1941 US Army WWII German Antitank Reg. NonTask Missions 5p.

8/14/2019 1941 US Army WWII German Antitank Reg. NonTask Missions 5p.

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D757.55U 5 I

U . S . W a r D e p t . G e n e r a l S t a f f , G - 2 .E m p l o y m e n t o f G e r m a n a n t i t a n k r e g i m e n t o n n o n - t a n k m i s s i o n s . D e c e m b e r 2 6 , 1 9 4 1 .

LIBRARYARMYWAR COLLEGECARLISLE BARRAC kS, PA.


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MILITAR Y INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INFORMATION BULLETINUSWAR DEPARTMENT. C , f w e : : . . - < * O U^-i - &-AV u 0 > 4

Washington, December 2 6 , 1941 MID 461

NOTICE

T h e information contained i n t h i s series of bulletinswill " b e restricted t o items from official sources which a r ereasonably confirmed.

This document i s being given a n approved distribution,and n o additional copies arc available i n t h e Military Intelligence Division. For provisions governing i t s reproduction,s e e Letter TAG 350.05 (9-19-40) M-B-M.

I EMPLOYMENT OF GERMAN ANTITANK REGIMENTU- ON NON-TANK MISSIONS

SOURCEThis bulletin i s b a s e d on a report submitted by an America n

official observer in Berlin. The tr ansl ate d article originallyappeared in t h e Milltar Wochenblatt. a semi-official German military journal.

CONTENTS1 . INTRODUCTION2 . AN ANTITANK COMPANY IN ACTION3 . COMMENTS BY OFFICIAL OBSERVER

X" " U l i K ' y v 'Y WAR conE T -


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EMPLOYMENT OF GERMAN ANTITANK REGIMENTO i l NON-TANKMISSIONS

1 . INTRODUCTIONThe regimental antitankcompany, the 14th Company i n t h e

German infantry regiment, i s composed o f four platoons. Each p latoon has three antitank-gun squads and a light machine-gun squad.During the Campaign in theWest i n 1 9 4 0 , antitankunits were e quippe d with the familiar 37-mm. g u n . I t i s believed that this weaponi s being replaced bythe 50-mm. antitank g u n . Curre nt newsreelsand published photographs of the Russian Campaign show both the37-mm. a n d t h e 50-mm. weapons i n action.

All German antitank units are motorized, and the weap onsa r e normally tewed by motor vehicles. I n combat, however, a s t h e article translatedbelow indicates, situations occasionally arisewhich necessitate the movement o f regimental antitank r u n s by othermeans, such a s man power o r horse power,

Y v h e n German assault infantry re gime nts a r e not threatenedby h ostile tanks, the weapons in the antitank companies of theseregiments a r e frequently used t o supplement the f i r e o f infantry- acc ompanying g u n s . T h e action described i n this article indicateshow re gimental antitankweapons have been used on non-tank missions.2 . ANANTITANKCOMPANY I N ACTION

"Prior maneuvers and combat firing exe rcises h ad given u sconfidence i n o u r antitank g u n s , and o u r faith i n t h e s ' e weaponsincreased afte r o u r first fe w days o f actual combat e xperience ,

"Early o n June 2 0 , 1 9 4 0 , we finally ap proach e d the e n e m y , who was methodically covering his retre at to the south with heavyandwell-aimed artilleryfire. T h e east bank o f the Meurthe a tFlin had been i n o u r possession since early i n t h e morning and o u rmission was t o force a crossing o v e r the Meurthe, and th en t o attackand pursue t h e defeated forces. I n spite o f the strong artilleryf i r e , whichwas intended t o pre ve nt u s from crossing the r i v e r , andt h e destroye d bridge, we reac h ed t h e oth er side with o u r small a r m s ,often T r a d i n g thro ugh water u p t o o u r hips. The advanced eleme nts o fo u r regiment quickly occupied the outskirts and t h e exits o f t h evillage. Reconnaissance was immediately started by patrols fromthe bicycle company and t h e re giment and we were ordered to attackh ostile units which had obtaine d a footing and were offering tenacious resistance a t a point 2 miles south o f F l i n . . As the regimentprepared to attack, we moved o u r antitank weapons to the crest o f a ridge. At first, strong hostile machine-gun fire prevented u sfrom crossing this ridge, and i n spite of all our e fforts i t wasimpossible to discover the e xact location o f t h e enemy's resistancenests.

