163_nepal_s_faltering_peace_process.pdf

7/27/2019 163_nepal_s_faltering_peace_process.pdf

1/45

NEPALS FALTERING PEACE PROCESS

Asia Report N163 19 February 2009


2/45

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................i

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................1

II. CONSENSUS OR CONFLICT? ......................................................................................2

A. WHATS LEFT OF THE PEACE PROCESS?.......................................................................................2B. THE MAOIST-LED GOVERNMENT: IN OFFICE BUT NOT IN POWER? ..............................................3

C. OLDNEPAL:ALIVE AND WELL....................................................................................................5

D. THE RISKS OF FAILURE ................................................................................................................6

III.PEACE PARTNERS AT ODDS.......................................................................................8

A. THE MAOISTS:BRINGING ON THE REVOLUTION?.........................................................................8

B. UNCERTAIN COALITION PARTNERS..............................................................................................9

C. THE OPPOSITION:REINVIGORATED,BUT FOR WHAT? ................................................................11

1. The Nepali Congress................................................................................................................. 11

2. The smaller parties .................................................................................................................... 12

3. A broader democratic alliance? ............................................................................................. 12

IV.THE TWO ARMIES .......................................................................................................13

A. THE INTEGRATION IMPASSE.......................................................................................................13

1. What the agreements say........................................................................................................... 13

2. The Nepalese Army position..................................................................................................... 14

3. The PLA position...................................................................................................................... 15

4. Other parties.............................................................................................................................. 16

B.NEWNEPAL,NEW ARMY?.........................................................................................................17

1. Affordability.............................................................................................................................. 18

2. Democratic control.................................................................................................................... 19

3. Accountability........................................................................................................................... 21

4. Impunity.................................................................................................................................... 22V. THE IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES .................................................................................23

A. REBUILDING THE PEACE PROCESS .............................................................................................23

1. Consensus and confidence ........................................................................................................ 23

2. A fresh start? ............................................................................................................................. 23

3. Mechanisms and monitoring..................................................................................................... 24

B. GETTING A GRIP ON GOVERNANCE ............................................................................................26

1. Policy priorities......................................................................................................................... 26

2. Public security........................................................................................................................... 26

3. Guiding international assistance ............................................................................................... 27

C. CONSTITUTION-WRITING ...........................................................................................................28

D. JUSTICE .....................................................................................................................................30

VI.CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................31


3/45

APPENDICES

A.MAP OFNEPAL ..........................................................................................................................32B. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS .........................................................................................................33C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ..............................................................................34D.CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2006...................................................35E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ..........................................................................................37


4/45



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite successful elections and a lasting militaryceasefire, Nepals peace process is facing its most se-vere tests yet. Major issues remain unresolved: thereis no agreement on the future of the two armies, verylittle of the land seized during the conflict has beenreturned, and little progress has been made writing anew constitution. Challenges to the basic architectureof the 2006 peace deal are growing from all sides.

Key political players, particularly the governing Mao-ists and the opposition Nepali Congress (NC), need torebuild consensus on the way forward or face a publicbacklash. International supporters of Nepal must tar-get assistance and political pressure to encourage theparties to face the threats to peace.

The April 2008 Constituent Assembly (CA) electionsdelivered a convincing victory for the Maoists but leftthem short of an outright majority. The major partiespromised to continue working together but the NC,which came second, refused to join the governmentthat was eventually installed in August 2008. For all

its weaknesses, this government is Nepals best hopebut it is not living up to its promise and there are noviable alternatives. There can be no functional gov-ernment without the Maoists on board, let alone anyhope of proceeding with a constitution-writing proc-ess in which they can wield a blocking vote.

Yet the Maoists have not fully adjusted to democraticpolitics, nor has mainstream politics adjusted to theirarrival. There is little unity of effort or intent amongthe governing coalition partners. Opponents of theMaoists talk up the prospects of a government col-lapse. Conservative wings of both the NC and the

moderate Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marx-ist-Leninist), the largest coalition partner, have beenreinvigorated. In the face of continued instability,armed protest and burgeoning identity-based move-ments, the immediate threat to Nepal is not Maoisttotalitarianism but a dangerous weakening of thestates authority and capacity to govern.

Maoist commitment to political pluralism is stillhighly questionable. Debate within the party re-named the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Mao-

ist), UCPN(M), following its merger with a smallergroup shows the goal of a communist peoples re-public is still in place. Although leading the govern-ment, Maoist leaders continue to threaten renewedrevolutionary struggle and the capture of statepower. Such threats have been underlined by cadrescontinued violent behaviour and an apparent drive toconsolidate alternative power bases through affiliated

organisations like trade unions.

However, the essence of the peace process, from theNovember 2005 agreement between the CPN(M) andthe mainstream seven-party alliance onwards, was adouble transformation. The Maoists were to renounceviolence and accept multiparty democracy and inter-national human rights norms. The mainstream partieswere to develop more inclusive and democratic inter-nal structures and renounce the bad behaviour thathad weakened the post-1990 exercise of democracy.The old politics was discredited and still faces thechallenge of renewing itself with the established

parties needing to earn legitimacy.

The Maoists have made a greater effort to changethan other parties but their democratic transformationis far from complete. They should take the lead to re-build confidence by unambiguously renouncing vio-lence and reaffirming their commitment to politicalpluralism. The Nepali Congress is in a state of organ-isational and political disarray. The Maoists coalitionpartners also face internal power struggles and toughpolicy decisions. In short, the democratic alternativesto the Maoists are alarmingly weak: the other partiessuffer from exclusiveness and weakened support and

offer no fresh options to complete the peace process.

The state of public security and law and order is wor-rying. Although the incidents that draw most attention killings, explosions and shutdowns have all de-creased since peaks in the first half of 2008, there islittle sense of stability. Districts across the Tarai, fromthe eastern and central heartland of the Madhesimovement to the far west, continue to be plagued byinsecurity and, in many areas, a near collapse of gov-ernance and policing. While the police are demoral-


5/45

Nepals Faltering Peace Process

Crisis Group Asia Report N163, 19 February 2009 Page ii

ised, the Nepalese Army (NA) remains a law unto it-self, resisting both democratic control and investiga-tion of alleged war crimes during the conflict.

International actors, India, the UN and Nepals long-standing donors, have played important roles in pro-moting peace and now need to maintain consistent

pressure on all parties to live up to their commit-ments. Allowing parts of the peace agreements to driftinto abeyance will put the entire process at risk. Thecommon struggle against the monarchy was not thesole foundation for the original negotiations, nor werethe initial talks based solely on parties self-interest.The search for peace was a powerful, and popularlybacked, rationale. All sides knew that the deal de-ferred some important, difficult topics but they wereright in opting to tackle them within a peace process,however contentious, rather than allowing the pursuitof a perfect deal to threaten a return to war. Despitesignificant political differences, this spirit of consen-

sus underpinned a remarkable peaceful transition.Nepals political leaders must urgently rebuild thiscollaborative spirit and recommit themselves to see-ing through the process.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To All Political Actors Party to the Peace and

Constitutional Processes:

1. Reestablish a basic consensus on completing thepeace process and set up the necessary mecha-

nisms, for example by:a) forming an appropriate political coordination

mechanism, such as an inter-party committeeor high-level commission, to set priorities, re-solve disputes and keep the process on track;

b) establishing an independent monitoring body,with nationwide presence, convening capacityand neutral but respected leadership, to observeand report on all parties adherence to theirpeace commitments and provide impartial, fac-tual updates on shortcomings;

c) seriously considering the possible benefits ofinternational technical and/or secretarial sup-port to such a body; and

d) ensuring the newly constituted Army Integra-tion Special Committee (AISC) promptly startssubstantive discussions on integration and re-habilitation of Maoist army combatants.

2. Ensure the constitutional process moves forward by:a) adhering to the promises of consensus and co-

operation set out in all agreements from No-

vember 2005 until the June 2008 multipartycommitment;

b) recognising the primacy of fulfilling promisesmade to the Nepali people as a whole by mak-ing a fresh public commitment to this effect;

c) promptly activating the CA committees andensuring they seek public input in their areas ofcompetence and maintain transparency in theirdiscussions; and

d) making every effort to adhere to the foreshort-ened timetable but avoiding the temptation tomeet deadlines by short-circuiting meaningfuldebate.

To the Government of Nepal:

3. Focus on peace process implementation by:a) setting up the commissions and committees

specified in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement(CPA) with as broad participation as feasible;

b) ensuring decision-making bodies have capa-ble, senior representation and are adequatelyempowered, and administratively supported, tofulfil their mandates; and

c) even if independent monitoring mechanismsare established, using government systems toreport regularly to the cabinet on progress orproblems.

