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10 Mind-Blowing Pentagon Audit Reports All Americans Need to
Know ByDavidDeGraw
Based on these U.S. government reports, as a top National
Security priority, Congress must fulfill their Constitutional duty
to begin wide-scale investigations into the epidemic of systemic
corruption throughout the Pentagon.
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REPORT SUMMARY: While trillions of dollars in military spending
have gone unaccounted for, a record number of Pentagon
whistleblowers have been retaliated against and silenced. As you
will read throughout this report, the chain of accountability has
been effectively dismantled. Department of Defense and Intelligence
Community Inspector Generals have been caught covering-up
whistleblower reprisal cases and shutting down investigations.
Prominent government insiders are speaking out. Many vital
Inspector General positions have been vacated under scandalous
circumstances. To make matters even worse, the C.I.A. was caught
illegally and unconstitutionally surveilling Congress to interfere
with whistleblower communications and investigations. Meanwhile,
political bribery and revolving door corruption have reached
all-time highs. Since the Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
first began reporting what is now over $21 trillion in unaccounted
for spending, 12,727 government officials have gone through the
revolving door with Global Military companies. In the latest
example, after spending 30-years at Boeing, Patrick Shanahan
recently took over as acting Defense Secretary and is now in charge
of military spending. Not surprisingly, the Pentagon has missed
their deadline and is yet to brief Congress on their failed
first-ever full-scope audit. As an initial audit found, “financial
management is so weak that its leaders and oversight bodies have no
reliable way to track the huge sums [of tax money] it’s responsible
for.” Thus far, the only significant change to come out of the
audit: Pentagon accounting fraud has now been “legalized.”
According to people who spent their careers working for the Defense
Finance and Accounting Service, the books are cooked as Standard
Operating Procedure. There are thousands of accounting and
financing operations throughout the Pentagon. No one even knows how
many there are, let alone how much money is being spent. Numerous
government investigations, audits and reports have revealed many
critical, wide-ranging accounting problems, which have been known
for years, yet have never been fixed. There are hundreds of
unimplemented solutions, which could save U.S. taxpayers tens of
billions of dollars annually.
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CONTENTS
KEY FINDINGS: #1) Record Number of Whistleblowers Retaliated
Against & Silenced, As Trillions of Dollars Unaccounted For #2)
Department of Defense Inspector General Caught Covering Up
Corruption, Altering Audit Reports #3) Intelligence Community
Whistleblowers Retaliated Against, Cover-Up Attempts Reported, Key
Officials Wrongfully Fired, ‘Honest Inspectors Flee,’ Prominent
Insiders Speak Out, ‘There Is No Oversight’ #4) C.I.A. Caught
Illegally, Unconstitutionally Spying on Congress, Using National
Security Classification to Cover-Up Corruption, Routinely
Retaliating Against Investigators & Whistleblowers #5)
First-Ever Full-Scope Audit Failed, No Congressional Briefing,
Accounting Fraud “Legalized” #6) Fixable Pentagon Accounting
Problems Ignored, Well-Proven, Long-Established Systemic Failure to
Address Known Critical Issues #7) Many Critical Cyber
Vulnerabilities Ignored at Pentagon & U.S. Treasury, An Open
Invitation For Criminals Worldwide #8) Known Solutions – That Can
Save Tens of Billions of Tax Dollars Annually – Not Implemented, As
Key Gov Accountability Offices Drastically Underfunded &
Understaffed #9) Since 1998, $21 Trillion Unaccounted For, $2.6
Billion in Bribes and 12,727 Government Officials Through Global
Military Revolving Door #10) Classifying Corruption: Under the
Guise of National Security, U.S. Treasury Looted & Constitution
Rendered Null & Void CONCLUSION DOWNLOAD FULL REPORT SHARE THIS
REPORT
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SOURCES Whistleblowers: The New ‘Insider Threat’
Watchdog Finds Majority of Pentagon Whistleblowers Out of
Luck
Congressional Testimony on Oversight of Department of Defense
Inspector General’s Military Whistleblower Reprisal
Investigations
Misconduct within the DoD IG [‘systemic practice of improperly
interfering with and undermining investigations’]
The Problem of Acting Inspector Generals
[Congressional Investigation] Recommendations
GAO Whistleblower Protection Report: Opportunities Exist for DOD
to Improve Reprisal Investigations
Nowhere To Turn: The Weak State of ‘Internal Channels’ For
Intelligence Community Whistleblowers
Fired Pentagon Whistleblower Goes Public in Attack on IG’s
Office
U.S. Intelligence Shuts Down Damning Report on Whistleblower
Retaliation
Key Intel Whistleblower Official Fired as Spy Agencies Face
Oversight Crisis
Grassley Wins Declassification of CIA Documents on Monitoring
Whistleblowers
CIA Inspector General Nominee Has Three Open Whistleblower
Retaliation Cases Implicating Him
Administration’s Nominee for CIA Watchdog Allegedly Misled
Congress
CIA Watchdog ‘Accidentally Destroyed’ Copy of ‘Torture
Report’
CIA Affirms It Spied on Senate Panel
CIA’s ‘Surveillance State’ is Operating Against Us All
A Crisis of Leadership at the Military Intelligence Agency’s
Watchdog Office
Why is Mattis Declaring War on Whistleblowers?
Holding U.S. Treasurys? Beware: Uncle Sam Can’t Account For $21
Trillion
The Pentagon’s New Stealth Bookkeeping
Massive Pentagon Agency Lost Track of Hundreds of Millions of
Dollars
Response to First Full Pentagon Audit Delayed Amid Staff
Shake-Up
Our Man From Boeing
Security Gaps Could Let Hackers Edit Government Spending Data,
Watchdog Says
The Pentagon Has More than 250 Cyber Gaps in Its Networks,
Watchdog Says
Congress Fed Up With DOD, Other Agencies Disregarding Audits
Pentagon IG Highlights More Than 1,500 Open Recommendations,
Some Dating Back a Decade
Congress Taking Aim at Waste and Fraud
The Watchdogs After Forty Years: Recommendations for Our
Nation’s Federal Inspectors General
Special Report: Behind the Pentagon’s Doctored Ledgers, a
Running Tally of Epic Waste
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KEY FINDINGS: Editor’s Note: This report is part of an
investigative series on the trillions of dollars in unaccounted for
military spending. If you have not researched this issue yet,
here’s a collection of evidence, including 26 Inspector General
audits, government reports and extensive background information:
Pentagon Audit: Evidence Proving $21 Trillion Unaccounted For –
Opening Statement. #1) Record Number of Whistleblowers Retaliated
Against & Silenced, As Trillions of Dollars Unaccounted For
When it comes to reporting corruption, potential whistleblowers
know that the chain of accountability has been effectively
dismantled. Investigations clearly prove that the process
established under PPD-19 (‘Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to
Classified Information’ directive) is failing. As PEN America
reported, “Today the structural integrity of these ‘internal
channels’ appears increasingly shaky…. [Whistleblowers] face three
abysmal choices: use the internal channels and risk career suicide,
go to the media and face potential jail time, or stay silent in the
face of waste, fraud, abuse, illegality, or threats to our
democracy.” Even with such tremendous risk involved, a record
numbers of whistleblowers have still attempted to come forward
using the proper internal channels, only to be retaliated against
and silenced. • According to a Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report, over 1000 whistleblowers have been retaliated against
and silenced at the Office of the Department of Defense Inspector
General (DoD IG). Over a three-year period, the DoD IG closed 1094
whistleblower retaliation cases without investigating them. A
stunning 91% of whistleblower reprisal complaints formally filed at
the DoD IG are shutdown without any investigation. [source one —
two — three] • On average, one whistleblower is retaliated against
and silenced at the DoD IG every single day, 365 days a year. Over
the time frame that the GAO investigated, DoD audits reported $6.87
trillion ($6,871,000,000,000) unaccounted for. [source four] •
According to publicly available data from the DoD IG’s semi-annual
reports to Congress, from April 1, 2012 to March 31, 2016, they
dismissed 86% of Military Reprisal cases, and found in favor of
whistleblowers in only 0.9% of cases. Citing that data, the Project
on Government Oversight (POGO) said the DoD IG “substantiated only
7 out of over 1,300 complaints received.” Over that time frame, DoD
audits reported $8.58 trillion ($8,582,000,000,000) unaccounted
for. [source five — six]
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• The GAO report also reveals that the majority of whistleblower
complaints came from Army personnel, over a time frame when DoD
audits reported $6.5 trillion unaccounted for within the Army
General Fund. As the GAO report states: “Among these [whistleblower
complaints], civilians and contractors or subcontractors affiliated
with the Army made the highest number of complaints, with 304….” A
Congressional Investigation Committee should reopen these cases,
which were shutdown without any investigation. [source seven —
eight] #2) Department of Defense Inspector General Caught Covering
Up Corruption, Altering Audit Reports
• As scandalous as the GAO’s findings were, the DoD IG was
caught manipulating case records to cover-up their whistleblower
reprisal track record, which “had a significant impact on the GAO’s
findings.” Therefore, the situation for whistleblowers at the DoD
IG is even worse than the GAO’s report revealed. [source nine] •
Former assistant DoD IG John Crane, who was also retaliated against
and fired under scandalous circumstances, has said, “key officials
retaliated against whistleblowers, destroyed permanent records and
altered audits under political pressure.” [source ten]
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• In Congressional Testimony, the Project on Government
Oversight (POGO) said they have “also heard directly from
whistleblowers within DoD IG who have expressed serious concerns
about the integrity of the office’s processes and investigations,
including pressure to back-fill whistleblower case files for the
GAO’s review. It is extremely rare to have whistleblowers from an
IG shop come forward, but in this case we have a number of them.”
