8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
1/38
SUPREME COURTOFTHE STATE OFNEWYORK
COUNTY OFNEW YORK
IN THE MATTER OF
SUBPOENA ISSUED BY COMMISSION TOINVESTIGATE PUBLIC CORRUPTION TO
HARRIS BEACH PLLC
Index No.: __________
I.A.S. PART:JUSTICE
HARRIS BEACH PLLCSMEMORANDUMOFLAW IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONTO
QUASH NON-JUDICIAL SUBPOENAAND FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER
HARRIS BEACH PLLC
99 Garnsey RoadPittsford, New York 14534
Telephone: (585) 419-8800
Fax: (585) 419-8811
ILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/21/2013 INDEX NO. 160880/
YSCEF DOC. NO. 3 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/21/
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
2/38
-i-
TABLE OFCONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................................2
A. The Governors Proposed Public Corruption Reform Legislation ..........................2
B. The Governor Forms the Commission to Investigate Public
Corruption................................................................................................................3
C. The Commission Issues Subpoenas to Legislators Outside
Employers ................................................................................................................5
ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................................8
I. THE SUBPOENA SHOULD BE QUASHED BECAUSE ITEXCEEDS THE COMMISSIONS STATUTORY AUTHORITY
UNDER NEW YORK EXECUTIVE LAW............................................................8
A. The Subpoena Constitutes an Unconstitutional IntrusionInto the Affairs of the Legislature by the Executive Branch
and Exceeds the Jurisdiction Afforded to the Executive
Branch by the Moreland Act........................................................................8
i. Governor Cuomos Grant of Authority to the
Commission to Investigate The Legislature Exceedsthe Governors Jurisdiction Under the Moreland Act......................8
ii. The Executive Order Impermissibly Relies onExecutive Law Section 63(8) As Authority to
Pursue Indirectly, Through the Attorney General,
What the Governor is Forbidden From Pursuing
Directly Under the Moreland Act ..................................................10
iii. The Subpoena Pursues Indirectly, Through Harris
Beach, What the Commission is Forbidden fromPursuing Directly, From Senator Nozzolio....................................13
B. The Subpoena was Improperly Issued to ImplementGovernor Cuomos Coercive Strategy To Effect Legislative
Reform .......................................................................................................13
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
3/38
-ii-
C. The Subpoena was Improperly Issued Prior to the
Commissions Promulgation of Rules and Procedure ...............................15
II. THE SUBPOENA SHOULD BE QUASHED BECAUSE IT IS
NOTHING MORE THAN AN IMPERMISSIBLE FISHINGEXPEDITION........................................................................................................16
A. The Commission Has No Factual Predicate to Support theSubpoena....................................................................................................16
B. The Admission That the Subpoena is Part of a Criminal
Investigation Subjects the Subpoena to a HeightenedEvidentiary Threshold That the Commission Cannot Satisfy....................18
C. The Information Demanded of Harris Beach Is Too Far-
Reaching and Bears Little to No Relevance to theCommissions Purported Purpose..............................................................19
III. THE SUBPOENA MUST BE QUASHED BECAUSE IT NOT
ONLY DEMANDS PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
MATERIAL, BUT IT IS OVERLY BROAD, VAGUE, UNDULY
BURDENSOME AND OPPRESSIVE..................................................................22
A. The Subpoena Demands Disclosure of Confidential,
Privileged and Proprietary Information .....................................................23
B. The Subpoena is Overbroad, Vague and Unduly Burdensome .................25
C. The Subpoena Is Oppressive......................................................................29
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
4/38
-iii-
TABLE OFAUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
2961 Realty Corp. v. Temp. Comm'n of Investigation of State of N.Y.,
115 Misc. 2d 768 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982)........................................................................ 20
Brodsky v. N.Y. Yankees,26 Misc. 3d 874 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 2009)................................................................ 17, 26
Cunningham & Kaming, P.C. v. Nadjari,53 A.D.2d 520 (1st Dept 1976).......................................................................................... 24, 25
DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2005)......................................................................... 24
Fahy v. Comm'n to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption
& Citys Anticorruption Procedures, 65 Misc. 2d 781
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971),aff'd, 36 A.D.2d 802 (1st Dept 1971) ...................................... 27
Finger Lakes Racing Assn. v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd.,
45 N.Y.2d 471 (1978) ................................................................................................................. 9
Future Tech. Assocs. v. Special Commr of Investigation
for N.Y.C. Sch. Dist., 115054/2010, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1352(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County March 17, 2011) ................................................................................... 17
Harlem Teams for Self-Help, Inc. v. Dept of Investigation of City of N.Y.,122 Misc. 2d 1066 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984)................................................................ 16, 19
Horn Constr. Co. v. Fraiman,
34 A.D.2d 131 (1st Dept 1970),aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 559 (1971) ................................................. 21
In re Diamond Asphalt Corp. v. Sander, 92 N.Y.2d 244 (1998)............................................ 11, 13
In re New York State Superfund Coalition
v. New York State Dept. Of Envtl. Conservation, 75 N.Y.2d 88 (1989) ..................................... 9
In re of Attorney Gen. of State of N.Y., 269 A.D.2d 1 (1st Dept 2000)........................... 11, 13, 20
Lerner v. Lerner, 90 A.D.2d 452 (1st Dept 1982)................................................................. 22, 25
Mahoney v. Staffa, 184 A.D.2d 886 (3d Dept 1992)................................................................... 25
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
5/38
-iv-
Myerson v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage Co.,
33 N.Y.2d 250 (1973) ........................................................................................................ passim
N.Y. Shredding Corp. v. NYC Dept of Investigation,
184 Misc. 2d 174 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2000)........................................................................ 16
N.Y.C. Dep't of Investigation v. Passannante,
148 A.D.2d 101 (1st Dept 1989)........................................................................................ 18, 21
Naples v. Whelan, 100 A.D.2d 743 (4th Dept 1984),aff'd, 63 N.Y.2d 891 (1984) ................................................................................................ 17, 20
Natl Freelancers, Inc. v. State Tax Commn, Dept of Taxation & Fin.,126 A.D.2d 218 (3d Dept 1987) ................................................................................................ 1
New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce
v. New York City Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene,110 A.D.3d 1 (1st Dept 2013).................................................................................................. 15
Nicholson v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct,67 A.D.2d 649 (1st Dept 1979).......................................................................................... 16, 18
Nicholson v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct,68 A.D.2d 851 (1st Dept 1979)................................................................................................ 16
Pavillion Agency, Inc. v. Spitzer,9 Misc. 3d 626 (Sup Ct. New York County 2005).............................................................. 23, 24
People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 42 A.D.3d 126 (1st Dept 2007)........................................ passim
Raynor v. Landmark Chrysler, 18 N.Y.3d 48 (2011) ................................................................... 10
Reuters Ltd. v. Dow Jones Telerate, Inc.,231 A.D.2d 337 (1st Dept 1997)........................................................................................ 23, 29
Straus v. Ambinder, 61 A.D.3d 672 (2d Dept 2009) ................................................................... 25
Suffolk County Builders Assn. v. County of Suffolk,
46 N.Y.2d 613 (1979) ................................................................................................................. 8
Temp. State Comm'n on Living Costs & Econ. v. Bergman,
80 Misc. 2d 448 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).................................................................... 12, 19
Tierney v. Cohen, 268 N.Y. 464 (1935)........................................................................................ 11
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
6/38
-v-
Tze Chun Liao v. New York State Banking Dept.,
74 N.Y.2d 505 (1989) ............................................................................................................... 12
White Bay Enters. v. Newsday, Inc.,
288 A.D.2d 211 (2d Dept 2001) .............................................................................................. 25
Wise v. Consolidated Energy Co. of N.Y.,
282 A.D.2d 335 (1st Dept 2001).............................................................................................. 23
Statutes
N.Y. Exec. Law 6......................................................................................................... 1, 3, 10, 11
N.Y. Exec. Law 63(8) ......................................................................................................... passim
N.Y. Exec. Law 63(12) ................................................................................................................ 1
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 106, I ........................................................................................................ 4
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 106, II(a)-(c)............................................................................................. 4
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 106, IV ..................................................................................................... 4
N.Y. Pub. Off. Law 73-a............................................................................................................ 28
N.Y. Pub. Off. Law 73-a(3) ....................................................................................................... 28
N.Y. Pub. Off. Law 73-a(8)(b)(v).............................................................................................. 24
N.Y. State Finance Law 187 ........................................................................................................ 1
Other Authorities
E. Breuer,Moreland Act Investigations in New York: 1907-65 (1965) at pp. 29......................... 10
