1.6 - Bence, György - Political Justice in Post-Communist Societies. the Case of Hungary (EN)

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Political Justice in Post-Communist Societies: the Case of Hungary

«Political Justice in Post-Communist Societies: the Case of Hungary»

by György Bence

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 1+2 / 1990, pages: 80-89, on www.ceeol.com.

http://www.ceeol.com/



http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=c51d4ec3-66bd-4122-9449-de6dade71cc3




POST-COMMUN

THE CA E

Gyorgy Bence

Vaclav Ravel's great essay The Power of the Powerless, written in the lateseventies, included a small parable about the butcher who had to put a sign into

the shopwindow, between the sausages and the meat: Long Live the Great Socialist

Revolution ofOctober! The story illustrated how the average citizen who just wantedto make a living became involved in the Great Lie.

But there was always an alternative, according to Havel. It was completely withinour power to renounce the game. Ifwe decided not to lie anymore, we could attain

the state of "living in the truth".

I must admit that back then, in the seventies, I felt that Havel was demanding

too much of the poor butcher. Was it not enough if he played the game strictly

according to the rules set down by his Communist bosses? If he did nothing morethan he was absolutely required to do?

My former scepticism with regard to Ravel's position has evaporated during

the first months of his presidency. It turned out that he did not draw vindictive

conclusions from his exalted demand of "living in the truth" , a demand to which

only exceptional people, like Havel himself, could live up. This lofty ideal has

been, in fact, a source of tolerance and forgiveness for Havel and his friends. 1

Communism pressed the citizen into active complicity with the system, unless he

was prepared to drop out of normal civil existence. Therefore, it is wrong to

condemn him simply because he t ried to survive. The former dissidents should

be the first to understand this, and Havel in fact did.Havel's position implies either a blanket amnesty for representatives of the

previous regime, or strict adherence to due process and the rule of law, even in

cases involving Communist bosses. According to this position, former leaders should

not be indicted simply because they filled high posts in the party or government.Indictments should be based on specific charges, substantiated by evidence, noton membership or rank.There is another story we should keep in mind when speaking of political justice

in post-communist societies, a real one we can see with our own eyes. In the greatdays of the Romanian uprising, the enraged crowd clamored for the blood of the

oppressors. Death to the tyrant! Death to the Securitate men! And summary justice

was done, as we watched on television.These are the two extremes defining the limits of political justice in post

communist Eastern Europe. What is going to emerge as a more regular pattern

will most likely fall between these two extremes. In Czechoslovakia, the fate of

former Communist leaders will not depend solely on the high morality of Havel.

Praxis International 10:1/2 April & July 1990 0260-8448 $2.00



Praxis International 81

But neither hopefully, it be the crowd that has the last word in these matters,as was the case in Romania.

My country, Hungary, has started out on a middle course in political justice.

No blanket amnesty will be given, it seems. But extreme sanctions will be alsoavoided. I have certain misgivings about this moderate course too. But before dis

cussing them, I have to make some comments on the Hungarian political atmospherethat surrounds the debate on political justice.

Our Communists, or maybe former Communists have undergone a sudden, but

understandable metamorphosis lately. They have become very fastidious in matters

involving finer legal points and ethical standards of political behavior.

The Communist press in Hungary is full of laments about the illegitimate pressure

exercised by the new parties, about the dangers of political discrimination amongprofessionals and in the civil service, about the likelihood of a wholesale proscriptionof innocent representatives of the old regime, and many other alleged abuses. 2

This indignation of the Communists is, obviously, hypocritical. Who exercised

a party dictatorship in the first place? Could amore thoroughgoing system of politicaldiscrimination ever be introduced than the infamous nomenklatura?Were the hand

picked civil servants, in a Communist country, so civil really?There is, nevertheless, an element of reality in the Communists' allegations.

No, as of now, there have not been actual cases of political discrimination, butyes, there is a flood of wild statements of intent coming from some new parties.

They say a "clean sweep" has to be made, presumably by the new government.A campaign poster of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the party that won the

general elections, depicted an overflowing garbage can with a big broom, and a

caption that read: "Spring cleaning-up is coming!" Other large parties, however,

and even the Democratic Forum itself on other occasions, have gone out of theirway to reassure the officials of the old regime.

All in all, the public mood does not seem to be excessively ugly in Hungary.

