal-Sa’ihtoJordan.HewasthepresidingjudgeoftheIslamicreligiouscourtinEastJerusalem,andwasaccusedofincitement.Policeofficersappearedathishouseatthree-thirtyinthemorning.Theyallowedhimtogetdressedandtakeafewpersonalbelongings.Whenhereachedthepoliceheadquarters,theyreadhimhisdeportationorder.Heaskedforandreceivedatranslatedcopy,buthisrequesttokeeptheoriginalHebrewdocument,signedbyMosheDayan,wasdenied.
Thesheikhwasnotparticularlysurprisedbythedeportation,butsaiditwasapity they had not told himwhile hewas still at home, so that he could havetaken some clothes. He asked to go back home to pack a suitcase. A policeofficer, NahumBosmi, whose title was “head of the Special Duties Branch,”promisedtomakesurethesuitcasereachedhiminJordan.Al-Sa’ihwroteanoteto his family and attached fifty-one liras—he wouldn’t be needing them inJordan. Before they left, he asked to pray, and was allowed to do so. A fewminutesafterseveninthemorninghearrivedattheAllenbyBridge,namedfortheBritishgeneralwhohad takenPalestine from theTurksexactly fiftyyearsearlier.Al-Sa’ihshooktheIsraelipoliceofficer’shandandcrossedtheriver.Bosmilaterreconstructedtheconversationtheyhadontheway.Bosmihinted
thatAl-Sa’ih’s familymightbe joininghim,and thesheikhaskedwhatwouldhappentohisproperty.Hethenwentontodeclarethateverythinghadhappenedbecauseoftheannexation,notbecauseoftheoccupationitself.Israelcouldhavesaved itself a lot of trouble if it had solidified its rule in stages instead ofannexingEastJerusalematonce, through legislation.HewonderedhowIsraelcould ignore resolutionsmadeby theUN—thevery sameorganizationwhoseresolutionofNovember29,1947,hadbroughtaboutthestate’sestablishment.Thesheikhaskedtosendregardstoapoliceofficer,DavidChen,whoworked
on relationswithArabs and Christians, and to David Farhi, an officer of themilitarygovernment.Once,herecalled,hehadgivenFarhiacompliment:betterasmartenemythanafoolishfriend.Farhihadrepliedthatthiswastrue,butthatthey were not enemies. En route to the bridge, Al-Sa’ih and Bosmi passedthroughJericho,where thesheikhsaidheownedapieceof land;hehadbeenhopingtobuildawinterhomethere.33
Less than three weeks after the sheikh’s deportation, a Foreign Ministryofficial,DannyMihaeli,wenttotheZioncinemainJerusalemtoseeElDorado,starring JohnWayne. In front of him, in the twenty-fifth row,were twoblackwomen.Inthemiddleofthemovie,theygotupandleftthetheater.Mihaelifeltaroundwithhisfeetandfoundabag.Hesenttwokidstobringanusher,whofoundatimebombinthebag.Theusherranwithittothepoliceheadquartersinthe nearbyRussianCompound,where the bagwas detonatedwithout causinganydamage.Anexplosionin thetheaterwouldhavebeendisastrous.Thetwofemaleterroristswerearrested.TheybelongedtoasmallcommunityofAfricanswholivednotfarfromtheTempleMount.Theuprisingand terroristactivitiesdidnotbringdownIsraeli rule,but they
demonstrated that East Jerusalemwas under occupation and that its residents
wereunwillingtoliveinIsrael,eventhoughtheirlegalstatusgavethemvariousadvantages over the residents of the West Bank and Gaza. As the threat ofterrorismincreased,sodidtheinfluenceoftheShabak.TheheadoftheShabak,YehudaArbel,whose namewas a secret at the time, became a powerfulmanwithgreatinfluenceontheoccupation.34
Ninemonthsafterthewar,militaryandpoliceforcesdemolishedthehomeofthe Fatah commander in Jerusalem, Kamal Nimri, who was captured andaccusedofmurderingaDruzeguardnearAbuGhosh.Thestreetssurroundinghis home in the Wadi Joz neighborhood were blocked, the residents told toleave. The two-story house imploded with its contents still inside. A fewneighboring houseswere also damaged.The authorities had acted legally, butthedemolitionarousedcriticism,partlybecauseitblurredthedistinctionIsraelwashoping tocreatebetween the statusof Jerusalemand the restof theWestBank.*Terrorismsoonbecameroutine inJerusalem.Thepolicewarnedresidents to
bealertforsuspiciousobjects.Bagsweresearchedatmovietheaters.“Anyonecouldwalkinwithanastypackage,”warnedamunicipalityofficial.Ashehadbefore thewar,Eshkolreceivedplentyofsuggestionsfromcitizenswhoknewexactly how to protect the city from terrorism.Among the ideaswere specialmarkingsonArab-ownedvehicles;guardsatschools;undergroundrepositoriesoutsideeverycinema,wherebombscouldbethrownifanywerefound;andtwothousandsnifferdogs.Somecitizens,demandingthedeathpenaltyforterrorists,weredividedonlyoverwhethertohangthemorshootthem.Thesewerethefirstintimationsofanewframeofmind,whichgrewincreasinglybrutalovertime.36
Shortlybeforetheanniversaryoftheoccupation,thecityofJerusalemgranted“honorary citizenship” to Levi Eshkol. His acceptance speech no doubtexpressedthesentimentsofmostIsraelis.“Theunifyingactof liberation”wasthekeyexperienceof thewar,Eshkol said.Theunificationof thecitywas“arecognitionofitsstatusasthenation’slifeandheart”andwasnotsubjecttoanyrationalconsiderations—political,military,oreconomic.Rather,itwastheunityofJerusalemthatdictatedallotherconsiderations.37
CHAPTER20FACE-TO-FACEWITHISHMAEL
1.CONDITIONS:“FORTHISWEWENTTOWAR?”
Roughly threeweeks after thewar,KingHussein attempted to renew contactwithIsrael.CommunicatingthroughtheUnitedStatesandBritain,heproposedameeting.YaacovHerzog called this “a sensational development,” and at theprimeminister’sofficetheybegandebatingwhowouldmeetwiththeking.1
Bothbeforeandafterthewar,IsraelisgenerallyregardedKingHusseinasanobjectofridicule.Theywereparticularlyadeptatinsultinghisshortstature,andhewaswidelyknownas“thelittleking.”EphraimKishongavehimthemoniker“Hussi,” andHerzog, in his diary, called him yanuka (Aramaic for “baby” or“child”). But when it transpired that Hussein was willing to talk with Israel,prestigebattlesfollowed,promptingEzerWeizmantodescribeHusseinas“theplayboy of Israeli politics.”2 Eban wanted to go to the meeting. HerzogsuggestedthatEshkolhimselfgo,butEshkolsaidhecouldnottalkwiththekingwithout“speakingclearly,”andthegovernmentdidnotyethaveanythingcleartosay.Infact,theyhadabsolutelynoideawhattosaytoHussein.
MOSHEDAYANTOLDABBC INTERVIEWER IMMEDIATELYAFTER THE FIGHTING ENDEDthatIsraelwassatisfiedwiththenewsituationandwouldnot,therefore,initiateanynegotiationswithArabstates.“We’rewaitingfortheArabstopickupthephoneandcall,”hedeclared.3Asitturnedout,Israelcalledthem.Israelofferedawithdrawal from Sinai and theGolan in return for direct negotiations for apeacetreaty.Adecisiontothateffectwasmadeasearlyaseightdaysafterthewar,onJune19.
“ItwasthemostdramaticinitiativetheIsraeligovernmentevertook,beforeorsince,” wrote Foreign Minister Eban. The move arose from the need for adiplomatic formulation thatwouldbeacceptable to theworldandprimarily totheUnitedStates.ThedecisionwaskeptsecretandIsraelisknewnothingofit.However, itwasconveyed to theAmericans.According toEban, they relayedtheproposaltoEgyptandSyria,whobothrejectedtheoffertoparley;thereis
noconfirmationofthisaccount,however.Israelthuscreatedtheimpressionthatithadofferedtoreturntheterritoriesin
exchangeforpeace.SincetheArabsrefusedtoholdtalks,therewasthereforenopeaceandIsraelwouldkeeptheterritories.4Therealstory,however,wasmorecomplex. Under the proposal, Egypt would not recover all its losses: Israelwould hold on to the Gaza Strip. The Foreign Ministry lawyers adeptlyexplainedthataspartofMandatePalestine,GazahadneverrightlybelongedtoEgypt, but their arguments did nothing to change the fact that Israel wasdemandingcontroloverhundredsofthousandsofPalestinians.EgyptwasalsorequiredtoagreetoademilitarizationoftheSinaiPeninsula,whichgivingupafacetof itsmilitary sovereignty.Naturally, Israelwanted toensure freedomofaccesstotheGulfofAqaba,butalsototheSuezCanal.IsraeliplaneswouldbegrantedfreepassageintheairspaceovertheStraitsofTiran.The agreement offered to Syria was also based on the “international
boundary”fromtheBritishera.Syriawasaskedtogiveupthedisputedterritoryalong the border, which had, until the war, been a demilitarized zone. TheSyrianswouldhavealsohad toagree todemilitarizationof theGolanHeightsandtoundertakenottoobstructtheflowofwaterfromtheJordanRiversourcesintoIsrael.These proposed peace agreements with Egypt and Syria were mutually
exclusive, but both countries were required to disregard Jordan: the offersformulatedonJune19includednotasinglewordaboutthefutureoftheWestBank, or about Jerusalem and its residents. This resulted from the ministers’inabilitytoagreeontheseissues.ThediscussionbeganinthesecuritycabinetonJune15,andaccordingtoone
ministeritfrayedeveryone’snerves.5Insomewaysthegovernmentfounditselfin an evenmore stressful situation than before thewar, because therewas noimmediatedangerdictatingdecisions:everythingwaspossible,itwasallintheministers’hands—akeymoment.TheywerepartnerstoadecisiononquestionsthathadbeenwiththeZionistmovementsincethebeginning:Whatkindofstatewould Israel be? How would it live with the Arabs? The argument has notended,andtherewereprobablynoideasthatatthatgovernmentmeetinginJune1967.The starting point was an Arabic maxim quoted by the minister of police,
EliyahuSasson:“Whetherinvictoryorindefeat,bearealist,demandonlywhatis feasible andwhat is possible.”* Sassonwent on to propose an astonishingplan:unilateralwithdrawalwithoutaformalpeaceagreement.Egyptwouldnot
signapeacetreatywithIsrael,hemaintained,andthedemandthatitdosoonlygaveitabargainingchip.SassonalsosuggestedgivinguponpeacewithSyria.Nooneagreed.Itwasnotaquestionoftactics,saidMenachemBegin,butof
a moral principle accepted throughout history: when there was a war, oneusuallywantedittoendinpeace.HeaskedSassonwhetherhebelieved,“basedonhisknowledgeoftheEast,”thatNassercouldagreetodemilitarizetheSinaiandallowfreedomofshippingwithoutapeaceaccord.Begin’sownanswerwasthat Nasser would agree to nothing—not peace, not demilitarization, notfreedomof theseas.Dayanasserted thatas longas therewasnopeace treaty,Israelwouldnotbudgefromtheterritories.Thiswasthegeneralopinionaroundthe table. In another forum, Dayanwas farmore blunt: the Arabs would notmakepeace,andsoIsraelwouldkeeptheterritories.The main argument revolved around the future of theWest Bank. Zalman
Aransaid,“I’mtellingyouplainlythatwedon’tneedtheWestBank.Itwilldousmoreharmthangood.”Hewasafraid,ofcourse,ofthePalestinians.“Tothisday, I love Eretz Israel more than the State of Israel,” Aran said, but as heconsideredIsrael’sfuturewiththeWestBank,hewassurethat“wewillchokeonit.”HeprophesiedthattheWestBankwouldbethedownfallofthestate.Thedaysofempiresweregone,addedMinisterofJusticeShapira: thiswas
theageofdecolonization.TherewerethosewhodenouncedIsraelasanagentofcolonialism,andifitinsistedonrulingtheArabsoftheWestBank,theirvoiceswouldonlygrowlouder.“Everyprogressivepersonwillsay,‘Look,thisiswhywecalled thesepeople the torch-bearersof imperialismandcolonialism.TheywanttoturntheWestBank,whichispopulatedbyArabs,intoacolonyoftheStateofIsrael.’”Itwasnotmerelyaquestionofwhatpeoplewouldsay,Shapiracontinued. Annexation of the West Bank would turn Israel into a binationalstate,anditwouldn’tbelongbeforetheJewsbecameaminority.“Thenwe’refinishedwiththewholeZionistenterpriseandwe’llbeaghettohere.”HehadnoobjectiontoIsraelclaiming,“totheoutside,”thattheJordanRiverwasitsfutureborder, but “on the inside,” they, theministers,must know that this couldnothappeniftheywantedthestatetosurvive.“Weshouldbeverycarefulofthis,”concurredPinhasSapir.Asthegovernmentwasdebatingthequestion,DavidBen-Gurionpublisheda
manifestoonthefutureoftheterritories.HedeclaredthatIsraelwaspreparedtodiscusspeacewithitsneighbors,throughdirectnegotiations.IfEgyptagreedtomake peace and allow free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and the SuezCanal, Israel would give back the Sinai. The Gaza Strip would remain with
Israel. If Syria agreed tomake peace, it would get theGolan back. The IDFwouldnotwithdrawfromtheJordanRiver.WestBankresidentswouldbegivenautonomy.TherefugeesfromGazawouldberesettledintheWestBank“orinsomeotherArabarea.” If Jordanmadepeacewith Israel, itwouldbegrantedaccess to the Mediterranean. There would be no negotiations over EastJerusalem.TheJewsofHebronwouldbeallowedtoreturntotheirhomes.According to Ben-Gurion, he published his views in response to questions
fromreportersfromseveralforeigncountries,followinganinaccuratequoteonhispositioninaJapanesenewspaper.Butbydoingso,heinsinuatedhimselfintothe government discussion, and cast his great shadow over it. The eventualdecisiondidnotinfactstraytoomuchfromhisposition.6
Thedebate,whichcontinuedinvariousforumsoverseveraldays, raised thebinational idea, aswell as the division of the country into “cantons,” theUNpartitionplanfrom1947,andproposalsfortransferringtheWestBanktojointIsraeli-Jordanian rule, or forgranting thePalestinians ameasureof autonomy.Dayansuggestedautonomy.Heassumedthattwoorthreeyearswouldpassbythetimetheyhadtoreachaconcretedecision.Duringthattime,residentsoftheterritorieswouldbesubjecttomartiallaw,keptbehindabordertheArabswouldnot be permitted to cross: “Up to here—you. From here on—us.”When themoment came, the Palestinians would be allowed self-government but notindependence: security and foreign policy would stay under Israeli control.Dayanwas not sure any of thiswas plausible: “If it turns out that there’s nopossibility of granting self-government, and I have to choose between thembelonging to Jordan—with the exception of Jerusalem—or becoming Israelicitizens,I’dpreferthattheybelongtoJordan.”YigalAllonheldtheoppositeview:“Isupportkeepingthelandintact,withall
theArabs,”heargued,buthealsosuggestedanotherpossibility:anindependentArabstateinpartoftheWestBank,surroundedbyIsraeliterritories.Allonwasalready working on a plan revolving around the annexation of the GolanHeights, the Jordan Valley, and the Gaza Strip. He thought Hebron andBethlehemcouldbeannexedat the same time. In the restof the territorieshesuggested, at first, establishing Palestinian quasi-autonomy, and then heproposed giving themback to Jordan.Allonwas hoping to establish a secureborder along the Jordan River and expand Israel’s territory without greatlyenlargingthestate’sArabpopulation.Dayanwasworkingoutthedetailsofhisownplan,whichinvolvedsettingupmilitaryoutpostsandJewishcommunitiesonthemountaintops,intheheartoftheArabpopulation.Thiswastheprimarydifferencebetweentheirtwoplans.
Ze’ev Sherf, the minister of commerce and industry, commented that theprecise boundaries were not all that significant. “We have a problem withterrorism, and the problem exists whether or not the Jordan River is theinternational border.” He believed there was no need to make an immediatedecision.MenachemBeginalsobelieved in thepowerof time.Begin rejectedeveryproposal discussed: a “canton”was a ghetto, andwhere anArabghettorose,aJewishghettowouldfollow;self-governmentorautonomywouldleadtostatehood.“Thisistheironcladlogicofthings,”hesaid.HedismissedoutrighttheideaofhandingtheWestBankbacktoHussein:“WesendoursonstowarsothattherewillbeyetanotherArabstate,orsothatpartsofEretzIsraelwillbegiventoanArabstate,sothatwe’llcreateanenclavewithinEretzIsraelfromwhichtheycanshootatTelAviv?Forthiswewenttowar?”HeagreedtogivebackalloftheSinai,butdemandedthattheIDFremaininSharmel-Sheikh.Heagreed to make peace with Hussein, as the king of the eastern bank of theJordan.Buthe“begged”thegovernmentnottohurry.Martiallawwasworking,and it was sufficient to let the United States know that Israel was seekingsolutions.Thetimeframehehadinmindwasatleastsevenyears,afterwhichtheycouldofferthePalestiniansachoice:acceptIsraelicitizenshiporleavethecountry.Heassumed Israelwouldattract a largenumberof immigrants in theinterim. “This is Greater Israel,” concurred Minister Israel Yeshayahu, whosoughttoimposesomeoftheresponsibilityontheJewsoftheworld:“LettheJewish people exert themselves to make Eretz Israel Jewish, with a decisiveJewishmajority.”Eshkolmaintained that the Jordan River should be Israel’s security border,
apparentlymakingadistinctionbetweenthatandapoliticalborder,althoughhedid not specify howhe imagined that thiswouldwork.He also differentiatedJerusalemfromGaza.“ForJerusalem,wearewillingtodie;fortheGazaStrip,whenwethinkofthe400,000Arabs,ourheartsarealittlebitter,”hesaid,asifJerusalemwerenotpopulatedbyArabs, andas ifmanysoldiershadnotbeenkilledwhileseizingtheGazaStrip.Buthenonethelesscalledforannexingthemboth.7 As he had before the war, Eshkol spoke at length about the need toconsider U.S. demands. He offered a comparison: the governor of RhodesiathumbedhisnoseattheBritishgovernmentandtreatedtheblackpopulationashesawfit.Israelcouldthumbitsnoseat theUnitedStates,butnotforlong:afewmonths,perhaps.Nomore.Abe Fortas was indeed attempting to influence the government’s decision,
almost as if he were one of its ministers. He “pleaded” with Israel, throughAmbassadorHarman,thatitsdecisionshouldnotonlystresstheneedforpeace
butalsoinvolveanexplicitdeclarationthatitdidnotintendanoccupation.TheU.S.ambassadortoIsraelreceivedareportonthegovernmentdiscussions.Theministers argued over what to tell the Americans. Waiting for the June 19decision,PresidentJohnsonintendedtopresenttheU.S.positioninatelevisedaddress.8
YaacovHerzog’ssummaryofthediscussionindicatesfouralternativesonthematterofSyriaandEgypt:peacebasedontheinternationalborder,andonotherspecific terms; a demand for peace, not specifying any terms (Dayan’sproposal);presenting termswithnorequest forpeace(Sasson’sproposal);andMinisterMosheCarmel’ssuggestion,“peace,butwithalltheterritories.”Withregard to Jordan, there were two outlooks: the Jordan River as the borderbetween Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom; alternatively, setting no finalborder,because thatwouldputanend to talkswithJordan.Theministersalsodebated three options for the refugee problem: a plan to settle them in Arabstates;theavoidanceofanyresettlementplan,whileinvestigatingthepossibilityof settling the refugees in theSinai, theWestBank,oron theeasternbank inJordan;andfinally,tablingtheproblemfornow.OneministersaidhefearedawaramongJewsmorethanonebetweenJews
andArabs.Sothateveryonecouldsupportthefinaldecision,theyagreednottomention the West Bank. They were playing chess with themselves, Eshkolobserved.AndthenthetelephonerangwithHusseinontheline.MinisterAranbreathedasighofrelief:“IftherewerenoHussein,wewouldhavehadtoinventhim.”Inpreparation for themeetingwith theking,Eshkolwished toconsultwith
Golda Meir as head of his party, and with Menachem Begin. But not withDayan, whose advice he did not want. It was decided to send Herzog to themeetingwithHussein,asthetwohadmetinthepast.HerzogsuggestedofferingHusseinaneconomicunionwithIsraelandjointcontroloftheWestBank,untilaconfederationcouldbeestablished.9
2.THEKING:“PEACEWITHDIGNITY”
The firstmeeting betweenHussein andHerzog had taken place in September1963. By the time of the Six-DayWar, they had met four times in London.AnothermeetingwasheldwithGoldaMeir,inParis.Indocumentspertainingtothemeetings,HusseinisgiventhecodenameCharles.The secret contacts were intended to establish a stable framework for the
cooperative relationship between the two countries,while the declared enmitywas merely for show. Herzog once passed on a warning to Hussein about aJordanian air force officer who was plotting against him, and Hussein gaveIsrael information about an Arab plan to assassinate Moshe Dayan.10 BothHerzog and Hussein might well have considered the war a personal failure.Whentheymetthreeweeksafterthefighting,theybothfelttheneedtobeginbypickingupthepieces,exchangingviewsonthehistoricalandemotionalrootsofthe conflict. Like previous meetings, this one took place at the clinic of Dr.EmmanuelHerbert,Hussein’sJewishdoctor,andinhispresence.Theybeganateight-fifteenintheeveningonSunday,July2.Theirconversationlastedanhourandthirty-fiveminutes.Herzogwroteafifteen-pagesummaryofthemeeting,inEnglish.Had he not disclosedwhat he really thought about his conversationswiththeking,onemighthavebelievedhewasstrivingforapeaceagreement.
HERZOGARRIVEDFIRST.HUSSEINWASCOMINGFROMAVISITWITHSOMEOFHIS SOLdierswhohadbeenwounded in thewarandwerehospitalized inLondon.HewasaccompaniedbyaBritishbodyguard,whomheaskedtowaitoutsideasifheweregoinginforamedicalcheck-up.Dr.Herberttookhimintooneoftheexamination rooms. Herzog came in next and bowed to the king. There wasgreatdrama in theair:Husseinwas riskinghis lifebycoming to themeeting.HerzogthoughthecouldseethetollofwaranddefeatonHussein’sface,buthefound that more than anger and bitterness, Hussein projected sorrow andresignation.*
Herzog sat down next to the king. He began by saying that their previousmeetings had not been for nothing and repeated the “biblical undertaking” hehadgiven theking in thepast: thismeeting, likepreviousones,wouldremainsecret.HeconveyedgoodwishesfromEshkolandEbanandsaidhewastheretoaskwhether thekinghad anything to say in the aftermathof thewar.HerzogstressedthattheconversationwasunofficialandthattheIsraeliswereawareoftheextremestrainthekingwasunder.Theyexpressedtheirsorrowforthelossoflifeonbothsides.With thedignityofawoundedknight,Hussein said thathadhebeen in the
Israelis’ position, he would have acted as they did. He had known for someyears that war was inevitable. The country’s difficult political and strategicconditionhadledhimtoconcludethatIsraelwouldeventuallytrytosolvetheproblemby force.He had seen the crisis coming.TheArabs hadmade gravemistakes,andhehadwarned themrepeatedly.He took responsibility forwhat
hadhappenedbecausehecouldhavedonemoretoemphasizetheurgencyofhiswarnings.TheMiddleEastwasnowat a crossroads,witha choicebetweenabetterfutureandanotherwar.TherewouldsoonbeanArabsummit,andifnounderstandingwasachieved,eachstatewouldconsideritselffreetoactasitsawfit.Asifaddressingfuturehistorians,Herzogofferedacorrection.Thekingwas
under amisconception: Israel had never planned a war; the war was entirelyunnecessary. Its military preparations had been aimed solely at defense. HelecturedthekingaboutthestrategicaimsthathadguidedtheArabworldsince1964;hetalkedaboutSyriaandaboutFatah.Inhisanalysis, itwasclearlythePalestinianswhohadbroughtaboutthecrisisthatultimatelyledtowar.Hadtheterrorist attacks continued, Israel inevitably would have had to act to defenditself,butithadnotplannedacomprehensiveattackonSyria,Herzogclaimed.Hedescribedatconsiderablelengththechainofeventsthathadledtothewar,upuntilthepointatwhichIsraelhadfeltthenoosetighteningarounditsneck.NasserhadsurprisedIsrael;theyhadnotexpectedanythingofthissorttooccurbefore1970.Israelwasnot toblamefor thewarwithJordan.Hecouldgive thekinghis
word of honor that there had been no plan to attack his country. As hewellknew, Israel had relayed twowarnings tohim,one throughGeneralOddBullandanotherthroughtheJordaniandelegatetotheMixedArmisticeCommission,Colonel Daoud. When Herzog mentioned the warning sent through Bull, hewrote, Hussein “smiled wistfully”; upon mention of the second warning, heseemedsurprised.AtthispointHerzogwentontopreachabouttherootsoftheJewishmentalityandZionist ideology, includingthecommonlyheldviewthatthe Arab leaders “did not understand” Israel. The persecution of Jews,culminatingintheHolocaust,hadledthemtoseeanyassaultononeJewasanassaultontheentirepeople.JewscouldnotlivetheirlivesquietlyinJerusalemor in Tel Aviv while farmers in the north were being fired on. This was themeaningofthe“transcendentalunity”oftheJewishpeople,saidHerzog,thesonof the late chief rabbi, referring to the traditional saying, “All the people ofIsraelareresponsibleonefortheother.”Herzog proceeded to explain that the Arabs had also never understood the
bond between the Jews and the land of Israel, which was unique in humanhistory and anchored in the spiritual origins of the Jewish people. Instead oftrying to understand this phenomenon, the Arabs had looked for rationalexplanations for the renewal of the Jews in the landof their forefathers, as ifthey had returned there asmere refugees, as if the Jewish nationalmovement
were an artificial constructwithout roots, and as if the sources of its strengthwerethewealthandthepoweroftheWesterncapitals.Itwastrue,Herzogsaid,that theNazipersecutionof Jewshad spurred theZionistmovement, and thatthe influence of Jews around the world was also an essential element. Butbeyond these, there had been, and stillwas, the eternal covenant between thepeopleofIsraelandthelandofIsrael,andwithitthesensethataslongasthepeopleareseveredfromtheirlandtheyareinexile,withoutshapeorrealization.HusseinrepliedthatattheArabsummitinMoroccoin1965,theparticipants
had decided that they would be ready within three years. “Ready for what?”Herzogasked.Husseinpausedand then replied, “To talkwithyouasequals.”Hemusthavemeantwar,Herzogobserved,becauseHusseinwentontoexplaintheArabs’motivation:within threeyears, theyestimated, Israelmight acquirenuclear weapons. The Arab states agreed to act in concert, but it quicklytranspiredthattherewasnounity.Thesupposedunifiedcommandturnedouttobe an empty shell. A few people, Hussein said, took advantage of the Israeliproblemtoassumeleadership.TheFatahoperationswereincontradictiontothestates’decisiontowaituntiltheycouldactinunison.Hussein said he had tried to the best of his abilities to suppress Fatah, as
agreed by the Arab states. The Fatah units that operated from his countryreceived no official support and had acted irresponsibly. He had receivedwarnings from Israel, via theUnitedStates and other channels, and had donewhathecould.IsraelhadoncegivenhiminformationaboutaBedouinterroristunit,butallhiseffortstolocateitfailed.AndthencameSamua.TheSamuaoperationhadbeenashocktohim.Onlyafewdaysearlier,hehad
receivedamessageofthanksfromIsraelforhiseffortstocombatFatah.AfterSamua, Hussein found himself in a corner. On the one hand, he was beingseverely criticized by other Arab states for his actions against Fatah. On theother, the Samua operation convinced him that Israel made no distinctionbetween Jordan and Syria. And so he had no choice but to draw his ownconclusions.Withoutsayingsoexplicitly,HusseinseemedtoagreewithHerzogthattheSix-DayWarwasaresultofthePalestinianstruggle.When he visited Nasser, Hussein continued, he learned that the Egyptian
presidentbelievedIsraelwasplanningtoattackSyria.Nasserhadnochoicebuttoprepareaccordingly,andasanArab,neitherdidHussein.Hewascertainthatthere had been no plan to launch a full-scale attack against Israel, he assuredHerzog.TherewasnocoordinationbetweenJordanandEgypt;theyhadnojointplans.HusseinhadaskedNasserwhyhehadnotsoughtHussein’sadvicebefore
sending forces into theSinai.Nasser replied thathehadnothad time;hehadhadtoactquickly,inlightofthethreatsagainstSyria.HehadnotmeanttotaketheUNforcesoutofthepicture.HusseintoldHerzogthatIsraelshouldnothavetakenNasser’sdeclarations toheart,and, likeHerzog,heproceeded todeliverananalysisofhisownpeople’smentality: “With theArabs,wordsdon’thavethe samevalueas theydo forotherpeople.Threatsmeannothing.”Formanyyears,thishadbeenoneofthegreatfailingsoftheArabs:theyconfusedwordswith intentions andacts.For amoment, it seemedas if the eventsof thepastweekswerenothingmorethanamutualmisunderstanding.Husseinsaidhehadhopedtobeabletorestrainhiscolleagues.Hepointedout
thatSaudiArabiahadsentnotasinglesoldiertoJordan,andonlyoneIraqiunithad reached the Jordan Valley. But Herzog surely knew all this, he addedbitterly.HerzogcommentedthattherewereEgyptiancommandounitsinJordan,andanEgyptiangeneralhadbeenplacedincommandofsomeJordanianforces.TothisHusseinmadenoresponse.The warning he had received through Bull had reached him when his
warplaneswere already in the air, theking said, but addedcandidly that evenhaditarrivedsooner,itwouldprobablynothavedoneanygood.Hisplaneshadgonetoattackmilitarytargets,mainlyIsraeliairforcebases,soastorestorethebalanceofforcesupsetbyIsrael’sairattackonEgypt.Healsoexplainedthatithad been important for him to maintain positions in theMount Scopus area,becauseitcontrolledstrategicallyvaluableroads.WhenHerzogaskedaboutthebombing of Jerusalem, Hussein looked stunned and said it had happened incontravention of his orders. One could not always control all the forcesinvolved, he explained, also bitterly; perhaps one of his men had decided tobombJerusaleminresponsetothebombingofAmman.HerzogassumedhewasreferringtothebombingoftheAmmanairfield.Hussein, also seeming to speak for the history books, listed the factors that
hadledtoIsrael’svictory:itsairforce,its intelligence,itsabilitytoshift largeforcesquicklyandeffectively.Itspowerwasenormous;hismilitaryhadfeltthatkeenly.“Suchiswar,”headdedcontemplatively.HesaidhewouldnotallowtheArab states to evade their responsibility so easily, and would demand acommission of inquiry into the war’s beginnings. Herzog repliedmagnanimously that the Jordanian army had fought courageously, and toldHusseinhow the Israelishad feltgreat fear.That those feelingshadshifted toelation was not, he assured Hussein, the result of conquest, but of survival.Herzogsoundedasifhewereattemptingtopersuadehimself.HowcouldNasserthink that allhisbehaviorwouldgounanswered?“Wehad to takehis actions
andwordsseriously.”Atthispointtheconversationwashalfwayover.HerzogandHusseinseemed
to have made their points. Hussein was downcast but at ease, Herzog noted,brokenbut alsohopeful, depressedbut also somehow liberated. It occurred toHerzog that although he had lost the war and a large part of his kingdom,Hussein had acquired, for the first time, the status of a true Arab leader: hismotiveswere no longer under suspicion in theArabworld, his patriotismnotquestioned.Defeathadnot, it seemed, shaken thecoreofhispersonality.The“furtivelook”intheking’seyeswasnowgone.Whatwas donewas done,Herzog toldHussein.The question nowwas the
future.Thefriendshipthetwohaddevelopedovertheyearsmadeitimpossibleforhimnottoask:WasHusseinheadedtowardanewwarortopeace?Husseinrespondedslowlyandfirmlyinhisdeepvoice.“Theextremists,”he
said,withahintofsarcasminhistone,“haveonecourse.Ihaveanother.Imustsayfranklytoyou,ifitispeace,itwillhavetobepeacewithdignity.”Hehadfor a long timeunderstood the connectionbetween the Jewishpeople and thelandofIsrael,hesaid,althoughothersdidnot.ThiswasthepointthattheArabsfoundmost difficult to accept. The fundamental problem they faced nowwashowtopreservetheirArabidentityintheregion.“Notonlyyouhaverights.Wealsohave rights.Donotpushus intoacorner. . . .Becarefulofour feelings.Treatthemwithrespectandunderstanding.Theregionisatacrossroads.Ihopewewilltakeapositivecourse.Somuchdependsuponyou.”Herzog offered a gloomy vision of what might happen in the absence of
peace, and remindedHussein that he had not heard officiallywhether hewaswillingtoenternegotiations.Withoutthatwillingness,Herzogcouldnotdiscussdetailsofasettlement.HewasnotauthorizedtoofferHusseinanagreement,buthe could share his own private thoughts, he said, and repeated the idea ofestablishinganeconomicunionbetweenJordanandIsrael,whichwouldleadtoaconfederation.Hesaidtheregioncouldbecome“thegardenoftheworld,”andHusseinloweredhisheadincontemplation.Later in theconversation,Herzog showeredHusseinwithpraise, lauded the
social institutions in his country, and described his survival skills as evidencethathehadbeen“providentiallysaved”sothathecouldmakepeace.Theking,predictably, replied thathispersonalsurvivalwasunimportant,only thefutureofhispeople.Husseinaskedforalittlemoretimeandpromisedaresponsetothequestion
ofpeace.InHerzog’ssummaryofthemeeting,writtenwiththeassistanceofDr.
Herbert, Israel is depicted as peace-loving,while even thismostmoderate ofArab leaders, in a secret meeting, face-to-face, emerges as hesitant in thisrespect. But apart from his personal vision of a confederation, Herzog hadbrought Hussein no proposal. Noting that the king did not mention theWestBankorJerusalem,hesurmisedthatHusseinwantedtoleavethequestionopen.ButHerzog did not explainwhy Israel hadmade no offer to return theWestBankandJerusalem.In reality, Herzog had not come to Hussein seeking peace. He wanted to
negotiate in order to buy time—to delay, at least for a while, the need towithdraw from theWest Bank. Herzog hadmade no secret of his intentions.“Eban and I disagree,” he had told Yigal Allon. “While Ebanmaintains thatthere isachance [forapeaceagreementwithJordan], Idispute this. I see theimportance[ofconversationswithHussein]aspurelytactical.”Hemadesimilarstatements toBegin: “I view the continued contactwithCharles as necessary,althoughIamcertainitwillnotleadtoanything.”12Meanwhile,IsraelwasalsotalkingwithPalestinianleadersintheWestBank.
3.COLLABORATION:“AGROVELINGTYPE”
Assoonasthewarwasover,andinsomecasesevenbeforefightinghadendedon all fronts, Israeli military government officials, army intelligence officers,ShabakandMossadagents,andseniorgovernmentofficialsbeganapproachingPalestinianpublicfigures:mayors;membersoftheJordanianparliament;formercabinetministers; and prominent attorneys, journalists, and businessmen. TheIsraeliswereextremelycurious tomeet thesepeople,whosenames theyknewmainly from intelligence reports and from the media. They came as victors,some speaking asmasters and occupiers.A few of these initial conversationsseemedmorelikeinterrogationsaimedatupdatingintelligencefiles.ButIsraelisalso had a sincere desire to find outwhether an independent Palestinian statewasfeasibleintheWestBankandGaza,therebyputtinganendtotheconflictoverPalestine.Dozensofsuchconversationsoccurredoverthefollowingmonths,producing
hundredsofpagesofminutes.Withtheexceptionofafewsecretandamateurishprobes conducted in the past, these talks were the first attempt to weave anagreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The Israelis who met withPalestinianleadersincludedEshkol,Dayan,andEban.
THEY BEGAN IN AN ARBITRARY AND IMPROVISED WAY, SUBJECT TO THE GENERALCHAOS of ChaimHerzog’s command. David Kimche, aMossad employee onleave, was sent to try and restart the radio station in Ramallah. He wasaccompaniedbyDanBawly, a formerJerusalemPost reporter and one of themanyreservistsstillonactivedutywhonowhadlittletodo.*ThetworanintosomeonewhoknewaseniorPalestinianjournalist,whosaidhecouldtakethemto themanagerof the radio station.ThedatewasprobablySaturday, June10.ThefightingontheGolanHeightswasnotyetover,butthemilitarygovernmentintheWestBankhadalreadybegunreturningcivilianlifetonormal.ThemanKimcheandBawlywerelookingforwasnothome,buttheysomehowendedupin the home of Aziz Shehade, a Christian lawyer born in Jaffa, who hadrepresentedJordanintalkswithIsraelinLausanne,Switzerland,backin1949.Theytalkedaboutthepresentandthefuture.Shehadesentthemtoseeafriendofhis,andgavethemamemorandumoutlininghispositions.
Whentheyhadmetwithtenpeople,Kimchesentareporttotheheadofarmyintelligence;thenextdayhereportedconversationswithfivemorePalestinians.Hewrotethathisinterlocutorswerestunnedbydefeatandfeltthatpeacemustbe achieved.Theyhoped the Jordanian regimewould not return: theywantedindependenceorautonomy.Intheircurrentstateofshock,theywerepreparedtocooperatewithIsrael,andquickactionwasthereforecalledfor.Kimche seems tohave introducedhimself to thesepeople as someone from
“the IDF’s political wing.” He and Bawly were joined by Aluf Hareven andYitzhak Oron, who had represented army intelligence and theMossad in thecomprehensiveinquiryintothefutureoftheWestBankinitiatedbyAbbaEbanaftertheSamuaoperation.Thedocumentproducedbythefourmenreflectstheworkofthoseteams.Italsoprojectsthesensethatvictoryhadbroughtwithitachanceforpeace,andanenormousfaith—almostmystical,somewhatnaïveandarrogant—inthepowerof theMossadtomakehistory.TheestablishmentofaPalestinian state necessitated “magnanimity and boldness,”wroteKimche andhisassociates,butPalestinianstatehoodwastobeaMossadoperation,a“sting”thatrequiredfastaction:Palestinianleaderswouldneedtoagreetothedecisiontoestablishthestatewithintwenty-fourhoursafterIsraelapprovedtheplan.ThePalestinianstatewouldbe“under IDFpatronage,”withoutanarmybut
withapoliceforce.An“Israelimilitarydelegation”wouldbe“credentialed”tothegovernmentofPalestine,andtheIDFwouldhaveapermanentpresenceintheJordanValleyandwouldprotectthestateofPalestinefromexternalthreats.TheborderbetweenPalestineandIsraelwouldbe“basedon”the1947partitionborders,butIsraelwouldannexsometerritories, includingtheLatruncorridor.
TopreservePalestinian“dignity,”Israelwouldalso“giveup”afewofitsownArabvillages.The state ofPalestinewouldhave access to the sea through anIsraeliport,andfreepassagebetweentheWestBankandGaza.EastJerusalemwould remain in Israel, but therewould be aPalestinian “submunicipality” intheOldCity,andtheholysiteswouldreceive“specialstatus.”ThePalestinianstate would establish its capital “at the closest possible point to Jerusalem,”whichwouldbepartof“greaterJerusalem.”Israelwouldundertaketosolvetherefugee problem bymeans of an international fund that would encourage therefugeestoleaveGazaandtheWestBankandsettleinothercountries.Asafirststeptowardfoundingthestate,KimcheandhiscolleaguessuggestedconveningPalestinianpublicfiguresinacongressofsorts.*TheproposalwasdatedJune14,buteventhen,fourdaysafterthewar,itwasnotthefirst:DayanandEbanhadstartedreceivingproposalsforaPalestinianstateonJune9.15
Eshkol did not reject the Kimche proposal outright. In order to hear morePalestinian opinions, he set up a “Special Inter-Office Committee,” whosememberswereChaimHerzog,now removed fromhispositionasgovernoroftheWestBank;DavidKimche;andtwoForeignMinistryemployees,ShaulBar-HaimandMosheSasson,thesonoftheministerofpolice.YaacovHerzogwasappointed as the committee’s government liaison, but it was to operate inaffiliation with the Secret Service and receive orders from a body called theSelectCommitteeofHeadsofServices,meaning theMossadand theShabak.Theywere instructed to address Palestinian leaders “politely, respectfully, butfirmlyandclearly,”withtheaimofimpressingthem.Theyhadtomakecleartotheir interlocutors that their people’s future now depended exclusively on thegovernmentofIsrael.ThePalestinianshad tobemadeaware that thiswas theonlycommunicationchannelavailabletothem.Thetalksweresupposedtotakeplacewithout publicity: “Prevent contact between Israeli journalists and thesepeople,”readthecommittee’sguidelines.16
Equippedwithbiographicaldetailspulledfromvariousintelligencefiles,thefoursplitupintotwoteamsandsetoffontheirmission:theIrish-bornHerzogandtheBritish-bornKimchespokeEnglish,whileBar-HaimandSassonspokeArabic. Theywere instructed to listen and report, but like everyone else theyalsowanted tomakehistory.Evenbefore theyhaddonemuch, theyproposedgrooming leaders whom they identified as suitable. The grooming would beachieved through “close contact” with the leaders, “under committeesupervision.”Thepotentialleaderswouldbedividedintogroups,eachofwhichwould be handled by a groomer to be introduced as a “liaison officer.” Thegroomingwassupposedtoinclude“respondingtowishes.”Theproposalechoed
attemptsmade by the Zionistmovement, even during British rule, to financePalestinianpartiesandnewspapers,bribeleaders,andbuycollaborators.17†
AndsoHerzog,Kimche,Bar-Haim,andSassonbegantoperceivethemselvesasanapoliticalbodywith thepower to intervene inalmost all aspectsof life.They recommended conducting a population census; sending a delegation ofdignitariestoHussein,todemandthathepermittheexportofproducefromtheWestBank toJordan;arrangingfinancialmatters incooperationwithbanks inSwitzerlandandLondon;andpublishinganewspaperunderthesupervisionofGabriel Tzifroni, a veteran of the Hebrew press. They prepared a list ofindividualswhoshouldbebroughtinasmembersoftheJerusalemcitycouncil,and advised against allowing any direct contact between residents of theterritories and representatives of Israeli political parties. All this was donewithinfivedaysofthecommittee’sinception.19
MostofthePalestinianleadersinterviewedbythecommitteeweresummonedto the offices of themilitary government, away from neighbors’ prying eyes.TheyallsaidtheywantedpeacewithIsrael.Somewantedanindependentstate,whileothersconditionedanysettlementona treatybetweenIsraelandJordan.They were not in an easy position: there was no assurance that Israel wouldremain in the territories, and so theywereafraid to commit to a settlement incasetheylatercametobeseenascollaboratorsandtraitors.TheyalsoworriedthatIsraelwouldreachsomeaccordwithHusseinbehindtheirbacks.Almosteveryoneofthemneededsomething,inthosedaysofshockafterthe
war: contactwith relatives, transit permits,money. “The sheikh’s family is inJordan and he asked for our help bringing them back. This could serve as ameans to pressure him,” said the backgroundmaterial on SheikhMohammedAliJaabari,themayorofHebron.TheIsraeliswrotedownmuchoftheflatterythey heard, apparently with some delight. Palestinian leaders repeatedlyexpressedtheirendlesswonderatthescopeofthevictory,repeatingagainandagainhowamazedtheywerethattheIDFsoldiersdidnotslaughterciviliansorrapewomen.Jaabarisaidhehadnowordsadequatetopraisetheattitudeofthecommandersand theirmen.He saidhehadwarnedHusseinnot togo towar,and declared that ifNasser had a shred ofmilitary dignity, hewould commitsuicide,asHitlerhaddone.TheIsraelis’notesrevealanambivalentvaluesystemintheirattitudetoward
the collaborators: they needed them, they encouraged them, and they scornedthem.“Heseemslikeacoward,flatteringthosestrongerthanhim,”theywroteofoneman.Andofanother,“agrovelingtype,interestedincollaboratingwith
the Jews.”OfSheikh Jaabari theywrote, “Greedyandeasilybribed.Hated intheWestBankbecauseofhiscorruption.”Butthesewerepreciselythepeopletheywerelookingfor:“Weunderstandthatheisinclinedtolookforapositivesettlementsolution.Hewillreceiveourencouragementandfullsupport.”20
Yet, three weeks after initiating these talks, the four committee membersconcludedthattherewasnochanceofsuccess.EventheWestBankleaderswhowere at first inclined to abilateral settlementwith Israel hadquickly changedtheirmindsandrefusedtoactwithoutcoordinationwithHussein.Theyhadalsobeguntorecoverfromtheshockofdefeatandoccupation.Themoretheygottoknow the wonders of the “enlightened occupation,” the more theWest Bankleaders were emboldened to demonstrate their resistance. “The situation isdeteriorating,” wrote Sasson, and listed several acts of rebellion: dignitariesfromNablussuggestedtoHusseinthathenotsignaseparatepeaceagreementwithIsrael;afewclergymeninJerusalemprotestedtheoccupationinatelegramtotheUNsecretarygeneral;eightofthedozenArabjudgesinJerusalemrefusedtogobacktowork;noneoftheArabmembersofthecitycouncilwouldagreeto serve on a joint council. “The pride and boastfulness exceed permissiblelimits,”wroteSasson,andsuggestedimposinghousearrestonafewpersonages,includingAnwarKhatib,who, as governor of Jerusalem,was themost seniorJordanian official remaining in theWest Bank. “I suspect that he is the onedirectingallthisactivityintheoccupiedterritories,“Sassonexplained.21
The failure of the talks led the committee to conclude that efforts tomakepeacewithJordanshouldbesteppedup,and that fullandexclusivecontroloftheWestBankmustbemaintainedfornow,withoutinvolvingrepresentativesofthelocalpopulation.
IN THE REPORT THEY SENT TO ESHKOL, THE COMMITTEE MEMBERS DETAILED THETERMS of a desirable agreement with Jordan. They proposed joint Israeli-Jordanian rule of theWest Bank; annexation of the Gaza Strip—“emptied ofrefugees”—to Israel; andadefensepactbetween IsraelandJordan thatwouldgrant the IDF an “automatic right to enter the East Bank” in the event thatcircumstances deteriorated, endangering the peace agreement. In the interim,they suggested setting up a special governmentministry entrustedwith rulingtheWestBank.
Thiswas only one of themany fantasies piling up on the primeminister’sdesk, and it reflected, predictably, a disagreement between doves and hawks.
Oneofthefour,ChaimHerzog,agreedtosigntheplanonlyifthreereservationsweremade:thegovernmentofIsraelmustdecidethattheborderwastheJordanRiver; he agreed with his colleagues thatWest Bank residents should not beallowed to purchase land in Israel, but thought Israelis should be allowed topurchase land in the West Bank; and, instead of setting up a governmentministry to oversee theWest Bank until a peace agreement was reached, heproposedappointinga“highcommissioner”alongthelinesoftheMandate-eracommissioners.*
4.CONVERSATIONS:“SORRYWEWON”
EshkolwasfondofMosheSasson,whomhenicknamed“Mussa.”InNovemberhe appointed Sasson to a newly created position as the “Prime Minister’sRepresentativeforPoliticalContactswithArabLeadersinJerusalem,theWestBank, and Gaza.” The appointment letter was carefully worded, mandating“coordination”amongtheforeignminister,theministerofdefense,theheadoftheMossad,theheadoftheShabak,andtheministerofpolice,Sasson’sfather.To prepare Sasson for his new role, Eshkol convened ameeting withMosheDayanandafewothers.Thequestionwaswhat,infact,Sassonwassupposedtoaccomplish. Dayan instructed him to try to ensure that West Bank residentswould“swallowtheannexationpill”ofEastJerusalem.AndsoSassononceagainwentvisitingwithWestBankleaders.Helistened,
hetalked,hestirredthingsuphereandthere,heoccasionallyagreedtohandlecomplaintsabouttheillsoftheoccupation,includinghousedemolitions,arrests,and interrogations under torture. The complaints became more numerous asFatah’s terrorist activities increased.Once in awhile, Sasson did some favorsand“acquiesced towishes.” In thehundredsofpagesofnoteshemadeofhisconversations,SassonusuallyidentifiedPalestiniansbytheirfirstnames,outofeithercondescensionor friendship.Heoftenvisited theirhomes,and theyhis.HeknewallthesecretsofPalestinianpolitics,therivalriesandtheintrigues,theschemes and the deceptions, on both sides of the river. He was constantlyinformedabouteventsinHussein’scourt.Hisnotestestifythatheenjoyedeveryminuteofhisroleaspartgovernor,partpubliccommissioner,pullingstringsandorchestrating events. He cultivated a complex network of contacts, amongwhom was the particularly mysterious figure of the Greek Catholic bishopHilarionCapucci.InFebruary1968,CapucciapproachedSassonwithaproposal.Hesaidithad
come from the Vatican, and that King Hussein had also authorized him tosuggestit:IsraelwouldwithdrawfromtheOccupiedTerritoriesandbereplacedbyUNforces.Thepartieswouldagreeinadvancetoatransitionperiodlastingfromsixmonthstoayear.Duringthistime,negotiationswouldbeheldbetweentheArabstatesandIsrael,withtheaimofreachingpermanentpeace.Ifwithinthestatedtimetheydidnotachievepeace,Israelwouldreturnitsforcestotheterritories upon prior UN authorization. In this case, the inhabitants of theterritories would be allowed to take matters into their own hands and sign aseparate agreement with Israel. Sasson responded that there were no interimsolutions, and advised the bishop not to get carried away by such flimsyinitiatives.Thetwometfrequently.Capucciwaslatercaughtsmugglingalargequantity of explosives in his diplomatic car, but during that initial period heseemedtohavebeenoperatingasSasson’scovertagent.23
Anwar Nusseibeh, of Jerusalem, also met with King Hussein on occasion.Nusseibeh was a Cambridge-educated lawyer and a founding father of thePalestiniannationalmovement,whohadservedasajudgeandaseniorministerintheJordaniangovernment.SassonintroducedhimtoEshkolandafewdayslaterhewasdispatched toAmmanwithanurgentmessage for theking: theremustbeimmediatetalkstocoordinatepositionsandcurbtheactivitiesofFatah.Nusseibeh came back with an idea he said had come from the king: “Whyshouldn’ttheIsraelisallowustoreinstateourciviladministrationandpolice?Iftheir army leaves the West Bank, we will agree not to post our own forcesthere.”SassonintroducedHikmatal-Masri,ofNablus,toForeignMinisterEban,who
allowedhimtotellHussein—andNasserhimself,ifhesowished—thatwithinthe frameworkofapeace treaty, IsraelwouldallowJordan to fly its flagovertheDomeoftheRockontheTempleMount.Al-MasriwenttoEgypt,andwhenhereturnedhesaidhehadmetwithNasseralone.Sassonheardvariousreportsof their conversation. From Capucci, he heard that if Israel announced itswillingness to withdraw from all the territories, Nasser would agree to holddirectnegotiations.Hewasnotdemandingawithdrawal as aprecondition forthese negotiations, only a statement of intent.According toCapucci, al-Masrihad told him he would not pass on directly to Israel the content of theconversation.24
With extreme caution and secrecy, Sasson sent Aziz Shehade to seeYahyaHammuda,thechairmanofthePLO,tofindoutwhetherhewouldagreetoanycontact with Israel. Hammuda replied, in writing, that he would agree under
“certain conditions,” which he did not specify. Dayan was not enthusiastic:“There’snohurry.FirstweneedachancetodestroyFatah.Thewaytohandlethemistodestroythem.”DayanspokewithHamdiKanaan,ofNablus,andwithAziz Shehade. He treated them as popular leaders and asked whether thePalestinians were willing to sign a separate peace agreement with Israel,unrelatedtoEgypt,Syria,orJordan.Theyrepliedpositivelyandimpliedthatallproblemscouldbesolved,withoneexception: theycouldnotagreeto leavingallofJerusalemunderIsrael’sexclusivesovereignty.DayansuggestedflyingaMuslimflagovertheTempleMount,butthePalestinianssaidthatthiswasnotenough.*The prospects were not promising to begin with. “Everyone is afraid for
themselves,”Capucci told Sasson, “afraid to voice their opinion even to theirclosest friends. Mutual accusations. Quarrels and suspicions. A Tower ofBabel.”Sassonwas authorized to offer the Palestinians civil autonomy in theWest
Bank, includingautonomywithrespect tosecurityandforeignaffairs.Hewasinstructed not to discuss Gaza, and to clarify that Israel was not leaving theterritories. Dayan had no objection to locating the offices of the autonomousentity inJerusalem,butSassonwassupposedto impressuponthePalestiniansthat unified Jerusalem, in its entirety,would remain the sole capital of Israel.“OnJerusalem,there’snothingtotalkabout,”Eshkolasserted.26
Eshkol himselfmetwith eight Palestinian leaders, includingAnwarKhatib,who had been exiled to Safed a fewmonths earlier andwas now allowed toreturn.†Sassonchose tohold someof themeetings in thehomeofhis father,who lived in theRehavia neighborhood of Jerusalem, not far from the primeminister’s residence.Before the firstmeeting,Eshkol toldSasson that the lastArab he had met was a laborer who had worked with him in an orchard inPetachTikvamorethanhalfacenturyago.Herememberedhisname:Mustafa.He had probably spoken with other Arabs since then, but he usually viewedthemasenemiesor,atbest,asundesirableforeigners.Eshkol seemed to assume that when they left their meetings with him, the
Palestinians would go home, sit around with their friends, and tell themeverything.He therefore recommended toDayan, Eban, and Sasson that theyconducttheirconversationswiththePalestiniansasiftheyweretalking“tothewholeworld.”28Sohedid,repeatingagainandagain:“YouwantmetosaytoHussein,’Sorrywewonthewaryoustarted,pleaseforgiveusandkindlytaketheterritoriesback.’”InresponsetoquestionsabouthispositiononJerusalem,
hesaid,“IheardthatFaisal,thekingofSaudiArabia,saidhewouldnotgototheTempleMountonaroadguardedbyJewishpolicemen.Lethimcomeinahelicopter, or on a flying carpet. Jerusalem will not be divided and it is thecapitalofIsrael.Theundividedcapital.”WhenoneofhisPalestinianinterlocutors,NasserEddinNashashibi,askedif
EshkolwishedtosendNasseramessage,suchasanofferofpeace,hereplied,“WhyshouldIproposesolutions?Wedidn’tstartthewar.YourquestionmakesitseemasifIhavetogetupandsay,’Pleaseforgiveusfornotbeingkilled.’Ihave nothing to say to him.We’re staying here, so there will be peace. Butmaybeyoucould tellhim that I amhonestlymore sorry thanhe is for all themany thousandsof peoplekilled. I’m surehedoesnot take that attitude eventowardhisownpeople.”Beyondthecommonslogans,theseconversationsdemonstratedthebreadthof
the discrepancy between the Zionist movement’s aspirations and those of thePalestiniannationalmovement.“Thestartingpointisthatthisisouronlyplaceintheworld,”EshkoltoldoneofhisPalestinianguests.“Insomeplace,inthisplace,wehavetostopbeingaminority.”HadtheJewsnotbeenpersecutedintheir countries of exile, he said, there might have been a hundredmillion ofthemtoday,andifnotforHitler,thirtymillion.Nowtherewerethirteenmillion.“Irecallourphilosophywhenwetookourfirststepsasamovementtoreturntothislandaftertwothousandyears.Webelievedthatwecouldliveinpeacehere.IknowhowIviewtheArabs.IhavebeenhereforfiftyyearsandIworkedwithArabsasalaborer,together.Andnowhereweareafterthethirdwar.Itiscleartomethatoneofthesedayswewillstopfighting,becausethereisenoughlandintheregion.Butobviously,thepointofdeparturemustbeyourwillingnesstounderstandtheconditionandthehistoryoftheJewishpeople.”Eshkol’s contention that there was enough land “in the region” was not
accidental. He proceeded to offer a “regional solution” for the refugees,particularly thosewho resided inGaza,whichEshkoldescribedasa“ghetto.”HissuggestionwastomovethemtoIraq.AnwarKhatibwashorrified.“Ineverimagined that thiswasyouroutlookon thequestionof the refugees,”he said.“Afterall,yousufferedfromexileandyouknowwhatitislike.ThePalestinianstodayareinexile.IamfirstandforemostaPalestinian,andthenanArab.Myfamilyhasbeenheresincebefore theappearanceof Islam. Ifyouwantpeace,you cannot say, ’Let them go to Iraq.’” He demanded that the refugees beofferedachoicebetweenreturningtotheirhomesandreceivingcompensation,andheassuredEshkolthattheywouldnotallwanttoreturn.Eshkolrepliedthattherewasnowheretoreturnto.“WewillnotcreateaCyprushere,”hesaidina
conversationwithNashashibi,andreiteratedhisviewthatIraqwastheplaceforthe refugees. Israel was willing to help finance the project, and would enlistsupportfromtheUnitedStatesandfromwealthyJews.Khatib, a former Jordanian ambassador to Egypt, told Eshkol about his
acquaintancewithNasserandtriedtoconvincehimthatNasserhadchangedhisfundamental approach to Israel, as he himself had done. “If I had been askedbefore theSix-DayWarwhether Iwaswilling to recognize the Jewish state’srighttoexist,evenjustintheareaofTelAviv,Iwouldhaverepliedno,”hesaid.Now, everythingwas different. TheArabs recognized the State of Israel, andpeacewouldhavetobemade.HetriedtopersuadeEshkolthatIsrael’sdemandtoexpandthestateboundariestosecurityborderswasmeaningless:“Whataresecurebordersinatimeofrocketsandothermoderntoolsofwarfare?”
MOSTPALESTINIANSWEREUNWILLINGTOACCEPTTHEOCCUPATIONARRANGEMENTS.Theyspokeof independence,ofJerusalem,andof therefugees.AzizShehadesaid,“APalestinianstatewithoutJerusalemispointlessandimpossible.ItwouldbebettertoannextheWestBanktoJerusalem.”Eshkolagreed:“Thatseemstobeinevitable.Andsowewillremainasweare,andwilldefendourselves.”Inanotherconversationheobserved,“Ihaveanationheretoo.”29
SassonbelievedeverythingrevolvedaroundJerusalem.“Ifwefindaformulathat thePalestinians can accept on the issue of Jerusalem, the other problemscan be solved,” he was about to write to Eshkol, but on second thought heshelvedthedraftofhisletter.Eshkol saw little value in the meetings, and feared contacts with the
Palestinianswouldgotoofar,tothepointwheretheywouldharmHussein.HenotedthatthiswasalsowhytheUnitedStatesobjectedtoaseparatesettlementbetweenIsraelandthePalestinians.*HesuspectedthatthePalestiniansdidnottrulywanta settlementwith Israel. InadiscussionwithDayan,Eban,Sasson,hisfather,andotherseniorofficials,EshkolcomparedthePalestinianstocertainJews inRussia,whomhe termed yishuvniks: Jewswho lived in remote, ruralareas, far from the nearest Jewish village.OnYomKippur such a Jewwouldcome to the village and enter the synagogue,where hewould be blessed andhonoredwithacall to theTorah.“In theend itwould turnout thatwhathe’dreallycometotownforwastobuyadressfortheshiksawhoworksforhim,”saidEshkol.31
Sassoncontinued to“groomleaders”over thenextfewmonths,and tried to
build up a Palestinian administration under the leadership of Sheikh Jaabari.WhenhebroughtJaabari tohisfather’shometomeetwithEshkol, thesheikhofferedEshkoladeal:hewould“demand”thatIsraelappointhimsoleruleroftheWestBank,andIsraelwould“accepthisdemand.”Thisproposedconspiracyproducedanotherseriesofdiscussionsandalargepileoftop-secretminutes,butnothingmore.
DID ISRAEL MISS ITS CHANCE TO PUT AN END TO THE CONFLICT OVER PALESTINE?PERhaps not. Israel never offered the Palestinians full independence or acompromisetheycouldacceptonthematterofJerusalem.ButDayanmayhavebeenrightwhenhesaid,“Evenifwehadofferedthemmountainsofgold,theywould have been suspicious.”32 Israel did, however, miss an opportunity tosolvetherefugeeproblem.
CHAPTER21THEBLUNDER
1. PLANS: “A HUNDRED THOUSAND PEOPLE WON’TTURNIRAQUPSIDEDOWN”
OntheafternoonofNovember30,YosefWeitz’stelephonerangandoneoftheprimeminister’ssecretariesaskedhimto“popover”toseeEshkol.Weitzaskedfor a car to “pop over” and pick him up, and by six he was at the primeminister’soffice.Eshkolledhimtoalargemaponthewallandasked,“WhereshouldthenewWestBankborderbe?”AUN-appointednegotiatorwasarrivingsoon,andtheyhadtodecidewhattotellhim.A fewweeks earlier,Weitz had published an article inDavar in which he
suggested solving the refugee problem by “transferring” them from the GazaStriptotheWestBank.HesuggestedgivingtheWestBankbacktoJordan,withcertainamendmentstotheborder.1“Howdowedothat?”askedEshkol.Weitzpromised to draw up plans, and the primeminister instructed that he be sentadequatemaps.
ESHKOLWAS HAUNTED BY THE VACILLATION AND INDECISION OVER THE FUTURE OFPalestine.Hehadnoideawhatshouldbedone,andpracticallynoonetoconsultwith.Hewanted toget ridof the refugeesbutdidnotknowhow;hewasnoteven considering the hundreds of thousands of “new refugees,” but only the1948refugeeswhowerestill living incamps,primarily inGaza.Theproblemhad suddenly risen from oblivion to irk him.* His feelings were apparentlysharedbythemanfromwhomhehadinheritedtheproblem,DavidBenGurion.Four days before the war, BenGurion had copied down in his diary some
numbersfromanineteen-year-oldnewspaperarticlethatclaimedtheestimatednumberofPalestinianrefugeeswasvastlyexaggerated.Eventhemostthoroughprobewouldfindnomorethan300,000,thearticlesaid,andBenGurionthoughtthat thiswasinformationheshouldkeep.Hedidnotexplainwhyhesuddenlyfelt theneed toconsider the issue,butheprobablyassumedthat the imminentwar would once again confront Israel with the Palestinian population. Eitherway,thenumberofArabswhohadlosttheirhomesin1948wasatleasttwicethefigureBenGurionhadquotedinhisdiary,andhesurelyknewit.†
About six months after the war, BenGurion employed a pseudo-legalargumentinanattempttoabsolveIsraelofanyresponsibilityforthefateoftherefugees: “All the refugees left following their leaders’ incitement during theBritishMandateeraandnotafterIsraelwasestablished.”Thiswasuntrue:LodandRamlewerecapturedandmostoftheirinhabitantsexpelledapproximatelytwo months after Israel’s declaration of independence, as BenGurion himselfhadoncepointedout inagovernmentdebate.At the time,heat firstsaid thatthey“left,”andthenconcededthat“theywerepressuredtoleave.”4Additionalrefugees were deported even later, from the Galilee, the Ashkelon area, andelsewhere.Israel’s heads of state had not concealed their satisfaction. Moshe Sharett
described the refugees’ “wholesale evacuation” as “more wonderful than thecreationoftheJewishstate.”5In1949Israelofferedtoreadmit100,000refugeesaspartofapeacesettlement,buttheplanfailedandIsraelrescindedtheoffer.TheUNdemanded that Israel give the refugees a choice of returning to theirhomesorreceivingcompensation.BenGurionobjected.“Everyonewillwanttocomehomeand theywilldestroyus,”he said in1961.Thiswas the fear thatdictatedIsrael’spositionuntil theSix-DayWar.“Wehavenothing togiveandnothingtoconcede,”EshkoltoldJean-PaulSartre.Most Israelis knew little of the refugees’ plight. Some saw them after the
occupationoftheGazaStripintheSinaiCampaign,butinthefollowingdecadetherewaslittletalkoftheproblem.WhenIsraelenteredtheterritoriesintheSix-DayWar, many people were stunned at what they found, and realized that asolutionhadtobereachedquickly.6“Wehaveamoralobligation,”wroteAmosElon in Ha’aretz a week after the war, “because the road to Israel’sindependencewaspavedonthebacksofthesepeople,andtheypaid,withtheirbodies, theirproperty,andtheirfuture,for thepogromsintheUkraineandtheNazigaschambers.”7Thesewereextraordinarywords:until then the receivedviewwas that Israelhadnot expelled the refugees, even that inmanycases ithadurgedthemtostay,andwasthereforenotresponsiblefortheirfate.Itwaslaterestablishedthatroughlyhalf therefugees left theirhomesandfledoutoffearofthewar,andhalfwereforciblydeported.8
Israel insisted that theUNwas inflating the number of refugees in order toenlarge its budgets and the scope of its activity, while the Arab states werepreventingtherefugeesfromsettlingdownandwereperpetuatingtheirsufferingin order to harass Israel.9 Efforts to convey this message preoccupied theForeign Ministry for years, but now even some ministry officials were
demandinganimmediatesolutiontotherefugeeproblembymeansofaquick,comprehensive,unilateraloperation,regardlessofwhatwastohappenwiththeterritories. “Wecan startworking immediately,”wroteone, noting that such astepwouldstrengthenIsrael’s“moralright”toholdontotheWestBank.Israel’sambassador toCanada,GershonAvner, tried toprod thegovernment fromhisofficesinOttawa:Whyweren’ttheysettingupatleastonefactoryforrefugeesand providing affordable housing nearby? he asked. He emphasized thepropaganda value of such a step, and suggested allocating funds from theForeign Ministry’s publicity budget. A senior ministry official proposedimmediately settingup two agricultural settlements.AmbassadorHarman sentJerusalem similar proposals from Jewish and other organizations.10 SeveralJewishpublic figures andorganizationsoffered to raise funds for the relief ofthe refugees.Among themwereLordRothschildand theWorldBank.EshkolinstructedYaacovHerzogtocoordinatethevariousparties.*Israel’sambassadortoWashington reported to the primeminister that the United States expectedIsraeltoinitiateaprogramtoresettletherefugees.HetriedtoconvinceEshkoltoagree,butEshkolresponded,“MaybeforoncewecanhearsomethingfromyouaboutJewishrefugeesinsteadofArabrefugees?”12
MostIsraelisdidnotyetacknowledge that theircountryboreat leastpartialresponsibility for creating the refugeeproblem.The almost existential need tobelieve that Zionism had caused no injustice was deep-seated. When theydiscussed the refugee problem a few days after the war, the governmentministersalsofounditdifficulttoovercomethisconviction.They all had their own solutions; Eshkol had two. Haim Moshe Shapira
proposedanastonishingplanbywhichIsraelwouldtakein200,000Palestinianrefugees.Thiswould raise thenumberof IsraeliArabs tooverhalf amillion,some20percentofthepopulation,Shapiraestimated,butheobserved,“That’snotsoterrible.”InordertomaintaintheJewishmajority,thegovernmentwouldhave toencourage immigration,“dosomething”about thebirthrate, andmakesurethenumberofdeathsincaraccidentsdropped.AllonsuggestedsettlingtheGazarefugeesinElArish,inthenorthernSinai,
as well as on theWest Bank.Menachem Begin also thought they should berehabilitated: the refugee situationwas a hugemoral and human problem, hesaid. He supported the idea of settling them in El Arish. The minister ofdevelopment,Bentov,suggestedmovingthemfromGazatotheWestBank,andthiswas one of Eshkol’s two suggestions. He noted explicitly that instead ofsettingupnewJewishsettlementsintheWestBank,itwouldbebettertoresettle
therefugeesofGazathere.MinisterSassonbelievedthattherefugeeswere“theroot of the conflict” and proposed founding an independent state for thePalestinians, or granting them an autonomous region. Dayan maintained theoppositeview:UNRWAwashandlingtherefugeesandtherewasnoreasontoabsolveitofthattask.Minister Ze’ev Sherf, conversely, believed Israel should begin quiet
negotiations with foreign countries, with the aim of settling the refugees“overseas.” This was also the hope guiding Pinhas Sapir, who described therefugeesasexplosive;Eshkol,too,supportedthisview.TheytoyedwithmovingtherefugeestoAlgeria,Morocco,Syria,orIraq.Thiswasnotmerelymeanttoirritate Eshkol’s Palestinian guests: he was quite serious. “There has been apopulationexchange,”hesaid,as Israelhadoftenargued.“Wegotpopulationfrom Iraq: we got a hundred thousand Jews. They’ll get a hundred thousandArabs. It’s the same language, the same standard of living, there’swater andthere’sland.”*EshkoladmittedthattheIraqismightnotaccepttheplan,buthethought the ideawas “pure justice.”Minister Shapira disagreed: “There is noreason to pull outArabswhowere born here andmove them to Iraq.”Beginintervened:“InGreecetheytookoutTurkswhowerebornthereandthatwasaspartofanagreement.”Eshkolquicklyresponded,“That’sexactlywhatIwantedto say, and I saw the way they were settled.” This had occurred some fourdecadesearlier,in1926.TheyoungShkolnik(Eshkol)hadtraveledtoGreecetolearnabouttheresettlementof600,000GreekrefugeesfromAsiaMinor.Itwas“anenormousandinterestingproject,”hewroteatthetime,andheassumeditcouldbeinstructiveinthecontextofJewishsettlementinPalestine.†
The refugees in Gaza could no longer return to their homes, Eshkolcontended, but “one hundred thousand people won’t turn Iraq upside down.”Onecouldnotsaysuchapopulationtransferwasunjust,headded,andthesameappliedtothe“newrefugees”livinginJordan:“Firsttheylivedhere,nowtheylive in Jordan.” A few weeks later, Allon also suggested “encouraging” therefugees toemigrate,butwarnedhiscolleagues:“Iamnot suggesting thatwepublicly adopt the emigration solution for the Arabs, because it soundssomewhatunpleasant,especiallyforJewsandZionists.”Everythingcameback to the foundationsofZionist ideology.“Afterall,we
didnotcomeinhereasanundergroundmovement,”saidEshkol.“Wedeclaredthat Palestinewas ours by right.”Minister ofHealthBarzilai disagreed: “ButtheyareresidentsofPalestine.”Theprimeministerstoodhisground:“All theJewsof theworldareresidentsofIsraelwhowereuprootedandexpelled,andthenfoundalifelineinotherplaces.”Afewministerstriedtoargue,butEshkol
silencedthem.15
The proposed resolution submitted to the cabinet stated that Israel would“demand”oftheArabstatesthattheytakeintherefugees.Toensureunanimity,theyeventuallyagreedonbroaderwording:“TheestablishmentofpeaceintheMiddleEast,andthecooperationtherebyengendered,willopenthedoortoaninternationalandregionalsettlementtoresolvetherefugeeproblem.”16
BYTHETIMEHECALLEDYOSEFWEITZINNOVEMBER,ESHKOL’SDESKWASPILEDHIGHwith plans and proposals to solve the refugee problem.17Weitz’s proposal, tosettletherefugeesintheWestBank,wasreinforcedbyaplanEshkolreceivedfrom a small group of academics led by the economistMichaelBruno. Theirproposalprovidedfor40,000families,some250,000people,whowouldmovefromGazatotheWestBankoverthecourseoftenyears.Thecostperfamily,including housing, job creation, roads, schools, and hospitals, was between20,000and25,000liras.Theaverageannualcostwouldbe200millionliras,or$50 million, at most. The project would create a huge economic upsurge inIsrael and on theWestBank,making the net cost far lower, and itwould notburden the country’s economy, evenwithout taking into account foreign aid.*RaananWeitzsentEshkolhisowndetailedplan.HesuggestedresettlingsomerefugeesnearJericho,andabout50,000intheElArisharea.Hisfatheropposedtheidea,andrecalledheatedargumentswithhisson.†
2.POSSIBILITIES:“IDON’TKNOWWHATIWANT”
OnDecember 6 Eshkol convened a lengthy consultationwith two professors,Roberto Bacci, the director of the Central Bureau of Statistics, and AryehDvoretzky, a professor of mathematics at the Hebrew University, who weretrying to convince him that the Gaza refugees should be moved to theWestBank.TheItalian-bornBacciwasinvolvedineffortstoraisethebirthrateamongJewsandreduceitamongIsraeliArabs.20Dvoretzkywasamong thescientistswhomade their skills available to the security establishment; in1960,hewasappointedheadofRafael,theweaponsdevelopmentauthority.The three did not talkmuch about the humanplight of the refugees,whom
theyviewed as a problem for Israel.At no point in the conversation did theyraise thepossibilityofabsorbing the refugeeswithin Israelor leaving them inGaza.Theybegantheirmeetingbystudyingamap.BaccigaveEshkolalarminginformation:asurveyhadshownthat infantmortality inGazamightdecrease.“Ifwecontinuetobeascompassionateaswearenow,”hesaid,infantmortality
in the territories might even come to rival that of Israeli Arabs. “This is ashocking situation,” he observed. Seeking some reassurance, Eshkol askedwhether therewas no hope thatWesternizationwould leadArabgirls to havefewerbabies.Baccisaidyes,butitwouldtakeat leastfifteenyearsforthat tooccur, “unless we are able to assert more control over the Palestinian familyunit.” Eshkol asked how this could be done, and Bacci replied, “It is a realproblem.” He told the prime minister that more than half of the territories’inhabitantswereundertheageoffifteen,whichwasanother“frighteningthing.”On the other hand, there was reason to hope that those Gaza refugees whomovedtotheWestBankwouldgoontoemigratetoJordanorelsewhere.One-thirdofWestBankfamiliessentoneoftheirchildrenoverseas,Bacciexplained.LiketheIsraeliswholeftthecountryforgood,manyPalestiniansbelievedtheywouldreturnbutendedupstayingabroad.BacciandDvoretzkyaskedtheprimeministerfordirection.“NowI’mgoingtoshowmycards,”saidEshkol.“First,Idon’tknowwhatI
want.Second, Iwould like todosomething.” Itwouldbedifficult to findanystatement that better expressed Eshkol’s position on almost everything at anygiventime.Hewasnotcertainwhetheritwasprudenttoinitiateactionforthebenefit of the refugees, he said; perhaps it would be better to wait for othercountriesorlargeorganizationstodoso.Orperhapstheyshouldwaituntiltherewas a peace treaty. Perhaps there would be a war. Perhaps they should startdismantlingonerefugeecampontheWestBank,thesmallestone,andseehowits inhabitants fared. “Regarding theArabsofGaza, Iwould like tohope thattheywill leave Israel,”Eshkol said, as ifGazawere apart of the state.Bacciasked how that could come to pass, and Eshkol replied, “I don’t know. I’mlookingforpeoplewhocanfindthesolution.”Bacci suggested that Eshkol not count on the Arabs of Gaza to emigrate
voluntarily.Before thewar,manyof themhad left forEgypt.Now theywerestuck. Eshkol asked about Libya: he had been told it was a country ofimmigrants.ButBaccireplied,“Youcan’texpelthem.Youcanonlyencourageemigration.” Still, evenBacci himself did not believe that thiswas sufficient:“Toassumethatitwillsolvetheproblem—thatisaverydangerousillusion.”Eshkoldidnotgiveup:hewasinterestedonlyintheemigrationofthecamp
residents.Bacciremindedhimthattheyweretalkingabout180,000people;theycould not bring about the emigration of such a large number. “It’s thirtythousand households,”Eshkol tried, almost pleadingly, butBacci insisted: “Inmyopinionweshould look forotherways.”Eshkol, ever the joker, couldnotresist:“Thereisoneotherway:anothersix-daywar.”