[source eleven] • POGO also found instances where the DoD IG sent
whistleblower reprisal cases to offices where the likelihood of
retaliation was high: “whistleblowers felt the IG needlessly
exposed them to additional retaliation, and had they known the IG
was going to refer their disclosures they would have chosen to
withdraw their complaints.” [source twelve] POGO’s Recommendations
to Congress: • “Investigate and consider for removal any senior
officials found to have illegally destroyed evidence in
whistleblower or other case files, improperly instructed employees
to back-fill cases, or otherwise interfered with the independence
and integrity of investigations;”…. [source thirteen] • “Request a
GAO or outside IG audit of the DoD IG’s reprisal investigations to
ensure that investigators’ decisions to dismiss, investigate, and
substantiate reprisals are proper and based on the legal
requirements for examining any evidence presented;”…. [source
fourteen] • In Conclusion: “Whistleblowers who report concerns that
affect our national security must be lauded, not shunned or, worse,
harmed. And the law must protect them. The perceived and real
failures of the DoD IG to act as a check on violations of law
should be of grave concern.” [source fifteen] #3) Intelligence
Community Whistleblowers Retaliated Against, Cover-Up Attempts
Reported, Key Officials Wrongfully Fired, ‘Honest Inspectors Flee,’
Prominent Insiders Speak Out, ‘There Is No Oversight’ • When it
comes to cases of retaliation against whistleblowers, the Office of
the Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) appears to
have an even worse track record than the DoD IG. An internal review
of 190 whistleblower reprisal cases from six national security
agencies revealed that the IC IG ruled in favor of only one
whistleblower. The IC IG “ruled against 99% of intelligence
community employees who claimed they were retaliated against for
blowing the whistle.” [source sixteen]
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• As the internal review was nearing completion, it was abruptly
shutdown when the new acting head IC IG Wayne Stone, “sequestered
the mountain of documents and data produced in the inspection, the
product of three staff-years of work. The incident was never
publicly disclosed by the office, and escaped mention in the
unclassified version of the IC IG’s semiannual report to Congress.”
[source seventeen] • POGO got a leaked copy of an inspection
report, which summarized the situation by saying, “A complainant
alleging reprisal for making a protected disclosure has a minimal
chance to have a complaint processed and adjudicated in a timely
and complete manner.” ‘Its conclusion is stark:’ “The deficiencies
in reprisal protections policies, procedures, and standards in the
evaluated agencies are causing a failure to provide reprisal
protections for individuals making protected disclosures.” [source
eighteen] • Overall, “the document produced by the Intelligence
Community’s IG, which covers 17 U.S. spy agencies, found that many
components are not following, ‘legally mandated… policies,
procedures and standards…. Causing non-substantiation of reprisal
claims, incomplete investigations, and for complaints not to be
processed.'” [source nineteen] • “As evidence, the document reports
that the Intelligence Community IG substantiated ‘only one reprisal
allegation’ during a six-year period stretching from fiscal year
2010 through fiscal year 2016, and that case took 742 days to
complete – well beyond the 240-day limit prescribed in regulation.”
[source twenty] • To make matters even worse, Dan Meyer, the Head
of Whistleblowing and Source Protection at the IC IG was abruptly
fired last year under scandalous circumstances. He was “escorted
out of the building while his office was ‘sealed off with
crime-scene tape.'” The move was widely considered “retaliation
against him for blowing the whistle… [on] ‘security infractions’
after raising concerns about a ‘systematic failure’ to implement
whistleblower protections.” [source twenty one] • Senators Chuck
Grassley (R-IA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) said Meyer “was terminated in
a process marked by procedural irregularities and serious conflicts
of interest” while the IC IG’s acting leadership “demonstrated a
lack of support for the critical whistleblower protection mission
of the office.” [source twenty two]
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• At the DIA Inspector General’s Office (DIA IG), Ron Foster,
former head of investigations, and David Steele, a 40-year military
and intelligence veteran, blew the whistle on Kristi Waschull, the
head DIA IG. They reported that she repeatedly asked them to lie
and change “investigative reports about problems and crimes within
the agency.” They also reported that she limited “the flow of
published reports,” and “retaliated against them and several
colleagues.” [source twenty three] • Foster, Steele and a staff
director were fired from the DIA IG without warning, and most of
their co-workers have now left as well, as Foreign Policy reported:
“Almost everyone who once worked for Steele in the Office of the
Inspector General has fled the agency, or is looking to leave, an
exodus he attributes to the toxic atmosphere created by the
official in charge.… ‘There is no oversight,’ Steele continued.
Whistleblower protection laws ‘assume the [Inspector Generals] are
the good guys. What happens when your Inspector General is a bad
guy?'” [source twenty four] • The DIA IG hasn’t published “the
results of any new investigations, and if the systemic issues
remain unaddressed or ignored by the agency, it could lead to an
intelligence community-wide ‘vulnerability,’ Steele told FP…. ‘The
Inspector General is incapable of policing itself,’ he said. ‘Who’s
watching the watchers?'” [source twenty five]
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• Former NSA Inspector General George Ellard was fired for
retaliating against a whistleblower who reported wasteful spending
of taxpayer money. However, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis stepped in
and shockingly reversed his termination. “The Pentagon offered no
explanation as to why Mattis chose to overrule the IG External
Review Panel and NSA’s current director, but the message is
abundantly clear: If you work in Pentagon management and retaliate
against a whistleblower, there’s a good chance you’ll keep your
job….” [source twenty six] • “Unfortunately, the Ellard case is not
unique within the Pentagon. And as a series of these cases
demonstrate, when the internal watchdog function breaks down at the
Defense Department, not only are taxpayers ripped off, but
intelligence failures costing the lives of thousands of Americans
can result.” [source twenty seven] #4) C.I.A. Caught Illegally,
Unconstitutionally Spying on Congress, Using National Security
Classification to Cover-Up Corruption, Routinely Retaliating
Against Investigators & Whistleblowers • The CIA has been
illegally, unconstitutionally spying on Congress in their
investigations and communications with whistleblowers, according to
a new partially declassified report: “Thanks to information
recently released by the Senate Judiciary Committee, we now have
fresh, incontrovertible evidence that elements of the Intelligence
Community (IC) have monitored the communications of employees or
contractors seeking to report waste, fraud, abuse or potential
criminal conduct by IC agencies – including communications to House
and Senate committees charged with oversight of the IC.” [source
twenty-eight — twenty-nine — thirty] • “Based on the available
public evidence, we also know that nobody in the IC responsible for
such domestic spying [on Congress and whistleblowers] has lost
their job or faced a criminal referral to the Justice Department.
The implications of this are multiple and chilling.” [source
thirty-one] • “The fact that the CIA… was reading congressional
staff’s emails about Intelligence Community whistleblowers raises
serious policy concerns, as well as potential constitutional
separation-of-powers issues that must be discussed publicly.” –
Senator Grassley [source thirty-two]
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• Jonathan Kaplan, a 33-year veteran investigator at the CIA IG
is one of several whistleblowers to file complaints against
Christopher Sharpley, the CIA’s former acting head IG and Trump’s
nominee to be permanent head IG. Kaplan said “he was retaliated
against because of his legally protected communications with the
Senate and House Committees on Intelligence and with the
Intelligence Community’s Office of the Inspector General.” [source
thirty-three] • “Kaplan says he had gone to the Committees and
others with a concern that the CIA IG’s investigative and oversight
capabilities were being compromised. Soon after, he said,
retaliators including Sharpley placed false and derogatory
information in his personal security file at the Agency, leading to
the loss of his security clearance, rendering his continued CIA
employment untenable. ‘Mr. Sharpley condoned retaliatory actions
against CIA employees including me, indicating that ethical and
professional standards are not being met,’ Kaplan said.” [source
thirty-four] • Sharpley is “named in at least three open
whistleblower retaliation cases.” He first sparked controversy when
he “deleted the agency’s only copy of a controversial Senate report
documenting the CIA’s history of using interrogation techniques
involving torture.” As The Hill reported, “both the electronic copy
and a hard disk were destroyed.” [source thirty-five — thirty-six]
• In an interesting coincidence, the CIA was also caught illegally
spying on Congress and violating the Constitution when Congress was
creating that very same Torture Report. As Senator Mark Udall
summed it up, “The CIA unconstitutionally spied on Congress by
hacking into Senate intelligence committee computers. This grave
misconduct is not only illegal, but it violates the US
constitution’s requirement of separation of powers. These offenses,
along with other errors in judgment by some at the CIA, demonstrate
a tremendous failure of leadership, and there must be
consequences.” [source thirty-seven] • Many IC IG investigators
have spoken out about Sharpley’s corrupt actions. “Roughly ten or
more complaints were brought to an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission unit inside the CIA to consider evidence of workplace
violations…” A few “memos cite a ‘hostile work environment,’ and
‘abruptly relieving certain managers and investigators of
substantive investigative case work.'” [source thirty-eight] • A
CIA employee memo “cites actions featuring an element of ‘cruelty
and malice’ by IG management as sweeping changes were imposed on a
group of veteran investigators.” Another memo says, “The
reorganization… is the latest in a series of intimidating and
bullying tactics employed to move out current INV (investigation
division) staff….'” [source thirty-nine]
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• “One member of the INV staff told POGO that Sharpley was the
office ‘enforcer.’ Another memo describes an occasion when Sharpley
and a colleague summarily disbanded an INV unit – as its four
senior staffers were told to join a newly-created group to
investigate leaks. ‘There is only one problem,’ the memo goes on to
say, ‘this OIG has no ongoing leak investigations. So, these senior
special agents and managers hardly have any meaningful reasons to
show up to work, except for preserving their spaces until they are
graciously ushered out the door by Buckley and/or Sharpley.'”
