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Introduction

In terms of near-universal participation by sovereign States, the high degree of observance among States partiesand the influence it has had on the international legal order, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations mayclaim to be the most successful of the instruments drawn up under the United Nations framework for codification andprogressive development of international law. Its success is due not only to the excellence of the preparatory work bythe International Law Commission and the negotiating skills of State representatives at the Conference, but also to

the long stability of the basic rules of diplomatic law and to the effectiveness of reciprocity as a sanction against non-compliance.

Historical Context

Among all peoples who wished to engage with each other on a basis other than that of conquest and subjugation, itwas practice from the earliest times that the person of the envoy or intermediary between them was sacrosanct. Untilit was accepted originally as a matter of religious scruple that the herald or emissary could pass safely in order tonegotiate terms of truce or agreements to settle quarrels, there could be no peaceful international relations or rules onquestions of substance. The personal inviolability accorded to envoys, for example among the ancient Greek cities andamong the states of ancient India, became of less importance with the rise of the Roman Empire and later ofByzantium both of these intent on subjugation rather than co-existence. Diplomacy in the modern sense revivedwith the Renaissance and during the sixteenth century a period of violent religious strife the special protectionand immunity from criminal jurisdiction even for ambassadors suspected of conspiracy against the sovereign to

whom they were accredited became established in practice among sovereign rulers. By the time of the Congress ofWestphalia in 1648, permanent legations were accepted as the normal way of conducting international businessamong sovereign States, and over the next century detailed rules emerged in relation to the immunity of ambassadorsand their accompanying families and staff from civil as well as criminal proceedings, the inviolability of their embassypremises and their exemption from customs duties and from taxes. These rules of customary international law weredescribed in detail by early writers such as Grotius (1625), Bynkershoek (1721) and Vattel (1758).

The first international instrument to codify any aspect of diplomatic law was the Regulation adopted by theCongress of Vienna in 1815 which simplified the complex rules on the classes of heads of diplomatic missions and laiddown that precedence among heads of missions should be determined by date of arrival at post. Until thenprecedence which guaranteed direct access to the receiving sovereign as well as ceremonial honours had causednumerous and bitter disputes. Codification among States of immunities and privileges of diplomatic agents did notbegin until the Havana Convention of 1928 drawn up among the States of the Pan-American Union but this did notwell reflect current practice either in its terminology or its rules. More influential was the Draft Convention drawn upin 1932 by the Harvard Research in International Law.

The establishment within the United Nations framework of the International Law Commission opened the way tocomprehensive codification to confirm what were accepted as well-established if not universally respected rules ofinternational law. There remained areas on which State practice was divergent in particular the privileges andimmunities of junior staff, the position of a diplomat who was a national of the host State and the extent of exceptionsto the immunity from jurisdiction of a diplomat so that any convention would contain an element of progressivedevelopment as well as codification of the law.

Negotiating History

The preparatory work for the Vienna Conference followed the standard United Nations procedure for thecodification of international law applied in fields where there is already extensive State practice, precedent anddoctrine. In 1952, Yugoslavia proposed that the topic should be given priority, and after discussion in the Sixth (Legal)Committee, the General Assembly requested the International Law Commission to undertake as a priority topiccodification of the law of diplomatic intercourse and immunities. The Commission appointed Mr. Sandstrm ofSweden as Special Rapporteur and his report formed the basis for the draft articles adopted by the Commission in1957. These articles were debated in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and sent to all members of theUnited Nations or any of its specialized agencies with an invitation to submit comments. Comments from 21Governments were taken into account by the Commission who in 1958 prepared revised and extended articles andrecommended that they should form the basis for a Convention a decision endorsed by the General Assembly.Eighty-one States took part in the Conference held at Vienna from 2 March to 14 April 1961 and the Convention wassigned on 18 April.

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The success of the Conference and of the Convention which it drew up may be ascribed first to the fact that thecentral rules regulating diplomatic relations had been stable for over 200 years. Although the methods of setting upembassies and communicating with them had radically changed, their basic functions of representing the sendingState and protecting its interests and those of its nationals, negotiation with the receiving State, observing andreporting on conditions and developments there remained and still remain unaltered. Secondly, because theestablishment of diplomatic relations and of permanent missions takes place by mutual consent, every State is both asending and receiving State. Its own representatives abroad are in a sense hostages who may on a basis of reciprocity

suffer if it violates the rules of diplomatic immunity, or may be penalized even for minor restrictions regardingprivileges or protocol. There was at the 1961 Vienna Conference no general underlying conflict of interest betweenopposing groups of States.

