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[G.R. No. 138497. January 16, 2002]
IMELDA RELUCIO, peti t ioner, vs. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ,respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is a petition for review on certiorarii[1]seeking to set aside the decisionii[2]ofthe Court of Appeals that denied a petition for certiorariassailing the trial courts orderdenying petitioners motion to dismiss the case against her inclusion as party defendanttherein.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiffbelow) filed a petition for APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATRIX OFCONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC., againstdefendant Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio, docketed as Spec. Proc. M-3630, in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 141. In the petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married tothe private respondent, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that hearrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugalproperties, spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the totalexclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez, afterabandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with hereinpetitioner since 1976.
It was further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during theirperiod of cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a fortune consisting mainly ofstockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled corporations, residential, agricultural,commercial lots, houses, apartments and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles,bank accounts and jewelry. These properties, which are in the names of defendantLopez and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their dummies and proxies, have beenacquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of money, property andindustry of defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from petitionerRelucio.
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In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as a father and husband, heexcluded the private respondent and their four children from sharing or benefiting fromthe conjugal properties and the income or fruits there from. As such, defendant Lopezeither did not place them in his name or otherwise removed, transferred, stashed awayor concealed them from the private-respondent. He placed substantial portions of theseconjugal properties in the name of petitioner Relucio.
It was also averred that in the past twenty five years since defendant Lopezabandoned the private-respondent, he has sold, disposed of, alienated, transferred,assigned, canceled, removed or stashed away properties, assets and incomebelonging to the conjugal partnership with the private-respondent and either spent theproceeds thereof for his sole benefit and that of petitioner Relucio and their twoillegitimate children or permanently and fraudulently placed them beyond the reach ofthe private-respondent and their four children.
On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by hereinpetitioner on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action against her.
An Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein respondent Judge
denying petitioner Relucios Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded asa necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties areregistered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.
Subsequently thereafter, petitioner Relucio filed a Motion for Reconsideration tothe Order of the respondent Judge dated February 10, 1994 but the same was likewisedenied in the Order dated May 31, 1994. iii[3]
On June 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorariassailing the trial courts denial of her motion to dismiss. iv[4]
On May 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying thepetition.v[5]On June 26, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. vi[6]However, on
April 6, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.vii[7]
Hence, this appeal.viii[8]
The Issues
1. Whether respondents petition for appointment as sole administratrixof the conjugalproperty, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a causeof action against petitioner.
2. Whether petitioners inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for
a complete adjudication of the controversy.ix[9]
The CourtsRuling
We grant the petition. We resolve the issues in seriatim.
First issue: whether a cause of action exists against petitioner in the proceedings
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below. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation ofthe legal right of the other.x[10]The elements of a cause of action are:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises oris created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate suchright; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of theplaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff forwhich the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.xi[11]
A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if thealleged facts were admitted or proved.xii[12]
In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaintmust show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has beenmerely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. xiii[13]
Hence, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action alleged in SpecialProceedings M-3630, we assay its allegations.
In Part Two on the Nature of [the] Complaint, respondent Angelina Mejia Lopezsummarized the causes of action alleged in the complaint below.
The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband.
Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner.Respondents causes of action were all against her husband.
The first cause of action is forjudicial appointmentof respondent as administratrixof the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her marriage to
Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. Article 128 ofthe Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit:
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or herobligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership,for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of theconjugal partnership property xxx
The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to theexclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband.Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-dutyrelation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action.
In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action exists.The second cause of action is for an accounting by respondent husband.xiv[14]The
accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage.
Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez.Hence, no cause of action can exist against petitioner on this ground.
Respondents alternative cause of action is for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez sharein the co-owned property acquired during his illicit relationship and cohabitation with
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[petitioner]xv[15]and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between him[Alberto J. Lopez] and the [respondent].
The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez share inproperty co-owned by him and petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of theco-ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether there is
basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez share, if any there be, in property co-owned byhim with petitioner.
Respondents asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez share alone.Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds inrespondents favor, results in a breach of an obligation to respondent and gives rise to acause of action.xvi[16] Such cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, notpetitioner.
The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled from a stranger.
The action in Special Proceedings M-3630 is, to use respondent Angelina M. Lopez
own words, one by an aggrieved wife against her husband.xvii[17]
References to petitionerin the common and specific allegations of fact in the complaint are merely incidental, toset forth facts and circumstances that prove the causes of action alleged against AlbertoJ. Lopez.