4. Set clear peace process and development priori-ties by:

a) clarifying and restating, with the support of allcoalition members, the key goals of the gov-ernments September 2008 statement of poli-cies and programs;

b) shaping the agenda for donor support by de-veloping clear requests for bilateral and multi-lateral assistance, and making the most oftechnical assistance; and

c) improving public communications, framingrealistic timetables to manage expectations andbuilding public confidence in the peace process

by highlighting success stories.

5. Deliver tangible improvements in the weak lawand order situation, by:

a) supporting the work of the home ministryspublic security task force and seriously consid-ering its recommendations, if appropriate request-ing international support to implement them;


6/45


Crisis Group Asia Report N163, 19 February 2009 Page iii

b) cracking down through non-lethal methods onillegal disruptive protests, while guaranteeingthe basic right to strike and peaceful protest;

c) keeping major roads and other infrastructuresecure and well patrolled, as well as providingmore intensive, community-oriented policingin unstable areas; and

d) strictly controlling the illegal activities of partyyouth wings, in particular their unlawful effortsto fulfil parallel policing functions.

6. Do not use the stability of the peace process as anexcuse for ignoring pressing calls for justice, by:

a) ending the culture of impunity by pursuing in-vestigations and prosecutions of all serious al-leged crimes;

b) empowering police to resist pressure to refuseto file cases or drop investigations and take ac-

tion against individuals and institutions seekingto pervert the course of justice;

c) bringing draft bills on disappearances and thetruth and reconciliation commission into lawonly after consulting victims, experts and thegeneral public, meeting international standardsand subjecting legislation to parliamentary ap-proval rather than using ordinances to bypassdebate;

d) requesting appropriate international technicalassistance for investigations; and

e) responding substantively to the UN Office ofthe High Commissioner for Human Rights re-ports on serious and systematic human rightsabuses during the conflict, by pursuing criminalinvestigations and prosecutions of those namedas allegedly responsible for repeated, gravebreaches of international humanitarian law.

7. Improve the management of state security forces, by:a) bringing the NA under meaningful democratic

control, including establishing parliamentaryoversight, fully auditing expenditure and de-veloping the constitutionally mandated workplan for democratisation of the army;

b) making the recently constituted National De-fence Council functional, providing it with se-cretariat support and using it as a forum to feedprofessional expertise into the political deci-sion-making process;

c) building the functions and capacity of the de-fence ministry and embarking, if appropriate,with international support, on the joint adminis-trative training of military and civilian officers;

d) ending the obstruction by both state and non-state security forces, in particular the NA, Peo-ples Liberation Army (PLA) and Nepal Police,of investigations into crimes committed duringthe conflict; and

e) avoiding politicisation of promotions, transfersand operational matters, perhaps by empoweringa multi-party body such as the AISC, in the caseof the army, to scrutinise important decisions.

To the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist):

8. Start the process of restoring confidence by un-equivocally reaffirming the ceasefire and CPAconditions on ceasing all political violence andthe commitment to political pluralism, in wordand deed.

9. Fulfil the prime ministers promise to put thePeoples Liberation Army (PLA) under the con-

trol of the AISC and end the practice of PLAcommanders speaking publicly on sensitive po-litical issues.

10.Fulfil outstanding peace process commitments, inparticular:

a) demilitarising the Young Communist League(YCL) and vacating seized premises it cur-rently occupies;

b) promptly discharging under-age and otherwisedisqualified combatants from the cantonments,cooperating with the government and interna-tional agencies on rehabilitation programs;

c) respecting press freedom, human rights andpolitical pluralism;

d) returning property seized during the conflict; ande) cooperating with investigations and prosecu-

tions of alleged crimes committed during theconflict and ceasefire periods.

To the Major Established Parliamentary Parties:

11.Make efforts to win back popular legitimacy by:a) reforming party structures with serious steps

towards internal democracy and increased re-sponsiveness to popular demands;

b) taking urgent steps to improve the representa-tion of women and marginalised ethnic, casteand regional groups at all levels of party struc-tures; and

c) considering, at the individual party level orcollectively, a renewed public commitment tothe promises for changed behaviour embodied


7/45


Crisis Group Asia Report N163, 19 February 2009 Page iv

in the 2005 twelve-point agreement accompa-nied by a clear program of action.

To the International Community, in particular

India, China, the U.S., EU, UN and Donors:

12.Recognise that the peace process is fragile andincomplete and maintain a commitment to high-level political engagement, including:

a) strongly warning the government and politicalparties that relations will be damaged by anybreakdown in the peace process or failure tocontrol political violence and underliningstrong international expectations of consensusand cooperation;

b) calling for a public and definitive Maoist re-nunciation of violence;

c) pressuring all parties to adhere to the CPA andother agreements and to have debates withinthat framework; and

d) urging investigations into the worst allegedconflict abuses and offering technical supportas appropriate.

13.Recognise that completing the peace and constitutionalprocesses is an essential basis for all developmentprograms and target assistance appropriately, by:

a) developing programs to buttress public confi-dence in the peace process, for example by en-couraging the government to focus on creatingjobs and opportunities for youth;

b) maintaining a strong emphasis on humanrights, political pluralism and conflict resolu-tion at the heart of all policies, including devel-opment aid and military cooperation; and

c) supporting the governments Nepal Peace TrustFund, with appropriate emphasis on transparentaccounting and fiduciary risk but without ear-marking, as well as the UN Peace Fund.

14.Recognise that delay in reforming the securitysector compromises all development by drainingresources and undermining political progress, by:

a) pushing for concrete, step-by-step progress onbuilding democratic control of the security sector;

b)

providing technical assistance, as requested, toparliamentary oversight mechanisms as well asthe ministry of defence; and

c) pressing the Nepalese Army to accept civilianoversight and assist in training and capacitybuilding of civilian and military officers.

Kathmandu/Brussels, 19 February 2009


8/45



I. INTRODUCTIONNepals peace process has made remarkable progressbut now faces its most severe obstacles.1Although theroadmap set out in the November 2006 Comprehen-sive Peace Agreement (CPA) was disrupted by dis-agreements between the major parties and externalchallenges such as the Madhesi movement, the Con-stituent Assembly (CA) elections were held success-fully in April 2008. The transition to a republic waspeaceful and the unprecedented diversity of the newCA raised hopes of more inclusive politics. The elec-tion of a president and, in August 2008, the formationof a Maoist-led government were both delayed bywrangling but nevertheless took place.2 These stepswere helped by a June agreement between the majorparties, although few of its provisions have been im-plemented.3

1On the process so far see past Crisis Group reporting: onthe CA election, Crisis Group Asia Report N149, Nepals

Election and Beyond 2 April 2008 and the companion post-election Asia Reports N155, Nepals Election: A Peaceful

Revolution?and N156,Nepals New Political Landscape, 3July 2008; on the various peace agreements: Crisis Group AsiaReport N106,Nepals New Alliance: The Mainstream Par-ties and the Maoists, 28 November 2005; Asia Report N126,

Nepals Peace Agreement: Making it Work, 15 December2006; Asia Briefing N68, Nepals Fragile Peace Process,28 September 2007; and Asia Briefing N72, Nepal: PeacePostponed, 18 December 2007; and on the constitutionalprocess: Asia Reports N99, Towards a Lasting Peace in

Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, 15 June 2005; and N128,Nepals Constitutional Process, 26 February 2007. FullNepali translations of all reports and briefings from 2007

onwards are available at www.crisisgroup.org/nepali.2Following its 13 January 2009 merger with the Unity Cen-tre (Masal), the CPN(M) was renamed the Unified Commu-nist Party of Nepal (Maoist), UCPN(M). This report usesCPN(M) for the pre-unification and UCPN(M) for thepost-unification parties.3The constitutional revisions proposed in the agreementwere implemented with the 15 July 2008 fifth amendment tothe interim constitution but most other promises remain un-fulfilled. Agreement between the political parties to amendthe Constitution and take forward the peace process, 25June 2008, unofficial English translation at www.un.org.np.

The new government passed an ambitious budget,made positive steps in international relations and re-stored some order in the administration not least byholding regular cabinet meetings and improving deci-sion-making. The CA carried out some of its legisla-tive duties and also agreed its constitution-writingprocedures, including setting a detailed timetable forcompletion of the new constitution and establishingthematic drafting committees. The presidency hasbeen a quiet success story. With no direct precedentsto guide his behaviour, President Ram Baran Yadav

has deftly avoided controversy and remained abovethe political fray, while also issuing public remindersof the need for all to work together in the national in-terest. The Public Service Commission has been re-constituted and there are signs that parties are close toconsensus on creating local peace committees and lo-cal government bodies.4

The new government, however, has faced problemswith its dual responsibilities as an executive and asguardian of the constitution-writing exercise. The dif-ficult global economic context does not help: it islikely to squeeze overseas employment, reduce the

remittances on which Nepal has come to depend andslow economic growth.

