149619653 libel-cases

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 146848             October 17, 2006

GMA NETWORK, INC. (formerly known as "REPUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.") and REY VIDAL,petitioners, vs.JESUS G. BUSTOS, M.D., TEODORA R. OCAMPO, M.D., VICTOR V. BUENCAMINO, M.D., CESAR F. VILLAFUERTE, M.D., ARTEMIO T. ORDINARIO, M.D., and VIRGILIO C. BASILIO, M.D., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision2 dated January 25, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV

No. 52240 which reversed and set aside an earlier decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 64, in Civil Case No. 88-1952, an action for damages thereat commenced by the herein respondents Jesus G. Bustos, Teodora R. Ocampo, Victor V. Buencamino, Cesar F. Villafuerte, Artemio T. Ordinario and Virgilio C. Basilio, all physicians by profession and the former chairman and members, respectively, of the Board of Medicine, against the herein petitioners GMA Network, Inc. (formerly Republic Broadcasting System, Inc.) and Rey Vidal.

The facts:

In August 1987, the Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the physicians’ licensure examinations. Out of the total two thousand eight hundred thirty-five (2,835) examinees who took the examinations, nine hundred forty-one (941) failed.

On February 10, 1988, a certain Abello and over two hundred other unsuccessful examinees filed a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the board of medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test papers. As alleged, mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous checking of answers to test questions vitiated the results of the examinations.

As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to gather news from courts, among other beats, its co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the filing of the mandamus petition. After securing a copy of the petition, Vidal composed and narrated the news coverage for the ten o’clock evening news edition of GMA’s Channel 7 Headline News.

The text of the news report,4 as drafted and narrated by Vidal and which GMA Network, Inc. aired and televised on February 10, 1988, runs:

Some 227 examinees in the last August Physician Licensure Examinations today asked the Manila [RTC] to compel the [PRC] and the Medical Board of Examiners to recheck the August 1987 test papers. The petitioners [examinees] today went to the Presiding Judge to also ask for a special raffling of the case considering that the next physicians examinations have been scheduled for February [1988] …. They said that the gross, massive, haphazard, whimsical and capricious checking that must have been going on for years should now be stopped once and for all.

The last examination was conducted last August … at the PRC central offices, the Far Eastern University and the Araullo High School, the exams on multiple choice or matching type involve 12 subjects including general medicine, biochemistry, surgery and obstetrics and gynecology.

21 schools participated in the examination represented by some 2,835 medical student graduates, 1,894 passed and 141 failed.

The results of the exams were released December 9 and were published the following day in metropolitan papers last years (sic).

A group of failing examinees enlisted the help of the Offices of the President and the Vice President and as a result were allowed by PRC … to obtain the official set of

test questions. The students then researched … and produced the key answers to the key questions.

The petitioners were also allowed to see their own test papers, most of them copying the papers ….

With these copies, they were able to match the scores and the correct answers in the examinations. They found that the errors in checking were so material that they actually lowered the scores that formed the individual ratings of the examinees in the various subjects.

Examples of the discrepancies are to be found in identical answers being rated as incorrect in one examinee’s paper but correct in another. There is also the case of two different answers being rated as correct. There are indications of wrong counting of total scores per subject so that the totals are either short by two up to four points.

Finally, there are raw scores that have been transmuted incorrectly so that a passing score was rendered a failure. The petitioners said that the haphazard and whimsical and capricious checking should now be stopped once and for all. They said that the nine years formal studies and the one year internship not to mention the expenses and the blood, sweat, and tears of the students and their families will have been rendered nugatory. The petitioners also noted that Com. Francia had promised last January 12 to rectify the errors in the checking and yet they have not received the appropriate action promised whereas the next exams have been set for Feb. 20, 21, 27 and 28. (Words in bracket added.)

Stung by what they claim to be a false, malicious and one-sided report filed and narrated by a remorseless reporter, the herein respondents instituted on September 21, 1988 with the RTC of Makati City a damage suit against Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., then known as the Republic Broadcasting System, Inc. In their complaint,5 docketed as Civil Case No. 88-1952 and raffled to Branch 64 of the court, the respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, alleged, among other things, that then defendants Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., in reckless disregard for the truth, defamed them by word of mouth and simultaneous visual presentation on GMA Network, Inc.’s Channel 7. They added that, as a measure to make a forceful impact on their audience, the defendants made use of an unrelated and old footage (showing physicians wearing black armbands) to make it appear that other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees. According to the plaintiffs, the video footage in question actually related to a 1982 demonstration staged by doctors and personnel of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) regarding wage and economic dispute with hospital management.