[source forty] • Another “memo accuses CIA IG management of ‘misuse
of position, abuse of resources, including unnecessary use of IG
subpoenas, corruption, waste of taxpayer funds, and more. These are
the very elements that an IG is expected to prevent and protect the
Agency against.'” “In that context, Sharpley’s alleged acts of
retaliation form part of a broader pattern plaguing America’s spy
agencies….” [source forty-one] • A Pro Publica report on Sharpley
misleading Congress at his nomination hearing features several
shocking quotes: “The CIA whistleblowers who suffered reprisal were
trying to report some really serious criminal activity within the
inspector general’s office — the fabrication of evidence in a
criminal case where the people who did it were never punished,”
said John Tye, an attorney for CIA IG whistleblowers. “The
situation within CIA OIG is a systemic mission failure that must be
corrected,” said former CIA IG Special Agent Investigator turned
whistleblower Andrew Bakaj. [source forty-two] • As Patrick
Eddington from the Cato Institute summed it up: “Why has Warner,
ranking member on the Senate Intelligence Committee — who is
clearly aware of the gravity of these issues — not prioritized them
like he has the Russia investigation? Why did Grassley dither for
years in the Meyer case when he had a legal sledgehammer to cut off
the salaries of out-of-control CIA bureaucrats spying on
whistleblowers trying to convey their concerns to Congress?”
[source forty-three] • “There’s a world of difference between the
kind of feckless, press-cycle ‘oversight’ practiced by Grassley and
Warner and the kind of accountability-driven action that should be
the hallmark of the committees on which both serve. Grassley,
Warner, and their Senate and House colleagues have, thanks to the
country’s founders, ample Article I power to aggressively protect
IC whistleblowers and punish their bureaucrat retaliators. That
they choose not to is precisely why the fraud, waste, corruption
and criminal conduct in the IC continues apace.” [source
forty-four]
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#5) First-Ever Full-Scope Audit Failed, No Congressional
Briefing, Accounting Fraud “Legalized” • In December 2018, the
Pentagon failed its first-ever full-scope audit, “a massive effort
that was continually put off since it was first called for in a
1990 law.” They have now fallen behind schedule in fixing issues
raised by the audit. “According to its most recent published
timeline for completing the audit, the department was due to brief
Congress on the findings and the status of its corrective action
plan in January 2019. That briefing has not happened.” [source
forty-five] • Based on the limited information that was released,
16 Pentagon agencies failed their audits. The audits found “glaring
shortcomings in the Department’s management of its IT systems” and
overall “the Department did not have the necessary tracking systems
to fully keep tabs on money flowing in and out.” (see also section
6 for more critical accounting problems) [source forty-six] • A
report summarizing Ernst & Young’s initial Defense Logistics
audit said: “Across the board, its financial management is so weak
that its leaders and oversight bodies have no reliable way to track
the huge sums [of tax money] it’s responsible for, the firm warned
in its initial audit… as the auditors found, the agency often has
little solid evidence for where much of that money is going.”
[source forty-seven] • According to people who spent their careers
working for the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, the books
are cooked as Standard Operating Procedure, there are thousands of
transaction per month without any supporting documentation and
money is spent without Congressional allocation. [source
forty-eight] • Defense Secretary Jim Mattis was a driving force
behind the audit. He has suddenly resigned and his new replacement
is Patrick Shannahan, who spent 30-years working for Boeing, the
Pentagon’s second largest beneficiary of our tax dollars. Having
Shannahan in charge of military spending and ongoing audits is an
egregious conflict of interest. It is therefore not surprising that
the audit has been delayed and deprioritized. * (more on revolving
door corruption below) [source forty-nine] • As The Washington Post
reported: “The [audit] effort is complicated by a leadership
transition at the highest levels of the Pentagon. The first audit
was spearheaded by David Norquist, an accountant and longtime
official who serves as comptroller and Chief Financial Officer. But
after Shanahan was elevated, Norquist is now performing the duties
of the Deputy Defense Secretary. Lawmakers said they are concerned
that Norquist’s dual roles could draw his attention away from audit
activities as the Pentagon functions without a permanent secretary.
A Defense Department official speaking on the condition of
anonymity… said Norquist is ‘still
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driving the audit’ even as he takes on new duties.” In addition,
John Gibson, the Pentagon’s first-ever Chief Management Officer,
who was specifically focused on finding missing money, abruptly
resigned in September. The Wall Street Journal reported that he was
“relieved of his duties” by Defense Secretary Mattis for “lack of
performance.” [source fifty]
Accounting Fraud Legalized • Thus far, the only significant
change to come out of the Pentagon Audit was the scandalous new
accounting “law” SFFAS 56, which legalizes accounting fraud by
allowing unaccounted for money to be classified and redacted from
public budget reports. In fact, the most recent DoD IG audit report
— from the series of reports that were revealing trillions in
unaccounted for spending — had all the accounting numbers redacted.
[source fifty-one — fifty-two] • The Intelligence Community, led by
the CIA, in fear of being held accountable for the first time ever,
was able to get this shocking wavier inserted into government
accounting practices. SFFAS 56 now gives them wide-ranging legal
cover to conceal how much money they are actually spending. [source
fifty-three] • As the DoD IG reported: “The guidance appears to
allow entities to misrepresent their public financial statements….
This conflicts with the AICPA requirement that an auditor assess
whether an entity’s financial statements can be considered a fair
representation of its use of Federal resources….” [source
fifty-four]
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• In a report featured in Forbes, Laurence Kotlikoff and Mark
Skidmore summed up the situation: “Several months after beginning
the [Pentagon] audit, the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory
Board (FASAB) posted a new document, which recommended that the
government be allowed to misstate and move funds in order to hide
expenditures if it is deemed necessary for national security
purposes…. Also troubling is the fact that Standard 56 can include
publicly traded corporations with significant funding and/or
federal government control.” [source fifty-five] • “With the change
in accounting guidelines, which is a full departure from Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), only a few people with high
level security clearances have the authority to determine what is
deemed to be an issue of national security and these same people
will now be allowed to restate financial statements in order to
conceal actual expenditures without any disclosure. No one but
those few people would know that such modifications were made, thus
making evaluation of government financial statements impossible.
From this point forward, the federal government will keep two sets
of books, one modified (and useless) book for the public and one
true book that is hidden.” [source fifty-six] • “The FASAB
recommendation effectively institutionalizes opacity in federal
financial reporting. Up till now, many aspects of federal finances
have been non-transparent because the government has failed to
comply with existing financial reporting laws. However, at least
citizens had the laws working in their favor. Now citizens have no
recourse; opacity is now the law of the land, controlled by
executive branch authority and policy. Accounting rules are often
thought of as boring and unimportant. In this case, it’s not the
case. The new FASAB ruling has enormous and highly dangerous
implications for our nation.” [source fifty-seven] • “Seventeen
years after 9/11 and we still can’t get out from under the ‘it’s
for national security, don’t worry about it’ rubber-stamping of too
much data and information that shouldn’t, and otherwise wouldn’t,
qualify as needing to be classified,” says Mackenzie Eaglen, a
defense analyst at the American Enterprise Institute. [source
fifty-eight] • As several prominent senators have repeatedly said,
information is often classified to cover-up corruption. Senator
Grassley (R-IA), Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and Senator
Wyden (D- Ore.), who is on the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, have consistently expressed deep concerns over how
information is often classified to cover-up corruption. Grassley
and Wyden are senior Senators who have been in pivotal positions to
know about classified matters for an extended period of time.