The twoprofessorssteppedup theirefforts topersuadeEshkol thatonly theWestBankofferedasolution.TherefugeescouldbesettledintheJordanValley,said Dvoretzky, but quickly added, “It’s very important that this fact not bedisclosed toanyone,because if anyoneknew that Israel could resettle twenty-five thousand families and is not doing so, there would be a huge outcry.”Dvoretzky proposed, therefore, that the Gaza refugees be moved into housesvacatedby the “new refugees,” andexplained toEshkolwhy thiswas agoodidea: themoreGaza refugeesoccupied thehousesofpeoplewhohad recentlylefttheWestBank,thelesschancetherewasthatthosepeoplewouldreturn.“Inaddition,youareprovokinginternalstrifeamongthePalestiniansthemselves.”LikeMichael Bruno and his colleagues, Bacci and Dvoretzky stressed that
there was no real basis for the plan to settle the Gaza refugees in El Arish.Besides, saidBacci,anElArishof refugeescouldcreatea“refugeestan”overthere,whileontheWestBanktheywouldbedilutedbytheotherresidents.“Ifwe move even a hundred thousand, and pray that another hundred thousandemigrate,we’veachievedagreatthing,”saidthemathematician.EshkolwasalsoopposedtotheElArishidea.“Idon’tknowalloftheSinai,
but I haven’t heard that they’ve found any water there,” he said. In aconversationwithIDFgeneralshesaidhe“feltinstinctively”thattheElArishplanwouldbeadisasterforIsrael.21ButhealsofounditdifficulttoacceptthattherightplacefortheGazarefugeeswasintheWestBank.“Whatamess,”hecommented. He looked at the map and said he did not know whether therewould be another war, but he did know one thing: Gaza must remain underIsraeli control. Bacci said thiswas “a seriousmatter,” and askedwhether theprime minister intended to incorporate the Gaza Arabs into Israel; here wasanother reason tomove them to theWest Bank. Eshkol was unconvinced. “Idon’t like this idea,”he said: theymightmove the refugees to theWestBankandthenHusseinmightsuddenlydeclare,“KeepthelandalongwiththeArabs,and leavemealone.”Bacci offered a contrasting scenario: Israelwouldmove150,000Arabs to theWest Bank andHusseinwould accept them. “Good forhim.He’llhaveanotherhundredandfiftythousandArabs,”Baccisaid.Eshkol said that the Ministry of Defense did not think the area would be
turnedover toHussein.Hedid not say “Dayan.”Bacci said that even so, theGazaStrip shouldbeemptied. “Letusassume for amoment thatyoumoveahundredandfiftythousandtotheWestBank.IfthewholeareaevergoesbacktoJordan,you’vetossedtheArabsoutsideyourborders.Andthatisadvisable.Ifthe area remains inourhands, thenyou’ll have less trouble from those in theWestBankthanintheGazaStrip.BecauseinGazathey’representedforallthe
world to seeas refugees.”Notnecessarily,Eshkol replied:“If theystay in theGazaStrip,we’llpressurethemtomovesomewhere.”Bacciwasnotcertainhehadunderstood:“Butwhywouldtheyleave?It’safantasy.”Eshkolrepeatedhisoriginal idea: “I say to them: take a hundred thousand refugees from here toIraq. Isn’t thatmoral?” Then he arguedwith his guests over their data.Whatwould the refugeeseaton theWestBank?hewanted toknow.Theprofessorseventuallygaveup.PerhapsitwasbettertowaitfortheIraqigovernmenttotakein the refugees, Bacci said, and Eshkol responded, honestly: “I don’t knowwhereIstandwiththiswholebusiness.”22
TheproposaltomovetherefugeestotheWestBankranintoresistancefromBegin,whohadearmarkedtheareaforJewishsettlement.Allonobjectedtotherefugees beingmoved to the JordanValley,which he also intended for Jews.Fromtimetotime,theinitiativetoresettletherefugeesservedasafocalpointforpersonalquarrelsbetweentheministers,repletewithleakstothepress,butiteventuallymeltedaway.23DayanwasopposedtoresettlingtherefugeesontheWestBank,insistingthattheybelongedwithHussein.Thenheadded,“Idon’tmindiftheyallemigrate.”Eshkolattemptedtobringthisideatofruition.24*
3. ATTEMPTS: “HOWMANY ARABS HAVE YOU DRIVENOUTSOFAR?”
Eightmonthsafter thewar,anewpositionwascreatedintheprimeminister’soffice.Eshkoldescribedthejob:AdaSereniwasto“seebutnotbeseen,”andherfunctionwastocoordinateeffortstoencourageGazaStripresidentstoleavethecountry.HerfirstmeetingwithEshkolwasattendedbyMeirAmit,headoftheMossad,andbyYosefHermelin,headoftheShabak.26
•••
THE HOPE OF MOVING THE ARABS OF PALESTINE TO OTHER STATES HAD BEEN ACONstant factor in the Zionist movement. During British rule, Zionist leaderslooked intovariouswaysofpayingArabs tomove todistantprovinces.27 TheArabs’flightandexpulsionduring theWarofIndependenceandafterwarddidnotputanendtotheseschemes.Israelmadeseveralattemptstoencouragetheemigrationof IsraeliArabs toLatinAmericaandelsewhere.28When theGazaStrip was occupied in the Sinai Campaign, Levi Eshkol, who was then theministeroffinance,allocatedhalfamilliondollarstofinancetheemigrationoftwohundredfamiliesofPalestinianrefugeesfromGaza,aswellasanumberof
IsraeliArabs,mostlywell-offChristians.TheprojectwascoordinatedbyEzraDanin,oneofZionism’sfirstsecretagents.29
In1962, thesameDanincameupwithanideaknownasOperationWorker.The purpose was to encourage Palestinian refugees to emigrate to WestGermany, where there was new demand for foreign labor. Roughly eighteenmonthsbeforetheSix-DayWar,IsraeltriedtoorchestrateanagreementbetweenGermanyandJordanthatwouldexpandtheemigrationofPalestinianrefugeesfrom Jordan to Germany through the German trade unions. Ruth Wolf, theForeign Ministry official involved in the project, declared, “Perhaps it isnecessary to hint to the Germans that they bear a special ‘guilt’ for theestablishmentof Israel, becauseof theHolocaust.Here theyhave a chance tohelpresettlerefugeeswhoseproblemresultedfromthecreationoftheStateofIsrael.”30
INEARLY1968,ASMALLUNITOFFIVEPEOPLEBEGANOPERATINGINGAZAUNDERTHEdirectionof an IDFmajor.Their jobwas toencourage the localpopulation toleave. They worked through collaborators who went around the campspromising peoplemoney in return for their agreement to go.Thiswas a jointoperation of the military government, the Shabak, and the prime minister’sadviser on Arab affairs. The Foreign Ministry also tried to promote refugeeemigration,andtheMinistryofFinancewasaskedtofundtheoperation.EshkolsentAdaSereni tocoordinate thevariousactors.“Shehasa specialknack forundergroundwork,”heexplained.31
Thesixty-two-year-oldSereniwasaheroic figure in theZionistdrama.Shehad been born inRome to awealthy and highly respected Jewish family, theAscarellis,whowereoriginallyfromSpain.Oneofthewomeninthefamilywasawell-knownsixteenth-centurypoet.Sereni’sfatherwasahistorybuffwhohadalargelibraryathome.HekeptflocksofsheepinSardinia,whereheproducedPecorinocheese,mostofwhichendedupgarnishingspaghettimadebyItalianimmigrantsinAmerica.HisdaughterAdawasashortchildwithasmall,sweetface,warmeyes,andalongblackbraid.Asaschoolgirl,shefellinlovewithaclassmate,EnzoSereni,alsofromaJewisharistocraticfamily.Hereadalotandwrote a novel, and when Ada became pregnant they married and went toPalestine. They lived in Rehovot at first, then joined the founders of a newkibbutz,GivatBrenner.EnzoSerenibecameanactivistforthelabormovement.Intheearly1930shetraveledtoGermanyasadelegateofayouthmovement,andlaterthecouplewenttoNewYork,wheretheylivedinaZionistcommuneon Riverside Drive. They had two daughters and a son. Sereni had been a
moderateman, but he changed his views duringWorldWar II and demanded“transfer” for the Arabs in Palestine. In Palestine, he dealt with issues ofdefense, security, and secret operations. He eventually joined a unit ofparatroopers in the British army, set up to infiltrate enemy territory. He wasparachutedintonorthernItaly,wherehedisappeared.After thewar, hiswifewent to search for her husband through the ruins of
Europeand,inanadventurousanddangerousoperation,shefoundevidencethathehadbeenmurdered in theconcentrationcampatDachau.She stayedon inEurope, where she worked for the Briha organization, which helped illegalJewish immigrants reachPalestine, andassisted in efforts topurchase arms inpreparation for the War of Independence. BenGurion asked her to use herconnections to acquire aircraft. Not long after her return to Israel, severalfoundingmembersofGivatBrenner left becauseof an ideological rift.SerenijoinedakibbutzthatwasoriginallycalledBuchenwald,aftertheconcentrationcamp,andwasnownamedNetzerSereni,inherhusband’smemory.In July1954,on the shoresofLakeTiberiasnearKibbutzMa’agan, a state
ceremonywasheldinmemoryofSereniandtheotherparatroopers.Therewasalargecrowd,andPrimeMinisterMosheSharettwasinattendance.Asmallplaneflyinginanairshowfortheoccasioncrashedintotheaudienceonlyyardsfromtheprimeminister.TwoofthosekilledwereDanielSereni,EnzoandAda’sson,andhiswife.Sereni, an energeticwomanwithhawkishviews,went on to joinNativ, the
covert Israeliorganization thathelpedJews leave theUSSR.Nativsenther toworkinItaly.32Inchoosingherin1967forthejob,EshkolhopedhercontactsinItalymightfacilitatetherelocationofalargenumberofrefugeesfromGazatoLibya.Sereni’s appointment lasted for six months. She believed that within two
years, forty thousand families—almost a quarter of a million Palestinians—couldberemovedtoJordan.Sheassumedtherefugeeswouldagreetoleaveinreturnforonethousandlirasperfamily,andsoshecitedacostoffortymillionliras,lessthan$10million.33
“Iwant them all to go, even if they go to themoon,”Eshkol told her. Theoperation reminded him of the process of emigration from Jewish villages inRussia toAmerica: “Therewere a few companies that dealtwith transportingpeople,andtheytooktheshirtsofftheirbacks,”herecounted.“Theyledthemlikesheep,buttheJewswent.”ButevenEshkol,motivatedashewas,founditdifficult to believe that the campaign would succeed, so he was reluctant to
financeit.Thousandsofrefugeesleft theGazaStripduringthosemonthswithnoencouragementfromthemilitarygovernment,andEshkolhopedthisprocesswould continuewithout any financial investment. Hewanted to know all thedetails, and expressed concern upon learning thatmany of the people leavingwereyoungmen,whiletheyoungwomenwerebeingleftbehind.“Thisisabigproblemforus.IhavefourdaughtersandIknowwhattroubleis.Wemayhavetosetupamatchmakingofficetogivemoneytowhoevertakesyounggirlsoutofhere.”Thiswasnottheonlyideadiscussedatthemeeting.Eshkol’sadviseronArab
affairs, Shmuel Toledano, reported happily that he had a thousand passportsfromacertainforeigncountry,whichhewasdistributingtoGazaresidentswhowishedtoleave.MeirAmitcommentedsternlythatfakepassportsshouldnotbeused; doing so could endanger all of Israel’s covert operations. Toledano,insulted,assuredhim thepassportsweregenuine.Later, it transpired that theyhad apparently been bought from the interior minister of a South Americancountry.Nevertheless,skepticismprevailed:aholderofoneof thesepassportsmightbeinvolvedinacaraccident,andthepolicewoulddiscoverthathedidn’teven speak the language.And thenextdayadifferent interiorministerwouldcomealongand start askingquestions.Eshkolwasnot enthusiastic either, butToledanobelievedhis passports could also be utilized to get rid of the IsraeliArabs: “Any Israeli-Arab citizenswe can get rid of—that’s very important. Itturnsouthardlyanyofthesepeopleareleavingthecountry.”*WhenSerenibeganherassignment,Eshkolpromisedtomeetwithherweekly,
andtheydidmeetfrequently.“What’sthesituation?Isthereachance?Isthereanyhopeofanything?”hewouldask.Andsometimes,“HowmanyArabshaveyoudrivenoutsofar?”34
Most of the time they talked about money. Eshkol agreed to increase thenumberoffieldagentsfromfivetotwenty.HeauthorizedSerenitosendpeopleto Australia and Brazil to look into emigration options there. Sereni and hercontact in the army, Shlomo Gazit, told Eshkol about additional needs: theJordanian officer in charge of refugee crossings at the Allenby Bridge wasdemanding kickbacks. They also had to bribe aman in SaudiArabia. Eshkolagreed to allocate funds and authorized an operational budget of over fivemillionliras.ButherepeatedlywarnedSereninottogivemoneytoArabswholeftthecountry,becauseassoonasyougavemoneytoone,therestwouldwantevenmore.35
Eshkolwasright.AtfirstSereniwantedonlyfivelirasperrefugee,topayfor
travelfromGazatotheWestBank.EshkolsaidhedidnotbelieveanArabfromGazacouldn’tcomeupwithfivelirasforcabfare,butheconsented.Serenisaidtheyalsohadtogiveoutflourandsugarandsubsistencemoneytotidepeopleover when they first arrived in Jordan. Then it turned out Jordan would notallowpeopletobringtheirbelongingswiththem,andSerenisaidtherefugeesshould be compensated for what they had to leave behind. She discussedsendingpeople toSouthAmericaand to theUnitedStates,atacostof$1,000per family.When she askedwhat to do about amanwho had $300 to get toAmerica but needed three hundred liras more, Eshkol decreed: “First let thepeoplegowhohavethemeanstogo.”Onanotheroccasionhesaid,“Perhapsweshould have stolen theirmoney on theirway out of here, like they’ve alwaysdone toJewsaround theworld.”Serenisaid therewere“enormousdifficultiesall around theglobe.”Australia, for example,waswilling to take Israelis, buttheywantedonly Jews,notArabs; and itwasdifficultwith thoseAustralians,Serenireported:theywouldn’ttakebribes.Gazit backed up Sereni’s requests, but the prime minister said he had no
money.Whenhebalkedatherrequestforahundredmillionliras,sheaskedifhewouldgiveherfiftymillion.Thecostcouldreachabillionliras,Eshkolsaid,andsherepliedthatitwouldnot.Shewantedonlytwoandahalfmillion.Everysooftenshewentbacktotheoriginalcalculation:“Youwon’tagreetofinishoffthe Gaza Strip affair for forty million liras? That’s a very reasonable price!”Eshkol replied, “If you make a contract with me that you’ll remove fortythousandpeopleforsuchandsuchaprice—thenmaybe.Butyoucan’tcommityourself.”HewasafraidtherefugeeswouldendupinsuchharshconditionsthatIsraelwouldhave to come to their aid.He alsodemanded that peoplegettingmoney from Israel provide receipts, so he could prove how much had beenspent.GazittriedtoconvinceEshkoltofinancethedepartureofanentiretribe—one
thousand families—from the Jebalia camp. Sereni had alreadymentioned theplan. The tribal sheikh wanted 200 liras per capita, which amounted to 1.2millionliras.Hewasalsoaskingfor200,000lirasinreturnfortheorchardandwaterpumpheowned.Theprimeministerrespondedlikeaseasonedsalesman:“Itwouldbefoolishofus toagree.Thepriceofanorchardin theGazaStrip,includingawater source that’sgetting saltier all the time,cannotbe sohigh.”ButhetoyedwiththeideaofpurchasinglandsandorchardsinGazaandsettlingJews there; he would give them stores and barbershops, he said dreamily. ItwouldbejustliketheolddaysinPalestine:theywouldgivealoantoanArab,hewouldlosethemoney,andthentheywouldbuyuphislands.Sereniwanted
toopenamortgagebank,anideaEshkoldidnotruleout.YaacovHerzogwroteinhisnotesfromonemeetingthat“Mrs.Sereniclaimed
thereisageneralmoralproblem.”Itisunclearwhathewasreferringto;perhapsonly to theadministrativearrangementsand theneedtoworkwithinapprovedbudgets.Eitherway,Eshkolreplied,“Iamwillingtotakeuponmyselfallmoralresponsibility in thismatter. Because I do not knowwhere this business willstartandwhereitwillend.”
FEWISRAELISKNEWOFTHETRANSFERPROJECT.EVERYTHINGWASDONESECRETLY,ASIFitweresomethingtobeashamedof,butmanypeopleintheGazaStripknewaboutthe“emigrationoffices”setupbythemilitarygovernmentinthecamps.TheU.S. embassy reportedon theproject, even specifying the codenamesoftwoofGazitandSereni’soperatives,“Wolfie”and“Yehuda.”TheInternationalRedCrosssentateenagedboytoSereni’s“travelagents”tofindoutwhatwasonoffer.Theboyreturnedwithaquoteoffivehundredlirasifheleftwithhismother and siblings. The father had already gone. Earlier, the Americandiplomatswrote,WolfieandYehudametwiththemukhtarsandaskedthemfora list of separated families.Upon departing the country, the emigrants had toleave behind the identification cards they had received from the militarygovernment.36Theyalsohad to signa formdeclaring, inHebrewandArabic,thattheywereleavingwillinglyandunderstoodthattheywouldnotbeabletoreturnwithout a special permit. They signedwith thumbprints; if they could,they added their names inwriting.Men signed for theirwives.The formwasoccasionally modified, as was the custom in the Occupation bureaucracy.37GazittoldEshkolthatDayanwantedtospeeduptheproject:theJordanbridgesmightbeclosedanyday.
INMAY1968,SERENIREPORTEDTOESHKOLTHATDURINGTHEFIRSTTHREEMONTHSOFherwork approximately 15,000 people had leftGaza.Gazit estimated around50,000hadlefttheGazaStripsincethewar;someofthemmighthavegonetothe West Bank. The Central Bureau of Statistics found that in the first sixmonths of 1968, approximately 20,000 people had emigrated from the GazaStrip.38The IDFcountedhowmanypeoplecrossed theJordanbridges,asdidthe UN and foreign embassies in both Israel and Jordan, but no one couldprovideanaccuratefigure.Thenumbersrangedfrom220,000to250,000,fromGazaandtheWestBank.39
It is difficult to estimate how many left as a result of Sereni and Gazit’sefforts.Dayan’sassistantZviZurtoldEshkolaboutsixdifferentstudiesofwhy
peoplewereleavingtheGazaStrip.Nineoutofeverytenemigrantswereyoungmen,almosthalfofthemsingle.Eightoutofeverytenwererefugees.Sevenoutof tenwentalone.Most leftbehindnoproperty;mosthad relatives in Jordan.Theysaidtheywereleavingbecauseofunemployment,andbecausetheywereno longer receiving the financial support their relatives inArab states used tosend them. Somewanted to reunite with familymembers, and somewent tostudy.*Hopes that the refugee problemmight be solved by emigration to faraway
countrieswerebolsteredfromanunexpecteddirection:theU.S.senatorEdwardKennedysupportedaplan todisperse200,000 refugees fromGazaaround theworld.Between25,000and50,000of themwere supposed tomake theirnewhomes in the United States. Another senator, Jacob Javits, initiated a plan toresettle the refugees, and the Israeli consul in New York reported that theLutheranchurchhadpledgedassistance.Therewasalsopromisingnews fromAustraliaafterall.40
AlongsideGazitandSereni’s“travelagents,”theForeignMinistry,apparentlyin coordination with theMossad, did what it could to encourage refugees toemigratetoBrazilandelsewhereinSouthAmerica.Withinweeksafterthewar,Israeli ambassadors in various foreign countries were asked to respond to aquestionnaireabouttheprospectsforimmigration.InAugust1967,Eshkolwrote toEban thatconversationswith theBrazilian
ambassador in Israel had led him to conclude that there was a possibility ofremoving thousands to that country, “if not tens of thousands.” The ForeignMinistry reported to Gazit about the arrival of a Brazilian travel agent whospecializedinimmigrants.41
Israeli diplomats in Washington tried to convince the administration tosupport the transferpolicy.Theyalsoestablishedcontactwithan internationalorganization that worked with refugees and displaced persons, theIntergovernmentalCommittee forEuropeanMigration.Thepurposeof ICEM,wroteMordehaiKidron,theIsraelidelegatetotheUN,wasnottoabsolveIsraelof responsibility for the refugees’ plight. Rather, the organization, whichwasfoundedafterWorldWarIItohelpdisplacedpersonsinEurope,wasfightingforsurvival: in the late 1960s, this large organization could no longer justify itsexistence,anditneededemigrants“asafishneedswater.”Norhadthepotentialhostcountries suddenlydevelopedadesire tohelp Israel.Theyneededskilledlabor:Brazilwantedagriculturalworkers,Australianeededbothshepherdsandurbanlaborers,Canadawantedforestersandconstructionworkers.TheIsraelis
suggestedstartingwithasmallgroupofabout150refugees.Whentheyreachedtheirdestination,theywouldbemetbyaMossadrepresentativewhowouldtakecareoftheir initialneeds.If theprojectwassuccessful,newswouldspreadbywordofmouthandthenumberofemigrantswouldgrow.One of the people involved in the attempt to organize the emigration of
refugees from Gaza was Charles Jordan, a senior executive at the AmericanJewishJointDistributionCommittee.JordanaddressedtheissueduringhisfinalvisittoIsrael,inAugust1967.42*TheForeignMinistry seems to have been functioning during this time as a
globaltravelagency.Discussionsrevolvedaroundpassports,visas,andairplanetickets.Therewasaproposal toexemptrefugees leavingGazafromthe traveltax. The ministry inquired about airline deals, noting that the refugees fromGaza refused to fly ElAl. Someone suggested chartering flights, and anothersaidtheministeroftheinteriorhadtoworkfaster:therewasnojustificationfortakingsolongtoissuetherefugees’transitpapers.Anargumentensuedamongtheofficials,someofwhomclaimedthatthetest
group proposed by ICEM was too small—they could go straight to massemigration,fifteenhundredortwothousandfamilies,betweenfivethousandandtenthousandpeople, in twoyears.Ontheotherhand,ICEMwasconsideredapro-Zionistorganization,andhadgivenIsrael$15milliontoabsorbimmigrantsinthepast.AndsotheycontinuedtofantasizeaboutafuturewithoutArabs,andtoworkonwaysofmaking it happen.OneForeignMinistryofficial,ShlomoHillel, was so gung-ho about the project that hewanted to present theArabswithacondition:nopeacetreatyuntiltherefugeesweregone.Asit turnedout,mostof therefugeesdidnot leaveGazainreturnforplane
tickets.Massdeportationsweremoreorlessimpossible,becausediplomatsandthe world press were always watching. But there was a third way. A seniorofficialintheForeignMinistry,MichaelComay,wrotetoAmbassadorHarmanthatthemilitarygovernoroftheGazaStrip,MordechaiGur,waspushingpeopleto leave Gaza by eroding their standard of living; he said Gur himself hadadmittedtothis.Noteveryoneinthemilitarygovernmentfavoredthisapproach:Dayan believed that although a deterioration of life in the Gaza Strip mightbringaboutthedepartureofrefugees,itmightalsomakethingsdifficultforthemilitary government and damage Israel’s reputation.44 In preparation for thenew budget, it was decided that the standard of living in Gaza should be“reasonable”butonly“closetothatwhichexistedbeforetheoccupation.”Whatthismeant,accordingtoonedocument,wasthatnewsourcesofincomewould
not be created for refugees living in the camps. In that same period,unemployment in Gaza reached 16.6 percent. The government did, however,decidetoattractrefugeesfromGazatoconstructionandagriculturaljobsintheWestBank.45
From time to time horror stories spread about initiatives to deport theresidents of the Occupied Territories, and on one occasion the Jordanianauthoritiesrefusedtoallowafewhundredrefugeestocrossabridge,claimingthey had been brought there against their will. In December, the Britishconsulate in Jerusalem confirmed a London Times story about some twohundredBedouinsfromtheNusseirattribewhohadbeenforcedovertheJordanRiver.About sixmonthsafter thewar, adiscussion inwhichDayan tookpartwas summarized: “There is authorization to continue the policy of imposinglocal curfews, searches, and arrests following every act of terrorism, as onemeansofencouragingdepartures.”46
But themore thewar receded intoadistantmemory, the fewerclaims therewereofforceddeportations,andsoitappearedthatmostPalestinianswho leftthe West Bank and the Gaza Strip were not forced to go. They were not,however,allowedtoreturn.Hundredstriedtoslipbackin,includingwomenandchildren.Buttheywereusuallysentback,andsomewereshotdead.TheJordanwasnotadeepriver.InAugustafewsoldierswrotetoEshkolandtoldhimtheywerebeingasked tokillwomenandchildrencrossing theJordan.Eshkolsentthe complaint to Dayan to investigate. Meanwhile, more rumors spread ofwomenandchildrenbeingwounded.OnSeptember13,DayangaveEshkol areport on the investigation. Minister of Justice Shapira demanded a moredetailed report. In the afternoon, the issue was raised in the security cabinet.YitzhakRabin told theministers that under the rules of engagement, soldierswere to open fire on people trying to cross the Jordan at night, unless theyidentifiedthemaswomenorchildren.Indaytime,thesoldiersweretoshoutawarning,andifthesuspectdidnotstop,theyweretofireshotsintheair.Inthethreemonths since thewar, Rabin said, 146 people had been killed trying tocross the Jordan, including twowomen and four children. Fourteen had beenwounded.JustoverathousandhadbeenarrestedanddeportedbacktoJordan.MinisterKol suggested installing lighting.MinisterEban proposed instructingthesoldierstoshoottowound,nottokill.A report contained in the IDF archives adds details: every night the army
positionedfiftyambushpartiesalongtheJordanRiver.Inthethreemonthsafterthewar, therewere ninety-five encounters. Some of the detaineeswere Fatah
members, but most were refugees trying to get back home. Two of thosewoundedwerechildren.According to IsraelLior,Eshkoldemandedanend tothekillings,butRabininsistedthattherulesofengagementremainunchanged.Dayan added, “It’s not that bad.” He assumed that by winter there would befewerrefugeestryingtogetback,andthusfewercasualties.Eshkolaskedtobekeptinformed.47
The plight of the refugees was a photogenic subject. Israeli ambassadorsoverseaswrotetoJerusalemthattelevisionbroadcastsfromthebridgesandthetentcampssetupbytheUNontheeasternsideoftheriverweredamning.TheyreportedonpicturesofIsraelisoldiersfiringshotsintheairtohurrytherefugeesover the bridges. Correspondents estimated that the new tent camps housedsome eighty thousand refugees from Gaza and the West Bank. Winter wascoming, threatening to make their conditions intolerable. “The most terribleimpressionismadebyscenesoffatherswithchildrenintheirarms,beggingourguardstoletthemgobacktotheirwivesandchildrenstillonourside,”wroteIsrael’s ambassador in Germany. He added, “We cannot stand up, here or inothercountries,tothewaveofprotest,whichwebelievewillalsohavepoliticalimplications.” He asked that Israel at least permit family reunifications. Theambassadorswere right: theugly images in themedia ledmanygovernments,includingtheUnitedStates,todemandthatIsraelallowtherefugeestoreturn.48
Attempting to improve its image, the Israelicabinetagreed tohelpnotonlythe residents ofKalkilya, but also those of two villages in theHebron area.*EshkolgaveorderstoexplaintoBritishprimeministerHaroldWilsonthatthereporters weremisconstruing the scenes: the people theywere photographinghad left their homes willingly. As was the usual custom, he also cited theHolocaust. “No people,” he told the vice president of the International RedCross,“that,likeours,sawsixmillionofitsoldandyoungbutcheredandburntby the Nazis less than a generation ago, could be unresponsive to anyhumanitarian interest.”Hepledgedonemillion liras to theUN to finance tentcampsforthe“newrefugees.”50
It was not enough, and the ministers knew it. Abba Eban was shocked byscenes he saw on television during a visit to New York, and told Eshkol toimmediatelyarrangeforatelevisedreturnofrefugees.TheministersreceivedacopyofanextremelybluntletterpublishedintheTimesofLondonbyamemberof Parliament, Margaret McKay.51† In July, the government gave in andgrudginglydecidedtoallowafewthousandpeopletoreturnforalimitedtime.Theywerecarefullyselected,withthepurposeofpreventingthereturnof1948
refugees.RuthWolf,fromtheForeignMinistry,believed,conversely,thatitwasthese refugeeswho shouldbepreferred, because their economic situationwasbetter thanks to financial support from the UN. “Furthermore, I recommendpayingattentiontothedemographics—notonlythenumberofchildren,butalsothe prospects for future births in terms of the women’s age,” she wrote. Heradviceondeterringpeoplewhowantedtoreturn:“MakesuretherearesuitablebroadcastsonKolIsrael inArabicabouttheinsecurityoffundstransfersfromoverseas,andthemeticuloussearches;also,donotconcealthecurrenteconomichardships.”TheJordanianscausedtheirownshareofdifficultiesbyrefusingtoallowrefugeestosignupfortheirreturnonformsbearingthesealoftheStateof Israel.While the two countries quarreled, summerwas drawing to an end.Eventually,Israelpermittedalargernumberofrefugeestoreturn.ThiswasOperationRefugee,anditwaswellpublicized.ThepoetHaimGouri
wasamongthosewhowenttotheAllenbyBridgetowatchtherefugeesreturn.“Womenwearingblackclotheswalkby,carryingchildrenwhodozeinthesunwhilefliesbuzzaroundthem.Aporterwalksbywithahugepileofblanketsandmattresses on his back.Awomanwith copper pots.A youngman carrying asuitcase. And again the porters, dragging household goods and linens, andsomeonecarryingaSingersewingmachineandaPrimusstove,ahandkerchiefwrappedaroundpitasandonions....AnelderlyhajjiwithadistantlookseemstocomefromancientpicturesofthePalestinethatdiedlongago.”53Theinitialintent was to allow twenty thousand people to return, but by the time theoperationwasoveronlyfourteenthousandhadmanagedtodoso.54
AndsoIsraelmissedthegreatopportunityofferedbythevictoryintheSix-DayWar to heal themalignantwound, asEzerWeizman called it, left by theWarof Independence.Thiswas the “refugeeblunder,”Weizmanarguedmanyyears later, “a painful and damaging blunder, perhaps no less so than theintelligenceandmilitaryblunderscommittedpriortotheYomKippurWar.”55Itis hard to explain. In the course of less than two decades, the 600,000 Jewsliving in Israel at its inception took in more than a million new immigrants.They built hundreds of new communities, including cities, all within theconfinesoftheGreenLine.Therefugeescouldhavebeenrehabilitatedaswell.Therewere several alternatives, and therewere adequate plans to settle the
refugees in Gaza and in theWest Bank. Their rehabilitation would not haverequired allowing them to return to their homes in Israel. Nor would it havenecessitatedadecisionon the futureof the territories—whetherwithdrawalorannexation.Themillionaireswhoofferedtofinancetherehabilitationwereonly
waiting for the call. And it was an undertaking that could have offeredsomething for everyone: national interest, humanitarian decency, Jewishsolidarity, economic and socialmomentum, and international prestige; Zionisthistorywouldhaveseemedthatmuchmorenoble.ButEshkol,Dayan,andtheotherpartners in theblunderbelieved therewas
noreasontohurry.Lackingvision,courage,andcompassion,captivatedbythehallucinations of victory, they never accepted Israel’s role in the Palestiniantragedy,orperhaps theysimplydidnothave thecourage toadmit it; thiswasprobablythemaininhibition.Andperhapstheytrulybelievedthatonedaytheywouldsucceedingettingridofthem.
CHAPTER22HAWKSANDDOVES
1.WORDSI:“ASINANDACRIME”
OneofthetopicsdiscussedatRabinandDayan’sregularweeklymeetingafterthewarwasrecordedintheminutesas“eventsintheoccupiedterritories.”Inarevised version of the document, the word “occupied” was crossed out andreplaced with “liberated.” Rabin and Dayan frequently referred to both“occupied territories” and “liberated territories,” but the minutes may havereflected the worldviews of different note-takers. While “occupation” wasconsiderednegativeandtemporary,“liberation”wasapositivestate,worthyofpermanence.1Themilitaryadvocategeneral,MeirShamgar,whoprepared thelegal infrastructure for the military government, suggested “administeredterritories” as a compromise. This artificial construct served official needsadequately,butthepressuseditwithscarequotesatfirst,asdidMosheDayan.2
Theselinguisticfluctuationsreflectedmorethanmerepoliticaldisagreement;therewasagenuinedifficulty inadapting to thesituation thewarhadcreated.Soldiers serving in the territories on theirway home for leave said theyweregoing“toIsrael,”implyingthattheterritorieswereinaforeigncountryandthat“Israel” referredexclusively to thestate,not“the land”—Eretz Israel.At leastonesoldierfromYehiamdescribedhisreturnfromtheWestBankasareturntoEretzIsrael.3
OnJune11,YediotAharonotpublishedadeclarationthatdeclared,“Nopartofour land that has been liberated shall be returned.”Maariv described a visitEshkol made to some wounded soldiers; the story’s headline was “’Do NotLeave!’CalledtheWounded.”OnegeneralorderissuedbyGeneralUziNarkisread, “You did not go to battle in vain. . . . The land is large andwhole,mysoldiers,becausethelandisyours.”4ThiswastheprevalentviewintheGeneralStaff.The IDF generals held that relations between Israel and the Arabs were
unchanged: the Arabs had not given up their desire to destroy Israel. Theterritories improved Israel’s strategic position and should therefore not berelinquished, at least as long as therewas no peacewith Egypt. TheGeneralStaffruledoutaseparatepeacewithHusseinandthoughtitwasbettertoreacha
settlementwiththePalestinians.TheyexplainedtheirpositiontoEshkol.Yitzhak Rabin, soon to become Israel’s ambassador to the United States,
supported founding a Palestinian state that would be “connected to Israel”—namely, one that would enable Israel to make the Jordan River its securityborder. Eshkol asked, with little enthusiasm, if the new state would have anarmy.Rabinsaiditwouldhaveapoliceforcebutnoarmy.“Whodecidesthat?”askedEshkol. “We do,”Rabin replied. Eshkolwas not convinced, andRabinadmitted,“We’renotsayingit’sanidealsolution.Thequestioniswhatwouldbeworse.”HaimBar-Lev,whohadreplacedRabinasIDFchiefofstaff,recognizedthat
thesituationmightchange.Unliketheothergenerals,hesupportedatreatywithHussein.Buthealsoagreedthatunderthepresentcircumstances,thebalanceofforcesshouldnotbealtered.NarkisproposedcountingtheIsraeli-Arabconflictamongthoseworldproblemsthathadnosolution.BesidesrecommendingthatEshkolmaintainthecurrentstateofaffairs,thegeneralsalsothoughtitpossiblethatthePalestinianswouldemigrate,flee,orbedeportedovertheyears.Gavishpointed out that 400,000 Palestinians had left theWest Bank in the past twodecades;hiscolleaguesremindedhimthatthisfigureincludedthe200,000whohad left in themost recentwar.Gavish said therewas no tellingwhatwouldhappeninthenextone.HaimBar-Levcautiouslysaid,“Theremaybeawarthatwedonotwant,but
itwillbe imposeduponus,and itwillofferanothersolutionofsorts, thewaysome four hundred thousand Arabs left the territories during this war.” ThegeneralsassuredEshkolhewasundernoobligationtogrant theinhabitantsoftheterritoriescitizenshiportherighttovoteformembersoftheKnesset.5
The generals were speaking not only in response to victory: the continuedoccupationwassupposedtopreventthenextthreatofannihilation.Theanxietythat had gripped somany Israelis before thewar now served as an argumentagainst withdrawing from the territories. Two days after the war was over,NarkiswasstilldescribingNasserasan“EgyptianHitler”andcallinghim“theFührerofCairo.”Hesaidthat theIDFhadtoremindNasser“whatbecameofHitler.”Similarsentimentsappearedincountlessnewspaperarticlesandbooks.GoldaMeirwrote,“WeresolvedthattherewouldbenoreturntoHitler’sFinalSolution;therewouldbenosecondHolocaust.”6Agroupofprominentwriterspublished a proclamation “for a Greater Israel.” They included some of theluminaries of Israeli literature: S. Y. Agnon, Natan Alterman, Uri ZviGreenberg, Haim Gouri, Moshe Shamir, and Haim Hazaz, among others. As
befitspeoplewholivebythepen,theyinvestedagreatdealofthoughtineveryword,duringlengthydiscussionsheldmostlyinsuchwell-knownTelAvivcafésasHerli,Kassit,andRoval.The opening of the proclamation was misleading—or deceitful. “The IDF
victoryhaspositionedthenationandthestateinanewera.GreaterEretzIsraelis now in the hands of the Jewish people.” This was untrue: the territoriesoccupied by the IDF in the Six-Day War did not encompass all of biblicalPalestine—and the State of Israel was not “the Jewish people.” Theannouncementwentontopositiontheterritoriesasequaltothestateitself:“Justas we have no right to give up the State of Israel, so we are commanded torealizewhatithasgivenus:theLandofIsrael.”Theverb“commanded”impliedan almost religious obligation, a vow of sorts, and then came the decisivedeclaration:“Wearebound to loyalty to the integrityofour land—to thepastand to the future, and no government in Israel has the right to give up thisintegrity.”Heretheauthorsseemedtosevertheoccupationfrompoliticalreality,aswellastowrestitfromdemocraticallymadedecisions.ThesignatoriesmadeanefforttopositionthemselvesatthecenterofZionistideology.Theinhabitantsof the territories, they wrote, would enjoy freedom and equality; the JewishmajorityinIsraelwouldbepreservedthankstoimmigrationandsettlement.Thedeclarationwasalsosignedbya fewformerseniorofficers,academics,
and other public figures. Unlike the writers, they were not renownedpersonalities,buttogetherwiththemtheyconstitutedapressuregroupthatcouldnotbeignored.Thiscollaborationbetweenfiguresformerlyidentifiedwiththeleft, includingvarious labormovementmemberssuchasNatanAlterman,andtheleft’sdetractors,amongthemUriZviGreenberg,showedtheextenttowhichthe terms “left” and “right” had lost their originalmeanings. This same pointhadbeenillustratedbytheestablishmentofanationalcoalitiongovernmentontheeveofthewar.7
Theprimarypoliticaldistinctionwasnolongerbetweenasocialist“left”andacapitalist “right,”butbetween“doves”and“hawks.”Theargumentbetweenthemwasconducted,asalways, in theKnessetandon theeditorialpages,butthecentralrolenowassignedtowritersandacademicsdeepenedthesensethattherewasnoneed for an immediatedecision, as if thewarhadmainly raisedquestionsconcerningIsraelisociety’sfundamentalvalues.8
“I must reformulate the conventions of identity and identification, becausetherehasbeenamajorearthquake,anerosionofwordsandmeanings,”wroteAmosOz. “ ‘Judaism,’ ‘Zionism,’ ‘homeland,’ ‘national right,’ ‘peace.’ These
wordsarebeingdrawnintonewrealmsandtakingonnewmeaningsthatwehadnotpreviouslyimagined.”Thephenomenonwaswidelyprevalent.Manypeopledescribed the occupation of the territories as part of a “miracle.”LeviEshkolsaid,“Whatthearmyhasdoneuptonowisamiracleontopofamiracle.”9
The feeling was genuine, devoid of political identification, and it gave thevictoryareligiousdimension.“Thegreatmiraclethathasoccurredastonishesusall.Wewerecertainofdestruction,andnoweverythinghaschangedandwearethevictors,”wroteaTelAvivwomantohersisterinBoston.“Amiraclefortheentirepeople,andaprivatemiracleforalmosteveryperson,wherevertheyare,”wrote a woman from Kibbutz Tirat Zvi to friends in Los Angeles. “A greatmiracle has occurred here,” wrote the elderly philosopher Schmuel HugoBergman,echoingthetraditionaldescriptionoftheHanukahmiracle.“Godhassavedourlittlecountry,”headded.10
A number of rabbis added their voices.Most of them, including SephardicchiefrabbiYitzhakNissim,objectedtoanyterritorialwithdrawal,andnotonlyfromsitesholy toOrthodoxJews,suchas theTempleMountand theWesternWall.“NoonefromIsrael, includingthegovernmentofIsrael,hastheright togivebackaniotaoflandfromthelandofIsraelwhichwehold,”wroteNissim,implyingthatthiswasprimarilyaquestionoffaith,notofpoliticsorsecurity.11
Oneof themostvocalandvisibleadvocatesof the imperative toholdon tothe territories was Shlomo Goren, the chief rabbi of the IDF, and the manidentifiedmorethananyotherwiththeconvictionthattheOccupationembodieddivine will was Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, from theMercaz Harav yeshiva inJerusalem.Equippedwithhisshofarandmilitaryrank,RabbiGorentraveledtheterritoriessharingwithsoldiershisbeliefthattheStateofIsraelexistedthanksto an unshakable divine mandate and that the IDF was implementing theprophets’predictionsfortheendofdays.“Thedivinespirit,whichhasnever left theWesternWall,nowwalksbefore
thearmiesofIsraelinapillaroffiretolightourwaytovictory,”hesaidwhenhereachedthewallwiththefirstofthesoldiers.Overthenextweeksheblewhisshofaralloverthecountry,fromMountSinaiinthesouthtoMountHermonin the north.OnAugust 10,Goren came to theTempleMount and found thegatesblocked.Heandagroupofsoldiersbegantobreakthegatesdownsotheycouldenterandpray,thusreoccupyingthecompoundfromtheMuslims.FromthemomentMosheDayanhadbeenwiseenoughtoordertheremoval
oftheIsraeliflagfromtheDomeoftheRock,immediatelyaftertheoccupation,IsraelhadinfactconcededtheTempleMounttoMuslims.Thechiefrabbinate
ruled that Jews were not permitted to go to the mount lest they accidentallydesecrate the site where the Temple had stood, which would be a sin. ThegovernmentdecidedthatJewswhotriedtopraytherewouldbetoldtomovetotheKotelsquare.TheministerialcommitteeinchargeofmaintainingholysitesaskedDayantoinstructGoren,throughRabin,tostoptryingtotakecontroloftheTempleMount,soastoavoidinvolvingtheIDFinareligiousconflict.RabbiKookwaslesstheatricalthanGoren,buthetooforbadethedivisionof
the land: “It is a sin and a crime to deliver our lands to gentiles.”Kook hadopposed partition of the land as early as the 1940s, for reasons of bothnationalismandtheology.Heassignedreligioussignificancetothestate,whichheviewedasastageinthemysticalprocessfromdestructiontoredemption.Theseizure of the territories, in this view, was also sanctified: “This is thedeterminationofdivinepolitics,whichnoearthlypoliticscanrival.”Hedidnotrepresent allofOrthodox thinking,buthedidhaveaprofound influenceonageneration of young religious Israelis, and they played a central part in thestruggleagainstwithdrawal.12
THE POSITION ADVOCATED BY THEMILITARY, THEWRITERS ADVOCATING A GREATERISrael, and the rabbis presented itself as an absolute truth. The powerfulmessianic emotion turned to a sweeping torrent of patriotism and religiousfervor,andthevoiceofthefaithfulreverberatedasthevoiceoftrueZionism.AttheHerutpartycongressinEastJerusalem,convenedonthefirstanniversaryofthewar,MenachemBeginpresenteda“declarationof the rightsof theJewishPeople” formulated as if it were intended to replace the Declaration ofIndependence.13
Thedovesfoundsuchfervordifficult tocontendwith.Mostof themmerelycautionedagainst“annexation.”
2.WORDSII:“NOTATANYPRICE”
Anumber of poets andwriters came out against annexation of the territories,includingDaliaRavikovitch,NatanZach,andYizharSmilansky.Butwhentheyopposed“annexation,”theywereinessencemirroringthegovernment’sstance.Somewriterswhowereidentifiedwiththelabormovement,suchasAmosOz,madeexplicitstatementsinsupportofEshkol,maintainingthatthereshouldbeno withdrawal without peace. Only a handful of people endorsed withdrawalfrom all the territories, includingGaza andEast Jerusalem, and their positiondeviated from the Zionist consensus to which most doves subscribed.* They
argued frequentlywithone another, and at times it seemed theydoubted theirowndeclarations.14
Eshkolspokeoftenaboutthefutureoftheterritoriestoo.Hisstylewaslight-years away from Dayan’s: less arrogant, not as blunt, and tormented withdoubts, he tended to think out loud, which often made him sound hesitant.Dayan never shared the rough drafts of his ideaswith anyone; as a result, healways sounded as if he knew exactly what he wanted, even though hefrequentlycontradictedhimself.InaconversationwithagroupofIDFgenerals,Eshkolleftnodoubtaboutwhathewanted:alargecountrywithnoArabsinit.But,ashehadoftendoneinthepast,heprojectedasensethatIsraelwastrappedbyhistoricalfactorsandprocessesoverwhichithadnocontrol.16
Eshkol’s aspirations in fact showed how similar he and Dayan were. The“Arabissue”wasnoclosertoDayan’sheartthanitwastoEshkol’s.BothmenbelievedthatIsraelshouldkeepEastJerusalem,partsoftheWestBank,Gaza,andafewotherpointsonthemapofoccupation.Countlessdiscussionsonthefutureoftheterritoriesrevolvedprimarilyaroundwhatshouldbedoneandsaidsoas tomaintain thecurrent situation. Insteadof looking fora solution to theconflict, they administered it. The long-term effects of occupation on Israel’sstatus as a Jewish and democratic state troubled Eshkol more than they didDayan; this was almost the only difference between the two. Everything elsewasegoandpolitics.The tension between the two men was rooted in Eshkol’s ouster from the
Defense Ministry, a defeat from which he had never recovered. Associatesobserved that as timewent by, his pain only deepened.He had trouble livingwith the fact that Dayan was appropriating the glory of victory, while heremainedintheshadows.*Attemptingtoresolvethesituation,IsraelLioraskedafewcolleaguestoclarifyDayan’strueroleinthevictory.Rabin,AharonYariv,andDayan’sbureauchief,RafiEfrat, repliedwithextremecaution thatDayanhadcontributedsignificantlytothedecisiontogotowar.Hismembershipinthegovernmenthadacceleratedthedecisionmaking.Hisinvolvementhadinspiredconfidence and faith: hehadhelped liftmorale.18GoldaMeir laterwrote thatshefounditdifficulttobelievethatthewarwouldhaveendedinanyotherwayevenifDayanhadnotjoinedthegovernment.IfDayanwassuchaclearchoiceforministerofdefense,shewondered,whyhadBen-Gurionnevergivenhimthejob?The rivalry between Dayan and Eshkol affected almost every political and
military issue, including the nuclear project and talks with Arabs in the
territories,withJordanandEgypt,andwiththeUnitedStates.Inoneincident,Dayan gave orders concerning the Dimona project, and only afterwardinstructedthatEshkolbeaskedwhetherhehadanyobjections.ForEshkolandhispeople, thiswas reminiscentof thewayDayanhaddecided tooccupy theGolan.EshkoldidnotwantDayantomeetwithU.S.secretaryofdefenseRobertMcNamara,mainlybecauseof howmuch the latter admiredDayan.PresidentJohnsonalsowantedtoseeDayan,buthetoldAmbassadorHarmanhedidnotknowhowtodosowithoutoffendingEshkol.19
Dayan complained that Eshkol treated him “with suspicion and envy,” andclaimed that every meeting with him caused emotional distress. He thoughtEshkol was trying to prevent him from handling the Arab population in theterritories.PinhasSapirwasalso interfering, according toDayan.HebelievedthatneithermanwascapableofhandlingtheArabs:“Aswastrueofmostoftheold-timeleaders,theirviewsontheArabshadevolvednotasaresultofdirectand continuous contact with them, but through debates and exchanges ofopinionsamongthemselves.ThetruthisthattheArabissuewasalientothemandnotclosetotheirhearts.”20ThiswasthevoiceofanIsraeligenerationthatthought in Hebrew and scorned the founding generation, which thought inYiddish.Italsoperceivedcontroloftheterritoriesasalocusofpoliticalpower—anothergoodreasonnottorelinquishthem.Yaacov Herzog observed that Dayan’s position changed over time.
Immediately after thewar, he tended to think about the territories in termsofsecurity. As time went by, his spiritual affinity with them deepened; Herzogonceheardhimsay,“AsfarasZionismisconcerned,IamareligiousJew.”InAugust, Herzog wrote, “I believe that the minister of defense is graduallybeginning to shape the state of things in theWestBank according to his ownbasicpolicies.Thisdevelopmentresultsnotonlyfromhispersonalityandstatus,butalsofromthefactthathebringsclearproposalsandatthesametimeshowsboth firmness and flexibility.”21 Polls asking Israelis about their choice forprimeministershowedthatbetween43and47percentwantedEshkol,17to19percentDayan, 13 to 14 percentBen-Gurion.22None of the cabinetministerswerepressedtoexplainwhytheyhadnotpreventedthewarortheOccupation;thequestionwasonlywhohaddonemoreforthevictory.Thedesiretokeeptheterritorieswasequatedwithpatriotism.Dayanwascriticized,butonlybecausehehadnotimmediatelysupportedtheoccupationofGaza,thecanal,Jenin,theOldCity,andtheGolanHeights.*Thecompetitionforfamewasplayedoutinanumberofbooksaboutthewar,someofwhichwereclearlyintendedtoexaltorembarrasscertainministersandbasedon information leakedaccordingly.One
minister complained about the leaks; the IDF decided not to cooperate withwriters.24
THE MINISTERS SQUABBLED FREQUENTLY OVER THE FUTURE OF THE TERRITORIES.GOVernmentdiscussionsmirroredpublicopinion,andoftenreachedahighpitch.Herzogdescribed ameetingduringwhichBegin stoodup ingreat excitementand began to orate as if hewere at a public square. “Willwe be the ones todivide the landof Israel for the first timesince thedestruction [of theSecondTemple]?” He added, “I admit I am a sentimentalist. It was sentiment thatbrought me here.” Minister Aran replied that he had also come to Palestinebecauseofasentiment:thepromiseofasafehavenfortheJewishpeopleinaJewish state. “A statewith forty percentArabs is not a Jewish state! It is theultimate fifth column! The kiss of death in twenty or thirty years.” Beginclaimedhe“dreamedofnegotiationsforpeace”andspokeofthepossibilityofan “economic union” with Jordan, but argued, “Wemust move not one inchfromtheJordan.”HesaidthiswasalsoasecurityimperativeanddemandedthattheGeneralStaffbebroughtbefore theministers toansweronequestion:wastherealinetothewestoftheJordanthatcouldassurethesecurityofIsrael?25
AMBASSADORWALWORTHBARBOURTRIEDTOIMPRESSUPONTHESTATEDEPARTMENThowdifficult he found it todeterminewhowas adove andwhowas ahawk,evenintheKnesset.It tookhimelevenpagestoclassifythecabinetministers,andheconcludedthatapproximatelyhalfweredovesandhalfwerehawks.Theambassador’sdifficultyresultedprimarilyfromthefactthateventhedoveswereunwilling to give up East Jerusalem Gaza, or other territories. And so theirunderlying rationale—whether nationalist, religious, or pragmatic—was of nogreatsignificance.TheambassadordescribedEshkolas“amildhawk.”26
Immediatelyfollowingthewar,almostsixoutoften(Jewish)IsraelisbelievedthatsomeoftheOccupiedTerritoriescouldbegivenbackwithintheframeworkof a peace agreement. Only one in three thought all the territories should beannexed. But when asked which territories they thought should be returned,even as part of a peace agreement, nine out of ten replied that the Old Cityshould not be given back; 85 percent said the Golan Heights should not bereturned; 73 percent thought the Gaza Strip should not be relinquished; 71percentsaidtheWestBankshouldnotbegivenback;andthesamenumberalsosaid that Sharm el-Sheikh should not be returned. A smaller minority, 52percent,saidtheSinaiPeninsulashouldnotbegivenback,either.Thesurveyindicatedacorrelationbetweentherespondents’levelofeducation
andtheiropinions:themorehighlyeducatedtherespondent(whichalsomeantthemoreAshkenazi),themorelikelyheorshewastosupportdovishpositions.Women tookmore hawkish positions thanmen: 40 percent of all housewivessupported annexation. Other surveys gave varying results, but the trend wasidentical in all of them: no significant portion of the territories should bereturned,evenforpeace.27*EveryoneagreedthatIsraelshouldstriveforpeace,buttheyalsoagreedwith
Yitzhak Rabin when he declared, “Not peace at any price.” This was theheadlineHa’aretzhadusedeightdaysafterthewar,abovealetterfromthepoetYitzhak Shalev; according to the paper, dozens of letters arrived expressingsimilarsentiments.28
Still arguing over the future of the territories, nine out of every ten IsraelisbelievedthattheArabstateswerenotyetreadyfortruepeace,whichabsolvedIsrael from having to make any decisions. Letters abroad reflected a sincerehopeforpeacewithoutwithdrawal.“Wemust takemoreandmoretrips to theterritories,andobserveandenjoyandhopethatwewillnevergivethemup,thatwe’llneverhavetogotowaragain,”wroteonewoman;“perhapsthedreamofpeace will come true.” Meanwhile, almost everyone agreed that the currentsituation was preferable. Returning to the prewar situation would be a“horrifyingdisaster,”saidEshkol.29
CHAPTER23STARTINGOVER
1.ISRAELISII:“WHATAWONDERFULNATION”
Israelisseemedtorediscover themselvesafter thewar;andthecountry,ontheface of things,was changed. “What awonderful nationwe have,” one IsraeliwrotetorelativesinBoston.AbbaEbandeclaredintheKnesset,“Insixdaysofaction,anewStateofIsraelwascreated.”Thegeneralsensewasthatlifeafterthewarwasbetter than ithadbeenbefore.Manypeopleattributed thesuddenreversal in circumstances to the victory—and victory, in turn, was associatedwiththenewlyoccupiedterritories.*Everyonenowpraisedtheyoung—amoststrikingillustrationofthereversal
inmood.“Thepapersconstantlywriteabout thegoldenyouthfromDizengoffwho fought heroically,”wrote aTelAvivwoman toLosAngeles.2 “Wewerewrongtodenounceouryoungpeople,becausetheyexceededallexpectations,”wroteonenewspaper.†
Sixweeksafterthewar,Maarivreportedasharpdecreaseinunemployment,andseveralweekslaterthegovernmentheardthesameinformationfromPinhasSapir.4 Within three months after the war, more than four thousand salescontractsfornewlybuiltapartmentsweresigned,almostfourtimesasmanyasinthethreemonthsbeforethewar.Overthenextthreemonths,justunderfivethousandmorecontractsweresigned.5Thesetransactionswereincomplete,andwerenotsufficient tobring theconstruction industryoutof itscrisis,but theyreflectedadramaticchange in themoodof Israelis: for the first time inmanymonths, they had faith in the future of Israel, andmuch as the recession hadbeen rooted to a great extent in the gloom preceding the war, the economicsituationwasnowaffectedbytheheadyfeelingofvictory.PinhasSapir estimated that thewarhad cost Israel $1billion; fortunately, a
largeportionwouldberecoupedthroughforeignaidanddonations.“Otherwisewe’dbelost,”Sapirtoldthegovernment.Variousestimatespeggedthecostofthe Occupation at between $50 million and $150 million a year. Sapir wasconcernedaboutthetensofmillionsIsraelwasabouttospendonPhantomwarplanes.But thewar alsogenerated income.Oil production in theSinaiwouldbringinseveralmilliondollars.Victorybroughtforeigninvestorsandpromised
flourishingtourism, includingdomestic tourism.Theneedtoreequip thearmystimulated defensemanufacturing. The construction industry recovered, partlyasaresultof thebuildingsurgeinJerusalem.Theinhabitantsof theterritoriesprovidedcheaplaborandboughtIsraeliproducts.6
Sapir highlighted a new phenomenon that was becoming more prevalent:many Jews were no longer willing to work in construction and agriculture,becausetheywerefindingpermanentworkinfactories.Insomeindustriestherebegantobeashortageofskilledlabor.EshkolcomplainedtoIDFgeneralsthatJewishwomennolongerwantedtoworkasmaids:Arabwomenwerecheaperand Jewish homes were flooded with them.7Many people also objected toSapir’sdovishpositions,andclearlyviewedthesuddenprosperityasaresultofthevictory.Theyrediscoveredthe“goodlife,”andAmericawasonceagaintherolemodel,asithadbeenbeforetherecession.TheownerofanappliancestoreinTelAvivtoldareporterthatmanysoldiers
returningfromthewarcelebratedbybuyinggiftsfortheirfamilies.Theman’snext line illuminates the interplay between economics and psychology: “Newbondsofaffectionhavebeenforged,andthisisclearlyreflectedintheincreaseinfoodprocessorsales.”Thebirthratein1968washigherthaninthepreviousyear.8 All this reflected a new faith in Israel’s ability to afford its people thegoodlife,and,moreimportant,alifethatwouldimproveyearbyyear.JustlikeinAmerica.Victory alsobrought about thebeginningof Israeli televisionprogramming.
TheKnessetwasaskedtoapprovetheestablishmentoftheGeneralTelevisionnetwork for “emergency” needs,with the initial purpose of increasing controlover theArabs in the territories. The first broadcast showed the huge victoryparade in Jerusalem. “This is a type of weapon,” explained Israel Galili, theminister inchargeof theBroadcastingAuthority.9Most Israeliswelcomed theprogrammingenthusiastically:nothingwasmoreAmericanthanTV.Televisionallowed Israelis to feel that theywere breaking out of the insularity that hadburdened the statebefore thewar.Notonlydid Israelis control the territories,butalsotheyincreasinglyfeltthattheyweregainingcontroloftheirowndailylives. Telephone service improved; the papers began reporting the computerrevolutionandtheincreasinguseofthebirthcontrolpill.10*
2.CHANGES:“PEOPLEGOTSOWORKEDUP”
Before thewar,most of the unemployedwereMizrahim, and now theywereamong the first Israelis to benefit and derive some hope from the victory.
Maariv sent its senior reporter,DovGoldstein, to revisitAmaliaBen-Harush,the woman from Kiryat Ata who had given birth to her twentieth son onIndependenceDay.Hefoundfive-month-oldIsraeldoingnicely,but thefatherrevealedthatfewofthepromisesthathadbeenmadebeforethewarhadbeenkept.Eshkol had sent a lovely telegrampromising that a giftwas on itsway.Fourmonths later, ithadnotarrived.SomeonehadpromisedaFrigidaire,butneverbroughtit.Goldstein’spieceranontheeveofRoshHashanah,andwhenhewentbackto
seethefamilyagaintendayslater,hecouldbarelysqueezeintotheapartmentbecausethereweresomanyboxesofclothes,toys,books,andshoes.Theyhadarrived from all over the country, by mail and special delivery—entiretruckloads of packages. The neighborhood mail carrier had almost collapsed,Goldstein reported,afterdeliveringhundredsof letters,many registered, somecontaining checks. Someone sent apples, which the Ben-Harush children hadneverseenbefore.Andthemanwhohadpromised therefrigeratorhadshownup.Afewregionalmunicipalcouncilswroteandofferedtoprovidethefamilywithhousingintheirjurisdictions.Thefather,apublicworkslaborer,neededajob,andreceivedsomeoffers.“Peoplegotsoworkedup,asiftheydidn’thaveanythingelsetoworryabout,”AmaliaBen-Harushcommented.12
•••
THE DAY AFTER THE WAR ENDED, HA’ARETZ HIGHLIGHTED THE ROLE OF MIZRAHISOLDIERSinthevictoryandextolledtheIDF’sabilitytointegratethemintothemilitary. “The IDF victories have proved that the numerous soldiers from thelater immigrationsfoughtwelland integratedwithout frictionwithin theunits,wheretheyencounteredveteranIsraelis.”Thepaperaddedthatpreparationsforthewar“reinvigoratedtheIDFasanarmyinwhichallstrataofthepeopleplaytheir part.” Aharon Megged observed that the war had knocked down thebarriers“betweenethnicities,classes,andparties.”13
Thiswasnotquiteaccurate.Abookoflifestoriesoffallensoldiers,publishedbytheMinistryofDefense,rarelynotedtheethnicoriginofthedeceased,butatleast60percentwereAshkenazi,15percentmore than theirproportionof thepopulation among their age group.At least 80 percent of officers killedwereAshkenazi.14 Among recipients of commendations, not even 20 percent wereMizrahi.15
ManyIsraelis,inamanifestationoftheirprewarprejudices,claimedafterthe
warthatMizrahisoldiershadshownvindictivehatredoftheArabsbuthadnotexcelledasfighters.16Herut’sroleinthevictorygovernmentofferedMizrahim,for thefirst time, thehopeofa trueshare indetermining theirownfutureandthat of the entire country.But anxieties about their cultural influence had notdisappeared. “Thecountry is becomingmore andmoreLevantine,”wroteoneIsraelifromHolontofriendsoverseas.17
And so the war and the Occupation did not eradicate the gaps betweenMizrahimandAshkenazis.TheMizrahimwere to remaindisadvantaged for alongtime,butthenewsituationofferedanimprovementintheirrelativestatus—for beneath the Israeli Arabs were now the Palestinians. Many Mizrahimentered managerial positions. They were often fluent in Arabic, and someemployed their own Palestinian laborers. The recovery from the economicrecessionandthepresenceofthePalestiniansalsoimprovedtherelativewelfareofIsraeliArabs.LikemanyoftheMizrahim,alargepartofthispopulationalsoshifted from menial work in agriculture and construction to skilled jobs,including white-collar posts. But like the Mizrahim, they also remaineddeprived: at the endof 1968only32percent of IsraeliArabsbelonged to theHistadruthealthfund.18
ThenewencounterwiththepopulationoftheterritoriesdidraisequestionsofidentityandloyaltyamongIsraeliArabs,manyofwhomnowrediscoveredtheirPalestinian identity.20 Thewar also deepened the identification betweenmanyIsraeliJewsandJewsinotherpartsoftheworld.*
3.IDENTITY:“THISISWHATTHEPEOPLENEED”
AstudycomparingaspectsofIsraelihighschoolstudents’identityafewyearsbeforeandaftertheSix-DayWarfoundnotablechanges.Followingthewar,25percentmoreIsraeliteenagersdeclared,“ThefactthatIamJewishfulfillsaveryimportantroleinmylife.”Therewasanincreaseof50percentinthenumberofyoungpeoplewhosaid that thepresenceofJews inPalestine inancient timesjustifiedtheestablishmentoftheStateofIsrael.Twiceasmanyrespondentsnowagreedthat“almostallnon-Jewsareanti-Semites.”Thestudyfoundsignificantdiscrepanciesamongstudentswhodefined themselvesas religious, traditional,andnonreligious,butalsofoundthatthesecularnowgavemoreweighttotheirJewishidentitythantheyhadformerly.Thirtypercentmoreyoungpeoplesaidthey were more religious than their parents; among those who definedthemselvesas secular,only2percenthadmade thesamestatementbefore thewar,whileafewyearsafterward5percentdid.21
AS TENSIONS ESCALATED BEFORE THE WAR, ISRAELI EMBASSIES ABROAD WEREFLOODEDwithrequestsfromyoungprofessionals,mostlyJewish,whowantedtovolunteerinIsrael.Itsoonbecameevidentthatthesupplyexceededthedemand,andtheForeignMinistryscaledbackitsoffertofinanceflightsforvolunteers;itwouldnowsubsidizeonlyJewswilling tospendat least fourmonths in Israel(doctorswouldneed tocommit toaminimumofsixweeks).Twodaysbeforethewar,thevolunteerswerealreadybecominganuisance,andonthethirddayofthewartheembassieswereaskedtostoptheflow:therewasnofurtherneedforvolunteers,Jewishornon-Jewish,doctorsorotherprofessionals.Itwasnoteasytogetridofthem.OnephysicianfromBostonCityHospital
wanted to set up a two-hundred-bed hospital in Israel.He said that hewouldbringfiftystaffmembers,andthatifIsraelwasnotinterestedhewouldmovehisprojecttoanArabstate,onhumanitariangrounds.Thepressurekeptupafterthewar,andtheForeignMinistrypracticallybeggedthevolunteerstostopcoming.Some ambassadors still tried to obtain authorizations for distinguishedvolunteers.Theambassador inGermany reported thatGünterGrasswanted tobringagrouptoIsrael,andurgedthegovernmenttoviewthisasasymbolicactof solidarity. FromAbidjan, the ambassador reported that the daughter of thepresidentofIvoryCoasthadannouncedavisit;rejectionofherofferwouldbeaterribleinsult.More than22,000people signedup tovolunteerbefore andduring thewar,
and7,500arrivedinthesixmonthsafterward.“Theycameonarescuemissionandweresenttopickplums,”wroteHa’aretz.Almostfivethousandofthemdidwork on kibbutzim, while more than a thousand served in civilian auxiliarycorpsoperatedby thearmy.22Althoughmost of thevolunteers servedno realpurposeandcomplaineda lot, thevolunteerismfed theatmosphereofelation.Israelis wrote about the phenomenon in their letters, often citing the Jewishawakeningasoneofthewar’saccomplishments.“NotonlytheStateofIsrael,but thePeopleof Israelhasbeen reborn,”declaredoneKnessetmember.“Weare moved by the awakening of the Diaspora: we did not see the like evenduringtheWarofIndependence.”HebelievedthishadoccurredbecauseIsraelhadfinallymanagedtopresentyoungpeoplewithachallenge.AnotherspeakerlocatedthischallengeinthesandsoftheSinai,therocksoftheGolan,andthewallsofJerusalem—“ourstolenland,whichtheIDFhasrestoredtous.”Victoryappearedasareturn to theearlydaysof thefirstZionistpioneers, includingarenewalofmassimmigration—theonlychancetoovercomethe“demographicproblem.”But the ideaof settling the territoriesdidnotdraw theJewsof theworld to
Israel. Everyone was aware that most of the volunteers would eventually gohome. “I readbeautiful letters fromAmerica,writtenbyyoungmenwhohadvisited here,” Eshkol told the generals. “They had a good time, soaked upenoughsunshinefordecades.Nowtheyhavecallusesontheirhandsandstoriesto tell in America.”23 Eshkol encouraged suggestions of ways to increaseimmigration,andhereceivedmanyideasforboostingtheJewishbirthrate.OnecitizenthoughttheissueshouldbehandledbytheMinistryofDefense.Anothersuggestedgivingaidonlytofamiliesproducingbabieswhocouldbeidentifiedas potential IDF soldiers. The government set up a “Demography Center,”directedbyZinaHarman,thewifeoftheambassador,whohadnowreturnedtoIsrael.Thelowbirthrate,whichhadworriedIsraelevenbeforethewar,wasnowat
the center of attention. The “Arab womb” continued to threaten the ZionistexistenceinPalestine.*However,thenumberofJewswhoimmigratedtoIsraelin1968,morethanthirtythousand,was40percenthigherthanthenumberwhohad come in either of the preceding two years.25† The new optimism wastherefore not unfounded, and it suited the postwar sense of Jewish solidarity.ThepressandtheKnessetoftendiscussedthepersecutionofthefewremainingJewsinArabstates,particularlyEgypt,Syria,andIraq.TheJewsofLibyawereallowed to leave. As in 1948 and 1956, Israel’s interest was once again inconflictwith thatofJews in theArabworld,but IsraelinewspapersaddressedtheissueasiftherewerenodifferencebetweenJewsandIsraelis.Israeltriedtohelp persecuted Jews, acting in concert with the United States and othercountries,aswellasthroughinternationalorganizations,includingtheUNandthe InternationalCommitteeof theRedCross.27Activismonbehalf ofSovietJewswasalso reinvigorated; thenewcampaignemployed the slogan“Letmypeoplego.”28
Israelis observed the effects of the victory on American Jews, who wentthroughavastspiritualawakeningthatwasauthenticandnolessexcitingthanthe one Israelis themselves had experienced, and in many cases even moreprofound.PrimeMinisterEshkolwasinundatedwithlettersofsupportandcheckssent
byJewsfromtheUnitedStatesandothercountries,someofthemmadeouttohimpersonally.Thesixtylargesttotaled$450,000,butmanypeoplesentsmallamounts;onemansentEshkolhisentire lifesavingsof$5,638.‡Aworldwidefund-raising drive held after thewar raised some $287million by the end ofSeptember,almosttentimestheamountcollectedthepreviousyear.29
“American Jews now understand that Nasser’s war is not directed solelyagainsttheJewishstate,butagainsttheJewishpeople,”wroteElieWiesel.LeonUris contributed an essay, “The Third Temple,” to one of the first publishedbooksofwarphotographs. In the autobiographicalpassagesofhispiece,Urisdescribed the anti-Semitic harassment he had endured as a child in Norfolk,Virginia.Hisoriginalname,hewrote,wasYerushalmi;hisbrotherYossilivedinIsraelandwasamongtheliberatorsoftheKotel.Urisexplainedthattheessaybelonged towhathe sawas a sequel to theBible, andhe referred to it as theBookofReturn.It includedashorthistoryoftheHolocaust.Attheendoftheessay,GodrecognizesthattheJewshavesufferedenoughandtellsthemtobuildathirdTempleanddwellintheirownlandforever.30
JamesMichenerwrotealetterofloveandidentificationwithIsrael,inwhichhesaidhewasworkinghard“tokeepattitudesherefromreturningtoanideaofadividedJerusalemandadividedPalestine.”31TheWashingtonPostpublishedthe impressions of the prominent historianBarbaraTuchman after her visit totherecentlycapturedJerusalem.“Itmayhavebeensomethingthisnationneeds:Prooftoitselfthatsubmissionisathingofthepast,thattheghettoisdeadforgood.”32*
Anage-oldproblemsoonreemergedfromtheoblivion.OneoftheoldestandwealthiestofJewishleaders, theoilmagnateJacobBlaustein,readthatEshkolhadreferredtothe“Jewishnation.”Hequicklypulledoutaletterhehadoncereceived fromBen-Gurion, inwhich the latter promised that Israelwould notinterfere in the livesofAmericanJewsanddidnotpretend tospeakfor them.Blaustein contacted Ambassador Harman to explain that the term “Jewishnation” undermined hismembership in theAmerican nation. The ambassadorhopedBlausteinwouldlettheissuedrop,buttheelderlyindustrialistpersisted.HarmansuggestedthatEshkolsendBlausteinaconciliatoryletter to theeffectthat therewerenodisagreementsbetween themand themisunderstandinghadprobablyresultedfromtranslationproblems.InJerusalem,theytookthematterseriously: Eshkol maintained that the prime minister of Israel could not takeback,evenbyimplication,hisuseoftheexpression“Jewishnation.”HeagreedtowritetoBlausteinthatnoticehadbeentakenofhiscomments.34
AFEWMONTHSAFTERTHEWAR,CHARLESDEGAULLE ISSUEDANEXTREMELYSHARPattack on the government of Israel. He demanded a withdrawal from theterritories, an end to the conflict, mutual recognition between Israel and itsneighbors, freedom of navigation, a solution to the refugee problem, andinternationalruleinJerusalem.ThiswasenoughtoirritatemostIsraelis,butde
Gaulle made matters worse by asserting that the State of Israel had been“implanted”intheMiddleEastundercircumstanceswhosejusticewasdubious,andbydescribing the Israelis as “self-confident anddomineering.”HiswordswereinterpretedasanattackonJews.“Oneday,twoorthreegenerationsfromnow,”wroteElieWiesel,“theywillmentionCharlesdeGaulleandsay. . .hedidalotforhispeople,buthewasananti-Semite.”35Ontheeveofthewar,deGaullehaddemandedthatIsraelnotfirethefirstshot.Whenthefightingbegan,France imposed an embargo onmilitary supplies to Israel, including sales ofMirageplanes.TheelderlygeneralhadatendencytoputonnationalistandCaesarlikeairs,as
ifherepresentedacountryonanequalinternationalfootingwiththeUSSRandtheUnitedStates.Thiswaspreposterous,butmanyIsraelislookedonhimwithreverenceandviewedFranceasimportanttoIsrael.EveryoneknewthatFrancehadsoldIsraeltheaircraftthatwonthewar,andmanypeoplewereawareofitsrole inadvancingtheDimonaproject.SodeGaulle’sstatementsstunnedthemand formany Israelis deepened their sense that theState of Israel, the Jewishpeople,andtheterritorieswereone.36
CHAPTER24ABSALOMDAYS
1.PROSPECTS:“KNOWWHATTOSAY”
OnedayinOctober,amilitarygovernmentofficiallefthisofficeinGazafortheSinaiDesert,inpursuitofalegend.SomeBedouinsdirectedhimtoalonepalmtree, not far fromRafiah.Whenhedugbeneath the tree, he found that itwasgrowingoutoftheskeletonofayoungman.ThesewerethebonesofAbsalomFeinberg—or at least, thatwaswhat Israel decided to believe.Major ShlomoBen-Elkana, a veteran police officer, was very familiar with the story of thehandsomeZionistspy,whosetoff tohelp theBritishwrestPalestinefromtheTurks and disappeared in the desert in 1917.On the eve of theSix-DayWar,nostalgia forAbsalomhadbeenanexpressionofdespair andennui.Now, theremains of “history’s first son of Israel” symbolized the delusions of theOccupation and the settlement of the territories; the old bones seemed toreinforcethefoundingaphorismofZionism:Ifyouwillit,itisnolegend.BeforeBen-Elkana’sdiscovery,onecouldstillcastdoubtsonthestorypasseddownbythe Bedouins from father to son, according to which the lone palm tree hadsproutedfromoneof thedates inFeinberg’spocketafterhewasburied in thedesert.Butnowtheageofdoubtwasover:itwasnolegend.The talewas intensely political. The undergroundNilimovement, towhich
Feinberg had belonged, had acted against the judgment of the Jewishcommunity’sleaders,andovertheyearsthis“activist”oppositioncametoserveasasymbolofnationalcourage,patriotism,andthedemandforquickaction—instarkcontrasttotherealisticpragmatismandself-restraintthathadcausedtheEshkolgovernmenttodelaythebeginningofthewar.AfewofAbsalomFeinberg’srelativesdemandedthathebereburiedbeneath
the samepalm tree in theSinai. “Absalomdreamedof thegreatEretz Israel,”said one of them. But other relatives, fearing that the grave would one dayremain beyond Israel’s borders, demanded a state military funeral at MountHerzl in Jerusalem. Eshkol was not enthusiastic about this demand, buteventually acquiesced, just as he had agreed to bring Jabotinsky’s remains toburial in Israel.YediotAharonot found thatwith theburial, theNili ethoshadearnedtheadmirationofanentirepeople.Thousandsattendedthefuneral;manywereintears,althoughtheydidnotknowwhetherofsorroworjoy.
Shaul Avigur wrote to Eshkol that the commotion surrounding Feinberg’sfuneralwasexcessiveandunjustified“fromaneducationalpointofview”—bywhich hemeant politically.As themanwho had spearheaded efforts to bringSovietJewstoIsrael,Avigurwasawareoftheendofthecountry’sAshkenazimajority,andofthedeclineinthefoundingelite’sstatus.Israelwouldsoonbeadifferentcountry,heknew,withdifferentvalues,andsohecautionedhispartyagainst losing itsmonopoly over national symbols.His fearswerewarranted:withtheestablishmentofthenationalunitygovernmentontheeveofthewar,thelabormovementbeganthecountdowntoitseventuallossofpower,tenyearsandonewarlater.1
BEFORE THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR, THE PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICEPUBLISHED anotherbooklet in the series “KnowWhat toSay,”which includedthefollowingstatement:“ThefactisthatuntilthisdaynoArabrulerhasshownawillingnesstoreachapeacetreatywithIsrael.”2Thiswasnotso:Nasserhadofferedatleasta“nonbelligerency”agreement,andHusseinhadofferedapeaceaccord.InearlyOctober1967,AbbaEbanspokewithRobertAnderson,anAmerican
friendofNasser’swhohadgonetoseetheEgyptianpresidentbeforethewarinanattempttopreventit.EbanwasnowaskingAndersontotrytoreachapeaceagreement with Egypt. Eban would tell him only what he said in publicappearances. Still, Andersonwent to Egypt again, with the approval ofDeanRusk.President Johnsonwas also in thepicture.Anderson spokewithNasserand came home with exciting news: Nasser was willing to make peace withIsrael,buthistermswerefarfromwhatIsraelwaswillingtoaccept.Hewouldnotagreetodirectnegotiations,onwhichIsrael insisted:noArableadercouldhold direct negotiations with Israel and survive, he maintained, so mediationwas necessary.Nasserwould prefer that the superpowers impose a settlementandsaid thatnoArabgovernmentwouldsignaseparatepeacewithIsrael.Hedemandedwithdrawalfromalltheterritories,includingGaza,andasolutiontothe refugee problem.Hewould agree to allow Israeli ships through the SuezCanal, althoughhecouldnot ensure that some fanaticwouldnotopen fireonthem,headded.Hedidnotruleout,inprinciple,thedemilitarizationofcertainterritories.WhiteHousedocumentsshowthatEbanbackedoff fromthe initiativeeven
before Anderson left for Egypt. TheWhite House assumed that he had beendiscouraged frompursuing it in Jerusalem.Whatever the reason,WaltRostowtold the president that the endeavor was done: “I do fear the Israelis will
overplaytheirhand,butthenIdon’tliveintheMiddleEast.”3
TOWARDNOVEMBER,THEUNINNEWYORKWASTHECENTEROFAFRENZYOFTRANSATlantic activity.More andmore draft proposals changed hands, the crafters ofdiplomaticlanguagetoiledoverwordsandsentencesinalmosteverycapitalinthe world, and finally the diplomats were sent to battle over a single word:“the.”ThequestionwaswhethertheSecurityCouncilwoulddemandthatIsraelwithdrawfrom“theterritories”ormerelyfrom“territories.”TwooftheofficialUNlanguages,RussianandChinese,donotusedefinitearticles,buteveryonewas working in English, and they finally agreed on “territories.” Only theSpanish-languagedocument,forsomereason,referredto“theterritories.”4*
UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution242,datedNovember22,broughtaSwedishdiplomattotheMiddleEast.GunnarJarringshuttledbackandforth,theneventuallygaveup.Israelhaddecidedthataslongastherewasnopeace,itwould “fortify its position” in the territories. Instead of talking about theinternational border, it was now speaking of “secure and recognizedboundaries.”ThedecisionsofJune19,whichhadproclaimedawillingness towithdraw from the Sinai and the Golan Heights in return for peace anddemilitarization,hadevaporated.Forawhileitseemedthatnooneknewwhattodo,andsonoonedidathing.“Theissueofpolicyconcerningtheterritoriesisso complex that I do not dare summarize it on paper,”wrote one ofEshkol’sassistants to Ambassador Harman. But as time went by, Israel’s grip on theterritoriestightened.
SEVERALSTATESMENANDANUMBEROFPRIVATEINDIVIDUALS,FROMPRESIDENTTITOOFYugoslaviatotheelderlyFieldMarshalViscountMontgomery,theheroofElAlamein, made efforts to broker settlements between Israel and Egypt.6AnAmericanattorneynamedJamesBirdsall,whorepresentedafertilizercompanyandwasafriendofArthurKrim,sawNasserafewtimes,andinDecemberhebroughtJohnsonapersonal letterfromhim,inwhichNasserofferedastateofnonbelligerency with Israel. The Americans were not enthusiastic about thisunusual channel of communication, but Johnson did sendNasser a reply, andthiswasasteponthewaytoarenewalofthediplomaticrelationsthathadbeencutoffbecauseofthewar.7
InJune1968,theRomanianforeignminister,GeorgeMacovescu,alsotriedtowork out an agreement between Israel and Egypt. According to his report,Nasserhadreiteratedthathesincerelywantedtoreachanagreement.However,he felt it could not be done in one leap, but only step by step. He offered
Macovescu what he had proposed to Anderson months earlier: an Israeliwithdrawal from all the territories, a solution to the refugee problem, IsraelishippingintheSuezCanal,and“nonbelligerency,”allinonepackagebasedonapredeterminedtimeline.Headdedthathedidnotpredicatenegotiationsonanimmediateandunconditionalwithdrawalfromtheterritories.Eshkol told theForeignAffairsandDefenseCommitteeabout the initiative,
and shared the response he had given his Romanian visitor: Israel wanted asignedpeacetreaty,tobeobtainedthroughdirectnegotiations.Hereiteratedthatitwasunacceptablethatthevictorinawarforceduponitshouldhavetokneelbeforetheloserandpleadwithhimtotakebackcapturedterritoriesinreturnforverbaldeclarations.IfNasserfelthewasunderpressure,well,Eshkol,too,wasunderpressure:“Decadesofpressure,thepressureofanattempttodestroyus,the pressure of the people in Israel and the Jewish people in theDiaspora, ofwhomweareonlythevanguard.”AttheendofAugust,theArabforeignministersconvenedinKhartoum,the
capital of Sudan, and agreed upon three negations that were prominentlypublicized in Israel:nopeacewith Israel,no recognitionof it,nonegotiationswithit.ButatleastoneArableaderdisregardedhispeers:KingHussein.8
•••
ROUGHLYFIVEMONTHSAFTERTHEIRPREVIOUSMEETING,YAACOVHERZOGMETWITHKingHusseinagain,butthistimeitwasmainlybecauseneitherofthetwocouldfind any more excuses to offer the former British politician Julian Amery.Amery, fullofenergyandadesire tohelp,keptonpressing;hedidnotknowthatHerzogandHusseinwereoldacquaintances.Thetwowerefinallyforcedtocometohishomeandpretendtheyhadnevermetbefore.*AbbaEbanarrangedhis own meeting with Hussein, through Julian Amery’s good offices. Beforeleaving,Ebanconsultedhiscolleagues in theparty.GoldaMeirwasafraid thekingmightsayhewaswilling tosignapeace treatywith Israel,whichwouldput Israel in the uncomfortable position of having to acquiesce to all hisdemands. The other party members were also filled with apprehension andsuspicions.10†
Eban’smeetingwithHusseinwasheldinLondonandlastedthreehours.Forthefirsttime,thekingwasaccompaniedbyZaidRifai,hischiefoftheDiwan,aswellasbyhischiefofstaff.EbancamewithHaimBarLev.Thegeneralsmetseparately. In response toEban’s question,Hussein said he did not rule out aseparatepeacewith Israel.Hewanted toknowwhat Israelwasoffering.Eban
repliedthatthishadnotyetbeendecided,butexplainedthevariousviewpoints:someheldthattheWestBankshouldbeannexed;somepreferredtoestablishaPalestinian state; and others wanted peace with Jordan but stipulated variousconditions, including “not insignificant border amendments” in the JordanValleyandelsewhere,aswellasdemilitarizationofterritories;IsraelwouldnotgiveupcontroloverArabJerusalem.Husseinrepliedthattherewasabasisfortalks,andproposedholdingthemin
NewYork, under the auspices of Gunnar Jarring. A few hours later, Husseinheard fromCairo thatNasserdidnotbelieve the talkswould succeed,butdidnot object to them. In the interim, Eban askedHussein to take action againstFatah.Hussein,inturn,encouragedtheIDFtostrikeatthePalestinians,aslongastheydidnotharmhisownarmy.Bar-Levconvincedhiscounterpartthatthiswasimpossible:iftheIDFresponded,itwouldinevitablyhittheJordanianarmytoo.Hussein was punctilious about maintaining royal etiquette, Eban told his
colleagues. “The properway to address him is ‘YourMajesty,’” he recountedwithamazement,asifHusseinwerenotarealking.Itwasthefirstmeetingofitskind,hesaidproudly,ignoringthemanymeetingsheldwithHerzog.There are several accounts of themeeting. Herzog found that Husseinwas
morerestrainedthanRifai,whotookmoreextremepositions.Herzogreportedto the government about an argument he had with Rifai about Jerusalem.“There’s nothing to be done about it,” Herzog said, and his Jordaniancounterpartreplied,“That’swhatyouthink.That’snotthewayitis.”Thechiefof Diwan maintained that it was not enough to fly a Jordanian flag on theTemple Mount. But he did offer Israel ownership of the Western Wall. Heexplained that Hussein couldmake any concession in theWest Bank, but onJerusalemhehadtorepresenttheentireArabworld.Herzogresponded,“Sir,westoodbefore theentireworld,wefoughtandwestoodstrong:doyou imaginethatwecannotstanduptoyou?”TowhichtheJordanianreplied,“Itwilltakeaslong as it takes, but we cannot live without Jerusalem.” He told Herzog thatparticipants in a discussion with Nasser had shed tears over the loss ofJerusalem. “Even those who had never visited Jerusalem could not bear thedisgraceoflosingthecity,”hesaid,andadded,“IfyouinsistonyourpositionregardingJerusalem,wewillmakenoprogress.”Herzogrespondedinasimilarvein.Abba Eban observed, on another occasion, “We have nothing to say, infact.”12*
ESHKOLTOLDHIS PARTY, “WEKNOWFROMVARIOUS SOURCES THATHUSSEINWOULD
liketomakepeacewithus.Hewouldliketoreachasettlement,andasettlementfor himmeans nothing other than peace. Ifwewere to offer him peacewithhonor, hewould reach an agreementwith us.”Thedifficultywas no longer afundamental one. “It is easiest to reach a settlement with Hussein,” Eshkoladded.14 This was also Yaacov Herzog’s view. He toldMoshe Dayan that ifMapamcontrolledthegovernment—thatis,ifthedovesinIsraelhadamajority—Israel couldmake peacewithHussein.Herzog, always the diplomat, had aprofessional view of the matter: “There is an objective gap between theminimumwe can agree to and the minimum C[harles] can agree to.” Dayanhimself surmised that the Arabs would only be willing to declare a state ofnonbelligerencyinreturnforanIsraeliwithdrawaltotheGreenLine.Andsoheconcluded:“IamnotawareofanyplanthatwecanagreetoandthattheArabswillaccept.”15
THE EFFORT ISRAEL INVESTED IN TALKS WITH HUSSEIN WAS INTENDED LARGELY TOCONvince theUnitedStates that itwasgenuinely trying to achievepeace.Thefear in Jerusalem was that the Americans might force Israel to withdraw. InOctober,JohnsonmetwithEban,andmadehisviewofthewarveryclear.HeregrettedthatIsraelhadactedalonerather thanheedhisadvice.Hethoughtatthe time that Israel had acted unwisely, and he still thought so.16 BesidesSkyhawk aircraft and other military equipment, the Israelis were hoping theUnitedStateswouldalsosell themPhantomfighters,whichwereat the topoftheir shopping list. They therefore had to be extremely cautious.Washingtonwasmakingangrynoises,butas themonthswentby, theUnitedStates turnedoutnottobeputtinganyrealpressureonIsrael.
2.FRIENDSHIP:“THISMAKESNOGOODDAMNSENSEATALL!”