Glenn Bain and Kenneth Lovett, Cuomo Believes Anti-Corruption CommissionCan Force Politicians to Give Details on Outside Incomes, New York Daily
News (Sept. 24, 2013) ............................................................................................................... 18
Governors Press Office, Governor Cuomo Appoints Moreland Commission to
Investigate Public Corruption, with Attorney General Schneiderman
Designating Commission Members as Deputy Attorneys General(July 2, 2013)...................... 3
Governors Press Office, Governor Cuomo Details Comprehensive Reforms to
Prevent Public Corruption, Modernize New Yorks Voting Laws, and Reduce
the Influence of Money in Politics (June 11, 2013)..................................................................... 2
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
7/38
-vi-
Governors Press Office, Governor Cuomo Proposes New Class of Public
Corruption Crimes(April 9, 2013) ............................................................................................. 2
Governors Press Office, Governor Cuomo Signs Ethics Reform Legislation
(Aug. 15, 2011),. ....................................................................................................................... 28
Interview with Attorney General Schneiderman, Capital Pressroom with Susan
Arbetter (Nov. 12, 2013) ..................................................................................................... 12, 14
Kenneth Lovett & Glenn Bain,Cuomo Believes Anti-corruption Commission Can
Force Politicians to Give Details on Outside Income, New York Daily News
(Sept. 24, 2013) ........................................................................................................................... 5
Kenneth Lovett & Glenn Bain, Senate and Assembly Leaders Refuse to Disclose
Details About Outside Jobs to Gov. Cuomos Anti-corruption Commission,
New York Daily News (Sept. 20, 2013) ..................................................................................... 4
Kenneth Lovett, Gov. Cuomo Expects Challenges To Anti-Corruption
Commission Subpoenas, New York Daily News (Oct. 21, 2013)............................................. 14
N.Y. Eth. Op. 645, 1993 WL 560284 (May 3, 1993) ................................................................... 24
N.Y. Exec. Order (Cuomo) 106 ............................................................................................. passim
N.Y. Exec. Order (Cuomo) 106, I.............................................................................................. 11
N.Y. Exec. Order (Cuomo) 106, V ............................................................................................ 15
Press Release from The Moreland Commission to Investigate Public Corruption,
Statement From Moreland Commission Co-Chairs(Oct. 15, 2013) .......................................... 5
Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Creates Special Commission to Investigate CorruptElected Officials, New York Times (July 2, 2013) ................................................................... 25
Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Says Abortion and Anticorruption Bills Arent Likely toPass Legislature, New York Times (June 17, 2013) .................................................................. 3
Thomas Kaplan, Panel to Investigate State Democratic Party, New York Times(Oct. 15, 2013) ............................................................................................................................ 5
Yancey Roy,Skelos: No witch hunt, Newsday (July 2, 2013), at A34..................................... 18
Rules
N.Y. C.P.L.R. Article 23................................................................................................................. 1
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
8/38
-vii-
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2304...................................................................................................................... 1
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3103...................................................................................................................... 2
N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 13 400.2 .............................................................................................................. 1
N.Y. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6 ....................................................................... 23, 24
N.Y. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6, Comment 2......................................................... 29
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
9/38
-1-
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On October 15, 2013, Harris Beach PLLC (Harris Beach) received a non-judicial
subpoenaduces tecum(Subpoena) issued by Danya Perry, Deputy Attorney General and Chief
of Investigations, on behalf of the Moreland Commission to Investigate Public Corruption (the
Commission). Affidavit of Karl J. Sleight, dated November 21, 2013 at 11, Exhibit C
(herein Sleight Aff.). The Subpoena is purportedly authorized pursuant to New York
Executive Law Sections 6, 63(8) and 63(12), State Finance Law Section 187, N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 13
section 400.2, New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Article 23 and Executive Order 106.
Harris Beach is a private limited liability company that has been providing legal services
in New York for over 150 years. Among Harris Beachs practicing attorneys is Michael
Nozzolio, who, separate and independent from his legal practice at Harris Beach, serves as a
New York State Senator. Senator Nozzolio has practiced at Harris Beach since 1995, and since
January 1, 1983 has separately served as a member of the New York State Assembly and more
recently as a member of the New York State Senate.
For a non-judicial subpoena to be enforceable under New York law, the issuing entity
must establish: (1) its authority for both engaging in such an investigation and issuing the
subpoena; (2) an authentic factual basis to warrant the particular investigation; and (3) that the
evidence sought is reasonably related to the subject of inquiry. Myerson v. Lentini Bros. Moving
& Storage Co., 33 N.Y.2d 250, 258 (1973); see also Natl Freelancers, Inc. v. State Tax
Commn, Dept of Taxation & Fin., 126 A.D.2d 218, 220 (3d Dept 1987). The Commission has
not and cannot establish any of the three prerequisitesfailure to do so as to any one of which is
fatalto support enforcement of the Subpoena. Accordingly, pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2304,
Harris Beach moves to quash the Subpoena on the grounds that: (1) it exceeds the Commissions
statutory authority and violates New Yorks separation of powers doctrine, as is more fully set
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
10/38
269638 2145547v4 -2-
forth in the memorandum of law filed by the New York State Senate in connection with its own
challenge to the Subpoena, which Harris Beach hereby incorporates in its entirety; (2) because
there is no factual predicate of public corruption or wrongdoing by Harris Beach or Senator
Nozzolio, the Subpoena is nothing more than an unfounded and highly intrusive fishing
expedition; (3) it is substantively improper because it (a) seeks confidential and privileged
information, (b) is overbroad, vague and unduly burdensome, and (c) is oppressive. Sleight Aff.,
16, Exhibit D. For these reasons, Harris Beach requests that this Court (1) quash the Subpoena,
or, in the alternative, (2) issue a protective order pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3103 directing that
Harris Beach need not respond to the Subpoena.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. The Governors Proposed Public Corruption Reform Legislation.
On April 9, 2013, Governor Cuomo proposed the Public Trust Act, the first piece of a
three-part legislative package purportedly aimed at curbing public corruption by implementing:
(1) tougher punishments for public corruption crimes; (2) voting reforms; and (3) campaign
finance reforms.1
None of the Governors proposed bills called for state legislators to disclose additional
information beyond that which the Public Integrity Reform Act of 2011 already obligates them to
disclose about their outside employment or clients. Nor would the proposed legislation have
imposed any special disclosure requirements on legislators outside employers.
Despite holding several news conferences about the proposed legislation during the
spring of 2013, the Governor did not release all three proposed bills until June 11, 2013nine
1 Governors Press Office, Governor Cuomo Proposes New Class of Public Corruption Crimes (April 9, 2013),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/press/04092013New-Class-of-Public-Corruption-Crimes; Governors Press
Office,Governor Cuomo Details Comprehensive Reforms to Prevent Public Corruption, Modernize New Yorks
Voting Laws, and Reduce the Influence of Money in Politics (June 11, 2013),
http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/06-11-2013-Influence-of-Money-in-Politics.
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
11/38
269638 2145547v4 -3-
days before the end of the legislative session. On June 17, 2013, the Governor acknowledged in
a radio interview that he did not expect the Legislature to approve his proposed public corruption
laws before the sessions June 20, 2013 close.2
The Governor threatened that should the
Legislature fail to act, he would appoint a commission to investigate the role of money in the
State political system.3
As the Governor predicted, the legislative session closed before the bills were brought to
the Senate floor for a vote.
B. The Governor Forms the Commission to Investigate Public Corruption.
Expressing his frustration with the Legislatures failure to enact his proposed legislation,4
on July 2, 2013, pursuant to New York Executive Law Sections 6 and 63(8), the Governor issued
Executive Order 106, establishing the Commission to Investigate Public Corruption. Sleight
Aff., Exhibit C. According to the Executive Order, the Commissions ostensible purposes
include investigating: (1) the management and affairs of the New York State Board of Elections,
including an examination of compliance with and the effectiveness of campaign finance laws; (2)
weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and procedures regulating lobbying, including
compliance by organizations and other persons engaged in lobbying or otherwise attempting to
influence public policies or elections; and (3) weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and
procedures related to addressing public corruption, conflicts of interest and ethics in State
2 See Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Says Abortion and Anticorruption Bills Arent Likely to Pass Legislature, New
York Times (June 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/nyregion/cuomo-says-abortion-and-
anticorruption-bills-arent-likely-to-pass-legislature.html.3 See id.4 In a July 2, 2013 press release announcing the formation of the Commission, the Governor stated: From the
beginning, I said I would not accept a watered-down approach to cleaning up Albany and that the Legislature
must either pass th is legislative package or I would empanel an investigative commission tasked with
accomplishing these same goals to achieve reform. Since the Legislature has failed to act, today I am formally
empanelling a Commission to Investigate Public Corruption . . . . Governors Press Office,Governor Cuomo
Appoints Moreland Commission to Investigate Public Corruption, with Attorney General Schneiderman
Designating Commission Members as Deputy Attorneys General (July 2, 2013),
http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/07022013-new-moreland-commission-named (emphasis added).