[source fifty-nine]
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#6) Fixable Pentagon Accounting Problems Ignored, Well-Proven,
Long-Established Systemic Failure to Address Known Critical Issues
• As a Reuters investigation revealed: “A review of multiple
reports from oversight agencies in recent years shows that the
Pentagon also has systematically ignored warnings about its
accounting practices. ‘These types of adjustments, made without
supporting documentation… mask much larger problems in the original
accounting data,’ the Government Accountability Office, the
investigative arm of Congress, said. Plugs also are symptomatic of
one very large problem: the Pentagon’s chronic failure to keep
track of its money – how much it has, how much it pays out and how
much is wasted or stolen.” [source sixty] • As Reuters summed it
up, “an organization that fields the most sophisticated technology
in the world to fight wars and spy on enemies has come to rely on
an accounting system of antiquated, error-prone computers… these
thousands of duplicative and inefficient systems cost billions of
dollars to staff and maintain… efforts to replace these systems
with better ones have ended in costly failures… it all adds up to
billions of taxpayer dollars a year in losses to mismanagement,
theft and fraud.” [source sixty-one] • Two previous Defense
Secretaries have publicly acknowledged shocking fraud throughout
military spending: Donald Rumsfeld summed up the Pentagon as a
“black hole” where “tax dollars disappear by the trillions” and
called the accounting problems “terrifying”; Robert Gates said he
couldn’t even “get answers to questions such as ‘how much money are
you spending?’,” let alone what it was being spent on. Gates summed
up the crisis by saying that there are “unaccountable fiefdoms”
operating throughout the Pentagon. [source sixty-two — sixty-three]
• No one knows how many secret financing and accounting systems
there are. In an interview with Reuters, former Deputy Secretary of
Defense Gordon England said, “There are thousands and thousands of
systems. I’m not sure anybody knows how many systems there are.”
The Pentagon once estimated that there were 2200 of them. However,
a little-noticed 2012 report by the Defense Business Board
estimated that there at least 5000. [source sixty-four —
sixty-five] • Subcommittee Chairman on Federal Spending Oversight
Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) recently expressed his frustration with
the Pentagon’s accounting crisis by saying: “The department charged
with carrying out our greatest Constitutional responsibility has
set the lowest possible standard for accountability.” [source
sixty-six]
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• William Hartung, director of the Arms and Security Project at
the Center for International Policy, summed up the accountability
crisis at the Pentagon by saying: “Call it irony or call it
symptomatic of the department’s way of life, but an analysis by the
Project on Government Oversight notes the Pentagon has so far spent
roughly $6 billion on ‘fixing’ the audit problem — with no solution
in sight. If anything, the Defense Department’s accounting
practices have been getting worse.” [source sixty-seven] While the
Pentagon has been able to ignore the law requiring full-scope
department-wide audits, the DoD IG has conducted audits of military
spending where corruption has been detected, as we have seen in the
reports on trillions of dollars in unaccounted spending year after
year. Here are a few highlights summarizing DoD IG Audit Findings:
• “The financial management systems DOD has put in place to control
and monitor the money flow don’t facilitate but actually ‘prevent
DOD from collecting and reporting financial information that is
accurate, reliable, and timely;'” • “DOD managers do not know how
much money is in their accounts at the Treasury, or when they spend
more than Congress appropriates to them, nor does DOD ‘record,
report, collect, and reconcile’ funds received from other agencies
or the public;” • “DOD tracks neither buyer nor seller amounts when
conducting transactions with other agencies;” • “DOD frequently
enters ‘unsupported’ (i.e. imaginary) amounts in its books and uses
those figures to make the books balance;” • “DOD does not know who
owes it money, nor how much. ‘Audit trails’ are not kept ‘in
sufficient detail,’ which means no one can track the money;” •
“DOD’s ‘Internal Controls,’ intended to track the money, are
inoperative. Thus, DOD cost reports and financial statements are
inaccurate, and the size, even the direction (in plus or minus
values), of the errors cannot be identified;” • “DOD does not
observe many of the laws that govern all this.” [source
sixty-eight] As Winslow Wheeler, who worked on national security
issues for the U.S. Senate and Government Accountability Office,
summed it up: “If you have a system that does not accurately know
what its spending history is, and does not know what it is now (and
does not care to redress the matter), how can you expect it to make
a competent, honest estimate of future costs?
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It is self-evident that an operation that tolerates inaccurate,
unverifiable data cannot be soundly managed; it exempts itself from
any reasonable standard of efficiency…. It is as if the
accountability and appropriations clauses of the U.S. Constitution
were just window dressing, behind which this mind-numbing
malfeasance thrives. Technically, this is a violation of the
Anti-Deficiency Act, a statute carrying felony sanctions of fines
and imprisonment.” [source sixty-nine] #7) Many Critical Cyber
Vulnerabilities Ignored at Pentagon & U.S. Treasury, An Open
Invitation For Criminals Worldwide
• The Treasury Department’s financial reporting system has
significant security gaps that “leave the door open for online bad
actors to tamper with the government’s spending data.” The
Government Accountability Office discovered “eight different flaws
in the system used by the department’s Bureau of the Fiscal Service
to check the accuracy of the annual financial reports it publishes
for every government agency.” [source seventy] • These security
gaps, in addition to “unresolved issues GAO previously identified
within the bureau… ‘increase the risk of unauthorized access to,
modification of, or disclosure of sensitive data and programs and
disruption of critical operations.'” [source seventy-one]
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• “The Fiscal Service Bureau is responsible for keeping tabs on
the government’s debt and monitoring agencies’ revenue, spending,
obligations and other fiscal behavior…. auditors said future
inaccuracies could go undetected.” [source seventy-two] • “Of the
eight flaws revealed in the audit, four could be exploited to
illegally access and change financial data and resources, three
could potentially allow for unauthorized changes to hardware and
software security, and one involved the bureau’s risk management
system… they collectively represent ‘a significant deficiency’ in
the bureau’s internal controls, GAO said….” [source seventy-three]
• “Investigators also found the bureau had yet to fully correct 15
different deficiencies GAO identified in previous audits, including
some the bureau said had already been addressed.” [source
seventy-four] • A DoD IG audit recently reported that “the Pentagon
had yet to correct 266 cyber vulnerabilities highlighted in
numerous watchdog reports between July 2017 and June 2018. Some of
the issues were identified long ago — two dated back to 2008.”
[source seventy-five] • “Auditors specifically found many
shortcomings related to cyber governance, or the policies and
practices that help officials monitor risk. ‘Without proper
governance, the DoD cannot ensure that it effectively identifies
and manages cybersecurity risk as it continues to face a growing
variety of cyber threats…’ the IG wrote in the annual report on the
Pentagon’s cyber posture.” [source seventy-six] • “In the redacted
report, auditors detailed a myriad of issues that had gone
unaddressed over the previous year. The department, for instance,
has not yet taken steps to comply with the cybersecurity framework
developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.”
[source seventy-seven] • “Auditors also reiterated the need to put
in place more controls to limit user access and monitor activity
across Pentagon networks. The IG published a separate report
detailing how inadequate controls left billions of dollars in
annual payments potentially vulnerable to bad actors.” [source
seventy-eight] • The astounding lack of accountability and
oversight concerning military spending and the hundreds of “cyber
vulnerabilities” that remain unfixed year after year amount to an
open invitation for every criminal element worldwide. Clearly,
global intelligence agencies, military contractors and hackers have
ample opportunity to exploit this system.
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#8) Known Solutions – That Can Save Tens of Billions of Tax
Dollars Annually – Not Implemented, As Key Gov Accountability
Offices Drastically Underfunded & Understaffed • Solutions to
known problems that could save U.S. taxpayers at least $87 billion
have not been implemented. “Congress is increasingly trying to
force federal departments, especially the Pentagon, to quit
disregarding audit recommendations on how to get more bang for
billions of dollars in taxpayer bucks.” Agencies have “not
implemented more than 15,000 proposals from their inspectors
general that could save $87 billion – some 38 percent of that money
at the Pentagon.” [source seventy-nine]
• “The Defense Department has more unheeded audit
recommendations than any other agency, according to the Government
Accountability Office. The Pentagon has failed to implement more
than half the 1,122 recommendations that GAO has put forth to
improve defense programs since fiscal 2014…. ‘It’s unacceptable
that federal agencies ignore thousands of recommendations on how to
become more efficient and save taxpayer dollars,” Rep. Mark Walker,
R-N.C….” [source eighty] • In addition to the GAO recommendations,
“For the second year in a row, the Defense Department’s inspector
general has released what it calls a ‘compendium’ of open
recommendations. The document… details all of the recommendations
the DOD IG has issued to the Pentagon that have been awaiting
management attention for at least a year, [it] now includes 1,558
separate matters, up from 1,298 in the 2017 version. Fifty-six have
been open for at least five years; seven have been open for eight
years or more….” [source eighty-one] • “The DoD OIG reported a
number of open and unimplemented recommendations that appear
straightforward and easy to implement, yet… have remained
outstanding for years. For instance, in 2010, the DoD OIG issued a
report concerning the Air Force’s time and materials contracts….