This report focuses on political developments that aremostly taking place in Kathmandu. There is a ten-dency for reporting on Nepal to focus on elite devel-opments in the capital while ignoring key issueshappening elsewhere, particularly in the Tarai flat-lands in the south. However the peace process has be-come an elite, Kathmandu-centred issue; indeed thatis one of its major flaws. Past Crisis Group reportshave examined issues in the Tarai and elsewhere andwill return to those subjects.

4Minister Ram Chandra Jha vowed that local bodies wouldtake shape by mid-February. The parties have agreed to allo-cate leadership on the basis of the CA proportional represen-tation vote, which would put the UCPN(M) in charge of 23districts, the Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party ofNepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (UML) sixteen each, theMadhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) five and the Tarai MadhesDemocratic Party (TMDP), Rashtriya Prajatantra Party(RPP) and CPN (Marxist-Leninist) two each.


9/45


Crisis Group Asia Report N163, 19 February 2009 Page 2

II. CONSENSUS OR CONFLICT?A. WHATS LEFT OF THE PEACE PROCESS?The fundamental weaknesses of the political settle-ment have now been exposed. The consensus underly-ing the twelve-point agreement and CPA was basedmore on a temporary convergence of interests than ona deeply shared vision for reshaping Nepal. In thepost-peoples movement period almost no attentionwas paid to confidence-building between the parties.The ever more insistent voices from outside theseven-party/Maoist fold were only listened to whenprotests or violence got them attention.

Deferring decisions on critical areas such as the armyand police enabled the elections to go ahead but hasallowed the most serious disagreements to fester andpositions to drift further apart. The election results madethe rebuilding of a common minimum understandingall the more difficult. For supporters of the status quo,the Maoist victory was initially indigestible and lat-terly unacceptable. As the losing parties have encour-aged each other to view the outcome as illegitimate,the public mandate for change has been devalued andthe political equations underlying the writing of theconstitution have been called into question.5

Decision-making remains narrowly based, exclusiveand non-transparent. The verdict of voters has had onlya slight significance in a political culture where estab-lished leaders feel unchastened by electoral defeat. Sofar, there have only been nods towards public consul-tation and participation in the constitutional process,although the establishment of CA subcommittees to

5The major observer organisations, national and interna-tional, have published their full reports on the elections.Some of them add considerable detail on pre-election clashesand campaign irregularities and all refer to the backgroundintimidation that coloured the election atmosphere. However,none suggests that these factors undermine the electionscredibility. One of the principal national organisations con-cluded that the Nepali people exercised their franchise in a

joyous, festive and peaceful manner and in overwhelmingnumbers. As a result, except for some minor incidences, noone seriously challenged either the total outcome of the elec-tion or the manner in which it was conducted.[we] con-cluded, on the basis of observations and reports receivedfrom its regional and district chapters, that those incidents[of reported violence, intimidation, unequal access to themedia and code of conduct infractions] did not severely af-fect the outcome of elections. Nepal Constituent AssemblyElection 2008: Comprehensive Report, National ElectionObservation Committee (NEOC), Kathmandu, August 2008,executive summary.

work in this area indicates some prospect for progress.The difference between reaching deals and managingtheir implementation a serious problem for thepeace process bears lessons for the constitution.6

Control over the security sector remains at the heartof the power struggle; the impasse over the question

of Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) integration andthe broader issues are discussed in detail below. Manyother aspects of the peace deal remain unresolved orunimplemented. Apart from a few exceptions, theMaoists have not fulfilled their repeated promises toreturn property seized during the conflict, nor havethey fully dismantled parallel structures.7Local gov-ernment is yet to be re-established, although cross-party consensus on creating interim bodies appearsclose. Basic governance and service delivery is patchyat best, with only six of the 75 districts having secre-taries posted in all village development committees.Most of the commissions and committees called for in

the CPA and subsequent agreements have not beencreated.8The state of law and order and public secu-rity is dangerously weak, especially in the Tarai.

6Major elements of agreements with the United DemocraticMadhesi Front (UDMF) and Federal Republican NationalFront (FRNF) have not been implemented. The eight-pointagreement with the UDMF is at www.unmin.org.np/downloads/keydocs/2008-02-28-Agreement.SPA.Govt.UDMF.NEP.pdf; an unofficial English translation is at www.unmin.org.np/downloads/keydocs/2008-02-28-Agreement.SPA.Govt.UD MF.ENG.pdf. The five-point government-FRNF agree-ment is at www.un min.org.np/downloads/keydocs/2008-03-02-Agreement. SPA. Govt.FRNF.NEP.pdf; an unofficialEnglish translation is at www.unmin.org.np/downloads/keydocs/2008-03-02-Agreement. SPA.Govt.FRNF.ENG.pdf.7In June 2008 the Maoists explicitly reconfirmed their long-standing promise to return all seized property and added atight deadline: Within 15 days, the Maoists will implementthe first point of the agreement between the eight politicalparties of 30 March 2007, which states, All property, in-cluding all private and public houses, land, offices, factoriesand vehicles, that has been controlled by the Maoists duringthe conflict [will be] returned to the concerned individualsand agencies. The administration will take legal action ifanyone obstructs and hinders the use of [such] property, in-

cluding houses, lands, factories and offices. Agreementbetween the political parties to amend the Constitution andtake forward the peace process, 25 June 2008, Art. 4. Inearly 2009 the Maoists returned property in some threedozen districts, including that belonging to other party lead-ers including former royalist prime ministers Surya BahadurThapa and Lokendra Bahadur Chand. Sampatti phirta suru,Kantipur, 3 February 2009.8The June 2008 Agreement (Art. 5) promised: During thecourse of implementing those provisions that have beenmade in [past] accords and understandings, including thoseyet to be implemented in the Comprehensive Peace Accord,


10/45



An increase in general unrest, mostly strikes andshutdowns, has severely disrupted economic activityand deterred new investment.9 This has been com-pounded by a growth in militant youth wings affili-ated to political parties.10Most of these were set up inresponse to the Maoist Young Communist League(YCL), which remains a militarised organisation.11

The release and rehabilitation of under-age and oth-erwise disqualified combatants from PLA canton-ments may soon get under way but is very belated.

Impunity is rife and extends from the heart of the stateto the activities of militant groups. There have beenmany unpunished offences in the ceasefire period.The most prominent violations include the Maoistsabduction and murder of businessman Ram HariShrestha and the killings of at least four journalists.12

a number of commissions will be formed within one month,on the basis of political understanding. These will include aNational Peace and Rehabilitation Commission, a Truth andReconciliation Commission, a High-Level Commission forRestructuring the State, a Commission to Investigate theDisappeared, a Commission to Study and Give Recommen-dations on Scientific Land Reform, and the other commis-sions as stipulated under Article 154 of the Constitution.The latter include possible commissions to safeguard andpromote the rights and interests of different sectors of thecountry including women, Dalits, indigenous ethnic groups,Madhesi, disabled, labourers or farmers although the consti-tution states that the government may rather than willform them. Interim Constitution, Art. 154.9The number of districts affected by shutdowns and thenumber of groups calling both strikes and shutdowns peakedat the start of 2008 (36 districts affected in February and sev-enteen groups involved in January), declined dramatically byOctober (four districts affected by two groups) but surgedagain in November (eighteen districts affected by ten groups).Locals, rather than any organised grouping, were respon-sible for most incidents (locals often blockade highways fol-lowing incidents such as pedestrian deaths in vehicularaccidents); the next most prolific shutdown-caller was thepre-election UDMF alliance. Nepal: Total Reports ofBandhs/Blockades in 2008, UN Office for the Coordinationof Humanitarian Affairs, Kathmandu, at www.un.org.np.10Apart from the Maoists, the UMLs Youth Force has beenthe most active. In mid November 2008, three further parties

formed new youth groups: the TMDP, RPP(N) and ChureBhawar Rastriya Ekata Party.11 On 24 January 2009 the YCL was renamed the YoungCommunist Democratic League. This report retains the widelyrecognised YCL as most references to the organisation in-clude the period before the name change.12Since 2006, four journalists, Uma Singh, J.P. Joshi, Biren-dra Sah and Pushkar Bahadur Shrestha, have been killed;Prakash Singh Thakuri has been missing since July 2007.The Federation of Nepali Journalists recorded 342 pressfreedom violations in 2008, including a significant escalationin the number of physical attacks on journalists and media

At the same time, hundreds of other killings havetaken place across the country, especially in the cen-tral and eastern Tarai, although levels have declinedsince early 2008.13The lack of any ceasefire or peaceprocess monitoring mechanism has become all themore critical, making it easy for claims of infringe-ments to be made without investigation or redress.