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
12/38
269638 2145547v4 -4-
Government.5 The Governor directed Attorney General Eric Schneiderman to inquire into these
three areas and appointed twenty-five members to the Commission to assist him in the endeavor,
ten of whom are sitting district attorneys.6 Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law 63(8), the Governor
appointed those ten attorneys as Deputy Attorneys General.7
On or about August 27, 2013, the Commission sent letters directly to state legislators
whose outside income from any single non-legislative source exceeds $20,000. Senator
Nozzolio received one of those letters. The letters demand that the legislators provide certain
information regarding their outside employment, including: (1) a description of the services
provided through outside employment; (2) the amount of compensation received for those
services, and the basis for computing that compensation; and (3) for those legislators who are
attorneys, a list of clients in any civil matters or any publicly filed criminal matters in which the
legislator is the attorney of record. Sleight Aff., 7, Exhibit A.
On September 20, 2013, the State Assembly and Senate responded in a joint letter,
declining to produce the requested material. They further stated that all legislators had already
submitted annual statements of financial disclosure to the Legislative Ethics Commission as
required by the Public Integrity Reform Act of 2011, which were publicly available and included
some information requested by the Commission. SeeSleight Aff., 9, Exhibit B.
That same day, Commission spokesperson Michelle Duffy suggested that the response
from the Assembly and Senate implied the legislators had something to hide: As the old adage
goes, if youve done nothing wrong, you have nothing to hide.8 Moreover, she described the
5 Exec. Order No. 106, II(a)-(c).6 Exec. Order No. 106, I.7 Exec. Order No. 106, IV.8 Kenneth Lovett & Glenn Bain, Senate and Assembly Leaders Refuse to Disclose Details About Outside Jobs to
Gov. Cuomos Anti-corruption Commission, New York Daily News (Sept. 20, 2013),http://www.nydailynews.com/ news/politics/legislature-rejects-cuomo-anti-corruption-commission-request-article-1.1463102.
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
13/38
269638 2145547v4 -5-
Legislators position as legally indefensible, ethically repugnant, and disrespectful to the
publics right to know, threatening that [t]here are a number of avenues through which the
Commission can obtain the information being sought, and we will pursue them.9 At a press
event on September 23, the Governor echoed this rhetoric: They [the panel] are
prosecutors . . . . When they say they have other avenues, it means they have other avenues
they are going to pursue.10
On October 15, 2013, the Commissions three co-chairs stated that the Commission
would proceed to aggressively move forward in compelling the production of information into
specific matters the Commission is investigating.
11
Later that day, the Commission emphasized
the broad scope of its investigation, claiming, Today, in addition to the investigation into the
Legislature, the Moreland Commission has moved to look across the board at all housekeeping
accounts . . . . Everything is on the table. We are looking at everything.12
C. The Commission Issues Subpoenas to Legislators Outside Employers.
Rather than issue a subpoena directly to New York legislators, however, the Commission
issued subpoenas to the employers, including law firms, of those legislators with outside income
over $20,000. On October 15, 2013, Harris Beach was served with the Subpoena at issue on this
motion. As signaled by and consistent with the Commissions overheated rhetoric, the Subpoena
demands substantially more information than what was sought by the informal request. Whereas
the August 27th letter requested a description or list of the services the legislator provides, the
9 Id.(emphasis added).10 Kenneth Lovett & Glenn Bain, Cuomo Believes Anti-corruption Commission Can Force Politicians to Give
Details on Outside Income, New York Daily News (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ cuomo-commission-details-pols-incomes-article-1.1465539 (emphasis added).
11 Press Release from The Moreland Commission to Investigate Public Corruption, Statement From MorelandCommission Co-Chairs(Oct. 15, 2013).
12 Thomas Kaplan,Panel to Investigate State Democratic Party, New York Times (Oct. 15, 2013),http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/nyregion/panel-to-investigate-state-democratic-party.html?_r=0 (emphasisadded).
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
14/38
269638 2145547v4 -6-
Subpoena demands any and all Documents and Communications relating to Senator
Nozzolios legal services, as well as Documents and Communications relating to Harris Beach
and its clients.
The Subpoena broadly defines Document, Communication, and Harris Beach as
follows:
Communication is defined in the broadest sense of the term, including, among otherthings, conversations, discussions and other transmittal of information or message,
whether transmitted in writing, orally, electronically or by any other means.13
Document is also defined in the broadest sense of the term and means each andevery writing of whatever nature, whether an original, a draft, or a copy, however
produced or reproduced, and each and every tangible thing from which information canbe processed or transcribed.14
The Subpoena notes specific examples of items that fall
within this definition, such as plans, records, charts, graphs, diaries, analyses,
instructions, voicemail, memoranda, notes, recordings (audio, visual or digital), creditcard charge slips, USB flash drives, diaries, studies, calendars, photographs (positive
prints and negatives), computer printouts and programs, microfilm and marginal
comments appearing on any Document.15
Harris Beach is broadly defined to include not just the firm itself, but also its attorneys,principals, executives, representatives, agents, affiliates, present or former parents,subsidiaries, related entities, directors, officers chair, partners, supervisors,
representatives, agents, contractors, or other persons acting on the firms behalf, its
respective predecessors or successors or any of the affiliates of the foregoing.16
In addition to requesting general information about Senator Nozzolios legal services,
compensation for the same, and a list of client names, the Subpoena seeks documents and
communications pertaining to more far-reaching topics about Senator Nozzolio, Harris Beach,
and the firms clients, including:
Documents and Communications relating to professional services provided by Senator
Nozzolio;17
13 Subpoena A(2).14
Id.at A(3).15
Id.16
Id.at A(1).17 Request No. 1, id. at C(1).
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
15/38
269638 2145547v4 -7-
Any contract, agreement, appointment or offer letter, letterhead, business card, attorneyprofile, and any Document, including correspondence, describing Senator Nozzolios
position within the firm;18
Records of Senator Nozzolios compensation, including in-kind benefits;19
Invoices, billable hour reports, timesheets, expense reports, reimbursement forms relatingto Senator Nozzolio;
20
Documents and Communications relating to the solicitation and engagement of any and
all Harris Beach clients by Senator Nozzolio;21
Clients advised or represented by Senator Nozzolio, and a general description of theservices provided to such clients;
22
Building access records and sign-in sheets reflecting Senator Nozzolios access to HarrisBeachs office;
23
Documents and Communications showing any relationship, business (including receipt offunding), litigation, lobbying or other contacts on Harris Beachs own behalf with, before
or against the State of New York or any of the States affiliated entities or bodies;24
Documents and Communications showing clients that have had any relationship, business(including receipt of funding), litigation, lobbying or other contacts with before or against
the State or any of its affiliated entities or bodies;25
Documents and Communications showing any clients that have engaged Harris Beach inconnection with requests for funding, lobbying activity, legislation or any other
legislative or political activity;26
Documents and Communications relating to monies, benefits, or campaign contributions
from Harris Beach, its members, or close relatives of its members, or any political
organization or committee associated with Harris Beach to elected state officials, political
candidates, political entities, campaigns, political action committees; political partyorganizations, or political clubs.
27
18
Request No. 1(a), id. at C(1)(a).19 Request No. 1(b), id. at C(1)(b).20 Request No. 1(c), id. at C(1)(c).21 Request No. 1(d), id. at C(1)(d).22 Request No. 1(e), id. at C(1)(e).23 Request No. 1(f), id. at C(1)(d).24 Request No. 2, id. at C(2).25 Request No. 3(a), id. at C(3)(a).26 Request No. 3(b), id. at C(3)(b).27 Request No. 4, id. at C(4).
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
16/38
269638 2145547v4 -8-
The Subpoena seeks this detailed and voluminous documentation for a period of nearly
four years, from January 1, 2010 to the present.28
The Subpoena claims that the materials
demanded, like office building sign-in sheets, are relevant and material to an i nvesti gationand
inquiry undertaken in the public interest.29
ARGUMENT
I. THE SUBPOENA SHOULD BE QUASHED BECAUSE IT EXCEEDS THE
COMMISSIONS STATUTORY AUTHORITY UNDER NEW YORK
EXECUTIVE LAW.