True, the call for a purge has been made repeatedly but public reaction has been

far from unanimous. More important, major political leaders were careful enoughto still these voices, to allay the fears of those who could become victimized. Thereis, consequently, a fair chance that the transition process can be completed without

excessive injustice and without wasting a lot of the human resources so much neededfor rebuilding my country.But to minimize injustice is not the sam,e thing as to avoid it. And there is a

growing consensus among the more thoughtful political leaders in Hungary abouthow to proceed. If one wanted to reduce injustice to an acceptable minimum

they say - the best way would be to apply political justice in a regulated form.Extraordinary measures are clearly needed. This way some injustice would beinevitably done but, at least, not spontaneously and outside the bounds of rationalcontrol. Political justice would however be dispensed by some kind of organized

tribunal- with judicial powers, although outside the framework of ordinary courts

- but not by the mob.This is where the issue stands for today's political leaders in Hungary. Therefore,

to raise the question of political justice from the viewpoint of Human Rights is

not necessarily a symptom of nostalgia for the bad old days of dissident purity.

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82 Praxis International

Back then, all injustice emanated from the powers that be, and their opponents

could indulge in the moral comforts of innocence at least.

Political justice is already being applied in Hungary, although on a small scale

and in a restricted way. A certain category of former political leaders are obliged

to undergo parliamentary investigation. They have to reveal their assets and account

for the way in which they obtained them. This is clearly a case of exceptional

justice, overstepping the boundaries of regular legal procedure, and there is a danger

of serious abuses of Human Rights.

Moreover, the popular demand for political justice is gaining momentum. It is

to be expected that some kind of political trials will be held. Therefore, the danger

of abuses is going to grow concurrently.

And, last but not least, by raising the question of political justice we are also

reformulating the ultimate question about the ongoing transition: Is a peacefultransition at all possible? Is there going to be a "second revolution"?

Before turning to more technical matters,3 let me make some further comments

on the distinction between ordinary justice and political justice. This distinction

might sound rather old-fashioned in the refined ears of an American audience.

It is a distinction under fierce attack by those most advanced legal minds of theCritical Legal Studies movement at Harvard and other leading law schools. 4

Our local lawyers in Hungary tend to stick, however, to the old style of thinking.

For them, there is a clear difference between the proper legal reasoning on theone hand, and political argumentation on the other. Once the basic legal principles

have been laid down, they maintain, there is a secure although complicated way

to give authoritative answers to legal problems. The principles are to be laid down

by an act of constitution-making, or by long tradition, or - preferably - by both.

Legal reasoning, except in the most trivial cases, is more than classification and

deduction, but it is still distinguished by its more cogent rationality from politicalargument.

Looking at it from such a conservative perspective, political justice is almosta contradiction in terms. It means, at its most extreme, that several legal prin

ciples are thrown overboard in a quasi-legal procedure. Judgment is then reachedby a direct appeal to general political considerations. In less extreme cases of politicaljustice, only a few principles are given up, usually with some reluctance, as a

concession to the exceptional character of a political situation.

Three basic types of political justice need to be distinguished: first, restitutive

political justice; second, punitive political justice; and third, the limiting case of

political amnesty. Let me start with a briefdiscussion of restitutive political justice.Then, amnesty will be mentioned for the sake of completeness. Finally, a new

set of types will be distinguished within the broad category of punitive political

justice.

Only after having reviewed these distinctions can we turn to the concrete material

of my presentation, a discussion of how punitive political justice is being applied

in Eastern Europe. Restitutive political justice is a burning political issue in Eastern

Europe these days. However, it belongs to this topic only insofar as it is fueling

the demand for punitive political justice.

Restitutive political justice is being dispensed massively in Hungary too. Strong

lobbying groups were organized by fonner defendants of show trials, other political




prisoners, camp inmates, their friends and relatives. They are represented by the

best legal minds of the country in their legal battle for individual retrials, quashing

the sentences of whole categories of people (for example: the participants in the

uprisingof1956) and for some financial compensation. And, I am happy to tellyou, these efforts have been largely successful.

Calls for revenge, tooth for tooth, are rarely heard. But these people, under

standably, do not want to see their tormentors - bestial interrogators, partisan judges,

brutal jailers - remaining unscathed and enjoying in safety the fruits of their labors.

This feeling is, moreover, shared by a large part of the public, well beyond thecircle of the victims themselves.

The young generation fortunately did not share the experience of the last wave

of Communist terror; yet they are even more under the spell of the revelations.