Criminal cases against Maoist and other politicalleaders have been dropped by executive fiat, regard-less of the seriousness of alleged offences.14 Slowsteps towards the establishment of an investigationcommission on enforced disappearances and the draft-ing of more satisfactory legislation for a truth andreconciliation commission suggest that some progresson transitional justice may be possible. There hasbeen little effort, however, to cultivate a national de-bate on appropriate measures or listen to victims voicesand address their pressing needs. Most significantly interms of impunity, the national armys apparent cul-

pability for systematic war crimes including abduc-tion, torture, rape and murder has not led to any action.

B. THE MAOIST-LED GOVERNMENT:IN OFFICE BUT NOT IN POWER?

The Maoists have had a mixed record in government.The coalition has held together and has managed thebasics of day-to-day governance. On some frontsthere have been unexpected, and largely uncelebrated,successes. Ministers foreign trips especially thoseof Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda

calmed some fears about the possible implicationsof Maoist rule. Against expectations, the governmenthas dramatically boosted revenue collection, putting iton track to meet one of its ambitious budgetary tar-gets.15A voluntary declaration of income scheme toencourage large earners to come into the tax net hasdiscomfited some businesspeople but raised signifi-

houses, prompting a February 2009 international media mis-sion to warn that press freedom still faced a serious threat.

Nepalese media in great danger, International Press FreedomMission finds, Reporters Without Borders, 8 February 2009.13See detailed statistics in Section V.B.2, Public Securitybelow.14On 23 October 2008 the government withdrew 349 crimi-nal cases against political party cadres accused of crimes in-cluding rape, robbery and drug smuggling. 53 of these caseshad been registered after the signing of the CPA.15 The first four months of the 2008-2009 fiscal year sawrevenue mobilisation grow by 35.4 per cent to reach Rs.33billion (approx. $425 million). Revenue collection soars toRs 33 billion, nepalnews.com, 1 January 2009.


11/45



cant sums.16Even as revenue has risen, however, de-velopment expenditure has declined.17 The profes-sionalism and good working relationship of MaoistFinance Minister Baburam Bhattarai and Finance Sec-retary Rameshwor Khanal has impressed donors. Min-ister for minister this government is far more seriousthan the interim government, says one diplomat. At

least the cabinet actually meets and tries to shape anagenda its far too soon to write off the govern-ment.18The launch of a national literacy campaign,provision of free maternal health services and recordtourist arrivals suggest there is good news to report.19

But the Maoist-led administration is already widelydismissed as a failure. Partly this is due to an almostuniversally hostile press and the governments poorgrasp of communications. But its own weaknesses aremore to blame. The party has been strong on com-promise and conciliatory statements but weak on de-livery. The UCPN(M)s commanding plurality in the

CA has not translated into a decisive grip on power ora clear lead on policy. An electricity crisis, the resultof a cumulative underinvestment for which the Mao-ists are partially responsible (in attacking and disrupt-ing hydropower projects during the conflict), hasreduced supply to eight hours per day.20This hits thepolitically influential urban middle classes hardest

16By the eve of the schemes deadline, property worth someRs 3.45 billion ($45 million) had been declared, with a 10per cent tax paid. Milan Mani Sharma, Self disclosurestouch Rs 3.45b, myrepublica.com, 10 February 2009.17Development expenditure tumbles by 23 pc, nepal-news.com, 20 January 2009.18Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, December 2008.19Gopal Sharma, Record tourist numbers as Nepal emergesfrom civil war, Reuters, 10 January 2009.20 The conflict is certainly not the only factor that has im-peded power schemes. One former managing director of theNepal Electricity Authority (NEA), explained: The patheticsecurity situation prevailing during the ten-year-old conflictperiod did indeed prevent potential private investors fromsetting up hydro plants. However, this should not have pre-vented the government and NEA from adding new genera-tion capacity. With each change in government, heads beginto roll in public enterprises, and in this manner, a new man-

aging director is appointed in NEA, not primarily on meritbut on considerations which are at best questionable. AjitN.S. Thapa, Extended load-shedding: symptom of deepermalaise, The Himalayan Times, 19 January 2009. The fi-nance secretary has blamed local agents, the invisible powerthat works between foreign contractors, goods importers andthe government for commission, for the delays in the KaliGandaki A project (initiated in 1997 but with constructiononly starting in 2004) and the Mid-Marsyangdi project(which came online more than three years late at the end of2008). Parties accused of lacking political will, ekanti-pur.com, 22 January 2009.

and adds to the pressures on the government, whichhas no options for immediate relief.

The obstacles that a radical party working throughtraditional institutions might face were always clear and well known to the Maoists from their two stints inthe pre-election interim government. Prachandas ex-

cuse that governing has proved more difficult thanexpected sounds naive at best. In fact, institutionssuch as the staid bureaucracy and traditionalist judici-ary are manageable. As successive transitions haveillustrated, they will orient themselves to a new powercentre if given a clear lead. Bureaucrats are as likelyto be inspired by dedicated, professional ministerswith vision as put off by ideological labels. Failing tobuild on this possibility reflects the Maoists weak-ness in planning, and slowness to adapt to the busi-ness of running a government, rather than bureaucratsinsurmountable intransigence.

In government, the Maoists have been more clumsythan totalitarian. They have spent most of their timeon the back foot, reacting to events rather than shap-ing the agenda. In the maelstrom of day-to-day fire-fighting, much of it in response to problems they havecreated for themselves, ministers efforts to get backin control have been ineffective. Initiatives such asintroducing weekly meet the press sessions to ex-plain government policy, developing an ethical codeof conduct for Maoist CA members and the primeminister vowing to avoid wasting time on unneces-sary ceremonial duties have yet to have much impact.

In November 2008, the CPN(M) and its largest coali-tion partner, the Communist Party of Nepal (UnifiedMarxist-Leninist), UML, established a coordinationcommittee and in December they agreed to set up fourhigh-level commissions.21But the partnership remainsshaky. As long as they are at odds, it is no surprisethat they fail to inspire confidence. The prime minis-ters most deft manoeuvring has been tactical ratherthan strategic. For example, Prachanda surprised theNepali Congress (NC) on 11 November by signing anine-point agreement conceding their demands,thereby averting its threat to block the passage of thebudget, but made no plans to implement his commit-

ments. Meanwhile, his and other Maoist leaders re-

21These are the state restructuring commission, scientificland reform commission (to be headed by Maoist centralcommittee member Haribol Gajurel), commission on the in-vestigation of disappeared persons and truth and reconcilia-tion commission.


12/45



peated warnings of a new revolution only increasesuspicions over the UCPN(M)s intent.22

The Maoists are still outsiders in Kathmandus opinion-forming circles. Even though they have twice as manyseats as their nearest rival in the CA, they have almostno voice in the mainstream media. Apart from UCPN(M)

party members, next to no columnist, commentator,civil society figure, human rights activist, lawyer,journalist or academic writes in support of them. TheNC, by contrast, enjoys a daily barrage of publicpraise from the very people former Panchayat lumi-naries, royal advisers and army emissaries who or-chestrated and applauded the two royal coups thattoppled Congress governments and jailed their leaders.

To a large extent, the Maoists predicament is of theirown making. Resolutely unclubbable, they havemostly kept their distance from the cocktail and semi-nar circuit that generates the capitals received wis-

dom. Instead, they have consciously and repeatedlyantagonised the press, business community and otherestablished forces whom they had initially courtedwith talk of cooperation. The incontrovertible evi-dence of their failure to fulfil commitments is brushedoff with implausible excuses. They have broughtproblems on themselves by starting to resemble theold parties. Their government has already been tar-nished by nepotism,23 patronage, indecision, junket-eering and factional fighting.

22 See, for example, PM reiterates revolt warning, nepal-news.com, 15 January 2009.23UCPN(M) alleged nepotism includes the following posi-tions held by members of Prachandas family: Samir Dahal(under-secretary of PMs office), son of Prachandas youngerbrother Narayan Dahal; Ganga Dahal (officer of PMs of-fice), Prachandas younger daughter (Indian citizen); Gan-garam Dahal (un-appointed foreign relations officer),Prachandas own brother; Renu Pathak (CA member),Prachandas daughter; Arjun Pathak (officer of CA), Prachandasson-in-law; Prakash Dahal (prime ministers PA/accountant),Prachandas son, salary equal to the under-secretary; Nara-yan Dahal (CA member), Prachandas nephew. BaburamBhattarais relatives: Hisila Yami (tourism minister), Babu-

rams wife; Taranaj Pandey (PMs adviser), Baburamsnephew; Praya Yami (National Planning Commission), His-ilas older sister; Timila Yami (chairperson of Drinking Wa-ter Project), Hisilas older sister; Chirik Shova (member ofKathmandu Drinking Water), Hisilas older sister; Babu-rams younger brother (tariff-fixing committee), head ofKathmandu Drinking Water. Arjun Gyawali, Karyakartakokathgharama prachanda-baburam, Drishti, 18 November2008. Minister Hisila Yami also recommended her relativeKayo Devi Yami as a member of the Public Service Com-mission. CC recommends PSC members, nepalnews.com,23 January 2009.