In the weeks after the war, Israel had to handle the aftermath of the Libertyattack.The Israeli embassy inWashington reported that theWhiteHouse andtheStateDepartmentwerebothencouragingthe“wickedinsinuation”thathadaccompaniedtheaffair—namely,theclaimthatIsraelhadintentionallyattackedthe ship. In an off-the-record press briefing, Johnson himself used the term“deliberateattack.”Newsweekwasplanningtoprintanarticlesuggestingthatbyinflating the affair the presidentmeant to lessen his dependency on pro-Israelpublicopinion.TheIsraeliembassyfoughtback.Harmanand theembassyspokesman,Dan
Patir,managedtotonedowntheNewsweekarticle:aquestionmarkwasaddedtotheheadlineandasidebarcommentarywasdropped.Buttheirinfluencewasnot limitless, and the following week they were no longer able to haltNewsweek’s story.17EphraimEvronbelieved thatSecretaryofStateRuskwastryingtoexploittheincidenttocreateabridgetoArabstates.Ifhesucceeded,theUnitedStateswouldhave“freerein” toactonpositions thatwouldnotbeconvenient for Israel. But the Israeli diplomat had suggested a means ofrestrainingJohnson:“Alerthimto thepersonal implications if thepublicfindsout that he participated in spreading the story,which borders on blood libel.”Theembassystaff,Harmanreported,wereworkingviaIlanandHarari(FortasandGinsburg).Justice Fortas spoke with the president and the public accusations were
dropped, but Fortas said that a lawyer would have trouble defending Israel’sdenial. Harman believed that Fortas was basing his opinions on informationobtainedattheWhiteHouse.AbeFeinbergalsoreported,onbehalfofasourcereferred to in the embassy telegrams as “Hamlet,” that the United States hadevidence of an Israeli pilot continuing to attack the ship even after havingverified its identity. Harman replied cautiously that there was a differencebetweenaccusingonepilotandpubliclychargingIsrael.Theambassadorwroteto the foreign minister that Israel was continuing to defend itself against thecharges,butthat“Menashe,”ArthurGoldberg,hadsuggestedtoHarmanthathebeverycarefulbecauseJohnsonwasextremelyangry.Goldbergalsorevealedtothe ambassador that the Americans had managed to record the Israeli pilotsduringtheattack,andtherecordingsprovedthattheyknewtheirtargetwasanAmerican vessel. Goldberg told Harman there was only one way out of thecrisis:Israelhadtoputsomeoneontrial.18
THE CHIEF OF STAFF APPOINTED COLONEL RAM RON TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT.Within four days, he produced a report concluding that theLiberty had beenattackedasaresultofaseriesoferrors,eachofwhichseemedreasonableunderthecircumstances.Theshiphadbeenidentifiedinthemorninghours,butwhenthepilotsshotatitlatertheydidnotrealizetheirtargetwasthesameship.Ronalso reprimanded the Americans: “One must emphasize the contributorynegligence of the Liberty itself, by sailing in that location at a time of war,withoutnotificationoridentification.”19
This looked like a cover-up, and Harman immediately demanded anotherinvestigation.Theappointmentofasingleinvestigatorforanincidentthathadcaused the deaths of thirty-four people would only arouse anger, he wrote.
ColonelRonwaswell-knowninWashington,headded,andpeoplewereawarethathewasnotanexpertonairforceornavalmatters.Therewasnochancethatthepresidentandthefamiliesofthosekilledwouldbesatisfiedwithhisreport.HarmansentJerusalemadetailedanalysisofthereport,exposingitsdefectsandcontradictions:“EvenasuperficialanalysisofRon’sfindingsprovidesabasistoassume that several parties acted negligently and recklessly,” he wrote. HeparticularlycriticizedRon’sfailuretoconsider thematerial theAmericanshadprovidedtoIsrael.EphraimEvroncabledWaltRostow’sresponse:“Thismakesnogooddamnsenseatall!”Theaffairwouldnotgoaway.“Theissuehasbecomeanopenwoundwiththe
potential to cause severe harm on all levels, including the president, thePentagon, public opinion, and the intelligence community,” cautioned theambassador.Thenextdayhewrote,“Icannotoverstatetheexplosivenessofthismatter.”Hedemandedimmediatenotice,thatsameday,thatofficialchargeshadbeenbrought.“Thisistheonlywaytomakeclear,bothtotheU.S.governmentand to the public, that the attack on the ship was not the result ofmaliciousintentorcarriedoutbyauthorizedpartiesintheIDF.”The recently sanctified IDF agreed only to appoint an investigating judge,
Lieutenant Colonel Yeshayahu Yerushalmi. Harman demanded that hisinvestigation lead to indictments for negligence and recklessness. Rabinprotestedtheseattemptstodictatetheresultsofaninvestigation.“WouldyouoryourAmericancounterpartsimaginethatintheUnitedStatestheadministrationwouldtrytoinfluencetheworkofaSupremeCourtjustice?”hewrote.Weekswent by.The ambassador pressed; themilitary said the investigation
wouldtaketime.YerushalmisummarizedhisfindingsattheendofJuly:“Thereappears to be insufficient evidence justifying charges against any person.”HeemphasizedthatthemistakesthathadledtotheLibertyattackwerereasonableat a time ofwar, though itwas conceivable that during peace hewould haveappliedanentirelydifferentstandardof reasonableconduct.Headded thathisinvestigationmaterialsmightbehelpfulforthefuture.20
The Americans were not satisfied. The State Department said the reportpointedto“terribleandculpablenegligence.”Evronhimselfthoughtthereportindicatedrecklessness:“Idonotthinkthisbehaviorisappropriateconductforawell-organized army like ours.” But the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem soondetermined that the affair was “almost history,” and only the question ofcompensationremained.IsraelemployedDavidGinsburg’sservicesagain, thistimeasanattorney.Apredictablytediousseriesofnegotiationsensued,replete
withemotionaldramaandmutualaccusations.Thevictims’familiesdemandedmoremoneythanIsraelwaswillingtopay;theU.S.governmentdemandeditsshare too.Over the next three years, Israel paid $6,889,957; roughly half theamountwenttothevictims’families.21*
•••
IN EARLY JANUARY 1968, LEVI ESHKOL CAME TO ASK LYNDON JOHNSON TO SUPPLYISRAEL with fifty Phantom planes. The preparations for his visit reflected thespecial nature of relations between Israel and the United States. AmbassadorHarmannoticedthatJohnsonwasscheduledtohostEshkolforlunch.“Wemust—particularlyforreasonsofprestige—seekadinnerinvitation,”hewrote,andwenttolookintothematterwithPresidentJohnson’sadviseronJewishaffairs,HarryMcPherson.Theadviser toldHarmanthatasaresultofavisit fromthekingofNepal,Johnsonhadinstructedhisstaffnottoburdenhimwithdinnersorexcessivelylongmeetingswithforeignleaders.“ApparentlytheNepaleseking’svisit was catastrophically boring and tried Johnson’s patience to its limits,”wrote the ambassador. Harman explained to McPherson that, with all duerespect, Israel was no Nepal, and President Johnson’s relationship with KingMahendrawas not the same as his relationshipwithEshkol.Clearly, Johnsonhimself should be interested in hosting a dinner, so that he could invite theWho’sWhoofAmericanJewry.McPherson agreed, but said he would have to speak with the president
himself.HarmanalsodiscussedthematterwithArthurKrim,nowthetreasurerof theDemocratic Party, who for his own reasons promised to recommend adinner.Theambassadorbelievedthateverythingwouldworkout.ButthematterbecamesocomplicatedthattheIsraelisresortedtotheirdiplomaticcodenames,Issahar(Johnson)andYehuda(Eshkol),andallcorrespondencewas“topsecret,eyesonly.”IssaharwantedtomeetYehudainawaythatwouldnotmaketroubleforhimwiththeJewishpublicinAmerica.ExperiencehadshownthatifheheldadinnerforYehuda,hewouldoffendalotofJewswhowerenotinvited.AfterthedinnerhehadhostedforPresidentZalmanShazar,Issaharhaddeclaredhewouldneveragainholdadinner foran Israeli,becausehehadmadesomanyenemiesamongthosenotinvited.Ginsburg offered a possible solution that he had suggested to Johnson: the
president would host Eshkol on his ranch in Texas. According to Ginsburg,Issahar was very interested in this way out. The ambassador explained thatwelcoming Yehuda at the ranch would demonstrate friendship and even
intimacy,without theneed to invite Jewishdignitaries to a formaldinner, andtherewasnodangerofanyonebeingoffended.HarmanrecommendedthatIsraelaccepttheoffer.Itwasclearthatastayontheranchwouldbeanopportunityforbusiness talkwithout theconstraintsofWashington,whereas theoriginalplanofferedonlyasinglehour-longconversation.The next day, the ambassador reported back on his conversation with Ilan
(Fortas).AbeFortashadsettledtheranchmatterwiththepresident,“inlightoftheinsurmountabledifficultiesofarrangingadinnerinWashington.”Fortashadalso asked Johnson about the additional twenty-seven Skyhawks Israel hadasked for, and Issahar replied that there was no need to wait for Yehuda torequest the aircraft officially: they were already in production. When Fortasraised the question of the Phantoms, Issahar said only, “In my entireadministration,IamIsrael’sgreatestfriend.”Itwasclearthattherehadnotyetbeenadecisionon thematter,Harmanreported.AmbassadorArthurGoldbergtoldHarman that theworkingpaperpreparedby theStateDepartment for thepresidentwas not “encouraging.” Fortaswasworried, too. The president wassurrounded by advisers who wanted the United States to embark on its ownpeace initiative. For months, Fortas had been advising the president not toinitiateanysettlement,butrathertoleadthepartiestodosothemselves.Buthefelt that Johnson was under increasing pressure to find a solution. Fortassuggested that Eshkol bring a long list of ideas for regional development.HementionedtotheambassadorthatthesummarystatementsshouldbeformulatedbeforetheconversationwithEshkol.Israel’srepresentativesintheUnitedStateswerenowfindingitmoredifficult
thaneverbeforetocontroltheburgeoningpoliticalactivismofU.S.Jews.Theyreported again and again on various public statements that had not beencoordinated with them, including vocal demands to annex the territories andexcessivelyenthusiasticsupportforJohnson’spolicyinVietnam.23IsraelhopedJohnson would be reelected. Eshkol was afraid of a Nelson Rockefellerpresidency, and evenmorewaryofRonaldReagan, another contender for theRepublicannomination.“AJohnsondefeatwouldbeathoroughlybadthingforus,”hesaid.Buthedidnotloseheart:“Iwouldstillliketohopethat,withourhelp,Johnsonwillbereelected.”24*The atmosphere at the ranchwaswarm and informal, and Johnson seemed
friendly. But the official talks were uneasy. Eshkol wanted to talk about thePhantoms.Johnson,andhissecretaryofstate,repeatedoverandoveragainthattheplaneswouldnotalter reality.Theywanted toknow“whatkindof Israel”
Eshkolwanted—or,inotherwords,whathewaswillingtogiveup.TheUnitedStates, Johnsonsaid,would“resistaggression,whether itbeHitler,Nasser,orIsrael.”* Eshkol could have taken offense, but he wanted the Phantoms.According to his military secretary, the Israelis were not sure the presidentwould consent. Eshkol spared Johnson almost no Israeli cliché: Israel was asmallcountrysurroundedbyenemieswhocoulddestroyitatanymoment,andso itwould not agree to go back to the prewar conditions orwithdraw to theJune 4 lines. Israel sought peace. It was not enough for Nasser to talk ofnonbelligerency. Israelwas fighting for its right to peace.After threewars, itdeserved peace. For now, there was no one to talk to. Egypt had forbiddenpassage of Israeli ships through the SuezCanal, and he, Eshkol, rememberedhowtheyusedtohangsignsupinRussia:“NoJews.”TheIsraeliscouldnotliveforeverwiththefeelingthattheywerepariahs.HealsoreiteratedtoJohnsonhisideaofresettlingthePalestinianrefugeesinIraq.Eshkolalmostbegged,aswell:hecouldnotpossiblyleavewithoutapromise
concerningthePhantoms,notonlybecauseofpublicreactionathome,butalsobecausetheArabswouldconcludethattheUnitedStateshadabandonedIsrael.Thecommanderoftheairforce,MordechaiHod,whotookpartinthetalks,saidthatonlybystrengtheningtheIsraeliairforcecouldtheUnitedStatesbesureitwouldnothavetosendforcesintohelpIsrael.Johnsonrepliedthathehadnotyet decided to sell the Phantoms to Israel, but agreed that Israeli pilots couldcometotrainonthem.TheIsraeliswereverypleased.27
THE WORKING PAPERS THE AMERICANS HAD PREPARED FOR THE VISIT DEALT WITHSEVeral topics, including the possibility that Israel had developed, wasdeveloping,orwoulddevelopanuclearbomb.TheminutesoftheconversationsbetweenJohnsonandEshkoldonotmentiontheissue.Thetwometforashortwhileinprivate,andoverthetwo-dayvisittheyhadplentyoftimetotalkaboutthebomb.Overthenextfewmonths,theUnitedStatestriedtopredicatethesaleofthePhantomsonanIsraelicommitmentnottomakeabomb,butiteventuallycontented itself with an agreement that the planes would not carry nuclearweapons. The man who conducted the official negotiations on the issue wasIsrael’s new ambassador,YitzhakRabin; the detailswereworked out byAbeFeinberg.†
On one of Feinberg’s visits to see Eshkol, he brought him the first case ofCoca-ColamanufacturedinIsrael.29
Disagreements, mutual suspicion, and reciprocal pressures notwithstanding,
thebottomlinewasthattheUnitedStatesstoodbyIsraelanddidnotcompelittowithdrawfromtheterritories.TheAmericanpositionreinforcedthesensethattherewasno reason tohurry andnoneed tobe contentwith an agreement toestablishnonbelligerencybetweenIsraelandEgypt.TheUnitedStatesalsodidnotblockIsraelfrombuildingnewsettlementsintheterritories.
3.SETTLEMENTS:“JUSTLIKEINTHEUKRAINE!”
Twenty-fourhoursaftertheoccupationoftheGolanHeights,RaananWeitzmetwithHaimGvati,theministerofagriculture,whowroteinhisdiary,“Theprimeminister asked to prepare material about the settlement possibilities in theadministratedterritories.”Infact,WeitzhimselfhadcalledEshkolonthefourthdayof thewar to propose sending someone to the Jordanian land registrationoffices to obtain information on titles,water sources, and development plans.Eshkol had laughed and exclaimed inYiddish that themeshuggenerwas stillmeshuggener,buthedidnotobjecttoobtainingtheinformation.This initiative embodied the essence of the Zionist entity—the vision, the
yearning:anewmovementwasonthehorizon,asecondbeginning,alateyouth.“TheJewishplowmanshallfollowtheswordsman,”wroteYehielAdmoni,oneofRaananWeitz’smen—justthewayitusedtobe,inMandatedays,theearlydaysofZionism.30
YigalAllonaccompaniedEshkolwhenhetouredtheJordanValleyjustafterthewar.Everyfewmilestheprimeministerorderedthejeepconvoytostopandjumped out to look at a brook or examine the quality of the earth. SomeonewoulddigasmallholeandshowEshkolthecolorofthesoil.Eshkolwouldfeelitandsmellitandtasteit;hewantedtoknowwhethertherewassaltintheearth,Allonrecalled:“Hewasthelandman.”WhenhelookedoutattheexpansesoftheGolanHeightsonhisfirsttourthere,Eshkolwasoverwhelmed.“JustlikeintheUkraine!”heexclaimeddelightedly.31
THEGOVERNMENT’SDECISIONTOFARMTHELANDSOFTHEGOLANHEIGHTSWASMADEonlyat theendofAugust,butonJune30,RafiBen-Yehuda,ofKibbutzNeotMordehai, took a few friends to the Golan to look for a suitable spot for asettlement. Some kibbutz movement people had discussed this option evenduringthewar.Ben-Yehuda’sdiaryevokesthefirstdaysofZionistsettlement.On his list of things to “get hold of,” dated July 4, were “food, mattresses,weapons,licenses,watertank,cigarettes,hammer,pliers,pipewrench.”Allthesettlement preparationswere coordinatedwith the government and authorized
by it. One of the kibbutz members, Dan Laner, was a senior officer in theNorthernCommand,andwasabletocontactGeneralDavidElazar.ThekibbutzpeoplealsohadopencommunicationlineswithYigalAllon.Afewdayslater,Ben-Yehuda and his friends appeared before the Upper Galilee RegionalCouncil and explained that they were going to the Golan “to start collectingcattle,sheep,horsesanddonkeys”—booty—aswellas toharvestcropsstill inthe fields. Theymight have to go into tourism or open a concession stand atfirst. The council approved a budget of 10,000 liras and allocated thekibbutzniks a jeep. The next day, RaananWeitz proposed budgeting anotherfortythousandliras.MinisterofLaborAllongavethemfundshetookfromthebudgetforpublicworksfortheunemployed.Afterexaminingtwopossiblesites,onJuly17thegroupdecidedtosettlein
theabandonedmilitarycampofAleika,andcalled themselvesKibbutzGolan.The namewas later changed toMeromGolan, and they ultimatelymoved toKunetra.Everything else is folklore: the first generator, the first snowfall, thefleas,thefirstwedding.OnthefirstanniversaryoftheSix-DayWar,thekibbutzhad169members,includingafewdozenvolunteersfromoverseas.32
ThegovernmentresolutiononsettlingGolanlandswasclassifiedtopsecret.Anoteinthemarginreads:“Thisresolutionwasnotincludedintheminutesofthegovernmentmeetingbecauseofitsconfidentialnature,anditispreservedinthegovernment secretariat.”Thesecrecywasnecessarybecause theUnitedStateswasopposedtosettlements.Butmoreoutpostsweresoonsetupin theGolan.Oneofthem,whosenamewasnotyetfinalizedandwhichwasidentifiedonlyas “the Banias outpost,” prompted someone in the prime minister’s office toauthorthefollowingblessing:“Thislandisours.Wehavelearnedtounderstandthatlandisboughtwiththreethings:tears,blood,andsweat.Wehaveshedourtears.Wehave spilledourblood.Todaywehavebegunpouringour sweat, tobetroththislandtousforever....Itisoursandweshallnotleaveit.”Inordertoestablish this particular outpost, the army destroyed the village of Banias; “itwas probably a pretty little town,” commented an American embassy stafferwhotoureditsruinsinSeptember,whenonlyamosqueandachurchremainedstanding.Inthenextfewmonths,anotherhundredorsoabandonedvillagesintheGolanHeightsweresystematicallydestroyed.33
ROUGHLYTHREEMONTHSLATER,ATOPSECRET—ANDQUITEEMBARRASSING—LEGALopinionbytheforeignminister’slegalcounselstatedthatciviliansettlementinthe “administrated territories” contravened international law. The counsel,TheodorMeron,wasunequivocal:accordingtoArticle49oftheFourthGeneva
Conventionof1949,anoccupyingcountryshallnotdeportortransferpartsofits own civilian population into the territory it occupies. Meron quoted anauthoritativeinterpretationoftheclause,whichreinforcedhisopinionthatIsraelcould not settle its citizens in the territories. He concluded that settlementsshouldbeimplementedbythearmy,incampsthatwere—atleastinappearance—temporary.Militarycampscouldnotbesetupjustanywhere,andownershiptitleshadtoberespected.Theserestrictions,theopinionwenton,appliedfirstofalltotheGolanHeights,whichundoubtedlyconstitutedanoccupiedterritory.*According to Israel, the final status of the West Bank had never been
determined,anditsannexationtotheHashemiteKingdomhadnotbeencarriedout legally.AndhenceIsraelclaimedthat theWestBankwasnotanoccupiedterritory,whichmeantthat itwasnotpreventedfromsettlingitscitizensthere.Meron did not refute this argument, but noted that it was disputed by theinternationalcommunity.Furthermore,Meronnotedwithembarrassment,Israelitself had recognized the status of theWest Bank as an occupied territory bypublishingmilitarydecreesdeclaringexplicitlythatitwouldrespecttheGenevaConventions.35
ThepublicitysurroundingtheGolansettlementsmadeAmbassadorHarman’sjob difficult; the situation was “absolutely catastrophic,” as he put it. Eshkolrepliedthatheunderstood,buttherewasnothingtobedone—theIsraelipublichaditsownmoodsandneeds.36Butattheambassador’srequest,andupontheadvice of Theodor Meron, the settlements were at first depicted as militaryoutposts, and at some point the settlers were even required to wear armyuniforms. “The fact that these outposts exist is widely known, amonggovernmentsandpoliticalpartiesaswell,butwemustavoidrepeatedlygivingjournalists cause to dwell on the matter,” cautioned Minister Israel Galili, aprominenthawkwhowasinchargeofpropaganda.Thequasi-covertoperationbrought to mind the semi-underground settlements during British rule. InJanuary 1968, therewere five settlements in theGolan, comprising some450residents.37
AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER, JUST BEFORE ROSH HASHANAH, A FEW DOZEN YOUNGPEOplesetouttoreestablishKfarEtzion,southofJerusalem.Someofthemwerethechildrenoftheoriginal“Gush”settlerswhohadbeenkilledortakenhostagein1948.Intheinterveningtwodecades,theyhadkeptintouch,hopingtoreturnone day.One of theirmain supporters in the governmentwasYigalAllon. “IneverforgaveBen-GurionforpreventingusfromtakingtheGush,whichwouldhave been very easy to do,” Allon once said. They organized quickly and
coordinated effortswith theOrthodoxministers in the government. They alsomet with Eshkol, who supported them. This settlement, too, was initiallydescribed as a military outpost, but the celebrations accompanying itsestablishment were widely covered in the press.38 The settlers set out fromJerusalem in a long convoyof vehicles, ledbyoneof the armoredbuses thatusedtogototheGushin1948.Someofthegovernmentministerstookpartintheceremony,andthenewspapersdevotedsupportiveeditorialstotheoperation.Itwas not as foreign occupiers that theywere settling on the land ofGush
Etzion,wroteMaariv, but rather “as children coming again to their borders.”TheAraboccupationoftheGushduringtheWarofIndependencewasdescribedas“aholocaust.”Ha’aretz alsodepicted the settlement as a returnhome.Thiswas,ofcourse,aproblematicclaim,becauseIsraelwasdenyingtherightsoftheArab refugees to return to their homes.However, even theForeignMinistry’slegalcounseldecided,albeitinfairlyweaklanguage,thatitmightbepossibletofindalegaljustificationforthesettlementofGushEtzion.39
Oneman stood out in his objection: YosefWeitz, a founding father of theoriginal Gush. He was unsympathetic to “the hysterical cries” of writers,journalists,andactivistsinsupportofthehastysettlementoftheWestBank.Incontrast tothe“tempestuousdays”oftheZioniststruggle,hewrote, therewasno longer any need to seize every possible spot.He feared that settlement inGush Etzion would hurt the prospects for peace. He thought this moveconstitutedaprovocationofthefewfriendsIsraelhadleft,includingtheUnitedStates,andthatitwouldstrengthenIsrael’senemiestothepointofdamagingtheunityof Jerusalem.Norwere theremanyyoungpeoplewanting togo tonewsettlements,wroteWeitz.Hebelievedthatthefewwhodidwanttogoshouldbesent to the Galilee, where Jewish ownership of the land, although currentlyinhabitedbyArabs,wasundisputed—“Notby IsaiahandnotbyJeremiahandnotbythegoyim.”40
AMONGTHEATTENDEESATTHEKFARETZIONCEREMONYWASARABBIINHISTHIRTIESnamedMosheLevinger.HewantedtojointheGushsettlers,butwasapparentlyprevented fromdoingsobecausehisAmerican-bornwifedidnotwant to livethere.Afewmonths later,Levingersettled inHebron. In thehistoryof Israelisettlement in the territories there has been no greater fanatic. Levinger camefromJerusalem.Hisfather,aphysician,hadimmigratedfromMunich,wherehehadbelongedtotheultra-Orthodoxnationalyouthmovement,Ezra.MostoftheGerman Jewswho settled in Israelwerenot ultra-Orthodox, and the fewwhowere found it difficult to integrate into the Eastern European ultra-Orthodox
communities,whicheschewedtheircomparativelymodernwayoflife.“The greatest madwoman of the family was the aunt,” wrote the journalist
Nahum Barnea. This aunt, well-known in Jerusalem, used to roam the citystreetsfollowedbyatrailofchildren,enigmaticallymumbling,“Bondwithone,bond with one.” Her brother, Avraham Halevy Frankel, was considered amathematicalgenius.MosheLevinger studiedat theMercazHaravyeshiva inJerusalem, known for its nationalistic fanaticism, and one of his teacherswasRabbiZviYehudaKook.Whenhefinishedhismilitaryservice,Levingerlivedfor a fewyears on a religious kibbutz,where heworked as a shepherd and arabbi. When the Six-Day War broke out, he was serving as the rabbi of amoshavnearPetachTikva.Hewasnotdrafted. Immediately after thewar, hewent toHebron,whereheexperiencedanawakeningof“tempestuousspirits,”ashelatersaid,andwasforeveraltered.Awrinkled-lookingman,hehadelevenchildren.Newsweek once wrote of him that had he lived during antiquity hewouldhavebeenseenasaprophet;Barneacalledhim“adervish.”41
HEBRONWASCONSIDEREDAHOLYCITY; THEMASSACREOF JEWSTHERE IN 1929WASimprintedonnationalmemoryalongwiththegreatpogromsofEasternEurope.ThemessianicfervorthatcharacterizedtheHebronsettlerswasmorepowerfulthantheawakeningthatledpeopletosettleinEastJerusalem:whileJerusalemhadalreadybeenannexed,thefutureofHebronwasstillunclear.Knesset member Shmuel Tamir, an attorney, wrote to Eshkol on behalf of
RabbiYehezkelSarna,a survivorof the1929massacre,whohad founded theHebron yeshiva in Jerusalem and now wanted to renew its activity in theoccupiedancientcity.Theprimeminister invited theelderly rabbi to seehim.They spoke for threeor fourhours,Eshkol later toldmembersof theGeneralStaff.Hethoughttherabbiwouldaskforaparticularbuilding,butSarnasaid,“Iwantyou toclearout thewholestreet forme.”Eshkol thoughthemighthavemisunderstood,butSarnaexplainedthatassoonasthewarbegan,Israel“shouldhave slaughtered the Arabs of Hebron one by one.” In May 1968, thegovernmentdecidedtorenewsettlementactivitiesinHebron.42
EshkolwascontactedbyotheryeshivasthatwantedtooperateinHebron,andbyLevinger’sgroup,whichaskedYigalAllontohelpcoordinateplanstoholdaPassoversederinalocalhotel,thePark.Allongavehisapproval,providedthatthemilitarygovernoragreed,andonconditionthattheystaynotinthecitybutonlynearby.Levingerandhispeoplemovedintothehotel,celebratedPassover—and refused to leave.Allon askedEshkol to allow them to remain, at least
untilthegovernmentcoulddecidewhattodowiththem.Eshkolagreed.“IhavetosaythatIdidnothavetopushveryhard,”Allonrecounted.Theministeroflabor himself provided Levinger and his group with money that came, onceagain,fromthepublicworksbudget.Allon went one step further: he spoke with one of the Gush Etzion settler
leaders,HananPorat,andaskedhimtosendarmstothehoteldwellers—afewsubmachineguns,handguns,andsomehandgrenades.Hefearedfortheirsafety,and also believed he should create a link betweenGush Etzion and the Parkhotel,“justincase,Godforbid,thereshouldbefighting,”ashelaterrevealedinan interview that was supposed to remain classified for many years. HepromisedPorathewouldensure“militarycover”fortheoperation,andindeed,uponreturningtoJerusalemhewenttoseeIsraelLiorandaskedhimtoreportonthemattertoDayan.Allonlatersaid,“IamcertainthattheGushEtzionpeopletothisdaythinkI
made somenon-kosher dealwith them, that I illegally transferredweapons totheParkhotel.ItistruethatItookuponmyselfanauthorityIdidnotformallyhave,butasaminister,andasageneral in reserveduty, I thought Icouldnotleavetheareawithoutpromisingsomething.”43
The Jewish presence inHebron aroused tensions in the city.Mayor Jaabaricomplained toEshkol, and the settlersweremoved to amilitary camp,wheretheycontinued tomake trouble for the army.Themilitary threatened to expelthemfromHebron,buttheyapologizedandwereallowedtostay.44
•••
ASHORTWHILEAFTERTHEFOUNDINGOFTHEGUSHETZIONSETTLEMENT,ESHKOLMETfor a long talk with leaders of the Greater Israel Movement, including thewriters Moshe Shamir and Haim Hazaz and the poet Uri Zvi Greenberg. Atmomentsthemeetingwastense,butmostofthetimeEshkoltriedtoconvincehisgueststhatheandtheydidnotdisagreeinprinciple:hewasalsoinfavorofsettlements in the territories; hewas just as patriotic, and knew therewas nooccupationwithoutsettlements,butunlikethem,hehadlargerresponsibilityandhadtoconsiderpoliticalconstraints.Ha’aretz predicteda future for the Israeli settlers inHebron,withdiamond-
polishing workshops, a kosher restaurant or even a hotel, a print shop, asouvenirfactory,andsoforth.45ButsettlementinHebronalsoproducedthefirstcracks in national unity. A few academics published a statement headed,
“SecurityandPeace,Yes;Annexation,No!”Allofthemwerewell-known,andtheygavethedovishprotestsaninstitutionalrespectabilitytheyhadlacked.*About six months after the war there were ten Israeli settlements in the
territories, including two in Sinai, andmore than eight hundred settlers.47 OnNovember12, the securitycabinet acceptedAllon’sproposal anddecided thatmapswouldnolongerbemarkedwiththeGreenLine,butratherwiththecease-fire lines—the occupation borders of the Six-Day War. The new boundarieswouldbedrawninpurple.48
4.MILESTONES:“IT’SNICETOBEINPOWER”
Presscoverageofdailylife intheterritoriesduringtheyearfollowingthewarpainted a rosy picture for Israelis. “Today Hebron is a quiet, obedient city,”Ha’aretzreported.AccordingtoMaariv,“TheKhanYounisdistrictisruledwithease.”AreporterwhovisitedGazaprovidedtheheadline,“WeAreHappyintheRefugeeCamps.”FromJenin,reportscamethatthelocalspreferredtogettheirbread and medical care from Israel. “In Kalkilya they worship Dayan,”announcedYediotAharonot,andthenewsfromtheGolanwasalsogood.†BankLeumipublishedanArabicphrasebook,fromwhichIsraelivisitorstotheWestBankcouldlearnhowtosay“Please,”“Thankyou,”“Hello,”“Howareyou?,”and“Sorry.”50
“It’snicetobeinpower,”MosheDayanobserved,sayingalltherewastosay.He felt that ruling the territoriesgave Israel “agreatopportunity to shapeanddeterminewaysof lifewiththeArabs.”Toillustrate,hespokeof theTombofthePatriarchsinHebron,aholysiteforbothJewsandMuslims.Therewasnochance that the Arabs would willingly allow Jews to pray there, and so “weimposedourpresence therebyforceofpower.Weassumedapartnership,andwealsorefusedtotakeoffourshoeswhenenteringasitethatisholytous.”Butwhen themufti asked that Jewish visiting hours be reduced duringRamadan,Israelcomplied.“It’samatterofcourtesy,”Dayanexplained.“Ifyourneighboris inmourningandasksyounot toplaydancemusicforaweek—itisnaturalthatyouwouldhonorhisrequest.”In December 1967, Dayan explained to the government that there was no
chance of peace. Consequently, he proposed unilaterally institutingarrangements as if there were peace. What he meant was the “enlightenedoccupation,”includingfreepassagebetweentheWestBankandtheArabworld.Summarizing the situation one year after thewar,Dayan stated, “The currentreality in the territories—that is my plan. The plan is being implemented in
actual fact.Whatexists todaymust remainasapermanentarrangement in theWestBank.”Earlier,DayanhadproposedrevokingthewithdrawaldecisionofJune19,1967.51
Dayannowbegan takingan interest in thewritingsofArthurRupin,oneofthe originators of the binational idea, which called for full equality betweenJews and Arabs in one state. Dayan also thought Jews and Arabs could livetogether—but,incontrasttothetenetsofthebinationalmovement,heassumedtheJewswouldretaincontrol.Forthetimebeinghewassatisfied:IsraelmightevencontinuetorulethePalestiniansforfiftyyears,hecommented.52
Edith Ezrachi of Jerusalem told her relatives that she and her family oftenwenthiking in the territories anddidnot encounter a single soldier forhours.Butsheknewthisseemingabsencewasillusory.Intheyearfollowingthewar,therewere687actsofterrorandborderincidents,approximatelytwoaday.Onehundredseventy-fiveIsraeliswerekilled,includingthirtycivilians—nearlyoneeveryotherday—andmorethanfivehundredwereinjured,eighty-fiveofthemcivilians.53 In the last week of September, terrorists entered the moshav ofOmetz, in thecenterof Israel, andmurdered three-year-oldYosefSalomon.Afew days later, theMovement for theAnnexation of the Liberated Territoriespublished a statement quoting a poem by Bialik: “Satan has not created thevengeance for the blood of a small child.” Could this murder have beenprevented, and could the next one be prevented? asked the authors of thestatement. Their own response: “The government is capable of preventingmurder if it simply declares that we are staying in the West Bank, andimmediatelybeginssettlingitwithJews.”54
OnOctober21, theEgyptiansattackedan Israelidestroyer, theEilat.Forty-sevencrewmemberswerekilled.TheIDFrespondedbybombingtherefineriesinthecityofSuez.55
THE IDF KNEW HOW TO CONTENDWITH THE EGYPTIANS, BUT THE REAL CHALLENGEwas Fatah, whose presence only grew after the war. The army once againdemanded authorization to take large-scale action against terrorist bases. ThistimeitdidnotwanttoactagainstSyriabutagainstJordan.YaacovHerzoglatercommentedthatthesituationremindedhimofthedaysprecedingthewar.OnMarch18,1968,aschoolbusfromHerzliyadroveoveralandminenear
Be’erOrah, some twelvemiles north ofEilat.Adoctor andone of the adultschaperoning the trip were killed, and dozens of children were injured. Inresponse,theIDFlaunchedanattackonKarame,avillageinJordan.
TheKarameoperation,anearrepeatofthefailedoperationinSamuaeighteenmonthsearlier,causedthedeathsofthirtyIsraelisoldiers.DozensofJordaniansand Palestinians were killed. Many of the terrorists managed to escape,including Yasser Arafat. The Palestinians described the battle as a defeat forIsrael and built it into a national myth. Eban quoted the U.S. ambassador aspredictingthatintwentyyears’timeahistorianwouldcitetheKarameoperationas the beginning of Israel’s end. A furious Menachem Begin retorted that aforeignrepresentativeprophesyingthedestructionofIsraelshouldnotbequotedinagovernmentmeeting.AbeFeinbergsentareassuringmessage:hehadbeenwithPresidentJohnsonwhennewsoftheoperationarrived.AlthoughJohnsonsaidIsraelwasmakingtroubleforhim,his tonewasnotespeciallysharp.ThePalestinianssteppeduptheiractivities;theysoonbeganhijackingplanes.56
“WehaveonceagainreturnedtothenightsofFatah—likebeforetheSix-DayWar,”wroteawomanfromEinHanatzivtoherchildreninLosAngeles.“Theyaresodark,theskies,andespeciallythestars,verydistant,andwhenyouwalkaloneintheearlyhoursofthenight,whicharethemostdangerous,youfeelaterrible loneliness.”Aweekearlier, herhusbandhadbeencalledup forguardduty,andshewasalone,surroundedbyagroveoftreesthatcastaheavyshadowonherhome,anditwasawful.EdithEzrachiwrote toConnecticut abouther constantworry:Wherewould
thisend?MostobserversbelievedtheVietnamWarwouldend,butthatwasnotthecasehere:“Ican’tseetheArabschangingtheirlineofhatredandmurder.”57OnJune6, theanniversaryof thewar’sstart,Ezrachisentherrelativesoneofthe saddest letters she had ever written. She had just learned that RobertKennedyhadbeenassassinated.“Onejustwantstoweepandscreamandbangone’sfist,”shewrote,“forhim,forhiswife,hiskids,fortheworld.”Andagainthe“little stateof Israel”was involved, shewrote,because theassassinwasa“formerPalestinianJew-hater,thefatherlivingnotsofarfromhere.”58
IN THE SPRING OF 1968, DAVID BEN-GURION STILL MAINTAINED THAT IF HE HAD TOchoosebetweenasmallIsraelwithpeace,andaGreaterIsraelwithoutpeace,hewouldprefer the former.But as timewentby,he, too,becamemore sure thatpeacewasunattainable,which ledhim to supportnotonlyenlargementof theJewishpopulationinJerusalem,Hebron,andGushEtzion,butalso“anywhereitis possible in theWestBank.”He repeatedly denied having opposed thewar,claimingthatfromthemomentNasserhadannouncedtheclosingoftheStraitshehadsupportedtheoperation.“Nooneheardfrommethatweshouldhunkerdown,becausesuchanonsensicalideaneverevenoccurredtome,”hewrote.59
OnIndependenceDay,Ben-Gurionagreedtoattendthegreatestmilitaryparadein Israel’s history, which passed by thewalls of theOld Citywith tanks andcapturedvehiclesandanairshow,butherefusedtositonthedignitaries’daisnexttoEshkol.Theyassignedhimaseatamongthetourists;TeddyKollekleftthedaisandsatnexttohim.60
TheSix-DayWarbroughtnewvigortotheprewarcompulsiontoreexaminethe state’s ideological identity. Countless journalists wanted Ben-Gurion tospeakaboutthefoundationsofZionism.“Whatisourhistoricalright?”hewasaskedby twoyoungreporters fromKol Israel.Theywere twoyearsoldwhenthestatewasestablished,Ben-Gurionnotedwithastonishment,andproceededto offer them a basic lesson: Eretz Israel belonged exclusively to the Jewishpeople.TheArabsalsohadrightsinthecountry,butitwasnottheirs.*Butinamomentofcandorhewrote that, in fact, hedidnot know themeaningof theterm “Zionism.” “Once, inmy youth, I believed that I knew, but over time Ilearned that I do not know, and I also doubtwhether theword even has anysignificance.”Ifhewereinhistwentiesagain,havingreadallthebookshehadreadinhislife,hewouldgoandstudybiology,particularlythestructureofthebrain,hewrotetotheeditorofastudentnewspaper.As he often did, Ben-Gurion expressed a feeling that many Israelis could
relate to: as time went by, they longed to escape the situation the war hadcreated—buttheydidnotknowhow.Mostofthemdidnotwanttogobacktotherealitythathadprevailedbeforethewar,butmoreandmoreofthembeganfearingthatIsrael’sruleovertheresidentsofGazaandtheWestBankwasnothelping the country but harming it. On the face of things, everything wastemporary, it would stay as it was just until a solution could be found, butbetweenonewarand thenext,1967begantoemergeas itsown“weepingforgenerations,” with its own troublesome permanency; everything that wouldhappenfromnowonoccurredinitsshadow.
YOSEFWEITZ,WHOHADGIVENTHEZIONISTMOVEMENTONEOFITSFIRSTHEROES,WASnotoptimistic.Inhisview,theoccupationthathadsavedIsraelfromdestructionwasnowthreateningtodestroyitasaJewishanddemocraticstate.Everythingwould have been simpler had Israel not conquered East Jerusalem, theWestBank,andGaza,or if ithadimmediatelysetaboutresettlingtherefugees.ButperhapseverythingwouldhavealsobeensimplerifIsraelhadtakenadvantageof the war to expel all the Arabs, including the residents of East Jerusalem;Weitzwasamongthosewhowerecapableofdefendingsuchastep,ashedidhiswhole life. When he suggested concentrating the Gaza refugees in the West
BankandgivingitbacktoJordan,hedidnotdosowholeheartedly:hewouldbesorry togiveup theWestBank.Everythingmighthavebeensimplerhad theytakenhis advice—buthedidnot suggestgivingupcontrolofEast Jerusalem,notevenforpeace.In the summer,Weitzwent to theRockefellerMuseum,apicturesquecastle
builtduringBritishrule,whosegrandopeningin1938wascanceledwhenoneoftheguests, theBritisharchaeologistJamesLeslieStarkey,wasmurderedbyPalestinian terrorists on hisway to the ceremony. Several of the IDF soldierswhohadcapturedJerusalemhadbeenwoundednearthemuseum.Weitzwantedtomeasuretheageofanoldpinetreeinthecourtyard;thedrillonlywentintoadepthofseveninches,whichmeanttherewere104rings.Weitzcalculatedthetree to be between 250 and 260 years old. He spent the next few weeksresearchingitshistory,payingaspecialvisit to theNationalLibrary,wherehefound“aspiritoftranquility”andapurehumansetting.Heeventuallywroteonthehistoryofthetree,entitled“PerfectOldAge.”HededicatedthearticletotheIDFingratitudeforitsliberationofJerusalem.
INHISOWNOLDAGE,YOSEFWEITZCONTINUEDTOFOLLOWTHENEWS,ANDHISDIARYnotesthefirstlarge-scaleterroristattacks.Whenhehadtime,heworkedinhisgarden.As hewas planting dahlias one day, hiswife,Ruhama, cameout andspokethreewords:“Eshkolisgone.”ItwasFebruary26,1969.“Iwasstunned,”wroteWeitz.“ShallIeulogizehim,thoughIalwayspredictedhewouldeulogizeme?” He pondered the passage of time, how the Angel of Death had freedEshkolfromhistormentsasprimeminister,andhowinsignificantlifewas.62Helivedforalmostfourmoreyearsanddiedshortlybeforethenextwar.
NOTES
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*AlldocumentscitedfromtheUnitedStatesNationalArchivesareidentifiedby“REG59,”unlessindicatedotherwise.
INTRODUCTION:HEROES
1.Biographical notes,CZA,A246/579;YosefWeitz,MyDiary (inHebrew)(TelAviv:Masada,1973),vol.VI,p.160;“Yehiam,”abiographicalessayprobablywrittenbyhisfather(1956),CZA,A246/795;RaananWeitz,TheScent of Acacia (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Keter, 1997), p. 82ff.; ShragaKadari,ed.,BeitHaKeremIsForty(inHebrew)(unnamedpublisher,1966);Jubilee Book of theHigh School Affiliated with theHebrewUniversity inJerusalem (inHebrew) (jubilee book, unnamed editor, unnamedpublisher,1987);YehudaSlotzki, ed.,HistoryBook of theHagana (inHebrew) (TelAviv:AmOved,1973),vol.III,partII,p.880ff.
2.Davar,19June1946,p.1,CZA,A246/797[pressclippingsfile];RinaGalandChavaYalon,eds.,KibbutzYehiamJubileeBook (inHebrew),1997,p.34;Weitzdiary,24June,19July,30July1946,CZA,A246/795;“Yehiam,”abiographicalessayprobablywrittenbyhisfather(1956),CZA,A246/795.
3. CZA, A246/797 [press clippings file]; Tom Segev, One Palestine,Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate (in Hebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,1999),p.211ff.;YehiamWeitz,Letters(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,1948);ShlomoHalevi:“InsideOneSabra,”Ha’aretz, 24Sept.1948,p.3;HaMishmar,6June1947,CZA,A246/797[pressclippingsfile]; Reuven Avinoam, ed., Parchments of Fire (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv:MinistryofDefense,1952).
4.CZA,A246/793.5.Letterstotheauthorandinresponsetoquestions.6.Ha’aretz,14Dec.1947,p.2.7. Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Domino,
1984), p. 43ff.; Uzi Benziman and Atalla Mansour, Sub-Letters: IsraeliArabs,TheirStatus,and thePolicyTowardThem (inHebrew) (Jerusalem:Keter,1992),p.54ff.;BennyMorris,Errata:JewsandArabsintheLandofIsrael,1936–1956(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,2000),p.117ff.
8.MordechaiBar-On,“StatusQuoBefore—orAfter?:InterpretiveCommentson Israel’s Security Policy, 1949–1958” (in Hebrew) in Studies on theEstablishment of Israel (1995), vol. 5, p. 65ff.; Mordechai Bar-On,“Security-Mindedness and Its Critics, 1949–1967” (in Hebrew) in TheChallengeofSovereignty,CreationandContemplationin theFirstDecadeoftheState,ed.MordechaiBar-On(Jerusalem:YadBen-Zvi,1999),p.62ff.;Arieh Naor,Greater Israel—Belief and Policy (in Hebrew) (Haifa: HaifaUniversity;TelAviv:Zmora-Bitan,2001).
9.AmosElon,TheIsraelis:FoundersandSons(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Adam,1981),p.27.
10.YehiamKapmaninlettertotheauthor,24May2004.11.CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.19,1968(in
Hebrew),p.453;seealso:Ha’aretz,23March1967,p.9.12.Ha’aretz,24July1967,p.8(announcement).13. Efraim Ilin, I, the Undersigned (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Maariv,
1985),p.215ff.;AriehAvnery,Sapir(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Peleg,1976),p.142ff.;ISA,P-9/907(PinhasSapir,“Autocars”).
14.Zohar,Kenan,andTomarkintoEshkolandauxiliarydocuments,18April1965,YEA,copyownedbyauthor.
15. YoramRosier, ed.,AbieNathan (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Poalim,1998),p.32.
16.Ibid.,p.40.17.EzerWeizmanandDovGoldstein,TheSkyIsYours,theLandIsYours (in
Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Maariv, 1975), p. 218; “Ness” platform,Ha’aretz,29Oct.1965,p.23.
18.NationalElectionsSupervisor,resultsoftheelectionsfortheSixthKnessetand local authorities, 2 Nov. 1965, Central Bureau of Statistics, specialpublicationseries,vol.I,no.216,p.73.
19. Bunche to Nathan, 30 Dec. 1966, ISA, HZ-1/3835; Rosier, ed., AbieNathan,p.66.
20. Amos Oz,Elsewhere, Perhaps (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Keter, 1991), p.107.
21.“SignthePeacePetitions,”Ha’aretz,11Feb.1966,p.13;16Feb.1966,p.6;28Feb.1966,p.6;Rosier,ed.,AbieNathan,p.66.
22.Maariv,1March1966,p.3.23.ShapiraintheKnesset,8March1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.45,p.856.Al-
AhrambasedonHa’aretz,2March1966,p.1.24.Ha’aretz,1March1966,p.1;Maariv,1March1966,p.2;YediotAharonot,
1March1966,p.2; (“7Days”supplement),3March1966,p.8;4March1966, p. 9; Rosier, ed.,AbieNathan, p. 78; Central Bureau of Statistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.18,1967(inHebrew),p.20.
25.Eshkolinthegovernment,16May1967,estateofYaacovHerzog,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
26.YediotAharonot,25Nov.1966,p.8.27.Ha’aretz,23Dec.1966,p.3.ReuvenBareketatMapaisecretariat,1June
1967,LPA,24–1967–3–5.28.Maariv(Saturday),4March1966,p.1.29.Gvati diary, 26May 1967, p. 129,YTA,Unit 15,Container 12, File 02;
Ibid., 25May 1967,May 26, 1967,YTA,Unit 15,Container 12, File 02;Ibid., 23May1967, p. 125,YTA,Unit 15,Container 12,File 02; Ibid., 2June1967,p.140,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02.
30. Eshkol and Rabin in cabinet meeting, 26 May 1967, estate of YaacovHerzog,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter;Gvatidiary,26May1967,p.129,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02.
31.Letter toVardit andAdirZik, 28May1967,with thekindpermissionofZik.
32.RostowtoPresident,31May1967,FRUS,vol.XIX,p.202.33.Gvatidiary,5June1967,p.142,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02.34.YediotAharonot,6June1967,p.1.35. Complete Jokes of Eshkol (in Hebrew) (unnamed author, unnamed
publisher,1966),p.23;MichaelShashar,TheSeventh-DayWar:DiaryoftheMilitary Governance in Judah and Samaria, June-December 1967 (inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatPoalim,1977),p.225.
36.MosheDayan,VietnamDiary(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Dvir,1977),p.111.37.Israel:AnnualReviewfor1967,p.5,PRO,FCO17/468,104038.
PARTI:BETWEENRISHONLEZIONANDMANHATTAN
CHAPTER1:SUSSITADAYS
1.Bar-Dayan diary, 18May1967,with his kind permission.YehoshuaBar-Dayan’swardiaryisusuallyquotedfromtheoriginalmanuscript.Seealso:MosheAdmonandYehoshuaBar-Dayan,ASoldier’sDiary(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Othpaz,1968);Ha’aretz(supplement),10May1968,p.14ff.;17May1968,p.14ff.;24May1968,p.26ff.
2.CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.18,1967(inHebrew),p.26;No.19,1968,p.31,46.
3. P. Ginur, “Twenty Years of Israeli Economy,” Economic Quarterly (inHebrew),16:57–58,Aug.1968,p.16ff.;A.Halperin,“TheRecessionandtheRecovery in the Economy,”EconomicQuarterly (inHebrew), 14: 56,Feb.1968,p.287ff.
4.Maariv,9Oct.1966,p.19(BeitShemeshandKiryatEliezer);Ha’aretz,28March1966,p.1(RamatGan);9Feb.1966,p.10(Arad);Maariv,19Oct.1966,p.12(BeitHaTefutzoth,Museum);YediotAharonot,30Aug.1966,p.1(theKnesset);seealso:SusanHattis-Rolef,“TheKnessetHouseonGivatRam,PlanningandConstruction,”Kathedra(inHebrew),no.96,July2000,p.131ff.;Kathedra,no.105,Sept.2002,p.171ff.;Maariv,9Jan.1966,p.8(BeitShemesh);Maariv,13Jan.1966,p.15;Ha’aretz,25Feb.1966,p.3;22 Jan. 1967, p. 8 (Haifa); 5 July 1966, p. 5 (Faculty);Maariv, 19 Sept.1966, p. 1 (satellite); Ha’aretz, 25 Aug. 1966, p. 22 (space); YediotAharonot,17March1967,p.1(matriculation);Ha’aretz,20Dec.1966,p.1(basketball);4April1966,p.3(Bentov).
5.LettersfromRishonLezion,1966–67,giventotheauthoranonymouslyandsamehereinafter.
6.LettertoAdirZik,29Aug.1966,withhiskindpermission.7. Ibid.; Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, No. 20,1969(inHebrew),p.162(income),174.
8.Ilinadvertisement,Maariv,17May1967,p.11;Ha’aretz,22July1966,p.4; Mercedes advertisement, Ha’aretz, 14 Feb. 1966, p. 9; BMWadvertisement,Ha’aretz,3April1966,p.2;Volvoadvertisement,Ha’aretz,18April1966,p.12;Vauxhalladvertisement,Ha’aretz,2Feb.1966,p.2;DodgeandChevroletadvertisements,Ha’aretz,3April1966,p.2.
9.CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.20,1969(inHebrew),p.162;YediotAharonot,7Jan.1966,p.7;MinisterofPostintheKnesset,7Feb.1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.48(inHebrew),pp.1175,1309;CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalAbstractof Israel,No.19,1968(in
Hebrew), p. 431; Ha’aretz, 4 July 1966, p. 9 (Bavli); see also: YediotAharonot,10Jan.1966,p.8.
10.Ha’aretz,8Feb.1967,p.3;9Feb.1967,p.2;12Feb.1967,p.2(oil);2Jan.1967,p.9;28Feb.1967,p.2;20March1967,p.2(milk).
11.Ibid.,12Sept.1966,p.12.12.Ibid.,12March1967,p.11.13.CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.18,1967(in
Hebrew), p. 95;Ha’aretz, 22 June 1966, p. 4; 8 Jan. 1967, p. 5; 22 June1966,p.4;YediotAharonot,3March1967,p.15.
14.Ha’aretz,12Aug.1966,p.12;Maariv,24Jan.1966,p.10.15.MosheShamir,TheBorder(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatPoalim,1966);Ha’aretz,3 June1966,p.2 (“too small”); letters to theeditor,Ha’aretz,4July1967,p.2;DavidHacohenandAbbaEbanintheKnesset,11Jan.1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.47(inHebrew),p.849(visas);Ha’aretz,30Jan.1966,p.6(takeoffs),p.7;Maariv,17June1966,p.1;5Aug.1966,p.1(Shazar);ISA,GL-7/4618(traveltax).
16.YisraelGalili in theKnesset, 15 Feb. 1967,KnessetMinutes, vol. 48 (inHebrew),p.1309;29March1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.48(inHebrew),p.1877; Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, No. 20,1969 (inHebrew),p.173;Ha’aretz, 4 Jan.1966,p.2;5 Jan.1966,p.12;announcements,Ha’aretz,6Jan.1966,p.11;Maariv,7Jan.1966,p.11.
17.ReportoftheEducationalTelevisionCouncil(inHebrew),1962;ReportoftheGeneralTelevisionCommittee(inHebrew),1965;ISA,GL-1/4604.
18.Maariv,7Jan.1966,p.9;Ha’aretz,4Jan.1966,p.5.19.Ha’aretz,25March1966,p.8.20.Ibid.,27March1966,p.2.21. Ibid., 7 Sept. 1967, p. 2 (“common sense”); Bodinger to Eshkol, 9 Oct.
1966,YEA.22. Yediot Aharonot (“7 Days” supplement), 27 Jan. 1967, p. 6 (Godick);Ha’aretz,27March1967,p.2.
23. Ha’aretz, 8 July 1966, p. 12 (Cinerama); Central Bureau of Statistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.19,1968(inHebrew),p.552;Maariv,16May1966,p.16;Ha’aretz,7Jan.1966,p.2(censorship);21Oct.1966,p.9;YediotAharonot (“7Days”supplement),19May1967,p.10(Gashash);Ha’aretz, 1 Dec. 1966, p. 4 (Ben-Amotz);Maariv, 19 Oct. 1966, p. 12(Wimpy);Ha’aretz, 22March1966, p. 10 (PamPam); 2Feb. 1966, p. 11
(wine).24.ErantoEshkol,12May1968,ISA,G-2/561(20);Ha’aretz,12June1966,
p.2;1Aug.1966,p.6;2Sept. 1966,p.3;6Feb.1966,p.4;Maariv,14Sept. 1966, p. 18;Misholim, the student newspaper at theArlozorovBeitHinuchschoolinJerusalem,Chanukah5724(1954),JMA,container3127;see also: Maariv, 14 Sept. 1966, p. 18; Central Bureau of Statistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.19,1968(inHebrew),p.534;ZionRabi,“DemographicDevelopmentinIsrael,1948–1966,”EconomicQuarterly(inHebrew),14:56,Feb.1968,p.318.
25.LettersfromIsraelistooverseas,copiesinpossessionoftheauthor.26.AmiGluska,Eshkol,Give theOrder! (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Ministryof
Defense,2004),p.149;MeirAmit,HeadtoHead:APersonalLookatGreatEventsandSecretAffairs(inHebrew)(TelAviv:HedArzi,1999),p.179ff.;Herzogdiary,9Aug.1966,18Aug.1966,ISA,A-16/4510.
27.CarlvonHorn,SoldieringforPeace(London:Cassel,1966),p.104.28.CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.19,1968(in
Hebrew),p.543ff.29. D. Teneh, “Building and Populating Apartments in 1967,” EconomicQuarterly (in Hebrew), 16: 57–58, Aug. 1968, p. 157ff.; Zion Rabi,“DemographicDevelopmentinIsrael,1948–1966,”EconomicQuarterly(inHebrew), 14: 57–58, Aug. 1968, p. 53; Ha’aretz, 24 Aug. 1966, p. 10;MinistryofHousingadvertisements,YediotAharonot,22April1966,p.10;Breshkevadvertisements,Maariv,15Aug.1966,p.8.
30.YediotAharonot, 2April 1967, p. 1;Ha’aretz, 4April 1967, p. 5 (dollarrate);PanLoanadvertisement,Maariv,25Nov.1966,p.9;seealso:NevehRamadvertisement,YediotAharonot(“7Days”supplement),21Oct.1966,p.8;AfricaIsraelInvestmentsadvertisement,Ha’aretz,3April1966,p.2;lotteryresults,Ha’aretz,5Aug.1966,p.6.
31. Rimon advertisement, Ha’aretz, 26 April 1966, p. 1; see also: Keretadvertisement,Ha’aretz,5June1966,p.1;Ascotadvertisement,Maariv,7Jan.1966,p.10;Maariv,15Feb.1966,p.2(cigarettes).
32. Yosef Goldstein, Ahad Ha’am (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Keter, 1992), p.264ff.
33.Bar-Dayaninresponsetotheauthor’squestion.34.Ha’aretz, 6Feb.1966,p.4 (qualityof life);A.Halperin, “Recessionand
Recovery in theEconomy,”EconomicQuarterly (inHebrew) 14: 56, Feb.
1968,p.287ff.35. Eshkol speech,Maariv, 22 Feb. 1966, p. 3; Yemima Rosenthal, Arnon
Lemfrom,andHagaiTzoref,eds.,LeviEshkol,theThirdPrimeMinister(inHebrew) (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 2002), p. 498ff.; Sapir in theKnesset,14Feb.1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.44(inHebrew),p.604ff.;seealso:reviewoftheMinisterofFinanceinthegovernment,Ha’aretz,26July1966,p.10;DanPatenkin,“ThoughtsontheBudget,”Maariv,24Feb.1966,p.4;seealso:Maariv(business),22Nov.1983;Ha’aretz,5July1966,p.8(“concessions”).
36. Barbour to Washington, 19 Jan. 1967, USNA, Box 2236, File POL 12;Hadow to Brown, 24 Jan. 1967, PRO, FCO 17/468, 104038; unsignedmemo, 16March, 1967, LBJL,NSF, Country File, IsraeliAid, Box 5/67;“Israel’s Economic Squeeze,” New York Times, 24 March 1967, p. 30;MiriamBiham and EphraimKleiman, “The Price of Recession,”BankingQuarterly(inHebrew),8:29–32,1968–1969,p.31ff.;NahumGross,“TheIsraeliEconomy”(inHebrew)inTheSecondDecade,eds.ZviTzimratandChanaYablonka(Jerusalem:YadBen-Zvi,2000),p.29ff.;Ha’aretz,4Feb.1966, p. 3 (quality of life); Lev Greenberg, The Histadruth AboveEverything(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Nevo,1933),p.130.
37.Ha’aretz,10June1966,p.9(restaurants);16March1966,p.13.38. Letter toAdir Zik, 24 July 1966,with his kind permission;Ha’aretz, 16
Aug.1966,p.9 (apartments); letter toChaimHaskal,3March1967,withhis kind permission;Ha’aretz, 30 March 1966, p. 2 (university); 7 April1966,p.5(theater);LaMerchav,8July1966,p.4 (museum);Ha’aretz,22July1967,p.4(villas);23March1967,p.9(vehicle);14April1967,p.9(Hilton);Maariv,2Sept.1966,p.8(engineer);Ha’aretz,21April1967,p.2(sighing); A. Halperin, “Recession and Recovery in the Economy,”EconomicQuarterly(inHebrew)14:56,Feb.1968,p.291;Davar,17June1966,p.2(illwind).
39.PinhasSapirintheKnesset,13June1966andothers,KnessetMinutes,vol.46(inHebrew),pp.1701,2189;MosheCarmelintheKnesset,8June1966,KnessetMinutes, vol. 46 (inHebrew), p. 2407; see also:KnessetMinutes,vol.47(inHebrew),p.370ff.
40.Maariv, 27 Jan. 1967,p. 5;GovernmentMinutes, 12Feb. 1967,with thekindpermissionofYossiGoldstein.
41.YosefAlmogi andYochananBader in theKnesset, 3May1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.49(inHebrew),p.2217;YediotAharonot,2Nov.1967,p.11;
Maariv, 28 Dec. 1967, p. 15; Esther Raziel-Naor in the Knesset, 3 May1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.49(inHebrew),p.2220;AharonKidantoAnatLevin,10May1967;KaravantoMinisterofTransportation,14April1967,ISA,G-9/6356;seealso:Maariv,28Dec.1967,p.15.
42.Ha’aretz,10June1966,p.9(restaurant);1April1966,pp.1,4(Sapir);31May1966,p.1(airplane);24Jan.1967,p.2(embassy).
43.LetterstoAdirZik,26March1967;3Aug.1966,withhiskindpermission.
CHAPTER2:OTHERPEOPLE1.DraftofasurveyontheMusraraneighborhood,JMA,container2472,streetgangsfile.
2.YochananPeres,EthnicRelationsinIsrael(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatPoalim, 1977), pp. 45, 115; Zion Rabi, “Demographic Development inIsrael,1948–1966,”EconomicQuarterly (inHebrew)vol.15,57–58, June1971,p.43ff.;CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.18,1967(inHebrew),p.42.
3.YediotAharonot,21Oct.1966,p.9.4.Peres,EthnicRelationsinIsrael,pp.106,112;CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.20,1969(inHebrew),pp.162,175,178;seealso:Ot,yearI,book2,1967,p.62ff.
5.TomSegev,TheSeventhMillion: Israelis and theHolocaust (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,1992),p.230ff.
6.DraftofasurveyontheMusraraneighborhood,JMA,container2472,streetgangs file; see also: ibid., Haim Degan to Y. Gil, 15 Feb. 1966; S. N.Eisenstadtinaninterview,Maariv,11Feb.1966,p.13.
7.Marziano toMunicipalEngineer, 7Nov. 1967;Suissa toAmidar, 19 Jan.1967; Sela to Ministry of Health, 17 April 1967, JMA, container 1121,Morasha file; reportof theAssociation forMorasha,23April 1967, JMA,container4918;Peres,EthnicRelationsinIsrael,p.115ff.;ZalmanAranintheKnesset,17July1967,KnessetMinutes, vol.49 (inHebrew),p.2600;Rabi, “DemographicDevelopment in Israel, 1948–1966,” 15: 57–58, June1971,p.43ff.;ArantoEshkol,6Aug.1967,ISA,G-1/6301,file5;ArantoEshkol,12May1968,ISA,G-2/561(20);seealso:EshkolintheKnesset,20March1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.48(inHebrew),p.1756.
8. Shakedi to Galili, 23 Oct. 1966, JMA, container 1954 (riots); AmnonRamon, “Doctors Living Among Doctors: The Rehavia Neighborhood in
Jerusalem,” Yad Ben-Zvi; report from the meeting of the Council onWorkingwithStreetGangs,5Dec.1966,JMA,container2472,streetgangsfile;Ha’aretz,2April1967,p.2;3April1967,p.4;24April1967,p.8.
9.YediotAharonot, 14March 1966, p. 10 (Ofer); Sami Shalom Shitrit,TheMizrahi Struggle in Israel, 1948–2003 (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: AmOved,2004), p. 99ff.; A. Cohen, “Problems of Development Towns and UrbanHousing Projects,”EconomicQuarterly, 49–50, June 1966, p. 117ff.; seealso:Ha’aretz,6May1966,p.11.
10.YossiGoldstein,Eshkol (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,2003),p.719;seealso:YigalAllonintheKnesset,9May1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.45(inHebrew),p.1335;Eshkolinministerialconsultation,7April1966,ISA,A-9/7922;seealso:Ha’aretz,20Jan.1967,p.3.
11. Maariv, 4 May 1966, p. 11; 30 Nov. 1966, p. 9; (“Days and Nights”supplement), 23Dec. 1966, p. 4; 19May1967, p. 6;YediotAharonot (“7Days”supplement),21Oct.1966,p.8;seealso:Maariv(“DaysandNights”supplement),19Aug.1966,p.18;Ha’aretz,13Feb.1967,p.4;Maariv,9Jan.1967,p.9;Ha’aretz,30Dec.1966,p.9.
12. Consultation on Economic Affairs, 7 April 1966, ISA, A-9/7922; YosefWeitz,MyDiary (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv:Masada, 1973), vol. VI, p. 156;SapiratMapaisecretariat,6April1967,PSA,KSMA,folder16;seealso:AllonintheKnesset,9May1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.45(inHebrew),p.1335;Allon andEshkol in theKnesset, 20March 1967,KnessetMinutes,vol. 48 (in Hebrew), p. 1752; Government Minutes, 15 Oct. 1967; LevGreenberg, “The Israeli Labor Movement in Crisis, 1957–1970: ThePoliticalEconomyoftheTiesBetweenMapai,theHistadrut,andtheState”(inHebrew)(diss.,TelAvivUniversity,1991),p.340ff.
13.AriehAvneri,Sapir(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Peleg,1976).14. Sapir at the Mapai secretariat, 6 April 1967, PSA, KSMA, folder 16;Maariv(“DaysandNights”supplement),24Feb.1967,p.8.
15.Weitz,MyDiary,vol.VI,pp.7,62ff.,224,227,495.16.EshkolintheKnesset,8Nov.1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.47(inHebrew),
p.242;Maariv,8Jan.1967,p.9;Ha’aretz,13Feb.1967,p.4;GovernmentMinutes,5Feb.1967,withthekindpermissionofYossiGoldstein;Maariv,15March1967,p.2;discussionsummary,11July1965,ISA,A-3/7928.
17. Ha’aretz, 24 Nov. 1966, p. 14 (landfills); Maariv, 14 Jan. 1966, p. 9(Mechasia);Maariv,6March1966,p.18(Shefer);27Nov.1966,p.18(OrAkiba); Ha’aretz, 13 Jan. 1967, p. 9 (Yerucham); Maariv (“Days and
Nights” supplement), 3March 1966, p. 11 (Ma’alot); 23Oct. 1966, p. 10(ZanoachandKfarTruman);Ha’aretz,3Feb.1967,p.9(Ramleh);Maariv,25 Dec. 1966, p. 9 (Carmiel);Ha’aretz, 23 Aug. 1966, p. 9 (Yokneam);Maariv, 22Nov. 1966, p. 5;Yediot Aharonot, 20May 1966, p. 8 (KiryatShmoneh); see also:Ha’aretz, 1April 1966, p. 9; 6 Jan. 1967, p. 9 (BeitShe’an).
18.RaffiMan, Inconceivable (inHebrew) (TelAviv:HedArzi,1998),p.38;Maariv,18Nov.1966,p.6;AriehBen-EliezerintheKnesset,19Dec.1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.47(inHebrew),p.583;Ha’aretz,16Jan.1967,p.2;Peres,EthnicRelationsinIsrael,p.124.
19. Ben-Gurion diary, 7 March 1966, BGA; Ha’aretz, 6 May 1966, p. 9(Lazimi);Ha’aretz,2May1966,p.1;YediotAharonot,2May1966,p.3;3May 1966, p. 5 (Ashdod); Maariv, 2 May 1966, p. 15 (other places);Ha’aretz,13Jan.1967,p.9(Yerucham);YediotAharonot,28Sept.1966,p.15 (Kiryat Shmoneh); Maariv, 1 Nov. 1966, p. 9 (“Who Imagined?”);Ha’aretz(supplement),6Jan.1967,p.5(TelAviv);DaletoDepartmentofState, 24 Jan. 1967, and Barbour to Department of State, 7 April 1967,USNA,Box2224,FilePOL2; see also:EphraimBenHaim, “TheEthnicGap”(inHebrew),Ot,Winter1967,p.62ff.
20.Weitz,MyDiary,vol.VI,p.192;YediotAharonot,20Dec.1966,p.4.21.TomSegev,OnePalestine,Complete: Jews andArabsUnder theBritishMandate(inHebrew),p.128ff.;Segev,TheSeventhMillion,p.109.
22.ZviTzameret,OnaNarrowBridge:Education in IsraelDuring theFirstYearsoftheState(inHebrew)(Beersheba:Ben-GurionUniversity,1997).
23.Maariv,14Sept.1966,p.16(Hazaz);TomSegev,1949:TheFirstIsraelis(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Domino,1984),p.105ff.;Peres,EthnicRelationsinIsrael, p. 83ff.; see also: liana Shelach, “Inter-EthnicMarriage Patterns inIsraelDuring1952–1958” (inHebrew) in Israeli Society, 1967–1973, eds.Reuven Kahana and Simcha Koppstein (Jerusalem: Hebrew University,1974), p. 333ff.;Maariv, 2 Sept. 1966, p. 11; Belha Noy,First Children:MemoriesfromSchoolDuringtheState’sEarlyYears(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatPoalim,1996),p.174ff.;Ha’aretz,6Feb.1967,p.2.
24.Mizrahiethnicities,general,ISA,6397/10-C.25.Peres,EthnicRelationsinIsrael,p.125ff.26.Nitzan to Tzabari, 2 July 1965, ISA, 6397/9-C; ISA, 6397/10-C;Herzog
diary,25Sept.1966,ISA,4510/16-A.27.Maariv,7Jan.1966,p.23(Sasson);Ha’aretz,17Feb.1966,p.3(Eshkol);
1Jan.1967,pp.2,7(Yeshayahu).28.DaletoDepartmentofState,24Jan.1967,USNA,Box2224,FilePOL2.29.YediotAharonot,21Oct.1966,p.9;Maariv,28Jan.1966;Ben-Gurionto
Mansur,6June1967,BGA.30.Maariv,1April1966,p.8;Ha’aretz,2Sept.1966,p.9;4Sept.1966,p.8;National Investigative Committee in the Matter of the Disappearance ofChildren of Yemenite Immigrants During 1948–1954 (in Hebrew)(Jerusalem:GovernmentPrinter,2001),appendixtoreport,partI,p.335.
31. Report of the National Investigative Committee in the Matter of theDisappearanceofChildrenofYemenite ImmigrantsDuring1948–1954 (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:GovernmentPrinter,2001).
32.Ben-GuriontoBen-Harush,21May1967,BGA;Ha’aretz,23May1967,p.4;ISA,6402/24-C(childallowance);Rabi,“DemographicDevelopment inIsrael, 1948–1966,” June 1971, p. 43ff.; Maariv, 19 May 1967, p. 10;Ha’aretz,21May1967,p.8.
33.Maariv(“DaysandNights”supplement),6Jan.1967,p.21;Gvatidiary,17July1967,p.182,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02.
34. Tom Segev, Elvis in Jerusalem (New York: Metropolitan, 2002), p. 62;Segev,1949,p.170;Maariv,14Sept.1966,p.16.
35. Maariv (special supplement on the occasion of David Ben-Gurion’seightieth birthday), 28 Sept. 1966, p. 11;AlonGan, “TheDiscourse ThatDied?:’DiscourseCulture’asanAttempttoDefineaSpecialIdentityfortheSecond Generation on the Kibbutzim” (in Hebrew) (diss., Tel AvivUniversity,2002),p.45;seealso:UzielandAvneriintheKnesset,28Dec.1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.44(inHebrew),p.262.
36.Ha’aretz,15July1966,p.2.37.Ibid.,11March1966,p.3.38.Ibid.,25Aug.1966,p.2.39.Ibid.,27July1966,p.2;Davar,19Aug.1966,p.15.40. Reudor Manor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, Hebrew
University, Institute for International Relations, second meeting, 16 July1974,p.6ff.,quotedwiththekindpermissionofDavidHarman.
41.BenYaakovtoHarman,21Aug.1966,ISA,3979/4-HZ.42.CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.18,1967(in
Hebrew),p.42;JewishAgency,21YearsofImmigrationandAbsorption,p.4ff.,ISA,3497/16-C.
43. Yaakov Shabtai, “The Spotted Tiger” (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutzHaMeuchad,1985),p.27;YediotAharonot(“7Days”supplement),21Oct.1966,p.8;seealso:Maariv(“DaysandNights”supplement),19Aug.1966,p.18;AndreChouraqui,“FromWadiSalibtoAshdod,”Today,6May1966,p.3;ZviLokertoMinistryofForeignAffairs,26Jan.1966;IsraeliConsulinBrusselstoMinistryofForeignAffairs,16Feb.1966,ISA,4042/24-HZ.
44.Maariv, 2 Sept. 1966, p. 3; AmosOz,A Tale of Love andDarkness (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,2002),p.543.
45.AtallahMansour,InaNewLight(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Kami,1966);seealso: Fauzi Al-Asmar, Being Arab in Israel (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem:Shachak,1975),p.124ff.;Maariv,21March1968,p.13.
46.ZeevSternhell,NationBuildingorSocietyMending(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,1986);EyalKafkafi,Lavon:Anti-Messiah(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,1998),p.102.
47.CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.18,1967(inHebrew), pp. 20, 39; Yair Baumel, “The Israeli Establishment’s AttitudeTowardArabsinIsrael:Policy,PrinciplesandActions:TheSecondDecade,1958–1968”(inHebrew)(diss.,HaifaUniversity,2002),p.15ff.
48. Hillel Cohen,Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Services and the IsraeliArabs(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,2006);SarahOzacky-Lazar,“MartialLawasaMechanismofControlovertheArabCitizens:FirstDecade,1948–1958,” The New East, vol. 43, p. 103ff.; Baumel, “The IsraeliEstablishment’sAttitudeTowardArabs in Israel,”p.272ff.;Ben-Gurion inthe Knesset, 16 Jan. 1960,KnessetMinutes, vol. 3 (in Hebrew), p. 536.;Aharon Shay, “The Fate of theAbandonedArabVillages in IsraelBeforeand After the Six-Day War,” Kathedra, no. 105, Sept. 2003, p. 15 Iff.;EshkolwithToledano,8Feb.1966,ISA,7924/1-A.
49. Baumel, “The Israeli Establishment’s Attitude Toward Arabs in Israel,”abstract,p.7ff.;EitantoYa’ari,1Feb.1967,YYA,90.77.1,Container841(Mapam).
50.Ha’aretz,18Feb.1966,p.3;20Feb.1966,p.12;21Feb.1966,p.4.51.Gvatidiary,21April1967,p.104,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02;MyName Is Ahmed, film, Jerusalem Cinematheque—Israel Film Archive;newspaper clippings collection,Cinematheque library, Jerusalem; see also:Maariv(“DaysandNights”supplement),30Sept.1966,p.19;Ha’aretz,17Jan.1967,p.8;17Feb.1967,p.3.
52.ToledanotoDirectorGeneralofMinistryofForeignAffairs,2April1967,
and confidential memorandum, unidentified author, Jan. 1967, ISA,4032/HZ-2;Ha’aretz (supplement), 24 March 1967, p. 5; Eshkol in theKnesset, 19 July 1966, Knesset Minutes, vol. 46 (in Hebrew), p. 2204;responsedraft,7July1966,ISA,6404/24-C;Ha’aretz,20July1966,p.14;17Aug.1966,p.2;7April1967,p.9.
53.Maariv, 5 Jan. 1966, p. 3; 6 Jan. 1966, p. 5;Yediot Aharonot (“7Days”supplement),29July1966,p.1.
54.BenAmiinministerialcommitteeonpopulationdispersion,18Feb.1963;Baumel, “The Israeli Establishment’sAttitudeTowardArabs in Israel,” p.280.
55. TheChief of Staffwith theMinister ofDefense, 31March 1967, IDFA,118/117/70;Ha’aretz,8Feb.1967,p.12;21Feb.1967,p.2.
56.Maariv,3July1966,p.10(Mohar);Ha’aretz(supplement),7Jan.1966,p.12 (medicine); 12 April 1966, p. 9; 8 May 1967, p. 8 (foreigners); UriKesari, “The JewishDignity ofMizrahi theGambler,”Ha’aretz, 10 Sept.1966,p.3;GideonTelpaz,“Diaspora,”Ha’aretz,24June1966,p.10.
57.GideonTelpaz,“Diaspora.”58.YitzhakRafael in theKnesset,19July1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.46(in
Hebrew),p.2204ff.;Rafael,Stern,andAvneriintheKnesset,19July1966,KnessetMinutes, vol. 46 (inHebrew), p.2207ff.;Vilner in theKnesset, 5April1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.48(inHebrew),p.2028ff.
59.ISA,6402/24-C(birthrateencouragement);Ben-GuriontoleadersofEfratsociety,4May1967,BGA;seealso:Ben-Guriondiary,18May1967,BGA;Uzi Benziman and Atallah Mansour, Sub-Letters: Israeli Arabs, TheirStatus,andthePolicyTowardThem (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,1992),p.51(conversiontoJudaism);BachitoEshkol,21July1966,ISA,6401/2-C;GovernmentMinutes, 9April 1967,with the kind permission ofYossiGoldstein.
60.Weitz toDanin, 4Aug. 1966,CZA,A246/696; debate onpolicy towardJordan,26Dec.1966,ISA,4094/10-HZ.
61.Baumel,“TheIsraeliEstablishment’sAttitudeTowardArabs inIsrael,”p.181.
62.YairBaumel, “MartialLawand ItsRevocationProcess,1958–1966,”TheNewEast(inHebrew),vol.43,2002,p.132ff.
63.EshkolwithHarel,15Feb.1966,ISA,7921/1-A.64.EshkolintheKnesset,8Nov.1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.47(inHebrew),
p. 228; “Revocation of Martial Law—Questions and Answers,” undated,YEA, copy in possession of the author;Goldstein,Eshkol, p. 470; Eshkolwith Golda Meir, 9 July 1963, ISA, 7921/1-A; Baumel, “The IsraeliEstablishment’s Attitude Toward Arabs in Israel,” p. 194ff.; Toledano toEshkol, 9April 1967, ISA, 6405/2-C; see also:weeklymeeting, 21April1967,IDFA,118/117/70.
65.YehiamNewsletter,335/17,4Oct.1967,p.2ff.66.Weitz,MyDiary,vol.VI,p.285.67.YehiamNewsletter,312/4,1Dec.1966,p.18ff.;109/1,14Sept.1966,p.2.68.CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.18,1967(in
Hebrew),p.29.69.Gan,“TheDiscourseThatDied?”p.14.70.YehiamNewsletter, 315/7,27 Jan.1966,p.25;Gan, “TheDiscourseThat
Died?”p.9ff.71.Davar,25Feb.1966,p.3.72.YehiamNewsletter,313/5,25Dec.1966,p.4.73.HazanintheKnesset,10March1949,KnessetMinutes,vol.1(inHebrew),
p.125.74.Gan,“TheDiscourseThatDied?”p.47ff.75.YediotAharonot(“7Days”supplement),24Sept.1966,p.3.76.Maariv, 3 Jan.1966,p.7;10April1966,p.14;YediotAharonot, 2Sept.
1966, p. 7; Yediot Aharonot (“7 Days” supplement), 24 Sept. 1966, p. 3;YediotAharonot,2Nov.1966,p.7.
77.Segev,TheSeventhMillion, p.230ff.;YehiamNewsletter, 318/10,7April1967,p.8.
78.YediotAharonot(“7Days”supplement),24Sept.1966,p.3.79.YehiamNewsletter,335/17,4Oct.1967,p.32.80.Gan,“TheDiscourseThatDied?”p.35ff.81.YehiamNewsletter,335/17,4Oct.1967,p.20;313/5,25Dec.1966,p.2;
312/4,1Dec.1966,p.9;109/1,14Sept.1966,p.18;310/2,20Oct.1966,p.5 (wedding gifts); 319/11, 5May 1967, p. 28 (compensation, insurance);109/1,14Sept.1966,p.14;315/7,27Jan.1967,p.11;312/4,1Dec.1966,p. 5; 310/2, 20 Oct. 1966, p. 3; 312/4, 1 Dec. 1966, p. 6; Gan, “TheDiscourseThatDied?”p.35ff.
82.Noy,FirstChildren,p.188ff.;Ha’aretz,3Aug.1966,p.2;YediotAharonot,
20May1966,p.8.83.Maariv,28Sept.1966,p.7;Weitz,MyDiary,vol.6,p.211.84.Noy,FirstChildren,p.185ff.;YehiamNewsletter,319/11,5May1967,p.1.85.Gan,“TheDiscourseThatDied?”p.30;YehiamNewsletter,319/11,5May
1967, p. 25; 314/6, 6 Jan. 1967, p. 14 The Jewish Agency, 17 Years ofAbsorption,ISA,6377/18-C.
86.YehudaAmir,“KibbutzMembersintheIDF,”Megamot,vol.16,no.2–3,Aug.1967,p.250ff.
87.YehiamNewsletter,313/5,25Dec.1966,p.8ff.;Ha’aretz,16Oct.1966,p.2; Yediot Aharonot, 18 Nov. 1966, p. 13;Ha’aretz, 30 Oct. 1966, p. 12(Amidror).
88.YediotAharonot,4Nov.1966,p.10;seealso:LaMerhav,11Nov.1966,p.2;AlHaMishmar,11Nov.1966,p.3;YediotAharonot,18Nov.1966,p.13.
89.YemimaRosenthal,ArnonLemfrum,andHagaiTzoref,eds.,LeviEshkol,theThirdPrimeMinister(Jerusalem:StateArchives,2002),pp.396,462.
90.Nitzotz,15[March]1967;YediotAharonot,7March1967,p.2;Ben-Guriondiary,27Feb.1966.
91. Shabtai Teveth,The Season of Fleecing (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: IshDor,1992);Kafkafi,Lavon.
92. National Elections Supervisor, The Results of the Election for the SixthKnesset and the Local Authorities, Central Bureau of Statistics, SpecialPublicationsno.216,p.73;CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.19,1968(inHebrew),p.583ff.;dataontheKnessetWebsite.
93.Ha’aretz,10March1967,p.2.94. Rosenthal et al., eds., Levi Eshkol, pp. 147, 75, 109; Goldstein, Eshkol;
ReudorManor,“ImagesandDecision-MakingontheSubjectofBordersinIsraeliForeignPolicy,1973–1948”(diss.,HebrewUniversity,1980),p.109.
95. Time, 9 June 1967, p. 21; Eitan Haber, Today War Will Break Out (inHebrew)(TelAviv:Idanim,1987),p.48;Ha’aretz,4Jan.1967,p.2.
96.Haber,TodayWarWill Break Out, p. 39; Gvati diary, 8 Jan., 13 Jan., 5March,andothers,1967,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02.
97.Barbour toDepartment of State,USNA,Box 2226, Pol 12;Ha’aretz, 18March1966,p.2;Maariv,10June1966,p.6;Ha’aretz,14Oct.1966,p.3;4March1966,p.9.
98.Maariv,2Sept.1966,p.3 (Amisragas);25Dec.1966,p.9;Ha’aretz,14Sept.1966,p.41;Maariv,17June1966,p.6;Ha’aretz,14Oct.,1966,p.3;
4March1966,p.9.99.Ha’aretz,19Sept.1966,p.2.100.Ben-GuriontoSharon,20Feb.1967;seealso:Ben-GuriontoHod,8April
1967; Ben-Gurion diary, 24 Nov. 1958; correspondence file 1082; Ben-Gurion to Frisch, 4 May 1967; Ben-Gurion to Todd, 26 Jan. 1967; Ben-GuriontoBlumberg,29Jan.1967;Ben-Guriondiary,23Oct.1966,BGA.