The exception to this symmetry of interests lies in the matter of communications between the embassy and itssending State and this was apparent at the Vienna Conference where probably the most controversial issue waswhether sending States were entitled as of right to install and use a wireless transmitter. Although the right of freecommunication between the sending State and its missions abroad was long established in terms of the inviolability ofcouriers and the diplomatic despatches which they carried so that any interference was covert and denied ifdiscovered in 1961 only those States with advanced technological resources operated transmitters. Other Statesexpressed concern that these transmitters might be used for broadcasting local propaganda, and that because theywere situated in inviolable premises beyond the control of the receiving State they might lead to breaches of theInternational Telecommunication Convention. An amendment which would have expressly required not only theconsent of the receiving State for a wireless transmitter but also proper arrangements for its use in accordance withthe laws of the receiving State and international regulations was adopted by the Committee of the Whole Conference

against the wishes of all major States. In plenary session, however, a compromise was reached, and the above wordswithin quotes which might have implied a right of inspection for the receiving State were withdrawn.

This example illustrates the readiness of the delegates to the 1961 Vienna Conference to seek compromisesolutions which would make the final Convention text acceptable to the Governments and national parliaments whowould later decide on ratification rather than to press home the advantage of numbers. A similarly constructiveapproach was also shown over the controversial matter of the diplomatic bag. Under previous customary practice itwas permissible for a receiving State suspecting that a diplomatic bag contained material other than permitted officialdocuments and equipment to challenge the courier upon which the sending State could either return the suspectbag unopened or submit it to inspection supervised by the authorities of both States. There was prolongedcontroversy in the International Law Commission as to whether this possibility should be retained, but ultimately itwas decided that although there was a duty on the sending State to use the bag only for diplomatic documents orarticles for official use, the bag could not be opened or detained under any circumstances. Despite numerousamendments and arguments in the Conference, this was the rule ultimately adopted in article 27.

A third question where previous State practice was inconsistent was the extent of immunities and privilegesaccorded to the administrative and technical staff of a mission junior employees without diplomatic rank such assecretaries, translators and senior security staff. In some States these had been given the same immunities andprivileges as diplomats while in others their immunity was limited to their official acts. The International LawCommission, after much argument, proposed that they should be given full diplomatic immunities and privileges andsome States at the Conference supported this approach, while others expressed concern in particular at possibleabuse of full customs privileges. The Conference limited exemption from customs duties for junior staff to articlesimported on first arrival at post and later after it seemed that there might be a total failure to agree on the immunityto be given to administrative and technical staff accepted a United Kingdom compromise under which they wouldenjoy full immunity from criminal proceedings, but would not enjoy immunity from civil and administrativeproceedings for acts performed outside the course of their duties. They can therefore be sued in respect of a roadtraffic accident occurring while they are off duty or for other matters unrelated to their work for the mission.

Key Provisions

The Vienna Convention provides a complete framework for the establishment, maintenance and termination ofdiplomatic relations on a basis of consent between independent sovereign States. It specifies the functions ofdiplomatic missions, the formal rules regulating appointments, declarations ofpersona non grata of a diplomat whohas in some way given offence, and precedence among heads of mission. It sets out the special rules privileges andimmunities which enable diplomatic missions to act without fear of coercion or harassment through enforcement oflocal laws and to communicate securely with their sending Governments. It makes provision for withdrawal of amission which may take place on grounds of economy or physical security and for breach of diplomatic relationswhich may occur in response to abuse of immunity or severe deterioration in relations between sending and receiving

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States. In either of these cases or where permanent missions have not been established a framework is providedfor the interests of each sending State to be protected in the receiving State by a third State.

Article 22 confirms the inviolability of mission premises barring any right of entry by law enforcement officers ofthe receiving State and imposing on the receiving State a special duty to protect the premises against intrusion,damage, disturbance of the peace or infringement of dignity. Even in response to abuse of this inviolability oremergency, the premises may not be entered without the consent of the head of mission. Article 24 ensures the

inviolability of mission archives and documents even outside mission premises so that the receiving State may notseize or inspect them or permit their use in legal proceedings.

Article 27 guarantees free communication between a mission and its sending State by all appropriate means, andensures that the diplomatic bag carrying such communications may not be opened or detained even on suspicion ofabuse. Given the purposes of diplomatic missions, secure communication for information and instructions is probablythe most essential of all immunities.

