10459_ftp

Explosion of Fixed RoofAtmospheric Storage Tanks,Part 1: Background and Reviewof Case HistoriesJerome Taveau1

Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, IRSN/DSU/SERIC/BEXI, 31 avenue de laDivision Leclerc, 92 260 Fontenay aux Roses Cedex, France; [email protected] (for correspondence)

Published online 26 August 2011 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI 10.1002/prs.10459

Many flammable products are stored in largetanks at atmospheric pressure. Ignition of a hydrocar-bon–air mixture in such tanks can lead to an explo-sion and cause lethal casualties or damage the sur-rounding facilities and buildings. To apprehend this,safety distances for humans, structures and equip-ments need to be defined. Several simple methodolo-gies have been set up to estimate safety distances incase of an atmospheric storage tank explosion.

This first article gives an overview of accident fre-quencies of atmospheric storage tanks and past acci-dents described in the open literature, to show thepossible accidental sequences, underline the most fre-quent causes involved in explosions of atmosphericstorage tank, and highlight the potential consequen-ces of such accidents. � 2011 American Institute ofChemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 30: 381–392,2011

Keywords: atmospheric storage tanks; fixed roof;explosion; accidents; frequencies

INTRODUCTIONMany flammable products, for example, liquid

hydrocarbons at normal temperatures and pressuressuch as gasoline, naphtha, heavy oil, kerosene, anddiesel oil are usually stored in large tanks at atmos-pheric pressure or under a low pressure of 0.5 barg[1–3]. In these tanks, a more or less important amountof flammable gaseous hydrocarbon–air mixture maybe present above the liquid phase (continuously for

fixed roof tanks or accidentally for floating rooftanks). When a sufficient amount of energy is sup-plied to the mixture, it may ignite and lead to eitheror both an explosion and a fire.

When a tank explosion occurs, overpressurewaves and ejected fragments that are generated mightcause devastating effects (see Some Examples of Stor-age Tank Explosions section). This first article givesan overview of past accidents to show the possiblecauses and consequences of atmospheric storagetank explosions.

TYPES OF ATMOSPHERIC STORAGE TANKSAtmospheric storage tanks are generally selected

according to the flash point of the stored liquid. Thetwo main types of atmospheric storage tanks arefixed roof storage tanks and floating roof storagetanks:

• Fixed roof tanks are used to store low volatilityproducts with high flash points, such as fuel oiland bitumen. The lower part of the tank containsthe stored liquid, whereas the upper part com-prises the vapor space (concentration dependingon the vapor pressure of the product).

• Floating roof tanks are divided into external andinternal floating roof tanks types. They are used tostore large quantities of high volatility products,such as crude oil or gasoline. The roof floats onthe surface of the stored liquid and hence can riseor descend, depending on the liquid level in thetank. This type of tank eliminates breathing lossesand greatly reduces the evaporative loss of the� 2011 American Institute of Chemical Engineers

Process Safety Progress (Vol.30, No.4) December 2011 381

stored liquid. For low liquid levels, the roof even-tually lands on deck legs, and a vapor space canform between the liquid surface and the roof.

Table 1 summarizes the advantages and disadvan-tages of fixed and floating roof tanks.

ACCIDENT FREQUENCIES OF ATMOSPHERIC STORAGE TANKSAccording to Kletz [5], atmospheric storage tank

accidents represent a significant fraction of the acci-dents in the process industries:

‘‘No item of equipment is involved in moreaccidents than storage tanks, probably becausethey are fragile and easily damaged by slightoverpressure or vacuum. Fortunately, the ma-jority of accidents involving tanks do not causeinjury, but they do cause damage, loss of mate-rial, and interruption of production.’’ [5]

Chang and Lin [6] have listed 242 accidents duringthe last 40 years involving atmospheric and pressur-ized storage tanks of any type containing petroleumor chemicals. 60% are fires and 25% are explosions(Table 2). Explosions comprise unconfined vaporcloud explosions, pressurized vessel burst, and tankexplosions.

According to Figure 1, the three major causes ofaccidents are lightning (32%), maintenance operations(13%), and operational errors (12%). Other causes areequipment failure (8%), sabotage (8%), crack andrupture (7%), leak and line rupture (6%), static elec-tricity (5%), open flames (4%), nature disaster (3%),and runaway reaction (2%).