Finally, as to the moral damages, respondents claim for moral damages is againstAlberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.
To sustain a cause of action for moral damages, the complaint must have thecharacter of an action for interference with marital or family relations under the CivilCode.
A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
of the suit.xviii[18]In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in SpecialProceedings M-3630.
If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. Anindispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of anaction.xix[19]Petitioners participation in Special Proceedings M-3630 is not indispensable.Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make anaccounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to respondentand their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez conjugal partnership with respondent,and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such
judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.
Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M-3630. Anecessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party ifcomplete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determinationor settlement of the claim subject of the action. xx[20] In the context of her petition in thelower court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez wereordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, givesupport to respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership withpetitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with
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respondent.
The Judgment
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of theCourt of Appeals. xxi [21] The Court DISMISSES Special Proceedings M-3630 of theRegional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 141as against petitioner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 149576
represented by the LandRegistration Authority,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,AZCUNA andGARCIA, JJ.
KENRICK DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 8, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
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The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001
decision1[1]and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
This case stemmed from the construction by respondent
Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence
around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation
Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a
result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters of
prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of
ownership over the property. It presented Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name
and which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the
name of one Alfonso Concepcion.
ATO verified the authenticity of respondents titles with the
Land Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose
Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the LRA,
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submitted his report. The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no
record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT No. 5450. The
land allegedly covered by respondents titles was also found to be
within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the Philippine Air Force)
in Pasay City.
By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint for revocation, annulment
and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines (as represented by the LRA) against respondent and
Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to Branch 114 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
96-1144.
On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was
purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for
respondent.
Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with
summons, the trial court ordered the issuance of an alias summons
by publication against him on February 19, 1997.
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The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents
relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or
continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare defendants in
default and other procedural matters.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee and Committee on Justice and Human Rights
conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land
registration and titling. In particular, the legislative investigation
looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how
respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and
135606.
During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998,
one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondents former
counsel. He testified that he prepared respondents answer and
transmitted an unsigned draft to respondents president, Mr. Victor
Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his. He
authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know
who finally signed it.
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With Atty. Garlitos revelation, the Republic promptly filed an
urgent motion on December 3, 1998 to declare respondent in
default,2 [2]
predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The
Republic argued that, since the person who signed the answer was
neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him, the
answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,3[3] it was a mere scrap of paper and
produced no legal effect.
On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution
granting the Republics motion.4[4] It found respondents answer to
be sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules.
The trial court ordered the answer stricken from the records,
declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic to present
its evidence ex parte.
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The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it
rested its case and formally offered its evidence.
Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February
19, 1999 resolution but the trial court denied it.
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari 5 [5] seeking to set aside the
February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent
contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in default for
failure to file a valid and timely answer.
On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision. It found Atty. Garlitos statements in the legislative
hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-
examination. The appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos
acts after the filing of the answer6[6]and concluded that he assented
to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead. This
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supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have had. Hence,
the appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari. It
directed the lifting of the order of default against respondent and
ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. The
Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this
petition.
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order
which declared respondent in default for its failure to file a valid
answer? Yes, it did.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or
ratify anothers statement.7[7]Where it appears that a party clearly
and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of
another, evidence of those statements is admissible against him.8[8]
This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.
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An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or
action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys
reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the
other person.9[9]By adoptive admission, a third persons statement
becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it.
Adoptive admission may occur when a party:
(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made
by another;10[10]
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;11[11]
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of
another;12[12]
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(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised
by another but ignores further points which he or she
has heard the other make13[13]
or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by
another.14[14]
Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty.
Garlitos and built its case on them. At no instance did it ever deny
or contradict its former counsels statements. It went to great
lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos testimony as well as its
implications, as follows:
1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact
was that the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading
could not be considered invalid for being an unsigned
pleading. The fact that the person who signed it was
neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically
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authorized by him was immaterial. The important thing
was that the answer bore a signature.
2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must
be signed by the party or his counsel, it does not prohibit
a counsel from giving a general authority for any person
to sign the answer for him which was what Atty. Garlitos
did. The person who actually signed the pleading was of
no moment as long as counsel knew that it would be
signed by another. This was similar to addressing an
authorization letter to whom it may concern such that
any person could act on it even if he or she was not
known beforehand.