Article 29 provides inviolability for the person of diplomats and article 31 establishes their immunity from civiland criminal jurisdiction with precise exceptions to immunity from civil jurisdiction where previous State practicehad varied. Immunity from jurisdiction like other immunities and privileges may be waived by the sending State,and article 32 specifies the rules on waiver. Article 34 sets out the tax exemption accorded to diplomats along withdetailed exceptions in respect of matters unrelated to their official duties or to ordinary life in the receiving State.Article 36 provides for exemption from customs duties on diplomatic imports throughout a diplomats posting.

Articles 37 sets out a complex code for the treatment of families and junior staff where as pointed out aboveprevious practice was varied and negotiation of a compromise difficult. Article 38 bars from all privileges andimmunities, except for immunity for their official acts, nationals and permanent residents of the receiving State.These two provisions in many States drastically reduced the numbers of those persons more likely to bring intodisrepute the system of privileges and immunities and were fully in accordance with the basic justification appliedthroughout the Convention of limiting immunities to what is essential to ensure the efficient performance of thefunctions of diplomatic missions as representing States.

Influence of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

The Convention has established itself as a cornerstone of modern international relations. Despite the need forimplementing national legislation in a number of States, it came into force following 22 ratifications only three yearsfrom its adoption and almost all States in the world are now parties. The rgime it sets out for the conduct of

diplomatic relations has become remarkably uniform as reservations made by ratifying States on a few points whichhad been controversial during the negotiations have in many cases been withdrawn or simply never applied. TheConvention has proved resilient to attack on its fundamental principles. This came during the 1980s from thosealarmed at the opportunities it provided for abuse as demonstrated in particular when following the murder of apolicewoman by shooting from the premises of the Libyan diplomatic mission in London the United Kingdom brokediplomatic relations and all those within the mission left England under the shield of immunity. More recently attackshave come from scholars concerned at the conflict between immunity and the human right of access to justice, or atimmunity for violators of international criminal law and in particular torturers. But in practice there has beenremarkably little erosion of the immunities of diplomats as it has been widely accepted that the Convention rules limitimmunities to what is essential for the functioning of diplomacy.

The focus of public concern has instead shifted to the vulnerability of diplomats to terrorist attacks. These mighttake the form of kidnapping diplomats with demands for ransom or release of prisoners a serious problem in the1970s until brought somewhat under control by collective determination by Governments that taking all appropriatemeasures to protect diplomats did not mean capitulating to blackmail. Alternatively terrorism might involvebesieging or bombing embassies most horrifically the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Forthe most part, parties to the Convention are in no way complicit in these attacks and have done their best to provideprotection sometimes helped by wealthier sending States. The striking exception was the detention for over a yearof the hostages in the United States Embassy in Tehran with the acquiescence of the relatively new revolutionaryGovernment of Iran. The United States brought proceedings against Iran before the International Court of Justicebasing itself mostly on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations including the Optional Protocol on theSettlement of Disputes to which both States were parties. Iran did not make serious efforts to justify its conduct inlegal terms before the Court and the Courts Judgment in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehrancase (I.C.J. Reports, 1980) contains important analysis of many of the principles in the Convention and greatlyassisted the United States in retaining the support of the international community and securing eventual release

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brokered by Algeria of the hostages. More recently, the International Court upheld a counter-claim by Uganda inthe Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)(I.C.J. Reports 2005) that Congolese soldiers had occupied the Ugandan diplomatic mission in Kinshasa and violatedarticle 29 of the Convention by threatening and maltreating staff on the premises.

In national courts there have been hundreds of cases where the Vienna Convention has been applied, since manyof its most frequently invoked provisions concern whether a national court may assume jurisdiction over civil or

criminal proceedings and what evidence may be admissible in national proceedings. Most of these cases concernambiguities in the text on such questions as the true meaning of the exceptions to immunity from civil jurisdiction,the construction of the term permanent resident, the protection of an embassys bank account from enforcementproceedings, or the balance to be struck between protecting the dignity of embassy premises and permitting effectiveexercise of human rights to demonstrate and to speak freely. Unlike the cases described in the previous paragraph,they did not involve fundamental breaches of the Convention.