For them, the memoirs and historical accounts, having come out since the lifting

of censorship, shattered a world of illusions.5 They believed in the possibility of

a decent and relatively peaceful existence, while the older generation has neverreally managed to forget the skeletons in the closets.

What then of the question of amnesty? In the above circumstances, it is not a

surprise that the demand for a political amnesty, covering the representatives of

the old regime, was not raised by any of the important new political forces.

The leaders of the reformist wing of the Communist party, now belonging to

the Hungarian Socialist Party, so much blinded by the glory of a successfullymanaged first stage of transition, felt themselves immune to any future prosecution.And about the fate of their former comrades, now organized in the fundamentalist

Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, they could not care less. It remains to be

seen, however, whether they did not commit a fatal mistake.

The new opposition parties, on the other hand, having no members or supporters

actually in jail, were not interested in raising the question of amnesty, if the other

side did not insist on it.

Anyway, whatever reasons the Hungarian Communists could have entertainedfor not trying to insure themselves against legal proceedings which might be initiatedby their victorious opponents, I am interested here in political justice as it is being

applied against Communists.Drawing on the available literature, I have sketched out three types of political

justice, to see whether the East European cases fit these age old patterns. Numbersand titles are given to these types, to make future reference easier, but I don't

have any pretensions about their being in the right order or with the best designation:

Type 1: Prosecution for ordinary crimes with a political end in view. - This is

the least questionable version of political justice. If an ordinary crime was, in fact,

committed, there is no need to stretch the law. It is enough to see a political opponent

exposed as a thief, embezzler, petty tyrant using his power for selfish and criminal

purposes.

Type 2: Political trials based on state protection provisions. - Even the most liberal

legal systems contain some provisions explicitly aimed at protecting the state againstsubversion, not constitutional political acts such as treason, sedition, etc. Formally

speaking there is nothing wrong with using these provisions against a political




opponent. But in extreme cases, especially when the opponent targeted has a chanceto start some violent action to prevent prosecution, it is more than likely that justicewill be expedited by questionable means. 6

Type 3: Revolutionary justice. - All the previous types of political justice involvea special risk that the bounds of legality, defined by statutes, established legal principles and institutionalized legal tradition, are to be overstepped. Here, this is openly

accepted as a matter of practical necessity.7

Revolutionary justice, at its most extreme, is dispensed by lay tribunals, convenedin an ad hoc fashion especially for that purpose, and based directly on the legallyunbounded "will of the people", the "spirit of the revolution" or similar ideologicalconstructs. Usually, however, some pretence of legality is kept up, and there is

some attempt to accommodate the proceedings and the principles invoked to thenormal course of justice.These categories prove helpful in bringing some order to the various instances

of political justice in the different East European countries undergoing transition.Type 1 proceedings have already taken place in several countries and, un

doubtedly, we will see more and more of them. The differences between theindividual East European countries will depend only on the degree to which formerCommunist leaders were shameless in abusing their power for personal gain and

advantage.The

moral indignationofthe public

isjustified; the legal means arethere. The only danger is that the courts, having been compromised by their less

than independent stance under the old regime, might display undue haste and severityin making show trials for public consumption.The examples are, of course, banal. Graft, corruption, nepotism everywhere.

In my country, the local bosses have been singled out first, probably because theywere living much more in the eye of their neighbors. There was one prominentfigure who was eliminated on a similar basis, namely the former Minister ofDefense, General Czinege. His speciality was abuse of subordinates, using them

for private purposes; he adored collecting juicy pieces of real estate bought ona nominal price from local councils.A typical Type 2 case was started in East Germany where treason charges were

lodged against the former Communist leader, Erich Honecker. According to thelatest reports from Czechoslovakia, treason proceedings will be initiated againstthose high functionaries who called in the Warsaw Pact troops in 1968.This last one seems to be an open and shut case, even according to the "socialist

legality" prevailing back in those days. Nonetheless, we should be aware of the

potential dangers. Such precedents, if they are to be followed, could lead to revolutionary - or rather counter-revolutionary - justice pure and simple, with all thedire consequences.Such Type 2 cases will likely come up in larger numbers in other East European

countries too. They all raise the painful question of legal continuity in the processof transition.In Romania, we saw a Type 3 case of revolutionary justice. I am referring,

obviously, to the so-called trial of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu. Since then,

according to my scant information, a series of other strange cases of political justicehave taken place in Romania.