Where they have reached out to former rivals, it hasoften been to bring on board surprisingly dubious ad-visers, including former royalists who neither burnishtheir radical credentials nor temper them with palpa-ble democratic commitment. Non-Maoists keen to seethe government succeed at development were heart-ened by the appointment of Pitamber Sharma, a widely

respected academic expert, to head the National Plan-ning Commission.24 But the government so under-mined and alienated him that he felt forced to resign.

Many within the governing coalition and beyond implythat the Maoists are still an illegitimate force eitherbecause of their incomplete democratic transformation,because they stole the election or because, in thewords of Congress leader G.P. Koirala, theirs is onlya caretaker government with no brief to shapelonger-term policies. Of course, the NC was lessquick to question the unelected post-April 2006 in-terim government, which it led. In contrast to that

transitional administration, this government is bothmandated by a popular vote and constitutionally em-powered and required to act as a normal governmentat the same time as providing leadership to the consti-tutional process, just as the CA is entrusted with thedual functions of drafting body and legislature. Criti-cism of the Maoists tends to fail to distinguish be-tween their role leading a coalition government andthe bigger questions of their partys position in thepeace process. But in both cases, answering suchcriticism is up to the Maoists themselves. They are nolonger the opposition.

C. OLD NEPAL:ALIVE AND WELLDespite the transition to a federal democratic republicand continuing rhetorical commitments to a progres-sive, socially inclusive new Nepal, rumours of theold Nepals death have been greatly exaggerated. Theend of the monarchy has in many respects benefitedthe interests it used to serve: the scapegoating of for-mer king Gyanendra, much as he was responsible forhis own woes, has freed the Kathmandu elite to re-group and rebrand themselves. With the UCPN(M)now cast as the authoritarian ruler, and providing ex-amples of continued illiberal behaviour, it is easier tocategorise anti-Maoist resistance as democratic.

The noisiest conservative revival has been spear-headed by the urban upper classes. That the Maoistsare not the new Khmer Rouge they predicted has not

24The de facto head of the National Planning Commission isthe vice-chairperson; the prime minister is the ex officiochairperson.


13/45



deterred constant cries of totalitarian dictatorship.For all their cadres sporadic brutality, the Maoistshave not muzzled the press, locked up political pris-oners or indeed implemented any notably dictatorialmeasures. Ironically, it is only when they proposegenuinely illiberal measures such as completely ban-ning strikes that the liberal democrats have rushed

to embrace them. In contrast, a budget so un-Maoistthat it satisfied the World Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) was greeted with derision forits excessive ambition as well as claims that programssuch as a national literacy scheme were camouflagedsteps towards a takeover of the state.25

Underlying the ritual denunciations is a more seriousfissure: many people do not want a new Nepal. Thegoal of radical transformation, which inevitably im-plies some uncomfortable upheavals, is not univer-sally shared. Such fears are not confined to those atthe top of the pile. Social inclusion is not a zero-sum

game but in the short term affirmative action of anysort does create losers and a sense of reverse dis-crimination. Many of those who feel threatened be-long to upper caste groups but are not elite in otherterms. As Indias experience since its introduction ofquotas and job reservations for marginalised groupsillustrates, organised resistance from those who hadcome to depend upon privileges is only to be ex-pected. Given Nepals endemic poverty and the se-vere shortage of career opportunities for young peopleof any background, managing a likely bitter strugglewill be a great challenge.

The enduring appeal for some of a unitary state isvisible in the influential coalition that has emerged toguard against the threat of ethnic federalism. Theproblem for those alarmed by the prospect of signifi-cant restructuring is that few have realistic alternativeplans, least of all the parties that agreed to federalismwithout considering its implications. By January2009, three years after formally agreeing to a con-stituent assembly and with a full nine-month gestationperiod after the CA election, the NCs internal com-mittees were still yet to prepare policy options on

25The budget was coloured by some partisan concerns. Forexample, it included a five-project Program to Honour Po-litical Sacrifice bringing development to the mid-westernMaoist heartland; the Maoists informal capital, the north-ern Rolpa village of Thawang will benefit from both con-struction of the Shahid Marg (Martyrs Road, runningfrom Tila to Rukumkot via Ghartigaon and Thawang) and amodel integrated settlement development program. Budget(2008-2009), Annex, Building New Nepal Campaign,Item J. A generous Rs. 50 million ($650,000) has been allo-cated to building an enigmatic-sounding Statue of Repub-lic at the former royal palace. Ibid, Item K.

state restructuring.26A presentation by one NC leaderon the topic was cobbled together with quotes fromWikipedia;27a more thoughtful proposal based on se-rious research and wider consultation is, however, alsounder discussion.28In short, a lack of consensus amongpolitical leaders over fundamental issues reflectswider public divisions, while fears of change that are

yet to be channelled into practicable policies only ag-gravate the tendency for unconstructive opposition.

If the Maoists are not offering the fresh leadership theypromised, nor is anyone else. The mass popular fer-ment of the peoples movement left the existing par-ties unruffled; the movement to overthrow themonarchy did not throw up a single new leader. Ironi-cally, it was the Madhesi uprising against the post-monarchical dispensation that brought some new facesonto the national political scene. The CA electionprovided an opportunity for voters to have their sayon the old guard and they did so with gusto. But party-

controlled proportional representation lists allowedsome, such as G.P. Koirala, to sidestep the risk of al-lowing voters to deliver a direct verdict. The eighteenof his relatives who lost first-past-the-post contestsinitially seemed less fortunate until it transpired thatelectoral defeat had little meaning. UML leader BamDev Gautam was nominated as home minister by hisparty while former general secretary Madhav Nepalwas parachuted into the CA as a nominee. Conserva-tive NC heavyweights such as Govinda Raj Joshi andKhum Bahadur Khadka have become more, not less,vocal and influential since their defeats.

D. THE RISKS OF FAILUREThe peace process does not yet face an imminent riskof collapse. Although the original ideal of a broadunity government working to shared goals is nowunlikely, the evidence suggests a prolonged processmarred by disputes and messy compromises is morelikely than a deliberate return to violent conflict. Theinternational context is positive: no influential inter-

26Bishnu Budhathoki, Koirala still reigns supreme, TheKathmandu Post, 5 January 2008.27Govinda Raj Joshi, Nepalma sanghiya shasan pranali(Kathmandu, 2008). See also Aditya Adhikari, Stalled de-bate, The Kathmandu Post, 23 December 2008. Joshi hasmade a serious effort to contribute to public debate, puttinghis proposals forward in the media. See, for example, 6 vatavyavaharik pradesh, Himal Khabarpatrika, 12 February2009; Bahulvadi samsadiya vyavasthaka pakshama,NayaPatrika,12 February 2009.28Narahari Acharya, Nepali kangreka nimti prastavit gana-rajya nepalko samrachana ra samvidhansabhako adhar-

patra(Kathmandu, 2009).


14/45



national players want to see the government fall, en-courage a military takeover or provoke a return toconflict in other forms. Outside Nepal the desire for aperiod of stability, rebuilding and consolidating func-tional democratic rule is genuine. For its neighbours,particularly India, this desire is rooted in solid self-interest, such as seeing Nepal develop as a partner in

regional security, a market and an exporter of hydro-power. New Delhi and other capitals are well awarethat such aims can only be achieved with politicalstability and a functioning government.

Nevertheless, the destabilising scenario of inter-partydissent and the unresolved future of two powerful for-mer warring armies means a return to war by mistakeis always possible. Should that happen, or the peaceagreement fall apart irretrievably, the chances for anew deal will never be as good as they were in 2005.Then, a unique combination of circumstances forcedthe Maoists to accept pluralism and the old parties to

accept the need for reform. The king was discredited,international players were willing to support a freshapproach, the UN was in a good position to assist and,most crucially, people at large were inspired by theprospect of a new consensus for peace and change.None of these factors is likely to recur as strongly anda renewed confluence of such forces is impossible.

No one may want war but it is a real possibilityshould the Maoists be forced out of government, orchoose to quit. The Maoists are not planning to goback to war, as Prachanda has clarified, despite hismisleadingly bellicose statements about resuming a

popular struggle should the UCPN(M) leave the gov-ernment. But the temptation for other parties to be-come more militaristic if the Maoists are agitatingfrom the streets will be hard to resist. The dividingline between street pressure and conflict is danger-ously thin.