A. The Subpoena Constitutes an Unconstitutional Intrusion Into the Affairs of
the Legislature by the Executive Branch and Exceeds the Jurisdiction
Afforded to the Executive Branch by the Moreland Act.
The Subpoena is invalid because it was issued by a Commission created by Governor
Cuomo in excess of the his jurisdiction under the Moreland Act. The Commissions objective to
investigate the Legislature blatantly violates New Yorks separation of powers doctrine. Further,
the Subpoena itself improperly pursues indirectly through Harris Beach what the Commission is
forbidden from pursuing directly from Senator Nozzolio.
i. Governor Cuomo s Grant of Authority to the Commission to I nvestigateThe Legislature Exceeds the Governor s Jurisdiction Under the
M oreland A ct.
Coercive tactics aside, because the Commission was formed for an unlawful purposeto
allow the Executive Branch to investigate the Legislatureany such jurisdiction it seeks to
assert over Harris Beach directly and Senator Nozzolio indirectly is unlawful.
An administrative agency or body derives its authority or power to act from the express
dictates of the Legislature. See Suffolk County Builders Assn. v. County of Suffolk, 46 N.Y.2d
613, 620 (1979); see also In re New York State Superfund Coalition v. New York State Dept. Of
28 Id.at C.29 Subpoena, at 1 (emphasis added).
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
17/38
269638 2145547v4 -9-
Envtl. Conservation, 75 N.Y.2d 88, 92 (1989) (the delegation of authority to an agency or body
must strictly coincide with its enabling statute). The agency or body may not act in
contravention of the will of the Legislature or broaden what the applicable legislative scheme
permits. See Finger Lakes Racing Assn. v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 45 N.Y.2d
471, 480 (1978); People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 42 A.D.3d 126, 136-39 (1st Dept 2007)
(noting the Legislatures plenary authority over its choice of goals and the methods to effectuate
them).
In Grasso, the First Department considered whether the Attorney General exceeded the
authority granted to him under Not-For-Profit Corporation Law (N-PCL) in pursuing non-
statutory claims against the former chairman and chief executive officer of the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), a not-for-profit corporation, for his allegedly excessive compensation.
See Grasso, 42 A.D.3d at 127-34. The court recognized that the N-PCL expressly confers
authority upon the Attorney General to bring certain causes of action against not-for-profit
directors or officers for excessive compensation, but that all claims contemplated entail a fault-
based determination of liability. 42 A.D.3d at 139-40. The court held that the Attorney General
lacked authority to bring the non-statutory claims because they would impose liability on Grasso
without regard to the fault-based requirements or would otherwise circumvent the substantive
standards for the liability of directors and officers established by the Legislature. 42 A.D.3d at
141.
TheGrassoCourt reasoned that [b]ecause the Legislature has not been completely silent
but has instead made express provision for civil remedy, neither the judiciary nor the executive
branch should attempt to fashion a different remedy, with broader [liability]. 42 A.D.3d at 141
(internal quotations omitted). Further, because the claims crafted by the Attorney General
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
18/38
269638 2145547v4 -10-
circumvented the core provisions of the N-PCL legislative scheme governing the duties and
liabilities of directors and officers of not-for-profit corporations, they were inconsistent with the
principle of separation of powers. 42 A.D.3d at 140.
Here, the Moreland Act permits investigations by the Governor into the affairs of any
department, board, bureau or commission of the state (N.Y. Exec. Law 6). By expressly
limiting the scope of the Act to the Executive Branch of the state, an irrefutable inference must
be drawn that the authority granted by the statute does not extend to permit investigations of the
Legislative Branch. See Raynor v. Landmark Chrysler, 18 N.Y.3d 48, 56 (2011) (Where a
statute describes the particular situations in which it is to apply and no qualifying exception is
added, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended
to be omitted or excluded.) (citation omitted); Grasso, 42 A.D.3d at 135-36 (applying the
doctrine ofexpressio unius est exclusio alteriusto preclude the Attorney General from engaging
in the exercise of powers not thus expressly conferred by the N-PCL).
To interpret the Moreland Act as granting the Executive Branch jurisdiction to investigate
the Legislature would result in plain contravention of New Yorks separation of powers doctrine.
See Grasso, 42 A.D.3d at 140; E. Breuer, Moreland Act Investigations in New York: 1907-65
(1965) at pp. 29 (By now it should be apparent that the Moreland Act relates solely to State
administrative offices [and] has nothing to do with the . . . Legislature.), 32 (noting the state
legislature and judiciary branches are not subject to Moreland Act investigations).
ii. The Executive Order I mpermissibly Relies on E xecutive Law Section
63(8) As Authority to Pursue Indirectly, Through the Attorney General,
What the Governor is F orbidden Fr om Pursuing Directly Under the
Moreland Act.
Executive Order 106 invokes Executive Law Section 63(8) as alternate authority for the
Commissions investigation of the Legislature on the rationale the matters under investigation,
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
19/38
269638 2145547v4 -11-
i.e., those identified in Paragraph II of the Order, involve issues of public peace, public safety,
and public justice. Executive Order 106, Section I. However, the Governor may not invoke
Section 63(8) of the Executive Law to have the Attorney General investigate these matters when
Section 6 does not grant him that authority.
The State or its instrumentalities may not pursue indirectly what the State is prohibited
from pursing directly. See In re Diamond Asphalt Corp. v. Sander, 92 N.Y.2d 244, 257 (1998)
(reiterating the Court of Appeals expressed concern that public officials not be permitted to do
indirectly what they may not do directly); Tierney v. Cohen, 268 N.Y. 464 (1935) (What the
city cannot do directly, an agency or authority cannot do indirectly.); Grasso, 42 A.D.3d at 140
n.9 (the Attorney Generals position that he could assert non-statutory claims at odds with
legislative scheme call[ed] to mind the venerable prohibition on public officials doing indirectly
what they are forbidden from doing directly); In re of Attorney Gen. of State of N.Y. , 269
A.D.2d 1, 9 (1st Dept 2000) (States cannot be allowed to do indirectly what they cannot do
directly . . . .). State officials are thus forbidden from evading the purpose of a statute by
merely altering the nature of an arrangement to bring it technically outside the scope of the
requirements. In re Diamond Asphalt Corp., 92 N.Y.2d at 256-57 (holding that New York City
Commissioner of Department of Transportation could not extend coverage of the [public
bidding] statute into areas unintended by the Legislature by applying it to private interference
utility work).
Here, Governor Cuomo merely fashioned a procedural arrangement (i.e., an Attorney
General controlled investigation) as a means to bring the Commission technically outside the
restrictions imposed on a Governor-controlled investigation under the Moreland Act. Attorney
General Schneiderman himself admits that the whole point of the Governor getting [him]
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
20/38
269638 2145547v4 -12-
involved in this venture [is] so that they can go beyond the Executive Branch and look at matters
in the Legislature or the Judicial Branches . . . . Interview with Attorney General
Schneiderman, Capital Pressroom with Susan Arbetter (Nov. 12, 2013) (it does require a little
bit of thoughtfulness about how you get the Legislature at the end of the day to cooperate).30
That Governor Cuomo invoked Section 63(8) by directing the Attorney General to
conduct an investigation of political corruption in the name of the public interest does not
change the fact the Commission represents a Governor-directed investigation of the Legislature
in violation of the Moreland Act. See Grasso, 42 A.D.3d at 142 ([T]he authority to bring suit in
what the Attorney General perceives to be in the interest of the state cannot trump contrary
determinations about the public interest made by the Legislature.).
The Subpoena must be quashed so as to prohibit the Governors improper invocation of
Section 63(8) as a means to expand his jurisdiction under the Moreland Act and permit an
unconstitutional investigation of the Legislature by the Executive Branch. See Tze Chun Liao v.
New York State Banking Dept., 74 N.Y.2d 505, 510 (1989) (Banking Department could not deny
check casher license to owner of stationery store on grounds of destructive competition where
such ground was not included in criteria expressly enumerated by legislature for license
qualification); Grasso, 42 A.D.3d at 142 (noting that although executive branch officials may
bring suit to enforce the law, they do not enjoy the quintessentially legislative authority toalter
the law) (emphasis in original); Temp. State Comm'n on Living Costs & Econ., 80 Misc. 2d at
453-54 (quashing subpoena where facts indicated the investigation was an improper criminal
investigation, outside the commissions jurisdiction, and an abuse of process).