The OIG reported… this unimplemented recommendation represents a
potential cost savings of over $24 million. Although the DoD OIG
made the recommendation nearly six years ago, [it] has remained
unimplemented and the cost savings for taxpayers remains
unrealized.” [source eighty-two see page 21] • The Pentagon is also
a significant offender when it comes to improper payments, another
large-scale government-wide scandal, which accounted for $144
billion in misspending in just one fiscal year, FY 2016. “A major
portion of wasteful government spending is a broad category known
as ‘improper payments,’ which are payments made in the wrong amount
(including both overpayments and
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underpayments), to the wrong people, or for the wrong reason. An
estimate from fiscal year 2016 showed $144 billion in misspending
that year – an all-time high. These improper payments result from
insufficient financial accountability, and divert dollars from
where they are needed.” [source eighty-three] • Even with all this
incredible corruption being uncovered, the work of Inspector
Generals, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and
Congressional Investigations Committees have been significantly
undermined in many ways. They are drastically underfunded and
understaffed. “Too often, the IGs suffer from inadequate or
inconsistent budgets. Resource constraints can directly affect the
ability of IGs to conduct effective and consistent oversight….
Congress needs to recognize the importance of proportionally
funding IG oversight.” [source eighty-four] • Due to the
record-breaking corruption presently taking place, the return on
investment (ROI) when it comes to funding accountability mechanisms
within our government is outstanding. It is has been proven to be
the best bang for our buck that we can get. Yet, this is where big
cuts in funding are occurring. For an effective budgeting metric,
in fiscal year 2017, the GAO uncovered over $73.9 billion in fraud
and wasteful spending. For every $1 they get, they give a return of
$128 dollars. [source eighty-five] • Meanwhile, where the most
corruption is taking place, where we get the least bang for our
buck, that’s where funding is increasing – namely, in DoD agencies
where huge sums of taxpayer money have gone unaccounted for. With
budget management like that, it is no wonder we have an all-time
record-breaking national debt of over $21 trillion, not to mention
the additional $21 trillion in unaccounted for military spending.
[source eighty-six]
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• Another significant issue undermining Inspector Generals is
the lack of congressionally approved leadership. “POGO firmly
believes that the effectiveness of an IG office can be diminished
when that office does not have permanent leadership, especially
when the vacancy exists for an extended period of time, as many of
the current vacancies have.” There are presently 12 vacancies in
head IG positions. [source eighty-seven — eighty-eight] •
“Permanent IGs undergo significant review — especially the IGs that
require Senate confirmation — before taking their position. That
vetting process helps instill confidence among Congress, agency
officials, whistleblowers, and the public that the office of the IG
is truly independent, and that its investigations and audits are
accurate and credible. In addition, a permanent IG has the ability
to set a long-term strategic plan for the office, including
establishing investigative and audit priorities.” [source
eighty-nine] • “An acting official… is known by all OIG staff to be
temporary, which one former IG has argued ‘can have a debilitating
effect on [an] OIG, particularly over a lengthy period.’…
Addressing the DoD IG’s deep cultural problems — all of which
predate Principal Deputy IG Fine — requires permanent leadership.”
[source ninety] • The last confirmed head DoD IG resigned shortly
before an audit report revealed $6.5 trillion was unaccounted for
in one fiscal year, FY 2015. Since that audit, the DoD IG office
has not had a congressionally approved Inspector General, that
position has been unfilled since January 2016. In addition, the CIA
has not had a congressionally approved IG since 2015. [source
ninety-one — ninety-two]
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#9) Since 1998, $21 Trillion Unaccounted For, $2.6 Billion in
Bribes and 12,727 Government Officials Through Global Military
Revolving Door • Since 1998, the Office of the Inspector General
has reported over $21 trillion in unaccounted for money. Over this
same timeframe, Global Military companies have spent at least $2.6
billion in known campaign contributions and lobbying activity.
Beyond this shocking amount of money spent influencing politicians,
the revolving door — between Global Military companies and
government officials — has been a significant source of
scandalously corrupt behavior. Since 1998, a stunning 12,727
government officials have gone through the revolving door with
Global Military companies. [source ninety-three — ninety-four —
ninety-five] • As shocking as those political corruption statistics
are, given the loosening of campaign finance laws regarding “dark
money” and PACs, and numerous military-intelligence-related shell
companies and aligned interests, it is impossible to account for
all the money they have spent influencing legislation and the
actual overall number of government officials who have gone through
the revolving door to companies that benefit from the Pentagon’s
lack of accountability. [source ninety-six] #10) Classifying
Corruption: Under the Guise of National Security, U.S. Treasury
Looted & Constitution Rendered Null & Void • Other than the
corruptly implemented “legalized bribery” schemes referenced above,
after an extensive analysis, it is evident that the National
Security Act, and corresponding agencies and laws derived therefrom
– with the power of secrecy that it provides – has been the primary
enabler of the greatest theft of taxpayer wealth in history.
[source ninety-seven] • The National Security Act set several
precedents that have severely undermined the U.S. Constitution. The
National Security Act created the “National Military
Establishment,” the National Security Council and the Central
Intelligence Agency, thereby codifying institutional secrecy.
[source ninety-eight] • Corresponding laws, such as the State
Secrets Privilege, Classified Information Procedures Act, Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, the PATRIOT Act, the Totten Rule,
The Espionage Act and the recent Executive Order 13526, which
defines rules for the classification of information, have all
played a pivotal role in concealing unprecedented criminal
activity. [source ninety-nine]
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CONCLUSION Based on the extensive evidence provided throughout
this series of reports, it is evident that we are obligated to
confront an extremely disturbing reality: under the guise of
National Security, an outrageously corrupt culture of unaccountable
War Profiteering has taken over the United States government. The
U.S. Treasury is being looted and the Constitution has been
effectively rendered null and void. The fact that these issues have
not been covered in the mainstream media, the subject of
significant congressional investigations, and a primary focus of
political representatives calls into serious question the integrity
and legitimacy of all leadership and responsible parties. In light
of the information contained within this investigative series, a
Congressional Investigation Committee needs to take immediate
action. As a top National Security priority, Congress must urgently
begin wide-scale investigations into the epidemic of systemic
corruption throughout the Pentagon. * Consider sending this report
to your congressional representatives. Please help spread the word
& share it widely. SHARE HERE
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SOURCES Whistleblowers: The New ‘Insider Threat’ Source: Just
Security, Cato Institute Thanks to information recently released by
the Senate Judiciary Committee, we now have fresh, incontrovertible
evidence that elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) have
monitored the communications of employees or contractors seeking to
report waste, fraud, abuse or potential criminal conduct by IC
agencies—including communications to House and Senate committees
charged with oversight of the IC. And based on the available public
evidence, we also know that nobody in the IC responsible for such
domestic spying has lost their job or faced a criminal referral to
the Justice Department. The implications of this are multiple and
chilling, but first, some background. On November 1, Sen. Chuck
Grassley (R-Iowa), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
issued a press release announcing that the CIA had monitored
communications between whistleblowers and congressional staff in
2014. Grassley said it took him more than four years to get the
incidents declassified—itself a statement about the anemic state of
congressional oversight of the IC. The targets of the monitoring
included IC whistleblowers and Dan Meyer, the person in the office
of the IC Inspector General (IC IG) charged with taking their
complaints and trying to shield them from retaliation. His title at
the time was executive director of whistleblowing and source
protection. Apparently, Meyer’s communications with congressional
investigators were also monitored…. In his March 28 notification to
HPSCI and SSCI leadership, [then-IC IG Charles] McCullough admitted
he was ‘concerned about the potential compromise to whistleblower
confidentiality and the consequent ‘chilling effect’ that the
present CI monitoring system might have on Intelligence Community
whistleblowing.’ But he did not ask the Intelligence Committees to
provide any additional legislative protection for such
communications. Interestingly, there was already a law on the books
that likely made the monitoring illegal…. Grassley clearly knew
about the notifications for years, which raises the question: Why
didn’t he use this section of the law to go after the CIA officials
responsible for what appears to be illegal monitoring of Meyer’s
communications with Congress? Why didn’t he call out McCullough for
ignoring the law itself?
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IC officials have been gunning for Meyer for years. In late
2017, Meyer was placed on administrative leave “with no
explanation.” When that became public earlier this year, Grassley
told GovExec.com that if Meyer was facing retaliation for
communicating with Congress, it would be “unacceptable.” But
Grassley appears to have accepted it. Meyer was officially fired by
the IC IG in March 2018, just months after he filed his own
whistleblower complaint. Grassley is hardly the only member of
Congress to take a less-than-aggressive approach to Meyer’s case,
specifically, and the threats to IC whistleblowers more generally.
As Jenna McLaughlin reported earlier this year, Senators Mark
Warner (D-Va.), Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Susan Collins (R-Maine) and
Grassley asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to
conduct “a far-reaching review” of IC whistleblower protections.