3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he
never disowned its contents and he resumed acting as
counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These
circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or
ratified the signing of the answer by another.
Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its
motion for reconsideration of the trial courts February 19, 1999
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resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of Appeals
as well as in the comment15[15] and memorandum it submitted to
this Court.
Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos
statements as its own. Respondents adoptive admission constituted
a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.
Contrary to respondents position, a signed pleading is one
that is signed either by the party himself or his counsel. Section 3,
Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must be
signedby the party or counsel representing him.
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his
counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is
unsigned to one that is signed.
Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal
to him. He may not delegate it to just any person.
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The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that
he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay.16[16]Under the Rules of Court, it is
counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these
matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal
work involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the
members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing
of a pleading to another lawyer17[17]but cannot do so
in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified personthe performance of any task which by law may only be performed by amember of the Bar in good standing.
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Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by
unqualified persons,18[18]something the law strongly proscribes.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty.
Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant
to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have
been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate
hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the
answer by another as long as it conformed to his draft. We give no
value whatsoever to such self-serving statement.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket
authority for just anyone to sign the answer. The trial court
correctly ruled that respondents answer was invalid and of no legal
effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly
declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to present
evidence ex parte.
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Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It
maintains that even if it were true that its answer was supposedly
an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could
be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly
labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid raison d etrein
the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them
aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice.19[19]
The Courts pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals20[20]is
relevant:
Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudicationof cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly bythe rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation inthe application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge abastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberalityin the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in propercases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is truethat litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that everycase must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure toinsure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
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Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only
when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree
of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure. 21 [21] In this case, respondent failed to show any
persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding
by the rules.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts
committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal
profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible
misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31,
2001 decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE
and the February 19, 1999 resolution of the Regional Trial Court of
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Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in default is hereby
REINSTATED.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the
commencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre
Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional conduct not befitting
his position as an officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.
MID-PASIG LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus -
G.R. No. 162924
Present:
CARPIO,J.,*
CORONA,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
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MARIO TABLANTE, doing business under
the name and style ECRM ENTERPRISES;
ROCKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY;
LAURIE LITAM; and MC HOME DEPOT, INC.,
Respondents.
PERALTA,JJ.
Promulgated:
February 4, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in the instant petition are the two (2) Resolutions22[1]of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated November 20, 2003 and March 22, 2004, dismissing the
petition for certioraribefore it on technical grounds and denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof, respectively.
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The background facts are as follows:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a piece of land situated in Pasig City,
bounded by Meralco Avenue, Ortigas Avenue, Doa Julia Vargas Avenue, and
Valle Verde Subdivision. On December 6, 1999, petitioner, represented by its
Chairman and President, Ronaldo Salonga, and ECRM Enterprises, represented by
its proprietor, Mario P. Tablante, executed an agreement whereby the former
would lease to the latter an area, approximately one (1) hectare, of the aforesaid
land, for a period of three (3) months, to be used as the staging area for the
Home and Garden Exhibition Fair. On March 6, 2000, the date of the expiration of
the Lease Agreement, Tablante assigned all his rights and interests under the said
agreement to respondents Laurie M. Litam and/or Rockland Construction
Company, Inc. (Rockland) under a Deed of Assignment of the same date.
Petitioner eventually learned that respondent Tablante had executed a Contract
of Lease with respondent MC Home Depot, Inc. on November 26, 1999 over the
same parcel of land. Thereafter, respondent MC Home Depot, Inc. constructed
improvements on the land and subdivided the area into fifty-nine (59)
commercial stalls, which it leased to various entities. Upon the expiration of the
lease on March 6, 2000, petitioner demanded that respondents vacate the land.
A final demand was made in a letter dated December 20, 2000.23[2]
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In order to forestall ejectment from the premises, respondent Rockland
filed a case for Specific Performance with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
266, Pasig City, on January 11, 2001, compelling petitioner to execute a new
lease contract for another three (3) years, commencing in July 2000. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 68213. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it was anticipatory in nature.
Consequently, on August 22, 2001, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 8788 for
unlawful detainer against herein respondents, raffled to the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), Pasig City, Branch 70. Simultaneously, petitioner filed a supplemental
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 68213, on the ground of litis pendentia.