101.Ha’aretz, 3 Oct. 1966, p. 1; Ben-Gurion to Ya’ari, 11 Feb. 1967, BGA;Ben-Guriondiary,10Sept.1966;27Feb.1967,BGA;Ben-GuriontoMeir,29 Sept. 1967,BGA;Ben-Gurion toAvigur, 7 Jan. 1967,BGA; see also:New Look, 26May 1966, p. 7; Goldstein,Eshkol, p. 525; Ben-Gurion toHacohen,12Oct.1967,BGA;Ha’aretz, 17Feb.1966,p.2;Haver,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.44.
102.Ben-GuriontoAvigur,7Jan.1967;Ben-GuriontoMenachemZichroni,30Jan.1967;Ben-Guriondiary,25and28Nov.1966;26 Jan.1967;27Oct.1966; Ben-Gurion to Bar-Av, 31 Jan. 1967; Ben-Gurion to Karoy, 6 June1967—allBGA.
103.MeirAmit,Head toHead: A Personal Look atGreat Events and SecretAffairs(inHebrew)(TelAviv:HedArzi,1999),p.149;IanBlackandBennyMorris, Israel’s SecretWars (London:HamishHamilton, 1991), p. 202ff.;Shlomo Aronson, Israel’s Nuclear Programme: The Six Day War and ItsRamifications(London:King’sCollege,1999);DavidGolombinanswertotheauthor’squestion;seealso:GolombtoBen-Gurion(undated)andlettertoHa’aretz,ISA,7231/1-A.
104. Eshkol in the government, 12 Feb. 1967 and others, ISA, 6339/52-C;Ha’aretz,21Feb.1967,p.2;3April1967,p.2;andothers;UriAvneri intheKnesset,7March1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.48(inHebrew),p.1599;no-confidencevotes,20March1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.48(inHebrew),p.1746ff.
105.Shazar toBen-Gurion,23Feb.1967, ISA;seealso:DayanandEshkol inthe Knesset, 20 March 1967, Knesset Minutes, vol. 48 (in Hebrew), p.1746ff.;BGAISA,4042/281-HZ.
106.Herzogdiary,2and9Aug.1966;17and25Sept.1966,ISA,4510/16-A.107.Maariv,6Jan.1967,p.10.108. Ben-Gurion to Rachel Mishal, 19 Jan. 1967, BGA; Ben-Gurion to
AlexanderPili,26Jan.1967,BGA.109.Maariv,17Feb.1967,p.6.
110. Yehiam Weitz, From Underground Fighter to Political Party: TheFoundingoftheHerutMovement,1947–1949(inHebrew)(Beersheba:Ben-GurionUniversity,2002);Ha’aretz,28June1966,p.2;11Sept.1966,p.2;Ben-Gurion toHaimGouri,15May1963,BGA;Maariv,10July1966,p.12;24Feb.1967,p.12;Ben-GuriontoAriMordechai,27Nov.1962,ISA,6380/7-C;Ha’aretz,18July1966,p.10.
111.Maariv,27June1966,p.2;29June1966,p.2;Ha’aretz,29June1966,p.3;Maariv,3July1966,p.3.
112.Ha’aretz,10Sept.1966,p.9;8Jan.1967,p.2.113.Letter toAdirZik,23March1967,withhiskindpermission;Maariv,30
Jan.1966,p.5.114. Letter to New York, 15 Jan. 1967, copy in possession of the author;
Ha’aretz, 19 Aug. 1966, p. 3; Ofra Nevo-Eshkol, Humorous Eshkol (inHebrew) (TelAviv:YediotAharonot, 1968), pp. 11, 127;Rosenthal et al.,eds.,LeviEshkol,p.512.
115. Ronny Stauber, A Lesson for a Generation: Holocaust and Heroism inPublic Thought in Israel During the Fifties (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: YadBen-Zvi,2000),p.137.
116.Ben-GuriontoS.Perldman,8Feb.1967,BGA.117.Ha’aretz,24April1966,p.4;28April1966,p.2.118.Maariv,21Feb.1966,p.10;1April1966,p.1.119.YehiamNewsletter,315/7,27Jan.1967,p.1.120.Ha’aretz,7July1977,p.2;13July1966,p.2.121. Ibid., 10Feb.1966,p.2;Simon toUzai, 16Feb.1966, ISA,6399/26-C;
Maariv,16Feb.1966,p.2.122.Ha’aretz,23Jan.1966,p.2;seealso:Ha’aretz,17Feb.1966,p.2.123.Ibid.,31July1966,p.4.124. Ibid.,3 Jan.2002,p.10 (Omer);Maariv,20April1967,p.3 (Yehezkel);
Ha’aretz,3Jan.1966,p.2(Kook).125.OzAlmog,TheSabra:TheCreationoftheNewJew(Berkeley:University
ofCaliforniaPress,2000),p.73ff.;Ha’aretz,11Aug.1966,p.2 (Shazar);Gan,“TheDiscourseThatDied?”pp.108(Sarig),14(Katznelson).
126.Ha’aretz,5April1967,p.2.127.InquiryonthequestionofJewishawareness,16Feb.1966,ISA,12973/10-
GL.
128.Ha’aretz,11July1966,p.11.129.Ibid.,21April1966,p.6;YediotAharonot,10Aug.1966,p.1;3Jan.1967,
p.1;Maariv,3April1966,p.1;YediotAharonot,7Jan.1966,p.2(Fagin).130. Amos Oz,Elsewhere, Perhaps (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Keter, 1991), p.
267.131. “Nativ” activities, 12 Jan. 1967, ISA, 7938/6-A; Shmorak toMinistry of
ForeignAffairs,3Nov.1966,ISA,4051/2-HZ(“Emanuel”);DinsteintoBar,5 Feb. 1968; Netzer to Adi Yaffe, 14 Feb. 1968, ISA, 7938/6-A; ReudorManor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, Hebrew University,InstituteforInternationalRelations,meeting21,31Aug.1976,p.Iff.,withthekindpermissionofDavidHarman;seealso:Ha’aretz,1April1966,p.3;Arieh Loba Eliav, Rings of Testimony (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved,1983),vol.II,p.165ff.
132. Eshkol toAvriel, 13 Feb. 1966; Eban toMinistry of ForeignAffairs, 21Sept.1967;4064/13-HZ.
133.Maariv,15Aug.1966,p.8.134.Ha’aretz,9Jan.1967,p.1.135. Ibid., 18May 1967, p. 11 (Kahana); Yitzhak Rafael, on the question of
autopsies, ISA, 3979/4-HZ; posters of the Public Committee for theProtectionofHumanDignity,ISA,6399/20-C;seealso:Ha’aretz,19April1967,p.8.
136.LeviandGrossintheKnesset,13March1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.48(inHebrew),p.1663ff.;YadidandBarzilaiintheKnesset,3July1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.49(inHebrew),p.2447;LaurenceandothersintheKnesset,23 March 1967, Knesset Minutes, vol. 48, p. 183 Iff.; Yael Zerubavel,Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli NationalTradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); see also: ISA,6399/20-C;YediotAharonot,3May1967,p.3;Ha’aretz,4May1967,p.1;Maariv,9May1967,p.3(doctors).
137.Man toCohen,17May1966, ISA,3979/3-HZ; Jacobson toMan,8May1967, ISA, 6399/18-C; Zohar to Jerusalem, 11 and 12 July 1966, ISA,3779/3-HZ.
138.ArnontoJerusalem,26April1966,ISA,3979/4-HZ;NewYorkConsulateto Jerusalem, 17 March 1967, ISA, 3979/7-HZ; New York Consulate toJerusalem,20Sept.1966,ISA,3979/4-HZ;HarmantoArgov,28Oct.1966;ZohartoMinistryofForeignAffairs,5Oct.1966,ISA,3979/5-HZ;HarmantoBitan,10April1967;RemeztoJerusalem,5April1967,ISA,3979/7-HZ.
139.LivnehtoEshkol,12Feb.1967,ISA,6360/25-C.140.CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.18,1967(in
Hebrew),p.21;JewishAgency,21YearsofImmigrationandAbsorption,p.4ff.,ISA,3497/16-C;Ha’aretz,14Sept.1966,p.11;Maariv,8Nov.1966,p.9;EttaZablockiBick,“EthnicLinkagesandForeignPolicy:AStudyoftheLinkageRoleofAmericanJewsinRelationsBetweentheUnitedStatesandIsrael,1956–1968”(diss.,CUNY,1983).
141.LivnehtoEshkol,12Feb.1967,ISA,6360/25-C;Ha’aretz,28June1966,p.2(“holdingouthands”);29April1966,p.13(Tammuz);28July1966,p.2;seealso:Ha’aretz,5Aug.1966,p.2(Livneh).
142. Rosen to Marmour, 27 July 1966, ISA, 3979/3-HZ; ISA, 4006/13-HZ(Britain);Ha’aretz,28July1966,p.2(“spirituallife”);seealso:Ha’aretz,5Aug.1966,p.2;IsraelconsulinLosAngelestoIsraelconsulinNewYork,28Dec. 1966, ISA, 3979/9-HZ;Arnon toMinistry of ForeignAffairs, 17Nov.1966,ISA,3979/5-HZ(reforms).
143.Ha’aretz,24April1967,p.3(Wiesel);Maariv,8Nov.1966,p.9(Pushkin);HarmantoEban,5July1966,ISA,7938/6-A.
144. Reudor Manor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, HebrewUniversity, Institute for InternationalRelations,meeting20,23Aug.1976,p.13ff.,withthekindpermissionofDavidHarman.
145. Eshkol in the Knesset, 20 March 1967, Knesset Minutes, vol. 48 (inHebrew),p.1752;ISA,4006/1-HZ;seealso:3979/5-HZ.
146. Charles S. Leibman, “Diaspora Influence on Israel: The Ben-Gurion-Blaustein ’Exchange’ and Its Aftermath,” Jewish Social Studies, vol.XXXVI, 1974, p. 271ff.; Blaustein-Rusk conversation, 17 Oct. 1966;Harman to Bitan, 4 Nov. 1966; Harman to Bitan, 15 Nov. 1966, ISA,3977/10-HZ; Evron to Gazit, 2 Jan. 1967, 4096/2-HZ; see also: ReudorManor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, Hebrew University,InstituteforInternationalRelationships,Meeting20,23Aug.1976,p.13ff.,withthekindpermissionofDavidHarman.
147. Reudor Manor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, HebrewUniversity, Institute for International Relationships, 1974–1979, with thekindpermissionofDavidHarman.
148.EvrontoBitan,2March1967,ISA,3979/7-HZ;T.H.Baker,interviewwithHarryMcPherson,no.3,16Jan.1969,p.24,LBJL,OralHistories.
149. Reudor Manor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, HebrewUniversity, Institute for International Relationships, meeting 20, 23 Aug.
1976,p.7;meeting18,3May1976,p.4,withthekindpermissionofDavidHarman.
150. Maariv, 17 April 1966, p. 20; Yediot Aharonot, 22 April 1966, p. 7;Ha’aretz(supplement),22April1966,p.29.
151. Arnold Forster, Square One: The Memoirs of a True Freedom Fighter’sLife-Long Struggle Against Anti-Semitism, Domestic and Foreign (NewYork: Donald I. Fine, 1988), p. 259ff.; Yuval Elitzur, From Shachrit toMaariv:ChaptersofLifeinJournalism(inHebrew),certificate(undated),p.172ff.;ReudorManor,seriesofinterviewswithAvrahamHarman,HebrewUniversity, Institute for International Relationships, meeting 26, 19 Dec.1977,p.10,withthekindpermissionofDavidHarman;seealso:HarmantoBitan(undated),ISA,3977/22-HZ.
152. Richard D. McKinzie, Oral History, interview with Abraham Feinberg,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,ISA,1885/P-3.
153.RobertDallek,Lone StarRising: Lyndon Johnson andHis Times, 1908–1960(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1991),p.512.
154.ValentitoPresident,March31,1965,LBJL,WHCF,NameFile,BoxF47;MichaelBeschloss,ed.,ReachingforGlory:LyndonJohnson’sSecretWhiteHouseTapes,1964–1965(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,2001),pp.21–23,188ff.;seealso:Money(inHebrew),29Nov.2001,p.lOff.
155.RostowtoPresident,8March1967,LBJL,NSF,CountryFileIsrael,IsraeliAid5/67Box145;seealso:YaffetoBitan,19Feb.1967;EvrontoBitan,17March 1967, ISA, 7938/A-10; Rostow to President, 13 Feb. 1967, LBJL,NSF,CountryFileIsrael,vol.VI;FeinbergGoodWords,LBJL,NSFFilesofWaltW.Rostow,Box12.
156.Beschloss,ed.,ReachingforGlory,p.188.157.EvrontoBitan,31March1967,ISA,3979/7-HZ;IsraeliConsultoMinistry
ofForeignAffairs,13June1967, ISA,3979/9-HZ;Hartman toEshkol,19Feb.and20July1967,ISA,7231/1-A;seealso:Ha’aretz,23Sept.1966,p.13;AbbaEban,LifeStories(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1978),vol.II,p.351.
158.RostowtoPresident,13Dec.1966,FRUS,vol.XVIII,Doc.No.369.159. Interview with Ginsburg, Johnson Archives, quoted with his kind
permission; also, Ginsburg in response to questions from the author andYoavKami.
160.HarmantoBitan,9June1966,ISA,3979/3-HZ.161. Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Schocken,
2000),p.102;MichaelKarpin,TheBombintheBasement:HowIsraelWentNuclear and What That Means for the World (New York: Simon andSchuster,2006),p.129ff.
162.EvrontoBitan,17March1967;HarmantoBitan,17March1967;EvrontoBitan, 20April 1967;Ginsburg andFeinbergwithEshkol, 28April 1967;AmericanJewryandIsrael,ISA,7938/10-A;RostowtoPresident,20April1967,LBJL,NSFCountryFile,Israel,Container140–41,Doc.No.98a;seealso:ZachiShalom,FromDimonatoWashington:TheFightforDevelopingIsrael’s Nuclear Option, 1960–1968 (in Hebrew) (Beersheba: Ben-GurionUniversity,2004).
163.HarmantoBitan,21April1967,ISA,7938/10-A.164.BitantoHarman,30April1967,ISA,7938/10-A;interviewwithGinsburg,
JohnsonLibrary,withhiskindpermission;AmericanJewryandIsrael,ISA,7938/10-A.
165. Meyer Weisgal, So Far (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), pp.122ff.,313ff.;MathildeKrim,inresponsetotheauthor’squestions.
166.MichaelL.Gillette,interviewwithArthurB.Krim,no.I,p.4(party);no.VI,p.6(Meir);no.IV,p.34(services);no.II,p.13(Feinberg);no.II,p.14(Eshkol); no. II, p. 6 (Harvard); no. IV, p. 6 (roots)—all LBJL, OralHistories; President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Daily Diary, 26 May 1967ff.,LBJL,WHCF,Box11;MathildeKrim,inresponsetotheauthor’squestions.
167.AvidartoMinistryofForeignAffairs,6Jan.1967,ISA,3979/6-HZ;Fortasspeech,BGA,File 1064;Ben-Gurion toFortas, 5Feb. 1967,BGA;LauraKalman,AbeFortas:ABiography(NewHaven,Ct.:YaleUniversityPress,1990),p.36.
168. Reudor Manor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, HebrewUniversity, Institute for International Relationships, meeting 20, 23 Aug.1976,p.10,withthekindpermissionofDavidHarman;HarmantoMinistryof ForeignAffairs, 28May 1967, ISA, 7919/1-A; Richard B. Parker, ed.,TheSix-DayWar:ARetrospective(Gainesville:UniversityPressofFlorida,1966),p.225.
169.MichaelL.Gillette,interviewwithArthurB.Krim,no.IV,9Nov.1982,p.34, LBJL,OralHistories; BruceAllenMurphy,Fortas: The Rise and theRuin of a Supreme Court Justice (NewYork:WilliamMorrow, 1988), p.450;HarmantoBitan,25Oct.1966,ISA,3977/20-HZ.
170.NewYorkTimes,31Dec.1963,p.16.171.LadyBirdJohnson,AWhiteHouseDiary (NewYork:Holt,Rinehartand
Winston,1970),p.28.172.LouisStanislausGomolak,“Prologue:LBJ’sForeign-AffairsBackground,
1908–1948”(diss.,UniversityofTexas,1989);Dallek,LoneStarRising,pp.169ff.
173.LBJL,ReferenceFile,LBJandtheJews.174.T.H.Baker,interviewwithHarryC.McPhersonJr.,no.Ill,16Jan.1969,p.
24;MichaelL.Gillette, interviewwithHarryC.McPhersonJr.,no.VII,9Sept. 1985, LBJL, Oral Histories; Beschloss, ed., Reaching for Glory, p.396;MathildeKrim,inresponsetotheauthor’squestions.
175.UziPeled,“TheIsraelisandtheVietnamWar,”InternationalProblems(inHebrew),VI:1–2(13),May1968,p.41ff.;Ha’aretz,30May1966,p.15;Barbour toDepartmentofState,24March1967;Wilson toDepartmentofState, 12 April 1967, USNA, Box 2228; minutes of Mapai’s politicalcommittee,28Juneand24July1966,ISA,7922/90A;RostowtoPresident,20April1967,LBJL,NSF,CountryFile,Israel,vol.VI;seealso:DirectorGeneral of Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Asia Department Director, 29March1967,ISA,3977/22-HZ;lunchwithVietnamesedelegation,26Dec.1966,ISA,3977/20-HZ;Ha’aretz,23March1966,p.2(relations).
176. Harman to Bitan, 9 June 1966, ISA, 3979/3-HZ; Arnon to Ministry ofForeign Affairs, 22 Sept. 1966, ISA, 3979/4-HZ; Evron to Ministry ofForeignAffairs,8Sept.1966,ISA,3979/4-HZ;Bick,“EthnicLinkagesandForeign Policy,” p. 209ff.; Judith A. Klinghofer, Vietnam, Jews and theMiddle East: Unintended Consequences (New York: St. Martin’s Press,1999); Ariel to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 Sept. 1966; Arnon toMinistry of ForeignAffairs, 3Oct. 1966; Frintz toArnon, 26 Sept. 1966,ISA,3979/5-HZ.
177.Michael L. Gillette, interview withMorris Abram, no. II,May 3, 1984,LBJL,OralHistories;Ariel toMinistryofForeignAffairs, 21Sept. 1966,ISA,3979/4-HZ.
178.ArnontoMinistryofForeignAffairs,20Sept.1966,ISA,3979/4-HZ.179.PrinztoArnon,26Sept.1966,ISA,3979/5-HZ;IsraelConsulinNewYork
toMinistryofForeignAffairs,2Jan.1967;ArgovtoIsraelConsul,15Jan.1967,ISA,3979/6-HZ.
180.YediotAharonot,11Sept.1966,p.1;Maariv,23Nov.1966,p.3;JerusalemPost,18Sept.1966,pp.1–2;EvrontoMinistryofForeignAffairs,11Sept.1966,ISA,3979/4-HZ;ArnontoMinistryofForeignAffairs,26Oct.1966,ISA,3979/5-HZ.
181.Maariv,24June1966,p.10;Eban in theKnesset,15June1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.46(inHebrew),p.1775;MinistryofForeignAffairstoIsraeliEmbassy inParis,22 June1966;Bitan toHarman,12 June1966;Eban toHarman,13June1966,ISA,HZ-31/4023;Herzogdiary,1Oct.1966,ISA,4510/16-A;Ha’aretz,9June1966,p.2;FeinbergtoRostow,June16,1966,LBJL, ConfidentialName FileDELBox 145 FE;MosheDayan,VietnamDiary(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Dvir,1977),p.29.
182.LivnehtoEshkol,12Feb.1967,ISA,6380/25-C.183.Ha’aretz,9Jan.1966,p.12.184.Ibid.,2Jan.1966,p.11.185.YediotAharonot,13–17March1966;Ha’aretz,9Nov.1966–6Jan.1967;
Maariv,9Dec.1966–6Jan.1967;Davar,27–31Oct.1966.186.YediotAharonot,10April1966,p.17(Ashkelon);Maariv,2May1966,p.
14(Ashdod);15Jan.1967,p.10(agent).187. JewishAgency,21Years of Immigration andAbsorption (inHebrew), p.
xxx, ISA,3497/16-C;Arnon toMinistryofForeignAffairs,27Oct.1966,ISA,3818/5-HZ;seealso:Ha’aretz,4Jan.1966,p.2.
188. Reuven Lamdani, “Emigration from Israel” (in Hebrew) in The IsraeliEconomy:GrowingPains,ed.YoramBen-Porat(TelAviv:AmOved,1989),p. 181; Jewish Agency, 21 Years of Immigration and Absorption (inHebrew), p. 4ff., ISA, 3497/16-C; see also: Zvi Sovel, Journey from thePromisedLand(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,1986);IsraeliImmigrationand Emigration, 26 April 1968, USNA, Box 2228, File, POL 23–9;LaMerhav,31Oct.1966,p.2(Gouri).
189.IsraeliConsultoMinistryofForeignAffairs,3May1967,ISA,3818/5-HZ;YediotAharonot,13Dec.1966,p.1; ISA,3818/5-HZ(diplomats’ reports);Weitz,MyDiary,vol.6,p.203.
190.LaMerhav,30Feb.1967,p.4.191.ZigeltoShragai,2Nov.1966,ISA,4601/10-GL;PaulRitterband,“Outof
Zion: The Non-Returning Israeli Student” (diss., Columbia University,1968);seealso:Ha’aretz,9Nov.1966,p.2;13Dec.1966,p.2;BarzilaiintheKnesset,20March1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.48(inHebrew),p.1768;see also:Ha’aretz, 19 July 1966, p. 5; government decision, 2 Feb. 1967,ISA,10136/2-C.
192. Shimoni toMinistry of Foreign Affairs, 10 Feb. 1966, ISA, 3818/5-HZ;YediotAharonot,17June1966,p.8;Maariv,27Dec.1967,p.1(Vietnam).
193.TamirintheKnesset,1June1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.45(inHebrew),p.1593;Ben-EliezerintheKnesset,20March1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.48(in Hebrew), p. 1745; Eshkol in the Knesset, 20 March 1967, KnessetMinutes,vol.48(inHebrew),p.1745.
194.Davar, 4March1966, p. 3 (Shamir); 18March1986, p. 3 (Gutthelf); 22April1966,p.4(Yagol);12Aug.1966,p.3(Shachar);14Sept.1966,p.9(Gutthelf); 5 May 1967, p. 3 (Gutthelf); 12 May 1967, p. 3 (Ya’ari);LaMerhav,17Feb.1967,p.2 (Hagor);seealso:YonahHadari,AMessiahRidingaTank (inHebrew) (Jerusalem:Hartman Institute, 2002), p. 386ff.(Hofshi,readerswrite);Davar,8April1966,p.3 (desertion);Ha’aretz,25Oct. 2002, p. 2; 25 Oct. 1966, p. 2 (Aran); 29 Dec. 1966 (Sapir); YediotAharonot,2Dec.1966,p.5(Gouri).
195.Davar,29March1966,p.3(parents);11Nov.1966,p.3(soldier);4Nov.1966,p.3(fate);11Nov.1966,p.3(beast).
196. LaMerhav, 21 June 1966, p. 2 (Bartov); Maariv, 21 Oct. 1966, p. 3(Schnitzer);Davar,27Jan.1967,p.4(Livneh);YediotAharonot,17March1966,p.5(Germany).
197.Ha’aretz,29Dec.1966,p.2(Sapir);seealso:13Dec.1966,p.2(abroad);2Nov.1967,p.2(America).
198. Ibid.,20Jan.1967,p.3 (interest);Maariv, 9 Jan.1967,p.9 (soldiers);2Sept.1966,p.8;seealso:Ha’aretz,16Dec.1966,p.2;17Jan.1967,p.2;NaomiNivtoEshkol,16Oct.1966,ISA,6378/16-C.
199.Ha’aretz,15July1966,p.9;16Dec.1966,p.2;Maariv,21Aug.1966,p.14;Yediot Aharonot (Shabbat supplement), 17 June 1966, p. 1; see also:EbantoEshkolandappendix,21Nov.1966,ISA,6378/16-C.
200. Letters to Penina Axelrod, 23 Dec. 1966–3 Aug. 1967, with her kindpermission; letters toRuthiandHaimHaskel,15April1967–3Feb.1968,withtheirkindpermission.
201.Maariv,21Oct.1966,p.3(Schnitzer);YediotAharonot,2Dec.1966,p.4;Ha’aretz,6Jan.1967,p.2.
202.Ha’aretz, 28 Jan. 1966, p. 2; 10 March 1966, p. 4 (who is to blame);Maariv, 15 Nov. 1966, p. 9; 18 Nov. 1966, p. 8 (Cohen);Davar, 27 Jan.1967,p.3(Gotthelf);Hadari,MessiahRidingaTank,p.385(save);KnessetMinutes,27Dec.1965–3Jan.1966,vol.44,p.226ff.
203.YarivBenAharon,HaKrav (inHebrew) (TelAviv:AmOved, 1966), p.179; see also: Gan, “The Discourse That Died?”, p. 15; Hadari,MessiahRidingaTank,p.387(howhavewereached).
204.YedlinintheKnesset,27Dec.1965,KnessetMinutes,vol.44(inHebrew)p.227;LaMerhav,17Feb.1967,p.2.
205.Ha’aretz,28Sept.1966,p.9;seealso:Maariv,26Sept.1966,p.14.206.Hadari,MessiahRidingaTank,p.386.207.Ha’aretz,28Sept.1966,p.9(Teveth);6May1966,p.2(Rubinstein).208.Ibid.,28Sept.1966,p.9;Davar,18March1966,p.33.209.YediotAharonot(“7Days”supplement),2Dec.1966,p.9;Davar,22April
1966, p. 4; 5 May 1967, p. 3; see also: Maariv (“Days and Nights”supplement),12Aug.1966,p.4;20Jan.1966,p.20;23Jan.1966,p.15.
210.AloniintheKnesset,28Dec.1965,KnessetMinutes,vol.44(inHebrew),p.252.
211. Ha’aretz, 5 Jan. 1966, p. 2; 19 Jan. 1966, p. 4; 6 May 1966, p. 2(Rubinstein);6Jan.1967,p.2;9Nov.1966,p.2(Teveth);Maariv,2Sept.1966,p.14(Ben-Yehuda);20Sept.1966,p.13(Ben-Gurion).
212.YehiamNewsletter,310/2,20Oct.1966,p.19;313/5,25Dec.1966,p.4;seealso:Gan,“TheDiscourseThatDied?”p.2;Ha’aretz,28Sept.1966,p.9(BneiAkiva);HaimAdlerandReuvenReuven,“ASocialPortraitof theYouth” (inHebrew) inEducation in Israel, ed. HaimOrmian (Jerusalem:MinistryofEducationandCulture,1973),p.195ff.;Ha’aretz,6June1966,p. 4;Hadari,MessiahRiding aTank, p. 398 (Kolberg);Ha’aretz, 29Dec.1966,p.2(desperation);16Jan.1967,p.2;seealso:MosheShamir,NathanAlterman:ThePoetasLeader(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Dvir,1988),p.11.
213. Yediot Aharonot, 28 Jan. 1966, p. 10 (“How Did They Manage toDestroy”);Ha’aretz,2Feb.1966,p.2(“TheSeedofDestruction”);Maariv,12May 1955, p. 14 (“TheDream and ItsMeaning”); 17 June 1966, p. 2(“TheCrisis”);14Sept.1966,p.6(“DeathofaVision”);7Oct.1966,p.5(“Vision and Failure”); Ha’aretz, 24 April 1967, p. 3 (“Israel Is Not aChallenge”);Maariv,12May1967,p.3(“LongLivetheFutureCountry”).
214. Maariv, 17 June 1966, p. 3 (“crisis”); Ha’aretz, 3 Feb. 1966, p. 2(“demoralization”);seealso:29April1966,p.13(“bitterness”);HaTzofeh,30 Dec. 1966, p. 3 (“distress”); Yediot Aharonot, 30 Dec. 1966, p. 5(“IndifferenceandDesperation”);Davar,17June1966,p.2(“111Wind”);Ha’aretz, 2 Feb. 1966, p. 2 (“FundamentalWeakening”);Davar, 19 June1967,p.6(“SuffocationandDespair”).
215.Maariv,14Sept.1966,p.3;12May1967,p.3(Schnitzer);Ha’aretz,7Oct.1966,p.3(Teveth);AmosOz,“TiredMan,”Davar,10April1966,p.5;see
also: Hadari,Messiah Riding a Tank, p. 46ff.; Pinchas Sadeh,On Man’sCondition (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1967), p. 243; see also:Ha’aretz, 4March 1966, p. 10; 4April 1966, p. 18 (Kurtzweil); 23 Sept.1966,p.9(Talmon);10Oct.1966,p.8(Shalmon).
216.Hadari,MessiahRidingaTank,p.402ff.;seealso:YediotAharonot,2Dec.1966,p.5.
217.YediotAharonot (“7Days” supplement), 13 Jan. 1967, p. 7;Ha’aretz, 21Jan.1966,p.3;Gan,“TheDiscourseThatDied?”p.152.
218.Herzog diary, 7Oct. 1966, ISA, 4510/16-A; see also:Gvati diary, 2 Jan.1967,YTAUnit15,Container12,File02.
PARTII:BETWEENISRAELANDPALESTINECHAPTER3:MAPSANDDREAMS
1.Maariv,28Jan.1966,p.8;seealso:YediotAharonot,24April1966,p.10.2.SabotageActivities in Israel,10March1967,USNA,Box2228,POL23,1/1/67; The Palestine Liberation Organization (no date), PRO, FCO370/285, 104038; Fatah incidents (no date),UNA, S-312,Box 26, File 5;summary of acts of sabotage, 7 April 1967–9 May 1967, YEA, copy inpossessionof theauthor; seealso: InfiltrationandActsofSabotage1966–1968,ISA,A-5/7936.
3.Maariv,14Jan.1965,p.1;YediotAharonot,14Jan.1965,p.1.4.YediotAharonot,31Oct.1966,p.3;AmiGluska,Eshkol,Give theOrder!(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,2004),p.421.
5.YediotAharonot,2May1966,p.10.6. Security survey (undated, probably 22 Nov. 1966), ISA, A-7/7935; JointResearch Department Memorandum, 15 Nov. 1966, PRO, FCO 370/285,104038;ThePalestineLiberationOrganization(undated),PRO,FCO17/5,104038; IntelligenceMemorandum, 2Dec. 1966,FRUS, vol.XVIII,Doc.No.356.
7.Yediot Aharonot, 31Oct. 1966, p. 3; Idith Zertal,Death and theNation:History, Memory, Politics (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 2002), p. 147ff.;Maariv,20March1967,p.14.
8. The Palestinian Liberation Army, ISA, HZ-9/4096; Yediot Aharonot(Shabbat supplement), 24 June 1966, p. 1;Ha’aretz, 2 Dec. 1966, p. 2.Maariv,3Aug.1966,p.6(Shukeiri);Ha’aretz,29Sept.1967,p.6;seealso:EhudYaari,Fatah(TelAviv:LevinEpstein,1970).
9.Maariv,11May1967,p.9(publicopinion);Oronindebate,14Dec.1966,ISA,HZ-13/4092(“PalestinianZionism”).
10.EshkolandYosefSapirintheKnesset,17Oct.1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.47,pp.4,7.
11. Yehoshafat Harkabi, The Palestinians: From Slumber to Awakening (inHebrew) (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1979), p. 59ff.; security survey (undated,probably22Nov.1966),ISA,A-7/7935.
12.EbanwithKatzenbach,12Dec.1966, ISA,HZ-20/3977;Yediot Aharonot(Shabbat supplement), 12May1967, p. 1;Ha’aretz, 10March 1967, p. 9(“fieldsmen”);YosefSerlinintheKnesset,17May1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.45,p.1439;seealso:Ha’aretz,6Aug.1966,p.2;4April1967,p.2.
13. UNA, Summaries of Complaints, 7 Oct. 1966, S-312, Box 26, File 3;Ha’aretz, 9 Oct. 1966, p. 1; Eitan Haber, Today War Will Break Out (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1987),p.104.
14.Herzog diary, 8Oct. 1966, ISA,A-16/4510;Ha’aretz, 9Oct. 1966, p. 2;Hayom,9Oct.1966,p.1;YediotAharonot,9Oct.1966,p.3;Maariv,6Nov.1966,p.3.
15.Maariv,10Oct.1966,p.3;Ha’aretz,10Oct.1966,p.2.16.Maariv,9Oct.1966,p.1(SundayTimes);11Sept.1966,p.9;Ha’aretz,28
Oct. 1966, p. 3 (campaign details); Moshe Dayan, Diary of the SinaiCampaign (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am HaSefer, 1965);Maariv, 28 Oct.1966,p.3;(Shabbatsupplement)p.1(depression);28Oct.1966(“DaysandNights” supplement), p. 6 (Rommel); Ha’aretz, 28 Oct. 1966, p. 3ff.(disappointment);Maariv,14Feb.1966,p.11;DavidBen-Gurion,MeetingswithArabLeaders(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,1967).
17.Ha’aretz, 30 Oct. 1966, p. 1 (announcement); Yediot Aharonot, 31 Oct.1966, p. 1 (“tomorrow we will reach”); Government surveys, ISA, C-15/6381;YediotAharonot,4Nov.1966,p.4;25Oct.1966,p.3(restrain).
18.Gluska,Eshkol,Give theOrder! p. 161;Eban to IsraeliAmbassadors, 14Nov. 1966, ISA,HZ-6/4030,A-7/7935;Ha’aretz, 13Nov. 1966, p. 2 (getusedto);Maariv,13Nov.1966,p.2(“avenge”).
19.GoldaMeirwithDeanRusk,13Oct.1965;RafaelEfrattoHaimIsraeli,14April1965;undateddiaryentries,AdiYaffe,ISA,A-7/7935;BitanatStateDepartment,29Nov.1966,ISA,HZ-20/3977;HarmantoForeignMinistry,14Nov.1966,ISA,HZ-6/4030;seealso:SamirMutawi,Jordaninthe1967War(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1987),p.76ff.
20.ReportbytheChiefofStaff,UNSTO,November1966,UNA,SeeS-0/67–0014,Box14,File6;Evron toForeignMinistry,14Nov.1966, ISA,HZ-6/4030; security survey, undated, ISA, A-7/7935; Avraham Ayalon:“Operation ‘Shredder,’” Ma’arachot (in Hebrew), 261–262, March-April1978,p.27ff.;Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.105ff.;seealso:YediotAharonot,13Nov.1966,p.1(threeissues);14Nov.1966,p.1.
21.Ha’aretz,14Nov.1966,p.2;seealso:Ha’aretz,18Nov.1966,p.2(poll);YediotAharonot,13Nov.1966,p.2(“urges”);Maariv,14Nov.1966,p.8(“lackofchoice”).
22.Ha’aretz,14Nov.1966,p.2;seealso:Ha’aretz,18Nov.1966,p.2;YediotAharonot,25Nov.1966,p.8.
23.YemimaRosenthal,ArnonLemfrum,andHagaiTzoref,eds.,LeviEshkol:The Third Prime Minister (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Israel State Archive,2002), p. 520; Government Minutes, 13 Nov. 1966, Security cabinetmeeting,13Nov.1966,governmentmeeting,20Nov.1966,with thekindpermissionofYossiGoldstein;Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.162.
24.Eban to Israeliambassadors,14Nov.1966, ISA,HZ-6/4030;AviadYafferecords,undated,ISA,A-7/7935;EbanwithUThant,9Dec.1966,UNA,S-512–0131;IsraeliEmbassyintheUnitedStatestoForeignMinistry,15Nov.1966;HarmantoForeignMinistry,16Nov.1966,ISA,HZ-6/4030.
25.Politico-MilitaryContingencyPlanning for theArab-IsraeliDispute,May1966, USNA, Box 19,Memos to the President, Folder 1 of 2; Komer toPresident,16No.1966,FRUS,vol.XVIII,Doc.No.336;AdiYafferecords,21Nov.1966,ISA,A-7/7935.
26.Rosenthal et al., eds.,Levi Eshkol, p. 520; Israel consul inNewYork toForeignMinistry,29Nov.1966,ISA,A-7/7935;ArnontoForeignMinistry,7Dec.1966, ISA,HZ-5/3979;Ebanwithofficials inWashington,12Dec.1966,ISA,HZ-2/3987;Ha’aretz,11Jan.1967,p.2;EbanwithKatzenbach,12 Dec. 1966, ISA, HZ-20/3977; Ofra Nevo-Eshkol, Humorous Eshkol(Jerusalem:Idanim,1988),p.150.
27. Reudor Manor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, HebrewUniversity, Institute for InternationalRelations,meeting7,p.7ff.;meeting12, p. 6, with the kind permission of David Harman;Ha’aretz, 28 Nov.1966,p.2;seealso:Ha’aretz,25Nov.1966,p.2;27Nov.1966,p.2;9Dec.1966,p.3;YaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
28. Davies to Secretary, 8 Feb. 1967, USNA, Box 2228, POL 23, 1/1/67;Maariv,2Dec.1966,p.1;30Dec.1966,p.2.
29.M.WernertoEshkol,28Nov.1966(electricfence);SalimDavidtoEshkol,24Jan.1967(deathpenalty);BochtoEshkol,13March1967(diagrams);A.Waxman to Eshkol (undated) (bag checks);Weitzman to Eshkol, 10May1967(IsraeliArabs);MizrahitoEshkol,14Nov.1966;AvivitoEshkol,28Nov. 1966; anonymous to Eshkol, 15 Jan. 1967—all YEA, copies inpossessionoftheauthor;seealso:Ha’aretz,14Oct.1966,p.3.
30. General Staff meeting, 23 Jan. 1967, IDFA, 205/117/70; Department ofStatetoEmbassyinIsrael,15Nov.1966,FRUS,vol.XVIII,Doc.No.335;Eshkol at editors’ board, 18May 1967, ISA,A-4/7920 (terrorist);Gluska,Eshkol, Give the Order! pp. 166ff., 125ff., 41 (Dayan), 148, 186, 195(“Jews”);Nevo-Eshkol,HumorousEshkol,p.57(Prussians).
31. David N. Myers, Re-Inventing the Jewish Past (New York: OxfordUniversityPress, 1995), p. 109ff.;Baer toEshkol, 23Nov. 1966, ISA,G-17/6301; Yossi Heller, From Peace Treaty to Unification: Yehuda LeibMagnes and the Struggle for a BiNational State (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem:Magnes,2003);LaMerhav,24April1967,p.16(Bar-Hillel);Ner:JournalofPublic IssuesandJewish-ArabRelations (inHebrew), 15thYear, 1965,books6–8,p.5(Shereshevski);SchmuelHugoBergman,Tagebücher,Briefe1948–1975:JüdischerVerlagbeiAtheneum,Königstein,TS1985,vol.II,p.497,395(21Dec.1961);MordechaiBar-On,“StatusQuoBeforeorAfter?Commentary on Israel’s Security Policy, 1949–1958,” Studies in theEstablishmentofIsrael(inHebrew),vol.5,1995,p.65ff.;seealso:Bar-On,“Security-Mindedness and Its Critics, 1949–1967” (in Hebrew) in TheChallengeofSovereignty,Creation,andThoughtintheFirstDecadeoftheState,ed.MordechaiBar-OnQerusalem:YadBen-Zvi,1999),p.66ff.
32. The Israeli Communist Party, Fifteenth Congress (in Hebrew), 1965, p.21ff.;Yaari toAlizaDror, 7May1967,YYA; “BetweenWar andPeace,”NewOutlook,vol.8,no.3(70)April-May1965,p.4ff.;AmnonZichroni,1Against119:UriAvneriintheKnesset(inHebrew)(TelAviv:DafHadash,1969), p. 204; HaOlam HaZeh, no. 1513 (Jan. 1967), p. 12; Israel Bar,Israeli Security Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv:Amikam,1966),p.411;Ha’aretz,12Aug.1966,p.2;12Aug.1966,p.2(Baer).
33. Alek Epstein, “For Freedom’s Sake: The Public Struggles of JerusalemProfessorsAfter the Establishment of the State,”Kathedra, no. 106, Dec.2002,p.139ff.;Gvatidiary,5March1967,p.78,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02.
34.EshkoltoBaer,11Jan.1967,ISA,G-17/6301;seealso:Zertal,Deathand
theNation,p.181ff.35.GalontoEshkol,8Dec.1966,Ben-YohanantoGalon,12Dec.1966,YEA,
copyinpossessionoftheauthor.36.Maariv, 24 April 1966, p. 5 (Rabin); Yitzhak Kotler to his girlfriend, 3
March 1967, in Parchments of Fire, Zvi Haber, ed., vol. 5, book I (inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,1981),p.336.
37.Ha’aretz,26April1966,p.1;YediotAharonot,26April1966,p.4.38.Maariv,26April1966,p.4(parade);Ha’aretz,8July1966,p.8;seealso:
USDAOTelAviv toRUEPJS/DIA,21 June1967,USNA,Box1796,File6/12/67.
39.YediotAharonot,13Jan.1967,p.5(TelKatzir);Ha’aretz,12May1967,p.10(myths);Poochoo,I’maCoward,IAm (inHebrew)(TelAviv:Masada,1966); see also: Ha’aretz, 13 June 1966, p. 10; Ze’ev Schiff and EitanHaber, Lexicon of Israel Security (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Zmora BitanModan, 1976), p. 109 (Gadna);Davar Le-Yeladim, 10 Jan. 1967, p. 415(Gadna); 17 Jan. 1967, p. 447 (boarding school); 17 Jan. 1967, p. 486(comics);seealso:23May1967;MaarivLaNoar,9May1967;ChildrentoBen-Gurion,undated,BGA.
40.K. J.Mclntire, “Israel and the Israelis in1967,”p.5,PRO,FCO17/576,104225.
41.GeneralStaffdiscussion,13March1967,IDFA,205/117/70.42.Maariv,12May1967,p.11.43.YediotAharonot(“7Days”supplement),7Oct.1966,p.14(Vered);Maariv,
20Feb.1966,p.10;seealso:Maariv,25Feb.1966,p.10(Sharon).44.Maariv,29April1966,p.10;YediotAharonot,29April1966,p.5.45.Maariv,25Feb.1966,p.10.46.MordechaiBar-On,“Security-Mindednessand ItsCritics,1949–1967” (in
Hebrew)inTheChallengeofSovereignty,Creation,andThoughtintheFirstDecadeoftheState,ed.MordechaiBar-On(Jerusalem:YadBen-Zvi,1999),p.92.
47.Ha’aretz,12July1966,p.8;24July1966,p.2;21Aug.1966,p.2;Maariv,5May1966,p.7.
48.Herzogdiary,12Sept.1966,ISA,A-16/4510;Ha’aretz,21Feb.1966,p.1;9May1966, p. 1;Eshkol in theKnesset, 18May1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.45,p.1469;Ha’aretz,28Jan.1966,p.2;AvnerCohen,IsraelandtheBomb (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1998); Eshkol with Eban and
others,28Feb.1966,ISA,A-2/794.49. Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee meeting, 8 Feb. 1966, ISA, A-
1/7924.50.Ha’aretz,10Jan.1966,p.1;23Jan.1966,p.1;YediotAharonot,23Jan.
1966,p.1;28Jan.1966,p.1;Maariv,27Jan.1966,p.1;YediotAharonot,3March1966,p.1;Maariv,18April1966,p.1;Ha’aretz,19April1966,p.1;Maariv, 22 April 1966, p. 11; Yediot Aharonot (Shabbat supplement), 22April1966,p.1.
51. YuvalNeeman, “Israel in theAge ofNuclearArms,”Nativ, no. 5, Sept.1995,p.35ff.;Cohen,IsraelandtheBomb,p.353;Karpin,TheBombintheBasement.
52.TomSegev,TheSeventhMillion: Israelisand theHolocaust (inHebrew)(Jerusalem: Keter, 1992), p. 347; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 28ff.;YediotAharonot,13April1966,p.2.
53.Ha’aretz,21April1966,p.2(ego);Baer,IsraeliSecurityYesterday,Today,andTomorrow,pp.262,310;Maariv,15April1966,p.3;5May1966,p.2.
54.ZeevZurintheForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,8Feb.1966,ISA,A-l/792.
55.Cohen,IsraelandtheBomb,p.195.56.Herzogdiary,18Aug.1966,ISA,A-16/4510.57. Katzenbach to President, 1May 1967, LBJL, NSF, Country File, Israel,
Aid,5/67,Box145;ZachiShalom,BetweenDimonaandWashington:TheStruggleoverDevelopingIsrael’sNuclearOption,1960–1968 (inHebrew)(Beersheba: Ben-Gurion University, 2004); Herzog diary, 12 Sept. 1966,ISA,A-16/4510(Argentina).
58.YediotAharonot,14Sept.1966,p.18;Maariv,2Nov.1966,p.4;UriZviGreenbergintheKnesset,9March1949,KnessetMinutes,vol.1,p.107.
59. Amnon Ramon, Divided Jerusalem: The Municipal Line, 1948–1967,GuidedWalks (inHebrew) (Jerusalem:Yad Ben-Zvi, 1987);Moti Golani,Zion in Zionism: The Zionist Policy on theQuestion of Jerusalem, 1937–1949(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,1992);TomSegev,1949:TheFirst Israelis (inHebrew) (Jerusalem:Domino, 1984), p. 52ff.;AmosElon,Jerusalem:AnObsession(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Domino,1991).
60.CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalAbstractofIsrael,No.19,1968(inHebrew), p. 30; David Kroyanker, Architecture in Jerusalem: ModernConstructionOutsidetheWalls,1948–1990 (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,
1991),p.158ff.61.YediotAharonot,5Aug.1966,p.6(sewage);Ha’aretz,15Jan.1967,p.8
(HaMekasher); 6 May 1966, p. 11 (Scharf);Maariv, 14 Oct. 1966, p. 7(Ofakim).
62.YediotAharonot,9Oct.1966,p.5(Tanushouse);Maariv,11March1966,p.10(Eshkol);(“DaysandNights”supplement),13Jan.1967,p.3(stolensites); Yediot Aharonot, 5 April 1967, p. 1 (Alborak); Raphael Israeli,JerusalemDivided:TheArmisticeRegime,1947–1967(London:Routledge,2002)(tourists);IsraelidelegationtotheIsrael-Jordancease-firecommittee,summary report on the special committee, 30 Nov. 1965, and LieutenantColonelY.Bieverman, 30Nov. 1965,with the kind permission ofMeronBenvenisti.
63.ZipporaGilad,ed.,CompletePalestine:GoodbyetoaDream?(inHebrew)(KibbutzBeitHashita,1999),p.25;LeahR.(7thgradeA):“IfOnlyISawtheOldCity,”Misholim,thestudentnewspaperofBeitHinuchnamedafterArlozorov,Jerusalem,Chanukah1954,p.28,JMA,Container3127;YisraelSegal,OneofUsTwo(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,1995),p.45.
64. Mordechai Gilat,Mount Scopus (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Masada, 1969);CarmitGuy,Bar-Lev(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,1998),p.137;OddBull,War and Peace in theMiddle East (London: Leo Cooper, 1973), p.59ff.;Gvatidiary,11June1967,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02;BalltoBunche,August22–23,1966,UNA,SE,S-0512–0113SG.CodeCables—Jerusalem, Unnumbered, 1966; UNA DAG-1/5.2.2.0:2; Office of theSecretary-GeneralS-0512–0113.
65. Special UNGA, June 1967, USNA, Box 18, vol. Ill, Folder 1; BernardWasserstein,Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for theHolyCity (London:ProfileBooks,2001),pp.203,195ff.(internationalstatus);ISA,HZ-19/4032(reporters);SapirintheKnesset,15June1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.46(inHebrew), p. 1773; Kollek to Eban, 3 Feb. 1967; 1 March 1967, JMA,Container 1346; Sapir toDirector of thePrimeMinister’sOffice, 20Dec.1966;YaffetoBaram,26Dec.1966;ShapiratoEshkol,18Jan.1967,ISA,C-1/6303; see also: ibid., proposed legislation for Jerusalem; ForeignMinistryresponse,ISA,HZ-14/4033;Uzaitocabinet,27Nov.1966,ISA,C-1/6303(displays);Maariv(“DaysandNights”supplement),19May1967,p.3(capitalforthreedays);KollektoEshkol,5Dec.1966,ISA,C-l/6303.
66. The author served as Kollek’s office manager between 1977 and 1979;TeddyKollek,OneJerusalem(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Maariv,1979),p.200
(Dietrich);YediotAharonot,21Oct.1966,p.10;Ha’aretz,14Oct.1966,p.9; 16Oct. 1966, p. 8; 17Oct. 1966, p. 8 (Benziman);LaMerhav, 19 Jan.1967, p. 4; 5 May 1967, p. 5;HaTzofeh, 18 May 1966; Ben-Yaakov toKollek,13Sept.1966,ISA,HZ-14/4032(shtetl);Maariv,27June1966,p.2;BatKol,20Dec.1966,p.2;Jerusalem:ScenesfromtheEternalCity(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Universitas,1958),pp.7,14(Agron);Davar,14April1967,p.2(memorial).
67.Allon toBen-Gurion, 24March, 1949,BGA;AnitaShapira,Yigal Allon:The Springtime of His Universe (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutzHaMeuchad, 2004), p. 426; Allon in an interview with Reudor Manor,Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, ISA, A-19/5001,meeting2,p.11;seealso:MordechaiGazit,“Ben-Gurion’s1949ProposaltoIncorporate the Gaza Strip with Israel,” Studies in Zionism, vol. 8, no. 2(1987), p. 223ff.; Ezer Weizman, For You the Sky, for You the Land (inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1975),p.285.
68.ReudorManor,“ImagesandDecision-MakingontheSubjectofBordersinIsraeliForeignPolicy,1948–1973” (inHebrew) (diss.,HebrewUniversity,1980);Bar-On,“StatusQuoBeforeorAfter?”p.65ff.
69.AnalysisofpossibledevelopmentsintheJordaniansituation,9May1963,ISA, HZ-10/4094; Shlomo Gazit, The Carrot and the Stick: IsraeliGovernance in Judah and Samaria (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan,1985),p.23;Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.258;(“grabs”),3June1967,and Operation “Mozart, 5 June 1967, IDFA, 1176/192/74; Uzi Narkis,summary report on the Six-DayWar, IDFA, 1/901/67, p. 75 (“sentimentalvalue”); Avraham Tamir, Peace-Loving Soldier (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem:Idanim,1967),p.317;Ha’aretz,6Nov.1998,p.6(“BneiOr”).
70.LieutenantColonelBieverman,30Nov.1965,withthekindpermissionofMeron Benvenisti (Latrun); Haber, Today War Will Break Out, p. 118(Eshkol);UziNarkis,summaryreportontheSix-DayWar,IDFA,1/901/67,p.75;seealso:Tamir,Peace-LovingSoldier,p.317;Ha’aretz,6Nov.1998,p.6(target);Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.50ff.;GovernmentMinutes,9 July 1957, ISA (Litani);EshkolwithGoldaMeir, 9 June1963, ISA,A-1/7921(“Switzerland”).
71.MeronBenvenisti,TheSlingshotandtheStick:Territories,Jews,andArabs(inHebrew) (Jerusalem:Keter, 1988), pp. 58ff.; see also: YoramBar-Gil,HomelandandGeography inOneHundredYearsofZionistEducation (inHebrew) (Tel Aviv: AmOved, 1993); Zippora Gilad, ed.,Greater Israel:Separation fromaDream? (inHebrew) (KibbutzBeitHashita, 1999), pp.
13, 17, 29, 37;AriehNaor,Greater Israel: Faith andPolicy (inHebrew)(Haifa:HaifaUniversity,2001),p.104ff.(Tabenkin).
72.Ha’aretz,15July1966,p.11(Thirty-five);seealso:19Sept.1966,p.10;14 May 1967, p. 2 (race); Nathan Shacham and Shmuel Katz, JourneyThroughEretzYisrael(inHebrew)(TelAviv:LevinEpstein,1966);YehiamNewsletter, 317/9, 17 March 1967, p. 6; Amos Oz, Resting Place (inHebrew) (Jerusalem: Keter, undated), p. 155; Yediot Aharonot, 24 April1966, p. 10 (Mei Ami); Shimon Rimon, I Am “Kushi” (in Hebrew)(Jerusalem: Idanim, 1978), p. 35; Unto Rock: Five Who Were Lost (inHebrew) (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutz HaMeuchad, 1966); see also: governmentmeeting,7April1957,ISA.
73.Maariv, 16 Aug. 1963, p. 6; Bar-Gil,Homeland andGeography in OneHundredYearsofZionistEducation,p.133ff.
74. Israel from Dan to Eilat (Head Education Officer, 1958–1959); Israel:Talking Maps, prepared and printed by the Measurements Department,MinistryofLabor,illustratedbyFriedlStern(TelAviv:LeonPrinting,1958)(nopagenumbers);Segal,OneoftheTwoofUs,p.22(RadioRamallah).
75.Naor,GreaterIsrael,pp.116ff.,77;Ha’aretz,25May2004,p.h/1(poets).76.Naor,GreaterIsrael,pp.80ff.,116ff.,98ff.;BeginintheKnesset,15Jan.
1957,KnessetMinutes, vol. 21, p. 750; 13March 1957,KnessetMinutes,vol.22,p.1346;YediotAharonot,14Feb.1967,p.19(Ben-Gurion);MabatChadash,19April1967,p.9.
77.Ha’aretz,25March1966,p.2;seealso:24June1966,p.3;Beginin theKnesset,16March1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.45,p.1010;Maariv,26Sept.1966, p. 14;Ha’aretz, 30March 1966, p. 2; 31March 1966, p. 2; Naor,GreaterIsrael,p.100(Kook).
78.YediotAharonot,11Nov.1966,p.6ff.;seealso:YediotAharonot,16March1962,p.1;Ben-GuriontoDavidShnir,15May1967,BGA;Maariv,14May1967,p.9ff.;Ha’aretz,17May1967,p.4(Yadin);AviShlaim,“InterviewwithYitzhakRabin”inStudies in theEstablishmentof Israel (inHebrew),vol.8,1998,p.683;Ha’aretz, 14May1967,p.9;19May1967,p.2;22May1967,p.2.
79.YediotAharonot,25Nov.1966,p.2;Ha’aretz,19Dec.1966,p.1;Maariv,23Dec.1966;29Dec.1966,p.9(Allon);22Dec.1966,p.3(Dayan);23Dec.1966,p.1(Eshkol);seealso:Maariv,13Jan.1966,p.16.
80. Sasson review, 13 Dec. 1966, ISA,A-7/7935; Yediot Aharonot, 25 Nov.1966,p.2;Maariv,12Jan.1967,p.6.
81.Ben-Guriondiary,3May1963,BGA.82.DiscussioninthePrimeMinister’soffice,28Dec.1966,ISA,A-7/7935.83.PlatformforpolicytowardJordan,23Dec.1966,ISA,HZ-9/4094.84.Discussionsummary,22Dec.1966,ISA,HZ-9/4094.85.GazitattheNationalDefenseCollege,13Oct.1966,ISA,HZ-10/4094.86.Ibid.,PeledtotheChiefofStaff,12Dec.1966,withthekindpermissionof
EladPeled.87.GazittoEban,4Jan.1967andappendices,ISA,HZ-13/4092.88.Rosenthaletal.,eds.,LeviEshkol,p.522;Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!
p.165ff.89. Meir Amit, Head to Head: A Personal Look at Great Events andMysteriousAffairs(inHebrew)(TelAviv:HedArzi,1999),p.204ff.
90. Discussion summaries, ISA, HZ-19/4091; Egypt-Israel, discussionplatform, 31 June 1966, and summary of the Egypt question, 31 March1966,withthekindpermissionofEladPeled.
91.MeetingatMeirAmit’shome,27Nov.1966, ISA,HZ-19/4091;Ha’aretz(supplement),18March1966,p.13;seealso:Maariv,25Oct.1967,p.1.
CHAPTER4:THESYRIANSYNDROME
1.Maariv,1April1966,p.5;Ha’aretz,19July1966,p.2;14Oct.1966.2.Ha’aretz, 19 July 1966, p. 2; 19Aug. 1966, p. 2;MosheShemesh, “TheArab Fight Against Israel over Water, 1959–1967,” Studies in theEstablishment of Israel (in Hebrew), vol. 7, 1997, p. 103ff.; Eitan Haber,TodayWarWill BreakOut (inHebrew) (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1987), p. 99;Maariv, 4Oct. 1967, p. 9; see also:YemimaRosenthal, Arnon Lemfrum,andHagaiTzoref,eds.,LeviEshkol:TheThirdPrimeMinister(inHebrew)(Jerusalem: IsraelStateArchive, 2002), p. 475;AmiGluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder! (inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,2004),p.110;AviShlaim, “Interview with Yitzhak Rabin, Studies in the Establishment ofIsrael (in Hebrew), vol. 8, 1998, p. 680; Ha’aretz, 19 Aug. 1966, p. 2(legumes).
3. Eyal Zisser, “Between Israel and Syria: The Six-Day War and After,”Studies in theEstablishmentof Israel (inHebrew),vol.8,1998,p.219ff.;Yediot Aharonot (holiday supplement), 27 April 1997, p. 2ff.; see also:Ha’aretz,18May1997,p.2;BulltoBunche,12Aug.1966,UNA,S-312,Box29,File6;Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.178ff.
4.Herzogdiary,11Aug.1966,ISA,A-16/4510;IntelligenceBranchforIDFattachés,24July1966,ISA,HZ-11/4069;M.MichaelitoIsraelEmbassies,18 Dec. 1966, ISA, A-5/7936; see also: discussion at Prime Minister’soffice,28Dec.1966,ISA,A-7/7935.
5.Maariv, 19Oct. 1966, p. 8 (Agnon); see also: 5Dec. 1966, p. 1; 6Dec.1966,p.1;Ha’aretz,18Oct.1966,p.2.
6.Herzogdiary,15Aug.1966,ISA,A-16/4510;Maariv,16Aug.1966,p.3;Eitan Haber, TodayWarWill Break Out (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Idanim,1987),p.11Off.;Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.148ff.;OddBull,WarandPeaceintheMiddleEast:TheExperiencesandViewsofaUNObserver(London:LeoCooper,1973),p.96ff.
7.Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,pp.96,139.8.Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.115ff.9.Ha’aretz,16Aug.1966,p.2;Maariv,16Aug.1966,p.8;Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.147.
10.Bamahane, 18Sept. 1966, p. 8;Ha’aretz, 12 and19Sept. 1966;Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.158;Herzogdiary,14,17,18,and30Sept.and2Oct.1966,ISA,A-16/4510;Maariv,11Sept.1966,p.1;19Sept.1966,p.28;Sept.1966,pp.2–3;Ha’aretz,25Sept.1966,p.2;YoramPeri,BetweenBattlesandBallots(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1983),p.160.
11.EshkolintheKnesset,17Oct.1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.47,p.4;17Jan.1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.47,p.916;Ha’aretz,8Feb.1967,p.1;seealso:Maariv, 11Oct. 1966, p. 2; 9 Jan. 1967, p. 2;Maariv, 15 Jan. 1966, p. 8(otherchoice).
12.Eshkolat theForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,17Jan.1967,ISA,C-15/6301;Ha’aretz,15Jan.1967,pp.2,1;seealso:Maariv,15Jan.1967,p.2;YediotAharonot,15Jan.1967,p.3.
13.Yediot Aharonot, 20 Jan. 1967, p. 7; 15 Jan. 1967, p. 3 (“take control”);Ha’aretz, 15 Jan. 1967, pp. 2, 1 (response); Carmon at General Staffmeeting,30Jan.1967,IDFA,205/117/70.
14.Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.107.15.Ibid.,p.175ff.16.GeneralStaffmeeting,16Jan.1967,IDFA,205/117/70.17.WalidKhalidi, ed.,All ThatRemains: ThePalestinianVillagesOccupiedandDepopulatedbyIsraelin1948(Washington,D.C.:InstituteforPalestineStudies,1992),p.445ff.
18.RabinatGeneralStaffmeeting,16Jan.1967,IDFA,205/117/70.19.TheDepartmentofStatetotheEmbassyinIsrael,17Jan.1967,FRUS,vol.
XVIII,DocumentNo.382.20.HarmantoEban,8Oct.1966,ISA,HZ-23987;RussiannoticetoIsrael,9Nov.1966,ISA,C-26382;seealso:ISA,HZ-27/4048;Maariv,3June1966,p.27(Chuvakhin);AvramovwithSneh,8July1966,ISA,C-4/6399;memo,12Oct.1966,ISA,A-7/7228;Maariv,13Oct.1966,p.10;seealso:RussiannoticetoIsrael,9Nov.1966,ISA,C-2/6382.
21.EshkolattheKnesset,17May1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.45,p.1441;seealso: 17Oct. 1966,KnessetMinutes, vol. 47, p. 5; 17 Jan. 1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.47,p.916;ShlomoArgovtoForeignMinistry,26Dec.1966,ISA,HZ-20/3977;Warnings:Maariv,11Oct.1966,p.2;9Jan.1967,p.2;Ha’aretz,12Jan.1967,p.1;16Jan.1967,p.1;17Jan.1967,p.1(Eban);RostowtoPresident,16Jan.1967,FRUS,vol.XVIII,Doc.No.380;YarivindiscussionwithEshkol,28Dec.1966,ISA,A-7/7935.
22.GeneralStaffmeeting,23Jan.1967,IDFA,205/117/1970.23.Ha’aretz,11Nov.1966,p.3;10March1967,p.9.24.RabinatGeneralStaffmeeting,8Feb.1967,IDFA,205/117/1970.25. Matityahu Mayzel, The Battle over the Golan: June 1967 (in Hebrew)
(Ma’arachot,2001),p.93ff.26.Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.186.27. Fatah Incidents Summaries, Feb. 1965-May 1967,UNA, S-312, Box 26,
File5;seealso:IsraelAnnualReviewfor1967,PRO,FCO17/468,104038;Tel Katzir and HaOn members to Eshkol, 14 Feb. 1967, YEA, copy inpossessionof author;Chief ofStaffmeetingwithMinister ofDefense, 31March 1967, IDFA, 118/117/70; Eban to Eshkol, 4 April 1967, ISA,6301/15-C;Ha’aretz, 4April 1967, p. 2; Shofman in theKnesset, 5April1967, Knesset Minutes, vol. 48, p. 2039; Maariv, 9 April 1967, p. 3(Spector);Ha’aretz, 9 April 1967, p. 1; 12 April 1967, p. 12 (Keshet);Maariv, Yediot Aharonot, 9 April 1967, p. Iff.; see also:Maariv, 16 Aug.1966, p. 8;Maariv (“Days andNights” supplement), 14 April 1967, p. 4(Gadot);YediotAharonot,10May1967,p.5(ledger);Maariv,9April1967,p.Iff.;YediotAharonot,9April1967,p.Iff.;seealso:Maariv,16Aug.1966,p.8;Ha’aretz,14April1967,p.3(Schiff);Maariv,19April1967,p.3;30April1967,p.3 (Eshkol);Gluska,Eshkol,Give theOrder! p.192;Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut, p. 141ff.;EzerWeizman,ForYou the Sky, forYoutheLand(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Sifriyat-Maariv,1975),p.254.
28.Ha’aretz,24March1967,p.10;31March1967,p.10.29.GilantoSartre,30March1967;Eshkol in thegovernment,12Feb.1967,
ISA,6339/52-C;Kol in thegovernment,19March1967, ISA,6381/C-15;Barbour to Department of State, 7 April 1967, USNA, Box 2228, File1/1/67.
30.Ha’aretz,30March1967,pp.1–2.31.Maariv,22May1967,p.15.32.PhilatelicService,19th IndependenceDayStamps (copy inpossessionof
theauthor);GovernmentDecisions,23Jan.1967,ISA,10136/C-2.33.YediotAharonot, 2May 1967, p. 1;YossiGoldstein,Eshkol (inHebrew)
(Jerusalem:Keter,2003),p.537.34.Ha’aretz,10May1967,p.1;14May1967,p.1;Davar,31May1967,p.1;
see also: ForeignMinistry toPrimeMinister’sOffice, 22Feb. 1967, ISA,7935/8-A.
35.Maariv,14May1967,p.12;LaMerhav,14May1967,p.1;Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.213;Ha’aretz,10May1967,p.1.
36.YediotAharonot(Shabbatsupplement),12May1967,p.1;YediotAharonot,14May1967,p.2;Maariv,12May1967,p.1.
37. Director General of theMinistry of Foreign Affairs with Chuvakhin, 13May1967,ISA,4048/27-HZ.
38. Rostow to Johnson, 15 May 1967, FRUS, vol. XIX, p. 4f; Saunders toRostow,16May1967,LBJL,NationalSecurityFile,Box7.
39. Yediot Aharonot, 14 May 1967, pp. 1–3; Ha’aretz, 14 May 1967, p. 1(Eshkol);EshkolintheKnesset,17Oct.1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.47,p.3;Ha’aretz,23Dec.1966,p.1.
40.AbbaEban,LifeEpisodes (inHebrew) (TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv, 1978),vol.II,p.314.
41. Rostow to Johnston, 29 April 1967, FRUS, vol. XVIII, Doc. No. 413;HaOlamHaZeh, no. 1549, p. 9; Ben-Gurion diary, 19 April 1966, BGA;EshkolandothersintheKnesset,16Feb.1966,KnessetMinutes,vol.44,p.645ff.;Ha’aretz,21April1966,p.l.
42.Ha’aretz,22April1966,p.2;1March1966,p.9 (Ben-Gurion);MichaelBarZohar,ZaphenathPaneah:TheLife andTimes of a JewishPrince (inHebrew) (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2003), p. 234 (Hussein); Levavi toEshkol,25Sept.1966,ISA,7935/7-A;seealso:Maariv,12May1967,p.3;Haber,TodayWarWill Break Out, p. 188;Ha’aretz, 21 April 1967, p. 8
(Rabin).43. Government Minutes, 11 Dec. 1966, with the kind permission of Yossi
Goldstein;HaOlamHaZeh,no.1549,p.9;YediotAharonot,28April1967,p. 2;Eshkol toRosenblum,30April 1967, ISA,6339/9-C;Ben-Gurion toYehudaIlan,28March1967,BGA.
44.Memorandum of Conversation, 26 Jan. 1967; Barbour to Rusk, 13May1967; Memo, 26 April 1967, Saunders to Rostow, 6 May 1967, LBJL;Smythe to Davies, 25 March 1967, USNA, Box 2228, File 1/1/67; NSFCentral File Israel, vol. VI, Memos [l.f2], Doc. 93; Rusk to Embassy inIsrael,22Aug.1967,FRUS,vol.XVIII,Doc.No.317.
45.Ha’aretz,24April1967,p.1;seealso:Maariv,28April1967,p.1.46.RostowtoJohnson,29April1967,FRUS,vol.XVIII,Doc.No.413.47.Maariv,14May1967,p.2(settlements);YediotAharonot,16May1967,p.
5(Malagasy);Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.145;Ha’aretz,18May1967,p.7;Maariv,19May1967,p.12(Alterman);BulltoBunche,17May1967; UNA, UNSTO-Israel, Oct. ’63-’67, Series 312, Box 29, File 5,ACC.79/58;UThant,ViewfromtheUN (NewYork:Doubleday,1978),p.218;YediotAharonot,16May1967,p.5(“Parade”);Ben-Guriondiary,15May1967,BGA.
48.Meir Ezri, IndependenceDay and Its Development in Israel (Council ofProgressiveRabbisinIsrael,1994);seealso:Ha’aretz,26April1966,p.2;Maariv,18May1967,p.15 (flag);16May1967,p.6 (quiz);Ben-Guriondiary,15May1967,BGA;Eban,LifeEpisodes,vol.II,p.311.
49.Maariv,12May1967,p.6;MabatChadash,19April1967,p.9;seealso:Ben-Gurion to Ben Erev, 4 May 1967, BGA; Ben-Gurion to ShmuelGoldnick,14May1967,BGA.
50.Ha’aretz, 15May 1967, p. 4; YonahHadari,Messiah Riding a Tank (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:HartmanInstitute,2002),p.47;seealso:DanMiron,IfThere Will Be No Jerusalem: Hebrew Literature in a Cultural-PoliticalContext(inHebrew)(TelAviv:HaKibbutzHaMeuchad,1987),p.175ff.
PARTIII:THEFORTYDAYSOFPRIVATEYEHOSHUABAR-DAYANCHAPTER5:THREEWEEKSTOWAR:WHATDOESNASSERWANT?
1.Bar-Dayandiary,21May1967,withhiskindpermission.2.EshkolatMapaisecretariat,1June1967,LPA2246790;YeshayahuGavish,interview,50YearsWar,Israel,Disk1,MECA.
3.Governmentmeeting, 16May1967,YaacovHerzog estate,with the kindpermissionofhisdaughter;Herzogdiary,16–17May1967,ISA,A-3/4513;Gvati, 16 and 17 May 1967, YTA, Unit 15, Container 12, File 02; AmiGluska, Eshkol, Give the Order! (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ministry ofDefense,2004),p.222;EitanHaber,TodayWarWillBreakOut(inHebrew)(TelAviv:YediotAharonot,1987),p.148;YitzhakRabin,ServiceBook(inHebrew) (TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1979),vol.1,p.134;UriBar Joseph,“The Forgotten Crisis on the Road to the 1967 War,” Journal ofContemporaryHistory,vol.30,no.3(July1996),p.547ff.;YediotAharonot,16May1967,p.1;Maariv,16May1967,p.8;Ha’aretz,17May1967,p.1.
4.UThant,View from theUN (NewYork:Doubleday, 1978), p. 197ff.; seealso: uneditedversionsof thebookTheWithdrawalof theUnitedNationsEmergencyForce(UNEF),UNA,SG,S-0512–0417,NewYork,UNOfficeofPublicInformation,1967;MemorandumfortheSecretary,29May1967,USNA,Box1792,File5–1-69;seealso:ISA,HZ-2/4085.
5. Reudor Manor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, HebrewUniversity, the Institute for International Relations, meeting 8, 14 April1975,p.6ff.,quotedwiththekindpermissionofDavidHarman;governmentmeeting,21May1967,YaacovHerzogestate,with thekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
6. Secretary-General with Ambassador Rafael, 18 May 1967, UNA, Series370,Box 43, File 5;RostowwithHarman, 20May 1967,USNA,Box 7,Daily Chron., May 3–10; government meeting, 21 May 1967, YaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
7.Ha’aretz,22May1967,p.2;ShoshanaOfrechttoBen-Gurion,2June1967,BGA;Avnery in theKnesset, 22May 1967,KnessetMinutes, vol. 49, p.2243.
8.RabinwithEshkol,15May1967;RabinattheKnessetForeignAffairsandDefense Committee, 17 May 1967, discussion brief in possession of theauthor;seealso:Rabin,ServiceBook, vol. I,p.135ff.;Yariv indiscussiongroup,29May1967,IDFA,1176/192/74;Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.155.
9.DayanandothersatForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,17May1967,discussion brief in possession of the author;MosheDayan,Milestones (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1982),vol.1,p.356;Rabin,ServiceBook,vol.I,p.137;Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.227;seealso:Maariv,11Nov.1966, p. 5; 28 Nov. 1966, p. 7; Yediot Aharonot, 12 Dec. 1966, p. 1;
Ha’aretz,24June1966,p.2.10.Governmentmeetings,17and21May1967,YaacovHerzogestate,withthe
kindpermissionofhisdaughter;Politico-MilitaryContingencyPlanningforthe Arab-Israeli Dispute, May 1966, USNA, Box 19, Memos to thePresident,Folder1of2;seealso:Yarivindiscussiongroups,29May1967,IDFA,1176/192/74;Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!pp.220ff.
11. Moshe Zak, Hussein Makes Peace (in Hebrew) (Ramat-Gan: Bar-IlanUniversity, 1994), p. 104; Sasson in security cabinet, 21 May 1967,discussionbrief inpossessionof theauthor;seealso:Rabin,ServiceBook,vol. I, p. 136;Rusk toEmbassies, 20May 1967;Burns toDepartment ofState,21May1967,USNA,Box1788,File5/20/67;Herzogdiary,15May1967,Eban atGovernmentmeeting, 21May 1967,YaacovHerzog estate,withkindpermissionofhisdaughter;ISA,A-3/4512.
12. Richard B. Parker, The Six-Day War: A Retrospective (Gainesville:University Press of Florida, 1996), p. 50ff.; see also: Avraham Ben-Zur,SovietFactorsandtheSix-DayWar(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatPoalim,1975);YosefGovrin,Israel-USSRRelationsSinceTheirRenewalin1953toTheirDiscontinuation in 1967 (inHebrew) (Jerusalem:Magnes, 1990), p.235ff.;YediotAharonot (IndependenceDaysupplement),30April1968,p.3.
13. Brezhnev at the Central Board, 20 June 1967, Bundesarchiv, DY/3537;Isabella Ginor, “The Cold War’s Cover-Up: How and Why the USSRInstigatedthe1967War,”MiddleEastReviewofInternationalAffairs,vol.7, no. 3, September 2003; government meeting, 21 May 1967, YaacovHerzog estate, with the kind permission of his daughter; Barbour toDepartment of State, 22 May 1967, USNA, Box 2226, POL. 15–1;MemorandumofConversation,23May1967,USNA,Box1788,File5–23-67; Yediot Aharonot, 17 May 1967, p. 2; Maariv, 25 May 1967, p. 8;Ha’aretz,26May1967,p.1.
14.EshkolandothersintheForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,17May1967,discussionbriefinpossessionoftheauthor;Galiliinthegovernment,21 May 1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kind permission of hisdaughter;BarbourtoDepartmentofState,21May1967,USNA,Box2226,POL15–1.
15.Ha’aretz,17May1967,p.4;18May1967,p.6(Yadin);YediotAharonot,19May1967,p.2(Ben-Gurion);Maariv,17May1967,p.3(Malhi);YediotAharonot(“7Days”supplement),19May1967,p.10(Gashash);Ha’aretz,
18May1967,p.11(autopsies);17May1967,p.5(Leinsdorf).16. Ha’aretz, 19 May 1967, p. 2 (eruption); Maariv, 19 May 1967, p. 1
(nerves);Yediot Aharonot, 19 May 1967, p. 1; 16 May 1967, p. 6 (war;Sinai).
17.Ben-Guriondiary,17and23May1967,BGA.18.Discussionbriefsinpossessionoftheauthor;seealso:Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!pp.221,226,228,253.
19. Bar-Dayan diary, 19 May 1967, with his kind permission; Dayan,Milestones,vol.1,p.191;Bar-Dayaninresponsetotheauthor’squestions.
20. Yariv at the General Staff, 28 May 1967, IDFA, 1176/192/74; see also:Aharon Yariv, Cautious Estimation (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ministry ofDefense,1998),p.157ff.;Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.252ff.;Eshkolwith Rabin, 20 May 1967, discussion brief in possession of the author;Rabin,ServiceBook,vol.I,p.138ff.
21. Bar-Dayan diary, 21May 1967; Bar-Dayan to his wife, 21 and 22May1967,withhiskindpermission.
22.Ha’aretz,21May1967,p.2;SecurityCabinetandGovernmentmeeting,21May1967,YaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter;Rusk to U.S. Embassies, 18May 1967, FRUS, vol. XIX, Doc. 15; Gvatidiary,21May1967,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02.
23.Ha’aretz, 14May 1967, p. 10;Maariv, 22May 1967, p. 3; Ben-Guriondiary,21May1967,BGA.
24.Rabin,ServiceBook, vol. I, p. 148ff.; Dayan,Milestones, vol. 2, p. 399;Abba Eban,Life Episodes (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: SifriyatMaariv, 1979),vol. 2, p. 329; Haber, Today War Will Break Out, p. 173ff.; Ben-Guriondiary, 21 and22May1967,BGA; see also:H. toBen-Gurion, 21 and22May 1967,BGA;MichaelBar-Zohar,Ben-Gurion (inHebrew) (TelAviv:AmOved,1977),vol.3,p.1588.
25.Bar-Dayandiary,22May1967,withhiskindpermission.26.Bar-Dayantohiswife,23May1967,withhiskindpermission.27. Consultation at Northern Command Post, 23May 1967, Yaacov Herzog
estate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter;Rabin,ServiceBook,vol.I,p.150;EshkolattheForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,22May1967,discussionbriefinpossessionoftheauthor;seealso:Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.164ff.
28. Security cabinet, 23 May 1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kind
permissionofhisdaughter.29.Rabin,ServiceBook,vol.I,p.157.30.Ha’aretz,24May1967,p.1;EshkolandotherswithBeginandothers,23
May 1967, discussion brief in possession of the author; see also: Dayan,Milestones,vol.2,p.400.
31.Rabin,ServiceBook,vol.I,p.158;EzerWeizman,ForYoutheSky,forYouthe Land (inHebrew) (TelAviv: SifriyatMaariv, 1975), p. 259; see also:Ha’aretz,22April1974,p.1.
32.GeneralStaffdiscussiongroup,Operations241030,24May1967, IDFA,1176/192/74;WeizmanwithEshkol,24May1967,discussionbrief,copyinpossession of the author; Eshkol with IDF generals, 24 May 1967,discussion brief in possession of the author;Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.176.
33. History Department, the alertness period, 24 May 1967, IDFA,1176/192/74;Weizman,For You the Sky, for You the Land, p. 259; Bar-Dayandiary,24May1967,withhiskindpermission;Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.281.
34.Bar-Dayantohiswife,24May1967,withhiskindpermission;Maariv,23May1967,pp.1,9;Ha’aretz,24May1967,p.2;26May1967,pp.3,7.
35. History Department, the alertness period, 24 May 1967, IDFA,1176/192/74.
36.MosheAdmonandYehoshuaBar-Dayan,DiaryofaSoldier (inHebrew)(TelAviv:Othpaz,1968),p.15.
CHAPTER6:ELEVENDAYSTOWAR:NOA’SFATHERIsWAITING
1.Bar-Dayantohiswife,25May1967;Bar-Dayandiary,25May1967,withhiskindpermission.
2.YediotAharonot, 23May1967,pp. 1, 8;Maariv, 28April 1967, p. 4; 29May1967, p. 3;Ha’aretz, 29May1967, p. 6;YosefWeitz,MyDiary (inHebrew)(TelAviv:Masada,1973),vol.6,p.245.
3.HalevitoBen-Gurion,18May1967;BermestoBen-Gurion,31May1967;“Anonymoussoldiers”toBen-Gurion,31May1967;Ben-AshertoEshkol,23May 1967; Sedewitz to Shazar and to Eshkol, 30May 1967;Aloni toDayan,31May1967;GotleibtoBen-Gurion,28May1967;OkontoBen-Gurion, 30May 1967, BGA; citizen toKnesset Chairman, 26May 1967,ISA,C-5/594.
4.Ben-Guriondiary,26May1967,BGA.5.YitzhakRabin,ServiceBook(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1979),vol.I,p.150;Ben-Guriondiary,21and26May1967,BGA;AmiGluska,TheConflictBetweentheGeneralStaffandtheEshkolGovernmentin“TheWaiting Period,” May-June 1967 (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: The DavisInstituteforInternationalRelations,2001),p.6.
6.Ben-Guriondiary,21and25May1967,BGA;PeresatRafisecretariat,25May1967,LPA,24–1967-3–5;Beginat“Herut”party,30May1967,JIA,2/2/10/2;BeginwithEshkol,24May1967,discussionbriefinpossessionoftheauthor;YossiGoldstein,Eshkol(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,2003),p.551.
7.HazantoYaari,26Feb.1982,YEA(7)95–23.7;Ben-Guriondiary,24and25May1967,BGA;Ben-GuriontoAvigur,25May1967,BGA;AvigurandMeirattheMa’arachpoliticalcommittee,25May1967,discussionbriefsinpossessionoftheauthor.
8.Bar-Dayantohiswife,26May1967,withhiskindpermission.9.Maariv,24and26May1967,p.1;Dayan,Milestones,vol.2,p.414;AriehDissentchik,Tchik(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,undated),p.157;seealso:Maariv,31May1967,p.8;YediotAharonot,23May1967,p.2;Ha’aretz,25May1967,p.2.
10.MordechaiGur,TheTempleMountIsOurs(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,1984),p.35.
11.Haddeninresponsetotheauthor’squestions;MeirAmit,HeadtoHead:APersonal Look atGreat Events and Secret Affairs (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Hed-Arzi,1999),p.235.
12.KatzenbachtoJohnson,1May1967,LBJL,NSF,CountryFile,Israel,Box145,IsraeliAid,5/67.
13.Politico-MilitaryContingencyPlanning for theArab-IsraeliDispute,May1966,USNA,Box19,MemostothePresident,Folder1of2.
14.RostowtoJohnson,15May1967,FRUS,vol.XIX,p.4f.15. Rostow to President, 23May 1967, LBJL, NSF, Box 145, Country File
Israel,IsraeliAid,5/67.16.HarmantoEban,22May1967,ISA,A-2/7919.17.EvrontoBitan,22May1967,ISA,A-2/7919.18.BitantoIsraeliEmbassyinWashington,21May1967,ISA,A-3/7920.19. Reudor Manor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, Hebrew
University,InstituteforInternationalRelations,meeting9,10July1975,p.7ff., with the kind permission of David Harman; Abba Eban, PersonalWitness:IsraelThroughMyEyes(NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sSons,1992),p.382ff.