Yet just months before the Senate quartet made the request to GAO,
the agency published a damning assessment of the state of the
Defense Department’s IG office—the very office where Meyer had
worked—and been retaliated against—years earlier. GAO found that
between fiscal years 2013 and 2015, the DoD IG closed without
investigation 1,094 of 1,197 whistleblower complaints it received—a
whopping 91 percent of them. In commenting on GAO’s findings, the
Project on Government Oversight (POGO) noted that the report raised
“questions about whether the office can fairly and appropriately
handle those who come forward with allegations of misconduct.”
That’s something of an understatement, given what I’ve found in my
own investigation of how the DoD IG has handled previous IC
(specifically NSA) whistleblower complaints. Why has Warner,
ranking member on the Senate Intelligence Committee—who is clearly
aware of the gravity of these issues—not prioritized them like he
has the Russia investigation? Why did Grassley dither for years in
the Meyer case when he had a legal sledgehammer to cut off the
salaries of out-of-control CIA bureaucrats spying on whistleblowers
trying to convey their concerns to Congress? As Loch Johnson, a
former senior staffer on the Church Committee, told me years ago,
“There’s no substitute for member engagement.” I worked for an
engaged House member, so I knew what Johnson meant—introducing and
pushing for passage of legislation, getting agency or department
heads on record in writing about problems and their optimal
solutions, and in the Senate, using the power to hold up
nominations to force key executive branch documents out into the
open.
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But there’s a world of difference between the kind of feckless,
press-cycle “oversight” practiced by Grassley and Warner and the
kind of accountability-driven action that should be the hallmark of
the committees on which both serve. Grassley, Warner, and their
Senate and House colleagues have, thanks to the country’s founders,
ample Article I power to aggressively protect IC whistleblowers and
punish their bureaucrat retaliators. That they choose not to is
precisely why the fraud, waste, corruption and criminal conduct in
the IC continues apace.” ~ Patrick G. Eddington was a congressional
senior policy advisor for over 10 years. He is a Policy Analyst in
Homeland Security and Civil Liberties at the Cato Institute. Prior
to his career on Capitol Hill, he served as a military imagery
analyst at the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center
for almost nine years. He received numerous accolades for his
analytical work, including letters of commendation from the Joint
Special Operations Command, the Joint Warfare Analysis Center and
the CIA’s Office of Military Affairs. Watchdog Finds Majority of
Pentagon Whistleblowers Out of Luck Source: Center for Defense
Information, citing GAO report While DoD IG appears to be the place
Department of Defense whistleblowers who experience retaliation
should go, DoD IG declines to pursue the vast majority of the
complaints they receive…. From fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2015
DoD IG dismissed without investigation 91 percent of the civilian,
contractor, and subcontractor complaints it received. The GAO found
a number of significant weaknesses in DoD IG’s processes for
declining cases. Interviewing complainants is key and a best
practice, since most whistleblowers never thought they would become
whistleblowers and consequently don’t know the standards and
evidence necessary to show they have a potential reprisal case.
Yet, the GAO found DoD IG declined 63 percent of the cases for
which they are the primary investigative body (which GAO refers to
as “nondiscretionary”) without interviewing the whistleblower.
Moreover, a quarter of the declined cases the GAO reviewed “were
declined for reasons inconsistent with DODIG guidance and the
reasons DODIG officials told us may warrant a case being declined.”
The number of cases declined by DoD IG has been an ongoing concern
for the Project On Government Oversight, and raises questions about
whether there is effective and fair enforcement of whistleblower
protections…. There remain concerns about the independence of
reprisal investigations. A 2015 GAO report found DoD IG’s military
reprisal investigations did not have an adequate process for
monitoring potential conflicts of interest, which meant DoD IG
could not ensure decisions regarding the independence of
investigations was appropriate. GAO found similar weaknesses for
the IG’s civilian investigations. In
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addition to a lack of process, 8 of the 28 investigators and
supervisory investigators GAO interviewed raised concerns about
bias in investigations. “Investigators stated examples of perceived
bias that, if true, indicate a climate that may not be consistently
favorable to independent and objective investigations,” the GAO
wrote. Incomplete case files also remain an issue, raising
questions about both the accuracy and completeness of reprisal
investigations. DoD IG’s internal policy requires case files be
complete upon closure. The 2015 GAO report found key documents were
uploaded after the IG closed the case in 77 percent of cases
completed in fiscal year 2013. POGO obtained emails that showed the
case management system was such a mess investigators had to “stand
down” to fix the records, further delaying other investigative
work. There has been improvement, but GAO still found that half of
the fully investigated case files had documents uploaded more than
30 days after the case was closed, with the average change
occurring 228 days after closure. The report also highlights one of
the challenges of whistleblowers seeking to raise allegations
anonymously. Many whistleblowers who choose to report waste, fraud,
or abuse anonymously do so because they fear they may be retaliated
against if they report allegations under their own name. In the
case of DoD IG, some whistleblowers have also raised concerns that
the office would reveal their identity to their managers and
subject them to additional retaliation. Finally, the GAO had
concerns about DoD IG’s ability to oversee the reprisal
investigations conducted by intelligence component IGs…. Despite
requirements for component IGs to provide timely notification to
DoD IG of every reprisal allegation they receive, GAO found the NSA
IG and DIA IG only reported investigations they were pursuing, and
in several cases the notification was provided months after an
investigation had been initiated. The shortfalls identified by the
GAO thus far have actually made some of the intelligence component
IGs consider reducing their reporting on reprisals to DoD IG.
Skeptics of whistleblowers, including some DoD IG officials, claim
most whistleblower allegations are about personal problems. GAO’s
review of the disclosures received by DoD IG found yet again this
was not the case, and that 72 percent of the cases closed alleged a
violation of law, rule, or regulation. Whistleblowers go to IGs
expecting them to be honest brokers of the law, particularly for
laws designed to protect sources who advance their investigations.
Unfortunately this report doesn’t give them much confidence their
allegations about waste, fraud, and abuse will ever receive due
consideration.
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Congressional Testimony on Oversight of Department of Defense
Inspector General’s Military Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
Source: Congressional testimony from POGO’s Mandy Smithberger POGO
has also heard directly from whistleblowers within DoD IG who have
expressed serious concerns about the integrity of the office’s
processes and investigations, including pressure to back-fill
whistleblower case files for the GAO’s review. It is extremely rare
to have whistleblowers from an IG shop come forward, but in this
case we have a number of them. Concerns raised by individual
whistleblowers are also echoed in OPM Survey data, which showed
that 26.5 percent of DoD IG employees surveyed responded that they
did not feel they could “disclose a suspected violation of any law,
rule, or regulation without fear of reprisal.” Forty-five percent
of DoD IG employees also disagreed that their senior leadership
maintains high standards of honesty and integrity…. Alleged
retaliation by DoD IG’s General Counsel against the agency’s former
Assistant Inspector General and the former Director of
Whistleblowing and Transparency only raises additional concerns
about the perilous environment for whistleblowers. We believe this
reflects deep cultural problems that must be remedied in order for
whistleblowers to believe this office should be trusted as willing
and able to protect whistleblowers and to hold accountable those
who illegally retaliate against them. POGO raised concerns about
the integrity of military reprisal investigations, timeliness,
toxic culture, and transparency in a letter to Principal Deputy IG
Glenn Fine in March…. Ensuring the fairness of military reprisal
investigations is particularly important because military
whistleblowers still have a higher burden of proof to show illegal
retaliation than other federal whistleblowers…. Fixing these deep
cultural problems will require more than the tweaks to policies and
training sessions the DoD IG has instituted thus far. It must
include changes in leadership in the offices of General Counsel and
Administrative Investigations…. POGO is concerned because the DoD
IG has dismissed without full investigation 86 percent of the
military cases it has received since pledging to make reforms in
2011. The IG’s rate of dismissal is particularly striking because
it is more than double that of Service IGs, who many consider to be
less independent. For purposes of comparison, during the same time
period the DoD IG dismissed an even higher
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percentage of civilian and contractor reprisal cases,
substantiating only 7 out of over 1,300 complaints received. And
for another comparison, the DoD IG’s investigative rates for
civilian reprisals are about half of what we have seen for federal
employee whistleblowers at the Office of Special Counsel. The DoD
IG’s low investigation and substantiation rates create the
appearance that the office is focused on closing, rather than
investigating, the cases it receives…. Failing to talk to
whistleblowers may also be contributing to whistleblowers feeling
betrayed by the DoD IG. POGO has found several instances in which
the DoD IG referred whistleblower disclosures back to entities that
are not sufficiently independent to conduct the investigation. In
some of those instances whistleblowers felt the IG needlessly
exposed them to additional retaliation, and had they known the IG
was going to refer their disclosures they would have chosen to
withdraw their complaints.… A 2011 Internal Review Team report
questioned substantiation rates, disagreeing with the DoD IG’s own
decisions in 47 percent of the cases they reviewed. In those
instances in which the DoD IG declined to investigate, the
reviewers disagreed 68 percent of the time…. Misconduct within the
DoD IG [‘systemic practice of improperly interfering with and
undermining investigations’] One of the major issues raised by the
GAO review was problems with the DoD IG’s case management system.