Table3 lists the types of tanks and contentsinvolved in reviewed accidents. Floating roof andfixed roof tanks (to a lesser extent), which are exten-sively used for the storage of crude oil, gasoline, and

Table 2. Number of fires and explosions [6]

Years

1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–2003 Total

Number of fires 8 26 31 59 21 145Number of explosions 8 5 16 22 10 61

Table 1. Advantages and disadvantages of fixed and floating roof tanks [4]

Advantages Disadvantages

Fixed roof tank Simple design and requires limitedmaintenance (no moving parts)

Evaporative loss of liquidLarge vapor space and hence high risk

of internal explosion if flammablevapor is ignited.

Floating roof tank Reduction of evaporative loss of liquidand limitation of VOC emission.*

Possible accumulation of rain water and snowon the roof leading to roof sinking.

Limited vapor space and so small riskof internal explosion.

*Volatile organic compounds.

Figure 1. Causes of tank accidents [6]. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available atwileyonlinelibrary.com.]

382 December 2011 Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs Process Safety Progress (Vol.30, No.4)

diesel oil, are the most frequent type of tanksinvolved in accidents.

Persson and Lonnermark [7] have also made a sur-vey concerning storage tanks accidents. They havelisted 479 fires involving hydrocarbon storage tanksbetween 1951 and 2003 (Table 4). 31% of these acci-dents were caused by lightning, which is in goodagreement with statistics from Chang and Lin.

On the basis of the work of Persson and Lonner-mark, Hailwood et al. [8] identified 21 tank explo-sions followed by a fire.

Based on a review of over 500 fixed roof hydro-carbon tanks over a 20-year period, Kletz and [9] esti-mated that the frequency of a fire or an explosion ina fixed roof hydrocarbon storage tank is about 1.2 31023/(year tank).

A report from the International Association of Oiland Gas Producers (OGP) [10] gives more recent datacoming from several sources. According to thisreport:

• Large atmospheric storage tank fires (LASTFIRE)project [11] quantified the occurrence of tank firescenarios but gave no cases of explosions in33,906 tank years for floating roof tanks; so assum-ing one case of explosion in 33,906 tank years bydefault, the frequency of an explosion is assumedto be 2 3 10-5/(year tank).

• Major hazard incident data service (MHIDAS) data-base was both analyzed by Technica in 1990 andDet Norske Veritas in 1997 for a different period oftime. Technica found that 2% of the 122 tank firesconsidered were initiated by explosions, whereas atotal of about 22% of these incidents wererecorded as involving explosions. Det Norske Veri-tas reported a much bigger proportion of accidentsinitiated by explosions for crude oil tanks, as 19out of 92 accidents were reported as explosions

followed by fires (20%). No detail is given aboutthe type of tank (fixed or floating roof tanks).

On this basis, the OGP report suggests:

• a frequency of 9 3 1025/(year tank) for internalexplosions and full surface fires and

• a frequency of 2.5 3 1025/(year tank) for internalexplosions without fires.

The review of different databases and reportsavailable in the open literature indicates that atmos-pheric storage tank explosions occur regularly and,hence, need to be correctly taken into account in arisk assessment.

The next section focuses on some particular welldocumented past accidents to show the possible acci-dent sequences and highlight the potential conse-quences of atmospheric storage tank explosions.

SOME EXAMPLES OF STORAGE TANK EXPLOSIONSThe present section focuses on some particular

well documented past accidents to show the possibleaccident sequences and highlight the potential conse-quences of atmospheric storage tank explosions thatoccured both in France and in the rest of the world.

Romeoville, USA (1977)On September 24, 1977, lightning struck a 58 m

(diameter) by 16 m (high) fixed roof tank that wasalmost fully filled with gasoil. The tank exploded,and the projected fragments spread the fire toanother tank (Figure 2). Overpressure was felt as faras 16 km away [12,13].

Herne, Germany (1984)Lightning provoked the bursting of a 10,000 m3

isopropyl alcohol tank at the Herne chemical site in

Table 4. Number of fires involving hydrocarbon storage tanks [7]

Years

Total1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–2003

Number of fires 13 28 80 135 161 62 479

Table 3. Type of tanks and contents involved in accidents [6]

Content

Type of Tank

FloatingRoof

FixedRoof Sphere

Fixed Roof withInternal Roof

FiberGlass

WoodenRoof

RefrigeratedTank Total

Crude oil 23 5 0 2 0 2 0 32Oil products 3 10 0 1 0 0 0 14Gasoline 20 3 0 3 0 0 0 26LPG 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 11Propane 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2Hydrochloric acid 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2Methyl cyanate 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1Subtotal 46 18 11 6 3 2 2 88

Process Safety Progress (Vol.30, No.4) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs December 2011 383

Germany (Figure 3). The roof was ejected and theoverpressure broke windows of the surroundinghouses up to 1 km from the centre of the explosion[14].