Resumed conflict, as in 2001 and 2003, tends to be morebrutal and intense than before. Another return to warwould most likely reinforce that pattern. The Maoistspeoples war strategy remains in place and theirPeoples Liberation Army (PLA) is, thanks to theextended cantonment impasse, larger and better

trained and organised than ever. But a new round ofconfrontation would be different: in place of rural base-building, the Maoists are now positioned for an urbanguerrilla struggle. There are no signs that the NAwould show any more concern for respecting the lawsof armed combat, nor that the old parties have devel-oped any interest in democratic control or enforcinginternational humanitarian law. Needless to say,renewed conflict would close the window ofopportunity to address the pressing social andeconomic problems that underlay the insurgency inthe first place.

III.PEACE PARTNERS AT ODDSAll of the political parties are in disarray, fightingwith each other and internally. Few articulate a con-sistent position on major issues or present a unitedface to the public. The UCPN(M) has done better than

others at managing a heated internal debate but majordisagreements over strategy remain; at the same timeits transition to non-violence appears stalled. The in-creasing volume of NC leaders public pronounce-ments is in inverse proportion to their organisationalsolidity. UML leaders busy themselves launchingregular assaults on the government of which they area part, while preparing themselves for the leadershipbattle that is set to play out at their February 2009general convention. The Madhesi Janadhikar Forum(MJF) has averted a crippling split but appears unsureof how to balance representing Madhesi interests withcontributing to governance and the peace process.

The major non-Maoist parties suffer from the sameweaknesses: lack of internal democracy, no progresson making themselves more inclusive, incoherent andshifting policy positions, lack of effort to rebuild linkswith voters, and indiscipline, in particular among thetop-heavy leadership. There is no sign they are heed-ing their November 2005 commitment not to repeatthe mistakes of the past which were committed whilein parliament and in government.29 If the constitu-tion-writing process is completed on schedule, onlythe Maoists appear ready to go back to the electoratewith a reasonably clear agenda and a functional cam-paign machine. But even the UCPN(M) is not demon-strating any visible enthusiasm for a prompt poll.

A. THE MAOISTS:BRINGING ON THEREVOLUTION?

Strong criticism of the governments performance hascome from within the Maoist movement itself, wherethere has been intense debate over tactics and strat-egy. For outsiders, the state and direction of Maoiststrategy is of great importance: Are they truly com-

mitted to democracy and non-violence? Will moreradical elements settle for nothing less than a one-party state and force a return to conflict? For Maoistfootsoldiers, the big question is simpler: Is this it? Isthis what we spent ten years fighting for?

29Twelve-point Agreement, 22 November 2005, Art. 7.


15/45



Prachanda has swung between urging consensus30andthreatening a capture of power.31 His party is em-broiled in complex debates, where ideological andstrategic considerations do battle with more pressingpractical imperatives. The Maoist central committeeremains divided on many issues but the fissures can-not be reduced to a simplistic hardline vs. softline

battle.32Indeed, there is no disagreement on the cen-tral analysis that the revolution is yet to be com-pleted and the central long-term goal a peoplesrepublic. The chief ideological architect of the Maoistapproach to the peace process, Baburam Bhattarai,has argued that it is precisely in order to bring therevolution closer that the UCPN(M) must stick withthe constitutional process and use all forums street,assembly and government to hasten the next stage.In this context, he has even underlined the need forthe Maoists to create the turmoil out of which revolu-tion will emerge, although he used the same addressto party cadres to reiterate the partys longstanding

line that political competition, rather than a Soviet orChinese-style one-party system, will be an essentialfeature of a Maoist republic.33

A November 2008 national gathering brought to-gether some 1,100 leaders from different levels andregions; it endorsed the new compromise party line ofa peoples democratic national republic and theformation of an internal advisory committee on inte-gration, including PLA commanders. In January2009, the CPN(M) merged with the much smallerUnity Centre (Masal) to create the Unified Commu-nist Party of Nepal (Maoist).

Transforming from an armed movement into a peace-ful political force was never likely to be an easy proc-ess. Even the Maoists harshest opponents acceptedthat it would take them time to get over the hang-over of their violent past. But as the third anniver-sary of the ceasefire approaches with the Maoists nowleading the government, excuses for thuggery andbrutal lawlessness ring hollow.

The continued violent conduct of some Maoist cadres,which has extended to abduction, torture and murder,cannot be dismissed as minor indiscipline. The media

response to an attack by Maoist cadres on the Hi-

30PM urges politics of consensus, nepalnews.com, 13January 2009.31 PM warns against bid to topple govt, The HimalayanTimes, 13 January 2009; PM Dahal for capturing power ifgovt toppled, ekantipur.com, 13 January 2009.32Dharmendra Bastola, Kendriya samitiko baithakkanirnayko mahattva,Janadesh, 23 December 2008.33Yantrik dhangale sampanna hundaina kranti, Naya Pa-trika, 30 January 2009.

malmedia publishing house was disproportionate.34But this incident, one of a number of assaults on jour-nalists and media corporations, has seriously damagedthe Maoists international reputation and will leave acloud over their relations with outside players forsome time to come, even if they take action againstthe offenders. For example, it has set back any

chances of removing the CPN(M) from the U.S. ter-rorist exclusion list.

The YCL has been a powerful tool but also a majorheadache. There has been more talk of reorienting itto development activities and time-bound promises torelinquish the buildings it had occupied and turnedinto de facto garrisons.35The Maoist commitment inthe June 2008 agreement was unambiguous:

The paramilitary functioning and activities of theCPN (Maoists)s Young Communist League (YCL)will be completely terminated, and all public, gov-

ernment and private buildings and lands under itscontrol will be vacated and returned to the respec-tive owners within fifteen days. The CPN (Maoist)has pledged to all of the political parties that YCLactivities will fully comply with the laws of theland, from this time forward.36

Although much has been made of its more egregiousbehaviour, its overall level of activity appears to havebeen significantly scaled back from the pre-electionperiod. Nevertheless, its militarised structure andsheer size, with many members expecting to be takencare of and looking jealously towards their relatively

comfortable and regularly remunerated colleagues inthe PLA, make institutional change difficult. Partyleaders want to keep it intact and motivated as an ex-tra force in uncertain times and as foot soldiers for thenext election campaign.

Amid these difficulties, Prachanda is still in chargeand has cards in his hand. He has ridden out the inter-nal criticism so far and can use the power and patron-age of the prime ministership to his advantage. Butthe barrage of dissent has a cumulative impact, weak-

34More serious incidents, such as the 18 November discov-ery of the bodies of two people allegedly killed by the YCLin Dhading district and the earlier killings of working jour-nalists outside the capital, generated less press coverage.There were, however, public protests. See, for example,Protest against YCL over killing of two abductees, ekanti-pur.com, 19 November 2008.35Ganeshman Pun, YCL ka agragami karyabhar,Janadesh,23 December 2008.36Agreement between the political parties to amend theConstitution and take forward the peace process, 25 June2008, Art. 3.


16/45



ening his authority and limiting room for manoeuvre.He is constrained by a greater range of pressures thanever, needing to balance his own partys interests withthose of coalition partners while taking into accountpositions of the NC and the army and continuing toreassure international powers that the Maoists de-mocratic transformation will move forward.

B. UNCERTAIN COALITION PARTNERSThe UCPN(M)s two major coalition partners, theUML and the MJF, have faced internal debates anduncertainty over their role in government. There aresigns, however, that policy and organisational diffi-culties are manageable.

In the run-up to its February 2009 general convention,the UML has to cope with a leadership struggle andbroader questions about its policy platform. Senior

cadres regularly speak out against the government ofwhich it is a coalition member. The most constantbarrage has been by K.P. Oli, who has announced hisintention to challenge general secretary JhalanathKhanal for his post. Later in 2008 he was joined byformer general secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal, whohad maintained a dignified silence following his elec-tion defeat and resignation before launching a campaignto return to high office.37 Madhav Nepals January2009 parachuting into the CA to head the constitutionalcommittee will likely reduce his public outbursts.K.P. Olis offensive, however, will probably be sus-tained as he seeks publicity and momentum for his

bid to win the partys leadership and push for a UML-led government. Bam Dev Gautam, as home ministerand deputy prime minister the partys most senior rep-resentative in the administration, has complained thatUML leaders and activists have been undermining thegovernment.38He has, in turn, been subjected to sear-ing public criticism from the UML press.39

The UML is still unsure where it stands ideologically,tactically and strategically. The extensive political re-

37 In December 2008 Nepal said his party should not have

joined the government and accused its leadership of seekingpower at the expense of cultivating its relationship with thewider public: Nobody will follow the party if we fail to ad-dress the concerns of the masses. Joining govt a folly: Ne-pal, ekantipur.com, 16 December 2008.38UML not helping govt: Home Minister, The KathmanduPost, 20 December 2008.39One cover story pointedly observed that In return for theparty making him deputy prime minister even though he lostthe election, Gautam has started publicly badmouthing partyworkers. Yi bamdev kaska hun kamred?, Budhabar, 24December 2008.

port presented by its central committee at the generalconvention does, however, offer a serious analysis ofits past weaknesses and a detailed blueprint for its fu-ture positioning.40It cannot reconcile itself to being ajunior partner to the UCPN(M) on the left, but its ef-forts to stand up have been patchy and often, as in thecase of its YCL-modelled Youth Force, counterpro-

ductive. It is unlikely to be tempted into an NC-ledbroader democratic alliance (see below) unlessthere is an immediate incentive, such as the offer ofthe prime ministership. In the face of the Maoistsscepticism towards parliamentary democracy, therelevance of the UMLs alternative, peoples multi-party democracy, is unclear.41It identified the mon-archy as the main threat to democracy and, forged in aperiod when the UML had signed up to parliamentarydemocracy, sits uneasily with the partys call for aparallel system of a popularly elected president along-side a popularly elected prime minister.