20.Evron toBitan, 22May1967;Bitan toHarman,23May1967;Argov toIsraeliEmbassyinWashington,24May1967,ISA,A-2/7919;RusktoU.S.EmbassyinTelAviv,26May1967,USNA,Box1789,File5/27/67.
21.EvrontoBitan,20May1967,ISA,A-3/7920.22.EbantoHarman,20May1967,ISA,A-3/7920.23.MemorandumforthePresident,21May1967,USNA,Box15.24. Reudor Manor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, Hebrew
University,InstituteforInternationalRelations,meeting9,10July1975,p.17,with thekindpermissionofDavidHarman; see also:AbbaEban,LifeEpisodes(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1979),vol.2,p.349.
25. Rusk to President, 26May 1967, LBJL,NSF-NSCHistory,Middle EastCrisis1967,Box17,Doc.219.
26.EshkolwithRabinandothers,25May1967,discussionbriefinpossessionof the author; Eshkol andAvigur at theMa’arach political committee, 25May1967,discussionbriefinpossessionoftheauthor;Rabin,ServiceBook,vol.I,p.161.
27.Eshkolat theSouthernCommand;EshkolwithRabinandothers,25May1967,discussionbriefsinpossessionoftheauthor.
28.Eban,PersonalWitness,p.382ff.29.Consultation,25May1967,ISA,A-3/4512.30.YemimaRosenthal,ArnonLemfrum,andHagaiTzoref,eds.,LeviEshkol:The Third Prime Minister (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Israel State Archive,2002),p.538.
31.EbantoEshkol,undated, ISA,HZ-30/5979;Rusk toU.S.Embassy inTelAviv,26May1967,USNA,Box1789,File5/27/67;RusktoPresident,26May1967,USNA,CentralFiles,Box15,MemostothePresident;RusktoU.S.EmbassyinCairo,26May1967,USNA,CentralFiles,POLISR,Box1788,File26/5/67.
32.RostowtoJohnson,25May1967,LBJL,Box17,MiddleEastCrisis,vol.II,tab31–42,memono.6.
33.Eban,LifeEpisodes,vol.2,p.345;Eban,PersonalWitness,p.382ff.34. Reudor Manor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, Hebrew
University,InstituteforInternationalRelations,meeting9,10July1975,p.4ff.,withthekindpermissionofDavidHarman.
35.Ibid.,meeting10,22July1975,p.3ff.,withthekindpermissionofDavidHarman.
36.Rosenthaletal.,eds.,LeviEshkol,p.538;Intelligenceassessments,25May1967,8:00P.M.,IDFA,1176/192/74.
37.Maariv,4Oct.1967,p.10.38.Governmentmeeting,26May1967,ISA,A-3/4513.39.Herzogdiary,30May1967,ISA,A-3/4513.40.MosheShemesh,FromtheNaqbatotheNaqsa:TheArab-IsraeliConflictandthePalestinianNationalProblem,1957–1967:Nasser’sPathtotheSix-DayWar (inHebrew) (Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion Institute, 2004), p. 606ff.;AmiGluska,Eshkol,Give theOrder! (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv:Ministry ofDefense,2004),p.283ff.
41.Bar-Dayandiary,25May1967,withhiskindpermission.42.AmitwithHadden,25May1967,minutesprovidedbyMeirAmit,copyin
possessionoftheauthor;seealso:Amit,HeadtoHead,p.235.43.Bar-Dayandiary,26May1967,withhiskindpermission;seealso:Gur,TheTempleMountIsOurs,p.29.
44. History Department, the readiness period, 25 May 1967, IDFA,1176/192/74.
45.Ben-Guriondiary,26May1967,BGA.46.Bar-Dayandiary,26May1967,withhiskindpermission.
CHAPTER7:TENDAYSTOWAR:WHATDOESAMERICAWANT?1. Ami Gluska, The Conflict Between the General Staff and the EshkolGovernmentinthe“WaitingPeriod,”May-June1967(Jerusalem:TheDavisInstituteforInternationalRelations,2001),p.15.
2. Security cabinet, 26 May 1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kindpermissionofhisdaughter;EshkolwithRabinandWeizman,26May1967,discussion brief in possession of the author; EitanHaber,TodayWarWillBreakOut(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1987),p.186
3.HarmantoForeignMinistry,26May1967,ISA,HZ-30/5973.4.EvrontoLevavi,26May1967,ISA,A-3/7919;President’sDailyDiary,26May 1967, LBJL, Box 11;WilliamB. Quandt, “Lyndon Johnson and the
1967War:WhatColorWastheLight?”MiddleEastJournal,Spring1992,vol.46,no.2,p.221.
5.GinsburgtoRostow,RostowtoPresident,26May1967,LBJL,NSFMiddleEastCrisis,May12-June19,1967,Box17.
6.MemorandumofConversation,26May1967,USNA,Box15,Memos tothePresident.
7.GevatoChiefofStaff,26May1967,ISA,A-3/7920;seealso:U.S.ForcesforanArab-IsraeliCrisis,USNA,Box18,vol.I,Folder1of2.
8.AbbaEban,PersonalWitness: IsraelThroughMyEyes (NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sSons,1992),p.394.
9.MemorandumofConversation,26May1967,USNA,Box15,Memos tothe President; Notes of aMeetingwith President Lyndon B. Johnson andForeignMinister Abba Eban at theWhite House, 26May 1967, ISA, A-3/4511; Zachi Shalom, “Foreign Minister Abba Eban’s Meeting withPresident Lyndon Johnson on the Eve of the Six-Day War,” YahadutZemanenu, vols. 11–12, 1989, p. 301ff.; Abba Eban, Life Episodes (inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1979),vol.II,p.347.
10.Eban,LifeEpisodes(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1979),vol.II,p.356;ReudorManor,seriesofinterviewswithAvrahamHarman,HebrewUniversity,InstituteforInternationalRelations,meeting9,10July1975,p.5,withthekindpermissionofDavidHarman.
11.President’sDailyDiary,26May1967,LBJL,Box11.12.LBJL,OH,JohnP.Roche,no.I,p.68.13.EshkolattheMa’arachpoliticalcommittee,27May1967,discussionbrief
inpossessionoftheauthor;Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.191;Eban,LifeEpisodes,vol.II,p.363;MiriamEshkol,Interview,50YearsWar,IsraelDisk1,MECA.
14.Ha’aretz,5June1992,p.B/5;Governmentmeeting,26May1967,YaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter;seealso:Eban,LifeEpisodes,vol.II,p.319ff.
15.MosheDayan,Milestones(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1982),vol.II,p.405; see also:UriMilstein andDovDoron,The ShakedCommandoUnit:Interdiction and Regular Security in IDF History (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv:YediotAharonot,1994).
16.Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.512.17.Eshkoletal.attheMa’arachpoliticalcommittee,27May1967,discussion
briefinpossessionoftheauthor;YitzhakRabin,ServiceBook (inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1979),vol.I,p.168;YossiGoldstein,Eshkol(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,2003),p.555.
18.Ben-Guriondiary,27May1967,BGA.19.Ibid.;Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.413.20.Bar-Dayandiary,27May1967,withhiskindpermission.21.Ben-Gurion diary, 27May 1967,BGA; ShlomoNakdimon,Toward ZeroHour(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Ramdor,1968),p.114.
22.EshkolattheMa’arachpoliticalcommittee,25May1967,discussionbriefinpossessionoftheauthor.
23. Barbour toRusk, 2 June 1967,USNA,Box 2226, POL 15–1;Hadow toMorris,2June1967,PRO,17/465.
24.Herzogdiary,4Sept.1967,YaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionof his daughter; Ami Gluska, Eshkol, Give the Order! (in Hebrew) (TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,2004),p.522.
25. S. Daniel, ed., Minister Shapira (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Yad Shapira,1980),p.252ff.
26.Securitycabinet,27May1967,discussionbriefinpossessionoftheauthor;Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.315ff.
27. Ben-Gurion diary, 27 May 1967, BGA; Ha’aretz, 28 May 1967, p. 2;KoteretRashit,3Oct.1984,p.26ff.
28.Bar-Dayandiary,27May1967,withhiskindpermission.29.ChiefofStaffdiscussiongroup,27May1967,IDFA,1176/192/74.30.Securitycabinet,27May1967,discussionbriefinpossessionoftheauthor;
Gvatidiary,27May1967,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File12.
CHAPTER8:NINEDAYSTOWAR:ATERRIBLESITUATION1.YosefWeitz,MyDiary (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Masada, 1973), vol. 6, p.246.
2.RikiBen-AritoAdirZik,7June1967,withhiskindpermission.3.Ha’aretz,24May1967,p.6;25May1967,p.6(Leinsdorf);ChiefofStaffdiscussiongroup,29May1967,IDFA,1176/192/74(Eilat);DeputyChiefofStaff planning group, 3 June 1967, IDFA, 1176/192/74; Moshe Dayan,Milestones(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1982),vol.2,p.424.
4.YeshurunKeshet,InBesiegedJerusalem:DiariesfromtheHomeFront(in
Hebrew) Jerusalem:ReuvenMass, 1973), p. 203;YediotAharonot, 1 June1967,p.4;seealso:Weitz,MyDiary (TelAviv:Masada,1973),vol.6,p.245; Edith Ezrachi, letters, 26 May, 6 and 8 June 1967, with the kindpermission of her son; see also:Ha’aretz, 24May 1967, p. 6;Maariv, 25May1967, p. 3;YediotAharonot, 1 June 1967, p. 4;Gvati diary, 25May1967,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02.
5. Civil Defense instructions, KYA, Container 29, File 246; see also: AlonGan, ’The Discourse That Died?: ’Discourse Culture’ as an Attempt toDefineaSpecial Identityfor theSecondGenerationon theKibbutzim”(inHebrew)(diss.,TelAvivUniversity,2002),p.66ff.
6. Bar-Dayan diary, 31May 1967; Bar-Dayan to his wife, 29 and 31May1967,with his kind permission;AriehGoldberg toSara’leh, 1 June 1967;YoavHaruvitoChaya’leh,30May1967;ReuvenAvinoam,ed.,ParchmentsofFire(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,1970),pp.302,359;seealsop.323.
7.Maariv, 22May 1967, p. 18 (“secretweapon”); 24May 1967, p. 11; 22May1967,p.7(shoemaker);1June1967,p.7(elderlycouple);Ha’aretz,25May1967,p.6(HelenaRubinstein).
8.Letters toPeninaAxelrod,23 to28May1967,withherkindpermission;Shapira to Bnei Akiva members, 2 June 1967; letter to Adir Zik, 1 June1967; Paschors to their daughter, 24May and 3 June 1967,with the kindpermissionofAdirZik;YediotAharonot(Sabbathsupplement),2June1967,p.4(blooddonations).
9.LetterstoPeninaAxelrod,28and30May1967,withherkindpermission.10.LettersfromRishonLezion,22May-4June1967.11.RikiBen-AritoAdirZik,7June1967,withhiskindpermission;Weitz,MyDiary, vol. 6, p. 245; Keshet, In Besieged Jerusalem, p. 203; see also:Ha’aretz,24May1967,p.6;Maariv,25May1967,p.3;YediotAharonot,1June1967,p.4.
12. Edith Ezrachi, 1 June 1967, with the kind permission of her son;YediotAharonot,5June1967,p.7,ISA,HZ-6/4090;Avner(Walter)Bar-On,TheUntold Stories: The Diary of the Head Censor (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem:Idanim,1981),p.195ff.;Ben-Guriondiary,21May1967,BGA.
13.Ha’aretz, 22May 1967, p. 6 (denial);Keshet, In Besieged Jerusalem, p.200;TekoahtoGussing,27August1967,ConditionsofArabsinIsraelandofJewsinArabStates,UNA,DAG-1/2.3,Box136,File1065(Annex);Seealso:ShlomoGazit,TheCarrotandtheStick:MilitaryGovernanceinJudea
andSamaria(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Zmora-Bitan,1985),p.34ff.14. Lior with Harmelin, 19May 1967, discussion brief in possession of the
author;RenewalofMilitarySupervisionovertheMinoritiesPopulation,26May1967, IDFA,76/117/70;FausiAl-Asmar,ToBeanArab in Israel (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Shachak,1975),p.126;Monthlysecurityreport,7July1967,IDFA,76/117/70.
15.LochameiHaGetaot,UpdateSheetforEnlistedSoldiers,no.5,3June1967,withthekindpermissionofZvikaDror;Seealso:YairBaumel,“TheIsraeliEstablishment’s Attitude Toward Arabs in Israel: Policy, Principles, andActions: The Second Decade, 1958–1968” (in Hebrew) (diss., HaifaUniversity,2002),p.196;Ha’aretz,25May1967,p.6.
16.Ha’aretz,22May1967,p.3;Ha’OlamHazeh,25May1967,p.8.17.ZichronitoEshkol,28May1967,ISA,C-15/6301.18.EdithEzrachi,1June1967,withthekindpermissionofIlanEzrachi,copy
inpossessionoftheauthor.19.TomSegev,TheSeventhMillion: Israelisand theHolocaust (inHebrew)
(Jerusalem:Keter,1991).20.Meetingprotocol,youthwhotraveledtoPoland,25Aug.1966,ISA,GL-
12/12976.21.HorowitztoWeisblatt,29March1967,ISA,GL-12/12973.22. Ofer Feniger, The World Was Within Me (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Levin
Epstein,1972),p.53.23.Herzogdiary,9Aug.1966,ISA,A-16/4510.24.LivnehtoEshkol(undated,apparently29May1967),ISA,A-l/7231.25.Ha’aretz,22May1967,p.2;29May1967,p.2;31May1966,p.2;5June
1967,p.2.26. Herzog diary, 1 June 1967, with the kind permission of his daughter;Maariv,25May1967,p.8;26May1967,p.1;2June1967,p.2;4June1967,p.3;YediotAharonot,23May1967,p.2;26May1967,p.2.
27.Ha’aretz,30May1967,p.2.28.BentovtoEshkol,1June1967,ISA,C-1/6301;ForeignMinistrytoIsraeli
Embassy,2June1967,ISA,HZ-6/6444;seealso:IdithZertal,DeathandtheNation: History,Memory, Politics (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 2002), p.171ff.
29.YediotAharonot,5June1967,p.6.
30.YediotAharonot,19June1967,p.12.31.AmiGluska,Eshkol,Give theOrder! (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Ministryof
Defense,2004),p.318.32.Avinoam,ed.,ParchmentsofFire,p.328.33.LochameiHaGetaot,NewsletterforEnlistedSoldiers(inHebrew),no.5,5
June1967,no.3(undated),withthekindpermissionofZvikaDror.34.NaomiShukritoVarditZik,28May1967,withthekindpermissionofAdir
Zik;seealso:ShlomitLeviandEliyhuKatz,“PublicOpinionandtheMoodin the Six-Day War” (in Hebrew), in Six Days—Thirty Years: NewPerspectives on the Six-DayWar, ed. Asher Sashar (Tel Aviv: AmOved,1999),p.246.
35.Gluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!p.252;AmiGluska,TheConflictBetweentheGeneralStaffandtheEshkolGovernmentDuringthe“WaitingPeriod,”:May-June1967 (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Davis Institute,2001),p.6; IsraelErlich (former head of Chevra Kaddisha), in response to the author’squestion;Ha’aretz(supplement),25Aug.1967,p.5ff.
36.RostowtoGoldberg,May26,1967;RusktoU.S.EmbassyinIsrael,May20,1967,USNA,Box1788,File5/2/67.
37.Goldberg to President,May 26, 1967, LBJL,WhiteHouseCentral Files,Box66.
38.SiscotoRusk,May30,1967,USNA,Box1789,File5/30/67;Prospectforapoliticalsettlement,June2,1967,USNA,Box18,Vol.I,Folder1of2.
39.“TheVoiceofThunderfromAlltheFronts”(albumproducedbyR.T.A.),inpossessionof the author; letter toPeninaAxelrod, 18 June1966,withherkindpermission;HaimHeferandMarcelYanko,FraternityofSoldiers (inHebrew) (Tel Aviv: Amikam, 1968) (no page numbers);Ha’aretz, 4 June1967,p.5.
CHAPTER9:ONEWEEKTOWAR:THEGENERALS’REVOLT
1.Bar-Dayandiary,28May1967,withhiskindpermission.2.AHA,P/0/03.3.Bar-Dayantohiswife,28May1967,withhiskindpermission.4.Bar-Dayandiary,28May1967,withhiskindpermission;Bar-Dayantohiswife,28May1967,withhiskindpermission;RostowtoPresident,27May1967,LBJL,NSFMiddleEastCrisis,May12-June19,1967,Box17;EvrontoForeignMinistry,27May1967,ISA,A-l/7919.
5.JohnsontoEshkol,27May1967,FRUS,vol.XIX,p.163.6.MapaiSecretariat,1June1967,LPA,2246790.7.Governmentdecision,28May1967,YaacovHerzogestate,with thekindpermission of his daughter; Gvati diary, 28 May 1967, YTA, Unit 15,Container 12, File 02; AmiGluska,Eshkol, Give the Order! (inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,2004),p.321ff.
8.YossiGoldstein,Eshkol(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,2003),p.557.9.MiriamEshkol,Interview,50YearsWar,IsraelDisk1,MECA.10.Herzogdiary,4Sept.1967,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter;Eitan
Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1987),p.194;YeshayahuGavish,ArielSharon,Interviews,50YearsWar,IsraelDisk1,MECA.
11.Bar-Dayandiary,28May1967,withhiskindpermission.12.Allon inan interviewwithReudorManor, ISA,A-19/5001,meeting1,p.
21.13. Eshkol at the General Staff, 29 May 1967, IDFA, 1176/192/74; Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.194ff.;Goldstein,Eshkol,p.558.
14.ArielSharon,Interview,50YearsWar,IsraelDisk1,MECA.15.Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.199.16.GeneralStaffdiscussiongroup,28May1967,IDFA,1176/192/74.17. Bar-Dayan diary, 29 and 30May, 1967; Bar-Dayan to hiswife, 30May
1967,withhiskindpermission.18.Bar-Dayandiary,31May1967,withhiskindpermission.19. Haim Herzog, The Great Days (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Maariv,
1967),p.15;seealso:ShlomitLeviandEliyhuKatz,“PublicOpinionandtheMoodintheSix-DayWar”(inHebrew),inSixDays—ThirtyYears:NewPerspectives on the Six-DayWar, ed. Asher Sashar (Tel Aviv: AmOved,1999),p.252.
20.MosheAdmonandYehoshuaBar-Dayan,DiaryofaSoldier (inHebrew)(TelAviv:Othpaz,1968),p.24.
21.Bar-Dayandiary,30May1967,withhiskindpermission.22.Gvatidiary,30May1967,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02.23.MosheDayan,Milestones(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1982),vol.II,p.
412.24.EzerWeizman,ForYou theSky, forYou theLand (inHebrew)(TelAviv:
SifriyatMaariv,*1975),p.261;HorevinChiefofStaffdiscussiongroup,29May1967,IDFA,1176/192/74.
25.Operationaldiscussiongroup,30May1967(morningsession);Operationaldiscussiongroup,30May1967 (afternoon session);DeputyChiefofStaffdiscussiongroup,1June1967;Planpresentationdiscussiongroup,31May1967;ChiefofStaffdiscussiongroup,31June1967;“Whip”orders,1June1967,IDFA,1176/192/74.
26. Mordechai Gur, The Temple Mount Is Ours! (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv:MinistryofDefense,1984),p.43.
27. “The Significance of a Freeze in the Situation for 2–3Weeks,” 31May1967,IDFA,1176/192/74.
28.President’sDailyLog,May19,1967,LBJL,Box11.29.Ibid.,May27,1967,LBJL,Box11.30.Ibid.31.RostowtoPresident,26May1967,LBJL,NSFMiddleEastCrisisMay12-
June 19, 1967, Box 17; see also: Anderson to President, 2 June 1967,USNA, Box 1792, File 6/1/67; Richard B. Parker, The Politics ofMiscalculationintheMiddleEast (Bloomington: IndianaUniversityPress,1993),p.55ff.
32.EvrontoForeignMinistry,27May1967,ISA,A-2/7919.33.HarmantoForeignMinistry,28May1967,ISA,A-l/7919.34.EvrontoForeignMinistry,31May1967,ISA,A-2/7919.35.EvrontoForeignMinistry,29May1967,ISA,A-2/7919.36.EshkoltoJohnson,30May1967,FRUS,vol.XI,p.187ff.;EditorialNote,
p.196;EvrontoForeignMinistry,31May1967,ISA,A-2/7919.37.RostowtoPresident,31May1967,LBJL,WhiteHouseCentralFiles,Box
67.38.ComparisonoftheEshkolletterandthePresident’sconversationwithEban
(undated),USNA,Box19,MemostothePresident,Folder2of2;HarmantoBitan,28May1967;ForeignMinistrytoIsraeliEmbassy,28May1967,ISA,A-2/7919;RusktoU.S.EmbassyinIsrael,28May1967,USNA,Box1789,File6/25/67.
39. Moyers to Johnson, 24 May 1967, LBJL, ND 19 CO 1–6, Box 193;Wattenberg toPresident, 31May1967,LBJL,WhiteHouseCentralFiles,Box67.
40.LBJL,NSDEXND,Box194,19/CO1–6,6/22/67.
41.CohentoPresident,31May1967,LBJL,ND19/CO,Box193.42.SueSackstotheMaizlishFamily,30May1967,AJA,SC5520.43.U.S.Consulate inJerusalemtoDepartmentofState,1June1967,USNA,
Box1790.
CHAPTER10:FIVEDAYSTOWAR:THEOUSTER
1.Ha’aretz,26May1967,pp.1,2.2.Ibid.,28May1967,p.2.3.Maariv,28May1967,p.1;26May1967,p.4.4.Ha’aretz,29May1967,p.2.5.Maariv,29May1967,p.8.6.Ibid.,22Sept.1968,p.11.7.YediotAharonot,1June1967,p.8.8.YadinDiary,30May1967,ISA,P-16/1403.9. Ha’aretz, 30 May 1967, p. 1; Ami Gluska, The Conflict Between theGeneral Staff and the Eshkol Government During the “Waiting Period,”May-June1967 (inHebrew) (Jerusalem:Davis Institute, 2001), p. 35; seealso:TomSegev,1949;TheFirstIsraelis(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Domino,1984),p.246.
10.EshkolintheKnesset,29May1967,KnessetMinutes(inHebrew),vol.49,p.2283ff.
11.Ben-Guriondiary,31May1967,BGA.12.Herzogdiary,30May1967,ISA,A-3/4512.13.Gvatidiary,29May1967,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02;Aranwith
Ma’arach ministers, 31 May 1967, discussion brief in possession of theauthor.
14.GaliliwithMa’arachministers,31May1967,discussionbriefinpossessionoftheauthor.
15.General Staff discussion group, 29May 1967, IDFA, 1176/192/74; EitanHaber,TodayWarWillBreakOut(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1987),p.200.
16.AmiGluska,Eshkol,Give theOrder! (inHebrew) (TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,2004),p.369.
17.AlloninaninterviewwithReudorManor,ISA,A-19/6001,firstmeeting,p.
15ff.;HanochBartov,Dado,48Yearsand20Days (inHebrew)(TelAviv:Dvir,2002),p.143.
18. Eshkol with Ma’arach ministers (morning session), 31 May 1967,discussion brief in possession of the author; Carmit Guy, Bar-Lev (inHebrew) (TelAviv:AmOved, 1998), p. 129;EzerWeizman,ForYou theSky,forYoutheLand(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1975),p.263.
19.MeirAmit,Head toHead: A Personal Look atGreat Events and SecretAffairs(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Hed-Arzi,1999),p.237.
20.MatiGolan,Peres(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Schocken,1982).21.YitzhakRabin,ServiceBook(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1979),
vol. I, p. 166;Governmentmeeting, 31May1967,YaacovHerzog estate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
22. Peres in discussion with opposition members, 23 May 1967, discussionbriefinpossessionoftheauthor;Ben-Guriondiary,25May1967,BGA.
23. Maariv, 31 May 1967, p. 2; Moshe Dayan, Milestones (in Hebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1982),vol.II,p.415;Kishoninresponsetotheauthor’squestions;seealso:YediotAharonot,1June1967,p.1.
24.Bar-Dayandiary,1June1967,withhiskindpermission.25.MeirwithMa’arachministers(morningsession),31May1967,discussion
briefinpossessionoftheauthor;seealso:MeiratMapaisecretariat,1June1967,LPA,2246790.
26.Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.420;seealso:Maariv,22Sept.1968,p.11.27. Rachel Tzabari at Mapai secretariat, 1 June 1967, LPA, 2246790; Anita
Shapira,YigalAllon:TheSpringtimeofHisUniverse(inHebrew)(TelAviv:HaKibbutzHaMeuchad,2004).
28.AlloninaninterviewwithReudorManor,ISA,A-19/5001,firstmeeting,p.23.
29.Ibid.,pp.17,34;seealso:YigalAllon,AScreenofSand(inHebrew)(TelAviv:HaKibbutzHaMeuchad,1959),p.61.
30.EshkolatMa’arachparty,30May1967,discussionbrief inpossessionoftheauthor.
31.Ben-Guriondiary,30May1967,BGA.32.Gvatidiary,31May1967,Unit15,Container12,File02.33.Ha’aretz,30May1967,p.1;Weizman,ForYoutheSky,forYoutheLand,
p.262.
34.AlloninaninterviewwithReudorManor,ISA,A-19/5001,firstmeeting,p.25.
35.PeresatRafisecretariat,1June1967,LPA,24–1967-3–5.36. Discussion brief, copy in possession of the author; see also: Mapai
secretariat,31May1967,LPA,2246790;Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.200ff.
37.Gvatidiary,31May1967,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02.38.Governmentmeeting,31May1967,YaacovHerzogestate,with thekind
permissionofhisdaughter;seealso:ZerachWarhaftig,Fifty-OneYears (inHebrew)(TelAviv:YadShapira,1998),p.185.
39.Mapaisecretariat,1June1967,LPA,2246790.40.Yadindiary,24May,1and2June1967,ISA,P-16/1403.41.Weizman,ForYoutheSky,forYoutheLand,p.262ff.;Haber,TodayWarWill Break Out, p. 199; Herzog diary, 12 Sept. 1967, with the kindpermissionofhisdaughter.
42.Minutessummaries,copiesinpossessionoftheauthor.43.Mapaisecretariat,1June1967(eveningsession),LPA,2246790.44.PeresandAlmogiatRafisecretariat,1June1967,LPA,24-1967-3-5.45.ShimonPeres:“TheWisdomofCompromise,”YediotAharonot(“7Days”
supplement),9March1979,p.16.46.Ben-Guriondiary,2June1967,BGA;seealso:Herzogdiary,1June1967,
ISA,A-3/4512.47.Herzogdiary,1 June1967, ISA,A-3/4512;Dayan,Milestones, vol. II, p.
421.48.YemimaRosenthal,ArnonLemfrum,andHagaiTzoref,eds.,LeviEshkol,the Third Prime Minister (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Israel State Archive,2002),p.550.
49.Yadindiary,2June1967,ISA,P-16/1403;EshkoltoDayan,4June1967,YaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
50.YediotAharonot,4June1967,p.2.51.Ibid.,2June1967,p.1.52.Bar-Dayantohiswife,2June1967,withhiskindpermission.
CHAPTER11:THREEDAYSTOWAR:THEDECISION
1.EitanHaber,TodayWarWill BreakOut (inHebrew) (Jerusalem: Idanim,
1987),p.204ff.2.KashtitoSapir,29May1967,ISA,A-4/7920.3.SpecialmeetingoftheGeneralStaffwiththesecuritycabinet,2June1967,IDFA,3/46/80;MosheDayan,Milestones (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1982),vol.II,p.421;Herzogdiary,4Sept.1967,withthekindpermissionof his daughter. See also Yemima Rosenthal, ed.,Yitzhak Rabin: SelectedDocuments Jerusalem:IsraelStateArchive,2006),vol.1;YossiGoldstein,Rabin:ABiography(TelAviv:Schocken,2006).
4.AbbaEban,LifeEpisodes (inHebrew) (TelAviv: SifriyatMaariv, 1979),vol.II,p.380;AbbaEban,PersonalWitness:IsraelThroughMyEyes(NewYork:G.P. Putnam’sSons, 1992), p. 405;Eban toQuandt, 26 July 1990,courtesy ofWilliamB.Quandt;YitzhakRabin,Service Book (inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1979),vol.I,p.179;EvrontoForeignMinistry,1June1967;HarmantoForeignMinistry,2June1967,ISA,A-2/7919.
5. Amit to Mossad, 2 June 1967, estate of Yaacov Herzog, with the kindpermissionofhisdaughter.
6.Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.422;Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.212;ShimonPeres,BattlingforPeace(London:WeidenfeldandNicolson,1995),p.166ff.
7.Peres,BattlingforPeace,p.166ff.8.Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.423.9.YarivatChiefofStaffdiscussiongroup,29May1967,IDFA,1176/192/74;DefenseandMilitaryAttache’sOffice,DispatchNo.1,13Dec.1967,PRO,FCO17/S26/104157.
10.PlanpresentationtotheChiefofStaff,2June1967,IDFA,1176/192/74.11.Ben-Guriondiary,2June1967,BGA.12.Bar-Dayandiary,3June1967,withhiskindpermission.13.Haber,TodayWarWill BreakOut, p. 215;Dayan,Milestones, vol. II, p.
424.14.AmitwithEshkolandothers,3–4June1967,ISA,A-3/4512.15.MossadrepresentativeinWashingtontoMossadhead,8June1967,Yaacov
Herzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter.16. Reudor Manor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, Hebrew
University,InstituteforInternationalRelations,meeting10,22July1975,p.11,withthekindpermissionofDavidHarman.
17.Amit report, 4 June 1967,with his kind permission;MeirAmit,Head to
Head:APersonalLookatGreatEventsandSecretAffairs(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Hed-Arzi,1999),p.237ff.;Amitinresponsetotheauthor’squestions;see also:RichardHelms,ALookoverMyShoulder:ALife in theCentralIntelligenceAgency(NewYork:RandomHouse,2003),p.273ff.
18.Amit,Head toHead, p. 242;Hadden to the author, 2 Jan. 2004;ReudorManor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, Hebrew University,Institute for InternationalRelations,meeting11,29July1975,p. Iff.,withthekindpermissionofDavidHarman;AmiGluska,Eshkol,GivetheOrder!(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,2004),p.382(gasmasks);seealso:WilliamB.Quandt,“LyndonJohnsonandthe1967War:WhatColorWastheLight?”MiddleEastJournal,Spring1992,vol.46,no.2,p.198ff.
19.Battle toRusk, 3 June1967,USNA,Box2226,POL16;ReudorManor,seriesofinterviewswithAvrahamHarman,HebrewUniversity,InstituteforInternational Relations, meeting 9, 10 July 1975, p. 13ff., with the kindpermissionofDavidHarman;Herzogdiary,15Aug.1967,ISA,A-3/4511.
20. Rusk to U.S. Embassy in Israel, 3 June 1967, USNA, Box 1790, File3/6/67;Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.217.
21. Reudor Manor, series of interviews with Avraham Harman, HebrewUniversity,InstituteforInternationalRelations,meeting9,10July1975,p.13ff.,withthekindpermissionofDavidHarman;HarmanwithEshkolandothers,3–4June1967,ISA,A-3/4512.
22.AmitwithEshkolandothers,3–4June1967,ISA,A-3/4512.23. Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East
(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1993);RichardB.Parker,TheSix-DayWar (Gainesville:UniversityPressofFlorida,1996);AviShlaim,TheIronWall:IsraelandtheArabWorld(NewYork:Norton,2000),p.218ff.;BennyMorris,Victims:TheHistoryoftheZionist-ArabConflict,1881–2001(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,2003),p.286ff.;MichaelOren,SixDaysofWar:TheBattleThatChangedtheFaceoftheMiddleEast(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Dvir,2004).
24.Bar-Dayandiary,4June1967,withhiskindpermission.25.Governmentmeetings, 4 June1967,YaacovHerzog estate,with the kind
permission of his daughter; Gvati diary, 4 June 1967, YTA, Unit 15,Container12,File02.
26. Allon in an interview with Reudor Manor, ISA, A-19/5001, secondmeeting,p.9ff.
27.GilaBar-Dayantoherhusband,4June1967,withtheirkindpermission.
CHAPTER12:DAYONE
1.MichaelOren,SixDaysofWar:TheBattleThatChangedtheFaceof theMiddleEast(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Dvir,2004),p.221ff.;TamarBrosh,ed.,A Speech for Every Occasion (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot,1993),p.133;Oztotheauthor,13Dec.2003.
2.Ben-Guriondiary,5June1967,BGA.3.Ezrachion8June1967,withthekindpermissionofherson;YosefWeitz,MyDiary (inHebrew),vol.6 (TelAviv:Masada,1973),p.246;Kollek toEshkol,7June1967,ISA,C-1/6301;seealso:Ha’aretz,6June1967,p.3;7June1967,p.2.
4. Shabtai Tevet, Exposed in the Turret (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Schocken,1968), p. 170; Reuven Avinoam, Remembrance (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv:MinistryofDefense,1971).
5.ForeignMinistrytoIsraeliEmbassyinWashington,5June1967,ISA,HZ-6/6444;OddBull,WarandPeaceintheMiddleEast(London:LeoCooper,1973), p. 108; Yossi Goldstein, Eshkol (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Keter,2003),p.731;RusktoBurns,5June1967,USNA,Box1791,File6/9/67.
6.HadowtoBrown,6July1967,PRO,FCO17/526/104157;seealso:HadowtoMorris,22June1967,PRO,FCO17/504.
7. Ezrachi on 8 June 1967,with the kind permission of her son;Weitz,MyDiary, vol. 6, p. 246;Kollek to Eshkol, 7 June 1967, ISA, C-1/6301; seealso:Ha’aretz,6June1967,p.3;7June1967,p.2.
8.Weitz,MyDiary, vol. 6, p. 246; Ezrachi on 8 June 1967, with the kindpermissionofherson.
9.LetterstoPeninaAxelrod,12and18June1967,withherkindpermission;lettertoAdirZik,6June1967,withhiskindpermission.
10.Avner(Walter)Bar-On,TheUntoldStories:DiaryoftheHeadCensor (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1981),p.231ff.;MosheDayan,Milestones(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1982),vol.II,p.436;“TheVoiceofThunderfrom All Fronts” (record produced by R.T.A.); Hagai Pinsker and YigalLussin,TheSix-DayWar:KolIsraelandGaleiTzahalatWar,CBSRecord;EzerWeizman,ForYou the Sky, forYou theLand (inHebrew) (TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1975),p.269;Ben-Guriondiary,5June1967,BGA;Dayanontheradio,5June1967,ISA,C-l7/6270;Gvatidiary,5June1967,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02;Maariv, 5 June1967 (ThirdEdition),p.1;Yehuda Ariel, The Six-Day War (in Hebrew) Jerusalem: Ministry ofEducationandCulture,1999),p.17;McPhersontoJohnson,11June1967,
LBJL,OfficefilesofHarryMcPherson,Box42.11.U.S.Consulate in Jerusalem toDepartment of State, 5 June 1967 (Three
cables),USNA,Box 1792, POL27, 6/5/67;Dayan,Milestones, vol. II, p.437ff.
12.EitanHaber,TodayWarWillBreakOut (inHebrew) (Jerusalem: Idanim,1987),p.228.
13. Moshe Zack, Hussein Makes Peace (in Hebrew) (Ramat-Gan: Bar-IlanUniversity,1994),p.57ff.;AviShlaim,“HisRoyalShyness:KingHusseinandIsrael,”TheNewYorkReviewofBooks,July15,1999,p.14ff.;RostowtoPresident,12Dec.1966,FRUS,vol.XVIII,Doc.364;HerzogtoRemez,23Nov.1966,Herzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
14.Operationdiscussiongroup,25May1967;ChiefofStaffdiscussiongroup,27May1967,IDFA,1176/192/74;Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.228.
15.Ha’aretz,6June1967,p.3;7June1967,pp.2,6.16.Weizman,ForYoutheSky,forYoutheLand,p.270.17.Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.438;Bar-On,TheUntoldStories,p.228.18. Bull, War and Peace in the Middle East, p. 115; Narkis in internal
discussiononthehistoryoftheSix-DayWar,IDFA,1/901/67;U.S.Consul,Jerusalem toDepartment ofState, 5 June1967,Box1796; 14Aug. 1967,Box1799.
19.MerleMiller,Lyndon:AnOralBiography(NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sSons,1980),p.480.
20.MemorandumfortheRecord(RostowRecollections),17Nov.1968,FRUS,vol. XIX, pp. 290; President’s Daily Diary, June 5, 1967, LBJL, Box 11;LyndonBainesJohnson,TheVantagePoint:PerspectivesonthePresidency,1963–1969(NewYork:Holt,RinehartandWinston,1971),p.296.
21.MathildeKrim,inresponsetotheauthor’squestions.RostowtoJohnson,6June1967,LBJL,NSF-NSCMiddleEastCrisis,Box18,Document39;seealso:PeninaLahav,IsraelinLaw:ShimonAgranatandtheZionistCentury(Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1999); Raphael to Levavi, 6 June 1967, estate ofYaacovHerzog,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
22.Bar-Dayandiary,5June1967,withhiskindpermission.23.Weitz,MyDiary,vol.6,p.246.24.Gvatidiary,5June1967,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02.25.Bar-Dayandiary,5and6June1967,withhiskindpermission;Ben-Gurion
diary,6June1967,BGA.
CHAPTER13:DAYTWO
1.Bar-Dayandiary,6 June1967,withhiskindpermission;AmatziaBaram,ed.,TheArmoredCommandoUnit(inHebrew)(Chaverim,1969),p.95.
2. “Priorities:TheRestof theWar,” estateofYaacovHerzog,with thekindpermission of his daughter; Moshe Dayan, Milestones (in Hebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1982),vol.II,p.440.
3.U.S.Consulate inJerusalemtoDepartmentofState,6June1967,USNA,Box1793,File6/6/67.
4. Government meeting, 6 June 1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kindpermissionofhisdaughter.
5.EshkolintheKnessetForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,7June1967,ISA,A-4/7920.
6.AbbaEban,LifeEpisodes (inHebrew) (TelAviv: SifriyatMaariv, 1979),vol.2,p.407.
7.AlloninaninterviewwithReudorManor,fourthmeeting,28May1967,p.20; Uzi Benziman, Jerusalem: Unwalled City (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv:Schocken,1973),p.20.
8.Bar-Dayandiary,6June1967,withhiskindpermission.9. McPherson to Johnson, 11 June 1967, LBJL, Office Files of HarryMcPherson,MiddleEastBox42.
10.Bar-Dayandiary,6June1967,withhiskindpermission;ReuvenAvinoam,ed.,Remembrance(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,1971),p.24;TheFifty-OneCommendations(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,undated), p. 67; Shabtai Teveth, Exposed in the Turret (in Hebrew) (TelAviv:Schocken1968),p.164ff.
11. BennyMorris, Victims: The History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,2003),p.217.
12.Maariv,7June1967,p.2.13.SummaryReportoftheSix-DayWar,Introduction—theGeneral’sReview,
p.2,IDFA,3/901/67;TheCommandDiaryofUziNarkis,RuthBondietal.,eds.,Notby the SwordAlone: TheWonderful Story of theHeroism of theNationofIsraelandItsVictoryintheSix-DayWar (inHebrew)(TelAviv:Levin-Epstein,undated),p.189.
14.EzerWeizman,ForYou theSky, forYou theLand (inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1975),p.282ff.
15. General Order, 28 May 1967; mobilization order—Central Command
newsletter, 5 June 1967, JMA, Container 1699; see also: Uzi Narkis, ASoldierofJerusalem(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,1991).
16.CalltoBattle,GeneralOrderNo.5,6June1967,AHA,PP/12/OR/012/313;Six-DayWarSummaryReport,Introduction—General’sreview,p.4,IDFA,3/901/67;“TheCommandDiaryofUziNarkis,”p.185;MordechaiGur,TheTempleMount IsOurs! (Tel Aviv:Ministry of Defense, 1984), p. 13; seealso: Uzi Narkis, 50 Years War, Israel Disk 1, MECA; Arieh Brown,PersonalSeal:MosheDayanintheSix-DayWarandAfterward(inHebrew)(TelAviv:YediotAharonot,1997),p.64.
17.TheCommandDiaryofUziNarkis, p. 189; see also:Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.441.
18.RusktoBarbour,6June1967,USNA,Box10andBox1793;Barbour toRusk,6June1967,Box1792POL27,6/5/67;BurnstoRusk,6June1967,Box 1793, File 6/6/67; Eitan to Foreign Ministry; Remez to ForeignMinistry; Bitan to Harman, 6 June 1967, ISA, A-4/7920; Bitanmemorandum, 6 June 1967, estate of Yaacov Herzog, with the kindpermissionofhisdaughter;Brown,PersonalSeal,p.62.
19.Ronentestimony,KYA,Container29,File249.20.Bar-Dayandiary,6June1967,withhiskindpermission.21.YosefWeitz,MyDiary (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Masada, 1973), vol. 6, p.
246ff.22.RuthGeffen-Dotandiary,6June1967,RuthBondietal.,eds.,Noton theSwordAlone: TheWonderful Story of theHeroism of theNation of Israeland Its Victory in the Six-DayWar (inHebrew) (TelAviv: Levin-Epstein,undated),p.278.
23.LettertoAdirZik,6June1967,withhiskindpermission.24.EitanHaber,TodayWarWillBreakOut (inHebrew) (Jerusalem: Idanim,
1987),p.231.25.Ha’aretz,6June1967,p.2;Maariv,6June1967,p.4.26.Haber,TodayWarWill BreakOut, p. 232;Dayan,Milestones, vol. II, p.
442;Ben-Guriondiary,6June1967,BGA.27.Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.437.28.Ibid.,p.433.29.Ronentestimony,KYA,Container29,File249.30.IsraelSegal,OneoftheTwoofUs(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,1995),p.
22;seealso:AmramGabaitestimony,ODI,File1(226),p.33.
31.Mosowitztestimony,KYA,Container29,File249.32.Securitycabinetmeeting,6June1967,YaacovHerzogestate,withthekind
permission of his daughter; discussion brief in possession of the author;YemimaRosenthal,ArnonLemfrum, andHagaiTzoref, eds.,Levi Eshkol,the Third Prime Minister (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Israel State Archive,2002),p.557.
33.Ben-Guriondiary,6June1967,BGA.34.Barbour toRusk (threecables);Rostow toEmbassies;Rusk toHarriman;
RusktoU.S.Embassy inItaly;USDOinIsrael toDepartmentofDefense,all5June1967,USNA,Box1792,POL27,6/5/67;McPhersontoJohnson,11June1967,LBJL,OfficeFilesofHarryMcPherson,MiddleEast,Box42;Memorandum for theRecord, 5 June1967 (RostowRecollections),LBJL,NSF,NSC,History,Box18,Document72.
35.BurnstoRusk,5June1967;U.S.EmbassyinEgypttoDepartmentofState,6 June 1967, USNA, Box 1792, POL 27, 6/5/67; see also Rusk toAmbassadors,7June1967,USNA,Box1793,File8/6/67;LopertoRostow,7June1967;CoopertoRostow,7June1967,Box18,vol.I,Folder1of2;CoopertoRostow,8June1967,Box18,vol.I,Folder2of2;RusktoBurns,7June1967,POLISR,Box1794,File6/10/67.
36.YosefArgaman,ItWasTopSecret:30IntelligenceandSecurityAffairsinIsrael (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Ministry ofDefense, 2002), p. 234;Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.460.
37.RusktoBarbour;MeekrtoRusk,both6June1967,USNA,Box1792,POL27, File 6/6/67; see also: Harold M. Saunders, The Middle East Crisis,LBJL,NSF-NSCHistory,MiddleEastCrisis,Box17,Doc.No.2.
38.LyndonBainesJohnson,TheVantagePoint:PerspectivesofthePresidency,1963–1969(NewYork:Holt,RinehartandWinston,1971),p.299;seealso:Califano to Johnson, 5 June 1967, LBJL, ND 19CO 1–6, Box 193;Memorandum for the secretary, 5 June 1967, USNA, Box 1789, File5/30/67;HacklertoChristian,5June1967,LBJL,ND19CO1–6,Box193.
39.CalifanotoJohnson,5June1967,USNA,Box15,MemostothePresident.40.CalifanotoJohnson,5June1967,LBJL,ND19CO1–6,Box193.41.RochetoPresident,6June1967,LBJL,WHCF,Box67.42.LBJLOralHistoryInterviews,JohnP.Roche,I,P.64.43.President’sDailyDiary,5June1967,LBJL,Box11.44.RobertDallek,Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson andHis Times, 1908–
1960(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1991),p.429.45.DonnelleytoSecretary,7June1967,LBJL,ND19,CO,1–6,Box193.46.Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.442.47.GeneralOrderNo.2,6June1967,AHA,P/200/9.
CHAPTER14:DAYTHREE1.Bar-Dayandiary,7June1967,withhiskindpermission.2. Arieh Brown, Personal Seal: Moshe Dayan in the Six-Day War andAfterward(inHebrew)(TelAviv:YediotAharonot,1997),p.68.
3. Mordechai Gur, The Temple Mount Is Ours! (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv:MinistryofDefense,1984),p.16.
4.Ibid.,p.318.5.Mosowitztestimony,KYA,Container29,File249.6.UziNarkis, Interview,50 YearsWar, Israel Disk 1,MECA; Carmit Guy,Bar-Lev(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,1998),p.138;TheSix-DayWar,KolIsraelandGaleiTzahalReportersatWar(CBSrecord).
7.Mosowitztestimony,KYA,Container29,File249.8.MosheDayan,Milestones(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1982),vol.II,p.443.
9.YemimaRosenthal,ArnonLemfrum,andHagaiTzoref,eds.,LeviEshkol,the Third Prime Minister (in Hebrew) Jerusalem: Israel State Archive,2002),p.566;OfraNevo-Eshkol,HumorousEshkol(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim, 1988), p. 1561; see also: Eshkol with theMovement for GreaterIsrael,12Nov.1967,ISA,A-7/7920.
10. Security cabinet, 7 June 1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kindpermission of his daughter; Eshkol at the security cabinet, at the ForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,andatthepoliticalcommittee,7June1967,discussionbriefsinpossessionoftheauthor.
11.Maariv(weekendsupplement),10April1997,p.44.12.UziNarkis,Interview,50YearWar,IsraelDisk1,MECA;NadavShragai,The Disputed Mountain: The Fight for the Temple Mount (in Hebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,1995),p.22.
13.Ha’aretz,8June1967,p.1;Maariv,8June1967,p.3.14.EitanHaber,TodayWarWillBreakOut (inHebrew) (Jerusalem: Idanim,
1987),p.234.
15.EzerWeizman,ForYou theSky, forYou theLand (inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1975),p.289.
16.YashayahuGavish,Interview,50YearsWar,IsraelDisk1,MECA;GeneralOrderNo.4(SouthernCommand),4June1967,AHA,P/200/19.
17.Weizman,ForYoutheSky,forYoutheLand,p.290.18.Dayan,Milestones, vol. II, p. 487;Herzog diary, 10 June 1967, ISA,A-
3/4512; see also: Yitzhak Rabin, Service Book (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv:Sifriyat Maariv, 1979), vol. I, p. 196; “Whip” Operation, OperationalCommandNo.2,4June1967,IDFA,1176/192/74.
19.Ronentestimony,KYA,Container29,File249.20.Chiziktestimony,KYA,Container29,File249.21.Bar-Dayandiary,11June1967,withhiskindpermission.22.Bar-Dayandiary,10June1967,withhiskindpermission.23.IDFSpokesmantoShlomoHillel,2March1968,ISA,HZ-44/4090.24.Chiziktestimony,KYA,Container29,File249.25. Uri Milstein and Dov Doron, Shaked Commando Unit: Interdiction andContinuous Security in the IDF History (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: YediotAharonot,1994),p.149ff.
26.YediotAharonot, 17Aug.1995,p.3; seealso:WashingtonPost, 17Aug.1995,p.A30.
27.YaakovRabinowitz,Kobi (inHebrew)(TelAviv:HaKibbutzHaMeuchad,1981),p.23;AlonGan,“TheDiscourseThatDied?’DiscourseCulture’asanAttempt toDefine a Special Identity for theSecondGeneration on theKibbutzim”(inHebrew)(diss.,TelAvivUniversity,2002),p.73ff.
28.Ga’atonmembers toYaari, 14 June 1967,Yaari toGa’atonmembers, 26June1967,YYA95–21.7(2).
29.DayanintheKnesset,21June1967,KnessetMinutes,vol.49,p.2384ff.;Dayan,Milestones, vol. II, p. 461; Rabin, Service Book, vol. I, p. 196;“Whip” Operation, Operational Command No. 2, 4 June 1967, IDFA,1176/192/74; see also:Command andStaff School (13thClass, 1966–67),Taking Over Occupied Territories (Abstract); IDF OperationsBranch/Training Department, Taking Over Occupied Territories (1960);MilitaryAuthorities inOccupiedTerritories (1961),YaacovHerzog estate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
30.YehoshuaBar-Dayantohiswife,7June1967,withhiskindpermission.31.Bar-Dayandiary,7June1967,withhiskindpermission.
32.Yadindiary,9June1967,ISA,P-16/1403.33. Chen Ronen testimony, KYA, Container 29, File 249; see also: Yisrael
Harel, ed.,Lions’Gate:TheBattle for Jerusalem in theExperience of theParatrooperFighters(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,1977).
34. Remez and Eitan to ForeignMinistry (separate telegrams), 7 June 1967,ISA,A-4/7920;Remez toLevavi andAmit, 7 June 1967,YaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter;seealso:BurnstoRusk,7June1967(twomessages),USNA,Box1793,File6/7/67.
35.UziNarkis, interview,50YearsWar, Israel,Disk 1,MECA;Ha’aretz,31Dec.1997,p.B/3.
36.Ben-Guriondiary,8and12June1967,BGA;Weizman,ForYou theSky,forYoutheLand,p.289.
37.YeshurunKeshet,InBesiegedJerusalem:DiariesfromtheHomeFront(inHebrew) Jerusalem: Reuven Mass, 1973), p. 226; Moshe Shamir, NatanAlterman:ThePoetasLeader(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Dvir,1988),p.105.
38.Maariv,7June1967,p.2.39.Ibid.,8June1967,p.3;7June1967,p.8;11June1967,p.5;Mosowitz
testimony,KYA,Container29,File249.40. Battle Call, General Order No. 5, 9 June 1967, AHA, PP/15/012/313;
GeneralOrderno.7and8June1967,JMA,Container8034.41.Davar,8June1967,p.1;Maariv,7June1967,p.2.42.BattleCall,GeneralOrdersNos.5and7,6and8June1967,AHA,PP/13–
14/012/313.43.Ha’aretz,7June1967,p.2;Maariv(weekend),9June1967,p.1(miracle);
8 June 1967, p. 3 (dreamers); Yediot Aharonot, 6 June 1967 (4 o’clockedition),p.1;7June1967,p.2;seealso:Harel,ed.,Lions’Gate.
44.LettertoPeninaAxelrod,18June1967,withherkindpermission.45.LettertoAdirZik,7June1967,withhiskindpermission.46. Letters to Penina Axelrod, 8, 16, and 18 June 1967, with her kind
permission.47.LettertoPeninaAxelrod,8June1967,withherkindpermission.48.Rosenthaletal.,eds.,LeviEshkol,p.563;HarmantoEshkol,9June1967,
andtoForeignMinistry,8June1967,ISA,A-9/7919.49.President’sDailyLog,5and7June1967,LBJL,Box11;seealso:Califano
to Johnson, 7 June 1967, LBJL, NSF-NSC, History of the Middle East
Crisis,Box18,vol.3,Doc.No.47a.50.CalifanotoJohnson,7June1967,LBJL,WHCF,Box67.51. Levinson andWattenberg to Johnson, 5 and 7 June 1967,LBJL,WHCF,
Box67.52.Donnelly toSecretary,8June1967,LBJL,ND19CO1–6,Box193;see
also: HarryMcPherson: “TheWhiteHouse, American Jews, and the Six-DayWar”(inHebrew)inSixDays:ThirtyYears:ANewLookattheSix-DayWar,ed.AsherSashar(TelAviv:AmOved,1999),p.3ff.
53.ArieltoForeignMinistry,13June1967,ISA,HZ-9/3979.
CHAPTER15:THEFINALDAYS
1.Bar-Dayantohiswife,8and9June1967,withhiskindpermission.2.Bar-Dayandiary,8June1967,withhiskindpermission.3.BarbourtoRusk,8June1967,USNA,Box1783,File8/6/67.4.A.JayCristol,TheLibertyIncident:The1967IsraeliAttackontheU.S.SpyShip(Washington,D.C.:Brassey’s,2002).
5.RobertDallek,FlawedGiant:LyndonJohnsonandHisTimes,1961–1973(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1988),p.430;RichardHelms,ALookOverMy Shoulder: A Life in theCentral IntelligenceAgency (NewYork:RandomHouse,2003),p.301;DeanRusk,AsISawIt (NewYork:W.W.Norton,1990),p.388.
6. Security Cabinet, 7 June 1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kindpermissionofhisdaughter;RostowtoJohnson,13June1967,LBJL,NSF-NSC,History,Box18,DocumentsNo.8–8a;LBJL,OralHistories,PaulC.Warnke, interview no. 3, p. 14; see also:YitzhakRabin,ServiceBook (inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1979),vol.I,p.196ff.
7.Ha’aretz,8June1967,p.2;Daf8June1967,p.1.8. Security cabinet, 8 June 1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kindpermission of his daughter; Matityahu Meizel, The Battle for the Golan,June 1967 (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 2001), p. 241ff.;HanochBartov,Dado:48Yearsand20Days (inHebrew)(TelAviv:Dvir,2002),p.141ff.;YediotAharonot (“7Days”supplement),30May1997,p.16ff.;ZerachWarhaftig,Fifty-OneYears (inHebrew) (YadShapira,1998),p.187ff.;EitanHaber,TodayWarWillBreakOut (inHebrew) (Jerusalem:Idanim,1987),p.247;YigalAlloninaninterviewwithReudorManor,firstmeeting,p.15,ISA,A-19/5001;LandofGolan(inHebrew),9May1985,p.
32ff.;MosheDayan,Milestones(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1982),vol.II,p.473ff.;Rabin,ServiceBook,vol.I,p.200.
9.Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.251.10.CarmitGuy,Bar-Lev(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,1998),p.143;Yigal
Allon in an interview with Reudor Manor, first meeting, p. 15, ISA, A-19/5001;YTA,Unit15,SeriesC,Container3,File2.
11.Rabin,ServiceBook, vol. I, p. 200;Herzogdiary, 11 June1967, ISA,A-3/4511;Meizel,TheBattlefortheGolan,June1967,p.271.
12. Security Cabinet, 9 June 1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kindpermission of his daughter; Herzog diary, 11 June 1967, ISA, A-3/4511;Bartov,Dado,p.153.
13.Bromtestimony,KYA,Container29,File249.14.TheFifty-OneCommendations(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,
undated),p.169ff.15.Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,pp.443,471;Rabin,ServiceBook,vol.I,p.196;
Arieh Brown, Personal Seal: Moshe Dayan in the Six-Day War andAfterward(inHebrew)(TelAviv:YediotAharonot,1997),pp.67,77,79ff.;General Order No. 5 (Southern Command), 9 June 1967, AHA P/200/19;YeshayahuGavish,interview,50YearsWar,IsraelDisk1,MECA.
16.Maariv,13Oct.1967,p.11;AirForceJournal,8June1967,Battle Issueno.2,p.2;ReuvenAvinoam,Remembrance(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,1971), p. 49; Aviezer Golan and Ami Shamir, The Book of Heroism (inHebrew) (Tel Aviv: Journalists Society, 1968), p. 25; Yonina Ben-Or inresponsetotheauthor’squestions;Herzogdiary,9and10June1967,ISA,A-3/4512.
17.MiriamEshkol,interview,50YearsWar,IsraelDisk1,MECA.18.Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.258;Guy,Bar-Lev,p.143;Ha’aretz,
12Sept.1967,p.4;Chiziktestimony,KYA,Container29,File249;Reportto the Secretary General, 24 Aug. 1967, S-0321–0002, Box 1, File 1;RubinsteinandChiziktestimonies,KYA,Container29,File249.
19.Ha’aretz,5June1992,p.5B.20.Warhaftig,Fifty-OneYears,p.196 ff.;Herzogdiary,9and10June1967,
ISA,A-3/4512.21.Ben-Guriondiary,9June1967,BGA.22.Yadin diary, 9 June 1967;Dayan toYadin, 10 June 1967; undated page,
ISA,P-16/1403.
23.RemembranceAlbum,1968,withthekindpermissionofAvrahamKushner.24. Zlicha to Israel Land Administration, 4 Feb. 1968, Benvenisti to
Katzenelbogen, 8 Sept. 1968, JMA, Container 5994,Mograbi and JewishQuarterfile.
25. Uzi Narkis, Soldier of Jerusalem (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ministry ofDefense,1991),p.333ff.;ChaimHerzog,WayofLife(inHebrew)(TelAviv:YediotAharonot, 1997), p. 223; ShlomoGazit,TheCarrot and the Stick:MilitaryGovernanceinJudeaandSamaria(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Zmora-Bitan,1985),p.53;UziBenziman,Jerusalem:UnwalledCity (inHebrew)(TelAviv:Schocken,1973),p.37ff.;seealso:MeronBenvenisti,Oppositethe ClosedWall: Divided andUnited Jerusalem (in Hebrew) (WeidenfeldandNicolson,1973),p.137.
26.Ben-GuriontoWeitz,12June1967,BGA.27.Ben-Guriondiary,8June1967,BGA.28.McPhersontoJohnson,11June1967,LBJL,McPhersonOfficeFiles,Box
42.29.YosefWeitz,MyDiary (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Masada, 1973), vol. 6, p.
247ff.;Governmentmeeting,11June1967,YaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
30.Gvatidiary,20June1967,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02.31.ReportsummaryoftheSix-DayWar,PartII,Paragraph4,Appendix14,p.
107, IDFA, 901/67/3; Natan Alterman, “Bederekh Noh-Amon”: Poems ofthe Ten Plagues of Egypt, Old Poems (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutzHaMeuchad,1972),p.231,Englishtranslation:NathanAlterman:SelectedPoems, trans.RobertFriend (TelAviv:HaKibbutzHaMeuchad,1978); seealso:Rubinsteintestimony,KYA,Container29,File249.
32.Ha’aretz,19June1967,p.2.33.Brown,PersonalSeal,p.66.34.Ibid.,p.68.35. Security cabinet, 7 July 1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kind
permissionofhisdaughter.36.Dayan,Milestones,vol. II,p.444;YosefArgaman, ItWasTopSecret:30IntelligenceandSecurityAffairsinIsrael(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,2002),p.246;seealso:Gazit,TheCarrotandtheStick,p.57.
37.RuthBondietal,eds.,NotontheSwordAlone:TheWonderfulStoryoftheHeroism of the Nation of Israel and Its Victory in the Six-Day War (in
Hebrew)(TelAviv:Levin-Epstein,undated),p.190.38.BurnstoRusk,10June1967,USNA,Box1794,File6/10/67.39.Sassonreport,12July1967,withhiskindpermission.40.WilsontoRusk,24June1967,USNA,Box1796,File6/24/67;Gazit,TheCarrotandtheStick,p.57.
41.RonenandRubinsteintestimonies,KYA,Container29,File249.42.U.S.EmbassyinJordantoDepartmentofState,9June1967,USNA,Box
1793,File6/9/67;DanielRubinsteininresponsetotheauthor’squestions.43.CampbelltoDepartmentofState,29February1968,USNA,Box2224,File
POL2.44.Ha’aretz (supplement), 5 June 1998, p. 14ff.; see also:KolHair, 8Nov.
1991,p.19;15Nov.1991,p.23;Herzog,WayofLife,p.222.45.Bromtestimony,KYA,Container29,File249.46.Six-DayWarSummaryReport,PartI,Paragraph2,p.60,IDFA,3/901/67.47. Amos Etinger,My Land, You Weep and Laugh (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv:
YediotAharonot,1991),p.269;Notefortherecord,29June1967, inNilsG.Gussing,ReporttotheUNSecretaryGeneral,24August1967,UNA,S-0321–0002, Box 2, File 1; Evan M. Wilson, Jerusalem: Key to Peace(Washington,D.C.:MiddleEastInstitute,1970),p.112;Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.496.
48.EzerWeizman,ForYou theSky, forYou theLand (inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1975),p.297ff.
49.Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.496.50.G.P.Cassels,NotefortheRecord,8July1967;J.Cambray,Notesforthe
Record, 11 August 1967, UNA, S-0321–0002, Box 1, File 7; Lewen toMoberley,24August1967,PRO,FCO17/212;HalltoDepartmentofState,23 August 1967, USNA, Box 1800; Dayan,Milestones, vol. II, p. 497;ReuvenPedhatzur,TheVictoryofEmbarrassment:TheEshkolGovernment’sPolicyintheTerritoriesAftertheSix-DayWar(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Bitan,1996),p.265.
51.Governmentmeeting,25 June1967,YaacovHerzogestate,with thekindpermissionofhisdaughter;seealso:ISA,C-3/10136.
52. Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kind permission of his daughter; BritishEmbassyinJordantoForeignOffice,13June1967,PRO,FCO,17/214.
53.HarmantoRostow,29June1967,USNA,Box1796;Maariv,13June1967,p.11;Ha’aretz,19June1967,p.2;seealso:Ha’aretz,12June1967,p.4.
54.NotesonGussingreport,18Oct.1967,ISA,HZ-4/4096.55.Governmentmeeting,25 June1967,YaacovHerzogestate,with thekind
permissionofhisdaughter.56.Note for theRecord, July1, 1967, inNilsG.Gussing,Report to theUN
SecretaryGeneral,August24,1967,UNA,S-0321–0002,Box2,File1.57.BattleCall,GeneralOrderNo.6,7June1967,AHAPP/13/012/313.58.Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.496.59.ReporttotheSecretaryGeneral,24August1967,S-0321–0002,Box1,File
1.60.KoteretRashit,26Dec.1984,p.29ff.61.Reporton thedestructionofvillagesandexpulsionofrefugees(undated),
ISA,C-5/3497;seealso:Ha’aretz,18July1997,p.4(UriAvneritoEditor).62.Brown,PersonalSeal,p.153ff.63. Ibid., p. 151; Gazit, The Carrot and the Stick, pp. 58, 60; Herzog with
Eshkol,6Dec.1967,ISA,A-2/7921;BlacktoJohnson,February14,1968,FRUS,vol.XX,Doc.No.80.
64.NotebyMr.Bakerjian,30June1967,UNA,S-0321–0002,Box2,File2;U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem to Department of State, 7 and 9 June 1967,USNA,Box1793,File6/9/67;CampbelltoJim,12June1967,PRO,FCO17/212/104225;Wilson,Jerusalem:KeytoPeace,p.111;seealso:Ha’aretz,8Nov.1967,p.2.
65.Memorandum,9 and16 June1967, ISA,HZ-14/4096;Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.269.
66.Bar-Dayandiary,8–9June1967,withhiskindpermission.67.AdamLaslowtestimony,KYA,Container29,File249.68.LetterstoAdirZik,18June,14and28July1967withhiskindpermission.69.GeneralOrderNo.3(SouthernCommand),7June1967,AHA,P/200/19.70. “Handlingbooty andprohibition against looting and arms,”8 June1967,
AHA,P/0/11.71.Gazit toChiram,5May1968;KnessetFinanceCommitteediscussionon
theStateComptroller’sreport,IDFA,80/2845/97.72.Barbour toRusk,11June1967,USNA,Box1794,File11/6/67;seealso:
Ben-HorintoDirector-General,4July1967,HZ-9/4089.73. Gazit, The Carrot and the Stick, p. 53; see also: Michael Shashar, TheSeventh-DayWar:DiaryoftheMilitaryGovernanceinJudeaandSamaria,
June-December1967(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatPoalim,1977),pp.43,50;Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.266;Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.458; Eban to Eshkol, 29 June 1967, ISA, A-10/7938; Yaish to ForeignMinistry,2Aug.1967,ISA,HZ-6/4088.
74. Rabin with Eshkol, 31 July 1967, IDFA, 118/117/70; see also: Arkin toDivision Commander, 24 June 1967, IDFA, 66/117/70. Brom testimony,KYA,Container29,File249;Bondietal,eds.,NotontheSwordAlone,p.320.
75.Ben-Guriondiary,9June1967,BGA.76.Bar-Dayandiary,12June1967,withhiskindpermission.77. Central Command, the Six-DayWar, Part I, Paragraph 2, p. 134, IDFA,
1/901/67;Rabin,ServiceBook,vol.I,p.203.78.HadowtoBrown,Dec.28,1967,PRO,FCO17/526/104157.79. Dayan,Milestones, vol. II, p. 482;Maariv, 23 Dec. 1966, p. 5; Brown,PersonalSeal,p.110;Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.273.
80.Herzogdiary,recordedattheendofAug.1969,YaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
81.Ze’evSchiffandEitanHaber,LexiconofIsraeliSecurity(inHebrew)(TelAviv:ZmoraBitanModan, 1976), p. 15; see also:BennyMorris,Victims:TheHistoryoftheZionist-ArabConflict,1881–2001(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,2003),p.309;Benvenisti,OppositetheClosedWall,p.119.
82.Bar-Dayandiary,10and12June1967;Bar-Dayantohiswife,12and13June1967,withhiskindpermission.
PARTIV:THEYTHOUGHTTHEYHADWON
1. Gabriel Stern, “On Mussa the Redhead’s Balcony” (in Hebrew), AlHaMishmar,1986.
CHAPTER16:ANEWLAND2.Maariv, 13Oct. 1967, p. 11;Air ForceNewsletter, 8 June 1967,GeneralOrderno.2,p.2;ReuvenAvinoam, InMemoriam (inHebrew) (TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,1971),p.49;AviezerGolanandAmiShamir,TheBookof Heroism (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Society of Journalists, 1968), p. 25;YoninaBen-Orinresponsetotheauthor’squestions.
3. Letter to PeninaAxelrod, 19 June 1967,with her kind permission; EdithEzrachi,14and22June1967,withthekindpermissionofherson;letterto
AdirZik,18June1967,withhiskindpermission;Ha’aretz,21June1967,p.11;2July1967,p.10.
4. Letter from 21 June 1967, with the kind permission of Asher Knafo;Avinoam,InMemoriam,p.60(Ben-Ezra);p.276(Amiram);p.325(Krock);p. 157 (Tal); p. 169 (Yair); p. 209 (Leeks); p. 214 (Magen); p. 102(Diamant);DearFamilies:Letters,EnvelopesandStampsforMemorialDay(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,1999);seealso: lianaShamir,LestItBeasIfTheyNeverLived(inHebrew)(TheUnitforCommemoratingSoldiers in the Ministry of Defense and the National Memoriam Press,Ministry ofDefense, 2003); letter toAdirZik, 5 July 1967,with his kindpermission.
5.Bar-Dayandiary,18–29June1967,withhiskindpermission;Bar-Dayaninresponsetotheauthor’squestions.
6.Letters toPeninaAxelrod, 8 and19 June1967,withher kindpermission(“narcotics”); letter to Adir Zik, 3 Aug. 1967, with his kind permission;YosefWeitz,MyDiary (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Masada, 1973), vol.VI, p.262.
7.Ronentestimony,KYA,Container29,File249.8.ZviTzabar,ed.,ScrollsofFire(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,1971),vol.V,bookI,p.338ff.
9.MosheDayan,Milestones(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1982),volII,p.451; EzerWeizman,For You the Sky, for You the Land (in Hebrew) (TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1975),p.296.
10.Bartov to Israeli, 24Sept.1967, IDFA,66/117/1970;Permits to enter theterritories,ISA,4091/HZ-10.
11. Yehiam Newsletter (in Hebrew) 32/113, 12 July 1967, p. 6ff.; MeronBenvenisti,The Slingshot and the Stick: Territories, Jews, and Arabs (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,1988),p.145;YehudaYosttoAdirZik,29July1967, with his kind permission; Dayan to Yanai, 20 June 1967, ChaimHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisson;DayantoYaffe,28June1967,ISA,6301/C-l(fileno.2);Weitz,MyDiary,vol.VI,p.250ff.
12. Letter to Adir Zik, 17 July 1967, with his kind permission; MichaelShashar,The Seventh-DayWar: TheDiary of theMilitaryGovernment inJudeaandSamaria(June-December1967) (inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatPoalim,1997),p.186;Weitz,MyDiary,vol.VI,p.257;Ben-Guriondiary,9June 1967, BGA; Ben-Gurion to Benyamin Nahari, 17 July 1967; Ben-Gurion diary, 27Aug. 1967;Ben-Gurion toZviBen-Erev, 30Aug. 1967;
Ben-GuriontoTebenkin,18Dec.1967,BGA.13.YehudaYosttoAdirZik,29July1967,withhiskindpermission;letterto
Penina Axelrod, 25 July 1967, with her kind permission; Yonah Hadari,MessiahRidingaTank(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:HartmanInstitute,2002),p.95.
14.Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.454;Tzabar,ed.,ScrollsofFire,vol.V,bookI,p.338;YehiamNewsletter(inHebrew)32/113,12July1967,p.6ff.;seealso:YehiamNewsletter(inHebrew)190/1,14Sept.1967,p.7ff.;Weitz,MyDiary,vol.VI,p.252.
15. Letters to Adir Zik, 22 July 1967, with his kind permission;Weitz,MyDiary, vol.VI, p. 267 (Gaza);p. 255 (refugees); p. 247 (birthrate); p. 252(“eyes glimmer”);Maariv, 26 June 1967, p. 3; Arie Lova Eliav,Rings ofTestimony(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,1983),p.287;Maariv,12June1967,p.3.
16.Weitz,MyDiary,vol.VI,pp.249ff.and262;YehiamFrior to theauthor;lettertoAdirZik,12July1967,withhiskindpermission(border).
17.Weitz,MyDiary, vol.VI, p. 254;Ha’aretz, 15 June 1967, p. 1; 18 June1967,p.6;Hayom,15June1967,p.1.
18. Rosenberger to Shazar, 3 July 1967; meeting summary, 5 July 1967;Sephardic Community Board to Eshkol, 11 July 1967, ISA, 6399/C-25;Weitz,MyDiary,vol.VI,p.266;Ha’aretz,21July1967,p.2(Leibowitz);seealso:Maariv,25Aug.1967,p.10;Davar,12Sept.1967,p.3;ArnontoEshkol, 30 Aug. 1967, ISA 6303/C-3; Eshkolot to Shapira, 2 Nov. 1967;EshkolottoEshkol,10Nov.1967,ISA5712/C-3;Maariv(Saturday),9June1967,p.1(twoidentities).
19.AlHaMishmar,9and16June1967,p.9.20.Governmentmeeting,11and15June1967,YaacovHerzogestate,withthe
kindpermissionofhisdaughter; see also:governmentmeeting,11and18June1967, ISA, 8164/A-6; 25 June1967, ISA, 8164/A-10; 26 June1967,ISA,8164/A-ll;Herzogdiary,17June1967,ISA,4511/A-3;Gvatidiary,11June1967,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02;RusktoU.S.EmbassyinIsrael, 17 June 1967, USNA, Box 1795, File 6/16/67; see also: Eban toEshkol,29June1967,ISA,7920/A-8;Ze’evitoShapira,22June1967,ISA,4089/HZ-14; Michael Shashar, Conversations with Rehavam Ze’evi (inHebrew) (TelAviv:YediotAharonot, 2001), p. 208ff.; Reuven Pedhatzur,TheVictoryofShame:TheStateofIsraelintheTerritoriesAftertheSix-DayWar (inHebrew) (TelAviv:YadTabenkin,1966),p.117ff.;Municipalities
OrdinanceAmendmentLaw, 27 June 1967,KnessetMinutes (inHebrew),vol. 49, p. 2421;Ha’aretz, 28 June 1967, p. 1; ShlomoGazit,TheCarrotandtheStick:MilitaryGovernmentinJudeaandSamaria(inHebrew)(TelAviv: Zmora-Bitan, 1985), p. 223ff.; Tkoa to Israeli Embassies, 26 June1967,ISA,7020/A-8;seealso:HarmantoForeignMinistry,29June1967,ISA,4089/HZ-14.
21.Maariv,8Oct.1967,p.1;ShiffmantoEshkol,5July1967,ISA,6301/C-l;Eshkol,Dayan,andothers inconsultation,3July1968, ISA,7921/A-5;AlHaMishmar,30June1967,p.1;Ha’aretz,30June1967,p.1;Maariv,2July1967,p.3;lettertoAdirZik,6July1967,withhiskindpermission.
22. Teddy Kollek, One Jerusalem (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Maariv,1979),p.215;Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.494;UziBenziman,Jerusalem:Unwalled City (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1973), p. 60; AlHaMishmar,30June1967,p.10;YediotAharonot,18June1967,p.5.
23.Weitz,MyDiary,vol.VI,pp.259,253.
CHAPTER17:VICTORYALBUMS
1.Maariv,16July1967,p.10.2.Mordechai Bar-On, “The Testimony of theMan Behind the Speech” (inHebrew) in The Second Decade, eds. Zvi Tzameret and Chana Yablonka(Jerusalem:YadBen-Zvi,2000),p.405ff.;TamarBrosh,ASpeechforEveryOccasion (inHebrew) (TelAviv:YediotAharonot, 1993), p. 60ff.;YonahHadari,MessiahRidingaTank (inHebrew) (Jerusalem:Hartman Institute,2002),p.96ff.;Ben-Gurion toRabin,28June1967,BGA;YitzhakRabin,ServiceBook (inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1979),vol. I,p.207;LaMerhav,11June1967,p.2(Megged).
3.Davar Le-Yeladim, 20 June 1967, p. 1160 (helicopter);Maariv, 13 June1967,p.16(Rabin);Maariv,23June1967,p.19(Gorodish,Sharonetal.);15Dec.1967,p.17;ShabtaiTeveth,ExposedintheTurret(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Schocken,1968),pp.152,100; see also:AlonGan, “TheDiscourseThatDied? ’DiscourseCulture’asanAttempt toDefineaSpecial Identityfor theSecondGenerationon theKibbutzim” (inHebrew) (diss.,TelAvivUniversity,2002),p.77ff.
4.Ha’aretz, 4 Aug. 1967, p. 11; Goldstein to Eshkol, 30 Aug. 1967, ISA,6303/C-6;AvishaitoEshkol,5Dec.1967,ISA,6304/C-18;ISA,6304/C-12(warmedals);Maariv,10Nov.1967,p.24(Zmora).
5.Maariv,15June1967,p.6(“betterthantheGermanarmy”);FromKunetra
to theCanal (inHebrew) (no identifiedpublisher,date,orpagenumbers);Gan,“TheDiscourseThatDied?”p.73ff.;seealso:Avner(Walter)Bar-On,TheUntoldStories:TheDiaryoftheHeadCensor(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1981),p.210.
6.Ha’aretz,20July1967,p.12(spectacle);4Aug.1967,p.9(show);21Aug.1967,p.5;24Aug.1967,p.2(reserve);seealso:theChiefofStaffwiththeMinister of Defense, 25 Aug. 1967, IDFA, 118/117/70;Ha’aretz, 8 Nov.1967,p.4(“TelAvivBurning”);11Dec.1967,p.4(“ThreeHoursinJune”).
7. “Six Days” (special edition of LaMatchil), AHA, P/200/17 (volunteers);Davar, 23 June 1967, p. 3 (“great spirit”); Yediot Aharonot (Shabbatsupplement), 21 July 1967, p. 5; best sellers: Shmuel Segev (inHebrew),Red Sheet: The Six-DayWar (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Tversky, 1967); EliLandau,JerusalemForever(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1967).
8.LettertoPeninaAxelrod,18June1967,withherkindpermission;lettertoRuthHaskal,26June1967,withthekindpermissionofHaskal.
9.YehiamNewsletter (inHebrew),334/16,22Sept.1967,pp.2,20;seealsoHa’aretz,5April1968,p.3.
10.AvrahamShapira,ed.,SoldiersTalk:EpisodesofListeningandObservation(inHebrew)(1970),p.119ff.
11.Ibid.;Gan,“TheDiscourseThatDied?”p.84ff.;Hadari,MessiahRidingaTank,p.96ff.
12.LettertoChaimHaskal,12June1967,withhiskindpermission.13.LettertoPeninaAxelrod,19June1967,withherkindpermission.14.MargotKlausnerarchives,CZA,A493/47;seealso:Ha’aretz,16Oct.1998,
p.12;31March1966,p.4(Klausner);YediotAharonot,30Oct.1967,p.7;31Oct.1967,p.7;1Nov.1967,p.7(others);HaTzofeh,12June1967,p.4;Ben-SassontoWarhaftig,27June1967,ISA,12251/GL-13(Temple).
15.Ben-Guriondiary,19June1967,BGA;Ha’aretz,20June1967,p.2;Ben-Gurion to Yosef Levi, 17 July 1967; Ben-Gurion to Shoshana Zehavi, 17July1967,BGA;Ha’aretz,21June1967,p.2.
16.HaTzofeh,24July1967,p.4(uprisingfallen);Herzogdiary,3Oct.1967,ISA, 4511/A-3 (proclamation); Ha’aretz, 19 June 1967, p. 45; YediotAharonot,15June1967,p.3(ArmonHanatziv);Ha’aretz,6July1967,p.3(Kollek);Maariv, 21 June 1967, p. 12; Chief of Staff meetings with theMinister ofDefense, 2Oct. 1967, IDFA, 118/117/70; Eshkol toDayan, 2Oct.1967,ISA,7231/A-2;YaffetoBen-Ami,15Oct.1967,ISA,6301/C-l
(Eshkol);Maariv,21June1967,p.12;Ha’aretz(supplement),16July1967,p.14ff.(Heker).
17.Araningovernmentmeeting,11June1967,ISA,8164/A-6;ISA,6302/C-7;ISA, 594/T-5 (proposals);Maariv, 12 June 1967, p. 6; see also: 15 June1967,p.6(“RabinHod”);16June1967,p.12;Ha’aretz,19June1967,p.2(“TheSixDays”);ZviZurannouncement,24July1967,IDFA,66/117/70;Maariv,11Aug.1967,p.14;seealso:Ha’aretz,14July1967,p.3(Begin);Maariv,15Dec.1967,p.17(Cohen).
18.NativtoEshkol,23Aug.1967,ISA,6301/C-l.19.ShemertoAldema,12June2004,withhiskindpermission;seealso:YediotAharonot,14April2000,p.30ff.
20. Allon to Eshkol, 20 Aug. 1967; Eshkol to Allon, 23 Aug. 1967, ISA,6405/C-2 (Druze); Herzog diary, 16 June 1967, ISA, 4511/A-3 (Harel);Urwick toMorris,7 July1967,PRO,FCO17/11 (Alaska); ISA,6303/C-8(Suez).
21.ShamgartoRabin,12July1967(withbillphotographs),IDFA,66/117/70;ordinance on issuing military Dinar, 9 July 1967, AHA, W/K/01; Gvatidiary, 29 June 1967, YTA, Unit 15, Container 12, File 02; GovernmentDecision 685, 23 July 1967, ISA, 10136/C-4; Bank of Israel documents,with the kind permission of the bank, copies in possession of the author;Yediot Aharonot (“7 Days” supplement), 14 May 1976, p. 16ff.; ChaimNirel, ed., Uzi Narkis: Pages Left on the Table (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv:SifriyaTzionit,2000),p.203ff.
CHAPTER18:THEENLIGHTENEDOCCUPATION
1.Ben-Guriondiary,17June1967;29Nov.1967,BGA;TeddyKollek,OneJerusalem(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1979),p.222ff.;ForeignMinistry to London Embassy, 14 July 1967, ISA, 4088/HZ-9; Bruce toSecretaryofState,3Jan.1968,USNA,Box1831;LewentoMoberly,7Dec.1967,PRO,FCO17/212/104255.
2.ISA,594/C-16.3. Zur to Herzog, 24 Nov. 1963, Chaim Herzog estate, with the kindpermissionof his son;ChaimHerzog,WayofLife (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Yediot Aharonot, 1997), p. 210;Michael Shashar, The Seventh-DayWar:The Diary of the Military Government in Judea and Samaria (June-December 1967) (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Poalim, 1997), p. 67;YehudaHarel,TheSix-DayWar:FromtheJournalofaReligiousJournalist
(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:MinistryofEducation,1999),p.29;ShlomoGazit,TheCarrot and the Stick:MilitaryGovernment in Judea and Samaria (inHebrew)(TelAviv:Zmora-Bitan,1985),pp.19,25.
4. Command and Staff School (Class 13, 1966–67), Taking Control ofOccupiedTerritories(abstract,inHebrew);IDFOperationsBranch/TrainingDepartment, Taking Control of Occupied Territories (in Hebrew) (1960);MilitaryPowersinanOccupiedTerritory(1961),ChaimHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisson.
5.ZviTzabar,ed.,ScrollsofFire(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,1981),vol.V,bookI,p.476;ShabtaiTeveth,TheBlessedCurse(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Schocken,1969).
6. Field security guidelines, 9 July 1967, ISA, 4095/HZ-7; Dayan in thegovernment,18June1967,ISA,8164/A-7;Gazit,TheCarrotandtheStick,pp.56(tractors),42.