Petitioners motion to dismiss was denied. The denial was questioned and
eventually elevated to the Supreme Court.24[3]
Meantime, on April 29, 2002, the MTC rendered judgment in the unlawful
detainer (ejectment) case. In the main, the trial court ruled that the issue did not
involve material or physical possession, but rather, whether or not ECRM had the
right to exercise an option to renew its lease contract. The MTC stated that,
considering that this issue was incapable of pecuniary estimation, jurisdiction
over the case was vested in the RTC. The trial court, therefore, disposed, as
follows:
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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack
of merit. In the meantime, the plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendants
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00).25[4]
On appeal, the RTC, Pasig City, Branch 160, affirmed in toto. In its decision
dated July 10, 2003, the RTC ruled that:
Relative to the issue raised by the appellant that the lower court erred in
finding it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case as the question of
whether or not ECRM under the provisions of the lease agreement (pars. 3 and 13) has
the right to exercise an option to renew its lease contract is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation and therefore jurisdiction is vested in the Regional Trial Court. Republic Act
No. 7691 grants Metropolitan Trial Courts the exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Since it has been sufficiently established under
the facts obtaining that the contract of lease has been renewed before the expiration
of the lease period, and the appellant has consented to the renewal and assignment ofthe lease, it necessarily follows that the issue on whether the lower court erred in
finding that it did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter raised by the appellant,
deserves scant consideration and this court need not delve into it anymore.26[5]
A petition for certiorariwas consequently filed with the CA.
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In the assailed resolution dated November 20, 2003, the CA resolved to
dismiss the petition on the following grounds:
1) The verification and certification against non-forum shopping wassigned by a certain Antonio A. Merelos as General Manager of the petitioner-
corporation without attaching therewith a Corporate Secretarys certificate or board
resolution that he is authorized to sign for and on behalf of the petitioner; and
2) Lack of pertinent and necessary documents which are material portions
of the record as required by Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.27[6]
The motion for reconsideration was denied;28[7]hence, the instant petition
assigning the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM-SHOPPING IN THE PETITION
FAILED TO ATTACH THE BOARD RESOLUTION SHOWING THE AUTHORITY OF THE
AFFIANT.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITION LACKED THE PERTINENT AND NECESSARY DOCUMENTS REQUIRED BY THE
RULES.
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THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION
THUS EFFECTIVELY UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TO WIT:
(a) THAT THE LEASE AGREEMENT WAS UNILATERALLY RENEWED AND THAT
PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING SUCH UNILATERAL RENEWAL; (b) THATRESPONDENTS TABLANTE/ECRM, ROCKLAND AND MC HOME DEPOT COULD VALIDLY
OCCUPY THE PROPERTY IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY VALID LEASE AGREEMENT
CONSENTED TO BY PETITIONER; (c) PETITIONER *IS+ LIABLE FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND
COSTS OF SUIT.29[8]
The petition is granted.
In Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,30[9]the Court had occasion to explain that:
It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation
Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted,
and all properties controlled by the board of directors. A corporation has a separate and
distinct personality from its directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate
powers through the board of directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate
officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation
without authority from the board of directors. This has been our constant holding in
cases instituted by a corporation.
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In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some
corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. In
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a
general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate
against forum shopping; x x x.
In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company
can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General
Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment
Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorizedsignatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination
of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale
applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or
representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum
shopping, being in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the
allegations in the petition.31[10]
From the foregoing, it is thus clear that the failure to attach the Secretarys
Certificate, attesting to General Manager Antonio Mereloss authority to sign the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, should not be considered
fatal to the filing of the petition. Nonetheless, the requisite board resolution was
subsequently submitted to the CA, together with the pertinent documents.32[11]
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Considering that petitioner substantially complied with the rules, the dismissal of
the petition was, therefore, unwarranted. Time and again, we have emphasized
that dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned upon
especially if it will result in unfairness. The rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have been adopted to help secure,
not override, substantial justice. For this reason, courts must proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather, they must ensure
that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
ventilation of their causes, free from the constraint of technicalities.33[12]
After a finding that the CA erred in dismissing the petition before it, a
remand of the case is in order. However, a perusal of the records reveals that this
is no longer necessary in light of relevant developments obtaining in the case at
bar.