The Convention has also been extensively drawn on by later treaties regulating immunities and privileges. Itsprovisions were used as a starting point in drawing up the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the1969 New York Convention on Special Missions in the latter case with unfortunate results in that insufficientaccount was taken of the differences between permanent missions and most special missions so that the Conventionhas attracted only limited support. It is used as a point of reference for determining the treatment to be accorded tothe premises, archives and senior officers of a substantial number of international organizations. Sometimes it is usedon a similar basis for agreements with the host State regulating the status of military forces or civilian missionsdespatched either by international organizations or by States providing military or civilian assistance. The 2004United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property contains references to itsprovisions, since in the nature of things the rules on state immunity and on diplomatic immunity, though different intheir origins and justification, are closely intertwined. As for the treatment given to heads of State, heads ofGovernment and foreign ministers in their personal capacity though practice is somewhat varied it is acceptedthat the rules in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations form a guide and perhaps a minimum standard.

Distributive bargaining is the approach to bargaining or negotiation that is used when the partiesare trying to divide something up--distribute something. It contrasts with integrative bargainingin which the parties are trying to make more of something. This is most commonly explained in

terms of a pie. Disputants can work together to make the pie bigger, so there is enough for both

of them to have as much as they want, or they can focus on cutting the pie up, trying to get asmuch as they can for themselves. In general, integrative bargaining tends to be more

cooperative, and distributive bargaining more competitive. Common tactics include trying to

gain an advantage by insisting on negotiating on one's own home ground; having more

negotiators than the other side, using tricks and deception to try to get the other side to concedemore than you concede; making threats or issuing ultimatums; generally trying to force the other

side to give in by overpowering them or outsmarting them, not by discussing the problem as an

equal (as is done in integrative bargaining). The goal in distributive bargaining is not to assureboth sides win, but rather that one side (your side) wins as much as it can, which generally means

that the other side will lose, or at least get less than it had wanted. (Distributive bargaining tactics

rarely assume the pie will divided in half.)

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Often these approaches to negotiation are framed as incompatible. Fisher, Ury, and Patton,

authors of the negotiation best-sellerGetting to Yessay that integrative bargaining is superior todistributive bargaining in most, if not all, circumstances--even in situations in which something

is to be divided up. By cooperating and focusing on interests rather than positions, they argue

that the pie can almost always be enlarged or some other way can be found to provide gains for

all sides. Other theorists suggest this is naive--that distributive situations requiring competitiveor hard bargaining often occur.

Conflict theorists Lax and Sebenius have suggested that most negotiation actually involves both

integrative and distributive bargaining which they refer to as "creating value" and "claiming

value." Negotiators should do as much as they can to "create value;" once the pie is as big asthey can make it, they should claim as much of the value they can for themselves. Knowing

which approach to take when is what they refer to as the "negotiators dilemma."

Counter-terrorism (also spelled counterterrorism) is the practices,tactics, techniques, andstrategies thatgovernments,militaries,police departmentsandcorporationsadopt to prevent or

in response to terrorist threats and/or acts, both real and imputed.

The tactic ofterrorism(used byterrorists) is available toinsurgentsand governments. Not all

insurgents useterroras a tactic, and some choose not to use it because other tactics work betterfor them in a particular context. Individuals, such asTimothy McVeigh, may also engage in

terrorist acts such as theOklahoma City bombing.

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If the terrorism is part of a broader insurgency, counter-terrorism may also form a part of a

counter-insurgencydoctrine, but political, economic, and other measures may focus more on theinsurgency than the specific acts of terror.Foreign internal defense(FID) is a term used by

several countries[citation needed] for programs either to suppress insurgency, or reduce the conditions

under which insurgency could develop.

Anti-terrorism versus counter-terrorism

Further information:Detentions following the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack

The concept ofanti-terrorism emerges from a thorough examining of the concept ofterrorismas well as an attempt to understand and articulatewhat constitutes terrorisminWesternterms. In

military contexts, terrorism is a tactic, not an ideology. Terrorism may be a tactic in a war

betweennation-states, in acivil war, or in aninsurgency.

Counter-terrorism refers to offensive strategies intended to prevent a belligerent, in a broader

conflict, from successfully using the tactic of terrorism. TheUS militarydefinition, compatiblewith the definitions used by NATOand many other militaries, is "Operations that include theoffensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism."[1]In other words,

counter-terrorism is a set of techniques for denying an opponent the use of terrorism-based

tactics, just as counter-air is a set of techniques for denying the opponent the use of attackaircraft.