30 In his interview with Ms. Arbetter, Attorney General Schneiderman did not articulate what authority supported
his conclusion that as a legal matter, theres no question in my mind that The Moreland Commission has the
ability to to inquire into matters relating to the Legislature. Interview with Attorney General Schneiderman,
Capital Pressroom with Susan Arbetter (Nov. 12, 2013)
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
21/38
269638 2145547v4 -13-
i i i . The Subpoena Pursues Indirectly, Through Harris Beach, What the
Commission is Forbidden from Pursuing Directly, F rom Senator
Nozzolio.
That the Subpoena is not directed to Senator Nozzolio only confirms the Commission
recognizes the separation of powers and jurisdictional problems manifest in a Governor-directed
subpoena aimed at investigating a legislator.
By merely altering the recipient of the Subpoena so that it technically is not directed to a
legislator, the Commission is nonetheless encroaching on the independence of the Legislature.
See In re Diamond Asphalt Corp., 92 N.Y.2d at 257. The Commission could not directly
subpoena Senator Nozzolio for the documents concerning his professional services and outside
income. It is similarly forbidden from indirectly seeking those documents from Harris Beach.
See Grasso, 42 A.D.3d at 140 n.9;In re Office of Attorney Gen. of State of N.Y., 269 A.D.2d at 9-
11 (quashing subpoenas served by Attorney General in connection with investigation into
potential claims against manufacturers for violations of federal standards on ground that claims
were federally preempted by Clean Air Act and relying in part on the rationale that States
cannot be allowed to do indirectly what they cannot do directly).
For these reasons, as well as the facts and arguments asserted by the New York State
Senate,31
which are incorporated herein in their entirety, the Subpoena must be quashed.
B. The Subpoena was Improperly Issued to Implement Governor Cuomos
Coercive Strategy To Effect Legislative Reform.
From this Commissions beginning in July 2013, Governor Cuomos ultimate purpose for
the Commission was clear: it would serve as a tool to coerce the Legislature into passing the
package of reform legislation that it chose not to consider or enact. In a July 2, 2013 press
release announcing the formation of the Commission, the Governor stated: . . . I said I would
31 These facts and arguments, which appear in the Memorandum of Law submitted by the New York State Senate in
connection with its separate action challenging the Subpoena, are incorporated in their entirety herein.
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
22/38
269638 2145547v4 -14-
not accept a watered-down approach to cleaning up Albany and that the Legislature must either
pass this legislative package or I would empanel an investigative commission tasked with
accomplishing these same goals to achieve reform.
As this rhetoric of intimidation continues unabated, it has become all the more apparent
that the Commissions true purpose is to enforce new rules that the Governor hoped his proposed
legislation would have effected. For example, the Governors proposed legislation would not
have imposed heightened disclosure requirements specifically on legislators or their outside
employers, but the Subpoena seeks to do just that. Recent statements from the Governor reveal
that the Commissions purported policy-making impact is but a faade: Id still like them to
pass legislation because that's how you change things . . . . I don't really need another
commission. I don't really need a lot of additional prosecutors. Really I would like to make
systemic reform once and for all.32
Attorney General Schneidermans statements in a
November 12, 2013 interview with Susan Arbetter further support the conclusion that the
Commissions goal is to force legislative reform:
Obviously, you know, its a its a its a tricky game becauseyou want to investigate early and make sure all everything that
potentially could be the subject of reform . . . but you have to do it
in a way that with the understanding that ultimately the reforms
are gonna have to be passed by the Legislature and signed by theGovernor. . . . But as a matter of strategy and really just trying to
get the best reforms possible, it it does require a little bit of
thoughtfulness about how you get the Legislature at the end of theday to cooperate.
33
When the threats and actions are aside, and the Subpoenas intrusive and coercive nature
exposed, it is clear that the Commissions purpose is improper. Governor Cuomos use of the
32 Kenneth Lovett, Gov. Cuomo Expects Challenges To Anti-Corruption Commission Subpoenas, New York Daily
News (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2013/10/gov-cuomo-expects-
challenges-to-anti-corruption-commission-subpoenas.33 Interview with Attorney General Schneiderman, Capital Pressroom with Susan Arbetter (Nov. 12, 2013).
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
23/38
269638 2145547v4 -15-
Commission as a coercive tactic to force legislative reform constitutes an unlawful exercise of
his delegated authority. See New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce
v. New York City Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, 110 A.D.3d 1, 16 (1st Dept 2013)
(holding that the New York City Board of Health overstepped the boundaries of its lawfully
delegated authority and violated the principle of separation of powers in promulgating the
Portion Cap Rule to curtail the consumption of soda drinks where Board acted in area where
legislature had tried but failed to act).
C. The Subpoena was Improperly Issued Prior to the Commissions
Promulgation of Rules and Procedure.
The Subpoena must be quashed because it was improperly issued before the Commission
promulgated procedures and rules, as it was required to under Executive Order 106.34
Pursuant
to Executive Order No. 106, Governor Cuomo granted the Commissioners who served as Deputy
Attorneys General the power to subpoena and to require the production of any books or papers
deemed relevant or material.35
These powers, however, were subject to two conditions
precedent: that (1) the Co-Chairpersons shall unanimously approve any subpoena prior to its
issuance; and (2) the Co-Chairpersons shall unanimously approve such procedures and rules as
they believe necessary to govern the exercise of the powers and authority given or granted to the
Commissioners. including rules designed to provide transparency while protecting the
integrity of the investigation and rights to privacy.36
Upon information and belief, the Co-
Chairs have never approved or published any such rules, and thus the Commission lacked the
34 Petitioner incorporates in this motion all of the arguments and facts asserted in New York State Senates
Complaint for a Declaratory Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion to Quash, in their
entirety35 Exec. Order No. 106, V.36 Id.
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
24/38
269638 2145547v4 -16-
statutory authority to issue the present Subpoena.37
See Nicholson v. State Comm'n on Judicial
Conduct, 68 A.D.2d 851, 852 (1st Dept 1979) (quashing subpoena, with respect to certain
requests, because the commission lacks jurisdiction, given the statutory conditions prerequisite
to the commissions investigation . . . have not been met.) Accordingly, the Commission had
no authority to issue the Subpoena and it is per seunenforceable.
II. THE SUBPOENA SHOULD BE QUASHED BECAUSE IT IS NOTHING MORE
THAN AN IMPERMISSIBLE FISHING EXPEDITION.
A. The Commission Has No Factual Predicate to Support the Subpoena.
As confirmed by the First Department, the issue of broad, sweeping subpoenas without a
preliminary showing of authority, relevancy and some basis for the inquisitional action might too
easily subject innocent parties to administrative abuses in violation of their rights to privacy and
due process, and would amount to a roving cause of inquiry that is both burdensome and
oppressive. Nicholson v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 67 A.D.2d 649, 650-51 (1st Dept
1979) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
To prevent such administrative abuse, New York courts require a factual basis to support
a non-judicial investigative subpoena. See, e.g., N.Y. Shredding Corp. v. NYC Dept of
Investigation, 184 Misc. 2d 174, 182 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2000) (A motion to quash a
nonjudicial investigatory subpoena requires the issuer to come forward with a factual basis to
establish the relevancy of the items sought to the subject matter of the investigation.);Myerson,
33 N.Y.2d at 258; see also Harlem Teams for Self-Help, Inc. v. Dept of Investigation of City of
N.Y., 122 Misc. 2d 1066, 1070 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984) ([W]hen an office subpoena is
challenged, the burden is on the issuer to come forward with a factual basis which establishes
37 In its November 1, 2013 letter to the Commission, Harris Beach requested that the Commission provide those
procedures and rules to help reassure the public that the Commissions work would be conducted with the
transparency and integrity that Executive Order 106 promises. Sleight Aff., Exhibit D. The Commission
responded in its letter to Harris Beach, dated November 6, 2013, that it is not obliged to adopt procedure to
govern the exercise of its powers. Sleight Aff., Exhibit E.
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
25/38
269638 2145547v4 -17-
relevancy before a person can be compelled to turn over the subpoenaed materials) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). In issuing a subpoena, [i]t is simply not enough that the
proponent merely hopes or suspects that relevant information will develop. Future Tech.
Assocs. v. Special Commr of Investigation for N.Y.C. Sch. Dist., 115054/2010, 2011 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 1352, *13 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County March 17, 2011). Simply put, New York courts will
not permit a non-judicial subpoena power to be used for the proverbial fishing expedition to
ascertain the existence of evidence. Brodsky v. N.Y. Yankees, 26 Misc. 3d 874, 887 (Sup. Ct.