In their answer with counterclaim, the defendants denied any wrongdoing, maintaining that their February 10, 1988 late evening telecast on the filing of the mandamus petition was contextually a concise and objective narration of a matter of public concern. They also alleged that the press freedom guarantee covered the telecast in question, undertaken as it was to inform, without malice, the viewing public on the conduct of public officials. And vis-à-vis the particular allegation on the film footages of the PGH demonstration, defendants tagged such footages as "neutral." Pressing the point, defendants hastened to add that the footages were accompanied, when shown, by an appropriate voiceover, thus negating the idea conjured by the plaintiffs to create an effect beyond an obligation to report.

In the course of trial, the plaintiffs presented testimonial evidence to prove their allegations about the Vidal report having exposed them, as professionals, to hatred, contempt and ridicule. And in a bid to establish malice and bad faith on the part of the defendants, the plaintiffs adduced evidence tending to show that the former exerted no effort toward presenting their (plaintiffs’) side in subsequent telecasts.

In a decision6 dated October 17, 1995, the trial court found for the herein petitioners, as defendants a quo, on the postulate that the Vidal telecast report in question is privileged. Dispositively, the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, plaintiffs’ complaint for damages against defendants Republic Broadcasting System Incorporated and Rey Vidal is hereby DISMISSED.

The defendants’ counterclaim for damages is likewise dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration,7 herein respondents went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 52240. As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its decision8 of January 25, 2001, reversed and set aside that of the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 17, 1995 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and [petitioners] are hereby ordered to pay, in solidum, the following:

a) the amount of P100,000.00 for each of the [respondents] as moral damages;

b) the amount of P100,000.00 for each of the [respondents] as exemplary damages;

c) the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fee;

d) and cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. (Words in brackets added.)

Hence, petitioners’ present recourse, submitting for the Court’s consideration the following questions:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA, AFTER DECLARING THE NEWS TELECAST OF FEBRUARY 10, 1988 AS QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN INJECTING ACTUAL MALICE TO THE NEWS TELECAST OF FEBRUARY 10, 1988 JUST SO THAT RESPONDENT BOARD OF MEDICINE COULD RECOVER MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN COMPLETELY REJECTING PETITIONERS’ EVIDENCE THAT

THE CHARACTER GENERATED WORDS ‘FILE VIDEO’ WERE INDICATED ON SCREEN TO IDENTIFY THE SHOWING OF THE OLD FILM FOOTAGE IN THE NEWS TELECAST OF FEBRUARY 10, 1988.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR … IN IMPUTING MALICE UPON PETITIONERS FOR NOT PRESENTING A TAPE COPY OF THE NEWS TELECAST OF FEBRUARY 10, 1988 ON THE GRATUITOUS DECLARATION THAT A TAPE COPY COULD BE EASILY SECURED FROM THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) WHICH ALLEGEDLY KEEPS FILE COPIES OF ALL SHOWS FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME.

D.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT BOARD OF MEDICINE CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS THEREOF, WHO NEVER QUESTIONED THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION DATED JANUARY 25, 2001 IN A SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT PETITION BEFORE THE HONORABLE COURT, CAN ASK FOR AN INCREASED AWARD IN DAMAGES FROM THE HONORABLE COURT UNDER THEIR COMMENT DATED 7 MAY 2001.

Summed up, the issues tendered in this petition boil down to the following: (1) whether or not the televised news report in question on the filing of the petition for mandamus against the respondents is libelous; and (2) whether or not the insertion of the old film footage depicting the doctors and personnel of PGH in their 1982 demonstrations constitutes malice to warrant the award of damages to the respondents.

It bears to stress, at the outset, that the trial court found the disputed news report not actionable under the law on libel, hence no damages may be recovered. Wrote that court:

This Court finds the telecast of February 10, 1988 aired over Channel 7 by [petitioner] Rey Vidal as a straight news report of the acts and conduct of the members of the Medical Board of Examiners who are public officers, devoid of comment or remarks, and thus privileged, and recognized under the 1987 Constitution.