Anti-terrorism is defensive, intended to reduce the chance of an attack using terrorist tactics atspecific points, or to reduce the vulnerability of possible targets to such tactics. "Defensive

measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include

limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces."[1]

United States Customs and Border Protectionofficers, fully armed and armored for a counter-

terrorism operation

To continue the analogy between air and terrorist capability, offensive anti-air missions attack

the airfields of the opponent, while defensive anti-air uses anti-aircraft missiles to protect a pointon one's own territory. The ongoingIsraeli-Palestinian conflict,[2]Sri Lankan Civil War,[3]and

Colombian Civil War[4]

are examples of conflicts where terrorism is present, along with other

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tactics, so that participants use counter- and anti-terrorism to limit the opponent's use of terror

tactics. Units engaged in counter-terrorism include the US Navy Seals and Delta Force.

[edit] Planning for, detecting and neutralizing potential

terrorist actsBuilding a counter-terrorism plan involves all segments of a society or many government

agencies. In dealing with foreign terrorists, the lead responsibility is usually at the national level.

Becausepropagandaandindoctrinationlie at the core of terrorism, understanding their profile

and functions increases the ability to counter terrorism more effectively.

See the series of articles beginning withintelligence cycle management, and, in particular,

intelligence analysis.HUMINTpresents techniques of describing the social networks that makeup terrorist groups. Also relevant are themotivations of the individual terroristand thestructure

of cell systemsused by recent non-national terrorist groups.

Most counter-terrorism strategies involve an increase in standard police and domestic

intelligence. The central activities are traditional:interception of communications, and the

tracing of persons. New technology has, however, expanded the range ofmilitaryandlawenforcementoperations.

Domestic intelligence is often directed at specific groups, defined on the basis of origin orreligion, which is a source of political controversy.Mass surveillanceof an entire population

raises objections oncivil libertiesgrounds.homegrown terrorists, especiallylone wolvesare

often harder to detect because of their citizenship or legal alien status and better ability to stayunder the radar.

To select the effective action when terrorism appears to be more of an isolated event, theappropriate government organizations need to understand the source, motivation, methods of

preparation, and tactics of terrorist groups. Good intelligence is at the heart of such preparation,

as well as political and social understanding of any grievances that might be solved. Ideally, onegets information from inside the group, a very difficult challenge forHUMINTbecause

operational terrorist cellsare often small, with all members known to one another, perhaps even

related.[5]

Counterintelligenceis a great challenge with the security of cell-based systems, since the ideal,

but nearly impossible, goal is to obtain aclandestine sourcewithin the cell. Financial tracking

can play a role, as cancommunications intercept, but both of these approaches need to bebalanced against legitimate expectations of privacy.

[edit] Legal contexts

Main article:Anti-terrorism legislation

In response to the growing legislation.

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United Kingdomo TheUnited Kingdomhas had anti-terrorism legislation in place for more than thirty

years. ThePrevention of Violence Act 1939was brought in response to an Irish

Republican Army (IRA) campaign of violence under theS-Plan. This act had been

allowed to expire in 1953 and was repealed in 1973 to be replaced by thePrevention of

Terrorism Actsa response tothe TroublesinNorthern Ireland. From 1974 to 1989 thetemporary provisions of the act were renewed annually.

o In 2000 the Acts were replaced with the more permanentTerrorism Act 2000, whichcontained many of their powers, and then thePrevention of Terrorism Act 2005.

o TheAnti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001was formally introduced into theParliament November 19, 2001 two months after theSeptember 11, 2001 attacksin

America. It received royal assent and went into force on December 13, 2001. OnDecember 16, 2004 the Law Lords ruled that Part 4 was incompatible with the European

Convention on Human Rights, but under the terms of theHuman Rights Act 1998it

remained in force. ThePrevention of Terrorism Act 2005was drafted to answer the Law

Lords ruling and theTerrorism Act 2006creates new offences related to terrorism, and

amends existing ones. The Act was drafted in the aftermath of the7 July 2005 Londonbombings, and like its predecessors some of its terms have proven to be highly

controversial.