Albany County 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Yet a fishing expedition is exactly what the Commission seeks, given it issued the
Subpoena in the absence ofany evidence of wrongdoing by Harris Beach, whether in connection
with its association with Senator Nozzolio or otherwise. The sole basis upon which the
Commission relies is an unfounded inference drawn from Senator Nozzolios failure to accede to
the Commissions letter of August 27, 2013. In a September 20, 2013 statement on behalf of the
Commission, Commission Spokesperson Duffy declared: The New York State Legislature has
refused to turn over the information requested by the Moreland Commission revealing their
outside clients. As the old adage goes, if youve done nothing wrong, you have nothing to
hide. Such an empty factual basis does not entitle the Subpoena to judicial enforcement.38
See
Naples v. Whelan, 100 A.D.2d 743, 744 (4th Dept 1984),aff'd, 63 N.Y.2d 891 (1984) (granting
motion to quash office subpoena where respondent showed no more than a barren basis that
38 Both the Commissions August 27, 2013 letter to legislators and the Subpoena are each conspicuously void of
any rationale or factual predicate for the underlying investigation. The August 27, 2013 letter states that
legislators are permitted to earn outside income in addition to their legislative activities, and adds, without
citation to any case or authority, that [m]any of the issues that arise concerning public ethics involve the
confluence of public and private activity. SeeSleight Aff., Exhibit A. In fact, the Subpoena provides even less
explanation, stating only that the Commission believes the requested materials are relevant to its investigation,
and directing the recipient to paragraph II of Exec. Order No. 106 for a general statement of the subject of the
investigation. SeeSubpoena, at 1.
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
26/38
269638 2145547v4 -18-
could not justify enforcement of the subpoena); N.Y.C. Dep't of Investigation v. Passannante,
148 A.D.2d 101, 105 (1st Dept 1989) (quashing non-judicial investigatory subpoena where the
only detail offered as a factual basis was an assertion that the investigation was based on the
receipt of various and specific allegations, unidentified as to source or content).
Here, the Commission does not, and cannot, make the requisite factual showing that
would justify the issuance of this Subpoena. Neither the Subpoena, Exec. Order No. 106, nor the
statements by the Commissioners has ever described reports or allegations of political corruption
or wrongdoing by or on behalf of Harris Beach in connection with its association with Senator
Nozzolio. Highly-publicized and totally unrelated corruption charges involving other elected
officials prompted Governor Cuomo to propose his ethics legislation. When those efforts failed,
he formed the Commission.39
There is, however, no evidence or factual predicate that any of
those incidents involved behavior by a law firm, nor is there any link at all between such conduct
and either Senator Nozzolio or Harris Beach. See Nicholson, 67 A.D.2d 649 (quashing subpoena
requesting virtually all documents related to a judicial campaign where the alleged basis for the
inquiry was one complaint by a fundraiser).
B. The Admission That the Subpoena is Part of a Criminal Investigation
Subjects the Subpoena to a Heightened Evidentiary Threshold That the
Commission Cannot Satisfy.
Not only is the Commission unable to satisfy the requisite showing of relevancy and
materiality needed to enforce a civil investigatory subpoena, it is wholly unable to satisfy the
heightened showing necessary for a subpoena related to a criminal investigation. If this
39 See, e.g., Yancey Roy, Skelos: No witch hunt, Newsday (July 2, 2013), at A34 (Cuomo said the [Moreland
Commissions] inquiry is needed to restore trust in government after a string of indictments and convictions of
state legislators.). The Governor has also reinforced the fact that the majority of the Commissioners are
prosecutors. E.g., Glenn Bain and Kenneth Lovett, Cuomo Believes Anti-Corruption Commission Can Force
Politicians to Give Details on Outside Incomes, New York Daily News (Sept. 24, 2013),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/cuomo-commission-details-pols-incomes-article-1.1465539 (They
are prosecutors. When they say they have other avenues [to obtain the requisite information], it means they
have other avenues. . . . ).
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
27/38
269638 2145547v4 -19-
Subpoena and the others issued by the Commission are indeed part of a criminal investigation, as
Commission Co-Chairperson Fitzpatrick, the sitting District Attorney for Onondaga County,
described in a recent interview,40
a stronger showing from the Commission is required. See
Harlem Teams, 122 Misc. 2d at 1075-77 (where materials sought are in preparation for or in aid
of a criminal prosecution, the issuer must make a stronger requisite showing to defeat a motion
to quash). [W]here the purpose of the subpoena is not investigatory, but rather to obtain
evidence for use against a person the authorities already believe guilty of criminal activity, courts
must apply a heightened standard, closer or equal to probable cause. Id.at 1073.
Accordingly, to the extent that the Subpoena is more than a preliminary civil
investigation but is actually part of a criminal inquiry, the Commission cannot meet its
heightened standard of factual background, materiality and relevance required to be enforceable.
See Harlem Teams, 122 Misc. 2d at 1082 (quashing office subpoena probing criminality because
it could not satisfy the heightened requirement); Temp. State Comm'n on Living Costs & Econ. v.
Bergman, 80 Misc. 2d 448, 453-54 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975) (same).
Simply put, the Commission served the far-reaching and intrusive Subpoena on Harris
Beach solely because of the firms association with Senator Nozzolio. This Court should
accordingly quash the Subpoena.
C. The Information Demanded of Harris Beach Is Too Far-Reaching and Bears
Little to No Relevance to the Commissions Purported Purpose.
Not only is the Subpoena part of an improper fishing expedition, but its broad demands
bear little or no relevance to the Commissions purported purpose. To be valid, a strong factual
predicate must underlie the Subpoena. Myerson, 33 N.Y.2d at 258 (the showing of factual basis
40 When asked about the Commissions subpoenas in a radio interview on October 22, 2013, Fitzpatrick stated:
. . . I m a little reluctant to talk about subpoenas because this isand its hardpartially a criminal
investigation.
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
28/38
269638 2145547v4 -20-
that must be made is related to the breadth of the inquiry and the extent of the investigation
preceding the subpoena.) (citations omitted). New York courts require that that (1) the factual
basis is sufficient in light of the breadth of the subpoena; and (2) the material sought is relevant
and necessary to the investigating bodys purported purpose. See, e.g.,id. at 256-57;Naples, 100
A.D.2d at 744 (granting motion to quash office subpoena where respondent failed to establish a
sufficient factual basis and demonstrate that the material sought is relevant or material).
For example, Request No. 1 seeks, for a period of nearly four years, Documents and
Communications41
relating to Senator Nozzolios professional servicesi.e., every document
and communication that Harris Beach has relating to its association with Senator Nozzolio
during that period. Given this breadth, most (if not all) of the responsive documents and
communications will be mundane business-related documents and communications, neither
relevant nor material to the Commissions investigation into public corruption. In short, the
Subpoena is too far reaching and constitute[s] an improper fishing expedition on the
Commissions part. 2961 Realty Corp. v. Temp. Comm'n of Investigation of State of N.Y., 115
Misc. 2d 768, 772 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982) (refusing to enforce subpoenas request of
corporate minutes, tax returns and financial statements, on the grounds that the requested
material was too far-reaching and not relevant to investigation into alleged arson for profit
scheme); In re Office of Attorney Gen. of State of N.Y., 269 A.D.2d 1, 12-13 (1st Dept 2000)
(quashing subpoena issued by Attorney General where the materials sought were irrelevant to a
legitimate subject of inquiry).
The Subpoena goes well beyond the Senator Nozzolios professional service. It also
demands Documents and Communications sufficient to show any relationship, contact, business,
41 The Subpoena defines Documents and Communications in the broadest sense of the term[s]. See infra
Section II.B.
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
29/38
269638 2145547v4 -21-
funding, litigation, lobbying or other contacts with State entities, agencies, committees and
contacts that either Harris Beach, its members, and its clients may have had, even if such
contacts and/or activity were wholly unrelated to the members affiliation with the firm, or the
clients retention of an attorney at the firm.42
Moreover, any such contacts or relationships,
neither of which the Subpoena defines, may include interactions or communications with low-
level government employees who lack any discretion or authority that could render the contacts
attenuated relationship to the firm or Senator Nozzolio relevant or material in the
Commissions investigation of public corruption. Accord, Horn Constr. Co. v. Fraiman, 34
A.D.2d 131, 133-34 (1st Dept 1970), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 559 (1971) (quashing subpoena upon an
insufficient showing of necessity, materiality or relevance, where subpoena sought all records of
payments made on any and all jobs of construction company during a one-year period, regardless
of whether the records pertained to the job contract at issue).