7.Herzog,WayofLife, p. 210;MichaelBarZohar,ZaphenathPaneah:TheLifeandTimesofaJewishPrince(inHebrew)(TelAviv:YediotAharonot,2003),p.13.
8.Gazit,TheCarrotandtheStick,pp.46,52;DanBavli,DreamsandMissedOpportunities,1967–1973(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Carmel,2002),p.159.
9.Distributionchart,ISA,4095/HZ-7;seealso:“TheStructureoftheCivilianBranchoftheMilitaryGovernmentintheWestBank,”July251967,ISA,4095/HZ-6; Board of Director Generals minutes, 18 Sept. 1967, IDFA,70/117/70;seealso:“OperatingtheMilitaryGovernmentintheWestBank,”10 June 1967, ChaimHerzog estate,with the kind permission of his son;“Military Government, Structure and Authorities,” 17 Sept. 1967, IDFA,70/117/70;Committees:ISA,7921/A-2.
10.MilitaryGovernmentStaff,12July1967,ISA,4095/HZ-7;“SurveyoftheJewishHolySites in theWestBank,” July1967, ISA,4095/HZ-6;Sashar,TheSeventh-DayWar,p.109.
11.WarhaftigtoDayan,2Aug.1967;DayantoWarhaftig,3Aug.1967,ISA,6301/C-l;otherquarrels:Eisenstadt andPatenkin toEshkol,13 July1967,ISA,6301/C-l.
12. Summary of restricted committeemeeting, 4 Jan. 1968, ISA, 4608/GL-l;NotestotheStateComptroller’sReport,5Feb.1968,ISA,4608/GL-l.
13.Gazit,TheCarrotandtheStick,pp.76,78;ShmuelHachamtoEshkol,6July1967;RonSayagtoEshkol,18July1967,ISA,6301/C-l(File4).
14.CentralCommandStaffmeeting summary, 4 July 1967, ISA, 4095/HZ-6(soap);WeeklyGovernmentReport,GolanHeights, 13Sept. 1967, IDFA,70/117/70 (prices); Staff Officer for the Treasury to the Deputy Chief ofStaff, 1 Jan. 1968, ISA, 4608/GL-l (income tax); Cohen to Minister ofDefenseoffice,14June1968,7921/A-5(complaints);“DeterminingtheFateofGoodsLeftinWarehousesintheGolan,”18Jan.1968,StaffOfficerfortheGeneralAccountant,1Feb.1968, ISA,4680/GL-l;RabinwithEshkol,29Sept.1967,IDFA,118/117/70;MilitaryGovernmentStaffmeeting,223June 1967, Chaim Herzog estate, with the kind permission of his son;Director Generals Committee minutes, 18 Sept. 1967, IDFA, 70/117/70(telegrams); Weekly Government Report for Gaza Strip, 19 Sept. 1967,IDFA, 70/117/70 (lifeguards); additional government ordinances, ISA,6301/C-l4; Report on the Civil Administrations’ activities, 23 July 1967,ISA,4095/HZ-6.
15. Shashar, The Seventh Day War, p. 97; Moshe Dayan, Milestones (inHebrew) (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1982), vol. II, p. 503; Bawly, Dreams andMissedOpportunities,p.162ff.;AriehBrown,PersonalSeal:MosheDayanintheSix-DayWarandAfterward(inHebrew)(TelAviv:YediotAharonot,1997), p. 170ff.; Mordechai Bentov, Time Will Tell: Memories from theDecision Period (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Poalim, 1984), p. 158;Teveth,TheCurseoftheBlessing,p.167ff.
16. Board of Directors General, 16 Dec. 1967, ISA, 4608/GL-2 (support);Gazit,TheCarrotandtheStick,p.218(summervisits).
17.TheCommitteefortheWestBank,19July1967,withthekindpermissionofMosheSasson.
18. Mining Supervisor to Deputy Minister of Defense, 19 Dec. 1967, ISA,4608/GL-l;Shashar,TheSeventhDayWar,p.114;AllontoDayan,13Sept.1967,ISA,7921/A-3;Gazit,TheCarrotandtheStick,p.349ff.
19.Herzogdiary,31July1697,ISA,4511/A-3;governmentdecisions,10,23,and 31 July 1967 (lira);Government decision no. 42, 5Nov. 1967 (UN);government decision no. 41, 5 Nov. 1967 (revocation), ISA, 10136/C-5;limited committee, 2 Jan. 1968;Hivner todeputydirector generals, 7 Jan.1968 (certificate); Board ofDirectorsGeneral, 14 Jan. 1968 (integration);Board of Directors General, 12 Feb. 1968, ISA, 4608/GL-l; see also:guidelines for preparing the budget of the civil administration in theterritories,5Nov.1967,ISA,8122/GL-6;Hiramtoministerialcommittee,3Oct. 1967 (traffic arrangements), ISA, 6301-C-9 (customs); encouragingIsraeli factories in the territories, 17 Oct. 1968; Gazit at the Board of
DirectorsGeneral,2Dec.1968,ISA,4608/GL-2(reactors);seealso:Reporton the Military Government’s activities, 23 July 1967, ISA, 4095/HZ-6;weeklyactivityreport,19Sept.1967,ISA,4095/HZ-4.
20.Avner Falk,MosheDayan, theManand theLegend:APsychoanalyticalBiography(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1985),p.263;Ha’aretz,7July1967,p.3;HaOlamHaZeh,4Oct.1967,p.10.
21. Herzog,Way of Life, p. 223; Shabtai Teveth, Exposed in the Turret (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Schocken,1968),p.307;Herzogdiary,12 June1967,ISA,4511/A-3;Gazit,TheCarrotand theStick,p.83ff.;MichaelShashar,Conversations with Rehavam Ze’evi (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: YediotAharonot,2001),p.124.
22. Hadow to Moore, 13 Sept. 1967, PRO, FCO 17/506; Moshe Dayan,VietnamDiary (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1977), pp. 68, 111, 138; seealso: Gazit, The Carrot and the Stick, pp. 39, 48; Ben-Gurion in thegovernment,25Nov.and23Dec.1956,ISA;Brown,PersonalSeal,p.64.
23.Shashar,TheSeventh-DayWar,p.84ff.;BenMenachemtoEshkol,7Nov.1967;Terloopinion,27Dec.1967,ISA,6301/C-l.
24.GershoniandGazittotheChiefofStaffOffice,takingstepsagainstNablus,20and21Sept.1967,IDFA,70/117/70;Gazit,TheCarrotandtheStick,p.307ff.; see also: West Bank Affairs, 16 Nov. 1967, PRO, FCO17/212/104225.
25.Ha’aretz,3Nov.1967,p.3;memorandum,15June1967, ISA,4088/HZ-10.
26.Dayan,Milestones,vol. I,p.38ff.;weeklymilitarygovernment report forGazaStrip, 13 and20Sept. 1967;weekly activity report for the occupiedterritories,22Sept.1967;actsofsabotageinandfromwithintheWestBank,25 Sept. 1967, IDFA, 70/117/70; biweeklymilitary government report forGazaStrip,26Dec.1967,IDFA,75/117/70;Gazit,TheCarrotandtheStick,pp.185,273,276ff.,293,297ff.;USNA,Box271(Sofronian).
27.PsychologicalWarfare,5Sept.1967, ISA,Unit429/10/L-79;KolHair, 4June1999,p.84ff.;Gazit,TheCarrotandtheStick,p.133.
28. Avneri and Dayan in the Knesset, 20 Dec. 1967, Knesset Minutes (inHebrew),vol.50,p.488;seealso:HilleltoIsraeliembassies,23Nov.1967.
29.GilboatoLevi,21Nov.1967,YEA,copyinpossessionoftheauthor;seealso:Avneri andDayan in theKnesset, 1Aug. 1967,KnessetMinutes (inHebrew),vol.49,p.2814.
30.Vardireport,undated(probablySept.1967),ISA,4096/HZ-4;seealso:U.S.Consulate in Jerusalem, Department of State, 30 Aug. 1967, USNA, Box1800.
31. IbrahimTawasha toEshkol, 21Oct. 1967; Pado toYaffe, 17Nov. 1967,ISA, 6405/C-2; Shashar, The Seventh-DayWar, p. 208;Ha’aretz, 12 Oct.1967,pp.1,2;AvneritoKol,20Aug.1968,LSA3497/C-1.
32.Gazit,TheCarrot and the Stick, p. 61; see also: “TwoYears ofMilitaryGovernment:DataontheActivitiesoftheCivilAdministrationonJudeaandSamaria,intheGazaStrip,andinNorthernSinai1967–1969”(inHebrew),internalreport,May1969,ChaimHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisson.
33.BaMachaneh, 4 Oct. 1967, p. 13; see also: Benor to Kantrowitz, 7 Jan.1968,ISA,4601/GL-ll.
34. Hamdi Kanaan with Dayan, 31 Aug. 1968; Hamdi Kanaan and AzizShehade with Dayan, 21 April 1968, with the kind permission of MosheSasson.
35.Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.534.36. Shlomo Gazit, Suddenly Trapped: 30 Years of Israeli Policy in theTerritories(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Zmora-Bitan,1999),p.218.
37.ShabtaiTeveth,MosheDayan(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Schocken,1971),p.600ff.
38.Dayan,Milestones,vol.II,p.537.39. “Two Years of Military Government” (in Hebrew), internal report, May
1969,pp.5,31,estateofChaimHerzog,withthekindpermissionofhisson;meeting of education supervisors in the administered territories, 11 Sept.1967,ISA,5603/C-4.
40.Ministry ofEducation andCulture, SlanderousWritings inTextbooks (inHebrew), p. 2, ISA, 5603/C-4; Chava Lazarus-Yaffe, “Guidelines forResearchingArabTextbooks”(inHebrew),TheNewEast,vol.17,book3–4(67–68),1967,p.207ff.
41.YosefArgeman,ItWasTopSecret:30IntelligenceandSecurityAffairsinIsrael(inHebrew)(TelAviv:MinistryofDefense,2002),p.253ff.
42.GadishtoAran,3Sept.1967,ISA,5603/C-4.43.“TwoYearsofMilitaryGovernment,”pp.6,31;seealso:GadishtoAran,1
Nov. 1967, 1Dec. 1967, ISA, 5603/C-4; notes on the StateComptroller’sReport,5Feb.1968,ISA,4608/GL-l.
44.Uzai toAran,9Aug.1967, ISA,5603/C-4;ministerialmeeting, 17Sept.1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kind permission of his daughter;protest posters, ISA, 5603/C-4; see also: Farhi to Narkis, 19 Sept. 1967,IDFA, 70/117/70; Lewen to Moberly, 21 Sept. 1967, PRO, FCO17/212/104225.
CHAPTER19:TEDDY’SPROJECT1.ChaimHerzog,WayofLife(inHebrew)(TelAviv:YediotAharonot,1997),p.219;Ha’aretz, 28 June1967,p.2;BoardofDirectorsGeneral,26 June1967; Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem, 21 June 1967, with the kindpermissionofMeronBenvenisti.
2. Ben-Gurion diary, 6 July 1966, BGA; Kollek at City Council, 16 April1967, JMA,Container2295,FileNo.5;TeddyKollek,OneJerusalem (inHebrew) (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Maariv, 1979); ISA, 6397/C-2; NaomiShepherd,TeddyKollek,Mayor of Jerusalem (NewYork: Harper Collins,1988).
3.UziBenziman,Jerusalem:UnwalledCity(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Schocken,1973), p. 61ff.; Kollek at the Israeli Management Center, 19 Feb. 1968,ChaimHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisson.
4.ISA,5688/C-l;YediotAharonot,1Aug.1967,p.4.5. Arbel to Kollek, 21 July 1967, with the kind permission of MeronBenvenisti, copy in possession of the author; Old JerusalemCity Councilmembers(undated),JMA,Container1331,Six-DayWarfile.
6. Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem, 21 June 1967; Board of DirectorsGeneral, 26 June 1967, quoted with the kind permission of MeronBenvenisti,copyinpossessionoftheauthor;seealso:proposaltoreorganizethe municipal administration in the liberated municipal territory, 28 June1967, ISA, (2)6303/C-l;Minister of Justice toMinister of Finance, 3 Jan.1968, ISA, 4601/CL-ll (property); Kollek to Eshkol, 27 Nov. 1967, ISA,6306/C-l(pensionsformunicipalworkers);ShapiratoEshkol,28June1967,ISA, 6301/C-l (municipality assets);Minister of Justice toPrimeMinister,14March1968(absenteeassets);14March1968(citizenship),YEA,copiesinpossessionoftheauthor.
7. Yonatan Shlonsky, ed., Jerusalem Master-Plan 1968 (in Hebrew)(Jerusalem:JerusalemMunicipality,1972),p.29;Ha’aretz,21July1967,p.16(Benvenisti);KukiatoDirectorGenerals,18July1967,ISA,5688/C-l.
8. Central Command Headquarters, East Jerusalem Discussion Platform, 11
Sept. 1967; Problems of handling East Jerusalem, 15 Sept. 1967, IDFA,70/117/70;Kollekat the IsraeliManagementCenter,19Feb.1968,ChaimHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisson.
9.AlHaMishmar,12Nov.1967,p.3;Ha’aretz,15Nov.1967,p.5.10.PorathYoseftoEshkol,27June1967,ISA,6302/C-l;TheYeshivabytheKotel to Eshkol, 3 Sept. 1967;HistadrutHaNoarHaOvedVeHaLomed toTamir,16Oct.1967,YEA,copyinpossessionoftheauthor.
11.Ha’aretz, 27 Nov. 1967, p. 1 (bus route 9);Maariv, 3 July 1967, p. 3(advertising);Maariv, 26 June 1967, p. 2 (Agnon); 7 July 1967, p. 6 (Al-Sheikh);Maariv (Days andNights), 16 June 1967, p. 19 (Luz); see also:Maariv,16June1967,p.19(Hebron);Maariv (DaysandNights),21July1967,p.13(GushEtzion);25Sept.1967,p.11(GolanMountains).
12.Ha’aretz, 28 June1967, p. 10 (evacuation);The JewishQuarter,ActivityReport,23Dec.1968,ISA,7920/A-8;TamirtoYaffe,30Aug.1967,YEA,copyinpossessionoftheauthor;seealso:ISA,12252/CL-l;UzaitoPrimeMinister,16Aug.1967,ISA,6030/C-l(“GreaterJerusalem”);EshkolattheMinisterialCommitteeforJerusalemAffairs,25Sept.1967(“Bukra”);Planto settle tens of thousands of families in Jerusalem, 5 Sept. 1967, ISA,7920/A-8.
13.SapirtoShapira,5July1967,ShapiratoSapir,29June1967,ISA,6303/C-l; Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem Affairs, 25 Sept. 1967; Eshkol atForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,25June1967,ISA,7920/A-8.
14. Tamir to Yaffe, 30 Aug. 1967, YEA (survey), copy in possession of theauthor; Argov to Yaish, 15 Oct. 1967, ISA, 4096/HZ-4 (“the world”);Barbour toDepartmentofState,26Jan.1968;Campbell toDepartmentofState,6June,20June1968,USNA,Box2252;YaffetoKollekandothers,29Feb.1968,ISA,7920/A-8(“noadvertising”).
15. Government decision, 12 Dec. 1967, Uzai to District Commissioner, 28Dec. 1967, Eban to government secretariat, 3 Dec. 1967; ISA, 6303/C-3;YaffetoTamir,3Jan.1968,ISA,7238/A-8(school);EbantoEshkol,22Jan.1968, YEA;Amnon toAdi, 19Dec. 1967, ISA, 6301/C-l; see also: ISA,7920/A-8 (hospital);Yaffe to Tamir, 3 Jan. 1968, ISA, 7232/A-8 (A-Tur);purchasingterritoriesinEastJerusalem,11Jan.1968,JMA,Container1331,Six-Day War (treasury); Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem Affairs, 27Dec. 1967, ISA, 6303/C-3 (no advertising); Symbols and CeremoniesCommittee,18June1967,ISA,10136/C-3(stamp).
16.ThalmannMission,UNA,DAG1/2.3,Box1347,File1066;Box138,File
1076–1087;EshkolinForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,2July1968,ISA, 7921/A-6; Warhaftig to Eshkol, 12 Aug. 1967, YEA, copy inpossessionoftheauthor;RabintoForeignMinistry,5May1968,Eshkolinthegovernment,5May1968,ISA,7921/A-6;HarmantoForeignMinistry,9June1967,ISA,7919/A-2.
17.Governmentmeeting,25June1967,ISA,8164/A-19;Herzogdiary,14June1967,ISA,4511/A-3.
18. Open letter to government ministers, 24 July 1967, ISA, (4) 6301/C-l;EliezerShostakandYaakovShimshonShapiraintheKnesset,18July1967,KnessetMinutes(inHebrew),vol.49,p.2643ff.
19.EbantoIsraeldelegationtotheUN,19and22June1967;TekoatoRosen,8Sept.1967; ISA,4086/HZ-l;Moberly toAspin,27 July1967,PRO,FO961/25UNADAG1/2.3,Box134,File1041;Ben-Zur toKollek, 16 July1971,withthekindpermissionofMeronBenvenisti.
20.Governmentmeeting,11and18June1967,ISA,8164/A-6.21.Eban toEshkol, 23Aug. 1967, ISA, 6342/C-l;Galili toEshkol, 25Sept.
1967;GalilitoGovernmentSecretariat,1Oct.1967,ISA,6306/C-l;MeronBenvenisti, The Slingshot and the Stick: Territories, Jews and Arabs (inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,1988),p.136ff.
22.BarbourtoDepartmentofState,22March1968;CampbelltoDepartmentofState,3April1967,USNA,Box2228,FilePOL18.
23.BarbourtoDepartmentofState,7July1967,USNA,Box2228,FilePOL18; Ha’aretz, 3 July 1967, p. 2; 4 July 1967, p. 2; Meron Benvenisti,Opposite the Closed Wall: Divided and Unified Jerusalem (in Hebrew)(Jerusalem:WeidenfeldandNicolson,1973),p.283ff.;seealso:Ha’aretz,5June1968,p.7.
24.TheJewishPopulation’sAttitudeTowardtheArabPopulation,andKollektoEshkol,11March1968,ISA,7920/A-8;Ezrachiinletter,14Aug.1967,withthekindpermissionofherson.
25.YehudaAmichai,Songsof Jerusalem (TelAviv: Schocken, 1987), p. 52;EnglishtranslationbyStephenMitchell,fromPoemsofJerusalemandLovePoems (New York: Sheep Meadow Press, 1992), p. 45; Bar-Chaim toDirectorGeneral, 14 July 1967, ISA, 4088/HZ-9;AlHaMishmar, 23 June1967,p.7;Maariv,19Dec.1967,p.3;seealso:Ha’aretz,23June1967,p.9.
26. Hala Sakakini, Jerusalem and I: A Personal Record (Amman: [nopublisher], 1987), p. Iff.; see also:Maariv, 13 Sept. 1967, p. 20; 27Sept.
1967,p.17;Shapirainthegovernment,11June1967,ISA,8164/A-6.27.Government decision 692, 27 July 1967,with the kind permission of the
government secretariat, copy in possession of the author; uprising posters(Hebrew),ISA,4095/HZ-5;CentralCommandHeadquarters,17Sept.1967,IDFA, 70/117/70; uprising posters (English), Campbell to Department ofState,3Oct.1967,USNA,Box2228,POL23.
28.Begininthegovernment,29July1967,YaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermission of his daughter; Michael Shashar, The Seventh-Day War: TheDiary of theMilitaryGovernment in Judea and Samaria (June-December1967)(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatPoalim,1977),p.149.
29.LewentoMoberly,21Sept.1967,PRO,FCO17/212/104225.30.Ha’aretz,29Sept.1967,p.6;seealso:EhudYaari,Fatah(inHebrew)(Tel
Aviv:LevinEpstein,1970).31.EitantoForeignMinistry,1Aug.1967,ISA,4088/HZ-6.32.Trialprotocol,copyinpossessionof theauthor;seealso:BaMachaneh,1
July 1969, p. 12; Shlomo Gazit, The Carrot and the Stick: MilitaryGovernment in Judea and Samaria (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan,1985),p.298;seealso:Ha’aretz,16Oct.1967,p.2;governmentdecisionno.22,29Oct.1967,IDFA,70/117/70.
33.Bosmireport,25Sept.1967,IDFA,70/117/70.34.Ha’aretz,9Oct.1967,p.1;11Oct.1967,p.6;25Oct.1967,p.14;Sarah
Ozacky-Lazar, Yehuda (in Hebrew) (privately published memorial book,1989).
35.CampbelltoRusk,26March1967,USNA,Box2252,POL28;Benvenisti,OppositetheClosedWall,p.268ff.
36.Mayoranddeputies,10Oct.1967, JMA,Container1331; student survey,YaelHighSchool,Bat-Yam,Oct. 1967, ISA, (7) 6303/C-l (marking cars);MasudaShalemtoEshkol,10Oct.1967,ISA,(7)6301/C-l(schoolguards);ShimkintoEshkol,18Oct.1967,ISA,(8)6301/C-l(repository);NaftalitoEshkol, 9 Oct. 1967, ISA, (9) 6301/C-l (hanging); Hacham to Eshkol, 11Dec. 1967, ISA, (10) 6301/C-l (shooting); Greisman to Eshkol, 10 Dec.1967, ISA, (10) 6301/C-l (dogs);Ha’aretz, 13 Oct. 1967, p. 3; see also:MosheDayanintheKnesset,15Nov.1967,KnessetMinutes (inHebrew),vol.50,p.162.
37.Eshkolathonorarycitizenshipceremony,26May1967,ISA,7920/A-8.
CHAPTER20:FACE-TO-FACEWITHISHMAEL
1. Sandstormdocumentation, 20 July, 22 July, 25 July, 7Aug. 1967,LBJL,NSFCountryFile,MiddleEast,Box113;RusktoU.S.EmbassyinJordan,23July1967,USNA,Box1792;RemeztoForeignMinistry,14June1967,Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kind permission of his daughter; Herzogdiary,15Juneand19July1967,ISA,4511/A-3.
2.EphraimKishonandDosh,SorryWeWon (inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv, 1967) (no page numbers); Herzog Diary, 29 Aug. 1968, ISA,4511/A-4;EzerWeizman,ForYou the Sky, for You the Land (inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1975),p.270.
3.Maariv,13June1967,p.1.4.AbbaEban,LifeEpisodes (inHebrew) (TelAviv: SifriyatMaariv, 1978),vol. II, p. 430; Prime Minister’s Office, Publicity Center,Know What toReply(inHebrew),BookOne,Aug.1967,p.16;BookFour,June1968,p.3;AviShlaim,The IronWall: Israel and the ArabWorld (inHebrew) (NewYork:Norton,2000),p.254.
5.Gvatidiary,19June1967,YTA,Unit15,Container12,File02.6.Ben-Gurionannouncements,18June1967,BGA,File1087.7.Governmentmeetings,18 June1967, ISA,8164/A-6;19 June1967, ISA,8164/A-8andISA,8164/A-9;SecurityCabinet,governmentmeetings,15–19 June 1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kind permission of hisdaughter;seealso:Davar,2June1987,p.13;5June1987,p.19;DayanintheLaborParty,18June1968,YTA,Unit15—Allon,Container3,File2;Dayan with Eshkol et al., 29 May 1968, ISA, 7921/A-4; Eshkol in thegovernment,19 June1968,7921/A-6; see also:YemimaRosenthal,ArnonLemfrum,andHagaiTzoref,Eds.,LeviEshkol,theThirdPrimeMinister(inHebrew)Jerusalem:IsraelStateArchive,2002),p.580;ReuvenPedhatzur,TheVictoryofShame:TheEshkolGovernmentPolicyintheTerritoriesAftertheSix-DayWar(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Bitan,1996),pp.43ff.,124ff.
8.HarmantoEshkol,9June1967;HarmantoForeignMinistry,8Jun1967,ISA,7919/A-9; 21 June1967, ISA,7938/A-10;Barbour toRusk, 16 June1967,USNA,Box1795;FRUS,vol.XIX,pp.483ff.
9.Herzogdiary,18June1967(governmentdiscussion);14and19July1967(before Hussein); ISA, 4511/A-3; Moshe Dayan,Milestones (in Hebrew)(Jerusalem: Idanim, 1982), vol. II, p. 490ff.; resolution drafts, notesexchanges,andmeetingsummaries;15–18June1967;governmentmeeting,15June1967(Aran),YaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhis
daughter.10.Michael Bar Zohar,Zaphenath Paneah: The Life and Times of a JewishPrince (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2003), p. 234; U.S.Embassy in Jordan toDepartmentofState,18 Jan.1968,FRUS,vol.XX,Doc.No.50.
11.U.S.Embassy in Jordan toDepartmentofState, 9 Jan.1968,FRUS,vol.XX,Doc.No.42.
12. Summary ofHerzogmeetingwithHussein, 2 July 1967,YaacovHerzogestate, with the kind permission of his daughter; Herzog diary, 29 Aug.1967, ISA, 4511/A-4; see also: Bar Zohar, Zaphenath Paneah, p. 284;Moshe Zak, Hussein Makes Peace (in Hebrew) (Ramat-Gan: Bar-IlanUniversity, 1996); Avi Shlaim, “His Royal Shyness: King Hussein andIsrael,”NewYorkReviewofBooks,15July1999,p.14ff.
13.DavidKimcheandDanBawly,Firestorm (inHebrew) (TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1968);DanBawly,DreamsandMissedOpportunities,1967–1973(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Carmel,2002),p.120.
14.Bawly,DreamsandMissedOpportunities,p.133.15.KimchetoheadofIntelligenceBranch,12and13June1967;Proposal to
ResolvethePalestinianProblem,withthekindpermissionofMosheSasson;Bawly,DreamsandMissedOpportunities, p. 146;Hillel toEban, 12 June1967, ISA, 4088/HZ-10; Danin, Palmon, and Yekutieli Memorandum, 12June1967, ISA,4096/HZ-14;seealso:Hillel toEban,15June1967, ISA,4088/HZ-10.
16.Memorandum, Committee of Heads of Services, 30 June 1967, with thekindpermissionofMosheSasson;seealso:MosheSasson:WithNoRoundTable(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,2004).
17.TomSegev,OnePalestine,Complete: Jews andArabsUnder theBritishMandate(inHebrew)Jerusalem:Keter,1999),p.222ff.;HillelCohen,TheShadowArmy:PalestinianCollaboratorsinServiceofZionism(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Ivrit,2004).
18.MeetingoftheCommitteefortheWestBank,19July1967,withthekindpermissionofMosheSasson.
19. Memorandum, the Committee of Four, 5 July 1967, with the kindpermissionofMosheSasson.
20. The Political Leadership on theWest Bank, 18 June 1967; conversationwithJaabari,7July1967,withthekindpermissionofMosheSasson.
21. Sasson to Eban, end of July 1967, with the kind permission of MosheSasson; summary of impressions from conversations with West Bankdignitaries,6–18July1967,ChaimHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisson;activityamongPalestinians,undated,ISA,7921/A-6.
22. The Inter-Office Ministerial Committee to Eshkol, 20 July 1967, ISA,4088/HZ-6;TheCommitteeofHeadsofServices toEshkol,27July1967,withthekindpermissionofMosheSasson.
23. Sasson with Capucci, 28 Feb. 1968, with the kind permission ofMosheSasson;seealso:FarhitoNarkis,24Sept.1967,ISA,4095/HZ-14.
24.NusseibehwithEshkol,6Feb.1968;NusseibehwithSasson,11Feb.1968;SassonwithCapucci,13May1968,withthekindpermissionofSasson.
25.Dayaninmeetingofministers,29May1968,ISA,7291/A-4.26.SassonwithAzizShehade,18March1968;discussionwiththeMinisterof
Defense,6April 1968;HamdiKanaanwithDayan,31Aug.1968;HamdiKanaanandAzizShehadewithDayan,21April1968;SassonwithCapucci,13May1968;reportandguidelinesfromthePrimeMinister,9April1968,withthekindpermissionofMosheSasson.
27.SassontoEshkol,24Jan.1968;discussionbrief,11Feb.1968;EshkolwithAyubMusalem,5Feb.1968;Eshkolwith Jaabari,12Aug.1968,with thekind permission of Moshe Sasson; see also: meeting on the West BankArabs,6Dec.1967,ISA,7921/A-3;HerzogtoDayan,7July1967,ChaimHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisson.
28.Eshkolinconsultationwithministers,21May1968,ISA,7921/A-4.29.EshkolwithAzizShehade, 5Feb. 1968;AnwarNusseibeh, 6Feb. 1968;
Hikmatal-MasriandwithWalidel-Shak’a,26Feb.1968;TaisirKanaan,24April1968;AnwarKhatib,25April1968;Nassera-DinNashashibi,27May1968,withthekindpermissionofMosheSasson.
30.U.S.EmbassyinIsraeltoDepartmentofState,13June1967,USNA,Box1794;Feb.20,1968,Box2227;U.S.ConsulateinJerusalem,17June1967,Box1795;30Aug.1967and12Sept.1967,Box1800;5Dec.1967,Box2224;20May1968and12June1968,Box2228.
31.SassontoEshkol(draft),8May1967,withthekindpermissionofMosheSasson; consultation on the Arabs in the territories, 21 May 1968, ISA,7921/A-4.
32.Consultationon theArabproblem,3July1968, ISA,7921/A-5; seealso:Shlomo Gazit, Suddenly Trapped: 30 Years of Israeli Policy in the
Territories (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan, 1999), p. 182ff.;consultationontheArabsintheterritories,21May1968,ISA,7921/A-4.
CHAPTER21:THEBLUNDER1.Davar,29Sept.1967,p.3.2.Weeklymeeting,4June1965,ISA,7925/A-8.3. Population Census 1967, Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel AnnualYearbook (in Hebrew), no. 18, 1967, p. 593; Bacci and Dvoretzky withEshkol,6Dec.1967,ISA,7921/A-3.
4. Ben-Gurion diary, 1 June 1967; Ben-GurionDiary, 14Dec. 1967, BGA;discussionwithBen-Gurion,23June1961,ISA,7936/A-6;seealso:DavidBen-Gurion,TheNewlyEmergingStateofIsrael(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,1969),vol.II,p.845.
5.Shertok toGoldman,14June1948,YehoshuaFreundlich,ed.,DocumentsontheForeignPolicyofIsrael(inHebrew)Jerusalem:IsraelStateArchive,1981), vol. I, p. 163; Yemima Rosenthal, Arnon Lemfrum, and HagaiTzoref,eds.,LeviEshkol,theThirdPrimeMinister(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:IsraelStateArchive,2002),p.250.
6.LevontintoEshkol,12June1967,ISA,5603/C-4;KatztoEshkol,15June1967, ISA, 6301/C-l; see also: ISA, 6301/C-l (4);Yesha toBen-Gurion, 8June 1967, BGA;Winshel to Ben-Gurion, 25 June 1967; Arthur Katz toBen-Gurion,19 June1967;Goertz toAllon,15 June1967,YTA,Unit15,Series B, Container 16, File 6;Ha’aretz, 2April 1967, p. 1 (EshkolwithSartre); ShlomoGazit,ThePalestinianRefugeeProblem (inHebrew) (TelAviv: Tel Aviv University, 1994); Dan Bawly, Dreams and MissedOpportunities,1967–1973(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Carmel,2002),p.104ff.
7.Ha’aretz,18June1967,p.2;seealso:21June1967,p.2;Maariv,15Sept.1967,p.13;17Sept.1967,p.9;YediotAharonot,16July1967,p.8.
8.Ben-Guriondiary,1June1967;14Dec.1967,BGA;discussionwithBen-Gurion, 23 June 1961, ISA, 7936/A-6; see also: Ben-Gurion, The NewlyEmerging State of Israel, vol. II, p. 845; Elisha Efrat, Geography ofOccupation (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Carmel, 2002), p. 139;BennyMorris,TheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblem,1947–1949(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,1987).
9. Devorah Kaplan, The Truth on the Arab Refugee Problem (in Hebrew)(Jerusalem:Meod,1956);seealso:LordSieffofPrimtontoChancellor,June13,1967,PRO,T217/950/104225.
10.YehielIlsartoDirectorGeneral,18June1967,ISA,4088/HZ-7;AvnertoBen-Horin,8Aug.1967, ISA,4088/HZ-7; seealso:Shacham toYaffe,27June 1967, ISA, 6301/C-l; Hillel to Eban, 6 Sept. 1967, ISA, 7931/A-2;BernsteintoHarman,21June1967,ISA,3979/HZ-9.
11.KintnertoJohnson,12June1967,LBJL,ND19,CO1–6,Box193;RemeztoForeignMinistry,12 July1967, ISA,4089/HZ-2;Remez toHerzog,13Dec. 1967, ISA, 4092/HZ-5; see also: ISA, 7234/A-9; see also: Sapir toForeignMinistry,25Sept.1967,ISA,3979/HZ-9;SafdietoBentov,10Jan.1968;BentovtoEshkol,24Jan.1968;EbantoBentov,4Feb.1968,YEA,copiesinpossessionoftheauthor;seealso:ISA,7234A-9;721A-2.
12.Herzogdiary,7Sept.1967,ISA,4511/A-3;YaffetoSuzyEban,6Feb.and3June1968(Rothschild);TzipporitoYaffe,28March1968;Ben-DavidandGnichovski to Taub, 5 March 1968 (World Bank), all YEA, copies inpossessionoftheauthor;ReudorManor,seriesofinterviewswithAvrahamHarman,HebrewUniversity,InstituteforInternationalRelations,meeting4,14Aug.1974,p.15,withthekindpermissionofDavidHarman.
13. Ben-Gurion in the government, 23 Dec. 1956, ISAminutes;Ha’aretz, 9Nov.1967,p.2(Peres).
14.KnabtoEshkol,11June1967,EshkoltoKnab,27June1967,ISA,6301/C-l;YagartoYaffe,1Aug.1967,ISA,6303/C-l.
15.Governmentmeeting,15 June1967,YaacovHerzogestate,with thekindpermission of his daughter; Allon in government meeting, 30 July 1967,minutesinpossessionoftheauthor;seealso:YigalAllon,StrivingforPeace(inHebrew)(TelAviv:HaKibbutzHaMeuchad,1989);Rosenthaletal.,eds.,LeviEshkol,pp.56,581ff.;seealso:SassontoEshkol,15June1967,withthekindpermissionofMosheSasson.
16.Governmentresolution,19June1967,ISA,7921/A-2;governmentmeeting,19 June 1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kind permission of hisdaughter;seealso:Davar,2June1987,p.13.
17.Arnon to Sapir, 25 June 1967, ISA, 4601/CL-ll; Gvati to Shilo, 30 June1967, ISA, 6301/C-l; Eshkol to Bacci, 20 July 1967, review of the socialproblemsintheoccupiedterritories,20Sept.1967,YEA,copyinpossessionof the author; see also:Government Secretariat to PrimeMinister, 8Aug.1967;HilleltoEban,8Sept.1967,ISA,7921/A-2;EbantoBentov,4Feb.1968,YEA,copyinpossessionoftheauthor;seealso:KomeitoHarman,22Nov. 1967, ISA, 4092/HZ-5; outline for policy on the refugee question, 8Sept.1967,ISA,4092/HZ-5.
18.Developmentof theadministrated territories, investigationofalternatives,ISA, 7921/A-3;Wiener to Eshkol, 28Nov. 1967, ISA, 7921/A-3; Plan toSettle 50,000 Refugees in Al Arish Area, CZA, A186/66; see also: ISA,7234/A-8;YosefWeitz,MyDiary (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Masada, 1973),vol.VI,p.191ff.;YaffetoEban,18Oct.1967,ISA,7921/A-3.
19. Yaffe to government ministers, 27 Sept. 1967, ISA, 7921/A-3; ReuvenPedhatzur, The Victory of Shame: The Eshkol Government Policy in theTerritoriesAftertheSix-DayWar(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Bitan,1996),p.40.
20.BaccitoHerzog,18June1967,ISA,6301/C-l.21.MeetingwiththePrimeMinister,5Dec.1967,ISA,7921/A-3.22.EshkolwithBacciandDvoretzky,6Dec.1967, ISA,7921/A-3; seealso:
Hillel toEban,12June1967,ISA,4088/HZ-10;SassontoEshkol,19July1967,ISA,7231/A-l;EshkolwithDvoretzky,20March1968,ISA,7921/A-4;Rosenthaletal.,eds.,LeviEshkol,p.582.
23.AllontoEshkol,10Sept.1967,ISA,6301/C-14;YigalAllonininterviewwithReudorManor,fourthmeeting,p.1,ISA,5001/A-19;seealso:Davar,2June1987,p.13;YediotAharonot,2July1967,p.3;ShmuelTamir in theKnesset,6Dec.1967,KnessetMinutes(inHebrew),vol.50,p.342;Herzogdiary,10Sept.1967,ISA,4511/A-3.
24.Dayaninconsultationwithministers,3July1968,ISA,7921/A-5;Dayanatministerial committee on the West Bank, 24 Dec. 1967, ISA, 7921/A-3;Dayaningovernmentmeeting,18Feb.1968,discussionbriefinpossessionoftheauthor;Dayaningovernmentmeeting,17Oct.1967,YaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter;Herzogdiary,25June1967,ISA, 4511/A-3;RaananWeitz,TheGreat Plow and the PlanningMap: ALook at the History of Settlement in the State of Israel (in Hebrew)Jerusalem:WeitzEstate,2003),p.94ff.
25. The Potential for Settling and Development in the Eastern Bank, YEA;ProjectforSettling10,000FamiliesinEastJordan,ISA,7921/A-4.
26.MeetingontheWorkofAdaSereni,19Feb.1967,ISA,7921/A-4.27.NurMasalha,ExpulsionofthePalestinians:TheConceptof“Transfer”inZionist Political Thought, 1882–1948 (Washington, D.C.: Institute forPalestine Studies, 1992); Tom Segev,One Palestine, Complete: Jews andArabsUnder theBritishMandate (inHebrew) Jerusalem:Keter, 1999), p.328ff.
28. Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis (in Hebrew) Jerusalem: Domino,1984),p.68.
29.DanintoWeitz,25Nov.1956,CZA,A246.30.OperationWorker,ISA,4095/HZ-16.31. Eshkol with Sereni and others; Eshkol with Dvoretzky, 20March 1968,
ISA, 7921/A-4; see also: Eshkol in the Foreign Affairs and SecurityCommittee,11July1967,ISA,7921/A-6.
32.RuthBondi,TheEmissary:TheLifeandDeathofEnzoSereni(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,1973);Ben-GuriontoSereni,29Feb.1948;SerenitoBen-Gurion (1958), BGA, correspondence; Hagar Sereni-Confino inresponsetotheauthor’squestions.
33. Eshkol with Dvoretzky, 20 March 1967; Eshkol with Sereni, 27 March1967,ISA,7921/A-4.
34.EshkolwithSereni,Toledanoetal.,19Feb.1968,ISA,7921/A-4;EshkolwithheadsoftheMovementforGreaterIsrael,12Nov.1967,ISA,7920/A-7;EshkolwithSereni,27March1967,ISA,7921/A-4(“howmany?”).
35. Prime Minister’s Office Director to Prime Minister’s Office DeputyDirector,2April1968, ISA,7921/A-4; seealso:Yaffe toAgmon,30May1968,YEA,copyinpossessionoftheauthor.
36.U.S.Embassy inLebanon toDepartment ofState, andU.S.Consulate inJerusalemtoDepartmentofState,25July1968;U.S.Embassy inIsrael toDepartmentofState,2Aug.1968,USNA,Box3049,REFARAB1/1/68;Arieh Brown, Personal Seal: Moshe Dayan in the Six-Day War andAfterward(inHebrew)(TelAviv:YediotAharonot,1997),p.154.
37.GreenbergtoGazit,27Oct.1967,declarationdraft,ISA,4095/HZ-4.38. Eshkol with Sereni, Gazit, Herzog, and others, 19 Feb., 20 March, 27
March,13May1968,ISA,7921/A-4;seealso:Maariv(weekend),13Aug.2004,p.19;StatisticalAbstractoftheOccupiedTerritories,ISA,4608/CL-2.
39.SummaryofthenumberofpeoplecrossingfromtheWestBanktotheEastBank, 11 July 1967, IDFA, 66/117/70; see also: Civil AdministrationActivityReport, 23 July 1967, ISA, 4095/HZ-6; SweenyReport, 12 Sept.1967,PRO,FO961/26/104107;RefugeeStatistics,SymmstoDepartmentofState,3Jan.1968,USNA,Box3049,REFARAB,1/1/68;BarbourtoRusk,26March 1968, USNA, Box 3056; Crawford toMoberly, 26 June 1968,PRO,FCO17/217/104107;EmigrationfromtheWestBank(IncludingEastJerusalem),28Aug.1970,withthekindpermissionofMosheSasson.
40.StudyonEmigrantsMovement;August1968,ISA,7921/A-4;Kennedyto
Sisco,10Aug.1967,USNA,Box3048,FileREFARAB8/1/67;ArnontoHillel, 14Nov. 1967, ISA, 7921/A-4;Ben-Haim to ForeignMinistry, Jan.1968,ISA,4092/HZ-5;BattletoRusk,13Feb.1968,USNA,Box3049.
41.Avner toRivlin,24July1967,ISA,4088/HZ-6;Eshkol toEban,23Aug.1967, ISA, 7921/A-2; Hillel to Gazit, 3 Oct. 1967, ISA, 4096/HZ-4; seealso:YagartoYaffe,1Aug.1967,ISA,6303/C-l.
42. Kahan toMinister of Justice Office, 4 Dec. 1967, 5602/C-4; Kidrom toKomei,11July1967,ISA,4089/HZ-2;KidromtoHillel,1Nov.1967,ISA,4092/HZ-5;OutlineofPolicyontheRefugeeQuestion,8Sept.1967,ISA,4092/HZ-5; Komei to Director General, 2 July 1967, with the kindpermissionofMosheSasson;ForeignMinistry toConsulate inNewYork,18June1967,ISA,4088/HZ-7.
43. Hillel to Embassy in Washington, 29 Oct. 1967; discussion with Petrarepresentatives;discussionwithICEMrepresentatives,29Oct.1967;Hillelto Eban, 30 Oct. 1967, ISA, 4091/HZ-ll; see also:Maariv (weekend), 13Aug.2004,p.18ff.;ISA,385/HZ-18;7499/C-26(Jordan).
44.HilleltoComey,3Dec.1967,ISA,4092/HZ-5;TheProblemsintheGazaStrip,21Jan.1968,IDFA,128/2845/97;Brown,PersonalSeal,p.166ff.
45.Hiram toDirectorsGeneral, 11Dec.1967, ISA,8122/CL-6;Governmentresolution,2 July1967, ISA,23July1967, ISA,10136/C-4;5Nov.1967,ISA,10136/C-5.
46. Lewen to Moberly, 14 Dec. 1967, PRO, FCO 17/212/104225; Lapp toChase,8July1967,MECA,JerusalemandtheEastMission,GB165–0161,Box73,File2;Campbell toRusk,29July1968;Barbour toRusk,1Aug.1968, USNA, Box 3049, REF ARAB 1/1/68; The Problems in the GazaStrip, 21 Jan. 1968, IDFA, 128/2845/97; Government Announcement, 29June1967,ISA,6309/C-3;YaffetoLevavi,28June1967,7921/A-2.
47. Herzog diary, 13 Sept. 1967, with the kind permission of his daughter;InfiltrationfromtheEastBanktotheWest,IDFA,70/117/70;seealso:Fauzial-Asmar,ToBeanArabinIsrael(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Shachak,1975),p.144;RosstoKomei,21Aug.1967,ISA,3982/HZ-17;EitanHaber,TodayWarWillBreakOut(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1987),p.291ff.
48.Ben-NatantoForeignMinistry,25June1967;RafaeltoForeignMinistry,26June1967,ISA,4089/HZ-2;ComeytoForeignMinistry,23June1967;Harman to Foreign Ministry, 23 and 26 June 1967; Remez to ForeignMinistry, 26 June 1967, ISA, 4088/HZ-10;ForeignMinistry toNarkis, 18June1967,ISA,4097/HZ-8;SapirtoForeignMinistry,27June1967,ISA,
7921/A-2;TkoatoIsraeliEmbassyintheU.S.,1Aug.1967,ISA,4088/HZ-6;ComeytoEban,4Aug.1967,YEA,copyinpossessionoftheauthor.
49.YaffetoLevavi,28June1967,7921/A-2(Wilson);Ben-HorintoDirectorGeneral, 1 Sept. 1967, ISA, 4088/HZ-7; Government decision, 10 Sept.1967,ISA,6304/C-9(BeitAwaandBeitMirsim);ForeignMinistrytoIsraelEmbassyinStockholm,27June1967,ISA,4088/HZ-10;AspintoMoberly,3 Aug. 1967 and Moberly to Brenchley, 5 Sept. 1967, PRO, FCO17/212/40225.
50.Governmentresolution,10Sept.1967,ISA,6304/C-9(Kalkila);Eshkolinthe government, 8 Oct. 1967, ISA, 7921/A-6; see also: Governmentresolution, ISA, 6405/A-2 (aid to Jericho refugees); Eshkol with VicePresident of the Red Cross, 22 Oct. 1967, ISA, 6303/C-5; Ha’aretz, 30March1967,p.1;HilleltoRafael,16Dec.1967,ISA,4088/HZ-3.
51.EbantoEshkol,12July1967,ISA,7921/A-2;ISA,6303/C-5;seealso:TheTimes(London),27Sept.1967,p.9.
52.WolftoComey,15Aug.1967,ISA,4088/HZ-7.53.Lamerhav,1Sept.1967,p.2;Maariv,20Aug.1967,p.3;MichaelShashar,TheSeventh-DayWar:TheDiaryoftheMilitaryGovernmentinJudeaandSamaria (June-December 1967) (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Poalim,1997),pp.101,148ff.
54.Government resolution, 2 July 1967; 6, 13, and 27Aug. 1967; 5 and 10Sept. 1967, with the kind permission of the Government Secretariat;Meeting summary, 4 July 1967, ISA, 6304/C-ll; Tkoa to Dayan, 23 July1967, ISA, 6301/C-l; Comey to Eshkol, 28 Dec. 1967, ISA, 4092/HZ-5;Tkoa toRaviv,11Aug.1967, ISA,4088/HZ-7;Hillel toGanur (undated),ISA,4088/HZ-5;WolftoComey,15Aug.1967,ISA,4088/HZ-7;HughestoRusk, 19 July 1967, USNA, Box 3048, File REF 7/1/67; Barbour toDepartmentofState,27Nov.1967,USNA,Box3049,REFARAB10/1/67;ArabRefugees,30Nov.1967,PRO,FCO17/217/104107.
55.EzerWeizman,ForYou theSky, forYou theLand (inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1975),p.297.
CHAPTER22:HAWKSANDDOVES
1.RabinwithDayan,21July1967(erasure);seealso:WeeklyActivityReportontheLiberatedTerritories,9/67;RabinwithDayan,28and31July1967,12 Sept. 1967 (“occupied”); Rabin with Dayan, 2 and 10 Oct. 1967(“liberated”),IDFA,118/117/70;seealso:Dayaninthegovernment,18June
1967,ISA,8164/A-7.2. Shlomo Gazit, Suddenly Trapped: 30 Years of Israeli Policy in theTerritories (inHebrew) (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan, 1999), p. 23;Maariv, 29Sept.1967,p.21.
3. Brom and Ronen testimonies, KYA, Container 29, File 249; MilitaryGovernment Report on the West Bank, 19 Sept. 1967, IDFA, 70/117/70;RabinwithDayan,discussionbrief,31July1967,118/117/70.
4.YediotAharonot,11June1967,p.9;seealso:Ha’aretz,27July1967,p.2;Davar, 10Nov. 1967, p. 4;Maariv, 16 June 1967, p. 17 (“do not leave”);GeneralOrderNo.9(CentralCommand),13June1967,AHA,PP16.
5.MeetingwiththePrimeMinister,5Dec.1967,ISA,7921/A-3.6.GeneralOrderNo.9(CentralCommand),13June1967,AHA,PP16;GoldaMeir,MyLife (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: SifriyatMaariv, 1975), p. 263; seealso:Maariv(Sabbath),16June1967,p.1;ShabtaiTeveth,ExposedintheTurret (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Schocken,1968),p. 41;Ben-Gurion toBenMenachem, 7 June 1976, BGA;YaakovYadgar,Our Story: TheNationalNarrative in IsraeliPress (inHebrew) (Haifa:HaifaUniversity, 2004), p.40ff.
7.Maariv, 22 Sept. 1967, p. 24; Moshe Shamir,Natan Alterman: Poet asLeader(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Dvir,1988),p.159ff.;DanMiron,TouchingtheEssence(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Zmora-Bitan,1991),p.339ff.;seealso:Yitzhak Tabenkin, The Six-Day Lesson: The Settlement of an UndividedPalestine(inHebrew)(TelAviv:HaKibbutzHaMeuchad,1971).
8. Begin to Herzog, 26 Dec. 1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kindpermissionofhisdaughter;Ha’aretz,10Nov.1967,p.3;LaMerhav,17Nov.1967,p.2.
9.Davar,10Nov.1967,p.4(Oz);Rosenthaletal.,eds.,LeviEshkol,p.569.10.LettertoPeninaAxelrod,12June1967,withherkindpermission;letterto
AdirZik,3Aug.1967,withhiskindpermission;SchmuelHugoBergman,“SanctificationofGod,”Shdemot,issue27,fall1968,p.7.
11.YediotAharonot,9Oct.1967,p.4;seealso:Ha’aretz,21Sept.1967,p.11;Maariv,25Aug.1967,p.10;seealso:AriehNaor,GreaterIsrael:FaithandPolicy(inHebrew)(Haifa:HaifaUniversity,Zmora-Bitan,2001),p.123ff.
12.ISA,4096/HZ-5;ministerialcommitteedecision,16Aug.1967,12252/GL-l;Ha’aretz,15Aug.1967,p.10;21Sept.1967,p.11;AviadRavitzky,TheRevealed End and the Jewish State: Messianism, Zionism, and Religious
Radicalism in Israel (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Ofakim, 1993), p. 182;Naor,GreaterIsrael,p.43ff.;seealso:NadavShragai,TheMountofDispute:TheStrugglefortheTempleMount,JewsandMuslims,ReligionandPolitics(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Keter,1995).
13.Hayom,27May1968,p.1;seealso:Naor,GreaterIsrael,p.158.14.Eshkolwithwritersandprofessors,18Nov.1967,ISA,6303/C-4;Ha’aretz,
29June1967,p.10(Ravikovitch);30June1967,p.10(Zach);8Sept.1967,p. 10 (Orpaz); 8Dec. 1967, p. 3 (Smilansky); see also:Ha’aretz, 17Dec.1967,p.2 (responses);25Dec.1967,p.11;15Dec.1967,p.8 (“SecurityandPeaceYes—AnnexationNo”).
15.Yediot Aharonot, 22 July 1967, p. 1 (Abie); Arnon to Jerusalem, 4 Dec.1967, ISA, 3835/HZ-l; Yoram Rosier, ed.,AbieNathan (in Hebrew) (TelAviv:SifriyatPoalim,1998),p.105ff;seealsoHa’aretz,22Sept.1967,p.8(Matzpen);28Sept.1967,p.7(refugees).
16.MeetingwithPrimeMinister,5Dec.1967,ISA,7921/A-3.17.EshkolintheKnesset,12June1967,KnessetMinutes(inHebrew),vol.49,
p.2331;Herzogdiary,12June1967,ISA,4511/A-3.18.Herzogdiary,21Aug.1967,ISA,4511/A-3;EitanHaber,TodayWarWillBreakOut (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1987), p. 261; Yadin diary, 8June1967,ISA,1403/P-16.
19. Herzog diary, 15 June 1967, with the kind permission of his daughter;JohnsonwithHarman,7Feb.1968,FRUS,vol.XX,Doc.No.73.
20.MosheDayan,Milestones(inHebrew)(Jerusalem:Idanim,1982),vol.II,p.493.
21.Herzogdiary,11 July1968, ISA,4511/A-4;14Aug.1967,with thekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
22.Ha’aretz, 23 July 1967, p. 7; 13 Oct. 1967, p. 2; see also: Barbour toDepartmentofState,21Aug.1968,USNA,Box2227,FilePOL15–1.
23.ShlomitLeviandElihuKatz,“PublicOpinionandtheMoodintheSix-DayWar” (inHebrew) in SixDays: Thirty Years: ANew Look at the Six-DayWar,ed.AsherSashar(TelAviv:AmOved,1999),p.253.
24.Meir,MyLife, p. 264ff.; see also:Ha’aretz, 18 June 1967, p. 3; Kol toEshkol, 6 Sept. 1967, ISA, 6301/C-l; Rabin with Dayan, 15 Dec. 1967,IDFA,118/117/70.
25.Governmentmeeting,14Dec.1967,YaacovHerzogestate,with thekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
26.BarbourtoDepartmentofState,1May1968,USNA,Box2227,FilePOL15–1.
27.NaomiKies,“TheEffectofPublicPolicyonPublicOpinion:Israel,1967–1974,”State,GovernmentandInternationalRelations(inHebrew),issue8,Sept.1975,p.36;Ha’aretz,18July1967,p.1.
28.EshkolwithRabin,24May1968,ISA,7934/A-4;Ha’aretz,19June1967,p.12;seealso:PrimeMinister’sOfficeannouncement,28Nov.1967,ISA,6303/C-4;Davar,7June1967,p.2;Maariv,11June1967,p.1.
29. Letter to Adir Zik, 8 Oct. 1967, with his kind permission; Eshkol ingovernment meeting, 31 Dec. 1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kindpermissionofhisdaughter.
CHAPTER23:STARTINGOVER
1.Ha’aretz,21June1967,p.11.2.LettertoChaimHaskal,16July1967,withhiskindpermission;EbanintheKnesset,31July1967,KnessetMinutes(inHebrew),vol.49,p.2761;lettertoVarditandAdirZik,7June1967,withhiskindpermission.
3.MinistryofEducationNotice,6Sept.1967,ISA,13173/CL-2.4. Maariv, 17 Aug. 1967, p. 3; Sapir in the government, 15 Jan. 1968(minutes); Lev Louis Greenberg, “The Israeli LaborMovement in Crisis,1957–1970: The Political Economy of the Ties Between Mapai, theHistadrut, and the State” (in Hebrew) (diss., Tel Aviv University, 1991),appendix.
5. D. Teneh, “Building and Populating Apartments in 1967,” EconomicsQuarterly(inHebrew),vol.16,Book57–58,Aug.1968,p.162ff.
6.Sapir in thegovernment, 15 Jan. 1968 (minutes);Greenberg, “The IsraeliLabor Movement in Crisis,” appendix; A. Halperin, “Recession andRecovery in the Economy,” Economics Quarterly (in Hebrew), vol. 14,Book56,Feb.1968,p.293ff.;Kol toEshkol,12Sept.1967(oilandotherresources in Sinai), YEA, copy in possession of the author; The SecondArab-IsraeliWar, 1967, the EconomicAftermath, 30October 1967, PRO,FCO17/568/104225.
7. Maariv, 17 Aug. 1967, p. 3; Sapir in the government, 15 Jan. 1968(minutes); Greenberg, “The Israeli LaborMovement in Crisis,” appendix;meetingwithPrimeMinister,5Dec.1967,ISA,7921/A-3;Ha’aretz,3Oct.1967,p.11;CentralBureauofStatistics, IsraelYearbook (inHebrew),no.
20,1969,p.42.8.Ha’aretz,3Oct.1967,p.11;CentralBureauofStatistics,IsraelYearbook(inHebrew),no.20,1969,p.42.
9.GaliliintheKnesset,13Nov.1967,KnessetMinutes(inHebrew),vol.50,p. 125; see also:Yediot Aharonot, 25 Aug. 1967, p. 5; see also: Galili toSapir,31Oct.1967,ISA,4604/CL-l.
10.Ha’aretz,3Sept.1967,pp.9–10(computers);Maariv,21Nov.1967(pill);Ha’aretz,25Dec.1967,p.8(phones).
11.Ha’aretz,4Sept.1967,p.4.12.Maariv(DaysandNights),4Oct.1967,p.8;18Oct.1967,p.11.13.Ha’aretz,11June1967,p.2;LaMerhav,11June1967,p.2.14.CentralBureauofStatistics,IsraelYearbook(inHebrew),no.18,1967,p.
40; Reuven Avinoam, ed., In Memoriam: The Lives and Deaths of theCasualtiesintheWarsofIsraelfromtheBeginningoftheSix-DayWaruntilthe General Memorial Day 5729 (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ministry ofDefense,1971).
15. Aviezer Golan and Ami Shamir, The Book of Heroism, June 1967 (inHebrew)(TheJournalistsSocietyandtheWorldAllianceofBergen-BelsenSurvivors,1968).
16.LaslauandBromtestimonies,KYA,Container29,File249;seealso:AlonGan, “The Discourse That Died? ’Discourse Culture’ as an Attempt toDefineaSpecial Identityfor theSecondGenerationon theKibbutzim”(inHebrew)(diss.,TelAvivUniversity,2002),p.120.
17.LettertoAdirZik,27July1967,withhiskindpermission.18.YairBeumel, “The IsraeliEstablishment’sAttitudeToward IsraeliArabs:
Policy, Principles and Actions: The Second Decade, 1958–1968” (inHebrew)(diss.,HaifaUniversity,2002),pp.BB,AA.
19.ConditionsofArabsinIsraelandofJewsinArabStates,UNA,DAG-1/2.3,Box246,File1065.
20. David Grossman, Present Absentees (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutzHaMeuchad,1992).
21. Simon N. Herman, Jewish Identity,: A Social Psychological PerspectiveJerusalem:HaSifriyaHaTzionit,1979).
22. ISA, 4092/HZ-6; see also: 4089/HZ-8 (distinguished); Eshkol in theKnesset,22Jan.1968,KnessetMinutes(inHebrew),vol.50,p.771;DovkintoEshkol,26July1967,ISA,6301/C-l(4);Ha’aretz,4Aug.1967,p.3;see
also:AlHaMishmar,30Nov.1970,p.4.23. ShneorZalmanAvramov andAkivaGovrin in theKnesset, 5 July 1967,Knesset Minutes (in Hebrew), vol. 49, p. 2509ff.; meeting with PrimeMinister,5Dec.1967,ISA,7921/A-3.
24.Herzogdiary,7Sept.1967,ISA,4511/A-3.25. JewishAgency,21 Years of Immigration andAbsorption (inHebrew), p.
4ff.;ISA,3497/C-16.26.21YearsofImmigrationandAbsorption,1969,ISA6303/a-627.Maariv, 25 June 1967, p. 2; 16 Oct. 1967, p. 11; Knesset Minutes (in
Hebrew),vol.50,p.344ff.,6Dec.1967;EbantoSecurityCabinet,23Aug.1967,YTA,Unit15,Container54,File4; ISA,4095/HZ-12;4096/HZ-13;4095/HZ-17; Conditions of Arabs in Israel and of Jews in Arab States,UNA,DAG-1/2.3,Box136,File1065;UThantwithRafaelandothers,24Aug, 1967, UNA, SG (Middle East Crisis), 13/12/01/NH; Goldberg to UThant,19Jan.and7May,1968,UNA,SG,S-0311–004,Box4,File14.
28.YediotAharonot,28Nov.1967,p.2;KnessetMinutes(inHebrew),vol.50,p.236ff.,27Nov.1967.
29. FinancialAffairs, ISA, 6303/C-6; see also: governmentmeeting, 18 June1967,ISA,8164/A-7.
30.YediotAharonot,2 June1967,p.6;Ha’aretz,14July1967,p.3;16July1967, p. 8; LeonUris, “The Third Temple,” inWilliam Stevenson, StrikeZion(NewYork:BantamBooks,1967),p.119ff.
31. Letter to friends in Israel (undated), ISA, 6301/C-l; see also: EliLederhendler,ed.,TheSix-DayWarandWorldJewry(Bethesda:UniversityPressofMaryland,2000).
32.TheWashingtonPost,9July1967,p.Bl.33.Ben-GuriontoTrim,6June1967;TrimtoBen-Gurion,19July1967,BGA;
Ben-Gurion toDayan, 15 June 1967,BGA, see also:Yediot Aharonot, 13Aug.1967,p.7;ErwinMoskowitztoBen-Gurion,8Oct.1967,BGA.
34.HarmantoHerzog,29Sept.1967,andYaffetoHarman,13Oct.1967,ISA,6380/C-25.
35. Yediot Aharonot, 6 Dec. 1967, p. 9; David Ben-Gurion, The NewlyEmergingStateofIsrael(inHebrew)(TelAviv:AmOved,1969),p.837ff.
36.YediotAharonot,28Nov.1967,p.2.
CHAPTER24:ABSALOMDAYS
1.KoltoEshkol,7Nov.1967andmore,ISA,6380/C-4;AvigurtoEshkol,13Dec. 1967, ISA, 6303/C-l; see also: Davar, 16 Feb. 1968, p. 4; YediotAharonot,2Nov.1967,p.4;15Nov.1967,p.3;30Nov.1967,p.3;Maariv(DaysandNights),13Nov.1967,p.16;Maariv,17Nov.1967,p.2ff.;29Nov.1967,p.17;Ha’aretz,16Nov.1967,p.1;30Nov.1967,p.2.
2. Prime Minister’s Office, Propaganda Center, Know What to Reply (inHebrew),FourthBook,June1968,p.3.
3. Report on Telephone Conversation, 4 Oct. 1967; Anderson with Eban,McPherson to Rostow, and Rostow to Johnson, 10 Oct. 1967; Rostow toJohnson, 31 Oct. 1967, LBJL, NSF Country File,Middle East, Box 113;RusktoJohnson,6Oct.1967,FRUS,vol.XIX,p.877ff.
4. Sydney D. Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242 (Dordrecht: MartinusHijhoff,1985).
5. Eshkol and others in the Knesset, 13 Nov. 1967, Knesset Minutes (inHebrew), vol. 50, p. 120ff.; see also:Yaffe toHarman, 4Dec. 1967, ISA,7921/A-3;GalilitoEshkol,30Oct.1967,ISA,7231/A-l;resolutiondraft,17Nov.1967,ISA,7934/A-4.
6. Tito Proposal, 5 Sept. 1967, USNA, Box 1800; Remez to Lurie, 1 Nov.1967,ISA,4510/A-16.
7.RostowtoJohnson,26May1967,FRUS,vol.XIX,p.146;KrimtoRostow,10Nov.1966,andBirdsalltoKrim,2Nov.1966,LBJL,GenCo3031/1/68,Box75;Nasser toJohnsonetc.,9Dec.1967,LBJL,NSFSpecialHeadofState,Box55;BirdsalltoJohnson,28June1968,19July1968,etc.,LBJL,GENND19/CO1–6,Box198.
8.EshkolintheForeignAffairsandSecurityCommittee,25June1968,ISA,7921/A-6; U.S. Interest Section to Department of State, 11 Sept. 1967,FRUS,vol.XIX,Doc.No.434.
9. Herzog to Eshkol, 21 Nov. 1967; Two Meetings with Charles, on themorningof19Nov.andonthemorningof20Nov.1967;“SpecialsectiononCharles,dictatedon3Nov.1967,”allinYaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
10.Discussion in theMa’arachpoliticalcommittee,14March1968;20April1968,discussionbriefsinpossessionoftheauthor.
11.EshkolattheForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,12May1968,ISA,7921/A-6;seealso:EshkolwithGeneralStaff,5Dec.1967,7921/A-3.
12.Purposesofthemeeting,25April1968;Ebaninthepoliticalcommittee,19
May1968,ISA,7934/A-4;Herzoginthesecuritycabinet,8May1968andotherreports;Ebaninthegovernment,10Dec.1967,YaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter.
13.Helms to Johnson, 8 June1968,FRUS, vol.XX,Doc. 187;MichaelBarZohar, Zaphenath Paneah: The Life and Times of a Jewish Prince (inHebrew)(TelAviv:YediotAharonot,2003),p.288.
14.Eshkolinthepoliticalcommittee,3June1968,ISA,7921/A-13.15.Herzogdiary,29Aug.1968,ISA,451l/A-4;BarZohar,ZaphenathPaneah,
p.284;seealso:EbanonGoldbergmeetingwithHussein,4Nov.1967,ISA,4510/A-16;Dayan in theLaborParty in theKnesset, 18 June1968,YTA,Unit15,SeriesC,Container3,File2.
16.MemorandumofConversation,24Oct. 1967,FRUS,vol.XIX,Doc.No.488.
17. Evron, Harman, and Patir to Foreign Ministry, 11 June 1967, ISA,4079/HZ-26;Newsweek,19June1967,pp.10,13;26June1967,p.9;RusktoBarbour,16June1967,FRUS,vol.XIX,p.439.
18.HarmantoForeignMinistry,12,13,and16June1967,ISA,4079/HZ-26.19.RontoRabin,16June1967,ISA,4079/HZ-26.20.HarmantoForeignMinistry,13,16,18,19,20,and28June1967;Rabinto
Harman, 29 June 1967, ISA, 4079/HZ-26; see also: FRUS, vol. XIX, p.360ff.
21.Evron toForeignMinistry, 30Aug. 1967, ISA, 4079/HZ-26; Payment ofU.S.LibertyClaims,USNA,PO/ISR/Box271,PS8–4; seealso:Evron toForeignMinistry,8March1968,ISA,4079/HZ-3.
22.Rabin toForeignMinistry, 8March1968, ISA,7938/A-ll; see also: ISA,4079/HZ-27.
23.Harman toYaffe, 13Dec. 1967;Harman to ForeignMinistry, 20 and 21Dec.1967,ISA,7232/A-7;ArnontoEitan,10Aug.1967;ArieltoForeignMinistry, 18 Sept. 1967, ISA, 3979/HZ-9; Evron to Foreign Ministry, 14Aug.1967,ISA,3980/HZ-2.
24.EshkolwiththeMovementforGreaterIsrael,12Nov.1967,ISA,7920/A-7.
25. Bitan to Israeli Embassy, 29 Nov. 1967, ISA, 7938/A-ll; McPherson toPresident,31Oct.1967,FRUS,vol.XIX,p.962.
26.EshkolwithRabin,24May1968,ISA,7938/A-ll.27.EshkolwithJohnson,7–8Jan.1967,FRUS,vol.XX,Doc.Nos.39,40,41;
Eitan Haber, TodayWarWill Break Out (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Idanim,1987),p.305ff.
28.RostowtoJohnson,5Jan.1968,FRUS,vol.XX,Doc.No.33;ISA,188/P-8; Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Schocken,2000),p.380ff.
29.EvrontoForeignMinistry,15March1968;YaffetoRabin,31March1968,ISA,7938/A-ll.
30.Gvati diary, 12 June 1967,YTA,Unit 15,Container 12, File 02;RaananWeitz,The Great Plow and the PlanningMap: A Look at the History ofSettlement in theStateof Israel (inHebrew)(author’sestate,2003),p.91;YechielAdmoni,ADecade of Judgment: Settlement over theGreen Line,1967–1977 (inHebrew) (TelAviv:HaKibbutzHaMeuchad, 1992), pp. 11,18ff.
31.YigalAlloninaninterviewwithReudorManor,sixthmeeting,p.18,ISA,5001/A-19.
32.Government resolution, 27Aug. 1967, ISA, 7920/A-7;AleiGolan (Ben-YehudaDiary) (inHebrew), issueno.32,17 July1968;YigalAllon inaninterview with Reudor Manor, sixth meeting, p. 18, ISA, 5001/A-19;Admoni,ADecadeofJudgment,p.23ff.;seealso:Ha’aretz,4July1967,p.11(animalsandabandonedfields).
33. Uzai to Eshkol, 29 Aug. 1967, ISA, 7920/A-7; see also: governmentresolution 866, 1 Oct. 1967, with the kind permission of the governmentsecretariat; Prime Minister’s Blessing, 23 Oct. 1967, ISA, 7920/A-6;BarbourtoDepartmentofState,13Sept.1967,USNA,Box1800,FilePOL27;AharonShai,“TheFateoftheAbandonedArabVillagesintheStateofIsraelontheEveoftheSix-DayWarandAfterward”(inHebrew),Katedra,no.105,Tishrei5763,p.168ff.
34.YaffetoShapira,27Sept.1967,ISA,7921/A-3.35.MerontoYaffe,18Sept.1967,ISA,7921/A-3.36.Harman toForeignMinistry,25Sept.1967;ForeignMinistry toHarman,
26Sept.1967,ISA,7938/A-10.37. Galili to Eshkol, 25 Aug. 1968, YEA; Maariv, 24 Oct. 1967, p. 13
(Mapam); strongholds in the administered territories, 27 Jan. 1968, ISA,7920/A-7;seealso:YehudaHareltoSapir,25March1968,ISA,4602/CL-l.
38.YigalAlloninaninterviewwithReudorManor,seventhmeeting,p.3,ISA,5001/A-19; Eshkol with the Gush Etzion people, 22 Sept. 1967, ISA,
7920/A-7;seealso:GushEtzionChildrenSocietytoEshkol,17Aug.1967,ISA, 6301/C-l (6); Hazani to Eshkol, 29 Sept. 1967, YEA, copy inpossessionoftheauthor;Admoni,ADecadeofJudgment,p.51ff.;DaletoAtherton,29Sept.1967,USNA,Box3049,REF9/1/67.
39.Maariv,27Sept.1967,p.9;20Oct.1967,p.11;Ha’aretz,29Sept.1967,p.2;2Oct.1967,p.8;MerontoYaffe,18Sept.1967,ISA,7921/A-3.
40.WeitztoEshkol,29Sept.1967,YEA,copyinpossessionoftheauthor.41.KoteretRashit,16May1984,p.13.42.TamirtoEshkol,18Oct.1967,ISA,6301/C-l;meetingwithPrimeMinister,
5 Dec. 1967, ISA, 7921/A-3; government resolution, 12May 1968, ISA,4602/C-l.
43.YigalAlloninaninterviewwithReudorManor,sixthmeeting,p.18,ISA,5001/A-19; see also: Gazit to Franko, 26 Feb. 1968; Hillel Dan to PrimeMinister’soffice,26Feb.1968;AgmontoPrimeMinister’sofficedirector,13March1968;YaffetoShragai,3June1968—allYEA,copyinpossessionoftheauthor.
44. Jaabari to Eshkol, 7May 1968, YEA, copy in possession of the author;Hebron settlers toDayan, 21Aug. 1968;Dayan toEshkol, 22Aug. 1968,YEA,copyinpossessionoftheauthor.
45.Eshkolwith theGreater IsraelMovement, 12Nov. 1967, ISA,7920/A-7;Ha’aretz,21May1968,p.2.
46.StatementofOpinion,12May1968,YEA,copyinpossessionoftheauthor.47. Strongholds in the administered territories, 27 Jan. 1968, ISA, 7920/A-7;
seealso:AkivaEldarandIdithZertal,Lordsof theLand:TheSettlersandtheStateofIsrael,1967–2004(inHebrew)(TelAviv:Dvir,2004);GershomGorenberg, Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements,1967–1977(NewYork:TimesBooks,2006).
48.MinisterofLaborproposal,3Nov.1967, ISA,6253/C-ll; seealso:ElishaEfrat, A Geography of the Occupation (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Carmel,2002).
49.BarbourtoDepartmentofState,13Sept.1967,USNA,Box1800,FilePOL27;seealso:HalltoDepartmentofState,30Aug.1967,USNA,Box1800.
50.Ha’aretz,14Aug.1967,p.2.51.Dayaningovernmentmeeting,26Dec.1967;resolutionproposal,31Dec.
1967, Yaacov Herzog estate, with the kind permission of his daughter;DayanintheLaborParty,18June1968,YTA,Unit15.
52.MosheDayan,NewMapDifferentRelations(inHebrew)(TelAviv:SifriyatMaariv,1969),p.19ff.;Dayanin theMa’arachpoliticalcommittee,3June1968,discussionbriefinpossessionoftheauthor.
53.IDFSpokesmandata,IDFA,290/581/75;seealso:DayanintheKnesset,24Jan.1968,KnessetMinutes(inHebrew),vol.50,p.803.
54.Maariv,25Sept.1967,p.1;Ha’aretz,8Oct.1967,p.4.55.Ha’aretz,22Oct.1967,p.1;condolenceletters,ISA,6304/C-5;Eshkolat
theeditorscommittee,24Oct.1967,ISA,7920/A-8;EshkolintheForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,29Nov.1967,ISA,7921/A-6.
56.YaacovHerzogestate,withthekindpermissionofhisdaughter;Eshkolinthegovernmentmeeting,31March1968,ISA,7921/A-6;Ze’evSchiffandEitan Haber, Lexicon of Israeli Security (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan,Modan,1976),pp.39,143,277;Haber,TodayWarWillBreakOut,p.338ff.;seealso:Ha’aretz(supplement),6Feb.1998,p.15ff.
57.LettertoAdirZik,8Oct.1967,withhiskindpermission;EdithEzrachi,2April1967;9April1968,withthekindpermissionofherson.
58.EdithEzrachi to theDuvinskis,6 June1968,with thekindpermissionofherson.
59.Nitzotz,28April1968,p.2(prefersmall);Ben-GuriontoDovGolan,1Oct.1967;toSarahOzen,23Oct.1967(anywhere);toTebenkin,3Sept.1967;toSelfter,2Oct.1967,toTebenkin,24Oct.1967(denies),BGA.
60.AmosElon,The Israelis: Founders andBuilders (inHebrew) (TelAviv:Adam,1981),p.21.
61.Ben-Gurion diary, 25Nov. 1967 (not their country);Ben-Gurion toBen-Meir,16Dec.1967(doubts), toIlanCohen,1Nov.1967(biology); toZviZehavi,23Oct.1967(converted),BGA.
62.YosefWeitz,MyDiary(inHebrew),vol.VI(TelAviv:Masada,1973),pp.261,266ff.(tree),382(Eshkol).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thisbook is theoutcomeof fiveyearsof researchandwriting that ledme tosometwenty-fivehistoricalarchivesinIsrael,theUnitedStates,andEngland.Ithankallofthearchives,whicharenamedintheendnotes.ThegreatdramathatoccurredinIsraelin1967yieldednumerousbooksandstudiesthatwereofhelpto me, and I owe thanks to their authors. I also made use of the dailynewspapers,inparticularHa’aretz,YediotAharonot,andMaariv.TogethertheyformasortofcollectivediaryoftheIsraeliswhoreadthem.AlongsidethethousandsofarchivaldocumentsIreviewed,thereisextensive
documentation that is not yet available for research and may never be. It isthereforedifficulttoanswersomeofthecentralquestions.Inordertocorrectlyassess the events of 1967 one needs to know, for example, whether Israelalready possessed nuclear weapons; if so, which of the governmentministersknewabout it;andhow, ifatall, thisaffected theirdecision togo towar.Thematerial that could answer these questions is likely being kept in an archivesomewhere; there is somematerial in thehandsof researchersand journalists,but itspublicationisforbiddenbycourtorders,amongotherfactors.It isverydifficult to understand the apparatus of Israel’s occupation of the Palestinianterritorieswithoutexamining theShabakarchives,but they tooare sealedandmay never be opened. An accurate picture of the country’s foreign relationswouldrequireareviewofMossaddocuments;theirarchivesarealsosealed.TheIDF allows access only to a small portion of its archivedmaterial. The IsraelStateArchivesalsocontainclassifiedfiles,includingtheminutesofgovernmentmeetings and some Knesset committees. The same is true of other archives,including some in the United States and England. Israel has adopted a fairlyliberalpolicytowarddeclassificationofofficialdocuments,butitsdecisionsareoften shaped by arbitrariness and obduracy. Hence the need to climb up intoatticsanddownintobasementsofpeople’shomes,whichoftenrevealtreasures.Thisbookisalsobasedtoagreatextentonunarchivedmaterialofinestimable
value. Shira Herzog granted me access to the estate of her father, YaacovHerzog, the director general of the prime minister’s office. He documenteddozensofgovernmentmeetingsandleftrecordsofhisconversationswithKingHussein.KnessetmemberYitzhakHerzogmadepapersavailablefromtheestateofhisfather,ChaimHerzog,thefirstmilitarygovernoroftheWestBank.MeirAmit,formerheadoftheMossad,gavemeacopyofthereportonhiscoverttrip
to Washington on the eve of the war, among other documents. AmbassadorMoshe Sasson provided transcripts of his conversations with dozens ofPalestinian leaders.DavidHarman, the sonofAmbassadorAvrahamHarman,allowedme toquote fromextended interviews recordedwithhis father. I alsoreceived extremely valuable material from Meron Benvenisti, former deputymayorofJerusalem,andfromEladPeled,commanderoftheNationalDefenseCollege.Asmallpartofthematerial,includingextractsofgovernmentmeetingsand other discussions, was provided anonymously. I am grateful for thegenerosityandhelpfulnessofsomanypeople,withoutwhomIcouldnothavewrittenthisbook.IntheUnitedStatesIspokewithJohnHadden,whowastheCIAstationchief
in Israel. Dr. Mathilde Krim, who knew President Johnson, granted me twointerviews at her home in Manhattan. Yoav Karni spoke at my request withDavidGinsburg,anattorneyinWashington,D.C.I received furtherdocumentarymaterial,oral information,andusefuladvice
fromGilAldema,DanAlmagor,RahelBarkai,NahumBarnea,AvnerCohen,HillelCohen,ZvikaDror,IsraelEhrlich,YuvalElizur,CharlesEnderlin,YitzhakGal-Nur,YossiGoldstein,DavidGolomb,YehudaHarel,MichaelKarpin,AmosKenan, Ephraim Kishon, Avraham Kushnir, Yehuda Litani, Sarah Ossetzky-Lazar, Danny Rubinstein, Avri Sela, Anat Seltzer, Hagar Sereni-Konfino,Avraham(Pachi)Shapira,andGilShiva.AdozenpeoplenamedafterYehiamWeitzwerekindenoughtorespondtoquestionsbothinwritingandverbally.Ithankthemall.I spent many hours in the kitchen ofMiriam Eshkol, PrimeMinister Levi
Eshkol’swidow;Ienjoyedhercompanyandgainedweightfromherexcellentcheesecake.Hermemory,wisdom,andhistoricalanalysestaughtmemorethanmanydocumentsevercould.IalsovisitedYoninaBen-Or,thewidowofAriehBen-Or,thepilotwhowaskilledontheGolanHeights;Ideeplyappreciateherwillingnesstoshareherstorywithme.Profoundand specialgratitude isdue toYehoshuaBar-Dayan,whoallowed
metousehiswardiary,anextraordinarilypowerfuldocument;hisvoiceisthevoiceofmanatwar.Aseriesofpeople,mainlyintheUnitedStates,respondedtomyrequestand
dug through old chests to fish out personal letters they had received in 1967from friends and relatives in Israel.Much of what I know about the lives ofIsraelisthatyear,whattheythoughtandfelt,Igleanedfromtheseletters,closeto fivehundredof them. I acknowledgewith sorrowAdirZik,whodiedafter
entrusting me with thick bundles of correspondence he received during hisstudiesinLosAngeles.IowethankstoIlanEzrachi,whoallowedmetoquotefrom his mother’s letters; to Asher Knafo from Ashdod; to Ruth and HaimHaskalandtoPeninaAxelrodfromBoston,aswellastoAnatPerlmuter-ShabofromJerusalem.Someofthepeoplewhogavemetheirlettersaskedtoremainunnamed,andIthankthemtoo.Iwasblessedwithwiseandkindresearchassistants.OmriKaplan-Feuereisen
assistedmeduring thefirststagesofmywork,Avner Inbarduring thesecondhalf, and IlanMoradi in between. I thank them for their diligence, precision,patience, and friendship.AviKatzman edited theHebrewmanuscriptwithhisusual meticulousness, knowledge, and wisdom, and rescued me from severalpitfalls. I acknowledgegratefullyDeborahHarris,my agent and friend. I alsoowethankstothepeopleatHa’aretzfortheirpatienceandsupport.
Most of the years when I worked on this book were years of terror andoppression,bothextremelycruel.Againandagainmyworkwasinterruptedbythewailofambulancesirens,rushingtothesceneofaterroristattack,followedbydreadfulnews.Sittingatmycomputer,nearawindowlookingouttowardtheOldCityandtheDeadSea,Ifollowedtheprogressoftheuglycementsecuritywallas itcrawledalongthehilltops,dividingJerusaleminthespiritofMosheDayan’swords,spokenasearlyasJune15,1967:“Uptohere—you.Fromhereon—us.”Itwasnoteasytoworkagainstthisbackdrop,andIoftenhadthesensethat Iwaswriting about the year that had sparked all thismisery.But just asoften,IthoughtaboutGabrielStern,ajournalistandarelentlessoptimist,whobelieved in goodness until the end of his days, despite everything. After myfather was killed in the 1948War of Independence, Gabriel Sternwas like afathertome;thisbookcommemorateshim.IdedicateittoItaiAbera,whoisasprecioustomeasason.InmanyrespectsIwrotethisbookforhimandforhisgeneration,inthehopethattheywillnotlivethroughanotherwar.