United Stateso U.S. legal issues surrounding this issue include rulings on the domestic employment of

Deadly forceby law enforcement organizations.

o Search and seizure is governed by theFourth Amendment to the United StatesConstitution.

o The US passed theUSA PATRIOT Actafter the 9/11 attacks, as well as a range of otherlegislation andexecutive orders.

o TheDepartment of Homeland Securitywas established to consolidate domestic securityagencies to coordinate anti-terrorism, as well as national response to major natural

disasters and accidents.

o ThePosse Comitatus Actlimits domestic employment of theUnited States Army,requiring Presidential approval prior to deploying the Army.Pentagonpolicy also

applies this limitation to theUnited States Marine Corps,United States Navy, andUnited

States Air Force. TheDepartment of Defensecan be employed domestically onPresidential order, as was done during theLos Angeles riots of 1992,Hurricane Katrina

and theBeltway Sniperincidents.

o External or international use of lethal force would require aPresidential finding. Australia

o Australia has passed several anti-terrorism acts. In 2004, a bill comprising three actsAnti-terrorism Act, 2004, (No 2) and (No 3)was passed. Then Attorney-General,PhilipRuddock, introduced theAnti-terrorism bill, 2004 on March 31. He described it as "a billto strengthen Australia's counter-terrorismlaws in a number of respects a task made

more urgent following the recent tragicterrorist bombings in Spain." He said thatAustralia's counter-terrorism laws "require review and, where necessary, updating if we

are to have a legal framework capable of safeguarding all Australians from the scourge

of terrorism." TheAustralian Anti-Terrorism Act 2005supplemented the powers of the

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earlier acts. The Australian legislation allows police to detain suspects for up to two

weeks without charge and to electronically track suspects for up to a year. The AustralianAnti-Terrorism Act of 2005included a "shoot-to-kill" clause. In a country with

entrenchedliberal democratictraditions, the measures are controversial and have been

criticized bycivil libertariansandIslamicgroups.

Israelo On December 14, 2006 theIsraeli Supreme Courtruledtargeted killingswere a

permitted form of self defense.[6]

[edit] Terrorism and human rights

One of the primary difficulties of implementing effective counter-terrorist measures is thewaning of civil liberties and individual privacy that such measures often entail, both for citizens

of, and for those detained by states attempting to combat terror. At times, measures designed to

tighten security have been seen asabuses of poweror even violations ofhuman rights.

Examples of these problems can include prolonged, incommunicado detention without judicialreview; risk of subjecting to torture during the transfer, return and extradition of people between

or within countries; and the adoption of security measures that restrain the rights or freedoms ofcitizens and breach principles of non-discrimination.[7]Examples include:

In November 2003Malaysiapassed new counter-terrorism laws that were widely criticizedby localhuman rightsgroups for being vague and overbroad. Critics claim that the laws put

the basic rights of free expression, association, and assembly at risk. Malaysia persisted inholding around 100 alleged militants without trial, including five Malaysian students

detained for alleged terrorist activity while studying in Karachi, Pakistan.[7]

In November 2003 a Canadian-Syrian national, Maher Arar, alleged publicly that he hadbeen tortured in a Syrian prison after being handed over to the Syrian authorities by U.S.

[7]

In December 2003 Colombia's congress approved legislation that would give the military the

power to arrest, tap telephones and carry out searches without warrants or any previous

judicial order.[7]

Images of unpopular treatment of detainees in US custody in Iraq and other locations haveencouraged international scrutiny of US operations in the war on terror.[8]

Hundreds of foreign nationals remain in prolonged indefinite detention without charge ortrial in Guantnamo Bay, despite international and US constitutional standards some groupsbelieve outlaw such practices.[8]

Hundreds of people suspected of connections with theTalibanor al Qa'eda remain in long-term detention in Pakistan or in US-controlled centers in Afghanistan.

[8]

China has used the "war on terror" to justify its policies in the predominantly MuslimXinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region to stifle Uighur identity.[8]

In Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Yemen and other countries, scores of people have beenarrested and arbitrarily detained in connection with suspected terrorist acts or links toopposition armed groups.[8]

Until 2005 eleven men remained in high security detention in the UK under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.

[8]

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Many would argue that such violations exacerbate rather than counter the terrorist threat.[7]

Human rights advocates argue for the crucial role ofhuman rightsprotection as an intrinsic partto fight against terrorism.[8]This suggests, as proponents ofhuman securityhave long argued,

that respectinghuman rightsmay indeed help us to incur security.Amnesty International

included a section on confronting terrorism in the recommendations in the Madrid Agenda

arising from the Madrid Summit on Democracy and Terrorism (Madrid 8

11 March 2005):

"Democratic principles and values are essential tools in the fight against terrorism. Anysuccessful strategy for dealing with terrorism requires terrorists to be isolated.