Against this backdrop, the UML has made little of itscapacity to act as a mediating force. Following thepattern established from the earliest negotiations of2005, neither the UCPN(M) nor the NC have lookedto it as a bridge, even when their relations have beenat their most strained; the UMLs own lack of a co-herent approach has meant no initiative to establishitself as a credible honest broker able to boost its ownimportance by bringing the two sides closer together.

The 16-21 February 2009 general convention shouldhelp clear the air: it is slated to create new senior po-sitions, including a party president and vice president,

largely to accommodate senior leaders irked at theircurrent marginalisation. A decisive mandate for thenew leadership may quell public dissent. The conven-tion may not take dramatic steps to reposition theparty but will acknowledge organisational shortcom-ings and initiate moves to reinvigorate the party. Pro-posed changes to the party constitution are likely toinvite serious debate;42there are, however, almost cer-

40Political Report, CPN(UML) Central Committee, Janu-ary 2009.41A week-long January 2009 central committee meeting re-

affirmed this policy, introduced by revered former leaderMadan Bhandari in the wake of the 1990 transition to multi-party democracy, as the partys basic line. UML adopts PMPDas guiding principle, The Himalayan Times,15 January 2009.42The UMLs proposed new party structure has a chairper-son above the general secretary. Vidhan SamshodhanPrastav, UML Central Committee, Kathmandu, January2009. The key elements are set out in Emaleko samshodhitvidhan tayar,Budhabar, 28 January 2009. Some influentialcentral committee members, including Pradip Gyawali andShankar Pokharel, have registered an alternative proposal forrevisions to the party statute, as have a group of youth lead-


17/45



tain to be some moves towards more inclusive struc-tures and efforts to address the widely acknowledgedgap between leadership and grassroots workers. Ifnothing else, the convention should mark a seriouseffort to face up to the partys difficulties and embarkon an overdue internal debate.

The MJF had to cope with policy confusion over itsone Madhes line as an internal rebellion was gather-ing steam.43 It is ill prepared to cope with any newMadhes uprising, having neither abandoned its claimto leadership of the one Madhes campaign nor donemuch to deliver on it. Its stance towards armed groupshas long been unclear and is more problematic nowthat it is in government. Its relatively upper-caste andbetter-off supporters and members will be threatenedby further identity politics movements. At the sametime, it could be outflanked by a more organised chal-lenge from the Tarai Madhes Democratic Party (TMDP),Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP) or other Madhesi par-

ties if it cannot consolidate its base. Dissatisfactionwith party leader and foreign minister Upendra Yadavdeveloped into an open challenge, with senior figurescalling for their ministers to resign from the govern-ment and force a change in policy and leadership.

Nevertheless, its January 2009 general conventionappears to have brought some stability. Althoughmarked by disputes and unrest, it ultimately saw partypresident Upendra Yadav unanimously re-elected. On7 February, a meeting of its new central committeeagreed to its strategy and endorsed its role in the coa-lition, while directing its ministers to report regularly

to the party on their progress. Party leaders have be-come less ambivalent towards their position in thecoalition, insisting the Maoist-led government is theonly viable option and working hard to communicatesuccesses. For example, the MJFs joint chairman, J.P. Gupta, presented the governments February 2009ordinances as a joint achievement for which his partydeserved credit, arguing that the ordinance on jobquotas in public services fulfilled several of theMJFs pre-election demands.44

Other coalition partners are also not fully in the fold.When the UCPN(M) expressed the view that Madhesi

parties are working for foreign powers, the reaction of

ers who argue they have stronger proposals for internal de-mocracy. The stage is set for a genuine debate.43When MJF leader and government minister Bijay KumarGachhedar suggested the one Madhes policy had becomeirrelevant he was subjected to a barrage of criticism fromwithin the party. See Gachhadars uttterings stir hornetsnest, THT Online, 16 December 2008.44MPRF not to quit govt, myrepublica.com, 9 February 2009.

the commerce minister and president of the NepalSadbhavana Party, Rajendra Mahato, was to accusethe Maoists themselves of being foreign agents.45Such public trading of insults may be partly theatricalbut suggests inter-party relations are disturbingly dys-functional.

C. THE OPPOSITION:REINVIGORATED,BUTFOR WHAT?

A vigorous opposition has enlivened the political sceneand played a useful role in challenging governmentpolicy. Some robust criticism and debate, especiallywhen the CA has functioned as legislature, has addedto the sense of a return to democratic politics. Thereare solid grounds for opposition: for example, theprime ministers failure to fulfil his commitment tothe assembly to implement the NC-backed nine-pointdemands by 15 December became not just a breach of

inter-party agreement but a betrayal of a promisemade to the legislature as a whole.46But methods arenot always helpful, as evidenced by the growing ten-dency to resort to boycotting or obstructing CA pro-ceedings.47 More worryingly, the major oppositionparties are in a bad shape internally and often preferthe spoilers role to constructive criticism.

1. The Nepali CongressThe NC has not made up its mind as to whether it isin or out of the peace process. Adopting the easy route

of spoiling for its own sake, party leaders have notdecided whether to use their considerable leverage towin specific concessions in return for cooperation orwhether to devote all their effort to wrecking the gov-ernment and hoping to supplant it upon its collapse.

In the meantime, the party is less democratic thanever. It has made no moves towards more representa-tive or accountable leadership, rather the reverse.Party president G.P. Koirala declared himself parlia-mentary party leader without any debate, let alone avote. He then adjourned discussions on the appoint-

45Maoists biggest foreign agents: Minister Mahato, ekan-tipur.com, 18 December 2008.46 See NC set to disrupt next session of Parliament, The

Himalayan Times,16 December 2008.47 During the CAs budget session, the Tarai Madhes De-mocratic Party (TMDP) blocked proceedings for twelve days(demanding implementation of the February 2008 Madhesi-government agreement), the NC for five days (demandingimplementation of their nine-point agreement with the gov-ernment) and the smaller parties for four days (over scholar-ship quotas).


18/45



ment of a deputy leader in order to avoid the possibil-ity of an election for that position. The mute accep-tance of his high-handedness (with only NarahariAcharya voicing dissent within the Central WorkingCommittee) is indicative of the weakness of the NCssecond-rank leaders, whom Koirala has reduced, inthe words of one journalist, to subservient sub-

jects.48 Even usually supportive media outlets havebecome restive in the face of the partys wilful resis-tance to serve its own interests by reform.49

Koiralas insistence on remaining parliamentaryleader does not extend to an immediate interest in par-liamentary functioning. The NC has repeatedly boy-cotted the CA; following the opening sitting, Koiralahimself has not attended a single CA session and hismain internal rival, Sher Bahadur Deuba, has onlyshown up twice.50The delay in finalising the parlia-mentary partys statute, which was eventually agreedon 4 February 2009, affected the Constitutional

Council, which makes appointments to importantbodies such as the Public Service Commission andElection Commission, as it required the participationof the leader of the opposition.51

Party organisation is also in disarray. Despite hisautocratic hold on the party, Koirala has only visitedthe NC headquarters eight times in the last fouryears.52In October 2008 he promised to reinvigoratethe party within three months and launched anawareness campaign to rebuild its electoral baseand, more importantly, to continue the still incom-plete reunification of the party following its 2002

split.53 Results have been mixed at best. The partyremains riven, with the unseemly public tussles be-tween its two main wings even extending overseas.54Since its refusal to join the government means that

48Bishnu Budhathoki, Koirala still reigns supreme, TheKathmandu Post, 5 January 2009.49See, for example, Congress course correction, editorial,