Petitioner, in its Memorandum dated October 28, 2005, alleged that
respondents possessory claims had lapsed and, therefore, had become moot and
academic. Respondent Rockland prayed that a three-year lease period be granted
to it in order that it would be able to plan its activities more efficiently. Since the
claimed lease contract had already expired as of July or August 2003, there
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appears no reason why respondents should continue to have any claim to further
possession of the property.34[13]
Respondent Rockland also stated in its Memorandum dated March 16,
2006 that it was no longer in possession of the subject property considering that:
50. In a Resolution dated 17 September 2004, in the case of Rockland
Construction Company, Inc. vs. Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation, et al.,
docketed as SCA No. 2673, and the Omnibus Order dated 12 November 2004,affirming the aforesaid Resolution, Branch 67 Pasig City Regional Trial Court
Presiding Judge Mariano M. Singzon awarded possession (albeit erroneously) of
subject property to Pasig Printing Corporation, an intervenor in the SCA case.
51. At present, petitioner does not have a cause of action against herein
respondent Rockland. Respondent is not unlawfully withholding possession of the
property in question as in fact respondent is not in possession of the subject
property. The issue of possession in this ejectment case has therefore been
rendered moot and academic.35[14]
This allegation was confirmed by respondent MC Home Depot, Inc. in its
Comment/Memorandum dated May 22, 2007 submitted to the Court. It stated
therein that the passage of time has rendered the issue of possession moot and
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academic with respect to respondent Rockland, as the three-year period has long
been expired in 2003.36[15] Furthermore, respondent MC Home Depot, Inc.
asserts that it is in rightful possession of the land on the strength of a
Memorandum of Agreement dated November 22, 2004 between the latter and
Pasig Printing Corporation. By petitioners admission that while it remains the
registered owner of the land, possession of the same had been adjudicated in
favor of Pasig Printing Corporation, another entity without any contractual
relationship with petitioner, on the strength of an Order from the RTC of Pasig
City. Considering that Pasig Printing Corporation has thejus possessionis over the
subject property, it granted the MC Home Depot, Inc. actual occupation and
possession of the subject property for a period of four (4) years, renewable for
another four (4) years upon mutual agreement of the parties.37[16]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. However, inview of the developments
which have rendered the issue of the right of possession over the subject property
moot and academic, the main case is hereby considered CLOSED AND
TERMINATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
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SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94093 August 10, 1993
FAR EAST MARBLE (PHILS.), INC., LUIS R. TABUENA, JR. and RAMON A. TABUENA,
petitioners,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondents.
Minerva C. genevea for petitioners.
Sabino B. Padilla IV for Bank of the Philippines Islands.
MELO, J .:
This has reference to a petition for review by certiorariseeking the reversal of the decision of theCourt of Appeals dated June 26, 1990, in CA-G.R. CV No. 14404 (Bellosillo (P), Marigomen,
Sempio-Diy, JJ.) which set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital JudicialRegion (Manila, Branch XIV), dated June 1, 1987 and remanded the case to the court a quo forfurther proceedings on the grounds that the complaint for foreclosure of chattel mortgage withreplevin had not prescribed and that, there being a cause of action, further proceedings, includingthe resolution of the motion for summary judgment may be pursued.
The antecedent facts of the case may be chronicled as follows:
On February 5, 1987, herein respondent Bank of the Philippines Islands (BPI) filed a complaint forforeclosure of chattel mortgage with replevin against petitioner Far East Marble (Phils.), Inc. (FarEast), Ramon A. Tabuena and Luis R. Tabuena, Jr. which was docketed as Civil Case No. 87-39345of Branch XIV of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila.
The complaint pertinently alleged:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST FAR EAST
2. That on various dates and for valuable consideration, the defendant Far Eastreceived from Commercial Bank and Trust Company . . . now merged with and intothe plaintiff bank . . . several loans evidenced by promissory notes executed by saidFar East, photo copies of which are attached hereto and made integral parts hereofas Annexes A, B and C.
3. That said promissory notes . . . .have long matured but despite repeated requests
and demands for payment thereof with interests and related charges due, Far Easthas failed and refused to pay. The account due on said promissory notes withinterests and related charges as of 10 September 1986 is P4,471,854.32 itemized ina statement of account, copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as
Annex D
4. That because of Far East's failure and refusal in bad faith to pay its long past dueobligations under the promissory notes above alleged, plaintiff was constrained to filethis suit . . .