Specifically, the GAO found that the IG uploaded key case documents
after it had closed the case in 77 percent of cases closed in
fiscal year 2013, and altered case variables for 83 percent of
cases closed in fiscal year 2014. Case variables that were changed
after the fact included information used to evaluate timeliness of
investigations and investigative outcomes, including “changes to
the date the service member filed the complaint and the
organization that conducted the investigation, as well as the
result code, which indicates whether the case was fully
investigated.” Case files were such a mess that IG management
instructed investigators to “stand down” on other work in September
2013 in order to add additional records to closed cases in the case
management system. Emails shared with POGO said personnel could
also apply for overtime to work on or amend the information in
their own and others’ old cases.
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Internal instructions by DoD IG management to staff that were
shared with POGO provide evidence of efforts to improperly
influence the GAO’s findings, including advising staff to add
information to files that were specifically within the scope of the
GAO’s review. Management’s instructions raise serious concerns
about those DoD IG officials and the cases processed by the
Administrative and Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations teams,
since changing these records likely had a significant impact on the
GAO’s findings. We are concerned that the DoD IG has only seen this
as a compliance exercise and does not understand the gravity of
trying to mislead GAO investigators. Since sending our letter,
additional whistleblower allegations that IG General Counsel Henry
Shelley improperly destroyed files in a whistleblower case have
been referred to the DoD IG by the Office of Special Counsel for
investigation. Principal Deputy IG Fine in turn referred the
allegations to the Department of Justice Inspector General for an
independent investigation, and we applaud him for doing so. But we
are troubled because this is only the latest allegation of many
that Shelley engages in a systemic practice of improperly
interfering with and undermining personnel investigations…. The
Problem of Acting Inspector Generals POGO views IGs as an essential
component of a well-functioning federal government, and over the
past few years we have undertaken a number of efforts to study and
improve the IG system. One of those efforts is to draw attention to
the large number of IG offices that are operating without permanent
leadership. POGO firmly believes that the effectiveness of an IG
office can be diminished when that office does not have permanent
leadership, especially when the vacancy exists for an extended
period of time, as many of the current vacancies have. In addition,
a permanent IG has the ability to set a long-term strategic plan
for the office, including setting investigative and audit
priorities. An acting official, on the other hand, is known by all
OIG staff to be temporary, which one former IG has argued “can have
a debilitating effect on [an] OIG, particularly over a lengthy
period.” While the DoD IG does not hold the record for the longest
vacancy, we believe that filling this position should be a priority
for the next administration. Addressing the DoD IG’s deep cultural
problems—all of which predate Principal Deputy IG Fine—requires
permanent leadership….
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[Congressional Investigation] Recommendations The DoD IG should:
Investigate and consider for removal any senior officials found to
have illegally destroyed evidence in whistleblower or other case
files, improperly instructed employees to back-fill cases, or
otherwise interfered with the independence and integrity of
investigations; …. Request a GAO or outside IG audit of the DoD
IG’s reprisal investigations to ensure that investigators’
decisions to dismiss, investigate, and substantiate reprisal are
proper and based on the legal requirements for examining any
evidence presented; …. Conclusion Whistleblowers who report
concerns that affect our national security must be lauded, not
shunned or, worse, harmed. And the law must protect them. The
perceived and real failures of the DoD IG to act as a check on
violations of law should be of grave concern. GAO Whistleblower
Protection Report: WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION Opportunities Exist for
DOD to Improve the Timeliness and Quality of Civilian and
Contractor Reprisal Investigations United States Government
Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters Source:
GAO-17-506 PDF [We conducted this performance audit from February
2016 to September 2017 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards… we obtained data on all civilian and
contractor whistleblower reprisal cases closed by DODIG and
appropriated-fund DOD civilian cases closed by the Office of
Special Counsel from October 1, 2012, through September 30, 2015,
and on all DODIG cases open as of September 2016. We selected data
from this period because they constituted the most complete and
recent data available in DODIG’s and the Office of Special
Counsel’s case-management systems during the time we were doing our
analysis.] Whistleblowers play an important role in safeguarding
the federal government against waste, fraud, and abuse, and their
willingness to come forward can contribute to improvements in
government operations. However, whistleblowers
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also risk reprisal, such as demotion, reassignment, and firing.
Congress and the former administration had established a statutory
and policy framework to protect whistleblowers from reprisal for
disclosing information concerning, among other things, fraud,
waste, and abuse to designated persons such as an inspector general
(IG). Under this framework and its implementing directives, the
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DODIG) is
responsible for investigating and overseeing the investigation of
complaints alleging reprisal against certain DOD civilian employees
and for conducting investigations of complaints alleging reprisal
against DOD contractor employees. Specifically, DODIG is the
primary investigative authority for reprisal complaints involving
Department of Defense (DOD) civilian non-appropriated-fund
instrumentality (NAFI) employees, and DOD contractor,
subcontractor, grantee and subgrantee employees. DODIG may also
investigate, on a discretionary basis, reprisal complaints it
receives from DOD civilian appropriated-fund employees. Finally,
DODIG is responsible for investigating reprisal complaints
involving DOD civilian employees under the Defense Civilian
Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS), overseeing the investigation
of such complaints by the defense intelligence components, and
investigating reprisal complaints involving actions affecting DOD
civilian and contractor employees’ access to classified
information. In recent years, members of Congress have expressed
concerns regarding the timeliness and integrity of DODIG’s reprisal
investigations, along with its interpretation of statutory
protections for contractor employees, among other things. In
February 2012 and May 2015, we reported that DOD faced challenges
in overseeing the military services’ whistleblower reprisal
investigations and made 18 recommendations to help improve the
timeliness of military servicemembers’ whistleblower reprisal
investigations and to improve investigation and oversight
processes, among other things. For example, we reported that DODIG
was not consistently or accurately recording key dates to track the
length of investigations, did not report the timeliness of its
investigations to Congress, and had outdated guidance about the
investigation process…. You asked us to examine DODIG’s conduct and
oversight of whistleblower reprisal investigations involving DOD
civilian and contractor employees. This report examines the extent
to which DODIG has: (1) met and taken steps to achieve key
timeliness goals for civilian and contractor whistleblower reprisal
investigations; (2) established processes to ensure that civilian
and contractor whistleblower
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reprisal cases are handled independently and thoroughly; (3)
conducted oversight of civilian reprisal cases handled by the
defense intelligence components; and (4) developed performance
measures to assess the timeliness and quality of its
investigations. For the first objective, we obtained data on all
civilian and contractor whistleblower reprisal cases closed by
DODIG and appropriated-fund DOD civilian cases closed by the Office
of Special Counsel from October 1, 2012, through September 30,
2015, and on all DODIG cases open as of September 2016. We selected
data from this period because they constituted the most complete
and recent data available in DODIG’s and the Office of Special
Counsel’s case-management systems during the time we were doing our
analysis. Using these data, we calculated the timeliness of DODIG
and Office of Special Counsel cases in relation to time frames
prescribed by statute and internal DOD goals, and assessed other
characteristics including case type and rates of substantiation. We
assessed the reliability of DODIG and Office of Special Counsel
data by administering questionnaires, interviewing cognizant
officials, and reviewing system documentation and quality-assurance
procedures. For DODIG data, we also compared electronic data to
fiscal year 2015 casefile documentation and conducted internal
checks…. DODIG Generally Did Not Meet Timeliness Goals between
Fiscal Years 2013 and 2015 and Has Not Collected Key Workload Data
or Reported Regularly to Congress…. In Fiscal Years 2013–2015,
DODIG Generally Did Not Meet Statutory and Internal Goals for
Civilian and Contractor Reprisal Cases…. DODIG Does Not Regularly
Report to Congress on the Timeliness of Civilian and Contractor
Whistleblower Reprisal Cases…. When Declining Cases for Review,
DODIG Does Not Always Follow Its Intake Process…. DODIG’s Case
files Were Missing Some Key Documentation Our review of case files
closed by DODIG in fiscal year 2015 found that some documentation
was consistently present, but that some other key documentation or
data were missing or were not uploaded to DODIG’s case-file system
in a timely manner. This documentation and these data are needed to
demonstrate compliance with or execution of investigative,
quality-assurance, and internal controls
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processes, including the internal controls checklist — which we
found did not include checks for some key documentation and
required investigative events. Further, our interviews with the 24
investigators from investigative teams showed that some steps
required to help ensure thoroughness during the investigative
process are not routinely followed…. Approximately 48 percent of
the cases that were fully investigated included documents that were
modified or were newly uploaded at least 30 days after case
closure. These changes related to documents such as the final
report of investigation, closure letters, evidence of legal review,
the investigative plan, congressional correspondence, and interview
transcripts…. DODIG’s internal policy required that case files be
complete upon case closure and the most recent change occurred on
average 228 days (median 148 days) after case closure, far
exceeding the internal policy and the prior practice of completing
internal controls checklists on a quarterly basis…. Two out of
three fully investigated cases with congressional inquiries were
missing correspondence to the Member of Congress providing a
summary of the findings, as required by DODIG’s 2012 investigations
manual…. Approximately 81 percent of the 413 testimony transcripts
and voice recordings we reviewed did not address one or more points
of the standard read-in/read-out process. This process consists of
a series of questions and statements at the beginning and end of
each interview intended to ensure that all witnesses are treated
equally and that they are afforded the proper notifications of
authorities and due process…. 16 of the 24 investigators stated
that the pre-subject-interview roundtables occur infrequently or
not at all, and 19 of the 24 investigators stated that
post-subject-interview roundtables occur infrequently or not at
all…. DODIG officials acknowledged, that DODIG’s internal controls
checklist does not capture the full range of key case-file
documentation and required investigative events, including
documentation of (1) an intake worksheet, (2) required roundtable
discussions, and (3) the program analyst for quality assurance
review.97 Without a checklist that captures the full range of key
case-file documentation and data associated with required
investigative steps, DODIG will be limited in its ability to ensure
compliance with CIGIE standards related to thoroughness and
adequacy of case-file documentation, as well as the currency,
accuracy, and completeness of data maintained in its
case-management system….