Where an agency seeks to use its subpoena power in an attenuated manner, such that it
could subpoena anyone, or any agency that receives money from a private entity that receives
some money from the [government]as the Commission purports to do herea much greater
showing of a factual basis and relevancy is required. See Passannante, 148 A.D.2d at 105
(quashing non-judicial investigatory subpoena because much more was required by the agency to
warrant judicial enforcement of the broad-reaching subpoena; for under the agencys rationale, it
could subpoena not only the obvious entities receiving money from the City . . . but literally
thousands of health facilities, and child care agencies, who in turn do business with private
entities)
42 Request Nos. 2-3;see also infra, Section II.B.
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
30/38
269638 2145547v4 -22-
The Subpoena is not just far reaching, it is invasive. For example, Request No. 1(f)
demands building access records (electronic or otherwise) for Senator Nozzolio, sign-in sheets
for Senator Nozzolio, or Documents reflecting other means by which Senator Nozzolio gains
access to Harris Beachs premises. There is no plausible factual basis to assert that, solely
because it has an affiliation with a state legislator, a private law firms building sign-in sheets
and access are relevant to an inquiry into public corruption. And yet, recent remarks by
Commission Co-Chair William Fitzpatrick indicate the Commissions rationale for this request is
a suspicion that legislators with outside law practices are getting paid not for their legal services,
but rather, for some corrupt activity: [W]e simply want to know what you do f or these
retainers these massive, were not talking about $5,000 retainers like someone would get for a
small criminal case. Were talking about 6-figure retainers from people that as far as we know,
never go to court. And we would like to know fromth ose who ar e honest legislator s, wh o h ave
trial firms, what do you do to earn it. Putting aside a number of sheer absurdities in Co-
Chairman Fitzpatricks statementtrial firms being but onethe utter lack of relevance of
what time Senator Nozzolio might enter and exit Harris Beachs office underscores the baseless
nature of the Subpoena, and precisely why it must be quashed.
III. THE SUBPOENA MUST BE QUASHED BECAUSE IT NOT ONLY DEMANDS
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL, BUT IT IS OVERLY
BROAD, VAGUE, UNDULY BURDENSOME AND OPPRESSIVE.
Under New York law, a person or entity subject to a non-judicial subpoena may
challenge it in on multiple grounds, including: it seeks privileged or confidential material, or
irrelevant or immaterial documents; or it is overly broad, unduly burdensome or oppressive. See,
e.g., Lerner v. Lerner, 90 A.D.2d 452, 454 (1st Dept 1982); Myerson, 33 N.Y.2d at 257; Horn
Constr. Co., 34 A.D.2d at 133-34; Reuters Ltd. v. Dow Jones Telerate, Inc., 231 A.D.2d 337,
344-45 (1st Dept 1997).
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
31/38
269638 2145547v4 -23-
A. The Subpoena Demands Disclosure of Confidential, Privileged and
Proprietary Information.
The Subpoena should be quashed because it improperly demands highly confidential
material that in most instances will likely be protected by the attorney-client and other privileges.
Production by Harris Beach would violate ethical obligations to preserve client confidences,
privileged communications and work-product.
As the First Department has acknowledged, a lawyers ethical obligation to maintain the
confidences and secrets of clients and former clients is broader than the attorney-client privilege,
and exists without regard to the nature or source of the information or the fact that others share in
the knowledge. E.g.,Wise v. Consolidated Energy Co. of N.Y., 282 A.D.2d 335, 335 (1st Dept
2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Pavillion Agency, Inc. v. Spitzer, 9
Misc. 3d 626, 633-34 (Sup Ct. New York County 2005) (holding that even though subpoenas
issued by Attorney General to worker referral service as part of investigation of discrimination
within domestic worker placement industry were enforceable, Attorney General was not entitled
to disclosure of information which might reveal the identities of services clientele). InPavillion
Agency, the court held that to allow disclosure of the services clientele would open the
floodgates with respect to issues of client confidentiality and potential harassment and would
effectively promote government interference with the most personal kind of employment
relationships . . . . Pavillion Agency, Inc., 9 Misc. 3d at 633.
Rule 1.6 of New Yorks Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits lawyers from knowingly
revealing confidential information absent client consent. Rule 1.6 defines confidential
information as information gained during or relating to the representation of a client that: (a) is
protected by the attorney-client privilege; (b) is likely to be embarrassing or detrimental to the
client if disclosed; or (c) that the client has requested be kept confidential. Further, the Public
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
32/38
269638 2145547v4 -24-
Integrity Reform Act specifically exempts licensed professionals, including attorneys, from
disclosing the names of their clients. N.Y. Pub. Off. Law 73-a(8)(b)(v).
Here, many of the documents sought by the Subpoena are likely confidential
information within the meaning of Rule 1.6. For example:
Request No. 1 seeks Documents and Communications relating to professional servicesprovided by Senator Nozzolio, and the Subpoena expressly defines Communicationand Document in the broadest sense of the term[s]. In this respect, the Commission
demands every e-mail, document, oral communication or discussion, whether recorded or
not, between Senator Nozzolio and his clients, as well as all work product created for and
in the course of Senator Nozzolios legal representation of his clients. Much of thismaterial is likely privileged or confidential material. See, e.g., Cunningham & Kaming,
P.C. v. Nadjari, 53 A.D.2d 520, 520 (1st Dept 1976) (noting that a subpoena calling for
production of records of a law firm . . . pose[s] a threat to confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship).
Request No. 1(c) seeks invoices, billable hour reports and timesheets, many of whichdescribe specific tasks undertaken in the course of legal representation. Under New York
law, time records and billing statements that detail the services provided, conversations,
and conferences between counsel and others, thus revealing legal work that has beendone and/or trial strategy, are protected by the attorney-client privilege. DiBella v.
Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 120 (2d Cir. 2005).
Request No. 1(e) seeks material regarding Senator Nozzolios clients, including a generaldescription of the services provided to them. Request No. 3(b) seeks Documents and
Communications showing clients that have engaged Harris Beach in requests for funding,
lobbying activity, proposed, draft or enacted legislation, or any other legislative orpolitical activity. However, New York ethics rules instruct attorneys not to disclose the
identity of a client or the fact of retention if it could be embarrassing or detrimental to the
client, or where the client specifically requested such information be withheld. SeeN.Y.Eth. Op. 645, 1993 WL 560284 (May 3, 1993). For example, the fact that a client has
consulted a criminal defense lawyer or a divorce lawyer should be kept secret if it is
embarrassing or detrimental. Id.
Accordingly, complying with the Subpoena would require Harris Beach and its members
to breach its ethical obligation of confidentialityexactly what Rule 1.6 seeks to prevent. See
Pavillion Agency, Inc., 9 Misc. 3d at 633. For this reason, the Subpoena should be quashed. See,
e.g., Lerner, 90 A.D.2d at 452 (quashing portion of information subpoena served on counsel on
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
33/38
269638 2145547v4 -25-
basis of attorney-client privilege because what services [were] rendered or [will] be rendered by
counsel . . . exceeds the bounds on the scope of disclosure).43
Of course, the Commissions attempt to force attorney-legislators to breach their ethical
obligations is in contravention of the Commissions stated purpose of ensuring that New Yorks
government is meeting the highest ethical and legal standards.44
Forcing Harris Beach and
other firms to breach their duties of confidentiality is incompatible with such goals, particularly
where no one client or firm is the target of the Commissions investigation. See Straus v.
Ambinder, 61 A.D.3d 672 (2d Dept 2009) (affirming grant of protective order where
subpoenaed documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege); Mahoney v. Staffa, 184
A.D.2d 886, 887 (3d Dept 1992) (quashing subpoena with respect to certain material because
letters exchanged between Commission and attorneys were protected by the attorney-client
privilege and not subject to disclosure). Rather, the Commissions investigation, like the
Subpoena itself, is nothing but a fishing expeditionindeed one that impermissibly casts a
proverbial wide net into protected waters.