Nepali Times, 12 December 2008.50Samvidhansabha jandainan thula neta, Naya Patrika, 7January 2009. Prachanda also has a bad record for CA atten-dance, with only four appearances, although he might claim

the excuse of government business.51Koirala still reigns supreme, op. cit.52Kiran Pokharel, Sunsan kangres mukhyalay,AnnapurnaPost, 24 December 2008.53NC will be reorganised within three months, claimsKoirala, ekantipur.com, 6 October 2008; and Koirala inBiratnagar to begin NC revival campaign, nepal-news.com, 23 October 2008.54In New York, rival pro-Koirala and pro-Deuba interna-tional contact offices still struggle for supremacy. CrisisGroup interview, Nepali Congress supporter, New York, 8December 2008.

senior figures cannot be pacified with ministerial of-fice, the succession battle has become more intenseand more complex, with smaller factions coalescingaround leaders including Sushil Koirala, RamchandraPoudel and K.B. Gurung.55

The NC has, however, taken to its opposition role

with vigour, harrying the government with all weap-ons available to it. Its choice of targets has sometimesbeen ill-advised or disingenuous and its languagenever dispassionate, but it has kept the government onits toes. Koirala, still energised by his sense of be-trayal at having been denied the presidency, confi-dently predicts the imminent collapse of the government.The prime minister must have the guts to step down,threatens one CA member. We are ready to run thegovernment.56Others, such as Ramchandra Poudel,are only slightly more circumspect, saying that theMaoists working under the guardianship of Koiralais the only way forward: We dont have any inten-

tion to pull down this government. This governmentwill collapse because of their own contradictions.57

The Maoists should take these warning shots seri-ously. Verdicts on the NCs own stints in power havebeen mixed but none can deny that Koirala is an ex-perienced wrecker of governments. Since throwingaway his own absolute majority in 1994, he has had ahand in the fall of most administrations, includingthose of his own party under rival leaders Sher Ba-hadur Deuba and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai. But unlessthe NC can show that its criticism is constructive itrisks tarnishing its name further. Nepali voters deliv-

ered a damning electoral verdict. Internationally, theNCs reputation has sunk to new depths. Formerlysympathetic observers despair at its undemocratic be-haviour and shambolic apparatus.58If it does not pullitself together, an unreformed NC will continue doinga serious disservice to the sizeable section of thepopulation that would like to be represented by acompetent, committed liberal democratic party.

55 See Santosh Acharya, Gut-upagutko birami, Nepal, 15February 2009.56NC is ready to form the government, Navindra RajJoshi,Peoples Review, 8 January 2009. Joshi insists, how-ever, that he was only speaking theoretically rather than call-ing for an immediate change in administration. Crisis Groupinterview, Kathmandu, 12 January 2009.57Interview, Spotlight, 9 January 2009.58Crisis Group interviews, New Delhi, Washington DC andLondon, November 2008-January 2009.


19/45



2. The smaller partiesMany smaller parties are increasingly frustrated andfear that their presence in the CA is destined to bedecorative. Although the CA committees were struc-tured to ensure full inclusion of all parties representedin the CA, the lack of debate on the assembly floor

and the continuing pattern of major decisions beingtaken by only a few large party leaders has left themfeeling sidelined. The symbolic challenge of DalitJanajati Party leader Bishwendra Paswan to MadhavNepals installation as chair of the constitutionalcommittee reflects this frustration. Of the parties out-side government, the TMDP is probably the most in-fluential. Its decision not to join the administrationand, in January 2009, to launch an agitation callingfor the implementation of past agreements and the ful-filment of Madhesi demands may earn it some of thecredibility and organisational presence that it lackedgoing into the election.

3. A broader democratic alliance?The right wing of Nepali politics, marginalised by theelectorate and thrown out of step by the abolition ofthe monarchy, is seeking to regroup. The strong con-servative wing of the NC was happy to oppose theparty line on federalism and republicanism even in therun-up to the CA election.59It failed to split the thenseven-party alliance or to wean its party away fromthe peace process consensus but has now joined handswith former Panchayat luminaries to call for abroader democratic alliance. A conservative column

outlines the plan:

The [NC leaders] have been making the necessarynoises, but till now have failed to form strong andappropriate alliances. First and foremost, the UMLand the most important Tarai parties have to bedislodged from the deadly embrace of the Mao-ists. Then the NC must assiduously work towardintegrating the smaller democratic parties like theRashtriya Prajatantra Party and the NepalJanashakti Party [sic] in the new coalition. TheCPN-Maoists can join as a junior partner, or not atall. Then only can the agenda of a new Nepal

really begin.60

The idea has been publicly promoted primarily by thesmaller right-wing parties, although it has been ech-oed sympathetically by influential NC insiders. If it

59See Crisis Group Report, Nepals New Political Land-scape,op. cit., p. 8.60Shashi P.B.B. Malla and Chandra Bahadur Parbate, Endof the road for Maoists, Peoples Review,18 December 2008.

becomes necessary, if the Maoists continue to act theway they are doing and invite instability, we must goahead by forming a democratic alliance that includesmany political parties, warned G.P. Koiralas daugh-ter, Sujata Koirala. But she tempered her commentsby adding: We will form this alliance not to bringdown the Maoist government or to bring instability,

but to bring stability to the country and prevent itfrom becoming a failed state if the Maoists areconcerned about the country and want to join the alli-ance, they are welcome.61 Former Prime MinisterSurya Bahadur Thapa has been a vocal proponent, ashave other former Panchayat luminaries.62 Some,however, are more cautious. For example, influentialformer royal minister Kamal Thapa, who heads a roy-alist splinter party, has doggedly stuck to his monar-chist principles but has also insisted that the Maoist-led government should not be brought down.63

The former king has mostly kept his counsel. The one

issue that prompted him to speak out was a contro-versy over the Maoists attempt to replace Indianpriests with Nepalis at the countrys major Hindutemple, Pashupatinath. The sight of the coalition thatsprung up to oppose the move royalists, conserva-tives in the major parties and press, Indias BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP) and Hindutva extremists such asthe Bajrang Dal may have made some nostalgic forthe last days of the embattled monarchy. But it alsostood as a reminder of Gyanendras baggage. Even ifthe BJP return to power in New Delhi, a royalist re-vival built on support from the neighbours Hinduright will not win mass support.

61The Maoists are trapped in a conspiracy, interview withSujata Koirala, The Kathmandu Post,19 January 2009.62See, for example, Thapa reinforces Koiralas idea ofBDA, nepalnews.com, 6 December 2008; and NC, now,has to lead democratic forces, says RPP chairman, ekanti-pur.com, 5 December 2008.63No alternative to Maoist-led govt: Kamal Thapa, ekanti-pur.com, 3 January 2009.


20/45



IV.THE TWO ARMIESA. THE INTEGRATION IMPASSEThe challenge for the security sector is reachingagreement on the integration of Maoist combatants.There is a serious difference of opinion over whatform this should take. The impasse over this issue,central to the peace process, is particularly debilitat-ing: it hinders progress in other areas and indefinitelyprolongs a UN arms monitoring role that was initiallyenvisaged as only a short-term transitional measure.In the meantime, those in the PLA cantonments whodid not meet the UNs verification standards newand under-age recruits have still not been dis-charged. This is a result of Maoist foot-dragging butalso due to uncertainty over their rehabilitation. TheMaoist-led government promised swift action to UNSpecial Representative of the Secretary-General forChildren and Armed Conflict Radhika Coomaras-wamy, who visited Nepal at the beginning of Decem-ber 2008. But getting this first program of dischargeand rehabilitation right has broader implications, af-fecting the credibility of the whole integration and re-habilitation process.

1. What the agreements sayThe numerous written commitments are ambiguousand deliberately vague. The November 2006 CPAcalled for a special committee to carry out monitor-

ing, adjustment and rehabilitation of the Maoist com-batants;64 the December 2007 Agreement onMonitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies(AMMAA) referred to integration into the securityforces;65 the interim constitution specified that thespecial committee would supervise, integrate and re-habilitate the combatants of the Maoist Army.66This,in turn, was amended to stipulate a special commit-tee representing all the major political parties inthe Constituent Assembly a change prompted bythe need to include the NC despite its absence from

64CPA, Art. 4.4.65 Those who are eligible for integration into the securityforces will be determined by a special committee as agreedin the Comprehensive Peace Accord. This integration proc-ess will be determined in subsequent agreement with the par-ties. AMMAA, Art. 4.1.3.66The Council of Ministers shall form a special committeeto supervise, integrate and rehabilitate the combatants of theMaoist Army, and the functions, duties and powers of thecommittee shall be as determined by the Council of Minis-ters. Interim Constitution, Art. 146.

the government.67This reincarnation of the erstwhile146 Committee, named after the interim constitu-tion article that mandated it but never a functionalbody, was christened the Army Integration SpecialCommittee (AISC).

The June 2008 multiparty agreement that led to this

amendment further specified that verified combatantswould be offered a choice between an economicpackage and various other alternatives for rehabilita-tion.68 For those who choose integration

163_nepal_s_faltering_peace_process.pdf

Documents