Consequently, the preference must be to treat terrorism as criminal acts to be handled

through existing systems of law enforcement and with full respect forhuman rightsandthe rule of law. We recommend: (1) taking effective measures to make impunity

impossible either for acts of terrorism or for the abuse ofhuman rightsin counter-

terrorism measures. (2) the incorporation ofhuman rightslaws in all anti-terrorism

programmes and policies of national governments as well as international bodies."[8]

While international efforts to combat terrorism have focused on the need to enhancecooperation between states, proponents of human rights (as well ashuman security) havesuggested that more effort needs to be given to the effective inclusion ofhuman rights

protection as a crucial element in that cooperation. They argue that internationalhuman

rightsobligations do not stop at borders and a failure to respecthuman rightsin one statemay undermine its effectiveness in the international effort to cooperate to combat

terrorism.[7]

[edit] Preemptive neutralization

Some countries see preemptive attacks as a legitimate strategy. This includes capturing,

killing, or disabling suspected terrorists before they can mount an attack.Israel, theUnitedKingdom, theUnited States, andRussiahave taken this approach, while Western European

states generally do not.

Another major method of preemptive neutralization isinterrogationof known or suspected

terrorists to obtain information about specific plots, targets, the identity of other terrorists,

whether or not the interrogation subjects himself is guilty of terrorist involvement.Sometimes more extreme methods are used to increasesuggestibility, such assleep

deprivationor drugs. Such methods may lead captives to offer false information in an

attempt to stop the treatment, or due to the confusion brought on by it. These methods are not

tolerated by European powers. In 1978 theEuropean Court of Human Rightsruled in the

Ireland v. United Kingdomcase thatsuch methodsamounted to a practice of inhuman anddegrading treatment, and that such practices were in breach of theEuropean Convention on

Human RightsArticle 3 (art. 3).

[edit] Non-military preventive actions

Thehuman securityparadigm outlines a non-military approach which aims to address the

enduring underlying inequalities which fuel terrorist activity. Causal factors need to be

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delineated and measures implemented which allow equal access to resources and

sustainabilityfor all people. Such activities empower citizens providing 'freedom from fear'and 'freedom from want'.

This can take many forms including the provision of clean drinking water, education,

vaccination programs, provision of food and shelter and protection from violence, military orotherwise. Successful human security campaigns have been characterized by the

participation of a diverse group of actors including governments,NGOs, and citizens.

Foreign internal defenseprograms provide outside expert assistance to a threatened

government. FID can involve both non-military and military aspects of counter-terrorism.

Another preventative action that has been used is the threat of and use of pork and pork

products against radical religious groups that feel that contact with pork will render themunclean. The bodies of killed terrorists are daubed with lard and buried wrapped in pigskin .[9]

[edit] Military intervention

Terrorism has often been used to justify military intervention in countries like Pakistan andIran where terrorists are said to be based. That was the main stated justification for the U.S.

invasion of Afghanistan. It was also a stated justification for thesecond Russian invasion of

Chechnya.

History has shown that military intervention has rarely been successful in stopping or

preventing terrorism.[dubiousdiscuss] Although military action can disrupt a terrorist group's

operations temporarily, it rarely ends the threat.[10]

Thus repression by the military in itself (particularly if it is not accompanied by othermeasures) usually leads to short term victories, but tend to be unsuccessful in the long run(e.g. theFrench's doctrine described inRoger Trinquier's bookModern War

[11]used in

IndochinaandAlgeria). However, new methods (see the new Counterinsurgency Field

Manual[12]

) such as those taken inIraqhave yet to be seen as beneficial or ineffectual.

[edit] Mathematical Modeling of the Interaction Between

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism and Its Policy

Implications

Mathematical modeling is currently being used to manage security policy. Specifically,scholars and practitioners of security studies are tackling the new challenge of managing

terrorism. This technology can only be used if correct predictions are made. Models are

being built to test predictions of situations that have never happened before throughempirically validated theories. This allows the world to adapt at a quicker rate while being

managed successfully. An essay in the September/October 2008 issue of Complexity[13]

explains such a modeling system looking at terrorism, counter-terrorism and their effects.