Channelview, USA (1990)Seventeen workers were killed on July 5, 1990, at

the ARCO Chemical Company site in Texas after a4,000 m3 tank storing wastewater and hydrocarbonsexploded [15]. Two cooling towers, a cogenerationfacility, a main pipe rack, and two large tanks wereheavily damaged. The explosion was felt as far as 13km away.

Rouseville, USA (1995)An explosion occurred at the Pennzoil Products

Company refinery in Rouseville, PA, at about 10:15a.m. on October 16, 1995, during a welding operationconducted near the wastewater tank 488 containing alayer of flammable liquid. Sparks ignited flammablevapors at openings in the tank. The deflagrationcaused the tank to fail at the bottom seam and shootinto the air (Figures 4–7). Five workers were killed.The tank did not have a frangible roof or other emer-gency venting. The resulting fire ignited several other

tanks, causing several loud explosions as compressedgas cylinders and other sealed containers exploded[16].

Ashdod, Israel (1997)On November 2, 1997, the explosion of a 15,000

m3 fixed roof gasoil tank located in the tank farm of

Figure 3. Tank fire, Herne, Germany (1984) [14].[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 2. Tank 413 fire, Romeoville, USA (1977) [13].[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.] Figure 4. Overview of the explosion area, Rouseville,

USA (1995) [16]. [Color figure can be viewed in theonline issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 5. Area of the explosion, Rouseville, USA(1995) [16].


Ashdod Oil Refinery caused loss of life of one worker(Figures 8–10). The investigation concluded that anoncomplete gasoil stripping with hydrogen at theexit of gasoil hydrotreating unit caused penetration ofhydrogen inside the tank. The source of ignition wasmost likely electrostatic spark initiated by syntheticrope (instead of cotton one) used to get samples outof the tank [17,18].

Delaware, USA (2001)On July 17, 2001, an explosion occurred at the

Motiva Enterprises LLC in Delaware City, killing oneworker and injuring eight others. The pressure wavewas sufficient to separate the tank’s base-to-shell joint(Figures 11 and 12). The explosion was most likelyinitiated by a spark from the maintenance work [15].

Figure 6. Original site of Tank 488 (tank 487 in back-ground), Rouseville, USA (1995) [16]. [Color figurecan be viewed in the online issue, which is availableat wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 7. Tank 488 after the explosion, Rouseville,USA (1995) [16]. [Color figure can be viewed in theonline issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 8. Tank 411 fire (1), Ashdod, Israel (1997) [18].[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 9. Tank 411 fire (2), Ashdod, Israel (1997) [18].[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 10. Roof of tank 411 in the dike, Ashdod, Israel(1997) [18]. [Color figure can be viewed in the onlineissue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]


Mestre, Italy (2002)An explosion occured at about 7:40 a.m. on No-

vember 28, 2002, in a chemical facility after a run-away reaction in a tank containing bitumen and tolu-ene diisocyanate, caused by a stirrer shutdown (Fig-ures 13–15). There were no casualties in the accident,but high damage and a high concern of the popula-tion because of the dispersion of toxic fumes [19].

Glenpool, USA (2003)At about 8:55 p.m., on April 7, 2003, an 80,000-

barrel storage tank exploded at the ConocoPhillipsCompany’s Glenpool South tank farm in Glenpool,Oklahoma, while being filled with diesel (Figures 16and 17). There were no injuries or fatalities. Nearby

Figure 11. Tank 393 (shell on the left and base onthe right), Delaware, USA (2001) [15]. [Color figurecan be viewed in the online issue, which is availableat wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 12. View of surrounding tanks, Delaware, USA(2001) [15]. [Color figure can be viewed in the onlineissue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 13. View of the toluene diisocyanate facility af-ter the explosion, Mestre, Italy (2002) [19]. [Color fig-ure can be viewed in the online issue, which is avail-able at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 14. Tank D 528/2 (first explosion), Mestre, Italy(2002) [19]. [Color figure can be viewed in the onlineissue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 15. Tank D 528/1 (second explosion), Mestre,Italy (2002) [19]. [Color figure can be viewed in the onlineissue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]


residents were evacuated, and schools were closedfor 2 days [20].