I had the opportunity to watch on Romanian television, with the help of an

interpreter, the first day of the Securitate Gang of Four Trial. The quality of the

proceedings, if I may share with you my impressions, was not very much abovethat of a classic show trial. With the only minor difference, of course, that the

defendants were guilty as hell!In Hungary, political justice took a different course from Czechoslovakia, the

GDR or Romania. No one in Hungary is talking about political amnesty. Type 1

proceedings are not widespread, although a few of the former leaders have beencharged with personal crimes, as we have seen. The treasonous activities of former

leaders - either under the previous regime, or during the process of transition

was barely raised as an issue. Type 2 proceedings do not seem to be on the agenda

of any important political group or party. As to Type 3 cases, revolutionary justice

proper, I am certain that all new political forces would vehemently deny that theyhave anything like that in mind.

There is, nevertheless, a public outcry for political justice aimed against the

greatest beneficiaries of the old regime. This outcry is only partly spontaneous,and partly instigated by demagogues. But the sentiment is truly shared by a large

part of the public.

Hungary is on the verge of bankruptcy. The living standards ofwhole segments

of the population, especially of elderly, retired people, are already at an intolerablylow level. And more hardship is to be expected. In contrast, the former Communist

leaders are living quite comfortably, sometimes even opulently on their excep

tional pensions. They enjoy the fruits of their labors in the form of valuable pieces

of real estate. And as they are the ones who have financial means, they are using

the new economic freedom to turn themselves into capitalists. This is what the

less privileged part of the public thinks. And the demagogues are ready to stir

up more vindictiveness and to manipulate the ingenuous.

The legal consequences are rather obvious, as can be gathered from press reports

about Hungary . Those who are responsible for the economic disaster should be

singled out. Their financial advantages should be curtailed by some extraordinaryprocedure. But if we want to understand the legal complexities involved in this

special kind of political justice, it is better to follow, at some length, the story

of these demands, and not to remain content with the results of the moment.

I cannot, of course, give complete details. The space limits for this presentation

would not allow it, and there are many facts which are not yet available, especially

in the parliamentary records yet to be published. The discussion about political

justice has had both a popular and a more scholarly, academic side. My account

will be inclined to the latter where I have been taking part in the discussion.The issue of confiscation of property as a form of political justice was first raised

in the Autumn of 1989.8 Interestingly, the more liberal of the two Communist

successor parties, the Hungarian Socialist Party, officially joined the demand for

a property test of former leaders. 9 I t took, nevertheless, a long time to transform

the delnand into a bill.

Three points were quite hotly debated. The Communists sided, of course, with

the milder proposal on all three counts. First, how wide a circle of former leaders

wouldbeinvestigated? Second,

howfar should the investigation extend into the past?




Third, should the investigation cover matters of political responsibility, or should

it be restricted to the financial situation of former leaders?

The provisions of the bill eventually adopted as Law iii of 1990 turned out to

be quite narrow. lO Instead of 1968, proposed by the Hungarian Democratic

Forum, the investigation reached back only to 1980. The circle of persons to be

investigated was restricted to high party, state and municipal functionaries, like

politburo members, ministers, county bosses. And matters of political responsibility

were excluded from the scope of investigation. The law left open the question,

moreover, of what should happen after the parliamentary commission entrusted

with the investigation will have reached its conclusions. ll

It was, most probably, a consequence of this relative mildness of the law that

after one full working session without dramatic results, the Commission even

tually faded away. The summons were not served, the members did not appear. 12

These meagre results notwithstanding, a critical threshold had been crossed.

From political sloganeering, political justice was transfonned into legislative reality.

This was perceived as a challenge by some scholars interested in Human Rights

and legal matters generally. On extremely short notice, a conference was called

together for January 14, 1990 at the Department of Social and Moral Philosophy

at the Budapest University. Historians, political scientists, philosophers, legal

scholars and practicing lawyers were invited to share their thoughts on "Political

Justice by Fiat of Successor Regimes."The two best represented groups of scholars, the lawyers and philosophers, took

opposing sides in the discussion, although there were some notable exceptions. 13

The first tended to warn against an uncritical commitment to political justice.

Some philosophers insisted, under the impact of the recent happenings inRomania, on the differences between revolutionary and regular justice. 14 Some

other philosophers stressed the necessity to curb moral indignation, even if justified,

because otherwise the rule of law cannot be preserved, not to speak of establishing

it, as it is on the agenda in Hungary. 15

Most lawyers, on the other hand, were convinced that the only practical question

is how to dispense political justice, not whether it is appropriate to do so.