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DODIG and the defense intelligence components have not fully
addressed requirements related to DODIG’s review of all DCIPS
employee allegations, determinations, and investigations handled by
the component IGs. DOD Directive-Type Memorandum 13-008—which
implements Presidential Policy Directive 19 (PPD-19)—requires that
DODIG provide oversight of reprisal allegations involving DCIPS
employees that are handled by the defense intelligence component
IGs, and that the component IGs correspondingly furnish information
to DODIG…. DODIG has not established processes with the defense
intelligence component IGs—such as standard operating procedures—to
ensure that the components provide the allegation notifications,
determinations to not investigate, and investigations prescribed by
Directive-Type Memorandum 13-008. As the principal advisor for DOD
IGs, DODIG is to assist the defense IGs—including the IGs of the
defense intelligence components—by coordinating and clarifying DOD
policy, issuing implementing instructions, and resolving
conflicting or inconsistent IG policy involving defense IG duties,
responsibilities, and functions. Without a process to fully
implement the requirements of Directive-Type Memorandum 13-008 that
includes (1) receiving notification of all allegations received by
the defense intelligence component IGs, (2) reviewing their
determinations to not investigate allegations, and (3) reviewing
all investigations that they conduct, DODIG and the defense
intelligence components will continue to not fully adhere to the
prescribed roles related to the oversight of component
determinations and investigations, as defined in agency
directives…. DODIG’s Timeliness Performance… Lacks Measures to
Assess the Quality of Investigations and Oversight Reviews…. DODIG
does not have performance measures to assess the quality of its
investigations and oversight reviews for fiscal year 2017 and
beyond. Prior to fiscal year 2017, DODIG had developed several
different timeliness and quality performance measures, but these
measures were inconsistently documented and reported…. DODIG did
not provide baselines for its fiscal year 2017 whistleblower
reprisal timeliness performance measures, and it has not
consistently reported on all of its past timeliness performance
measures, as discussed below, thus inhibiting baseline and trend
analysis…. DODIG’s fiscal year 2017 timeliness measures… do not
address the unit’s priority of conducting thorough investigations
that adhere to CIGIE standards….
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DODIG’s fiscal year 2017 timeliness measures are focused on the
agency’s priority to improve the timeliness of its reprisal
investigations and oversight reviews, and do not address the
quality of investigations. Without addressing the government-wide
priority of quality, an overemphasis on timeliness could undermine
quality. In addition, DODIG’s suite of timeliness measures does not
address the efficiency or cost of service associated with
investigations and oversight reviews. Although DODIG has not
developed performance measures for fiscal year 2017 to specifically
assess the quality of its reprisal investigations and oversight
reviews, DODIG officials stated in April 2017 that they were in the
process of doing so. Prior to fiscal year 2017, DODIG had developed
several performance measures to assess both the timeliness and
quality of its reprisal investigations, but the evaluation of these
measures was inconsistently documented and reported, and some
measures changed over time…. Maintaining a timely, independent, and
thorough process for investigating whistleblower reprisal
complaints is essential to executing DODIG’s mission…. However,
without regularly reporting on the timeliness of all civilian and
contractor investigations, decision makers’ ability to effectively
oversee the whistleblower reprisal program is limited. DODIG also
does not have key workload data that would enable it to more fully
assess its personnel requirements in support of its planned steps
to improve timeliness…. Enhancements are also needed for existing
processes designed to help ensure the independence and thoroughness
of DODIG’s investigations. By documenting investigators’ recusals
and conflicts of interest—and evaluating these and other threats in
the aggregate—DODIG will have increased institutional awareness of
threats such as bias, thereby better enabling it to fully evaluate
such threats. Also, by establishing and clearly communicating a
declination policy for nondiscretionary cases, DODIG will have
better assurance that these complainants are afforded the same due
process as those whose cases are routed through the intake process.
Additionally, developing an internal controls checklist that
captures the full range of key case-file documentation and data
associated with required investigative steps will help DODIG ensure
compliance with CIGIE standards related to the thoroughness and
adequacy of case-file documentation. Moreover, it will be better
positioned to withstand scrutiny by outside authorities, and
address concerns expressed by members of Congress regarding the
integrity of its investigations.
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Another area in which DODIG’s process can be improved is in its
oversight of cases involving DCIPS employees that are handled by
the defense intelligence component IGs. While DODIG is reviewing
investigations conducted by some of the defense intelligence
component IGs, it has not established processes with the defense
intelligence component IGs that fully address requirements to
receive notification of all allegations involving DCIPS employees
that are received by the components, review component
determinations to not investigate allegations, and review all the
investigations the components conduct. Without a process for doing
so, DODIG and the defense intelligence components are unable to
fulfill their prescribed roles related to the oversight of
component determinations and investigations. Moreover, without
fully executing its oversight responsibilities, DODIG cannot
achieve its vision of being the model whistleblower-protection
program in the federal government. Finally, given… the anticipated
increase in cases — it is important that there be a reliable means
by which to gauge progress in the timeliness and quality of both
investigations and oversight reviews…. DODIG has not developed
measures for quality for fiscal year 2017 and beyond….
Recommendations for Executive Action We are making the following
seven recommendations to the Department of Defense Office of
Inspector General (DODIG): · The DOD Inspector General should
assess the feasibility of collecting additional workload data, such
as the amount of direct and indirect labor hours associated with
each case, and including such data in future personnel requirements
assessments, as appropriate. (Recommendation 1) · The DOD Inspector
General should report regularly to Congress on the timeliness of
civilian and contractor investigations, including those contractor
and subcontractor cases exceeding the 180-day timeliness
requirement. (Recommendation 2) · The DOD Inspector General should
implement a process to document employee recusals and impairments
to independence and incorporate such information into an
aggregate-level evaluation of threats to DODIG’s independence.
(Recommendation 3)
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· The DOD Inspector General should establish and clearly
communicate a declination policy for nondiscretionary cases in the
AI Investigations Manual or other guidance, and align this policy
with the intake policy. (Recommendation 4) · The DOD Inspector
General should revise the existing internal controls checklist to
include all key case-file documentation and required investigative
events. (Recommendation 5) · The DOD Inspector General should work
in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence, and the inspectors general of the
defense intelligence components to establish a process to fully
implement the requirements of DirectiveType Memorandum 13-008 so
that DODIG (1) receives notifications of all allegations received
by the components, (2) reviews all component determinations to not
investigate allegations, and (3) reviews all investigations
conducted by the components. (Recommendation 6) · The DOD Inspector
General should develop quality performance measures and enhance
existing timeliness performance measures to reflect key attributes
of successful performance measures. At minimum, these measures
should be clear, quantifiable, and objective, and they should
include a baseline assessment of current performance.
(Recommendation 7) Case Dispositions for Complaints Closed in
Fiscal Year 2013 through Fiscal Year 2015 The majority of civilian
and contractor and subcontractor complaints closed by DODIG in
fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2015 — 1,094 of 1,197, or
about 91 percent — were closed without investigation, while 103, or
about 9 percent, were fully investigated…. Our analysis of data
from DODIG’s case-management system showed that the overall number
of declined cases — those that do not go through the intake process
— as a proportion of total closed civilian and contractor cases
rose from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2015…. Whistleblower
Reprisal Complaints Received by DODIG in Fiscal Year 2013 through
Fiscal Year 2015 In fiscal years 2013 through 2015, DODIG received
a total of 1,208 complaints from appropriated-fund civilians; NAFI
civilians; contractors, subcontractors, grantees, and subgrantees;
and DCIPS employees or employees with eligibility for access to
classified information alleging whistleblower reprisal….
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Of the 1,208 complaints, 758, or 63 percent, were filed by
civili