The most general policy conclusions drawn from the models are: the counter-terrorism forces

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should close off the borders of any terrorist crossings; keep initial terrorist strength small and

counter-terrorist effectiveness high; have large initial counter-terrorist forces; avoid anyincentives for bandwagoning or growing sympathy for the terrorists. To keep the sympathy

factor small, policy should withhold the general public of information regarding the

terrorists success or activities. The activities of terrorists and counter-terrorists take place

within the general public from which members are recruited. As terrorist and counter-terrorist activity increases, so will the need for recruitment. The models created have not yet

discovered the implications of recruitment and therefore are only useful for situations in

which terrorism and counter-terrorism is kept small.

[edit] Planning for response to terrorism

Police, fire, and emergency medical response organizations have obvious roles. Local

firefightersand emergency medical personnel (often called "first responders") have plans for

mitigating the effects of terrorist attacks, although police may deal with threats of such

attacks.

[edit] Target-hardening

Whatever the target of terrorists, there are multiple ways of hardening the targets to prevent

the terrorists from hitting their mark, or reducing the damage of attacks. One method is to

placeJersey barrieror other sturdy obstacles outside tall or politically sensitive buildings toprevent car andtruck bombing.

Aircraft cockpits are kept locked during flights, and have reinforced doors, which only thepilots in the cabin are capable of opening.Englishtrain stationsremoved theirgarbage cans

in response to theProvisional IRAthreat, as convenient locations for depositing bombs.

Scottishstations removed theirs after the7th of July bombingof London as a precautionary

measure. TheMassachusetts Bay Transportation Authoritypurchased bomb-resistant barriers

after theSeptember 11 terrorist attacks.

A more sophisticated target-hardening approach must consider industrial and other critical

industrial infrastructure that could be attacked. Terrorists need not import chemical weaponsif they can cause a major industrial accident such as theBhopal disasteror theHalifax

explosion. Industrial chemicals in manufacturing, shipping, and storage need greater

protection, and some efforts are in progress.[14]

To put this risk into perspective, the first

major lethal chemical attack in WWIused 160 tons of chlorine. Industrial shipments of

chlorine, widely used in water purification and the chemical industry, travel in 90 or 55 tontank cars.

To give one more example, the North American electrical grid has already demonstrated, in

theNortheast Blackout of 2003, its vulnerability to natural disasters coupled with inadequate,

possibly insecure,SCADA(supervisory control and data acquisition) networks. Part of thevulnerability is due to deregulation leading to much more interconnection in a grid designed

for only occasional power-selling between utilities. A very few terrorists, attacking key

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power facilities when one or more engineers have infiltrated the power control centers, could

wreak havoc.

Equipping likely targets with containers (i.e., bags) of pig lard has been utilized to

discourage attacks by Islamist suicide bombers. The technique was apparently used on a

limited scale by British authorities in the 1940s.

[15]

The approach stems from the idea thatMuslims perpetrating the attack would not want to be "soiled" by the lard in the moment

prior to dying. The idea has been suggested more recently as a deterrent to suicide bombingsin Israel.[16]However, the actual effectiveness of this tactic is probably limited as it is

possible that a sympathetic Islamic scholar could issue afatwaproclaiming that a suicide

bomber would not be polluted by the swine products.

[edit] Command and control

In North America and other continents, for a threatened or completed terrorist attack, theIncident Command System(ICS) is apt to be invoked to control the various services that

may need to be involved in the response. ICS has varied levels of escalation, such as mightbe needed for multiple incidents in a given area (e.g.,the 2005 bombings in Londonor the

2004 Madrid train bombings, or all the way to aNational Response Planinvocation ifnational-level resources are needed. National response, for example, might be needed for a

nuclear, biological, radiological, or large chemical attack.

[edit] Damage mitigation

Fire departments, perhaps supplemented by public works agencies, utility providers (e.g.,gas, water, electricity), and heavy construction contractors, are most apt to deal with the

physical consequences of an attack.

[edit] Local security

Again under an incident command model, localpolicecan isolate the incident area, reducing

confusion, and specialized police units can conduct tactical operations against terrorists,often usingspecialized counter-terrorist tactical units. Bringing in such units will normally

involve civil or military authority beyond the local level.

[edit] Medical services

Emergency medical services will bring the more seriously affected victims to hospitals,

which will need to have mass casualty andtriageplans in place.

Public health agencies, from local to national level, may be designated to deal with

identification, and sometimes mitigation, of possible biological attacks, and sometimeschemical or radiologic contamination.

[edit] Counter-terrorism tactical units