A comparative examination of the telecast of the disputed news report with the Petition for Mandamus entitled Abello, et al., vs. Professional Regulation Commission … filed before the [RTC] by the medical examinees reveals that the disputed news report is but a narration of the allegations contained in and circumstances attending the filing of the said Petition for Mandamus. In the case of Cuenco vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-29560, March 31, 1976 …, [it was] … held that the correct rule is that a fair and true report of a complaint filed in Court without remarks nor comments even before an answer is filed or a decision promulgated should be covered by the privilege. xxx. This Court adopts the ruling [in Cuenco] to support its finding of fact that the disputed news report consists merely of a summary of the allegations in the said Petition for Mandamus, filed by the medical examinees, thus the same falls within the protected ambit of privileged communication.

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, [petitioners], in consideration of the foregoing observations … cannot be held liable for damages claimed by [respondents] for simply bringing to fore information on subjects of public concern.9 (Words in brackets supplied.)

The CA, too, regarded the text of the news telecast as not libelous and as a qualifiedly privileged communication, "[it having been] merely lifted or quoted from the contents and allegations in the said petition [for mandamus]."10 But unlike the trial court, the CA saw fit to award damages to the respondents, it being its posture that the insertion to the news telecast of the unrelated 1982 PGH picket film footage is evidence of malice. Without quite saying so, the CA viewed the footage insertion as giving a televised news report otherwise privileged a libelous dimension. In the precise words of the appellate court:

While it is the duty of the media to report to the public matters of public concern and interest, the report should be a fair, accurate and true report of the proceedings. The subject telecast failed in this aspect. The insertion of the film footage showing the doctors’ demonstration at the PGH several times during the news report on the petition filed by the board flunkers undoubtedly created an impression that the said demonstration was related to the filing of the case by the board flunkers. The insertion of the film footage without the words ‘file video’, and which had no connection whatsoever to the petition, was done with the knowledge of the [petitioners], thus, in wanton and reckless disregard of their duty to the public to render a fair, accurate and true report of the same.

xxx xxx xxx

The findings of malice on the part of the [petitioners] should not be construed as a censure to the freedom of the press since their right to render a news on matters of public concern was not the issue but rather the misrepresentation made when they inserted a film footage of the doctors’ demonstration which created a wrong impression of the real situation. Unquestionably, the news reporting, interview and the showing of [the flunkers] filing the case were fair reporting. At this point, that would have been sufficient to inform the public of what really happened. However, for reasons only known to [petitioners], they inserted the questioned film footage which had no relation to the news being reported. There is no other conclusion that there was motive to create an impression that the issue also affected the doctors which forced them to demonstrate. xxx. (Words in brackets supplied).

With the view we take of this case, given the parallel unchallenged determination of the two courts below that what petitioner Vidal reported was privileged, the award of damages is untenable as it is paradoxical.

An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act amounting to defamatory imputation or libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person.11 Liability for libel attaches present the following elements: (a) an allegation or imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.12

Malice or ill-will in libel must either be proven (malice in fact) or may be taken for granted in view of the grossness of the imputation (malice in law). Malice, as we wrote in Brillante v. Court of Appeals,13 is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by

personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. Malice implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous or defamatory remarks made the same with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.

In the instant case, there can be no quibbling that what petitioner corporation aired in its Channel 7 in the February 10, 1988 late evening newscast was basically a narration of the contents of the aforementioned petition for mandamus. This is borne by the records of the case and was likewise the finding of the trial court. And the narration had for its subject nothing more than the purported mistakes in paper checking and the errors in the counting and tallying of the scores in the August 1987 physicians’ licensure examinations attributable to the then chairman and members of the Board of Medicine.

Conceding hypothetically that some failing specifically against the respondents had been ascribed in that news telecast, it bears to stress that not all imputations of some discreditable act or omission, if there be any, are considered malicious thus supplying the ground for actionable libel. For, although every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged. In fine, the privilege destroys the presumption.

Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified.14 Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action. Examples of these are speeches or debates made by Congressmen or Senators in the Congress or in any of its committees. On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. The second kind of privilege, in fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel provided the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To this genre belongs "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks" falling under and described as exceptions in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.15

To be sure, the enumeration under the aforecited Article 354 is not an exclusive list of conditional privilege communications as the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the press has expanded the privilege to include fair commentaries on matters of public interest.16 .

In the case at bench, the news telecast in question clearly falls under the second kind of privileged matter, the same being the product of a simple narration of the allegations set forth in the mandamus petition of examinees Abello, et al., devoid of any comment or remark. Both the CA and the trial court in fact found the narration to be without accompanying distortive or defamatory comments or remarks. What at bottom petitioners Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., then did was simply to inform the public of the mandamus petition filed against the respondent doctors who were admittedly the then chairman and members of the Board of Medicine. It was clearly within petitioner Vidal’s job as news writer and reporter assigned to cover government institutions to keep the public abreast of recent developments therein. It must be reiterated that the courts a quo had determined the news report in question to be qualifiedly privileged communication protected under the 1987 Constitution.

This brings us to the more important question of whether or not the complaining respondents, in their effort to remove the protection accorded by the privilege, succeeded in establishing ill-will and malice on the part of the petitioners in their televised presentation of the news report in dispute, thus committing libel.

The CA, adopting the respondents’ line on the matter of malice, resolved the question in the affirmative. As the CA noted, the insertion of an old film footage showing doctors wearing black armbands and demonstrating at the PGH, without the accompanying character-generated words "file video," created the impression that other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the unsuccessful examinees.

The Court disagrees.

Contrary to the CA’s findings, the identifying character-generated words "file video" appeared to have been superimposed on screen, doubtless to disabuse the minds of televiewers of the idea that a particular footage is current. In the words of the trial court, the phrase "file video" was "indicated on screen purposely to prevent misrepresentation so as not to confuse the viewing public."17 The trial court added the observation that "the use of file footage in TV news reporting is a standard practice."18 At any rate, the absence of the accompanying character-generated words "file video" would not change the legal situation insofar as the privileged nature of the audio-video publication complained of is concerned. For, with the view we take of the state of things, the video footage was not libel in disguise; standing without accompanying sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in nature.

And lest it be overlooked, personal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not automatically equivalent to defamation. The law against defamation protects one’s interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation "as good as one’s character and conduct warrant" in the community.19 Clearly then, it is the community, not personal standards, which shall be taken into account in evaluating any allegations of libel and any claims for damages on account thereof.

So it is that in Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel,20 we held:

The term "community" may of course be drawn as narrowly or as broadly as the user of the term and his purposes may require. The reason why for purposes of the law on libel the more general meaning of community must be adopted in the ascertainment of relevant standards, is rooted deep in our constitutional law. That reason relates to the fundamental public interest in the protection and promotion of free speech and expression, an interest shared by all members of the body politic and territorial community. A newspaper … should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest, wherever they may take place within the nation and as well in the outside world, with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another (however defined in scope) on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keep within the general community. Any other rule on defamation, in a national community like ours with many, diverse cultural, social, religious an other groupings, is likely to produce an unwholesome "chilling effect" upon the constitutionally protected operations of the press and other instruments of information and education.

It cannot be over-emphasized furthermore that the showing of the 1982 film footage, assuming for argument that it contained demeaning features, was actually accompanied or

simultaneously voiced over by the narration of the news report lifted from the filing of the mandamus petition. As aptly put by the petitioners without controversion from the respondents, there was nothing in the news report to indicate an intent to utilize such old footages to create another news story beyond what was reported.21

To be sure, actual malice, as a concept in libel, cannot plausibly be deduced from the fact of petitioners having dubbed in their February 10, 1988 telecast an old unrelated video footage. As it were, nothing in the said footage, be it taken in isolation or in relation to the narrated Vidal report, can be viewed as reputation impeaching; it did not contain an attack, let alone a false one, on the honesty, character or integrity or like personal qualities of any of the respondents, who were not even named or specifically identified in the telecast. It has been said that if the matter is not per se libelous, malice cannot be inferred from the mere fact of publication.22 And as records tend to indicate, the petitioners, particularly Vidal, do not personally know or had dealings with any of the respondents. The Court thus perceives no reason or motive on the part of either petitioner for malice. The respondents too had failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that petitioners were animated by a desire to inflict them unjustifiable harm or at least to place them in a discomforting light.