"The re were apparently 2 heavy machine g u n s directly south- 1 -


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of u s a t a range of about 1500 yards, and some others h ad beenbrought into pos i t i on a t the edge o f the woods t o o u r right.Before we could safely carry o u t the attack, these weapons had t obe put o u t o f action. \ \ : e fired about three rounds from each antitank g un i n t o t h e suspected ma ch i ne-gun positions, and t h e regimental infantry -accompanying g u n s also fired o n these targets.Pr e s e n t ly the fire coming f r o r a . t h e south subsid ed, but i t continuedfrom the woods o n o u r r i g ht and from t h e heights o n o u r right front.As the attack progressed, our infantrymen o n the left advan ced ata good pace, and the word was passed around: 'Antitank g u n s , keepu p close --continue advancing. 1

"Our motor vehicles wer e not available because they wereunable t o cross the Me urthe until the pioneers had bui lt a bridge.T h e terra i n slope d slightly t o t h e s o u t h , however; we advancedwi t h out difficulty, towing our guns by h an d and ca rrying our ammun ition the same way. The ma ch i ne-gun and rifle fire o n t h e rightceased after t h e i nfantr y o n o u r righ t flank penetr a t e d the woods.

"The advance c o nt inu edwi t h out compl ic at io ns i n the directiono f Domptail, and o u r a ssault element s we r e soon o u t of s i g h t . Withmuch exertion o n t h e part o f the gun crews we c ro ssed t h e ridgequickly. After we h a d procee de d about 500 yards, the projectilesbegan whizzing over our heads and stri king i n the farmyard behindu s . l i e had alre ady learned that r a p i d , un inter rupted advan ce i sthe b est protection a g a i n st hostile arti lle r y fire.

" Y i " e covered the 3 miles to Dompta il without o u r motorvehicles. One c r e w , however, found a ho rse a n d used i t to towtheir g u n . Other crews attached theirs t o passin g motorcycles,and o n e gun was towed by an ab andoned Fren ch tank .

" T . h e n the assault elements entered Domptail, th eywereme twith h e a v y f i r e . Consequently, we ru shed forward wi t h o u rg u n s t o a ssist o u r e nd ange r ed comrades. After passing the firstfew houses, we too wer e g re et ed with de adly f i r e . The men fromthe rifle compan ies were forced t o g o into shelter, wh ile wesought pr otection behind the shields o f our a ntitank g u n s . O n ehouse after t h e other was take n under fire by our g u n s , whic halways used an anti tank projectile first* and followed with anH . E . s h e l l . Gradua lly the host ile fire subsided.

"The in fantrymen f o l l o x v e d o n either s i d e o f t h e streetand cleared the houses systematically. At a turn i n the streetwe began f iring a g a i n , presuming that i t was safe t o advance. Aho st il e ma chine gun opened u p , however, and wo u n de d five men, o n emortally. I t was impossible to determine t h e exact location o fthe machin e g u n , but we suspected i t to be i n o n e o f two hou sesdown the street o n our right. Conseque ntly, we fired s i x H.E.she lls into each o f t h e m . T J h e n o n e house beg an to b u r n , the

*Probably t o dete r mine accuracy by means o f tracer. G - 2 - 2 -


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machine gun ceased firing andwe renewed the advance. I n accordancewith combat-proven procedure, the infantrymen, protected by the walls,advanced on bot h sides of the street and searched all the houses.The machine gun was discovered in a cellar entrance, camouflagedwithbranches to make it invisible from the street. A fev hand grenadessilenced the snipers firing from the roofs.

"After an hour and a half, t h e village was completely inour hands. Clouds of smoke rising into the sky and burning housesgave evidence of the bitter struggle. We antitank r a e n were proudthat we had been able t o give such excellent assistance to ourcomrades in t h e rifle companies."5 . C O i f i J B N T S OF OFFICIAL OBSERVER

a . Although the German antitank gun i s normally towed by amotor vehicle, gun crews are frequently required to move theirweapons for considerable distance by hand. I n the action describedin the above article, guns n vere moved at least 5 miles without theassistance of their normal prise movers,

b . Althou gh the primary nission of antitank weapons i s tocombat tanks, some current German training pamphlets ( f o r example,Das Konaaandobuoh by Colonel E e . y e n - : l o r f , published in 1941) statethat in special situations, suoh as combat in villages, antitankguns are especially effective in subduing hostile strong points.Naturally, such employment i s recommended only in the absence of ahostile tank threat.

c . I t i s logical for the Germans to take advantage of themobility, fire pover, . n d the limited amor protection of theirregimental antitank weapons to use them against ground targetschecking the advance of assault units. They believe it i s an inefficient use of available nateriel t o have such v / e a p o n s and theircrews remain idle during combat, if they can be used effectivelyagainst menacing hostile targets and if there i s no threat fromenemy tanks. The author's statement that his guns alternated antitank projectiles with H.E. shells when attempting to neutralizehostile fire coming from houses on a village street i s r i o t e d withinterest. Later, when the source of the hostile fire was localizedto one of two buildings, he states that H.E, - s h e l l s were used.

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1941 US Army WWII German Antitank Reg. NonTask Missions 5p.

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