B. The Subpoena is Overbroad, Vague and Unduly Burdensome.
Subpoenas that are overbroad and unduly burdensome are unenforceable. White Bay
Enters. v. Newsday, Inc., 288 A.D.2d 211, 212 (2d Dept 2001) (quashing subpoenas that were
overly broad and unduly burdensome). Even if the Commission had the authority to issue the
Subpoenaand it does nota finding of statutory authority does not mean it has unlimited
43 At a minimum, any such material would have to be subject to a courts in camera inspection prior to
production. See Cunningham & Kaming v. Nadjari, 53 A.D.2d 520, 521-22 (1st Dept 1976) (upon motion to
quash subpoena, requiring that trial court inspect in camera materials regarding claims of privilege to avoid a
breach of confidentiality); Myerson v. Colonial Commercial Corp., 40 A.D.2d 972 (1st Dept 1972) (affirming
order to comply with subpoena, as modified, and reserving decision on issue of confidentiality, in that the
subpoena requested material protected by the attorney-client privilege, for trial courts examination of the
material).44 Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Creates Special Commission to Investigate Corrupt Elected Officials, New York
Times (July 2, 2013), at A22.
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
34/38
269638 2145547v4 -26-
power to issue subpoenas and obtain voluminous business records. Brodsky, 26 Misc. 3d at
885, 891 (quashing overly broad subpoena issued by state legislative committee). Rather, [t]he
power to issue a subpoena compelling document production comes with the obligation to tailor
any document requests with specificity so that the recipient can reasonably ascertain what
documents to produce. Id. at 888. But here, the Commission has neglected this important
mandate to narrowly tailor its requests, resulting in an unenforceable Subpoena that is overly
broad, vague, and unduly burdensome.
First, the definitions in the Subpoena are so broad that when combined with other defined
terms, they create requests so far-reaching that compliance would be onerous and all-consuming.
For example, the Subpoena expressly defines Communication in the broadest sense of the
term, including conversations, discussions and other transmittal of information or message,
whether transmitted in writing, orally, electronically or by any other means.45
As such, the
Subpoena includes information transmitted by oral communications, which may never have been
previously recorded. Further, Harris Beach is defined as more than just a professional limited
liability company or attorneys presently employed by Harris Beach: rather, the Subpoena
defines Harris Beach to include any of its representatives, agents, affiliates, present or former
parents, subsidiaries, related entities, directors, officers, contractors, its respective predecessors
or successors or any of the affiliates of the foregoing.46
By combining these two definitions in
Request Nos. 2 and 4, the Subpoena purports to require the production of never transcribed oral
communications between or among persons no longer in Harris Beachs employment, and about
which Harris Beach may never have had any knowledge.
45 Subpoena A(2).46 Subpoena A(1).
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
35/38
269638 2145547v4 -27-
Second, the Subpoena is overly broad and vague in that it combines these broad
definitions into laundry-list requests that contain other confusing and undefined terms. For
example, the Subpoena seeks Documents and Communications relating to monies, benefits, or
campaign contributions from Harris Beach, its members, or close relatives of its members, or any
political organization or committee associated with Harris Beach, to New York state elected
officials, political candidates, political entities, political campaigns, political action committees,
political party organizations, or political clubs47
These requests are overly broad, vague and
ambiguous, given that the terms benefits, close relatives and political organization or
committee associated with Harris Beach are left undefined.
Third, the Subpoena is unduly burdensome in that seeks this vast amount of information
regardless any given relationship, activity or contribution may be wholly unrelated to Harris
Beach or undertaken in a personal capacity.48
Such minute particularization sought by the
Commission is completely unnecessary and bears little to no relation to the Commissions
purported purposes. See Fahy v. Comm'n to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption &
Citys Anticorruption Procedures, 65 Misc. 2d 781, 785-86 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971), aff'd,
36 A.D.2d 802 (1st Dept 1971) (finding schedule A of the non-judicial subpoena to be
particularly oppressive, unnecessarily burdensome and, in several instances, totally irrelevant
where subpoena sought minute particularization about police officers personal and family
expenditures.) Indeed, as the court inFahyconcluded when it came to an examination of police
officers household expenses in an investigation into police corruption, while a large laundry
47 Request No. 4,id. at C(4) (emphasis added).48 For example, while Request No. 2 seeks material showing any relationship, business, funding, litigation or
contacts, on H arri s Beach s behalf , with the State, Requests No. 3(a) and 4 do not have the same limitation:
Request No. 3(a) seeks material about any relationships, business, funding, litigation or contacts that clients
have with the State (including in a personal capacity), and Request No. 4 seeks material related to campaign
contributions and benefits from Harris Beach, its members, and close relatives of its members have made
(including in a personal capacity) to political campaigns and elected officials. See Subpoena C(2), (3)(a),
(4).
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
36/38
269638 2145547v4 -28-
bill might be indicative of an aversion toward home laundering or of a penchant for cleanliness,
it would have no bearing on whether corruption exists. Id.
Fourth, the Subpoena is unduly burdensome because Senator Nozzolio has already
complied with his legal obligation to disclose certain information, and the Commission has no
factual basis to show that the materials requested are relevant to its investigation. In 2011, the
State Legislature enacted the Public Integrity Reform Act, which significantly expanded
legislators financial disclosure obligations, including disclosure of outside employment and
income. See N.Y. Pub. Off. Law Section 73-a.49 In particular, that Act requires disclosure of
certain clients of the legislator or his outside employers who have conducted business with,
received grants or contracts from, or were involved in proceedings before the State.50 However,
and particularly relevant here, the law specifically exempts licensed professionals, including
attorneys, from disclosing the names of their clients.51 The legislators must file their annual
statements of financial interest with the Joint Commission on Public Ethics, which then makes
the annual statements publicly available online.52 As described by the Governors press office,
the law establish[ed] unprecedented transparency . . . . and a strong independent monitor with
broad oversight of New York State Government.53 Senator Nozzolio submitted his 2012 annual
statement of financial disclosure by the May 15, 2013 deadline. He is in full compliance with his
49 Governors Press Office, Governor Cuomo Signs Ethics Reform Legislation (Aug. 15, 2011),http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/08152011EthicsReformLegislation.
50 The services rendered by the legislator must be in direct connection with the clients business with, contract orgrant from, or proceeding before the State, and the legislator must have received over $10,000 in fees for suchservices. N.Y. Pub. Off. Law 73-a(3).
51 Id.52 Governors Press Office, Governor Cuomo Signs Ethics Reform Legislation (Aug. 15, 2011),
http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/08152011EthicsReformLegislation.53 Id.
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
37/38
269638 2145547v4 -29-
disclosure obligations under existing law.54
Enforcement of the Subpoena will impose undue
burden by requiring Senator Nozzolio to disclose vast amounts of additional material, when he
has already fulfilled his legal and ethical disclosure obligations under the law.
C. The Subpoena Is Oppressive.
The Subpoena should be quashed because it is plainly oppressive. The law encourages
clients to communicate openly with their attorneys on the assurance those communications will
remain protected.55
Notwithstanding this, the Subpoena seeks to compel Harris Beach to breach
that duty of confidentiality, not just with regard to one specific client, but to many clients. In this
respect, the Subpoena brings with it a real risk of disturbing the relationship between Harris
Beach and its clients, and putting [Harris Beach] at a competitive disadvantage. Reuters, 231
A.D.2d at 344-45.
Given the lack of relevance of the documents requested to the perceived, the voluminous
material that would need to be produced under the Subpoenas excessively broad scope, and the
threats by the Commission and the Governor when the legislators proposed a more targeted
production of information, it is clear that this Subpoena is, and was intended to be, an oppressive
and punitive investigative tool designed to interfere with the state legislators outside
employment by placing their employers in an untenable position. See Reuters, 231 A.D.2d at
344-45 (quashing non-judicial subpoena on the grounds that it was patently overbroad,
burdensome, and oppressive and could harm the business of the recipient).
54 As the State Senate and Assembly noted in a joint letter to the Commission on September 20, 2013, the
legislators annual statements of financial disclosure are publicly available on JCOPEs website. See
http://www.jcope.ny.gov/elected%20officials/fdselectedofficials.html.55
See, e.g., Comment 2 to Rule 1.6 of New York Rules of Professional Conduct (the purpose for confidentiality is
to encourage clients to communicate fully and frankly with a lawyer, even to embarrassing or legally
damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively.)
8/13/2019 186374798 Memo of Law Re QuashProtective Order HBROC 2152980 v1
38/38
* * *
For the reasons described above, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court quash the
Subpoena in its entirety, and issue a protective order confirming that Harris Beach need not
respond to it.
Dated Pittsford, New York
November 21, 2013
HARRIS BEACH PLLC
By:/s/Karl J. SleightKarl J. Sleight
Philip G. Spellane
James P. Nonkes
Allison A. Bosworth99 Garnsey Road
Pittsford, New York 14534
Telephone: (585) 419-8800Fax: (585) 419-8811