They started with the assumption that an extraordinary judicial procedure is to

be instituted with the aim of establishing political responsibility for the economic

disaster. But they wanted to mitigate the disturbing aspects of such an initiative,

and therefore they stressed that the purpose is to establish the truth. The sanctionswould therefore be of a milder, non-criminal character. 16

It was here that the idea of a moral or political pillory came up first in Hungary.

Suppose that the defendants are found guilty by a special tribunal trying them on

ad hoc charges, not provided for in any statute, like gross negligence or malfeasancein government. Even in such a case no criminal charges shall be brought against

them. They shall only have to suffer the consequences of compulsory publicity

to be given to their sins. They shall have to see the results of the investigation

broadcast on television, published in the press and posted on walls. 17

The problems connected with ex post facto law or, in the language of the U. S.

Constitution, with a bill of attainder were, of course, also discussed by several

participants of the conference. So were the time limits set by the statute of limitations for political justice. 18




The next contribution to the public debate about political justice, both on thepolitical and more scholarly side, was the proposal of the Independent Lawyers'Forum, a professional group responsible for having initiated the Opposition Round

Table (EKA) talks last year.19

The Independent Lawyers presented a draft billwith appropriate explanations which will, undoubtedly, constitute an importantstepping stone for the work of the new Parliament and Ministry of Justice.The Independent Lawyers took over the principle of collective indictment from

the Law iii of 1990, which I mentioned above. But they insisted on the analogyof objective responsibility under Hungarian tort law. As in the case of a driverwho is expected to drive carefully and not to cause harm to anybody, the managers

of the national economy should have been careful enough to avoid the presentdisaster.

My main problem with such an approach is that it would undermine the autonomy

of the executive branch of government. Any policies which would be considereddisastrous in the future, could give rise to special proceedings against the ministersresponsible for them.The sanctions also envisaged by the proposal include measures which are, clearly,

of a confiscatory character. At this point, therefore, the analogy with tort law breaksdown. The national economy would not be compensated by the confiscation ofproperty accumulated by former ministers. This is, clearly, a punitive measure.

Third, the Independent Lawyers wanted to extend the time limit of the investigation as far back as the adoption of the first Communist constitution in 1949. Asthey maintained, it was too formalistic to argue against their position by invoking

the statute of limitations. The time elapsed since the Communist takeover did notcount in matters of political justice, because the courts were not independent and,therefore, there was no real chance of prosecution.This argument did not take into account the rationale behind the statute of limita

tions and related provisions, like prescription in property law. This is an enormous

subject, of course, but two things seem to stand out. One is the difficulty of proofafter a long time. The other is connected with the inherent conservatism of thelaw, and as such is particularly relevant for the present subject.In the course of time all kinds of consequences, good or bad, accrue to an original

action starting the whole process, however evil itmight have been in the first place.The law is, therefore, always reluctant to overturn long-established conditions for

people's private lives. 20

All this is a matter of degree, of course, depending on how obnoxious the original

act was. There is, obviously, a difference in this respect between criminal acts,like murder and torture, and that kind of irrationality which the Communistsdisplayed in their management of the national economy.All the attempts to account for political justice in Hungary that I tried to analyze

and discuss here share a common weakness. It is excessive reliance on legal

procedure and state action in general.If the main purpose, as it was claimed by many lawyers arguing for political

justice, is to reveal the truth, to establish responsibility, to give moral satisfaction

to the nation, and not to punish those who are responsible, why could not thisbe done without judicial recourse? Are historians and economic analysts less able

to establish facts and assign responsibility than prosecutors, judges and parliamentary




commissions? And if the public prefers tribunals, all kinds of private commissions

could be formed, consisting of distinguished experts and moral authorities.

There are, of course, advantages and disadvantages on both sides. The court

can subpoena witnesses, can force them to tell the truth under the threat of contempt

and perjury sanctions, but it is bound, among other things, by the rules of evidence.Although a social tribunal has no control over its living sources, but is not restricted

by legal technicalities.

Looking at it from the perspective of rule of law, however, there is an over

whelming advantage on the side of an investigation conducted by a private committee. There is no need, then, to tinker with the statute of limitations, to invent

ex post facto provisions and to use the other dubious devices of political justice.

It is hard to escape the suspicion that the temptation to use legal procedure to

overcome the legacy of the past, belongs rather to the problem than to its solution.

NOTES

1. See Lally Weymouth's report in the Washington Post as quoted in the Guardian Weekly of

February 18, 1990.