INDEX
Abram,Morris,384AbuShahin,HassanYusuf,466Adam,Brother(Benedictinemonk),36Admoni,Yehiel,574AfricanAmericans,107,120Agnon,S.Y.,29,62n,91,194,495,545Agranat,Ella,140Agranat,ChiefSupremeCourtJusticeShimon,140,347–48,488Agron,Gershon,174nAgudasAchimsynagogue,Austin,Texas,120–21Aharon,Yitzhak,77AhdutHa’avodaparty,74,75,86,89,177,217AirForceJournal,394Akiba,Rabbi,147nAkzin,Benjamin,307Al-Ahram,259Alami,Musa,455,456albomim(victoryalbums),440–42Aldema,Gil,222Algamis,Yossi,339Algeria,proposalforsettlementofArabrefugeesin,526AlHamishmar,79,141Allenby,Edmund,1,370Allon,Modi,395Allon,Yigal,5,89,177–78,183,263,580Arabrefugees,positionon,526,527bordersofIsrael,postwar,429onDayan,391Israelipoliticsand,89,94Jerusalemand,491AbieNathanand,11nuclearweaponsand,165
OccupiedTerritoriesand,469–70,580Jewishsettlementof,574,577,579peacenegotiationsandfutureof,504,509,567n
pre-Six-DayWartensionsand,199responseto1966terroristattacks,150AScreenofSand,311–12Six-DayWardayone,349,350daytwo,352,360finaldays,387,388,389,390,397
thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,235,255,268,272,273,275,290,295n,296,308,311–12,313,314,318,320
decisiontogotowar,326–27,335,336,337WarofIndependenceand,175
Almogi,Yosef,318Alon,Azariah,177Aloni,Shulamit,137Alsop,Joseph,303nAltalena,117Alterman,Natan,220n,380–81,403,545Ama’ah,Toufik,Hassan,466AmericanJewishCommittee,108,384AmericanJewishCongress,124AmericanJewishJointDistributionCommittee,538AmericanJews,106–26Ben-Gurion’sviewof,67financialsupportforIsrael,106–7,559LyndonJohnsonand.SeeJohnson,LyndonB.andJohnsonadministration,AmericanJewsand
lettersofsupportforIsrael,304–5,384OccupiedTerritoriesand,560n,572politicalactivismof,572relationshipofIsraelisand,106–8Samuaoperationand,153Six-DayWar’seffecton,559–60
VietnamWarand,384,572Amery,Julian,566Amidror,Benjamin,83–84Amihai,Yehuda,494–95Amikam,Eliyahu,166Amir,Aharon,306Amir,Rafi,368,377Amir,Yehuda,83,84Amisragas(gassupplier),89–90Amit,Meir,93,283n,326,531Arabrefugeesand,534pre-Six-DayWardiscussionsofrelationswithEgypt,188n,189–90Six-DayWar,364,387thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,230,255,259–60,309decisiontogotowar,328–34,336
Amitai,ColonelEliezer,474Amman,Jordan,537nAmsalem,Eliyahu,53Amsalem,Sarah,53Anderson,Claudia,121Anderson,Robert,187,563–64Angleton,JamesJesus,329–30,331,332Anti-DefamationLeagueofB’naiB’rith,110,384Arabrevoltof1936,2,139,476
ArabsdemographicproblemforIsrael,186,526,529,541,550,558–59IsraeliArabs,67OccupiedTerritories,429,430,503,529,548
Israeli.SeeIsraeliArabsIsraeliuseoftheterm,7livingintheOccupiedTerritories.SeeOccupiedTerritories,Arabslivinginthe
Palestinian.SeePalestiniansrefugees.Seerefugees,Arab
Arabsummits,508,565Arad,Israel,20Arafat,Yasser,146,497,582Aran,Zalman,47–48,101,130,284n,450OccupiedTerritoriesand,480,550peacenegotiationsandfutureof,502,505
Six-DayWar,349,361,389thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,226,235,263,272,274,275,290,291,307,313
decisiontogotowar,323,325Arbel,Yehuda,485n,499Arbiv,Irene,53Arendt,Hannah,158Argov,Shlomo,202Ariel,David,124Ariel,Yehuda,343Arkia(Israeliairline),435ArmonHanatziv (theHighCommissioner’s Palace), 171, 176, 410, 412, 450,491–92Six-DayWar,345,346
Arnon,Michael,124Ascarellifamily,532–33Ashdod,Israel,54Ashkelonarea,deportationofArabrefugeesfromthe,524
AshkenazimattitudetowardArabsofEastJerusalem,494clashbetweenMizrahimand,14,56–58,61–63,556educationand,47–48immigrationof,9,63,64,87,106askibbutzniks,81–82outnumberedbyMizrahim,43,563qualityoflifeof,44,48,55Zionismasvisionof,56
Al-Asmar,Fausi,281AssociatedPress,12AssociationofMerchants,435nAl-Atassi,NurAl-Din,390Australia,proposedemigrationofArabrefugeesto,535,537,538automotiveindustryinIsrael,8,22autopsies,104–6,231Avidar,Tamar,26Avigur,Shaul,102,232,250–51,313,563Avner,Gershon,525Avnery,Uri,73,74,157,163,217,218,228n,387Avrahami,Uzi,19Six-DayWar,339,343,344,348,376–77thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,225,245,322wifeof,328
Axelrod,Penina,279
“BabEl-Wad,”415Bacci,Roberto,73,528–31Baer,Israel,157,165Baer,Yitzhak,156,157–58Balas,FarjAbdel,40Balfour,LordAlfred,1BalfourDeclaration,1–2,109,139ballroomsocieties,135–36,137Bamahane,162,196,197,215BambiMilkShakeBar,555n
Banai,Gavri,30Banais,the.SeeGolanHeights,theBanaisBankLeumi,468,580–81BankofIsrael,40,49,452occupationcurrency,452–54
Barak,Ehud,asprimeminister,321Bar-Barimdiscotheque,136–37Barbour,Walworth,55,166,219,332,493,551,572nbombingoftheLibertyand,386demographicproblemand,558nSix-DayWar,356
thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,230,289,292Bar-Dayan,Ali,298Bar-Dayan,Dr.BenZion,35Bar-Dayan,GilaSamsonov,19,20,36,251,268,275,298,321,322,423Six-DayWar,340,348,376–77,412,416thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,225,234,238–39,245,247,288,328–29,334,337
Bar-Dayan,Nissan,298Bar-Dayan,Yariv,19,36,225,234,247,251,275,288,298,321,322,329,334,337,340,348,377,423
Bar-Dayan,Yehoshua(Shuka),19–20,35–36,388nbackgroundof,35,232–33diary,publicationofhis,423nonGorodish,439–40releasedfromactiveduty,423Six-DayWardayone,338–40,341,343–44,345,348–49,350daytwo,351–54,357daythree,366,372–74,376–77finaldays,385,411,412–13,414–16
thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,225,232,234,244,245,246,247,251–52,259,260–61,268,271–72,275,278,288,289,29In,297–99,310,321–22,328–29,334,337
Barenboim,Daniel,280Bar-Haim,Shaul,postwartalkwithPalestinianleaders,514–16Bar-Hillel,Yehoshua,156,282n
Bar-IlanUniversity,174Bar-Lev,Haim,245,391,544becomesdeputychiefofstaff,308peacenegotiationswithJordanand,566,567nSix-DayWar,368,398
Barnea,Nahum,578Bar-On,Mordechai,23In,437SoldiersTalk,editingof,444n,447n
Bartov,David,426Bartov,Hanoch,131Barzilai,Israel,527responseto1966terroristattacks,150thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,240,263,274,275
Bar-Zohar,Michael,182,238Bat-Kol,174Bavli,Dan,468Bavli,Hana,22n,421Bawly,Dan,512–13BBC,352,500Beersheba,398Begin,Menachem,86,94–95,147,335,492n,496,582Altalenaand,117nArabrefugees,positionon,526,527,531
backgroundof,94–95Ben-Gurionand,92,181,249–50,272bordersofIsraeland,180–81,360,550–51onDayan,472described,95DruzeofSyriaand,452EastJerusalem’sannexationand,433–34economicphilosophy,95Herutpartyand,94,95,96,180–81,321,547martiallawand,74peacenegotiationsandthefutureoftheOccupiedTerritories,502,504,506,511
RevisionistZionismand,94–95
Six-DayWarbombingoftheLiberty,386dayone,349,350daytwo,352,360daythree,366–67,369finaldays,392,397,402,403
namingof,451nthethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,241,249–50,272,297,308,311decisiontogotowar,323,325,335,336joinsEshkolgovernment,319,321
Begin,Ze’evBenyamin,147BeitAwa,villageof,406,54InBeitHatefutsot(MuseumoftheJewishDiaspora),20BeitJalla,villageof,431BeitMirsim,villageof,406,54InBeitNuba,villageof,407,408BeitSh’an,53–54BeitSira,villageof,408,409Bellow,Saul,107Ben-Ami,Oved,71–72Ben-Amotz,Dan,30Ben-Ari,Riki,277,280,382Ben-Ari,Uri,44InBenBarka,Mehdi,93,214nBen-Eliezer,Arieh,130,242Ben-Elkana,MajorShlomo,562Ben-Ezer,Ehud,214Ben-Ezra,Max,421Ben-Gurion,David,60,69n,73,98,149,161,286MusaAlamiand,455theAltalenaand,117nAmericanJewsand,67,107n,108,560nArabrefugees,positionon,524–25,527nBeginand,92,95,181,249–50,272bordersofIsraeland,7,221–22eightiethbirthday,90,91
Eshkoland,85,94,158,249–50,251,263–64,307,318,319hatredofEshkol,88,92,93,181n,237–38,272,583Feinbergand,112GushEtzionand,431,577HebrewEncyclopediaentry,94nontheHolocaust,284IDFannualmilitaryparadeand,217–18,221IsraeliArabsand,73n,74TeddyKollekand,483,484Lavonaffairand,86,88,92,93–94,158,439Mapaiheadedby,6ontheMizrahim,58
theOccupiedTerritoriesJewishsettlementof,583manifestoonfutureofthe,503
theOldCityandplanfordestructionofOldCitywalls,449–50Six-DayWar,350,379–80,402
Peresand,309–10,318–19popularityof,86,90,91,93Rabin’sHebrewUniversityspeechand,439ontherecession,54SinaiCampaignand,240–41Six-DayWar,360,402–3GolanHeightsand,400,428ninformedofprogressofthewar,339,342,350,363,379OldCityand,350,379–80,402WesternWall,401
terroristattacks,responseto,148thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,236–37,243,260,270–71,274–75,306,318,328,336oppositiontomilitarygovernment,307oppositiontothewar,248,249,270,272,275,276,339,583replacementofEshkoland,231,247–51,263–64,272,307WarofIndependenceand,175,533writingsof,90–91,92
Ben-Gurion,Paula,251,274,379Ben-Harush,Amalia,60,555Ben-Harush,Israel,60,555Ben-Harush,Meir,60BenKenaz,Atniel,464Ben-Or,MajorArieh,394–96,397,419–20Ben-Or,Arza,395,397,420Ben-Or,Michal,395,397,420Ben-Or,Yonina,394–96,397,419–20Bentov,Mordehai,263,284,468Arabrefugees,positionon,526Six-DayWar,349thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,235,274,275,336
Benvenisti,Meron,177,178,427,486,492Ben-Yakov,Yisashar,63n
BenYefuneh,Caleb,464Ben-Yehuda,Baruch,137Ben-Yehuda,Rafi,574–75Benziman,Uzi,400,402Bergman,ErnstDavid,21,157,164Bergman,SchmuelHugo,156,546Bermes,Yaakov,248Bernstein,Leonard,440Betar,181Bethlehem,231,504Six-DayWar,362,378n,394,404–5Bialik(poet),582BiblicalZoo,Jerusalem,341Bilu(Zionistorganization),35Birdsall,James,565BirLahfan,357
birthrateofArabrefugees,541ofIsraeliArabs,528ofJewishIsraelis,429,526,528,554,558–59
Bitan,Moshe,115–16,254Blaustein,Jacob,108,560BlessedCurse,The(Teveth),462nBlumberg,Stanley,91BneiAkiva,138,422BoardofDirectorsGeneral,467,469,470nBodinger,Herzl,28nbordersofIsrael.SeeIsrael,bordersofBorman,Martin,283nBornstein,Moshe,109–10Borodianski,BenZion,388nBosmi,Nahum,498Brazil,proposedemigrationofArabrefugeesto,535,537,538Bresnick,Stephen,304Brezhnev,Leonid,230Brihaorganization,533Britain,294appeasementofHitler,284BalfourDeclaration.SeeBalfourDeclarationIDFannualmilitaryparadeand,218–19oilinterestsintheMiddleEast,202Palestineruledby,111–12,425,577methodsofIsraelimilitarygovernmentand,459,472,475,476,496Palmahoperations.SeePalmah
trilateralpactof1956,148,241BroadcastingAuthority,Israeli,555Brom,Haim,393,405Bronstein,Amnon,463,468Brotherhood,The,519nBrown,Arieh,404Brunn,Gabi,374–75
Bruno,Michael,528Buber,Martin,74Buch,Ehud,154Bul,93,214nBull,GeneralOdd,193,195,209,399Six-DayWar,340,346–47,351,508lootingofresidence,410
Bunche,Ralph,11,171n,193Bundy,McGeorge,331,387Burg,Yosef,275,335Burstein,Mike,222n
CaféKassit,TelAviv,9CaféRoval,TelAviv,9California(restaurant),TelAviv,9,11,13,62Callas,Maria,118Canada,proposedemigrationofArabrefugeesto,538CandidCamera,27Capucci,BishopHilarion,517–18,519Carmel,MoshepeacenegotiationsandthefutureoftheOccupiedTerritories,505
thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,235,240,273,275,290Carmiel,Israel,90Carmon,David,580nCarmon,ColonelDavid,202–3,259CarrotandtheStick,The(Gazit),473nCastro,Fidel,103n,146CBS,28CentralBureauofStatistics,Israeli,528,537CentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA),253,257,259–60Israel’sdecisiontogotowarand,329–30,331
Chagall,Marc,174n,305Chamberlain,Neville,284,335Chaplin,Charlie,116chemicalwarfare,prospectof,239,243,288,297,332,338
Chen,David,498Chenprintinghouse,496ChiefMilitaryRabbinate,465nChiefRabbinate,168,286Chizik,Uri,372,374,398,399Chouraqui,Andre,64Churchill,Winston,306grandsonof,280,327
Chuvakhin,Dimitri,201,230,267,268,274,292,399Clifford,Clark,326Coca-Cola,109–11,574CochinJews,143Cohen,Benjamin,366Cohen,Geula,94,134,221–22Sharoninterview,440,451
Cohen,JusticeHaim,99Cohen,Mihal,99Cohen,Rivka,420,428,447Cohen,SheldonS.,121,304Cohen,Yaakiv,147Cohen,Yaffa,54Cohen,Yosef,198,200Comay,Michael,539CommitteefortheWestBank,469nCommunistparty,95,157martiallawand,74
CompleteEshkolJokes,96–97Concentration(realestateboardgame),180ConferenceofPresidents,124Connery,Sean,440“ConqueringtheLandasaMoralAct,”181Crusaders,298Cubanmissilecrisis,335culturallife,28–30,32
Dachauconcentrationcamp,533
Daf,387Dajanifamily,485nDakar(Israelisubmarine),448“DangerofHitlerIsReturning,The,”284Danin,Ezra,532Danon,Dafna,117,118Danon,David,117Daoud,Colonel,346,508Davar,3,6,33,90,101,131–32,134–35,136,217,381,442,523DavarLeyeladim,160–61
“HelicopterCampaign,”439David,King,tombof,7,97Davis,Uri,74,282Dayan,Devorah,35,334Dayan,Moshe,5,89,183,231,233,268–70,419,439,560nArabplantoassassinate,506Arabrefugeesand,526,531,537,540,541n,542birthof,471childhoodof,35demilitarizedzonesand,193described,268,318,332,361–62,391,470–72,478–79Eshkol’srelationshipwith,125,313,316,320,361,370,391,414,548–50freemovementintwopartsofJerusalemand,435injurycausinglosteye,334,471Jerusalemand,491joinsRafiparty,86MargotKlausnerand,448nuclearweaponsand,164,549OccupiedTerritories,517,531,548,549–50economicintegrationof,470educationin,480as“liberatedterritories,”543militarygovernmentof,463,464,465,472–79,547,549–50,580,581“openbridgespolicy,”468peacenegotiationsandfutureof,500,502,503–4,505,518–19,567–68
visitsto,425,428“whipandcarrot”approach,473–75
Palestinianstate,proposalsfora,514,522peacenegotiationsandfutureoftheOccupiedTerritories,500,502,503–4,505,518–19,567–68onRabin’sbreakdown,237,238SinaiCampaignand,149Six-DayWar,372n,376,549dayone,342,344,345–46,350,363ndaytwo,354,356,357,360–62,363,365daythree,366–67,369–71,379finaldays,387–88,389–92,393–94,397,399,400,401,404–8,410
thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,228–29,234–35,238,241,242–43,260,268,270–71,299n,309thedecisiontogotowar,323,325–29,326,332–37,549joining theEshkol government, 270–71,272,297, 310, 311–20, 328, 331,332
replacementofEshkolgovernment,231,263,306,307victoryalbumsand,441victoryarchinJerusalemand,450Vietnamvisit,15,125–26,335,472–73
Dayan,Shmuel,35DeadSeaScrolls,378deBeauvoir,Simone,213DeclarationofIndependence,Israeli,67,450,549nDefenseDepartment,U.S.,116,119deGaulle,Charles,172,207,260,273,560–61demographics.SeeArabs,demographicproblemforIsrael;birthrateDe-Nur,Nina,71depressivestateofIsraelis,inthemid–1960s,14,138,286economicrecessionand,39,40,41
Diamant,Yehoshua-MordehaiAzriel(Shaia),422–23DiasporaJews,163,429beliefJewsbelonginIsrael,33,106“NewHebrew”comparedwith,5,155,262,283,549–50relationshipofIsraeliswith,100–103,557,559.
SeealsoAmericanJewsDietrich,Marlene,29,173nDimona,Israel,54nuclearreactorat.Seenuclearprogram,Israeli
alDin,Salah,298Dinstein,Dr.Yoram,102nDinstein,Zvi,235DirAyub,villageof,407DirYassin,villageof,410Dishonincident,198–99,200–201,204–5Disraeli,Benjamin,448Dissentchik,Arieh,252nDomeoftheRock,370,379,449,518,547Dori,Yaakov,271Dotan,RuthGeffen,358DotanValley,358Drimer,Moshe,393Druze,67,452,466Dvoretzky,Aryeh,528–31EastJerusalem,166,182,356,584educationinoccupied,481expropriationofArabpropertyin,487–90freemovementbetweenwesternJerusalemand,434–36Israeliannexationof,433–34,489,491,498,517Israeliruleof,482–99Jordan’scontrolof,7OldCity.SeeOldCity,JerusalemPalestinianstateand,513peacenegotiationsandthefutureof,503,505,519,520,566,567proposalsfortakeoverofthe,175,176WesternWall.SeeWesternWall.SeealsoJerusalem;OccupiedTerritories
Eban,Abba,103n,125,164n,183,187,198,201,202,221,568,582Arabrefugeesand,528n,538,540,541described,266,267DruzeofSyriaand,452
onguerillawarfare,146IsraeliannexationofEastJerusalemand,433Jerusalemand,72–73,489–90,491Arabictermfor,492
Novyand,114nnuclearweaponsand,166Palestinianstate,proposalsfora,514peacenegotiationsandthefutureoftheOccupiedTerritories,500,501,511,518,563–64,566,567
Samuaoperationand,150,152,153Six-DayWar,351–52,364,387,397,399,412moodafter,553
ontensionswithSyria,209–10,217thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,226,230,231,236,242,258,275,288–89,290,292,303,313
decisiontogotowar,326,329,333,335missiontotheU.S.,240,254–57,260,264–67,268,273,301,316,330removalofUNpeacekeepingforce,227,228
VietnamWar,123–24Eban,Suzy,352
economyofIsraeldecisiontogotowarand,295,324,331inflation,89OccupiedTerritories,policiesfor,469–70post-Six-DayWar,553–54
proposalresettlementArabrefugeesintheWestBankand,528
prosperityofthe1960s,20–23recessionofthemid–1960s,14,36–42,49–55,89,132,286,554
education,30–31,33,133–34bordersofIsraeland,178,179costof,89Mizrahimand,47–48,55,56–57,62intheOccupiedTerritories,479–81post-Six-DayWarchangesincurricula,553nsecurityserviceand,68–69SurveyExam,30–31,47–48onZionisthistory,134–35
Efrat,Rafi,549
EgyptattackontheEilat,582blockadeofStraitsofTiran.SeeStraitsofTiran,Egypt’sblockadeofdeploymentoftroopsinSinaiDesertin1967,13,187,226,227,229,233,333Jewsof,559-Jordandefensepact,299,304,311peacenegotiationsand,501,503,518,520,563–64,565,574pre-Six-DayWardiscussionsofrelationswith,187–90Six-DayWar,414,507airforce.SeeEgyptianairforcearmy.SeeEgyptianarmycasualties,351,445EgyptianPOWs,348,357,371–76
-Sovietrelationship,230-Syriandefensepact,13–14,183,212,216,228.SeealsoNasser,GamalAbdel
Egyptianairforce,263–64,326importanceofstrikingthefirstblowagainst,236,238,239,241,262,295,328,333,336
Six-DayWar,351destructionofaircraft,338,340,342–43,344,346,348,349,350,359,363n,365
U.S.assessmentof,253
Egyptianarmypre-Six-DayWarassessmentsof,293,294,296,323–24Six-DayWar,348,349,365,423collapseof,358,366POWs,371–76
Ehrenfeld,David,70Eichmann,Adolf,145n,282,483Eilat(Israelidestroyer),582Eilat,Israel,277Six-DayWar,335–36
Einstein,Arik,136Eisenhower,DwightD.,255nEisenstadt,S.N.,190Eitan,Rafael,440Eitan,Walter,207,378Elad,Ehud(neEidelman),353,357,414Elad,Eli,398Elad,Hava,353ElAl,10,538ElArish,345,386,403proposalsforsettlingArabrefugeesin,526,528,530Six-DayWar,348,357,362,365
Elazar,BrigadierGeneralDavid,162n,428n,575pre-Six-DayWartensionswithSyriaand,203–5Six-DayWar,387n,388,390,392–93thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,244,295,308
Eldad,Israel,181“ElElYehezkel,”100Elgat,Zvi,11–12El-Hama(HamatGader),399Eliav,ArieLova,312,429Elitzur,Yavul,110–11Elon,Amos,7,493Arabrefugees,positionon,525onDayan,471
Elsewhere,Perhaps(Oz),102
Elyashar,Eliyahu,57n
emigrationArabrefugeeproblem.Seerefugees,Arab,emigrationoffromIsrael,14,126–34,286ofIsraeliArabs,531,534intheweekbeforetheSix-DayWar,277,329yordim,129–31
Erez,Yaakov,195Eshkol,Leviagriculturalsettlementsand,51–52,86–87Altalenaand,117nAmericanJewsand,559,560Arabrefugees,positionon,520–21,523–31,532,534–42returnof1948refugees,214backgroundof,87Ben-Gurionand.SeeBen-Gurion,David,EshkolandbordersofIsraeland,175,176–77conciliatorystyleof,95Dayanand.SeeDayan,Moshe,Eshkol’srelationshipwithdeathof,585described,88DruzeofSyriaand,452economicpolicy,37–38,49–50,51–52,87educationaltelevisionand,28onemigration,130Feinbergand,113asfounderofMapai,87IDFannualmilitaryparadeand,217–18immigrationand,103,558intuition,relianceonhis,263,275,296,334,335IsraeliArabsand,71,534Jerusalemand,430,434,488,489,491,494,499,520investmentindeveloping,173victoryarchin,450
LyndonJohnsonmeetinginJanuary1968,571–73KingHussein,talkswith,500Krimsand,119
marriages,88martiallawand,75Mizrahimand,57,87,555nuclearweaponsand,164,166,549
OccupiedTerritoriesdecisionwhethertoholdonto,430,544,546,548,551,552Jewishsettlements,429–30,576–80peacenegotiationsandthefutureof,500,505–6,564n,565
oppositiontogovernmentof,85–86,89–90,96–97replacementasministerofdefense,263,297,311–20,359–60,430,548–49thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,231,241,247–51,252,263–64,270–71,272,286,306,307,309–11
Palestinianleaders,postwartalkswith,514–22Palestinianstateand,544peacenegotiationsandthefutureoftheOccupiedTerritories,500,505–6,564n,565,566n,567
pre-Six-DayWartensionswithSyriaand,194–98,199–212,215–17religioninpubliclifeand,105Six-DayWardayone,344,345,349–50daytwo,351,352,356–57,359–63daythree,366–67,369–70,382finaldays,387–88,390,391,392,397–98,399,400,403,412namingof,450–51
terroristattacksonIsraeland,147,148,154–55,499responseto,150–54,158
thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,13–14,225–37cooperationwiththeU.S.,236,241,245,253–60,264,276,289,292,302,303,310,323,326,334,335,382
decisiontogotowar,323–37,563radioaddress,stammering,290–91,306,337
unemploymentand,49–50,51,52U.S.aidand,115victoryalbumsand,441waterissueand,192WesternWalland,170Zionistprinciplesand,146
Eshkol,MiriamZelikowitz,88,97,226,267,291,387n,397Eshkov,Elisheva,232EternalRoad,The,116
EthiopianJews,99Etzel,95,117Evron,Boaz,84–85,114,284nEvron,Ephraim,109,120,124–25,335,383,572nLibertybombingand,568,569–70Samuaoperationand,151thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,15,254,265,302–3,306
Exodus(film),117nExodus(Uris),102nExposedintheTurret(Teveth),443Ezekiel,Prophet,100,163Ezra(youthmovement),578Ezrachi,Amiri,341Ezrachi,Edith,278,280,282,420,494,581,583Six-DayWar,339,340,341Ezrachi,Eitan,282Ezrachi,Ilan,341
Faisal,KingofSaudiArabia,520Faitlovitch,MiriamandJacques,99Falk,Avner,471“Falujapocket,”10familyplanning,46,73Farhi,David,498FastHotel,496,497Fatah,143–47,154,201,499,518,540activitiesaftertheSix-DayWar,478,517,
582–83attacksinIsraelinmid–1960s,13,143–44,147–48,149,205,508–9Dishonincident,198–99,200–201
KingHussein’seffortstosuppress,507–8,518,566Syriaand,144,192,193–94,204
Feinberg,Abe,110,111–14,116,126,153,253,254,302–3,569,573–74,582brotherof,119nLyndonJohnsonand,112–14,115,216Six-DayWar,347,382,383n
Feinberg,Avshalom(Absalom),139–40,562,563Feinerman,Uzi,388Feinstein,RabbiMoshe,106fences,security,148,155,203,204,205,206–7Feniger,Ofer,283Feuchtwanger(bank),39–40foreigninvestmentinIsrael,37ForeignMinistry,Israeli,184,284Arabrefugeesand,525,532,537–38,539currencyoftheWestBankand,470nJerusalemand,172,173pre-Six-DayWarassessmentofEgypt,189Six-DayWar,340–41,347,356,359,374n,407SoldiersTalkand,443thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,254,255,256volunteersfromabroadand,557,558
Forster,Arnold,110Fortas,JusticeAbe,119–20,121,265,302–3,335,382–83,491Arab-Israelipeacenegotiationsand,505armssalestoIsraeland,572Libertybombingand,568–69
France,122,316,389,561–62IDFannualmilitaryparadeand,218–19trilateralpactof1956,148,241.SeealsodeGaulle,Charles
Frankel,AvrahamHalevy,578Frankenstein,Carl,282nFriedlander,Saul,580nFriedmancompany,23Frisch,Amos,91
Gadnayouthbattalionsprogram,72,160Gadol,Haim,90GadtheSeer,465Gahal,86,181,315,316Galai,Benyamin,438n
Galilee,52,75,388,577–78deportationofArabrefugeesfrom,524IsraeliArabslivingin,67,74
Galili,Israel,177–78,197,492,555,576–77thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,229,240,262,273,275,307,315
Galon,Eitan,158Gan,Alon,78,82,140,444Gaon,Yehoram,60Gavish,BrigadierGeneralYeshayahu,314OccupiedTerritoriesand,544Six-DayWar,371,394looting,411
thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,226,243,245,291,292,293decisiontogotowar,324,327
GazaStrip,87,179,180,270,423,580Arabrefugees,post-Six-DayWaroptionsfor.Seerefugees,Arab
decisionwhethertoholdonto,429,430,503,505,516Egyptiancontrolof,7Israelivisitorsto,afterthewar,424–31peacenegotiationsandfutureofthe,501,503,505,516SinaiCampaignand,178,180,459,472,473,525,532Six-DayWar,344,349,360,369,379,403,446
plansgoingintothewar,326,327–28
WarofIndependenceand,175.SeealsoOccupiedTerritories
Gazit,Mordehai,184,185,188,517nGazit,Shlomo,74,184–85,188,404,458–59,463Arabrefugeesand,535–36,537OccupiedTerritoriesand,464,465,470n,477,480
Geffen,Aviva,471
GeneralStaffOccupiedTerritoriesand,544politicalfuturesofgeneralsservingonthe,321pre-Six-DayWartensionswithSyriaand,196,202–8responseto1966terroristattacks,150,154–55thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,244–45,246,290,299–300,307–8confrontationwithEshkol,aweekbeforethewar,292–97
decisiontogotowar,323–26,327–28.
SeealsonamesofindividualsGeneralTelevisionnetwork,Israeli,554–55GenevaConventions,376,458,576Germany,131Arabrefugeesencouragedtoemigrateto,532Holocaust.SeeHolocaustkibbutzimand,78neo-Nazismin,33reparationstovictimsofNazipersecution,37,44,78,79n,80,109
Getieh,Benjamin,99Gigi,Meir,148Gilan,Maxim,93,214nGinai,Arel,189,215–16Ginsburg,David,114–15,116,119,216,220,253–54,265,326,364, 383–84,568,570,571
Gitieh,Yirmiyahu,99Gluska,Ami,192,212Gnichovski,Dov,453Godik,Giora,29,60GolanHeights,503Banias,427,428Six-DayWar,351,360,363,369,387,388,392
decisionwhethertoholdonto,430,503,543–52,564economicintegrationof,470Israelivisitorsto,afterthewar,424–31Jewishsettlements,574–77
peacenegotiationsand,501,503refugeesfrom,398securityofIsraeland,427–28Six-DayWar,363,386–93,397–400.SeealsoOccupiedTerritories
Goldberg,Arthur,109,122,125,265,266,286,302,572Libertybombingand,569Six-DayWar,347–48
Goldenberg,MajorMoshoe,466Goldman,Dr.Nahum,33,103,109Goldstein,Dov,555Goldstein,Yossi,75Golomb,Eliyahu,232Goren,GeneralShlomo,368,377,379,449,546–47Gorodish,ColonelShmuel,238,271,353,355glorificationof,439–40Six-DayWar,339,415
Gothelf,Yahuda,39Gotlieb,Batya,248Gotthelf,Yehuda,134–35Gouri,Haim,94,128,130,135,138,139,178,443,542,545Grabow,ArnonDavid,285Grass,Günther,29,558GreaterIsraelMovement,580Greece,527Greenberg,UriZvi,166,180n,545,580GreenLine,7,166,175,176,177,178,359,430,568,580Gross,Dr.Shlomo(“Poles”),189–90,274Gross,Shlomo-Jacob,104guerillawarfare,146,165GulfofAqaba,501,503.SeealsoStraitsofTiranGur,ColonelMordechai,252,300–301Six-DayWar,356,367–68
GushEtzionregion,177,178–79,426,429–31,577renewedsettlementbyIsraelis,429–30,431,577–78Six-DayWar,377
Gussing,Nils-Göran,398n,405,408,557ngvarvarim,9Gvati,Haim,14–15,61,574IsraeliArabsand,70Six-DayWar,15,403informationoneventsof,342,349
thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,235,263,264,273,275,276,307,312,314
decisiontogotowar,337
Ha’am,Ahad,35Ha’aretz,7,21,65,83,95,101,107,159,213,222,284,466,551–52,580adviceforwomen,23–25onArabrefugees,525YehoshuaBar-Dayan’sdiarypublishedin,423nbordersofIsraeland,181,182oncomplaintsofIsraelis,90onculturallife,27,28,29,30onDayan,471ontheeconomicrecession,38,39,40–41,53,54onemigration,126–27,131–32,133–34onEshkolgovernment,96–97,306,310,313onetiquetteofmourning,421onIDFannualmilitaryparade,218,219onIsraeliArabs,69–70,71,72,281–82onJerusalem,434–35,450n,482,493onJewishsettlements,577,580MargotKlausnerand,448onKollek,174ontheMizrahim,57,58,61,62onnuclearweapons,164onpatriotism,553nonSamuaoperation,151,152Six-DayWar,reportingon,343,359,370n,381,386–87ontensionswithSyria,191–92,196,198,199,209,215shootingdownofSyrianMiGs,210–11
onterroristattacksandFatah,146,147–48,150thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,227,230,231,245,252,274–75,276,277,282,313
onVietnamWar,123,126nonvolunteersfromabroad,558ontheWesternWall,432,433onyouthofthe1960s,135–36,138
HabimaTheater,448Hablin,Shalom,388Hacohen,ArielZviBenYehuda,487Hacohen,David,242,307HadassahHospital,47,105,171Hadden,John,252–53,259–60,329,332nHadow,Michael,202,340n,472Hagana,2,112,177,269HagasheshHahiver,30Hagiz,Yitzhak,221Hagvul(“TheBorder”)(Shamir),27Hahiver,Gashash,136,231HaifaTheater,39Halevi,Meir,39Halevi,Rafael,248Hammarskjóld,Dag,227Hammuda,Yahya,518Handel,Nehama,381Hanreck,Noemi,214Ha’olamHazeh,8,9,74,79–80,157,163Harari,Yizhar,190Harel,Isser,74–75,452Hareli,Tamar,25Hareven,Aluf,513Harkabi,GeneralYehoshafat,146,248–49Harman,Avraham,110,113,115–16,126,155,201,382,491,549,560,565AmericanJewsand,106,108Arab-Israelipeacenegotiationsand,505Arabrefugeesand,525,539
DiasporaJewsand,103Eshkol-Johnsonmeetingand,571,572AbeFortasand,120JewishsettlementsintheOccupiedTerritoriesand,576Libertybombingand,568,569Mizrahimand,63mythofJewishpowerand,109nuclearweaponsand,166Samuaoperationand,153,154thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,227,256–57,265n,267,302decisiontogotowar,329,331,332–33,335
Harman,Zina,558Harmelin,Yosef,281Hashlosha(ship),41HashomerHatzair,2,76al-Hatib,Rawhi,484Hatikva,134,350,377Hayon,148Hazan,Yaakov,78,96,250,337Hazaz,Haim,56,61,545,580HebrewEncyclopedia,29,94nHebrewGymnasium,Jerusalem,2HebrewUniversity,29,33,39,85,169,171,172,225–26,306“Jewishmorality”and,437–38Mizrahimattending,47MountScopuscampus,constructionof,488Rabin’sspeechat,437–39,443,444Six-DayWar,354
Hebron,179,503,504,541Israelivisitorsto,afterthewar,425,426Jewishsettlementsin,578–79,580militarygovernmentof,461–62,475murderoftheJewsof,in1929,474nopeningofpostoffice,inJuly1967,473–74Six-DayWar,365,394,402
Hecker,Zvi,450
Hefer,Haim,12,14,100,321,415HeihalShlomo,168HelenaRubinsteincosmeticscompany,279Helms,Richard,257,330,331,386,567nHendel,Nehama,451Herbert,Dr.Emmanuel,345,506,511Hermelin,Yosef,531Heroes’Fortress(Qala’atDjedin),5Herutparty,86,221,547,556Beginand,94,95,96,180–81,321,547bordersofIsraeland,180–81,547martiallawand,74
Herzfeld,Avraham,431Herzl,Theodore,109,139,167,220Herzog(Bellow),107Herzog,GeneralChaim,298,401,482asmilitarygovernoroftheWestBank,463–64appointmentof,412,458
Palestinianleaders,postwartalkswith,514–16peacenegotiationsand,516–17
Herzog,Dalia,342Herzog,Pnina,140Herzog,Yaacov,57n,93–94,140,147,165,549n,550,582Arabrefugeesand,525,536Dayandescribedby,360–61,550peacenegotiationsandthefutureoftheOccupiedTerritories,505,506–11,566,567
postwartalkswithPalestinianleaders,514pre-Six-DayWartensionswithSyriaand,197,198onFatah,193Samuaoperationand,153,154
secretmeetingswithKingHussein,344,566,567Six-DayWar,360,391,392,397,399,407,463talkswithKingHusseinand,500thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,230,255,256,258,307,317,319,320
decisiontogotowar,333HeWalkedintheFields,55Hillel,Shlomo,539Hino(Japanesecarcompany),8Histadrut,38,57,87Histadruthealthfund,33,46,89,556Hitchcock,Alfred,29Hitler,Adolf,145n,335Nassercomparedto,178,283–84,313,326,545
Hod,Mordechai,212,440,573Six-DayWar,350,379thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,239,244decisiontogotowar,324,325
HoleintheMoon,A,9Holocaust,15,56,76,103,116–17,164,380,447,495,508,532,541immigrationofsurvivorstoPalestine,111–12remindersof,priortotheSix-DayWar,14–15,240,249,250,256,282–87ZionisteffortstorescueJews,483
HolocaustBasement,97–98homosexuality,100Horev,GeneralAmos,208,299Horowitz,David,452housing,34–35,36,39destructionofhousingofArabs,144–45,476–77,499,517aspsychologicalwarfare,476aspunishmentforactsofsabotage,475,476inSamuaoperation,151intheSix-DayWar,401–2,405–6,408,409,410,423n,446bytheWesternWall,401–2
expropriationofArab,488,489ofIsraeliArabs,69inJerusalem,167–68oftheMizrahim,44–45,46,48–49,55post-Six-Daywarconstructionof,553–54
Huberman,Israel,393Humphrey,Hubert,254,302n
Hussein,Hassan,183Hussein,KingofJordan,151,183,218defensepactwithNasser,299,304,311Fatahand,507–8,518,566Palestiniansand,187,515,516,530–31,566peacenegotiationsand,500,505–11,517–18,544,563,565–68pre-Six-DayWardiscussionsoffutureof,185,186–87Samuaoperationand,153,154,183,205
secretmeetingswithIsraelispriortotheSix-DayWar,344–45,506,566,567
Six-DayWar,345,358,364,507–10cease-fire,petitionfor,356–57,359,378sorrowandsenseofguilt,507warningstoHussein,340,508,509–10
thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,230,299–300Husseini,AbdelKhader,145,149,368al-Husseini,GrandMuftiHajAmin,145
Idelson,Beba,297IDF.SeeIsraelDefenseForces(IDF)Ihudmovement,433immigrationandimmigrants,JewishofAmericanJews,106,107fromArabcountries.SeeMizrahimdropin,14,36,128,130,286fromEasternandCentralEurope,9,63,64,87.SeealsoAshkenazim
onkibbutzim,82–83olim,129,130aftertheSix-DayWar,“demographicproblem”and,504,526,558,559
Imwas,villageof,407InaNewLight(Mansour),65–67IndependenceDay,1591967,215–22,2261968,583infantmortalityrates,528InMemoriam(MinistryofDefense),422IntergovernmentalCommitteeforEuropeanMigration(ICEM),538–39
InteriorMinistry,Israeli,483InternationalRedCross,536,541,559InternationalYoungPeople’sBibleQuiz,221Iraq,509Jewsof,559proposalforsettlementofArabrefugeesin,520–21,526–27,531,573
Iraqipilot,defectionin1966by,31–32IraqPetroleumCompany,202
Israelborders,77,175–82,221–22,580Biblical,166demilitarizedzones.SeeSyria,demilitarizedzones,agriculturallandsinGreenLine,7,166,175,176,178,359,430,568,580OccupiedTerritoriesand,429,431,523,543–52,564-65partition,6–7,167,177Six-DayWarand,299–301
creationofstateof,7DeclarationofIndependence,67,450,549nSinaiCampaignof1956.SeeSinaiCampaignof1956
trilateralpactof1956,148,241U.S.recognitionof,112WarofIndependence.SeeWarofIndependence
IsraelDefenseForces(IDF),6,8,452,476,566annualmilitaryparade,217–21Arabrefugeesand,537,540attitudestoward,159,161–64Bar-Dayan’sdiaries.SeeBar-Dayan,Yehoshua(Shuka)bordersofIsraeland,175–76civilianmissionsof,159,437compulsoryservicein,159designedforoffensiveoperations,155elitismof,162GeneralStaff.SeeGeneralStaffglorificationof,postwar,437–42IntelligenceBranch,184,187,301postwartalkswithPalestinianleaders,512,513thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,233.SeealsoYariv,GeneralAharon
kibbutzniksand,77,83–84lengthofservicein,53military government of the Occupied Territories. See Occupied Territories,militarygovernmentof
militarytakeoverofthegovernment,talkof,306–7
Mizrahimand,556moralvalues,associationwith,437–38pre-Six-DayWartensionswithSyria,195,199Rabin’sHebrewUniversityspeechpraisingthe,437–38,439,443,444
reservistsdischargingof,413nMay1967callupof,19–20,232,237,243,247,295
SchoolofCommandandStaff,459n,460–61Six-DayWar.SeeSix-DayWarunityofthepeopleand,278–79
Israeli,Haim,426Israeli,Itan,468IsraeliAirForce,10,12,13,187,195,312,573Rabin’sHebrewUniversityspeechpraisingthe,437–38recruitmentslogan,437,438shootingdownofSyrianMiGs,April1967,209,210–12Six-DayWar,351,389,510bombingoftheLiberty,386,568–70destructionofArabair forces,338,340,342–43,344,346, 348, 349, 350,359,363n,365
postwarassessments,414thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,234,264anticipatedlossofairplanes,325importanceofstrikingthefirstblow,236,238,239,241,262,268,295,328,333,336
IsraeliArabs,65–76Arabsintheterritoriesand,556–57civilrightsof,67confiscationoflandfrom,68,69,74demographics,67discriminationagainst,69,70emigrationof,531,534employmentof,69,70fearof,71–72priortotheSix-DayWar,243,280–82
livingconditionsof,9,69–70,556,557nmartiallawimposedon,67–68,69,74–75,459numbersof,14,67,72,526birthrate,72–73,106
transferof,talkof,74
unemploymentamong,69,75afterWarofIndependence,7
IsraeliAtomicEnergyCommission,164“IsraelisinAuschwitz,”283IsraelMuseum,Jerusalem,20–21,39,341,449,493IsraelWorkers’List.SeeRafipartyIsTelAvivBurning?,441
Jaabari,SheikhMuhammadAli,474,515,522,579Jabotinsky,Ze’ev(Vladimir),9,94–95,95,180,250,307,563Jacob,346Jacobson,Charlotte,124nJarring,Gunnar,564,566Javits,Jacob,537Jenin,182,300,580militarygovernmentof,462Six-DayWar,344,345–46,353,358
Jeremiah,prophet,300Jericho,528Dayan’spostwarvisitto,425modelfarmtoteachagronomytorefugeesnear,455Six-DayWar,365,394,404,406
Jerusalem,167–75,180,425,560Arabictermfor,choiceof,492–93ArmonHanatziv(theHighCommissioner’sPalace),171,176,410,412,450,491–92
BeitHakeremsectionof,2boundaries,postwar,430,433–34ascapitalofIsrael,167,172,219,519,520cinemasin,169divided,7,141,166–75
freemovementbetweenthetwopartsof,434–36IDFmilitaryparadein,217–21,226Israeliruleof,482–99terrorismandresistanceto,495–99
Jewishimmigrantslivingin,167–68
aslaboratoryofJewish-Arabcoexistence,493Lions’Gate,367,368MandelbaumGate,171,357,362Hussein’splanstocloseoff,318
Mizrahimneighborhoods,43–48OldCity.SeeOldCity,Jerusalempeacenegotiationsandthefutureofthe,503,505,519,520,521,566,567populationofIsraelis,in1967,167–68sewagein,168shoppingin,169,435Six-DayWar,345,510
dayone,340–41,344,345,349daytwo,345,354,355–57,358,360–61,362–63,366–71daythree,370,378–80GeneralStaffprewardiscussions,300–301monumentcommemoratingArabskilledin,493
surveyonIsraeliattitudestowardArabsfromEastJerusalem,494TempleMount.SeeTempleMountterroristattackinOctober1966,147–48thetriangle,168victoryarchproposedfor,450
“JerusalemofGold,”222,378,381,416,451–52JerusalemPost,105JewishAgency,73,166,168,429settlementdepartmentof,52,87,430
JewishNationalFund(JNF),1,50,51,68,426,429,430,431JewishObserver,108nJewishReformmovement,100JewishState,The(Herzl),139JewishWarVeteransAssociation,123
JewsandJudaismAmericanJews.SeeAmericanJewsanti-Semiticmythofpowerof,109,116changesinreligiousattitudesaftertheSix-DayWar,557determinationofstatusasaJew,98DiasporaJews.SeeDiasporaJewshalaka(Jewishlaw),99–100IsraeliJews,aspercentageofworld’sJewishpopulation,106religioninpubliclife,98–100,103–6secular,101,557“twoPeoplesofIsrael,”157
Jibril,AbdulMan’im,496–97Jiftlik,villageof,477Johnson,LadyBird,121Johnson,LyndonB.andJohnsonadministrationAmerican Jewsand,108–9,111–26,216,253–54,301–2,347, 364, 382–84,568–69,571–72,582
Arabrefugeesand,410,526,538,541armssalestoIsrael,253,316,568,571,572–73Dayan-Eshkolrivalryand,549Dishonincidentand,200–201IDFannualmilitaryparadeand,219–20Israel’sdecisiontogotowarwithSyriaand,216JewishsettlementsintheOccupiedTerritoriesand,574,575Libertybombingand,568–70OperationTexas,121peacenegotiationsand,501,505,521,563,564,565,567n,568,572–73Samuaoperationand,152–53Six-DayWar,347–48,352n,363–64,382–84,387bombingoftheLiberty,386,568–70pressuretostandbyIsrael,364–65,383–84
assupporterofIsrael,108–9,112,114–16lettersfromAmericansand,304,384the threeweeks leading to the Six-DayWar, 15,117, 229, 230, 236, 239,241,253–57,259–60,264–67,273–74,276, 286–87, 288–90, 292, 293,294,301–4,312–13
decisiontogotowar,323,326,329–34,335Vietnamand,115,122–26,254,304,572
JohnsonLibrary,121JointChiefsofStaff,U.S.,265
JordanArabrefugeesand.Seerefugees,ArabbordersafterWarofIndependence,7,176-Egyptdefensepact,299,304,311IDFannualmilitaryparadeand,218“openbridgespolicy,”468–69peacenegotiationswith,500,503,505–11,516–17,518,544,565–68pre-Six-DayWardiscussionsofrelationswith,182–87Samuaoperationagainst,151–54,158,182–83,508Six-DayWar,345,507–10dayone,341,344,345,349daytwo,356,365GeneralStaffprewardiscussions,299–300startof,336
terroristinfiltrationsfrom,144,147–48,209U.S.militaryaidto,113,114WesternWalland,170.
SeealsoHussein,KingofJordan;WestBankJordan,Charles,538JordanRiver,503,504ArabrefugeesattemptingtoreturntoIsraelacrossthe,540borderofIsraelaftertheSix-DayWar,504,505,544diversionofwaterfrom,192,203,231,501“openbridgespolicy,”468–69
Joseph,346,358JourneyThroughEretzYisrael,A(ShachamandKatz),179JudeaandSamaria,179
KafrKassem,281,362Kahana,RabbiKalman,104Kahana,S.Z.,97
KalkilyaIsraelivisitorsto,afterthewar,424–25mayorof,Dayanand,478militarygovernmentof,477,580refugeesfrom,405–6,407,541
Kanaan,Hamdi,478,519Kando(Bethlehemantiquitiesdealer),378nKarameoperation,582Karavan,Danny,40Katz,Avshalom,70Katz,Shmuel,179Katzenbach,Nicholas,153Katznelson,Berl,101Kaye,Danny,440Kazablan,60–61,213Kenan,Amos,9,306,408,409–10Kennedy,Edward,537Kennedy,JohnF.,112,117,118,119,335Kennedy,Robert,583Keshet,Silvie,138n,210–11Keshet,Yeshurun,278,281KfarEtzion,577,578KfarSaba,Israel,357KfarYuval,143,206Kfir,Ilan,163KhanYounis,townshipof,339,341,349Khatib,Anwar,516,519,520–21KibbutzAyeletHashahar,357KibbutzBeitHashita,444KibbutzBrenner,533KibbutzDegania,232–33,388,471KibbutzDeganiaBet,87KibbutzEinHanatziv,342,358,582KibbutzEinShemer,445KibbutzErez,36,423KibbutzGadot,211,388
KibbutzGalon,281KibbutzGolan(laterMeromGolan),575KibbutzHagoshrim,388KibbutzLohameiHagetaot,281,285KibbutzNeotMordehai,574–75KibbutzNetzerSereni,533KibbutzSdeBoker,91,94KibbutzTelKatzir,159–60,209KibbutzTiratZvi,467KibbutzYehiam,76,80,99,123foundingof,5,76newsletterof,75–76,79–80,81,82,83,99,428,442partitionofPalestineand,6–7preparationsfortheSix-DayWar,278Six-DayWar,362visitstotheWestBankbymembersof,426youthof,137–38
KibbutzYifat,446kibbutzim,76–85Americancultureand,77–78Ashkenazimlivingon,81–82changesinlifestyleofthesecondgeneration,80–81collectionofmembers’experiencesduringtheSix-DayWar.SeeSoldiersTalk(OzandShapira,editors)
IDFand,77,83–84IsraeliArabrightsand,75–76Mizrahimand,81–83populationof,in1967,76preparationsfortheSix-DayWar,278,285prestigeaftertheSix-DayWar,442principlesof,76–78takingoftheGolanHeightsand,388–90,391,398volunteersworkingon,558warcasualtiesfrom,442
Kibya,villageof,425nKidron,Mordehai,538
Kilani,Dr.Muhammad,457Kimche,David,512–16Kimche,Jon,108nKingDavid’sMausoleum,485nKiryatEliezer,Israel,20KiryatShmoneh,53,54–55,81,82Kishon,Ephraim,31,309,310,500Klausner,Margot,448–49Klemperer,Otto,29Klinow,Rina,178Knafo,Odette,421Knafo,Yitzhak,421Knesset,168,169compositionof,86Arabmembersof,68,71Mizrahiminthe,57,86
EastJerusalem’sannexationand,434elections,10–11,86ForeignAffairsandDefenseCommittee,164,165,308peacenegotiationsand,565
thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,228,234–35,239,242,275Six-DayWar,350Dayan’spostwarspeech,414
Knessetbuilding,Jerusalem,21Six-DayWar,341,349
“KnowWhattoSay,”563Kohn,RabbiHersch,105Kol,Moshe,98,540responseto1966terroristattacks,150Six-DayWar,349thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,274,275
Kolberg,Eilon,138KolIsraelradio,53–54,70,100,215,298,492,541,583Six-DayWar,coverageof,340,342–43,363nsongcontest,222
Kolitz,David,380
Kollek,Teddy,62n,173–75,222,328,490,494,499n,583MusaAlamiand,455,456attitudetowardArabsofEastJerusalem,484–85backgroundof,483Ben-Gurionand,483,484described,483,484freemovementintwopartsofJerusalemand,435fundingforJerusalem,172–73asfund-raiser,483–84JewishQuarteroftheOldCityand,379,380occupationofJerusalemand,482–87Six-DayWar,341,356,379,380,401
Kolnoa(“Cinema”),80Komer,Robert,153Kook,RabbiZviYehuda,100,181,546–47,578KoreanWar,266Koslowski,Pinhas.SeeSapir,Pincas(neKoslowski)Kosygin,Alexey,267Kotel.SeeWesternWallKotler,Yitzhak(Iki),159visittotheOccupiedTerritories,425,428
Kremnitzer,Mordehai,282–83Krim,Arthur,114,116–19,120,301–2,565,571Krim,Dr.MathildeGalland,116–19,122,301–2,347,383Kuneitra,GolanHeights,397–98
Kurzweil,Baruch,139nLa’isha(“ForWomen”),80Lamerhav,217LandofIsraelclub,77Laner,Dan,575Lapid,Yosef,161–62Lasker,Mary,301Laskov,Haim,312,354LatinAmerica,Arabrefugeesencouragedtoemigrateto,531,537,538Latrunregion,176,513
Arabrefugees,407–10,477Six-DayWar,344,345,351,353–54
Lavi,Arik,412,415Lavonaffair,86,88,92,93–94,158,439Lazimi,Prosper,54Leibowitz,Yeshayanhu,94n,433Leinsdorf,Erich,121,231,277,526nLesseps,Ferdinandde,452nLevanon,Nehemiah,230Levavi,Arieh,359,361,363Levavi,Arye,258Levi,Ram,70Levi,Shaike,30Levinger,Moshe,578,579Levinson,Lawrence,365,384Levy,Gideon,405Liberalparty,86Liberty(U.S.spyvessel),386,568–70
LibyaJewsof,559proposalforsettlementofArabrefugeesin,529–30,533
Life,190Lior,Israel,192,218,540,579opinionofEshkol,88,398onRabin’sbreakdown,237responseto1966terroristattacks,150Six-DayWar,344,358,361,369–70,389–90,397–98,549ontensionswithSyria,194,195–96,209,210,212thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,226,239,244,281,291,296,317decisiontogotowar,323
Lipman,Zev,453,454LitaniRiver,177Litvinoff,Amanuel,102Livnat,Arnon,396Livnat,Hana,396Livneh,Eliezer,106–7,131,165,168,284Lod,expulsionofArabsfrom,524Lorincz,Shlomo,104,105Lurie,Ranan,405Lutheranchurch,537Luz,Kadish,313,456
Ma’arah,88,89,92,255,311,312,314,318Maariv,21,64,79,100,107,110,125,139,159,166,194,220,221,231,236,271,284,309,414,420,495onArabrefugees,214nonbordersofIsrael,179,182oncomplaintsofIsraelis,89,90DiasporaJewsand,103ontheeconomicrecession,54onemigration,132,133,134ontheIDF,161,441onIsraeliAirForce,438nonIsraeliArabs,72
onIsraelipolitics,94onJerusalem,afterthewar,433,488onkibbutzim,78,81–82ontheMizrahim,58,59,60,555AbieNathanand,12onnuclearweapons,164ontheOccupiedTerritories,543,580balancingtheArabpopulationin,429Jewishsettlements,577
onRabin,439onSamuaoperation,152ontheSinaicampaign,148–49Six-DayWarnamingof,451reportingon,342–43,354,359,370n,381,407
ontensionswithSyria,191,195,196,198,216shootingdownofSyrianMiGs,210,211–12
onterroristattacksandFatah,143,144,148,150thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,226–27,231,245,252,278–79,306,320
onunemployment,553ontheWesternWall,170
MaarivLanoar,161MacArthur,GeneralDouglas,266McKay,Margaret,541McNamara,Robert,115,126,267,335,347,549
decisiontogotowarand,326,330,331Macovescu,George,565McPherson,HarryC,Jr.,121–22,124–25,343,352n,403,571Mafdal(NationalReligiousParty),72,94,96,315MahanotOlim,177–78MahanotYouthmovement,177Mahendra,KingofNepal,571Maizlish,Mrs.,304MalagasyRepublic,220,232Malhi,Eliezer,231
Mandelbaum,Esther,442Mandelbaum,Yakov,17InMani,Dr.A.,458Mani,Eliyahu,57Manor,Amos,252Mansour,Atallah,65Mapai,6,75,221,311,312n,316–17,318Ben-Gurion’sbreakwith,86,94Ben-Gurion’scriticismof,92Eshkolasleaderof,86foundingof,87Histadrutand,38,87IsraeliArabsand,68Mizrahimand,57
Mapam,94,96,189,567martiallawand,74rightofreturnand,157VietnamWarand,122
Marciano,Sa’adia,47Marcus,Yoel,26Mardor,Meir(Munya),208Markus,Yoel,313martiallawIsraeliArabsand,67–68,69,74–75,459intheOccupiedTerritories,458
Masada,104–5,307,377Masrawa,Ahmed,70al-Masri,Hikmat,518al-Mazarib,AbdelMajidKhader.See
Yarkoni,Amos(néAbdelMajidKhaderal-Mazarib)
medicalservices,33Megamot,83Megged,Aharon,439,556Meir,Golda,118,386n,545,549KingHussein’smeetingwith,345,506
peacenegotiationsandthefutureoftheOccupiedTerritories,506onSoldiersTalk,443thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,242,250–51,270,310–11,313–16,318,320
Mekorot,87MemorialDay,Israel,220MercazHaravyeshiva,445,546,578Meron,Theodor,576Meskin,Aharon,91Michener,James,560Mihaeli,Danny,498Mihaeli,Rivka,222MilitaryGovernmentStaffattheCentralCommandHeadquarters,464,466MinistryofDefense,Israeli,37–38,47,72,200,391,451,466n,531,556Eshkol’sousterfrom,263,297,311–20,359–60,430,548–49InMemoriam,422victoryalbumsissuedby,441
MinistryofEducation,Israeli,72,441–42OccupiedTerritoriesand,479–81
MinistryofFinance,Israeli,466,532MinistryofForeignAffairs,Israeli,452DayanvisittoVietnamand,125–26immigrationfromNorthAfricaand,64n
MinistryofHousing,Israeli,34MinistryofLabor,Israeli,180,466OccupiedTerritoriesand,469–70
MinistryofPost,Israeli,22,435–36PhilatelicServices,214–15
MinistryofReligiousAffairs,Israeli,433n,464–65MinistryofTourism,Israeli,465MinistryofTradeandCommerce,Israeli,466MixedArmisticeCommittee,170,176,200,508Mizrahi,Rahaman,154Mizrahim,43–65,168attitudetowardArabsofEastJerusalem,494Beginand,321
clashbetweentheAshkenazimandthe,14,56–58,61–63,556discriminationagainst,44,55,56–57,58,87,120,286,556economicrecessionand,41–42,49,53–55familyplanningand,46kibbutzimand,81–83Mimounacelebration,61missingchildren,58–60outnumbertheAshkenazim,43politicalrepresentationof,57–58post-Six-DayWareconomyand,555qualityoflifeof,43,44–49,53–55,286SoldiersTalkand,445WesternWalland,432–33Zionistmovementandimmigrationof,56
Mohammed,Suleiman,476nMoisheVentilator,30Monroe,Marilyn,118Montgomery,FieldMarshalViscount,565Moore,Henry,29Mor,Shmuel,93,214nMorocco,proposalforsettlementofArabrefugeesin,526Mosenzon,Yigal,60,213Moskowitz,Erwin,560nMosowitz,Haimito,362–63,368–69,381Mossad,32n,102,253Arabrefugeesand,531,537BenBarkamurderand,93headof,secrecyofidentityof,189Palestinianleaders,postwartalkswith,513,514–16pre-Six-DayWardiscussionsonEgypt,187–88,189–90onJordan,184.SeealsoAmit,Meir
MountHerzl,563Jabotinsky’sburialon,95,250,563
MountofOlives,3,7,367,487
Jewishcemeteryon,436,493MountScopus,171,176,299n,301,318busroute,487–88restorationof,488Six-DayWar,344,345,349,351,354,355,356,510
MountZion,432significanceof,97–98
MovementfortheAnnexationoftheLiberatedTerritories,581–82movies,29–30Moyers,Bill,304Muhieddin,Zakaria,302nMukhaimer,MuhammadAbdullah,456–58Müller,Heinrich,283nMusalem,Ayub,519nMyNameIsAhmed,70–71
Nablus,179militarygovernmentof,474–75Six-DayWar,365
Nadel,Baruh,284Narkis,BrigadierGeneralUzi,162n,307,545backgroundof,355Jerusalem’soccupationand,496,499noccupationcurrencyand,454nOccupiedTerritoriesand,463,464,480,486–87,544pre-Six-DayWartensionswithSyriaand,205–6Six-DayWar,344,346,354,355–56,368,370,378–79,381,410Arabrefugees,404,406onlessonofthewar,413WesternWall,401,402
thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,244,252,295,297,299Nashashibi,NasserEddin,520,521Nashashibi,Samika(neeErika[Esther]Wiener),495Nasser,GamalAbdel,10,69n,148,187,216assassinationof,proposalfor,452comparedtoHitler,178,283–84,313,326,545
defensepactwithKingHussein,299,304,311Israel’srighttoexistand,521AbieNathan’smission,10–13,548npeacenegotiationsand,518,520,563–64,565,566onrefugees’rightofreturn,190Six-DayWar,345,364,390,394,507,509thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,226,227–28,234–35,258,292,297,302,336blockadeofStraitsofTiran.SeeStraitsofTiran,Egypt’sblockadeof.
SeealsoEgypt“NasserIsWaitingforRabin,”415Natan,Shuli,222Nathan,Abie,9–13,14,62,548nNathan’s,110NathantheProphet,465NationalDefenseCollege,184,185,189,355,464NationalInsuranceInstitute,60nNationalLibrary,Jerusalem,169,495,585NationalParksAuthority,427NationalSecurityCouncil,U.S.,216Nativ,102,103,533,538nNatureReserveAuthority,427Nazareth,280Nebenzahl,Dr.YitzhakErnst,454Ne’eman,Yuval,164,528nNetanya,Israel,357NeutralityAct,U.S.,364NewHebrews,5,155,262,283,309,549–50Newman,Paul,117nNewsoftheWorld,327Newsweek,568,578NewYorkTimes,38,93,106,120–21,174n,284,489NightofBridges,2–3,4nightvisionbinoculars,207Nili,139–40
Nilimovement,562,563Nimri,Kamal,499Nissim,RabbiYitzhak,546Nitzotz,85Nixon,Richard,440Novy,Jim,114,121Noy,Bilha,56–57nuclearprogram,Israeli,176,188,189,190,249,253,508armssalestoIsraeland,573nuclearreactoratDimona,15,115n,164–66,263,290,561Dayan-Eskolrivalryand,549fearofEgyptianattack,229,233,235,255,264,273Peresand,309
OccupiedTerritoriesand,470nproposalofnucleartest,topreventwar,327
Nusseibeh,Anwar,518Nutting,Anthony,23Inoccupationcurrency,452–54OccupiedTerritories,16,422,429,455–81,543–52,553AmericanJewsand,560n,572Arabslivinginthe,472,523–42,544demographicproblemof,429,430,503,529,548,550militarygovernment.SeethisentryundermilitarygovernmentofPalestinianleaders,talksbetweenIsraelisand,512–22peacenegotiationsandfutureof,502–4.Seealsorefugees,Arab
currencyin,452–54,470debateoverthefutureof,post-Six-DayWar,543–52publicopinion,551–52religiousdimensionto,546–47
economicpolicyfor,469–70economyofIsraeland,554educationin,479–81“enlightenedoccupation,”455–81,581handbooksformilitarygovernors,458–61,462schoolingand,479–81
Zionistideologyand,455–56financialcostsofoccupation,554Israelivisitorsto,afterthewar,424–31,463permitsrequiredforcivilians,426,431,470
Jewishsettlementof,429–30,574–80U.S.position,574,575
as“liberatedterritories,”543militarygovernmentof,458–81,580,581BoardofDirectorsGeneral,467,469,470ncivilservantsand,465–66civilservices,restorationof,473–74Dayan’s“whipandcarrot”approach,473–75destructionofhousingandvillages,475,476,477duplicationandarbitrarinessof,464formerJordaniangovernmentemployeesworkingfor,466handbooksforfuturegovernors,458–61,462IDFUnit640,476psychologicalwarfare,476SchoolofCommandandStaff,459n,460–61standardoflivingand,539
ministerialcommitteesetuptohandleTerritorialaffairs,467n“openbridgespolicy,”468–69peacenegotiationsand,501–11,564–65,566–68,574SoldiersTalkand,446terrorismin,580n,581–83,585.SeealsoEastJerusalem;GazaStrip;GolanHeights;SinaiDesert;WestBank
Oded,58Ofer,Avraham,48Ofer,Zvi,460–61Ofir,Shaike,322,412,415Ohon,HaimElimeleh,248Oistrakh,David,29OldCity,Jerusalem,167,170–71,174,175,179,182,299,300,301,357,432,583Ben-Gurionand
planfordestructionofOldCitywalls,449–50Six-DayWar,350,379–80,402
Christianholysitesin,463freemovementsbetweenthetwopartsofJerusalem,434–36Israelioccupationof,486restorationplans,487–89terrorismandresistanceto,495–96
JewishQuarter,355,487,488,489rebuildingof,486,488repopulationwithJews,379,380,402,488,489transferofArabresidentsfrom,488
Six-DayWar,349–50,351,352,355–56,360–61,366–71,377,378–82,404,438,463
TempleMount.SeeTempleMountduringWarofIndependence,487WesternWall.SeeWesternWall
Oliver!,102Olmert,Ehud,96Omar,Daherel’,5Omer,Dan,100OntheRoad(Omer),100“openbridgespolicy,”468–69OperationRefugee,542OperationShredder.SeeSamuaoperationOperationWorker,532Oron,Yitzhak,184,513Orthodoxandultra-OrthodoxJews,89,103–6,578IndependenceDayand,221inJerusalem,167,168autopsiesand,104–106,231Jewishweddings,controlover,98–99repopulationoftheJewishQuarter,488statusquo,98Zionistvs.non-Zionist,104
Oufkir,Mohammed,93Oz,Amos,11,64,102,138–39,179,339,415,546,548
SoldiersTalk,442–47
Palestine,1,140,533Britishruleof.SeeBritain,PalestineruledbyimmigrationofHolocaustsurvivorsto,111–12kibbutzimin,77martiallawin,68politicsin,87UNpartitionof,6,112,139,167,177
PalestineLiberationOrganization(PLO),145–46,518PalestinianLiberationArmy,497PalestinianNationalLiberationMovement.SeeFatahPalestinians,112ascitizensofIsrael.SeeIsraeliArabsFatahand.SeeFatahflightanddeportationof,7–8,67,143,524,525,532encouragementofemigrationof,513,529–40.Seealsorefugees,ArabKingHusseinand,187living in theOccupied Territories. See Occupied Territories,Arabs living inthe;refugees,Arab
postwardiscussionsbetweenIsraelandthe,516–22refugees.Seerefugees,Arabrightofreturn.Seerefugees,ArabSix-DayWarexecutionof,374–75implicationsofseizingArabterritories,359,369,379plansgoingintothewar,327,328refugees.Seerefugees,ArabasresultofstruggleofPalestinians,507,509.
SeealsoOccupiedTerritoriesPalestinianstate,55In,566Arabrefugees,proposalsfor,526
discussionsbetweenPalestinianandIsraelileadersimmediatelyaftertheSix-DayWar,512–16,521–22
Rabin’sproposalfor,544Palmah,2–3,77,101,311,321,355,444NightofBridges,2–3,4
Palombo,David,97“ParadeofFallenSoldiers,”415parapsychology,448–49Pardes,RabbiHaim,96PassoverHaggada,300Patir,Dan,568PaulVI,Pope,98,358,432Peled,GeneralElad,28n,185–86
decisiontogotowar,324,325,326pre-Six-DayWartensionswithSyriaand,208
Peled,QuartermasterGeneralMatityahu,295Peres,ShimonArabrefugees,positionon,527narmsdealsand,316backgroundof,309bordersofIsraeland,176onHussein’srule,183Six-DayWar,379thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,249,250,271,309–10,314,318–19,328proposalforavoidingwar,327
Petra,179PhilharmonicOrchestra,Israel,29,231Pik,GolanHeights,398Pike,JamesAlbert,449Poliakov,Yisrael“Poli,”30Pope’sRoad,432Porat,Hanan,579PorathYosefyeshiva,487Pragai,Michael,410Preminger,Otto,117n
PreventionofReligiousCoercion,433nPrinz,Joachim,124Profumo,John,138n
al-Qassam,Izzal-Din,269,346Quandt,William,326,347Qutub,AbdulRazzak,496,497
Rabin,Leah,243Rabin,Yitzhak,5,183,218,309–10asambassadortotheU.S.,573Arabrefugeesand,524n,540bordersofIsraeland,175,182,300chemicalwarfareand,239onDayan,391,549described,262glorificationof,postwar,439,440HebrewUniversityspeech,437–39,443,444Libertybombingand,570noccupationcurrencyand,454nOccupiedTerritoriesand,543,544,551pre-Six-DayWartensionswithSyriaand,195–98,199,200,203,206–12,215,217shootingdownofSyrianMiGs,210,212
asprimeminister,321Samuaoperationand,205nSix-DayWar,345,376assessmentof,413bombingoftheLiberty,386ndayone,344,345–46,350daythree,370,371,377finaldays,387,388,390,391,394,401,404,406,412
terroristattacks,responseto,150,152,155thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,15,226,228,229,232,233–34,236–42, 248, 256, 258, 262, 264, 268, 286, 289–90, 297, 300, 306, 308,311,314,317,319,320
decisiontogotowar,323–24,326,327,333,549nervousbreakdown,236–37,238,243,244,245,255,257,272,273,299victoryalbumsand,441waterdiversionissueand,192
Rabinowitz,Kobi,375Rachel’sTomb,428,434,465nradioactiveweapons,301RadioPalestine,149Rafael,Gideon,227Rafael,theWeaponsDevelopmentAuthority,528Rafael,Yitzhak,72–73Rafiah,townshipof,339,343,348Rafiparty,60n,89,439Ben-Gurionstarts,86joiningEshkolgovernment,310,312,315,316,318
Ramallah,477,519nradiostation,512Six-DayWar,362,363,378
RamatDavid(AirForcebase),344RamatGan,Israel,20,519nRamie,expulsionofArabsfrom,524Ravikovitch,Dalia,213–14,548Reagan,Ronald,572recessionofthemid–1960s,14,36–42,49–55,89,132,286,554ReformJudaism,107refugees,Arab,523–42,584attemptingtoreturnfromJordan,540–42emigrationof,encouragementof,513,529–40fund-raisingforthereliefof,525,526n,542fundstoencouragerefugeestoleaveGazaandtheWestBank,513,532,534,535–36
Israelis’knowledgeofplightof,525mediacoverageof,540–42moralobligationofIsraelisand,525,526numberof,estimatesof,524,525optionsfordealingwith,523–42,544
emigration,encouragementof,513,529–40settlementinArabstates,505,513,526–28,529–30,533,573settlementintheSinai,505,526,528settlementintheWestBank,oronJordan’seasternbank,505,523,526,528,529–31,542,576n,584
peacenegotiationsandoptionsfordealingwith,505,564,565the“refugeeblunder,”542responsibilityfor,acknowledgmentof,526,542rightofreturn,7,156,157,189,190,214,430,455,524–25,541Six-DayWarand,403–10,429,431,446
Reinhardt,Max,116religioninpubliclife,98–100,103–6Remez,Aharon,378Reston,James,284Reuters,343Rice-Davies,Mandy,138nRifai,Zaid,566,567Riftin,Yaakov,189RishonLezion,Israel,20,21,23,28,30,35,423pre-Six-DayWarlifein,279–80recessionand,39–40,41
Rivlin,Hana,170Roche,John,364–65Rockefeller,Nelson,572RockefellerMuseum,356,378,584Rogers,Colonel,413–14Ron,ColonelRam,569Ronen,Chen,357,362,372,378visittooccupiedKalkilya,424–25
Roosevelt,FranklinDelano,111Rosen,Meir,107Rosenblum,Herzl,154,166,182,218,321Rosenfeld,Shalom,284Rostow,Eugene,120Rostow,Walt,38,120,123,126,216,219–20,347Libertybombingand,386n,569
peacenegotiationsand,564Six-DayWar,347,382the threeweeks leading to the Six-DayWar, 253–54, 257, 264–65, 288–89,303,306
Rostropovich,Mstislav,29Rotenberg,Roi,233Rotenstreich,Nathan,163–64,437Rothbloom,Howard,304Rothschild,Baronde,99,525,526nRothschild,Gad,453,454Rothschildfamily,21,28Rubenstein,Amnon,493Rubenstein,Artur,29Rubenstein,Daniel,405Rubinstein,Amnon,136,137Rubinstein,Rafi,398,399,404Rupin,Arthur,581Rusk,Dean,115,166,201,219,347,563,569bombingoftheLibertyand,386IsraeliannexationofEastJerusalemand,433Libertybombingand,568Six-DayWar,356,364,383nthethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,254,257,266,292,302,303,333
Russell,Betrand,102RuththeMoabite,464
Sabras,77,139–40,155Sacks,Sue,304–5al-Sadat,Anwar,399Sadeh,Pinhas,139Safdie,Moshe,526nal-Sa’ih,SheikhAbdal-Hamid,497–98Sakakini,Khalil,495Salameen,SelmaNasser,151Salmon,Yosef,139Salomon,Yosef,581
Samsonov,Rema,3,36,412Samuaoperation,151–54,158,182–83,205,208,212,228,508KingHussein’sreactionto,508
Sapir,Pincas(neKoslowski),130,263,549Arabrefugees,positionon,526Jerusalemeconomyand,172OccupiedTerritoriesand,469–70,503post-Six-DayWareconomyand,553,554recessionand,40–41,50–51thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,235,268,272,275
Sapir,Yosef,350,379,399,464Sarig,Nahum,101,444Sarig,Ora,444Sarig,Ran,444Sarig,Tikva,101,444–45Sarna,RabbiYehezkel,578–79Sartre,Jean-Paul,213–14,525Sashar,Michael,467–68,473–74Sasson,Eliyahu,57,58,112,263,275Arabrefugees,positionon,526backgroundof,502nPalestinianleaders,postwardiscussionswith,514–19,522peacenegotiationsandthefutureoftheOccupiedTerritories,502,505
Sasson,Moshe,183,404postwartalkswithPalestinianleaders,514–16
Sassoon,Celina,487SaudiArabia,509Saunders,Hal,216Scharf,Uri,168–69Schechter,Haim,101Schiff,Ze’ev,122–23,182,191–92,204n,210,284onArabrefugees,403,407thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,234
Schnitzer,Shmuel,64,131,133,139,189,190Schocken,Gershom,90,274–75,276Scholem,Gershom,156
schools.SeeeducationScreenofSand,A(Allon),311–12SdeBokerCollege,107nSebastia,villageof,456SecondTemple,449secularJews,101,557Seeger,Pete,214nSela,Zvi,47SelectCommitteeofHeadsofServices,514Sephardim.SeeMizrahimSereni,Ada,531,532–38Sereni,Daniel,533Sereni,Enzo,533Serlin,Yosef,241–42SeventhDay:SoldiersTalkAbouttheSix-DayWar,The,443nShabak(securityservices),435,452,464,476,496,499,580nArabrefugeesand,531,532,540Palestinianleaders,postwartalkswith,512,514–16
Shabtai,Yaakov,64Shafir,MargalitandEliyahu,147Shahak,Dr.Israel,99,100,306Shaham,Nathan,179Shaham,Ze’ev,468Shaham,ColonelZe’ev,405Shalev,Yitzhak,552Shalit,Benjamin,98Shalom(passengership),40Shamgar,Meir,281,370,543Shamir,Moshe,27,55,423n,545,580Shapira,Avraham,37–38SoldiersTalk,442–47
Shapira,HaimMoshe,94,96Arabrefugees,positionon,526,527EastJerusalemandannexationand,434Jordaniancourthouse,488–89
GushEtzion,Jewishsettlementof,429
peacenegotiationsandthefutureoftheOccupiedTerritories,502–3pre-Six-DayWartensionsand,199,200onresistancetoJerusalem’soccupation,495responseto1966terroristattacks,150Six-DayWar,349,361,362,379,392,399,402thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,235,236,239–41,243,258,262,272,273–74,275,307,312,315,317,319decisiontogotowar,325,336
Shapira,Yaakov-Shimshon,100thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,275
Shapira,Yoskeh,279Sharett,Moshe(néMosheShertok),4,35,232,533Arabrefugees,positionon,524
Sharmel-Sheikh,234,236,240,270peacenegotiationsandthefutureoftheOccupiedTerritories,504Six-DayWar,351,360,370,371,377
Sharon,Ariel,35attitudetowardtheArabs,163Ben-Gurionand,91GeulaCohen’sarticleon,440,451glorificationof,440nickname,163asprimeminister,321promotedtogeneral,91SinaiCampaignand,149Six-DayWar,349,351,354,365,425nthethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,245,255,291,293,296–97,299,308decisiontogotowar,325
Shashar,Michael,496Shazar,Zalman,27,91,93n,94,101,156,220,474,571Shdemot,443Sheetrit,BehorShalom,41,57–58Shehade,Aziz,478,512–13,518,519,521Sheinerman,Shmuel,35Shemer,Naomi,381,451–52
Shenker,Israel,317Sherashevski,Dr.Shimon,156Sherf,Ze’evArabrefugees,positionon,526occupationcurrencyand,453OccupiedTerritories,debateonfutureof,504thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,235,275
Shermer,Naomi,222Shertok,Moshe.SeeSharett,Moshe(néMosheShertok)Shimoni,David(Shimonovitz),135Shimoni,Yaakov,130Shimron,Erwin,468,480Shofman,Yosef,210Shtengl,ColonelAharon,403Shukeiri,Ahmad,145–46Shukri,Naomi,285Silver,AbbaHillel,111Silwan,villageof,488Simon,AkibaErnst,156,282Simon,Michael,99–100SinaiCampaignof1956,8,87,139,148–49,206,207,208,231,233,239,240–41,281,357,362,366,395,459GazaStripand,178,180,459,472,473,525,532tenthanniversaryof,148,149withdrawalfromterritories,177–78,180,181
SinaiPeninsula,179,423Arabrefugees,proposalsforresettlementof,505,526,528,530decisionwhethertoholdonto,430,564demilitarizationof,501Egypt’s deployment of troops in 1967. See Egypt, deployment of troops inSinaiDesertin1967
incomefromoilproduction,554Israelivisitorsto,afterthewar,423,424–31Jewishsettlements,580peacenegotiationsandfutureof,501,503,504proposalforIsraeltopurchasethe,452
Six-DayWar,365EgyptianPOWs,371–76plansgoingintothewar,326.