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST FAR EAST
6. That on various dates and for valuable consideration, the defendant Far Eastreceived from and was extended by . . . plaintiffBank . . . credit facilities in the form of Trust Receipts, photo copies of which arehereto attached and made integral parts hereof as Annexes E, F, G, H, I and J.
7. That said Trust Receipts . . . have long matured and despite repeated requestsand demands for payment thereof with interests and related charges due Far Easthas failed and refused to pay. The amount due on said Trust Receipts with interestsand related charges as of 10 September 1986 is P2,170,476.62 as itemized in astatement of account, copy of which is attached hereto and made an integral parthereof as
Annex K.
8. That because of far East's failure and refusal to pay its long past due obligationsunder the Trust Receipts above alleged, plaintiff was constrained to file this suit . . .
xxx xxx xxx
10. That in September 1976 Far East executed in favor of . . . plaintiff Bank . . . aChattel Mortgage, photocopy of which is attached hereto and made an integral parthereof as Annex L, to secure the payment of its loan obligations including interestsand related charges. . .
xxx xxx xxx
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS RAMON A. TABUENAAND LUIS R. TABUENA, JR.
13. That in September 1976, defendants Ramon A. Tabuena and Luis R. Tabuena,Jr. executed in favor of . . . plaintiff Bank . . . a "continuing guaranty" photocopy ofwhich is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Annex M, whereby they bindthemselves,jointly and severally, to answer for the loan obligations to the Bank ofdefendant Far East.
14. That despite requests and demands for their payment of Far East's long past dueaccounts, said defendants Ramon A. Tabuena and Luis R. Tabuena, Jr. have failedand refused to pay said Far East accounts and have already defaulted in theirsolidary obligationunder said "continuing Guaranty."
15. That because of the failure and refusal of defendants Ramon A. Tabuena andLuis R. Tabuena, Jr. in bad faith to pay Far East's past due accounts under theirsolidary obligation stipulated in said "Continuing Guaranty,". . . plaintiff has beenconstrained to file suit against them . . .(pp. 32-36, Rollo.)
On March 10, 1987, Far East filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim admitting thegenuineness and due execution of the promissory notes attached as Annexes A, B, and C to thecomplaint, but alleging further that said notes became due and demandable on November 19, 1976,respectively. On the basis of the maturity dates of the notes, Far East thereupon raised the
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affirmative defenses of prescription and lack of cause of action as it denied the allegation of thecomplaint that BPI had made previous repeated requests and demands for payment. Far Eastclaimed that during the more than 10 years which elapsed from the dates of maturity of saidobligations up to the time the action for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage securing said obligationswas filed, it had not received from BPI or its predecessor any demand for payment and thus, it had"labored under the belief that they [the obligations] have already been written off" in the books of BPI.
Moreover, Far East denied the genuineness and due execution of the trust receipts and of theStatement of Account (pp. 78-79, Rollo). A motion to hear affirmative defenses was attached to theanswer.
On March 16, 1987, BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear affirmative defenses, alleging thatits cause of action against Far East have not prescribed, since within 10 years from the time itscause of action accrued, various written extrajudicial demands (attached thereto as Annexes "A" and"A-1") were sent by BPI and received by Far East. Moreover, BPI offered several written documentswhereby Far East supposedly acknowledged its debt to BPI (Annexes "B" to "B-6). Withal, BPImaintained, the ten-years prescriptive period to enforce its written contract had not only beeninterrupted, but was renewed.
On the same date, BPI filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that since Far East hadadmitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes and the deed of chattelmortgage annexed to its complaint, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, thus entitlingBPI to a favorable judgment as a matter of law in regard to its causes of action and on its right toforeclose the chattel mortgage.
On June 1, 1987, the trial court issued an order to the following effect:
WHEREFORE, the Court issues this Order:
1 Dismissing the complaint against the defendant Far East Marble (Phils.) Inc. forlack of cause of action and on grounds of pre[s]cription:
2 Denying for lack of merit the Motion for Summary Judgment and theSupplemental Motion for Summary Judgment;
3 Striking off from the records the order of March 6, 1987 and recalling the writ ofreplevin issued by this Court, and dismissing all the contempt charges;
4 Ordering the Sheriff to desist permanently from enforcing the writ of seizure andto return all the property seized by him under the Writ of Replevin, to the defendantFar East Marble (Phils.) Inc. immediately from receipt of a copy of this order, and incase of his failure to do so, the value thereof shall be charged against the replevinbond. (pp. 89-90, Rollo.)