2. The disguised variety of the Communist press is no less busy in spreading this phony moral

indignation. The weekly Reform, controlled allegedly by financial interests of the Communist party ,

is a typical tabloid. The "Independent Democratic Magazine", as the sub-title runs, seems to beradically anti-Communist to the naive reader. But, at the right moment, it comes out with a Com

munist message, not to be mistaken by the less naive.There are, for example, two lead stories in the recent issue of April 6, 1990. One is about the

heroes of the 1956 uprising. Its main point is that the candidates belonging to this group failed at

the elections. The other lead story is about the purge to be expected after the new government takes

over. It starts with the picture of a former Olympic gold medalist, the boxer Gedo who lost his

job and had to seet up a shoe shining stand on Heroes' Square; then continues with a quotationfrom Mr. Horn, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the most popular Communist leader, warning against

the coming purge; then come many other reports about distinguished government officials who are

planning to retire, to start business ventures, etc.3. I will rely on the only full-length monograph on the subject known to me: Kircheimer, Political

Justice (Princeton: 1961).4. R. Dnger, Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge: 1986).5. In Hungary, the revision of political sentences is being done in two different ways, as I intimated

in the main text. Either the sentences are quashed by the Supreme Court (not to be mistaken forthe new Constitutional Court) on technical grounds, or there is a retrial.

In the latter case the public has the opportunity to relive the whole ghastly experience. There

are the surviving judges and attorneys, the stage managers of the show, and they have to give account

of their sinister operations.

This happened during the retrial of the so-called Standard Case. The Standard Co. was a sub

sidiary of I.T. and T. , and all its staff personnel were imprisoned or executed for industrial espionage

and sabotage in 1950.A fascinating television documentary was made of the whole story by AnnaMerei, a movie director

and Dr. Vera Pecsi, a historian.6. In constructing the first two types, I leaned heavily on Kircheimer, (ch. 3) and Schmitt,

Veifassungslehre (Berlin: 1928).

7. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre , para. 9.8. It is not yet clear who could claim the dubious distinction of being the first to introduce the

issue of confiscation into the parliamentary debate. There are two representatives, returned in freelycontested by-elections to the previous parliament, who stand a better chance than anybody else:

Zoltan Kiraly and Erno Raffay.




9. See the interview ofMr. Csaba Hamori under the title, "Property test- according to European

norms" in the Nepszabadsag of February 28, 1990. Note the adjective "European"!

10. Magyar Kozlony, February 12, 1990.11. "It shall make proposals to be acted upon" says a Parliamentary Decision no. 12, February 14,

1990 as published in Magyar Kozlony. Proposals to whom? What kind of action is envisaged?12. "A commission disappearing", Nepszabadsag, April 6, 1990.13. The most notable was, if I might say so, Andras Sajo, the distinguished legal scholar who,

in his mild and sophisticated way, called attention to the dangers of political justice. Bence et al,

Visszameno politikai igazsagszolgaltatas utodrezsimekban (Budapest: 1990).14. Maria Ludassy and Mihaly Vajda, in Bence et a1.

15. Janos Kelemen and Gyorgy Bence, in Bence et al.16. Alajos Dornbach and Istvan Nehez-Possony, in Bence et a1.

17. This was the position of the legal scholar Csaba Varga (not to be confused with the NationalPeasant Party leader), ibid. It is instructive to compare this conclusion with the ideas about the "truth

phase" and "justice phase" of such an investigation, developed by Mendez, Truth and Partial Justice(NY: 1987) and Neier in the New York Review ofBooks on Feb. 1, 1990. The Hungarian lawyers,

mos t probably, did not know the first and could not know yet the second publication.

18. The whole conference was amply reported by the press and covered by the media. Thus,

th e results had a considerable influence on the subsequent discussion in Hungary. I don't want toen ter into the details of the journalistic debate that has been dominated by demands for more politicaljust ice. But a few cautionary voices were also to be heard. See E. Hankiss "Tegyunke igazsayot?"Magyar Nemzet, March 8, 1990 and my article "Azt kovetelik az einberek - Jogorok Vigyazzatok!"lvIagyar Novancs, Feb. 21, 1990.19. Independent Lawyers' Forum, 1990. I want to express my thanks to Dr. Pal Bartfay who

kindly sent me the text of the proposal.

20. See Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France in The Works ofEdmund Burke, Vol. 11

(London: 1872).

1.6 - Bence, György - Political Justice in Post-Communist Societies. the Case of Hungary (EN)

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