Surely, the petitioners’ failure, perhaps even their indisposition, to obtain and telecast the respondents’ side is not an indicia of malice. Even the CA, by remaining mum on this point, agrees with this proposition and with the petitioners’ proffered defense on the matter. As petitioner Vidal said while on the witness box, his business as a reporter is to report what the public has the right to know, not to comment on news and events, obviously taking a cue from the pronouncement of the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New York Times Co. v. Connor23 that "a reporter … may rely on statements made by a single source even though they reflect only one side of the story without fear of libel prosecution by a public official."

What is more, none of the herein respondents ever made a claim or pretence that he or all of them collectively was or were among the demonstrating PGH doctors in the 1982 video footage. It thus puzzles the mind how they could claim to have been besmirched by the use of the same video in the subject news telecast.

Given the foregoing considerations, the propriety of the award by the CA of moral and exemplary damages need not detain us long. Suffice it to state that moral damages may be recovered only if the existence of the factual and legal bases for the claim and their causal connection to the acts complained of are satisfactorily proven.24 Sadly, the required quantum of proof is miserably wanting in this case. This is as it should be. For, moral damages, albeit incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate one for injury sustained and actual damages suffered.25 Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if the claimants, respondents in this case, were able to establish their right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.26 Not being entitled to moral damages, neither may the respondents lay claim for exemplary damages.

In all, the Court holds and so rules that the subject news report was clearly a fair and true report, a simple narration of the allegations contained in and circumstances surrounding the filing by the unsuccessful examinees of the petition for mandamus before the court, and made without malice. Thus, we find the petitioners entitled to the protection and immunity of the rule on privileged matters under Article 354 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. It follows that they too cannot be held liable for damages sought by the respondents, who, during the period material, were holding public office.

We close this ponencia with the following oft-quoted excerpts from an old but still very much applicable holding of the Court on how public men should deport themselves in the face of criticism:

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged by the balm of clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his officials acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. xxx.27

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed decision dated January 25, 2001 of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 52240 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and that of the trial court is REINSTATED andAFFIRMED in toto.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 As filed, the petition impleads the Court of Appeals as respondent, which should not have been under Sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (now a Comelec Commissioner) and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Rollo, pp. 11-26.

3 Id. at 27-34.

4 Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp. 9-11, Id. at 398-400 and Respondents’ Memorandum, pp. 24-25, Id. at 365–366.

5 Annex "D," Petition, Id. at 102 et seq.

6 Supra note 3.

7 Per Order dated January 17, 1996; Annex "M," Petition, Rollo, p. 163.

8 Supra note 2.

9 Supra note 3 at 6 and 8.

10 Supra note 2 at 9.

11 Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code.

12 Daez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47971, October 31,1990, 191 SCRA 61.

13 G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 441, citing US v. Cañete, 38 Phil. 253 (1918) and Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 238, 314 SCRA 460 (1999), citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254 (1964).

14 Flor v. People, G.R. No. 139987, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 440, citing Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution and Regalado, Florenz, Criminal Law Conspectus, p. 646 (1st Ed.).

15 Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. -- Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

16 Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999, 301 SCRA 1.

17 Page 7 of the RTC Decision; Rollo, p. 98.

18 Ibid.

19 Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel, G.R. No. L-76565, November 9, 1988, 167 SCRA 255, citing Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Vol. 1, p. 349 (1956).

20 Id., citing Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, (1052); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, (1964); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, (1967); and The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 Columbia L. Rev. 808, (1969).

21 CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 15.

22 Reyes, Jr. v. CA, 47 O.G. 3569.

23 No. 22362 [August 4, 1966], 365 F. 2d 567,576.

24 Article 2217, New Civil Code of the Philippines.

25 Simex International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88013, March19, 1990, 183 SCRA 360.

26 Article 2234, New Civil Code of the Philippines.

27 United v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 740-41 (1918).

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. NO. 142509             March 24, 2006

JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR., Petitioner, vs.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated January 18, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 20988 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 167 of Pasig City, convicting him of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the appellate court’s Resolution2 dated March 13, 2000 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court, are as follows:

On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. Jose J. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz), retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The letter was open, not contained in an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz’ wife put it on her husband’s desk. On that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the letter and made out its content. It reads:

DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES ESTATEOffice of the Asst. Court Administrator No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City,Metro Manila

August 18, 1995

ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZCounsel for Benjamin A. Monroy#8 Quirino St., Life Homes SubdivisionRosario , Pasig City, Metro Manila

Subject: Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995 addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco

Atty. Pieraz:

This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter dated August 18, 1995, addressed to our client; using carabao English.