An appeal therefrom was forthwith interposed by BPI, assailing the findings of the trial court withrespect to its finding that BPI's cause of action has prescribed and the consequent denial of themotion for summary judgment.
On June 26, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting aside the June 1, 1987 order ofthe court of origin and remanding the case to said court for further proceedings, "including theresolution anew of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment . . ., reception of the evidence of theparties and, thereafter, to decide the case as the facts may warrant." (pp. 98-99, Rollo.)
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Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorarifiled by Far East, anchored on the followingassigned errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT THAT PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN OBLIVIOUS OF THEFACT THAT THIS FINDING WAS REACHED AFTER DUE HEARING.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING FOR A REOPENINGOF THE TRIAL FOR THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE ON BOTH ISSUES OFPRESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN THESE WERE ALREADYTRIED AND WEIGHED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THECASE CONSIDERING THAT THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN INVOLVE PUREQUESTIONS OF LAW. (p. 14, Rollo.)
The issue of jurisdiction being basis, we shall endeavor to dispose of it ahead of the other topicsraised by petitioners
Petitioner Far East maintains the position that the Court of Appeals stepped beyond the limits of itsauthority when it assumed jurisdiction over the appeal filed by BPI inasmuch as said appeal raisedonly the pure questions of law or whether or not the trial court erred: (1) in dismissing BPI'scomplaint for lack of cause of action; (2) in finding that BPI's cause of action had prescribed; and (3)in ruling that BPI is not entitled to summary judgment on its causes of action against Far East.
Consequently, Far East contends, BPI should have taken its case directly to this Court.
There is no dispute with respect to the fact that when an appeal raises only pure questions of law, itis only this Court which has jurisdiction to entertain the same (Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (e), 1987Constitution; Rule 45, Rules of Court; see also Santos, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 378[1987]). On the other hand, appeals involving both questions of law and fact fall within the exclusiveappellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. At this point, there seems to be a need to distinguish aquestion of law from a question of fact.
It has been held in a number of cases (Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 191 SCRA 218 [1990]; Gan vs. LicupDesign Group, Inc., G.R. NO. 94264, July 24, 1990, En Banc, Minute Resolution; Pilar DevelopmentCorp. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 146 SCRA 215 [1986]; Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola BottlingCo., 19 SCRA 289 [1967]; Consolidated Mines, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 58 SCRA 618[1974]), that there is a "question of law" when there is doubt or difference of opinion as to what thelaw is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an examination of the probative value ofthe evidence presentedby the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of fact" whenthe doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there isno dispute as to fact,the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is aquestion of law.
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In the case at bar, BPI alleged in its complaint (Rollo, p. 42) that on various dates and for valuableconsideration, it extended to Far East several loans, evidenced by promissory notes, and creditfacilities in the form of trust receipts, and that despite repeated requests and demands for paymentthereof, Far East had failed and refused to pay. Thus BPI sought foreclosure of the chattel mortgagesecuring such indebtedness.
In its answer (Rollo, p. 78), Far East admitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissorynotes involved in the case, but denied BPI's allegation that repeated demands for payment weremade by BPI on it. Far East then raised the affirmative defenses of prescription and lack of cause ofaction, arguing that since the promissory notes matured in 1976 while BPI filed its action to foreclosethe chattel mortgage only in 1987 (or more than 10 years from the time its cause of action accrued),and there being no demand for payment which would interrupt the period of prescription forinstituting said action, BPI's claims have prescribed.
BPI, however, countered that its allegation of repeated demands on Far East for payment sufficientlystated a cause of action; that within ten years from the time its cause of action accrued in 1976, itsent written extrajudicial demands on Far East requesting payment of its due and outstandingobligations; that within that 10-years period, it received written acknowledgments of debt from FarEast; and, that these demands for payment and acknowledgments of debt effectively interrupted andrenewed the prescriptive period. Worth noting is the fact that the acknowledgment of debt and thedemands for payment, including the affidavits of BPI's counsel who prepared the demand letter andthat of BPI's messenger who allegedly personally delivered said letters to Far East were dulyannexed to BPI's pleadings.