Partridge-Raleigh, USA (2006)Three contractors died and one contractor suffered

from serious injuries after an explosion at the Par-tridge-Raleigh Oilfield (Figures 18–20) on June 5,2006, as they were standing on top of a series of fouroil production tanks, preparing to weld piping to thetanks [21].

Spoleto, Italy (2006)On November 25, 2006, an explosion occurred at

Umbria Olii plant near Spoleto, Italy, when fiveworkers were welding a structure on the roofs of sev-eral tanks. Firstly, one tank containing raw pomaceoil exploded, rising up of about 10 m. This firstexplosion led to a pool fire that spread in the tanks’park. One hour later, two other tanks explode, with

Figure 16. Tank 11 in background, Glenpool, USA(2003) [20]. [Color figure can be viewed in the onlineissue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 17. Wreckage of tank 11, Glenpool, USA (2003)[20]. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 18. Overview of tanks 1, 2 and 3 after theexplosion, Partridge-Raleigh, USA (2006) [21]. [Colorfigure can be viewed in the online issue, which isavailable at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 19. View of tanks and debris from the explo-sion, Partridge-Raleigh, USA (2006) [21]. [Color figurecan be viewed in the online issue, which is availableat wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 20. Fire-fighting operations, Partridge-Raleigh,USA (2006) [21]. [Color figure can be viewed in theonline issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]


rupture of the bottom welding, ejecting missiles of 10tons 80 m away near warehouses storing by-productsand packaging materials. Four workers lost their lifein this accident [22] (Figures 21 and 22).

Sløvag, Norway (2007)On May 24, 2007, an explosion occurred in a stor-

age tank of the company Vest Tank AS, on the Sløvagindustrial area. The first explosion took place in tankT3 at around 10 a.m. (Figures 23 and 24): the base–shell weld ruptured and the upper part of the tankwas launched up in the air and landed in the north-eastern corner of Tank Farm II. Subsequent explo-sions and fires destroyed Tank Farm II. There wereno casualties in the accident. This accident occurredduring purification of coker gasoline (reduction ofthe content of mercaptans). The investigation foundthat addition of hydrochloric acid during the processreduced the solubility of mercaptans in the solution,leading to the build-up of a flammable mixture. Airfilter with activated carbon placed on the roofabsorbed mercaptans, leading to a self-ignition andthe explosion [23].

Tomahawk, USA (2008)On July 29, 2008, three workers died and one

worker was injured after the explosion of a 24-m-tall

Figure 21. Frames taken by a CCTV during the explo-sion, Spoleto, Italy (2006) [22].

Figure 22. Tank projected by the explosion,Spoleto, Italy (2006) [22]. [Color figure can beviewed in the online issue, which is available atwileyonlinelibrary.com.

Figure 23. Tank T3 few minutes after the explosion,Sløvag, Norway (2007) [23]. [Color figure can beviewed in the online issue, which is available atwileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 24. Tank T3 after the fire, Sløvag, Norway(2007) [23]. [Color figure can be viewed in the onlineissue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 25. Storage tank after the explosion (1), Toma-hawk, USA (2008) [24]. [Color figure can beviewed in the online issue, which is available atwileyonlinelibrary.com.]


storage tank at the Packaging Corporation of America(PCA) in Tomahawk, Wisconsin (Figures 25 and 26).The workers were on the tank (containing a mixtureof recycled paper pulp and water) performing weld-ing at the time of the explosion. The causes of thisaccident remain unknown for the moment [24].

Several tank explosions also occurred in Franceduring the last two decades:

• 1992, Verdun: On March 10, two tanks containingfuel oil exploded due to an excessive heating [25].

• 1994, Portet-sur-Garonne: An explosion occurredon May 3, during hot work near the vent of a tankcontaining bitumen (Figures 27a and 27b). Thetank was thrown 20 m away, and two workerswere killed. This first explosion caused a fire andthe explosion of another tank [26].

• 2000, Villette-sur-Aube: On July 24, lightning struckthe roof of a 5,000 m3 storage tank containing1,000 m3 of ethanol (Figure 28). Roof lifted off andfell down on the tank [27].

• 2001, Lespinasse: During a cleaning operation onFebruary 20, two workers entering a 5,090 m3 pe-troleum tank caused an internal explosion [28](Figure 29).