May we remind you that any attempt on your part to continue harassing the person of Mrs. Teresita Quingco of No. 1582 Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, Metro Manila---undersigned much to his regrets shall be constrained/compelled to file the necessary complaint for disbarment against you.

You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the full consequence of the law. Needless for you to cite specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is irrelevant to the present case. As a matter of fact, the same shall be used by no other than the person of Mrs. Quingco in filing administrative charge against you and all persons behind these nefarious activities.

Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned to face you squarely in any courts of justice, so as we can prove "who is who" once and for all.

Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding these matters, I remain.

Yours in Satan name;

(Signed)

JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR.Atty-in- Fact of the presentCourt Administrator of the entireIntestate Estate of Don Hermogenes

Rodriguez Y. Reyes.

Copy furnished:All concerned.

Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz, nevertheless, responded and sent a communication by registered mail to said Buatis, Jr., accused-appellant. In reply, Buatis, Jr. dispatched a second letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.

Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: "Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish carabao," Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its contents came to the knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him telling him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."

Aside from the monetary expenses he incurred as a result of the filing of the instant case, Atty Pieraz’ frail health was likewise affected and aggravated by the letter of accused-appellant.

The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial. According to him, it was at the behest of the president of the organization "Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan" or NASATAMA, and of a member, Teresita Quingco, that he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a comment to the letter of private-complainant in the second week of August 1995.

Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had signed that letter-comment or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had made and sent another letter, this time dated August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit which he filed before the Pasig City Prosecutor’s Office, however, Buatis, Jr. could not deny its contents, among which was his admission that indeed, he had sent subject letter of August 18 and the letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.3

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 30, 19974 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of libel, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. GUILTY of the crime of LIBEL defined in Art. 353 and penalized under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day, as minimum, to Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10) Days, as maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P20,000.00, by way of compensatory damages; the amount of P10,000.00, as and for moral damages, and another amount of P10,000.00, for exemplary damages; to suffer all accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs. 5

The trial court ruled that: calling a lawyer "inutil", stupid and capable of using only carabao English, is intended not only for the consumption of respondent but similarly for others as a copy of the libelous letter was furnished all concerned; the letter was prejudicial to the good name of respondent and an affront to his standing as a lawyer, who, at the time the letter was addressed to him, was representing a client in whose favor he sent a demand letter to the person represented by petitioner; the letter is libelous per se since a defect or vice imputed is plainly understood as set against the entire message sought to be conveyed; petitioner failed to reverse the presumption of malice from the defamatory imputation contained in the letter; the letter could have been couched in a civil and respectful manner, as the intention of petitioner was only to advice respondent that demand was not proper and legal but instead petitioner was seething with hate and contempt and even influenced by satanic intention.

The RTC also found that since the letter was made known or brought to the attention and notice of other persons other than the offended party, there was publication; and that the element of identity was also established since the letter was intended for respondent. It rejected petitioner’s stance that the libelous letter resulted from mistake or negligence since petitioner boldly admitted that he had to reply to respondent’s letter to Mrs. Quingco, it being his duty to do as the latter is a member of petitioner’s association.

The RTC found respondent entitled to recover compensatory damages as the immediate tendency of the defamatory imputation was to impair respondent’s reputation although no actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted. It also awarded moral damages as well as exemplary damages since the publication of the libelous letter was made with special ill will, bad faith or in a reckless disregard for the rights of respondent.

Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTC’s decision to the CA which, in a Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its entirety the decision of the trial court.

The CA found that the words used in the letter are uncalled for and defamatory in character as they impeached the good reputation of respondent as a lawyer and that it is malicious. It rejected petitioner’s claim that the letter is a privileged communication which would exculpate

him from liability since he failed to come up with a valid explanation as to why he had to resort to name calling and downgrading a lawyer to the extent of ridiculing him when he could have discharged his so called "duty" in a more toned down fashion. It found also that there was publication of the letter, thus, it cannot be classified as privileged.

The CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated March 13, 2000.

Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, raising the following issues:

A. CAN THERE BE MALICE IN FACT, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF LIBEL, ATTRIBUTED TO A RESPONDING URBAN POOR LEADER ACTING AS COUNSEL, DEFENDING A MEMBER OF AN ASSOCIATION UNDER THREAT OF EJECTMENT FROM HER DWELLING PLACE?

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ALLEGED LIBELOUS LETTER AS ONE OF THOSE FALLING UNDER THE PURVIEW OF PRIVILEGE (sic) COMMUNICATION?

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT: THE PETITIONER CAN NOT BE MADE TO ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY THAT WHAT HE DID IS A CRIME?6

The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment in behalf of the People and respondent filed his own Comment praying for the affirmance of the CA decision. As required by us, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.

The principal issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.

In his Memorandum, petitioner claims that: the CA failed to apply the ruling in People v. Velasco7 that "if the act/matter charged as libelous is only an incident in [an] act which has another objective, the crime is not libel;" when he made his reply to respondent’s letter to Mrs. Quingco making a demand for her to vacate the premises, his objective was to inform respondent that Mrs. Quingco is one of the recognized tenants of the Rodriguez estate which is claiming ownership over the area of Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, and petitioner is the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the Rodriquez estate; communication in whatever language, either verbal or written of a lawyer under obligation to defend a client’s cause is but a privileged communication; the instant case is a qualified privileged communication which is lost only by proof of malice, however, respondent failed to present actual proof of malice; the existence of malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic evidence that petitioner bore a grudge against the offended party, or there was ill will or ill feeling between them which existed at the time of the publication of the defamatory imputation which were not at all indicated by respondent in his complaint; contrary to the findings of the CA, there was justifiable motive in sending such a letter which was to defend the vested interest of the estate and to abate any move of respondent to eject Mrs. Quingco.

Petitioner further argues that if the words used in the libelous letter-reply would be fully scrutinized, there is justification for the use of those words, to wit: "lousy but inutile threatening letter…using carabao English" was due to the fact that the demand letter was indeed a threatening letter as it does not serve its purpose as respondent’s client has no legal right over the property and respondent did not file the ejectment suit; that respondent is just making a mockery out of Mrs. Quingco, thus he is stupid; that the words "Yours in Satan

name" is only a complementary greeting used in an ordinary communication letter, which is reflected to the sender but not to the person being communicated and which is just the reverse of saying "Yours in Christ".

We deny the petition.

Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.8

The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. There is publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against whom it has been written.9 Petitioner’s subject letter-reply itself states that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of has communicated it to a third person.10 Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.

The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself.

We shall then resolve the issues raised by petitioner as to whether the imputation is defamatory and malicious.

In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.11

For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes,12 to wit:

In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the court had the following to say on this point: "In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of construction are conspicuously applicable: (1) That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered. (2) The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole."

In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account. The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used in the publication.13

Gauging from the above–mentioned tests, the words used in the letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using words such as "lousy", "inutile", "carabao English", "stupidity", and "satan", the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of petitioner have caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have told him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."14

Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that petitioner’s imputation is malicious (malice in law).15 A reading of petitioner’s subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioner’s good intention and justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference of malice.

Petitioner, however, insists that his letter was a private communication made in the performance of his moral and social duty as the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the Rodriguez estate where Mrs. Quingco is a recognized tenant and to whom respondent had written the demand letter to vacate, thus in the nature of a privileged communication and not libelous.

We are not persuaded.

Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity.─ Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Clearly, the presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged communication.

In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, as claimed by petitioner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.16

While it would appear that the letter was written by petitioner out of his social duty to a member of the association which he heads, and was written to respondent as a reply to the latter’s demand letter sent to a member, however, a reading of the subject letter-reply addressed to respondent does not show any explanation concerning the status of Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled to the premises as against the claim of respondent’s client. The letter merely contained insulting words,i.e, "lousy" and "inutile letter using carabao English", "stupidity", and "satan", which are totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs. Quingco’s right over the premises. The words as written had only the effect of maligning respondent’s integrity as a lawyer, a lawyer who had served as legal officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for so many years until his retirement and afterwards as consultant of the same agency and also a notary public. The letter was crafted in an injurious way than what is necessary in answering a demand letter which exposed respondent to public ridicule thus negating good faith and showing malicious intent on petitioner’s part.