From the foregoing exchange of pleading, the conflicting allegations of factby the contending partiessprung forth. It is thus quite obvious that the controversy centered on, and the doubt arose withrespect to, the very existence of previous demands for payment allegedly made by BPI on petitionerFar East, receipt of which was denied by the latter. This dispute or controversy inevitably raised aquestion of fact. Such being the case, the appeal taken by BPI to the Court of Appeals was proper.
We now come to petitioner's first two assigned errors.
The trial court's finding that BPI's claims due to prescription, can no longer prosper, is inextricablyconnected with, and underpinned by, its other conclusion that BPI's allegation that it made "repeatedrequests and demands for payment" is not sufficient to state a cause of action. Moreover, in itsquestioned Order (Rollo, p. 88) dated June 1, 1987, the trial court held that:
Apart from the fact that the complaint failed to allege that the period of prescriptionwas interrupted, the phrase "repeated requests and demands for payment" is vagueand incomplete as to establish in the minds of the defendant, or to enable the Courtto draw a conclusion, that demands or acknowledgment [of debt] were made thatcould have interrupted the period of prescription. (p. 88, Rollo.).
Seemingly, therefore, the trial court believed that the interruption of the prescriptive period to institutean action is an ULTIMATE FACT which had to be expressly and indispensably pleaded by BPI in itscomplaint, and that failure to so alleged such circumstance is fatal to BPI's cause of action.
We believe and hold otherwise.
Section 3 of Rule 6 state that a "complaint is a concise statement of the ultimate facts constitutingthe plaintiff's cause or causes of action." Further elaborating thereon, Section 1 of Rule 8 declaresthat every pleading, including, of course, a complaint, "shall contain in a methodical and logical form,
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a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts . . . omitting the statement of mereevidentiary facts." "Ultimate facts" are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basisof the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of thedefendant (Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic of the Phil., et al., 204 SCRA 428 [1991]), while "evidentiaryfacts" are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts.
What then are the ultimate facts which BPI had to allege in its complaint so as to sufficientlyestablish its cause of action?
Basically, a cause of action consists of three elements, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2)the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation ofsaid legal right (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 193 SCRA 732 [1991]); Rebollido vs. Court of
Appeals et al., 170 SCRA 800 [1989]). These elements are manifest in BPI's complaint, particularlywhen it was therein alleged that: (1) for valuable consideration, BPI granted several loans,evidenced by promissory notes, and extended credit facilities in the form of trust receipts to Far East(photocopies of said notes and receipts were duly attached to the Complaint); (2) said promissorynotes and trust receipts had matured; and (3) despite repeated requests and demands for paymentthereof, Far East had failed and refused to pay.
Clearly then, the general allegation of BPI that "despite repeated requests and demands for payment,Far East has failed to pay" is sufficient to establish BPI's cause of action. Besides, prescription is nota cause of action; it is a defensewhich, having been raised, should, as correctly ruled by the Courtof Appeals (DBP vs. Ozarraga, 15 SCRA 48 [1965]), be supported by competent evidence. But evenas Far East raised the defense of prescription, BPI countered to the effect that the prescriptiveperiod was interrupted and renewed by written extrajudicial demands for payment andacknowledgment by Far East of the debt.
A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though theallegation may be vague or indefinite, for in such case, the recourse of the defendant would be to filea motion for a bill of particulars (Ramos vs. Condez, 20 SCRA 1146 [1967]). It is indeed the betterrule that, pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be liberally construed so that the litigants may
have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims so as to avoid possible denial of substantialjustice due to legal technicalities (Adamo, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 191 SCRA195 [1990]).
In the case at bar, the circumstances of BPI extending loans and credits to Far East and the failureof the latter to pay and discharge the same upon maturity are the only ultimate facts which have tobe pleaded, although the facts necessary to make the mortgage valid enforceable must be provenduring the trial (Ortiz v. Garcia, 15 Phil. 192 [1910]).
In fine, the finding of the trial court that prescription has set in is primarily premised on amisappreciation of the sufficiency of BPI's allegation as above discussed. The records will show thatthe hearing conducted by the trial court was merelypro formaand the trial judge did not sufficiently
address the issue of whether or not a demand for payment in fact made by BPI and duly received byherein petitioner Far East.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appealshereby AFFIRMED. No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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