SeealsoOccupiedTerritoriesSix-Days(IDFvictoryalbum),441Six-DayWar,13–17,338–416Arabrefugees.Seerefugees,Arabcivilianvolunteers,storiesof,441–42daytwoof,351–65daythreeof,366–84daysfourthroughsixof,385–416fearsofextinctionpriorto,14–15,240,249,250,256,282–87foreignvolunteersandvisitorssupportingIsrael,280,557–58glorificationoftheIDFafter,437–42intoxicationofvictory,423Israelicasualties,339,341,343,344,350,351,352–53,356,365, 393, 394,396,397,413,414,415
anticipated,249,286,331,414fromkibbutzim,442mourningperiod,national,420–23
Israeliciviliansbombshelters,341–42,349,358informationavailableto,340,342–43,344,346,349,350,358
looting,410–12
moodinIsraelafterthewar,553beforethewar,277–87,421,428,544
namingof,450–51OccupiedTerritories.SeeOccupiedTerritoriespeacenegotiations,500–511,516–18,544,563–64,565,572–73,574debatesofcabinetministers,501–6
postwarassessments,413–14postwarpsychologicalandeconomicchanges,553–60preemptivestrike,avoidingtheappearanceof,335,336,342,363–64,363npreventionofwar,possibilitiesfor,228n,251,286–87,327,334,337threeweeksleadingto,225–37avoidingtheappearanceofapreemptivestrike,335,336,342,363ndecisiontogotowar,323–37,549,563moodinIsrael,277–87,421,428,544politicalmaneuverings.SeenamesofindividualsandpoliticalpartiesU.S.prewarassessmentofcourseof,253,265victoryalbums.Seevictoryalbums
Smilansky,Yizhar,548SocialistInternational,312nSocietyinDefenseoftheDignityofthe
DepartedofIsrael,450SoldiersTalk(OzandShapira,editors),442–47abridgedEnglishtranslation,443nexcludedcontent,444–47onhurtingcivilians,447originsofideafor,442–43salesfiguresfor,443
Somerfin(shippingcompany),39SouthAmerica,Arabrefugeesencouragedtoemigrateto,531,537,538SovietUnion,15Angleton’sviewof,330-Israelirelations,389,399Jewsfromthe,102,103,108,122,156,533,559,563kibbutzimand,78-Syriarelations,152,153–54,194,201,216,387,388
thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,230–31,267,268,274,302Spector,Yiftah,210n“SpottedTiger,The,”64Starkey,JamesLeslie,584statecomptroller,OccupiedTerritoriesand,465StateDepartment,U.S.,119,551armssalestoIsraeland,572IDFannualmilitaryparadeand,219–20Israeland,109,116Jerusalemand,489Libertybombingand,568,570Six-DayWar,364–65,383thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,236,273,286–87,326,332,333
Stavsky,Avraham,17InSteinbeck,John,29Stern,Friedl,179Stern,Gabriel,17,141,223,417,433,434,435Stern,MordechaiHaim,73StraitsofTiran,241,260,287Egypt’sblockadeof,238,239–40,248,270,583decisiontogotowarand,330Israelreopens,370
potentialU.S.roleofending,242,243,254–55,265,266,267,273–74,288–89,290,294,303,312–13,326,330,331,332–33,335,382,414
peacenegotiationsand,501potentialblockadeof,232,235,236,238Sharmel-Sheikh.SeeSharmel-Sheikh
SubiranayLobo,Francesca,103nSubiranayLobo,Dr.Ricardo,103nSuezCanal,148,270,452npeacenegotiationsand,501,503,564,565Six-DayWar,363,371,393–94plansgoingintothewar,326,327
SundayTimes(London),148SupremeCourt,Israeli,98,169,489Sussman,AlexanderAlexandrowitzAbraham,35
Sussman,Dr.Devorah,35Sussman,Ezra,35Suttendorf,EdnaandBinyamin,34–35
SyriaBa’athpartyin,177nborderincidentsandterroristinfiltrations,13,31–32,144,191,203,231demilitarizedzones,501agriculturallandsin,191,192,193,199–200,203,209–10,231Six-DayWar,360,396
Druzelivingin,452-Egyptiandefensepact,13–14,183,212,216,228Fatahand,144,192,193–94,204GolanHeightsand.SeeGolanHeightsJewsof,557n,559peacenegotiationsand,501,503pre-Six-DayWartensions,191–212,215–17Dishonincident,198–99,200–201shootingdownofSyrianMiGs,210–12
settlementofArabrefugeesin,proposalfor,526Six-DayWar,344,349,351,358,360,369,386–93,397–400,414-Sovietrelations,152,153–54,194,201,387,389thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,226,228waterdiversionissueand,192,203,231,501
“Syriansyndrome,”195
Tabenkin,Yitzhak,177–78,180Takson,Nahum,17InTal,GeneralIsrael,154–55,200pre-Six-DayWartensionswithSyriaand,208Six-DayWar,349,351proclamationdeliveredtothetroops,338–39,415
weekbeforetheSix-DayWar,294,297Talmi,Menahem,354Talmon,Yaakov,139Tamir,Shmuel,130,578–79Tamir,Yehuda,488Tammuz,Benjamin,107Tan’ami,Hamama,58–59Tan’ami,Moshe,59
Tan’ami,Yehuda,58–59TanusHouse,170Tarabia,AliMukhassan,466Tchernichovsky,Shaul,180n,213TchernichovskyWriters’House,213Tegart,Charles,476Tegartforts,476TelAviv,Israel,167architecturein,20culturallifein,28–30foreignembassiesin,172lifeinthemid–1960s,8–9Mizrahimof,48–49shoppingin,168–69Six-DayWar,345duringWarofIndependence,232–33
TelAvivHevreKaddisha,286TelAvivUniversity,21TelAzaziat,351,387,393“TelephoneSong,The,”30
televisionArabrefugees,coverageof,540–42
inIsraelbeginningofIsraeliprogramming,554–55kibbutzimand,79in1966,27–28
TempleMount,97,449,486,518,519,546,547,567Six-DayWar,367,368,378–79WesternWall.SeeWesternWall
terrorist attacks on Israel. See names of individuals; individual organizations,andsponsorcountries
Teveth,Shabtai,61–62,134,136,137,138,439,471TheBlessedCurse,462nExposedintheTurret,443
Thalmann,Ernesto,489Thant,U,152,221,227,254,491“ThirdTemple,The,”559–60“Thirty-five,”177,178–79Timemagazine,317,327Times(London),539,541“TiredMan,”138–39Tito,JosipBroz,565Todd,Ruth,91Toledano,Shmuel,75,534TombofthePatriarchs,177,428,465,581Topol,Chaim,415Toscanini,Arturo,29
tourismpost-Six-DayWar,554terrorismand,206travelabroadbyIsraelis,26–27,79,424
Trim,Kenneth,560nTrotsky,Leon,318Truman,HarryS.,111,112Trumpeldor,Yosef,55Tuchman,Barbara,29,560Tukan,Fadwa,478TulKarem,refugeesfrom,404,405,406Tumarkin,Yigal,9,385Turkey,527Turner,Steven,304TwelveTribesofIsrael,The(Chagallstainedglasswindows),305Tzfira,Braha,213Tzifroni,Gabriel,381,515
ultra-OrthodoxJews.SeeOrthodoxandultra-OrthodoxJewsunemployment,49–55,69,75,89,286emigrationofArabrefugeesand,537,539post-Six-DayWareconomyand,553–54,555
UNESCO,481nUnitedArtists,116,117nUnitedJewishAppeal(UJA),119,440UnitedNations,559Arabrefugeesand,524–25,536,541post-Six-Daywarnegotiationsand,523
UnitedNations Emergency Force, removal from Sinai border of the, 227–28,229,231,234,248,491,509
UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,166,489partitionofPalestine,6,112,139,167,177,232Six-DayWarand,352
UnitedNationsHeadquarters,450UnitedNationsobservers,Six-DayWarand,340,344,346–47,351,399,405UnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgency(UNWRA),406,481n,524n,526
UnitedNations SecurityCouncil, 141, 153–54, 158, 170, 201, 202, 389, 392,489cease-fireresolution,397,400Resolution242,564–65
UnitedPalestineAppeal,111
UnitedStatesAmericanJews.SeeAmericanJewsArabrefugees’emigrationto,proposalfor,537Johnsonadministration.SeeJohnson,LyndonB.andJohnson
administrationU.S.Congress,256,303UniversityofHaifa,21UniversityofTexas,121Unterman,RabbiIsserYehuda,432UpperGalileeRegionalCouncil,575Uris,Leon,102n,559–60Uris,Yossi,559USSR.SeeSovietUnionVardi,Rafael,464Vatican,356,489,517Vered,Avraham,162–63victoryalbums(albomim),440–42VietnamWar,115,122–26,130n,146,231,241,254,304,325,330,384,386,572Dayan’svisittoVietnam,15,125–26,335,472–73
Vilner,Meir,73VoiceofThunder(Egyptianradiostation),287,342vonGlahn,Gerhard,459vonHorn,MajorGeneralCarl,33
Wagner,FirstLieutenantNahman,376WailingWall.SeeWesternWallWaqf,489Warhaftig,Itamar,399Warhaftig,Dr.Zerah,100,231,262–63,283,433pre-Six-DayWartensionsand,200Six-DayWar,389,392,399–400thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,262,274,275,286,315decisiontogotowar,336
WarofIndependence,7,10,17,76,159,175,177,182,231,300,355,388,398,410,483,487,577Arabrefugees.Seerefugees,ArabbordersofIsraelafter,7,166,175,182Latrunregionand,353–54memorials,214–15
Palestiniansafterthe.SeePalestinians;refugees,Arabpurchaseofarmsfor,533startof,232
WashingtonPost,125,560Wattenberg,Ben,365,384weddings,controloverJewish,98–99Weill,Kurt,116Weisgal,Meyer,116,117Weisler,Menahem,160Weisman,Ezer,514nWeitz,Nir,402,436Weitz,Raanan,52,341,429Arabrefugees,positionon,528,584decisionwhethertoholdontotheOccupiedTerritoriesand,430,431JewishsettlementsintheOccupiedTerritoriesand,574,575
Weitz,Ruhama,5,6,55,585gravesiteofYehiamand,436Six-DayWar,340,341
Weitz,Yehiam,1–8,76,436Weitz,Yosef,1,3–6,7,55,68,76,129,339,584–85agriculturalsettlementsand,51–52Arabrefugeesand,7,523,528deathof,585gravesiteofYehiamand,436IsraeliArabsand,74Mizrahicultureand,61,432–33OccupiedTerritoriesand,426–27,428–31Jewishsettlements,577–78
onpostwarbehavior,423onpre-Six-DayWartensions,247,277,280Six-DayWar,341,349,358,402unemploymentand,50,51WesternWalland,432–33
Weitzman,Bonnie,304Weizman,Ezer,163,200,212Arabrefugeesand,542
onbordersofIsrael,175KingHusseinand,500nephew,David,355Six-DayWar,342,345,354,370–72,379–80,403,405thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,226,239,242,243–45,264,268,276,294,299,300,308,313outburstinEshkol’soffice,317–18
visitstheOccupiedTerritories,425Weizman,Moshe,354Weizman,Reuma,342,354Weizman,Yael,354–55Weizmann,Chaim,109,112,116,354–55,450WeizmannInstituteofScience,Rehovot,116,117,117nWerfel,Franz,116WestBank,344,345,349–50,351,356,358,363,364,369,402–6bordersofIsraeland,175–76,177,523currencyof,470decisionwhethertoholdonto,429,430,431,502–4,543–52demographicsof,186economicintegrationof,469–70GeneralStaffprewardiscussions,299–300Israelivisitorsto,afterthewar,424–31,463,581Jewishsettlementof,576Jordan’scontrolover,7mailservicebetweentheoccupiedWestBankandJordan,469nmilitarygovernmentof.SeeOccupiedTerritories,militarygovernmentofPalestinianleaders,post-Six-DayWartalksbetweenIsraeliofficialsand,511–22
peacenegotiationsandfutureof,502,503–4,516–17pre-Six-DayWardiscussionoffutureof,184–87,359,513proposalsfortakeoverofthe,175–76
refugeespost-Six-Daywaroptionsfor.Seerefugees,ArabSix-DayWar,403–10,429,431,446Six-DayWar,444decisiononwhethertoconquertheWestBank,359–63,369,379Palestinianrefugees,403–10,429,431,446
WarofIndependenceand,175,182.SeealsoOccupiedTerritories
WesternWall,97,167,170,449,546,547,567historyof,401–2Israelisreturnto,432–33Six-DayWar,360,367–71,377,379–80,381,412destructionofpublictoiletsandhousingbytheWall,400–402,432
stampwithapictureofthe,490nWestGermany.SeeGermanyWheeler,GeneralEarleG.,265“WhoKnowsHowMany?,”222nWiesel,Elie,108,440,559,561Wilson,Harold,260,273,541Wingate,CaptainOrde,476Wolf,Dr.Fritz,343Wolf,Ruth,532,541WorldBank,525WorldJewishCongress,103WorldWarI,Jewishbrigadesin,236WorldZionistOrganization,103
Ya’ari,Haim,131Yaari,Meir,94,96,250,337,375–76Yabed,villageof,346Yadin,Yigal,105,179,182,231,306–7,312,318,378nRabin’shonorarydegreefromHebrewUniversityand,439Six-DayWar,344,391,399,400
YadVashem,98,121Yaffe,Adi,255,317,318Yaffe,Avraham,245,294
Six-DayWar,349,351,365Yalu,villageof,407Yariv,GeneralAharon,183,215,549Samuaoperationand,152Six-DayWar,345dayone,344daytwo,351,358
thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,228,233,239,255,256,258–59,268,276,292decisiontogotowar,323,325,327n,329,335
Yarkoni,Amos(neAbdelMajidKhaderalMazarib),269–70,375nYarkoni,Yaffa,381,415,416Yavnel,Palestine,1YediotAharonot,21,79,86,102, 139, 159–60, 166, 218, 220, 221, 316, 321,409,442,563onbordersofIsrael,179,182onemigration,128–29,131,132,133on“JerusalemofGold,”451–52onkibbutzim,78–79,81,84–85onMizrahim,44AbieNathanand,12onnuclearweapons,165ontheOccupiedTerritories,543ontherecession,54–55onSamuaoperation,151–52,182,183ontheSix-DayWar,15ontensionswithSyria,191,198–99,209,210,215–16,216onterroristattacksandFatah,144,148,149thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,227,230,231,280,284,306ontheWesternWall,170
Yedlin,Aharon,135Yehoshua,A.B.,580nYehud,villageof,425nYekutieli,Baruch,468Yelin-Mor,Nathan,282nYeruham,Israel,54
Yerushalmi,LieutenantColonelYeshayahu,570Yeshayahu,Israel,58peacenegotiationsandthefutureoftheOccupiedTerritories,504thethreeweeksleadingtotheSix-DayWar,273,274,275,312
Yinon,Avigail,435Yinon,Yoel,96,422–23,435Yishai,fatherofKingDavid,464“Yishuv,”185–86Yitzhaki,Arieh,375Yitzhaki,Levi,268Yizhar,S.,5Yizkor,415Yohanan,Captain,251–52Yost,Yehuda,21–22,428visitstheBanias,427
Yovel,Shoshanna,44–46Yulish,Moshe,194
Zach,Nathan,306,548Ze’evi,MajorGeneralRehavam(Gandhhi),262onDayan,472Jerusalem’sboundariesafterthewarand,434Palestinianstateand,514npre-Six-DayWartensionswithSyriaand,206–7Six-DayWar,349weekbeforetheSix-DayWar,293
Zihroni,Amnon,282Zik,Adir,428Zim(shippingcompany),40Zionism,1,9–10,35,109,166,354,410,445,508AmericanJewsand,108Arabrefugeeproblemand,526,532Ben-Gurionon,583–84“enlightenedoccupation”and,455–56Europeanoriginsof,56asfailedproject,14
IsraeliArabsand,67Israeliyouthofthe1960sand,134–36,138Jerusalem,attitudetoward,167Palestiniannationalmovement,discrepancybetween,520–21principlesof,146,508,527restorationoftheOldCityand,487–88Revisionist,94–95
Zmora,Ohad,44InZohar,Uri,9,30,287n,322,412,415Zuaretz,Frija,456–58Zur,Rafi,232,245Zur,Zvi,175,342,413n,458,537Zussman,Zvi,185
ABOUTTHEAUTHOR
TOM SEGEV is a columnist forHa’aretz, Israel’s leading newspaper, and theauthor of three now-classic works on the history of Israel— 1949: The FirstIsraelis; The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust; and OnePalestine,Complete:JewsandArabsUndertheBritishMandate,whichwasaNewYorkTimesEditors’Choicefor2000.HelivesinJerusalem.
*AnIsraeli-madefour-speedContessacostapproximately10,000liras,whileaVWBeetle cost close to 15,000. InTelAviv one could get hold of the latestMercedes,BMW,andVolvomodels,aswellasavarietyofAmericancars.8†Telephoneswereinstalledinthreeoutofeverytenapartmentsatthetime,andnearly 60,000 people were waiting for lines. In another reflection of theimprovedeconomy,thePostalMinistrykeptlesseningthewaitingtime.‡Many telephone owners placed them in the entryway to their apartmentsbecauseneighborswouldoftencomeby tomakecalls.HanaBavli, the IsraelidoyenneofEuropeanetiquette,respondedtoareaderofHa’aretzwhowantedtoknow how to handle a neighbor who came over andmade long phone calls.“Onecanoffertorefusepaymentforthecall,andthishintwillusuallysuffice,”Bavliwrote. “But if shedoesnotunderstand,onecanpolitely informher thatoneiswaitingforanoutsidecall.”9
*Aspartofthecontinualimprovementinconvenience,towardtheendof1966milkinIsraelbegantobesoldinplasticbags,insteadofglassbottles.10
*Therewerealmostthreetimesasmanyfemaleasmaleteachersinelementaryschools.Bycontrast, insecondaryschools thereweremoremaleteachers thanfemale.12
*An IDFofficer,FirstLieutenantHerzlBodinger,wrote to theprimeministerthatthebenefitsIsraelwouldgainbybroadcastinginblackandwhitewouldbeinsufficient: inorderforit tohaveaclearadvantage,colorbroadcastsmustbeinstituted immediately.21 In the meantime, the government assigned an IDFgeneral,EladPeled,tooverseethematter.
*Filmshad tobeapprovedby thecensorbeforebeing screened.Mostpassed,butanItalianfilmabouttheslavetradewasdisqualifiedsoasnottoinsulttheIvoryCoastandDahomey:PrimeMinisterEshkolwasscheduledtovisitAfricasoon.
*Hewaswrong:IsraelacquiescedtotheAmericanrequestandhandedovertheMiG for inspection.Most Israelis did not know that the arrival of theSoviet-manufactured MiG-21 had been organized by the Mossad, which wasresponsibleforIsrael’scovertoperationsabroad.TheplanewasthefirstMiGofitstypeobtainedbyanycountryintheWesternbloc,andtheMossadgaveitasymbolicname:007.26
*Theofficialexchangeratein1966was3lirastothedollar.TheblackmarketrateinApril1967hoveredataround3.5lirastothedollar.
*ApackofAscotscost82aguras;therewerecheapercigarettes,buttherewerealsomoreexpensiveones.Siloncost50aguras,Timecost1.25liras.31
*Onereporter,forMaariv,alsoquotedjobseekerswhospokeYiddish.
*Oneofthenewspaperspublishedanarticleabout400residentsofKiryatGatwhotookforestryjobs,andhatedeveryminuteofthework.14
*ThedeputydirectorgeneraloftheMinistryofForeignAffairsoncedrewupalist of those among the hundreds of senior officials in his ministry who“belongedtotheMizrahiethnicities.”Itwasashortlist.Amongtheforty-nineMizrahiofficialsweresixambassadors.Asimilarlistwaspreparedintheprimeminister’s office. Yaacov Herzog, the director general of that office, tried toreassure the head of the Sephardic Committee, Eliyahu Elyashar: “In myopinionthereisnoobjectivefoundationtotheclaimthatSephardicchildrenareinherentlyretarded.”26
*The headlinewas “EthnicMinisters,”meaningMizrahiministers:AshkenaziIsraeliswereneverdescribedas“ethnic.”Inanotherpiece,thepapernotedthatYeshayahuwasafinechoiceforpostalminister,becausehewasafrequentletterwriter.27
*The checkwas transferred via theHaifa branch ofBen-Gurion’s party,Rafi.Upuntil1960,thegovernmentgavegrantsof100lirastoeverymothergivingbirthtohertenthbaby.Nearly5,000womenreceivedthesegrants.After1960,child allowances of 100 liraswere distributed through theNational InsuranceInstitute. In the second half of 1966, the birthrate decreased, apparently as aresultoftherecession.
*The term “Levantine” connoted something culturally inferior, but notnecessarilyMizrahi.When Ben-Gurion protested “Levantinization,” hemeantthatinTelAvivthereweretoomanycommercialsignsinEnglish.“Levantinismis wrapping itself in a cloak of Americanization,” a kibbutz movementpublicationoncecautioned.35
*S.Y.Agnonwrote to thepaper that he spentmost hours of theday in sterncontemplationoftheevilofman,thankstotheracketcausedbypeoplenearhishome in Jerusalem. In response,Mayor Teddy Kollek ordered that a sign bepostednexttoAgnon’shouse,askingpeopletobequiet.39
*Another Israelidiplomat in theUnitedStates,YisasharBen-Yakov,estimatedthatJewishAmericanswerefindingitmoreandmoredifficulttounderstandthechanging face of Israel.He therefore proposed appointing aMizrahi publicityofficial.41
*Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Europe reported thatmanyNorthAfrican Jewswere hesitant to immigrate to Israel because of theeconomicsituation,preferringthe“fleshpots”ofBrusselsandParis.43
*InFebruary1963,Ben-Gurion,speakingintheKnesset,usedquotationsfromthenotebooksofstudentsinArabschoolsasevidenceofgrowingadmirationofthe Egyptian president, Nasser. He did not say how he had obtained thechildren’snotebooks.
*Severalyearspriortothis,Ben-GurionhadaskedtolookintothepossibilityofconvertingIsraeliArabstoJudaism.
*InadiscussionbetweenEshkolandHarelonmartial law, theclosedmilitaryareasweredescribedas“cages.”63
*Many kibbutzim built swimming pools with the reparations their membersreceived from Germany. They also used the money for sports fields, diningrooms,andclubhouses.77
*The topic also preoccupied YosefWeitz, who in addition to hismany otherpositionswasalsoamemberoftheHulacouncil.Inthecontextofthegrowingunemployment inKiryatShmoneh, hepositionedhimself at theheadof thosewho objected to the project, opposing Minister of Agriculture Gvati, whosupportedit.Weitzmanagedtoobtainatwo-yearpostponement.83†Untilthemid-sixties,about4percentofallimmigrantsweresenttokibbutzim,butfewstayed.Nordidtheabsorptionofnewcomersreflecttheethnicmakeupofimmigrantsoverall:mostwhowenttokibbutzimwereAshkenazi.85
*For some reason, Eshkol insisted on wearing a beret. Hismilitary secretarykept a supply of them in his car. Before IndependenceDay in 1967, the IDFpublished a glossy book of photographs.According to one source, at the lastmoment someone instructed that thepictureofMinisterofDefenseEshkolbepulledfromthebookandreplacedwithamoreflatteringphotograph,minustheberet.95
*Ben-GurionadmiredtheyoungSharon,butasprimeministerhadcaughthiminaliemorethanonce.HesaidthatSharonadmittedasmuch.
*EshkolinstructedhismilitarysecretarytolookintoBen-Gurion’saccusations,butLior said hewas unsuccessful. Eshkolwas troubled. “What does hewantfrom me?” he would ask in Yiddish; according to Lior, “His heart waswrenched.”101
*There is no reason to assume that Ben-Gurion himself would not haveauthorized such an operation, but he found it difficult to pass up a chance toattackEshkol.PresidentShazarsenthimanemotional,handwrittenletter,urginghim to abandon the matter. At least some of the details of the affair remainclassified, stored in a file kept in the state archives and in sealed portions ofBen-Gurion’sdiary.105
*Atthebeginningof1967therewasanuproaroverthe“Ben-Gurion”entryinthe Hebrew Encyclopedia. The author was the encyclopedia’s senior editor,YeshayahuLeibowitz,aprofessorattheHebrewUniversityandalong-standingideologicalopponentofBen-Gurion.“IthinkBen-GurionisthegreatestdisastertobefallthepeopleofIsraelandthestateofIsraelsinceitsestablishment,”theprofessortoldMaariv,andthisviewwasreflectedintheencyclopedia.107Ben-Gurionwashurt.“Idon’tcarewhatProfessorLeibowitzwrites.IcarewhatIdo,ifit’sgoodornot,”herespondedtoanadmirer;totheencyclopedia’spublisherhewrote,“Leibowitzisconsumedwithhatred.”108
*Accordingtohisdaughter, thiswastheonlyoneofall thejokes’punchlinesthatEshkolactuallysaid.Althoughitcamebacktohaunthim,hehadintendeditasajoke.Heusuallypreferredtea.
*The complexity of the issue was also apparent in the controversy overgovernment ministers’ vehicles. The ministers’ cars bore blue license plates,whileothervehicleshadorangeones.OntheSabbath,ministersusedtoswitchto orange plates, because it was deemed less than respectable for an Israeliministertopubliclyviolatetheprohibitionagainstdriving.128
*One Nativ operation involved a literary initiative: Leon Uris, the author ofExodus, looked favorably on an Israeli suggestion to write a novel about theplight of Soviet Jews, according to a Nativ agent’s report to one of PrimeMinister Eshkol’s assistants. The request was made under a heavy cloak ofsecrecy.“Urisisinterestedinacoverfortheoperation,sothatitcannotlaterbeclaimedthathis inspirationfor thebookwastheIsraeligovernment,”reportedthego-between,Dr.YoramDinstein.
*Jewish fatebrought to Israel adiplomatwhose life storywas fairlydramaticandwhodideverythingtokeepitsecret.Dr.RicardoSubiranayLobowasborninHanover,innorthernGermany,toaJewishfamilynamedWolf.Anengineerandan inventor, he immigrated toCubabeforeWorldWar I; therehemadeafortune. In the late fifties he supported Fidel Castro and helped finance therevolutionthatbroughthimtopower.CastroacceptedSubiranayLobo’srequestto serve as Cuba’s ambassador to Israel. He came with his non-Jewish wife,Francesca, set up one of the most lavish estates in Israel, and did volunteerwork;AbbaEbanwrotethathewasa“loyalsontoanancientpeople.”132
*This was also Ben-Gurion’s basic stance, but he too sometimes turned toAmerican Jews, as he did in mid-1966, partly to raise funds for Sde BokerCollege.†SimilarreportscamefromLondonregardingthe“poorstateofBritishJewry.”
*The question also came up regarding ties with Jews in other countries. JonKimche,theeditoroftheJewishObserver,aBritishweekly,wasremovedfromhispostbecauseEshkolbelievedhefavoredtheRafipoliticalline.145†BlausteinsuggestedatonepointthathemeetwithEgypt’sNasser.ThefactthathewasnotaZionistmightbeofhelp,heclaimed.Itisunclearwhetherhewasjoking,buthedidhelpIsraelonotherdiplomaticmatters.
*Coca-Cola even sued Bornstein, claiming that with one beverage he wasimitating their bottles and the name “Cola.” The case was settled: the Israelibottleremainedunchanged,butthenamewasnowtobespelled“Kola.”
*Although he was not Israeli, Feinberg’s personal archives are housed in theStateArchivesinJerusalem.
*Novywasthemanwho,inthe1950s,firstintroducedtheIsraeliambassador,AbbaEban, totheDemocraticSenatemajorityleader,LyndonJohnson.Israelidiplomats in the United States cultivated ties with Novy, and one of hisacquaintancesaskedEshkoltohelppromotehisbusinessinIsrael.157
*President Johnson was “Issahar” in Ministry of Foreign Affairs telegrams;Eshkolwas“Yehuda.”160†FeinbergwasacentralfigureinraisingthefundsIsraelinvestedinitsDimonanuclearplant.161
*TheAltalena reached the shores of Israel in June 1948, carrying some 850immigrantsaswellasthearms.PrimeMinisterBen-GuriondemandedthatEtzelhandover thearmsto thenewlyformedIDF.NegotiationswereconductedbyMenachem Begin and Levi Eshkol, among others. When talks failed, Ben-Gurionsawtheaffairasatestofthestate’ssovereigntyandorderedthattheshipbebombarded.†Weisgalalsobenefitedfromthematchmaking:afewyearslaterhehelpedOttoPreminger film the story of the Exodus, the ship of illegal immigrants. ThemoviestarredPaulNewman,withWeisgalhimselfintheroleofBen-Gurion.Itwas perhaps the greatest achievement of the Zionist movement’s propagandaefforts,greatereventhantheactualsailingoftheExodus.UnitedArtists,ownedbyKrim,distributedthemovieandpromisedtheWeizmannInstituteashareintheprofitsofapproximately$1million.165
*HeonceaskedKrim to tellAbeFeinberg thathehaddecided to support thecandidacyofFeinberg’sbrotherforajudgeship,notneglectingtomentionthathewastherebyangeringotherinfluentialJewsinNewYork.
*PrimeMinisterBen-GurioncametoFortas’shousetomeetJohnsonwhenthelatterwasstill theSenatemajorityleaderin1960.ButJohnsonhadtoattendasenator’s funeral that day and it is unclearwhether he had time tomeetBen-Gurion. Eitherway, in his car on theway to the airport, he spokewithBen-Gurion on the phone and showered himwith questions about the situation inIsrael.167
*Ha’aretz supported the establishment of diplomatic relations between IsraelandSouthVietnam.175
*Israeli diplomats soon became actively involved in the question of Prinz’sreplacement; Israel’s choice was the president of Hadassah, CharlotteJacobson.179
*Notlongafterward,DayansaidthathadEshkolaskedhimnottogo,hewouldhave canceled the trip. But Eshkol did not. Ha’aretz supported the visit,contendingthatthegovernmentshouldnotbeallowedtomonopolizethedebateonforeignrelations.
*Both terms are still in common usage today. Over the years, however, theyhave taken on amore neutral tenor, referring simply to the entry and exit ofJewishmigrantstoandfromIsrael.
*AstheVietnamWarintensified,therewerereportsfromvariousplacesintheUnited States that Israelis residing there were asking to restore their Israelicitizenship,fearingtheymightbedrafted.192
*ThedirectorgeneraloftheMinistryofEducationpromisedthereporterthattheinstruction of the “Hatikva” wasmandatory in four out of the eight years ofelementaryschool,butwaslaterembarrassedwhenitturnedoutthatthiswasinmusic,ratherthanincivics.
*During that time, a woman with a reputation came to live in Israel, havingmarried an Israeli businessman.MandyRice-Davies had been involved in thesex-and-espionage scandal that eventually resulted in the resignation of theBritish secretary of state forwar, John Profumo.TheHa’aretz reporterSilvieKeshetwrote a fictional dialogue between two Israelis in honor of the guest.“She’sallweneedhere,” says the firstman,whilehis friend responds, “Whynot?She fits right in, thewholecountry isonebig—”Themissingwordwasprobably the Russian bardak, which had been adopted into Hebrew slang tomean“totalchaos”(literally,“whorehouse”).
*The well-known literary critic Baruch Kurzweil denounced both authors forturning theirbacksonZionist idealsand lamented literature’s“bankruptcy.” IfSatanhadanytalent,hewrote,hewouldwritelikeAmosOz.
PARTIIBETWEENISRAELANDPALESTINE
GabrielSterneventuallybecameajournalist,writingforAlHamishmar.Hegothis biggest international scoop during a Saturday walk along Jerusalem’spartition line. Looking out toward the Mount of Olives, he noticed theJordanianswerebuildinga largehotelon thegroundsof theJewishcemetery.Anuproarfollowed,leadingtoadebateintheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil.AnynumberofJerusalemjournalistscouldhavelandedthestory,hadtheyonlyknown to observe their surroundings as Gabriel Stern did. During the twodecadesbetweentheWarofIndependenceandtheSix-DayWar,Sternseemedunwilling to acknowledge the partition of Jerusalem. Every few years, whensnow fell in the city, Al Hamishmar would report: “Our diplomaticcorrespondenthaslearnedfromsourcesclosetoUNobserversthatitissnowingintheJordanianpartofJerusalemandintheOldCitytoo.”
*In the early sixties, Mufti Haj Amin’s name came up during the AdolfEichmann trial, when the prosecution recounted ameeting between themuftiandHitleringreatdetail.InMarch1967,theepisodewasreportedagain,asifnewlyrevealed.7
*WhileEshkol’sstatementmighthavesoundedlikecorner-storeaccounting,inkeepingwith his image, it also reflected his Jewish learning. The line,whichwas to become one of the most famous in the Arab-Israeli conflict, wasborrowed from theBookofEthics, the“PirkeiAvot,”where it isattributed toRabbiAkiba(MasehetAvot,3:16,“Thehandiswriting”).
*LeviEshkol’sdaughterlaterattributedthefollowingquotetoherfather:“Wemeanttogivethemother-in-lawapinch,butinsteadwebeatupthebride.”26
*HetoldthemaboutayoungmanwhohadinfiltratedIsraelfromSyria,crossingtheJordanRiverbyboat.Themanwascaughtandwas found tohaveagoodcommandofHebrew.Hewascarryingovertwenty-fivepoundsofexplosives,aswell as threatening letters addressed to a few statesmen and newspapers. Hismissionwastocarryoutanassaultinapopulatedarea.†Eshkollikedtocallthegenerals“Preissn”—Prussians,inYiddish.30
*Eshkol was referring to an extremely painful argument that had surfaced inpubliclifeinIsraelaftertheHolocaust,reawakenedfollowingaseriesofarticleswrittenbytheJewishAmericanphilosopherHannahArendtaftertheEichmanntrial. Arendt condemned the “Jewish councils” that had collaboratedwith theNazis, and was severely critical of Israel. Contrary to Eshkol’s insinuation,however, she did not admonish the Jews for having failed to defendthemselves.34
*IkiKotlerwaskilledinactionafewyearslater.36
*ThequestionalsopreoccupiedtheBritishmilitaryattaché.Hedidnotruleoutthe possibility of an IDF coup, but thought the chances were slim. He didassume,however, that therewasa reasonablechance thatarmyofficerswouldinfluencegovernmentpolicybylegitimatemeans—forexample,throughpublicopinion.40
*The army’s elitist sense of itself was illustrated in typical fashion during aGeneralStaffdiscussionaboutsupplyingsoldierswithwindbreakers.Oneofthegenerals,UziNarkis,complainedaboutteenagerswhoadoptedmilitaryfatiguesasafashionstatement,somethinghesawasinsultingtothearmy:“Allsortsofteenagers, construction workers whomay or may not have jobs, are walkingaround in camouflage clothes. It is unbelievable chutzpah.” Another general,DavidElazar,commentedthatinNazaretheventheArabsworefatigues.41
*EshkolonceaskedAbbaEbanwhat,infact,wasmeantwhenEnglish-speakersused the verb “introduce” in the context of nuclear arms—was it that Israelshould not be the first country to use the bomb, or that it not be the first tomanufacture one? Eban replied, “It means that something that didn’t existsuddenlydoesexist.”48
*AnIsraeli-Jordaniancommitteewassupposedtoregulateaseriesofunsettledissues, including access to theWesternWall, but after a few years it ceasedoperating,“fellintoadeepsleep,”andfinally“died.”62
*ThegateoweditsnametoYakovMandelbaum,whohadbuilthishometheremany years earlier. The Jordanians wanted to change the name, and debatedwhether to name it after Salah a’Din, who had retaken Palestine from theCrusaders,orsimplytocallittheGateofReturn-meaningthereturnofthe1948refugees.†AnIsraelicitizennamedNahumTaksononceaskedtheUNsecretarygeneralfor permission to enter the Old City so that he could visit the grave of hisbrother, who had been killed in 1948. Another citizen, Avraham Stavsky,demanded that theUNundersecretarygeneral allow Israelis freeaccess to theWesternWall.Theundersecretary,RalphBunche,politely replied tobothmenthathecouldbeofnohelp.
*Early on in his first term, Kollek hosted Marlene Dietrich in his home.Ha’aretz printed a largepicture showinghim sittingon a rug at her feet.ThereligiouspartyrepresentativesinJerusalemprotested,andKollekexplainedthatalthoughhehadbeensittingatthemostbeautifulfeetintheworld,hehadbeenthinking only of the city’smonetary problems, as evidenced by the sorrowfulexpressiononhisface.
*TalkingwithaNewYorkTimesreporter,KollekoncecomparedJerusalemwitha Jewish village in EasternEurope. The shtetls, he pointed out, had not beenbeautiful.AnIsraelidiplomatintheUnitedStateshurriedlyrespondedthattheshtetlhadspiritual resonance,and themayor’sderisionwas tobecondemned.HeaskedKollek,“Incidentally,whatwouldyourfriendMarcChagallsayifhewere to read your comment?” Kollek promised to choose his words morecarefullyinthefuture.†Hispredecessorshadmade similar statements.Oneof them,GershonAgron,describedthepartitionofthecityasadisgrace.HiswordswerepublishedinaglossybookofphotographsofJerusalem.Oftheeightyphotos,almostadozenshowedsitesintheJordanianpartofthecity.
*One IDF general explained that Armon Hanatziv was worthy of occupationpartlybecauseofits“sentimentalvalue.”
*Earlyoninhisterm,EshkolhadraisedthepossibilitythattheBa’athpartyinSyriawouldagreetocloserrelationswithIsraelonanideologicalbasis,seeingthatitsharedMapai’ssocialistprinciples.Hehopedthiswouldalsobringabouta thaw in relations with the Soviet Union. He understood that the idea wasnaïve,hesaid,butstillhepromotedit:Israelwouldbeneutral,likeSwitzerland,andwouldwithdrawfromtheUN.70
*The most popular radio station among Israeli youth was broadcast fromRamallah.AfemaleDJwhosevelvetyvoicegainedhersomenotorietyplayedmore current British and American music than did Kol Israel or the IDFstation.74†Otherimportantpoets,includingShaulTchernichovskyandUriZviGreenberg,expressedyearningintheirpoetryforaregionthatextendedallthewaytotheEuphratesinIraq.75
*Thepragmatic establishmentofGahal enabledBen-Gurion toofferBeginanabsolutionofsorts.“IfHerutwouldbewillingtojoinagovernmentthatstrivesforpeacebasedonthestatusquo,itshouldnotberejectedbecauseitbelievesin’GreaterIsrael,’whichshallcomewhentheMessiahcomes,”saidBen-Gurion,whoby1965hatedEshkolevenmorethanhehatedBegin.76
*In early 1966,Meir Amit, head of theMossad, who had ties with a seniorfigureintheEgyptianregime,proposedthatEshkolallowhimtotraveltoCairoto pursue negotiations. Eshkol thought such a step would be too dangerous.AmitbelievedthatIsraeltherebymissedahistoricopportunity.89
*Rabin revealed how he had forced residents out of two villages in thedemilitarized zone and intoSyria. “Howdidwe do it?Therewere threats, ofcourse,andthentheysigneddocumentsstatingthat theyweremovingof theirownfreewill.”
*WhentheSyriansrefused togivebackasoldierwhohadcrossed theborder,apparently bymistake, Liorwrote, “This added a little to the heavy sense ofbitterness[inEshkol]andthedesiretohurttheSyrians,eventotakerevenge.”
*A few of Dayshum’s inhabitants had arrived in the mid-nineteenth centuryfrom Algeria, as had some of the Jews who settled in Dishon in the early1950s.17
*Some two months after this discussion, Ze’ev Schiff from Ha’aretzaccompaniedanighttimeambushpartyagainstFatah,andalthoughhe tried topraise the soldiers and supported the increase of passive defenses againstterrorist infiltration, he left no room for doubt: the ambushes served no realpurpose.23
*Afewdaysafterthismeeting,RabincommentedinaGeneralStaffdiscussionthattheSamuaoperationhadinfactstrengthenedHussein’sposition.Thiswasnottosaythattheking’senemieswouldnottrytokillhim:“Abulletcanalwaysfind him.” But he added that the Samua operation should not be viewed ashavingbeenintendedfromthebeginningtostrengthentheking.“Iwouldn’tsaywewerethatsmart.”24
*One of the Israeli pilots, Yiftah Spector, who reached the outskirts ofDamascus, was later askedwhat the city looked like. His response became astapleofIsraelipoliticalfolklore:“LikeanArabvillagethatgrewup.”
*Thiswasacommoncliché.Israelhadalwayswantedto“teach”itsenemies“alesson.”Maarivwroteof“anexemplary,crushinglesson,”anditseditorialwasentitled“CrimeandPunishmentandLessons.”
*Prior to Sartre’s visit, the Israeli prisoner Maxim Gilan wrote him a letter,introducinghimselfasthetranslatorofJeanGenetandaskingSartretovisithimin prison. Gilan was still serving time for his attempt to publish informationabout Israel’s part in theBenBarka kidnapping in theweeklyBul. The letterseems to have gotten only as far as the primeminister’s office,where itwasplaced in a file. Eshkol told the cabinet that various foreign entities werepressuringIsraeltoreleaseGilanandhiscolleague,ShmuelMor.ThetwowereabruptlypardonedandreleasedjustbeforeSartre’svisit.29†A fewweeks later, Israelwas told by another visiting celebrity that itmustallow the refugees to return:PeteSeegerannounced inTelAviv thatproceedsfromhis concert in Israelwould fund the education of a Palestinian boywhowas living in a refugee camp near Beirut and who dreamed of becoming anengineer.Maarivresponded,“Obviously,thegoodPete...hasnotheardabouttherefugeeprobleminIndiaandPakistan,inPoland,andelsewhere.”31
*These words were omitted from the English-language version of theannouncement.†ThedecisiontoissuethesestampswasmadebythegovernmentonJanuary23,1967,astensionsraged.32
*Thenextday,theSovietambassadorcomplainedtothedirectorgeneraloftheMinistry of ForeignAffairs that “military circles”were creating provocationsalongtheSyrianborderinanattempttotoppletheSyrianregime.37
*The agreement also prohibited planes from entering Jerusalem’s airspace,exceptbyspecialauthorization.ThisgaverisetooneofthemanycharacteristicsattributedtoJerusalemites:whentheyhearaplane,theyalwayslookup.
*A popular march to Jerusalem was also held every year, shortly beforeIndependence Day. In the 1967 march, some citizens carried signs reading,“NextYearinOldJerusalem.”Themarchwasheldunderthearmy’sauspices,andHa’aretzaskedChiefofStaffRabinwhathethoughtoftheslogan.“Lettheyoung people celebrate,” he responded. He conceded that some of thesloganeeringwasunnecessary,butsaidtherewasnopointincensoringit.42
*Careful to avoid provocation, the primeminister’s staff instructed that a fewlinesbeomittedfromapoembyNathanAltermanthatwastoberecitedatthedisplay.The lines inquestion included thewords“Arabia,consideryourwaysbeforeit’stoolate!...Thismaybethefinalhour.”Predictably,theinstructionwasleakedandEshkolwasonceagainportrayedasacoward.
*The song that actually won the contest was “Who Knows How Many?,”performedbyanAmerican-bornactor-singer,MikeBurstein.
PARTIIITHEFORTYDAYSOFPRIVATEYEHOSHUA
BAR-DAYAN
Once,ayoungboyaskedGabrielSterntoexplainwhataborderwas.Aborder,Stern said, is not a line that separates good people from bad. There are goodpeopleontheothersideoftheborder,too.Buttheydonotknowthattherearegoodpeopleonourside—andthatiswhywehavewar.
*AfewIsraelisagreedthattheUNforceshouldbemovedtotheIsraelisideoftheborder.OneofthemwrotealettertoHa’aretzinsupportoftheidea;anothersuggestedit inalettertoDavidBen-Gurion.UriAvneryproposedpostingUNforcesonbothsidesoftheborder.InanannouncementonbehalfofhisKnessetparty,Avnerydemandedthateveryeffortbemadetopreventwar:“Theone-hit-and-we’re-donesystemhasfailedfornineteenyears;letusnotcontinuewithitnow.”7Hadtheideabeenimplemented,the1967warmighthavebeenavoided.Theseisolatedvoices,however,remaineduninfluential.
*Ben-Gurionspenttheweekendreadingbooksaboutthetalksthathadprecededthecampaign,includingonebyMordechaiBar-On,theformerheadofChiefofStaffDayan’soffice,andanotherbytheBritishwriterAnthonyNutting.17
*Rabinlaterwrote,“Wewerenotpreparedforchemicalwarfareatthattime;wegrewmoreworried.”
*TheeditorofMaariv,AriehDissentchik,committedhispapertothecampaignto appointMosheDayanminister of defense. He did so in coordinationwithDayan,butdidnotconfinehimselftohisroleasjournalist:inkeepingwiththeexcessively close relationship between newspaper editors and politicians, hewenttoEshkolandtriedtopersuadehimtogiveupthedefenseportfolio.
*Atsomepoint,bothWhiteHouseand Israeli embassystaffcontacted formerpresident Dwight Eisenhower to inquire what exactly the United States hadcommitted itself to do, a decade earlier, in order to preserve freedom ofmovementthroughtheStraits.24
*TheWhiteHousealsoreiterated its request that Israelstopapplyingpressurethroughitsdomesticletter-writingcampaign.“Ofcoursewearecontinuingit,”AmbassadorHarmanreportedtoJerusalem.3
*Manyyearslater,Chuvakhinsaidsomewhatcriticallythathehadsupportedameeting betweenEshkol andKosygin, and that had it been held, theSix-DayWar might have been averted. But his recommendation was overruled byMoscow. Eban described Chuvakhin as a “sadist”; he told the ministers thatonce, when he had spoken with Chuvakhin about the terrorist attacks, theambassadorhaddenied that theSyrianswerebehind themand insinuated thattheCIAmightbecarryingthemout.14
*If theMafdalministersbelieved thatDayancould stop theescalation towardwar, they were not alone. The U.S. and British ambassadors made a similarassumption.23
*“What is a newspaper, anyway?” Ben-Gurion once said, according toSchocken.“Alandlordhiressomeworkersandtellsthemwhattowrite.Thefactthat Schocken told his people to write this and write that—this means it hassome importance?” Usually, Schocken said, he found Ben-Gurion toonationalistic,likeBegin,“determinedtostandagainsttheworld,withabackthatwastoostraightandachestthatwasalittletoopuffedout.”
YosefandRuhamaWeitzwiththeYehiams,1951:“Thechildrenofthedream”(CentralZionistArchives)
Dizengoff,morethanastreet(IsraelStateArchive)
TheSussita.ThemodelsbelowaretheSabrasportscar, theCarmelsedan,theSussitacommercial,andtheSussitastationwagon.(GovernmentPressBureau)
AbieNathan,pilotforpeace,1966
A tale of two cities: a Tel Aviv country club; Jerusalem in winter (MosheFreidan;MosheMilner)
Musrara:lifeonthelineinJerusalem(MosheFreidan)
TheMandelbaumGate(FritzCohen)
“Theparadewaspathetic”:theHebrewUniversityStadium,IndependenceDay,
1967(IlanBruner)The 13thGovernment, January 1966. Standing (fromleft):MosheKol, ZerahWarhaftig, Moshe Carmel, Eliyahu Sasson, Yigal Allon, Yosef Burg, IsraelBarzilai, Haim Gvati, Yaakov-Shimshon Shapira, Mordehai Bentov, IsraelGalili,HaimTzadok.Sitting (fromleft): PinhasSapir,BehorShalomSheetrit,Levi Eshkol, President Zalman Shazar, Haim Moshe Shapira, Zalman Aran,
AbbaEbanTheunemployedprotestinginTelAviv,March1967:“I’mafraidofthemomentwhenmychildrenaskforbreadandIwon’thaveanytogivethem”(IsraelStateArchive)
TheCompleteBookofEshkolJokes
TeddyKollekwithMarleneDietrich: “Sittingat themostbeautiful feet in theworld,butthinkingonlyofthecity’smonetaryproblems”
Fatahterroristattack,October1966:atrainderailedonthewayfromJerusalemtoTelAviv(MosheMilner)
Syrianbombardment,June1967:achildren’shouseonKibbutzTelKatzir(AsafKotin)
Samua,November1966(MosheMilner)
“ThroughThisWall”: the commemorative letter sent to bereaved families forMemorialDay,May1967
“If Nasser wins, we were born in vain”: Tel Aviv high school students digtrenches.(IlanBruner)
*The onslaught on grocery stores stopped a few days later. The minister ofagriculture wrote in his diary that the buying panic had reflected temporarysupplyproblems,causedbythecall-upofsomanydrivers.4
*Othersignatories to thepetitionwerefamiliar toHa’aretz readers:ProfessorsYehoshuaBar-Hillel,Carl Frankenstein, andNathanYelin-Mor, awell-knownintellectual,formerlyacommanderintheLehiundergroundforceandamemberoftheFirstKnesset.
*In August 1966, Meir Amit reported to Eshkol about the attempts to trackdowntwoNazicriminals:MartinBormann,Hitler’sprivatesecretaryandheadof the party chancellery, and Heinrich Müller, the head of the Gestapo. HepresentedvariouspossibilitiesofcaptureforEshkol’sconsideration.23
*Incontrast,BoazEvronofYediotAharonotwarnedagainst the inclination tocompareNasserwithHitler,suggestinginsteadthatIsraelis,unliketheJewsofEurope,“standuplikemen.”30Inacabinetmeetingjustbeforethewar,ZalmanAranalsomaintainedthat“NasserisnotHitler.”31
*TheHebrewwordforthunder(ra’am),isalsotheacronymfortheUnitedArabRepublic,asEgyptwasofficiallyknownduringthatperiod.(Translator’snote.)†ThepopularentertainerUriZoharrespondedwithamorale-buildingsongthatheperformedforsoldiers:“NasseriswaitingforRabin,ay-ay-ay/Lethimwaitandnotbudge/Becausewe’llbethereforsureHe’swaitedtwicebeforeAndwegaveittohimgood/He’llbeshouting,ay-ay-ay/LikeintheSinaiCampaignYou’llsee,thedaywillcomeHe’llbegforpeace.”39
*PrivateYehoshuaBar-Dayandidnothearthespeech;hewasonkitchenduty.11
*Yigal Allon later cited the economic hardship caused by the call-up as ajustification for the war: “A general mobilization in Israel means economicparalysis.Theycoulddriveuscrazyeverythreeorfourmonthsbyredeployingandeachtimewewouldhavetocallmenupandthenletthemgo.”12
*MosheDayanmetwithNarkis atAriana, aTelAviv restaurant, and the twoagreedthatiftheJordaniansattacked,IsraelshouldseizeMountScopusandtheLatrunRoadandnotgivethemback.23
*IntheWhiteHouselog,EbanisidentifiedastheIsraeliprimeminister.
*TheUnitedStateswasholdingdirecttalkswithNasser,andhopedtobuytimebyinvitinghisvicepresident,ZakariaMuhieddin, toWashington,andsendingVice President Humphrey to Cairo. Johnson received a conciliatory messagefrom Nasser through an American attorney identified as a friend of ArthurKrim’s.31
*Evron also conveyed other impressions. The news columnist JoeAlsopwasproposing that Israel take action—that it should not rely on theUnitedStatesbeing able to enlist international support, and that the Russians would notintervene. This was also the opinion among “authoritative circles inWashington,”EvronreportedasperAlsop.35
*Atapproximatelythesametime,Ben-Gurionheardontheradiothatthepartiesof theSocialistInternationalhadexpressedsolidaritywithMapai.“Theydon’tknowthatMapaihasnosolidaritywiththeStateofIsrael,”hewrote.31
*Eban,however,saidinthesamediscussionthatiftheUnitedStatescouldnotorganize an international response, it would withdraw its objection to Israeliaction.
*According to Allon, Eshkol was willing to appoint him commander of theSouthernCommand,butunlikeDayan,Allonsaid,“Iwouldn’tdothattoShaike[Gavish].”34
*Ben-Gurion’s diary does not confirm Peres’s account. On the contrary:according toBen-Gurion, he sent Peres toEshkol to tell him thatRafiwouldapprove Dayan’s appointment on condition that Eshkol step down as primeminister.Ben-GurionclaimedPerestoldhimhehadrelayedthemessage.46
*Earlier, Aharon Yariv had warned Rabin that the air force plans might beleaked, andmentioned thatChurchill had telephonedoverseas, saying that theair forcewould initiate anassault.Themilitaryattachéat theBritish embassyreportedthatIsraeliintelligencepeoplewerebesidethemselvesoverhowmuchChurchillknew.9
*InacornerofapublicparkinJerusalem,oppositetheOldCitywallsandtheHillofEvilCounsel,liesablackstonecenotaphinhonorofAngleton.Itbearsaslightly mysterious inscription in Hebrew, English, and, oddly, Arabic: “Inmemoryofadearfriend.”
*JohnHadden recalled a similar experience. He returned to Israel via Rome,also on a plane loaded with gas masks. Both he and Amit, Hadden wrote,realized that the United States had given Israel the green light. AmbassadorHarman remembered leavingWashington with a sense that the red light hadchanged,butnottogreen:“We’vebeengiventheamberlight.”18
*Bythistime,presumably,theBritishambassador,MichaelHadow,wasalreadyfeeling“somehumility,”ashelaterwrote;ameretwenty-fourhoursearlier,hehadreportedwithconfidencethattherewouldnotbeawar.Whenheheardtheair-raid sirens in Tel Aviv onMonday, he was certain they had gone off bymistake.Theambassadorapologized tohis superiors.Unfortunately,hewrote,foreigndiplomatsinIsrael,includingHerMajesty’sambassador,werenotpartytocabinetproceedings.6
*It seems, however, that the Americans were unaware of Hussein’s directcontactswith Israeli leaders until the end ofDecember 1966.They found outonly when the king himself chose to inform them, and they reacted withamazement.
*The president’s adviser Harry McPherson told Johnson about two “good-lookinggirlsinuniform”whorodeinthebackofajeeponedaywhenhewasinsouthern Israel.Onewaswearing a spangled purple bathing cap, the other anorange turban. They were on their way to the front with two brawny youngsergeants. “Incidentally,” McPherson added, “Israel at war destroys theprototypeofthepale,scrawnyJew;thesoldiersIsawweretough,muscular,andsun-burned.”9
*MajorEhudEladwasposthumouslypromotedtotherankoflieutenantcolonelandgivenacommendationforhiscourageandtenacityinthemission.10
*Levavi complained about Dayan’s radio address the night before: hisannouncementthattheEgyptianplaneshadbeendestroyedonthegroundmadeitdifficult forIsrael toclaimtheEgyptianshadattackedfirstand impeded theongoing efforts to convince the world that Israel had not fired the first shot.Dayan admitted that his statementwas “a blunder,” and noted twomore: theleakinFranceandthenewsoftheairattackgivenonKolIsraelinArabic.
*Liorwasright:Dayan’sspeechattheKotelwaspublishedthenextdayonthefrontpageofHa’aretzalongsidehispicture.Eshkol’sstatementranwithasmallheadline,beneathDayan’spieceandwithnopicture.MaarivpublishedEshkol’sspeechinamodestinsetatthebottomofthethirdpage.13
*IsraelwasholdingroughlyfivethousandEgyptianPOWs,includingsome480officers. Dayan met with them as well. Earlier, he had suggested to thegovernment that they returnmost of the prisoners to Egypt and keep holdingonly the officers. The government rejected his proposal, fearing the POWswouldgobacktowar.18
*At the request of the Foreign Ministry, the IDF spokesman gatheredinformationaboutafewsimilarcasesfromallfrontsofthewar.23
*The pursuit of soldiers from the Egyptian army’s Palestinian units wasdelegatedtotheShakedcommandounit,whosecommanderwasAmosYarkoni—AbdelMajid—whohadhostedDayaninhishomejustbeforethewar.25
*YigalYadin, thearcheologistandadvisertotheprimeminister,alsospokeofthe scrolls. Even before thewar he had forged secret tieswith awell-knownBethlehemantiquitiesdealernamedKando.WhentheIDFenteredBethlehem,Yadinordered that they takeoneofKando’s scrolls, part ofwhichhe alreadyowned,andtheninstructedthatKandohimselfbeinterrogatedtofindoutifhehadanymore.32
*During a phone conversation with the secretary of state later that day, thepresidentsenthissecretarytolookforKrim’smemo,andwhenshebroughtittohim, he read parts of it to Rusk. Abe Feinberg asked to convey similarsentimentstothepresident.49
*WaltRostowtoldPresidentJohnsonthatwhenYitzhakRabinheardabouttheattack,hewaswithGoldaMeir.Reportedly,hewas so takenabackhealmostfainted.6
*MiriamEshkolaskedGeneralDavidElazar,oftheNorthernCommand,totaketheBaniasasabirthdaygiftforher.
*ThiswasthesamedelegationthathadstoppedoffinPetachTikva,atthehomeof the local physician, Ben-Zion Borodianski. Their arrival was one of thechildhoodrecollectionsofthedoctor’sson,YehoshuaBar-Dayan.
*TherewasanotherreasonforAllon’sdesiretooccupytheGolanthathedidnotmentionatthemeeting.HewastoyingwiththeideaofsettingupaDruzestatethatwouldactasabufferbetweenIsraelandSyria.
*Allonwasnot themostobjectiveofDayanobservers: his archives contain afileofmaterialsmeanttodisgraceDayan,includingaccountsofarchaeologicaldigsheconductedillegallyanddetailsofhisdivorce.10
*Atthebeginningofthelastweekofhislife,AriehBen-OrwroteacondolencelettertoHavaLivnat.TheletterarrivedonFriday,thedayhedied.
*Nils Gussing, the representative of the UN secretary general, quoted twoestimatesofthenumberofrefugees:theSyrianssaid110,000,Israel85,000.
*Manyyearsafterward,ChuvakhinexplainedthathecriedonlybecauseonhiswaytoEshkolhehadtwistedhisankleandwasinpain.19
*Twodaysearlier,ZviZur,assistanttotheministerofdefense,hadreportedtoDavidBen-Gurion that the reservistsnumbered roughly171,000and that theywouldsoonbegindischarging140,000ofthem.75
PARTIVTHEYTHOUGHTTHEYHADWON
Thirtyyearsafterhebegan toworkasa journalist inJerusalem,GabrielSternwas asked about his hardestmoments. “Themost difficult thing,” he replied,“waswriting against our ownmilitary operations and denouncing our acts ofinjusticeandvengeancewhileourdeadwerestillwithusandmyreaders’heartswerebleeding.”1
*MaxBen-Ezra, ofDimona,was a draftsman.Hewas killed in the battle forGaza, on the second day of the war. He left a wife, two sons, and a littledaughter.
*Bar-Dayanbeganpreparinghisdiary forpublicationwhenhegothome.Theideahadcometohimsoonafterhebeganwriting,butitwasnoteasytofindapublisher. The writer Moshe Shamir, who worked for the publisher SifriatMaariv,toldhimthatthediarywasnotfitforpublicationbecausesoldierswerenotsupposedtocry.AmodifiedversionwaspublishedayearlaterinHa’aretz,andtheninbookform.5
*Before visitingKalkilya, Ronen passed through the village of Kibya.Whiteflagsflewoneveryhouse.Heknewthesignificanceofwherehewas,andfelt“the great stain” that hadmarked the IDF since a force commanded byArielSharonblewupa fewdozenof thevillagehouses,killing their inhabitants, inOctober 1953, in retaliation for themurder of an Israeli woman and her twochildreninnearbyYehud.7
*Ben-Gurion,whohadopposedtheincursionintotheGolan,nowhadachangeofheart.FollowingavisitwithGeneralElazar,hedescribedtheGolanHeightsascriticaltoIsrael’ssecurity.12
*A small group calling itself the League for the Prevention of ReligiousCoercionsoonbegantobarragegovernmentministerswithlettersprotestingthepartitionerectedalongtheKotelsquarebytheMinistryofReligiousAffairstoseparatemenandwomen.OthersdemandedtobeallowedtofollowtheReformmovement’sprayertraditionsatthesite.
*A Jerusalem pencilmanufacturer soon complained that themarket had beenflooded with Chinese pencils. “The State of Israel has turned into a bargainbasement, with everyone rushing to buy in the Arab stores,” protested theAssociationofMerchantsinalettertoEshkol.“WhyaresomanyJewsrunningtoshopinGaza?”Eshkolwondered.Dayanresponded,“Becausethey’reJews.”
PrivateYehoshuaBar-Dayan
GabrielStern(RicardaSchwerin)
AnIsraeliintheWhiteHouse:MathildeKrimwithPresidentLyndonJohnson
Krimatthepresident’sranch(JohnsonLibrary,Texas)
Thefirststrike:anEgyptianAirForcebase
POWsatSharmel-Sheikh(YaakovAgur)
Victors:LeviEshkol,MenachemBegin(MosheMilner)
Thetasteofvictory:theadvertisementreads,“MirageGlorywithEverySmoke.”
YitzhakRabinonthecoverofaspecialeditionofLife-Maariv:“Israel’sLightningVictory,”readstheheadline.
RabbiShlomoGorenandparatroopersattheWesternWall(DavidRubinger)
ParatroopersattheWesternWall:“It’stheKotel!Thewallofprayer,thewalloftears.Wearedreaming...”(DavidRubinger)
JenininJune(AriehKanfer)
Thenewrefugees:residentsofthevillageofIm’us,intheLatrunarea,ontheirwaytotheWestBank(YosefHochman)
AdaSereni
Occupationcurrency(TheBankofIsrael)
YaacovHerzogandKingHusseinatasecretmeetinginLondon(c.1970)
EshkolonDayan,inanotepassedtoYaacovHerzog:“Theledgerisopenandthehandiswriting”
EshkolandDayan
Jerusalem,21June1967(MosheFreidan)
*BenyaminGalaiwroteinMaariv,“Nosloganhaseverprovedsotrue.Indeedthebest,thededicated,theyoungandthehandsome,jointheairforce.Theelitejointhearmoredcorps,thebravethenavy,thegreattheinfantry,theall-aroundexcellenttheparatroopers,andtheslanderedtheintelligenceservice.”1
*Onepublisher,OhadZmora,lateradmittedthathehadplannedanalbumevenbeforethewarbegan.HecollaboratedwithUriBen-Ari,anemployeewhowasacolonelinthereserves.4
*An abridgedEnglish translationwas published in 1971 asTheSeventhDay:SoldiersTalkAbouttheSix-DayWar(NewYork:Scribner’s).
*MordechaiBar-On, the author ofRabin’s speech, also had a hand in editingSoldiersTalk.
*The editors claimed that the religious soldiers’ quotes were left out “fortechnicalreasons,”buttheywerenotincludedinlatereditionseither.
*Someoftheomissionswereprobablyenforcedbymilitarycensors.MordechaiBar-Onmadehisownamendments:onespeakersaidhisfriends“behavedlikeanimals,”andBar-Onsuggestedmodifying this to read“behaved improperly.”Buttheeditorsstoodtheirgroundandtheoriginalstatementwaspublished.11
*Withinafewdaysafterthewar,peoplebegancontributingtoaspecialfundsetuptofinancethereconstructionoftheSecondTemple.Itthentranspiredthatforyears there had been a bank account collecting funds for this purpose.A daylaborerfromRamatGanpromisedtheministerofreligiousaffairsthathewoulddonateamonth’sincomeforthereconstruction.14
*ManypeoplewrotetoBen-Guriontoprotesttheidea.Ha’aretztookissuewithitinaneditorialcalled“TheBarbariansAreComing.”15
*Menachem Begin was still protesting this in mid-August. He preferred “theWarofRedemption.”
*The Suez Canal also fired the imagination ofmany Israelis, some ofwhomsuggested digging alternate routes.One proposed rebuilding thememorial forFerdinand de Lesseps, the builder of the canal, which the Egyptians haddestroyed.20
*The IDF’s legal adviser contacted the Bank of Israel with a request fromGeneralUziNarkis:hewanted tokeep someof thebills as souvenirs. It latertranspiredthatYitzhakRabinalsohadabillinhispossession.
*WhenBen-GurionfinallymanagedtogetholdofAlamionthephone,thelinebetweenSdeBokerandLondonwasverybad.Ben-Gurion’saccountdescribesthe entire history of Israeli-Palestinian relations: “He couldn’t hearme, but Icouldhearhim.Thenitgotbetter.Hecouldhearme,butIcouldn’thearhim.”
*Thestudymaterialsgiven to the thirteenthgraduatingclassof theCommandand Staff School in 1966-67 specified, among other things, the duties of theSecurityServiceintheoccupationapparatus.
*Ofer recounted these events to the journalistShabtaiTeveth.Oferwaskilledwhile pursuing terrorists, and Teveth made him the hero of the “enlightenedoccupation”mythinhisbookTheBlessedCurse,asequelofsortstoExposedintheTurret.
*The state comptroller’s report on the first year of Israeli control of theterritorieswassodevastatingthattheIDFmanagedtoblockpublication.Ithasremained classified ever since. Besides detailing violations of Palestiniandetainees’rights, thereportalsocontainedasmall taleofcorruption: thechiefmilitary rabbinate posted charity collection boxes in holy sites like Rachel’sTomb,butsoldiersopenedtheboxesandnoproperaccountswerekept.12
*TheMinistry of Defense tried to sell off fabric and furniture abandoned byGolanresidentsinwarehousesandhomes.ThestaffofficerfortheTreasuryintheGolanwasaskedtooverseethesaleofsomeotherwarbooty:539headsofbeefcattle,730sheep,29goats,34donkeys,and89horses.Thosewhoownedconfiscatedcarscouldreclaimthem;theunclaimedcarsweresold.
*TheBoardofDirectorsGeneraleventuallydeterminedthatPalestinianscouldnotbehospitalizedinIsraelexceptinextraordinarycases.Theboardnotedthatthere“isnowaytosupplytheresidentsoftheterritoriesmedicaltreatmentthatmeetsIsraelistandards.”†The government established at least half a dozen ministerial committees tohandleterritorialaffairs,oneofwhichwasnamedtheMinisterialCommitteeforCoordination Between the Ministerial Committee for Internal Affairs andServicesand theMinisterialCommittee forEconomicAffairs in theMatterofTerritoriesAdministeredbytheIDF.
*AspartoftheefforttonormalizetieswithJordan,Israelwantedtorestoremailservice between them. This could have been accomplished through theInternationalRedCross inSwitzerland, but a forumcalled theCommittee fortheWestBankwishedtoimposedirectcontactwithJordan,andsoitdecidedtothrowsacksofmailtotheothersideoftheJordanRivereverydayandwaitforresponses.17
*Thiswasaclearstepinthecreepingannexation.AttherequestoftheForeignMinistry, the government agreed that if the Israeli lira was declared the solecurrencyintheWestBank,theywoulddelaypublicationoftheordinanceuntilaftertheannualUNGeneralAssemblymeeting.†These decisions were part of a much larger process that later included thedecisiontoencourageIsraelistoopenfactoriesintheWestBank.Iftherewereanydoubts about Israel’s reluctance to leave the territories quickly, theywerequelledbyasecretcommunicationbyShlomoGazit to theBoardofDirectorsGeneral:certainsitesintheOccupiedTerritorieshadbeenearmarkedforfuturenuclearreactors,“ifneeded.”
*Dayan suffered from severe eye pain his whole life, which oftenmade himimpatientandunkind.
*Thephrasemeritsfurtherconsideration.Boththe“carrot”andthe“whip”—orthestick—areusedbypeoplewhendrivingbeasts.Thephrasebelongstoalongline of expressions that reflect common Israeli attitudes toward Arabs; forexample, the uproar that followed whenever the Arabs “raised their heads,”meaning that theybehaved impudently.TheCarrotand theStickwasalso thetitleofabookbyShlomoGazit,coordinatorofoperationsintheterritories.
*Like many Israelis, Shashar brought with him to Hebron memories of themurderofJewstherein1929.Whenhefirstarrived,heimaginedhecouldsee“murderintheeyes”oftheinhabitants.FollowinganIsraelicitizen’sapplicationto the prime minister, the attorney general examined, and rejected, thepossibilityofrevokingthestatuteoflimitationsonthemurdersinHebron;thepetitionwas based on the fact that the statute of limitations did not apply tomurdersofJewsbyNazis.23
*Immediately after thewar, amine had exploded in one of theGaza refugeecamps.Thearmydemanded that the residents turn in theoperatives, atwhichpoint roughlyahundredPLOmembersgave themselvesupbut refused tosaywhichonehad laid themine.Theywereall deported to theSinai and“left totheir own devices,” as an official report stated. The army also blew up eighthousesinthecamp.25
*AhouseDayandemolishedinRamoun,avillagenearRamallah,onthepretextthat it was the home of a Palestinian underground member, belonged to anAmerican citizen. The man, SuleimanMohammed, of Ann Arbor, Michigan,demanded$30,000incompensation.TheAmericanconsulateinJerusalemtookuptheaffair,andthewranglingoverhisclaimwentonforyears.26
*The considerationswere aesthetic, too. These prompted the following letter:“Theprimeminister alerts theminister of agriculture to the presence of ruinsthatmar theLatrun landscape visible from the Jerusalem-TelAvivHighway.”Eshkolsawtheruinsasa“visualnuisance,”thelettercontinued,andaskedtheIsraelLandsAdministrationtodealwiththem.29
*In the next conversation with Dayan, Mayor Kanaan began with variousrequests, the subject approaching his ruler, the occupied his occupier. Hebroughtupvisitingandreturnpermitsforstudentswhohadbeenabroadduringthe war. Dayan said that was a matter for the Ministry of the Interior, butpromisedtodowhathecould.34
*UNESCO’sscrutinyof thetextbooksusedinUNRWAschoolsseemstohavebeenevenstricterthantheMinistryofEducation’s.Outof38booksintheWestBank, only 4 were approved; 23 required amendments and 9 were entirelydisqualified. In Gaza, UNESCO examined 70 books, authorized 24, requiredamendmentsin35,anddisqualified11.43
*MorethanahundredArabswhoownedassetsinWestJerusalemquicklysuedtoget theirpropertyback, some retaining Israeli attorneys.TheDajani familydemandedthereturnofitslabyrinthofhallsonMountZion,whichhousedKingDavid’sMausoleum,butfailedintheirbid.4†YehudaArbel,theheadoftheShabak’sJerusalemDistrict,sentKollekalistofmembersoftheeasterncitycouncil,whichhesaidwasbasedonmaterialfromthreearchives.Inadditiontodetailedbiographies,thedocumentnotedpersonalattributes,suchas“tractable,”or“memberofafamilyknownasarmsdealers.”Someofthenamesweremarked“no,”meaningtheyweretobeexcludedfromthecitycouncil.5
*Whenthegovernmentdecidedto issueastampwithapictureof theWesternWall, it was careful to instruct that the Israeli flag should not appear on thestamp.15† The minister of religious affairs reported to the prime minister that a fewclerics from the Christian denominations, as well as some Muslim leaders,protestedtheevidenceofmoraldecline,particularlyintheArabnightclubs.
*Ashortwhile later,atagovernmentmeeting,MenachemBeginproposed thephrase“handoverterritories”insteadof“returnterritories.”20
*ThequestioncametopreoccupytheU.S.ambassador,WalworthBarbour,whoadvised his superiors to stop using the term “Arab Jerusalem.” His proposedalternativesincluded“EastJerusalem”and“theArabQuarter.”TheU.S.consul,conversely, suggested using a number of different names, includingAl-Kuds,interchangeably.22
*Approximately half the residents (52.3 percent) said the restaurants inWestJerusalemwerebetterthantheonesintheeast:moreMizrahimlikedtheIsraelirestaurants,whilemoreAshkenazislikedtheArabones.
*One Foreign Ministry official suggested quickly taking advantage of “thetwilight hour” of the early occupation to confiscate anti-Semitic publicationsfromEastJerusalembookshops.
*Israel’s ambassador to Paris suggested not using the word “resistance” todescribe the Palestinian rebellion; the word was closely associated in FrancewiththeoppositiontotheNazioccupation.31
*The American consul in Jerusalem quoted Teddy Kollek’s opinion that UziNarkisshouldberemovedfromhispostfollowingthedemolition.KamalNimriwasanengineer,andthesonofaJewishmother.Hecamefromaneducatedandhighlyideologicalfamily.35
*EliyahuSasson,originallyfromDamascus,wassixty-fiveatthetime,andoneof the few Arabic-speaking government ministers. A journalist and a secretagent, he had started working for the Zionist movement in the 1920s. As adiplomatandapolitician,hewasinvolvedinalltalksbetweenIsraelandArabrulers.
*TheU.S. ambassador toAmman,whometwithHussein frequently, reportedthatthekinghaddevelopedaprofoundsenseofguilt.11
*Duringthetenseperiodbeforethewar,KimcheandBawlyhaddecidedtoco-authorabookabouttheeventsofthoseweeks,andafterthewartheydidso.13
*Thefour-pageproposalwassenttoEshkol,Dayan,Allon,EzerWeizman,andothers. Weizman’s assistant, Rehavam Ze’evi, concocted a name for thePalestinianstate:“Ishmael.”14† Following some interministerial wrangling, it was decided that the Shabakwouldhandlethe“grooming,”incoordinationwiththeMinistryofDefenseandtheForeignMinistry.18
*Inmid-July,theministerial“WestBankCommittee”discussedaworkingpaperbyMordehaiGazitoftheForeignMinistry,inwhichheproposednofewerthansevenpossiblealternativesettlements.22
*Weekslater,Dayanstatedthathewouldnotobject to thePalestinianscallingRamallah part of Jerusalem, just as RamatGanwas in fact part of Tel Aviv.Over the years, the two cities would become one larger metropolitan areaanyway,hesaid.25†ThefirstArabwhocametoseeEshkolwithSassonwantedmoney.HisnamewasAyubMusalem;hewasaChristianfromBethlehemandaformerJordanianminister.Inreturnforaonetimeconfidentialpaymentof60,000liras,heagreedto publish a daily newspaper named The Brotherhood. Sasson supported theidea,butthoughtitmightbebettertostartwithaweeklypublicationandamoreneutralname,suchasNews,ThisMorning,orTheTime.27
*TheU.S.embassyandtheAmericanconsulateinJerusalemcloselymonitoredthemeetingswiththePalestiniansandreceivedupdatesfrombothsides.30
*EshkolhadalreadyhadreasontoworryabouttheGazarefugeesroughlytwoyearsbefore theSix-DayWar.The refugeesweremultiplying, andwhen theirnumbersreachedhalfamillion,hefearedthesituationwouldbecomeexplosive.Once, he asked the chief of staffwhatwould happen if theEgyptians simplymarchedtherefugees—womenandchildreninthevanguard—towardtheborderwithIsrael.Rabinsaidtheywouldnotdothat,andiftheydid,assoontheIDFkilledthefirsthundred,therestwouldgobacktoGaza.2†Nooneknewexactlyhowmanyofthe1948refugeesremainedintheterritoriesaftertheflightthattookplaceduringtheSix-DayWarandcontinuedforsometimeafterward.Furthermore, thereweredifferentwaysofdecidingwhowasarefugee.AccordingtotheIsraelidata,therewere122,000refugeesintheWestBankandroughly234,000inGaza.UNWRAcitedfarhighernumbers.3
*The conductorErichLeinsdorf,who had so hastily canceled his concert andleftIsraelbeforethewar,wasnowquicktocallPresidentJohnsonandsuggestimmediateactiononbehalfoftherefugees.ThefundstartedbyRothschildwasapparentlysupposedtofinance,amongotherthings,theestablishmentofanewcity for refugees in the West Bank, to be built with plans submitted by thearchitectMosheSafdie.11
*Eshkol was not the first person to talk of resettling refugees in Iraq: DavidBen-Gurion had suggested it at a government meeting over a decade earlier.Shimon Peres thought the refugees should be encouraged to emigrate to thePersianGulfoilstates.13†Eshkol received letters from ordinary citizens demanding that he empty theterritories of their inhabitants and reminding him of the population exchangebetween Turkey and Greece. He responded to one with a polite letter ofthanks.14
*WeeksafterBruno’splanreachedEshkol,hisofficedirectorwrotetoEbanthatitwasbeingkepttopsecretbecauseitdemonstratedthattherewasnoeconomicbarriertosettlingtherefugeesintheWestBank—aconclusionthatcouldresultininternationalpressure.18†The ideaof settling theGaza refugees in thenorthernSinaiwasexaminedattheendofthe1950s,andalsoturnedupinproposalsProfessorYuvalNe’emansenttoDayanbeforethewarwasevenover,onJune9.19
*Various experts who examined the resettlement and emigration options alsoconsideredwhetherrefugeescouldbesettledontheeasternbankoftheJordan,and found that with adequate development more than a quarter of a millionpeoplecouldberesettledthere.25
*Eshkol had his own thoughts on this point: perhaps if theymade the IsraeliArabsjointhearmy,theywouldallleave,heoncemused.
*Gazit explained toEshkolwhymanyof the refugeeshesitated to leave: theywereafraidthatIsraelwouldseizeAmman,andtheyhadhadenoughinGaza.EshkolauthorizedhimtotellthemthatIsraelwouldnotseizeAmman.
*JordanwasinvolvedincovertIsraeliactivitiesrelatedtoNativ.Inmid-August,he went to Prague and disappeared; his body was later found floating in theVltavaRiver.Hewaspresumablymurdered,butthecircumstancesofhisdeathremainamystery.43
*The villages, Beit Awa and Beit Mirsim, near Hebron, became a focus ofattention by Swedish charitable organizations, perhaps because the SwedishconsulinJerusalemwasoneofthefirsttodiscovertheirdestruction.Israeltriedto prevent the Swedes from rebuilding the villages, lest it appear that therefugees needed the beneficent world to protect them from Israel’s acts ofmalice. Dayan suggested telling the Swedish ambassador to worry aboutSwedishaffairs.49†Inordertopacifytherefugeesandimprovetheuglyimpressionleftonforeignvisitors,aForeignMinistryofficialsuggestedsettingup toiletsandbenches intheshade,“sofarewellswillnothavetobemadeinthemiddleoftheroad.”52
*AbieNathanvisitedtheWestBanksoonafterthewarandhandedoutfoodandcandytofortythousandlocalchildren.InJuly,hemadeanotherfailedattempttofly to seeNasser. InDecember, the Israeli consul inNewYork reportedwithsome disgust that Nathan was planning to start a seagoing radio station topromotepeace.15
*ShortlybeforeEshkolgavehisvictoryspeechintheKnesset,YaacovHerzog’sdiplomatic skills were called upon to convince him to acknowledge MosheDayan. Grudgingly, Eshkol finally consented to mention “the minister ofdefense.” Herzog then noticed someone else who had been left out of thespeech:God.Hequickly insertedHim:“And thanks to theRockof Israelandthe redeemer, Israel shall dwell securely.”The term “Rock of Israel”—one ofthebiblicalappellationsofGod—appearsintheDeclarationofIndependence.17
*Most lower-educated Israelis believed thatDayan’swas the glory of victory,whilethebettereducatedthoughtRabinwasthetruehero.23
*Only 14 percent of Jewish Israelis supported a proposal to establish anindependentArabstateintheterritories,withtiestoIsrael.
*As the growing wave of patriotism engulfed Israel, a fewHa’aretz readersaskedHanaBavliwhether itwaspermissible tobeat theirrugsoverabalconyflyingtheIsraeliflag.Bavlirespondedthatitwasnot:thenationalflagdeservedsupremerespect.Likewise,laundryshouldbehungtodryelsewhere.1†The war brought about a change in school curricula: seventh-graders beganlearningabouttheterritoriesinanextrahourofcivics.3
*AnadvertisementforthegrandopeningofanewcaféinTelAviv,BambiMilkShakeBar, promised a bounty of delicacies, includingwaffles, pancakes, andmilkshake specials—not a word was in Hebrew.11 The official exchange ratewasstillthreelirastothedollar,butinNovemberitwasrevisedto3.5.
*Israel agreed to respond to a series of questions on the condition of IsraeliArabs presented by the UN emissary, Nils Gussing; Syria answered similarquestionsfromGussingabouttheconditionsofitsJewishcommunity.19
*WalworthBarboursharedthesedemographicanxieties,oncecommentingthatevenifIsraelgavefertilitydrugstoeverywoman,itcouldnotoutdotheArabpopulationexplosion.24†In1969,therewerefortythousand.26
‡BankregulationsrequiredEshkoltoindividuallyendorseeverysinglecheck.
*ATucson,Arizona,mannamedKennethTrimarguedwithDavidBen-Gurionover the question of howmanyArabs an Israeli soldier equaled. Ben-Gurionthought itwas five,butTrimreplied thatone Israeli soldierwasworth twentyArabs. Another American cabled Ben-Gurionwith an idea: the United Stateswouldprovide Israelwith fivehundredB-50bombers; in return, Israelwould“lend” it Moshe Dayan for six months, to help the war in Vietnam. “WhatshouldI tellhim?”Ben-GurionaskedDayan.AmannamedErwinMoskowitzdemandedthatIsraelimmediatelybeginbuildingsettlementsintheterritories.33
*Eshkol followed the squabbles, and when he found a draft resolution thatasserted that a countrywasnot entitled to annex territories it hadoccupied inwar,hewroteinthemargins:“Theyaddedthislineagainstus.”5
*AmerythoughthewasmakinghistoryuntilHusseinmadeaslipofthetongue,askingHerzogwhenhehadstoppedsmoking,atwhichpointAmeryrealizedhehadbeenduped.9†Eshkoloncevoicedasimilarfear:“I’mafraidof thedaytheArabssay,‘Youwantdirectnegotiations?Fine!’”11
*The CIA director, Richard Helms, reported on the meeting to PresidentJohnson.Overthenextmonths,otherIsraelismetwithHussein,includingChiefofStaffBar-LevandMinisterYigalAllon.NoneofferedHusseinanagreementhecouldaccept.13
*AmbassadorYitzhakRabinsentEshkoladetailedaccount:hadthesailorsbeenkilledonactiveduty,theU.S.governmentwouldhavehadtopaytheirfamiliescompensationof$1,054,527.InnegotiationswithIsrael,thefamiliesdemandedadditionalcompensationfortheiremotionaldistress:$1,240,000fortheparents,$540,000 for the wives and children, and $1,540,000 for loss of support andservices.22
*AmbassadorBarbouroffered Israelhisownadvice:President Johnsonwouldappreciatenothingmore,inpreparationforEshkol’svisittohisranch,thantheestablishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and SouthVietnam. Thisdidnothappen,butEvrondidletJohnsonknowthatinthenextfewmonthshewouldbe appearing almost everyweekendbefore Jewishgroups, “tohelp thepresident.” Johnson had not yet announced that he would not be running forofficeagain.25
*EshkoltoldRabinaboutapunJohnsonhadmade:“Youclaimyouwantpeace.Infactyouonlywantapieceofthisandapieceofthat.”26†ThedraftagreementforthesaleofthePhantoms,includingrestrictionsontheuseofnucleararms,isamongFeinberg’spapersintheIsraeliStateArchive.28
*Meronalsodetermined,however,thattherewasnolegalargumenttopreventIsraelfrommovingPalestinianrefugeesfromGazatosettleintheWestBank.34
*AmongthedozenprotesterswerethehistorianSaulFriedlanderandthewriterA.B.Yehoshua.46†TheU.S. ambassador reported on Shabak successes in the territories, notingthat the deputy head of the intelligence branch, David Carmon, was “nearlyecstatic” over operations to expose terrorists, which he called “simplyfantastic.”49
*Ben-Gurion amused himself with the notion that the Palestinians weredescendantsoftheancientHebrewswhohadconvertedtoIslam.61
TOMSEGEVisacolumnistforHa’aretz,Israel’sleadingnewspaper,andtheauthor of three now-classic works on the history of Israel— 1949: The FirstIsraelis, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust, and OnePalestine,Complete:JewsandArabsUndertheBritishMandate,whichwasaNewYorkTimesEditors’Choicefor2000.HelivesinJerusalem.
ADVANCEPRAISEFOR1967
“Today we know that Israel’s triumph in 1967 was a Pyrrhic victory. TomSegev’s1967makes thatmoreclear thananythingwrittenon the subject. . . .Segevdocumentsthishistorictragedybrilliantly,authoritatively,asnoonehasbefore.”
–AMOSELON,AUTHOROFTHEPITYOFITALL
“Theyear1967dividesthehistoryofIsraelintwo:whatcamebeforeandwhatcameafter.TomSegev’sbookmakesthisabundantlyclear,anddemonstratesthedifferencebetweenamilitaryvictoryandapoliticalone.”
–DANIELBARENBOIM“TomSegev’s1967offersabrilliantdescriptionoftheSix-DayWarinitswidestcontext:theinternationalscene,theMiddleEasternconfrontations,thepoliticaland social situation of Israel, aswell as fascinating snippets of everyday life.Thecrucialroleofindividualactorsisdeftlywovenintothegeneralpicture,thedescriptionofthemilitaryeventsisenthralling.ThisisprobablythebestbookonthosemostfatefuldaysinthehistoryofIsraelandtheMiddleEast.”–SAULFRIEDLANDER,AUTHOROFTHEYEARSOFEXTERMINATION:NAZIGERMANY
ANDTHEJEWS,1939-1945
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