Moreover, the law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, such statement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement.17 A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public.18 In this case, petitioner admitted that he dictated the letter to one of her secretaries who typed the same and made a print out of the computer.19While petitioner addressed the reply-letter to respondent, the same letter showed that it was copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication.20 Such publication had already created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which brought discredit and shame to respondent’s reputation.

Since the letter is not a privileged communication, malice is presumed under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. The presumption was not successfully rebutted by petitioner as discussed above.

Thus, we find that the CA did not commit any error in affirming the findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.

An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review and it becomes our duty to correct any error, as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not.21 We find that the award of P20,000.00 as compensatory damages should be deleted for lack of factual basis. To be entitled to actual and compensatory damages, there must be competent proof constituting evidence of the actual amount thereof.22 Respondent had not presented evidence in support thereof.

Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means of writings or similar means with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.

The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals,23 where petitioners therein were convicted of B.P. 22 which provides for alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment, we

deleted the prison sentence imposed upon petitioners and instead ordered them only to pay a fine equivalent to double the amount of the check. We held:

Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.24

In the subsequent case of Lim v. People,25 we did the same and deleted the penalty of imprisonment and merely imposed a fine for violation of B.P. 22, concluding that such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.

Adopting these cases, we issued Administrative Circular No. 12-2000. On February 14, 2001, we issued Administrative Circular 13-2001 which modified Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 by stressing that the clear tenor of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. 22.

While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we find the reasons behind the imposition of fine instead of imprisonment applicable to petitioner’s case of libel. We note that this is petitioner’s first offense of this nature. He never knew respondent prior to the demand letter sent by the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then sought his assistance thereto. He appealed from the decision of the RTC and the CA in his belief that he was merely exercising a civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private complainant. In fact, petitioner could have applied for probation to evade prison term but he did not do so believing that he did not commit a crime thus, he appealed his case. We believe that the State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends.26 Consequently, we delete the prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose a fine of six thousand pesos.

This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of imprisonment and imposed a fine instead in the crime of libel. InSazon v. Court of Appeals,27 petitioner was convicted of libel and was meted a penalty of imprisonment and fine; and upon a petition filed with us, we affirmed the findings of libel but changed the penalty imposed to a mere fine.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall be a fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The award of compensatory damages is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief JusticeChairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., concurred in by Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., and B.A. Adefuin-dela Cruz; rollo, pp. 30-37.

2 Rollo, p. 26.

3 Id. at 31-33.

4 Id. at 41-47; Penned by Judge Alfredo C. Flores.

5 Id. at 47.

6 Id. at 17.

7 G.R. No. 43186, CA, February 19, 1937.

8 Alonzo v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 60, 71 (1995).

9 Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207, 239 (1997).

10 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1997 edition, Vol. III, p. 551 citing 36 C.J. 1223; Adamos, CA 35 O.G. 496;Dela Vega-Cayetano, CA 52 O.G. 240; Jose Andrada, CA 37 O.G. 1782.

11 Novicio v. Aggabao, G.R. No. 141332, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 138, 143.

12 27 Phil. 52 (1914).

13 Id. at 59-60.

14 Rollo, p. 34.

15 Sazon v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1053, 1065 (1996).

16 Brillante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 541, 569.

17 Id. at 570-571.

18 Daez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47971, October 31, 1990, 191 SCRA 61, 69, citing Lacsa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-74907, May 23, 1988, 161 SCRA 427.

19 TSN, December 12, 1996, p. 4.

20 Supra note 16 at 571.

21 Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455, 477.

22 Cañal v. People, G.R. No.163181, October 19, 2005, citing People v. Agudez, G.R. Nos. 138386-87, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 692.

23 359 Phil. 187.

24 Id. at 195.

25 394 Phil. 844, 854 (2000).

26 De Joya v. The Jail Warden of Batangas City, G.R. Nos. 159418-19, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 636, 645, citing People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 (1933) .

27 Supra note 15 at 703.