• 2001, Lillers: An empty 1,500 m3 ethanol tankexploded during a cleaning operation on Septem-ber 3. Several tank explosions followed (Figure30). Workers used potassium permanganate, caus-ing a runaway reaction in the presence of ethanolresidues [29].

• 2002, Dunkerque: On May 18, a 185-m3 tank con-taining additives for bitumen exploded. The tanklifted off and fell down several meters away(Figure 31). This explosion was due to thermaldecomposition of polymers into organic peroxides,which have then self-ignited [30].

• 2010, Burosse-Mendousse: On May 5, 3:45 p.m., inan oil depot, an explosion occurred during thestart-up of a 1,400 m3 atmospheric storage tankcontaining crude oil. The tank was equipped with

Figure 27. (a and b) Location of tanks after the explo-sion, Portet-sur-Garonne, France (1994) [26]. [Colorfigure can be viewed in the online issue, which isavailable at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 28. View of the tank after the explosion andthe subsequent fire, Villette-sur-Aube, France (2000)[27]. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 26. Storage tank after the explosion (2), Toma-hawk, USA (2008) [24]. [Color figure can beviewed in the online issue, which is available atwileyonlinelibrary.com.]


a frangible roof. The roof was ejected severalmeters away and the tank’s base slightly lifted up.Investigation concluded that the most probableignition source is an electrostatic discharge (Fig-ures 32 and 33) [31,32].

• 2011, Nogent-sur-Seine: On January 18, a 1,000 m3

tank filled with paper pulp exploded at around8:40 am whereas two workers were performinghot work on the roof. One operator died. Causesremain unknown (presence of hydrogen?). An esti-mate of damage caused by the accident amountedto 2 million dollars (Figure 34) [33].

CONCLUSIONSNumerous atmospheric storage tank explosions

with spectacular consequences occured during thelast decades, involving different products (gasoil, die-sel, bitumen, alcohols, waste) and ignition sources(lightning, hot work, sparks, chemical reaction, ex-cessive heating). According to data and examplesreviewed in this article, most frequent causes arelightning and human errors, which represent morethan 60% of the total causes.

Figure 31. Roof of the tank after the explosion, Dun-kerque, France (2002) [30]. [Color figure can beviewed in the online issue, which is available atwileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 29. View of the tank after the explosion, Lespi-nasse, France (2001) [28]. [Color figure can beviewed in the online issue, which is available atwileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 30. Tank F10 (roof on the left and shell on theright) and damaged tanks in the background (left),Lillers, France (2001) [29]. [Color figure can beviewed in the online issue, which is available atwileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 32. Roof of the tank after the explosion, Bur-osse-Mendousse, France (2010) [31]. [Color figure canbe viewed in the online issue, which is available atwileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 33. View of the tank after the explosion, Bur-osse-Mendousse, France (2010) [32]. [Color figure canbe viewed in the online issue, which is available atwileyonlinelibrary.com.]


Several cases led to extensive damage to surround-ing facilities and dwellings, either caused by theresulting overpressure, particularly Romeoville (over-pressure felt 16 km away) and Herne (broken win-dows 1 km away) accidents, which involved tanksfull of liquid and stricken by lightning, or caused byejected fragments when tanks do not have frangibleroofs (Rouseville), causing tanks shooting into the air.It seems that lightning provokes the most devastatingaccidents: in their article, Chang and Lin [6] indicatedthat ‘‘among the 80 lightning accidents, a dozen tankswere hit directly, resulting in roof blowing off andmassive destruction.’’ Also, many accidents causeddomino effects in the surrounding units (Channel-view, Rouseville, Mestre, Portet-sur-Garonne, Lillers).

Since atmospheric storage tank explosions occurregularly and often lead to extensive damage, theprocess safety community must understand these haz-ards, and further be able to make appropriate predic-tions such that if a storage tank explodes, the conse-quences to life and property are reduced as low asreasonably practicable.

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Figure 34. Roof of the tank after the explosion,Nogent-sur-Seine, France (2011) [33]. [Color figurecan be viewed in the online issue, which is availableat wileyonlinelibrary.com.]


and Mitigation of Industrial Explosions, Paper no.5, Yokohama, Japan, 2010.

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32. L’inventaire 2011 des accidents technologiques,Preventique Securite, no. 117, Mai-Juin, 2011, pp.14–29.

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