1 The Luxembourg Wealth Study : enhancing comparative research on household finance Rome, 6th July 2007 Do the elderly reduce housing equity? An international comparison Maria Concetta Chiuri* and Tullio Jappelli** * Università di Bari, CSEF and CHILD ** Università di Napoli Federico II, CSEF and CEPR
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The Luxembourg Wealth Study : enhancing comparative research on household finance
Rome, 6th July 2007
Do the elderly reduce housing equity? An international comparison
Maria Concetta Chiuri* and Tullio Jappelli**
* Università di Bari, CSEF and CHILD** Università di Napoli Federico II, CSEF and CEPR
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Outline
Motivations
Main contribution of our paper
The evidence to date
The international dataset
Estimating ownership trajectories
Explaining international differences
in ownership trajectories
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Motivation 1 - Policy
Population aging makes of clear policy interest understanding the determinants of decisions over:
how much to save how to save should wealth be annuitized, … etc. as people get older.
o Real estate is the largest component of total wealth (more than 70% of tot. wealth)
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Motivation 2 - Theory Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) predicts
that with perfect markets selfish individuals run down their wealth in order to smooth consumption over their life-cycle
from owning to renting or downsizing.
Bequest motives Housing as a source of consumption
itself
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Main contribution of our paper
A systematic international comparison of age-trajectories of home-ownership
17 OECD countries, 59 national surveys,
years 1974-2000, 300.000 obs.
Empirical test on whether they are explained by differences in financial markets, institutions and public policy.
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The evidence to date -1
US Feinstein and McFadden (1989) use PSID and find
transition from owning to renting of <0.3% per year. Venti and Wise (2002; 2004) HRRS, SIPP, AHDAOO find
1.76%; but about 8% for those with precipitating shocks; they do not depend on h/h composition. Cohort effects are relevant.
Fisher, Johnson, Marchand, Smeeding and Torrey (2007) evidence from CEX that the elderly prefer to stay in their home.
Canada Crossley and Ostrovsky (2003) use three Canadian
surveys and find an annual decline of 0.6% from age 55 to 80.
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The evidence to date - 2
UK Ermisch and Jenkins(1999) use five waves
of BHPS and find only rare residential mobility.
Germany Börsch-Supan (1994) compare data from
Germany and the US and find that the decline is similar in the two countries.
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Summing up – previous evidence
Decumulation, but slow
Importance of cohort effects
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Country Survey and years available
Australia Australian Inc. and Hous. Costs Survey: 1981
Austria Micro-census: 1987, 1995; ECHP : 1997
Belgium Panel S. of CSP: 1985, 1988, 1992, 1997; Panel S. of Belgium H/h: 2000
Canada S. Consumer Fin.: 1975, 1981, 1987, 1991, 1994, 1997;
S. of Lab. and Income Dyn. 2000 Denmark Income Tax S.:1987, 1992 Finland Income Distribution S.: 1995, 2000 France Household Budget S.: 1984, 1989, 1994
over-mortgaging, re-mortgaging or second-mortgage)
o Regulation in financial mkt difficult to distinguish from other economy-wide regulation
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Table 5 - Index of mortgage market and economy-wide regulation, property taxes and no. of beds in nursing homes: international comparisons
Index of mortgage market
regulation
Index of economy wide regulation
Property taxes to GDP ratio
Number of beds in nursing homes
Australia .1 .30 .027 4.8
Austria .9 .37 .006 1.7
Belgium .9 .50 .013 2.9
Canada .5 .41 .037 12.2
Denmark .3 .19 .017 5.1
Finland .5 .08 .011 4.3
France .7 .60 .024 1.3
Germany .7 .39 .01 8.6
Ireland .1 .06 .016 6.9
Italy .9 .75 .023 2.7
Luxembourg .3 .036 5.9
Netherlands .5 .08 .019 3.8
Norway .3 .34 .011 9.1
Spain .5 .42 .02 0.3
Sweden .3 .43 .02 5.4
UK .1 .0 .038 3.1
US .3 .09 .032 5.4
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The index of mortgage market regulation is taken from Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004). The score adds one point for fulfilling each of the following five criteria: (i) Mortgage rate arrangement are primarily extended on the basis of fixed rate contracts; (ii) Mortgage equity withdrawals is absent or limited; (iii) The loan-to-value ratio does not exceed 75 percent, (iv) Valuation methods of property is based on historical values, rather than based on market values (v) Mortgage backed securitization is absent or limited. The index is then normalized to one.
The index of economy wide regulation is taken from Kaufman, Kraay and Zoldo Lobaton (1999). The index is a very wide indicator of the degree of economic regulation covering many different regulatory areas (state control, barriers to entrepreneurship, administrative regulations, tariff and non-tariff barriers, etc.) aggregated through factor analysis.
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Figure 6. Change in ownership and mortgage market regulation
Ireland
UK
Denmark
Luxembourg
USSweden
Finland
Netherlands
Canada
France
Germany
Belgium
Austria
Italy
-.1
-.0
8-.
06
-.0
4-.
02
0
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Ch
ange
in o
wn
ersh
ip
Index of mortgage market regulation
Note. Cohort-adjusted change in ownership between age 71-75 and age 76-80.
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Figure 7. Change in ownership and economy-wide regulation
Note. Cohort-adjusted change in ownership between age 71-75 and age 76-80.
UK
Ireland
Netherlands
Finland
USDenmark
Austria
Germany
Canada
Sweden
Belgium France
Italy
-.1
-.0
8-.
06
-.0
4-.
02
0
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
Ch
ange
in o
wn
ersh
ip
Index of economy-wide regulation
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Table 6 Regressions for change in ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Index of mortgage -0.045 -0.048
market regulation (0.018)** (0.024)*
Index of economy- -0.063 -0.060
wide regulation (0.016)*** (0.016)***
Property tax to GDP 1.006 0.096 0.187
ratio (0.730) (0.641) (0.416)
Number of beds in 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
nursing homes (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Ownership in age -0.020 -0.011 -0.036 -0.007 -0.029 -0.019
group 71-75 (0.036) (0.028) (0.054) (0.050) (0.035) (0.026)
Constant 0.003 -0.008 -0.032 -0.042 0.016 -0.003
(0.030) (0.020) (0.039) (0.042) (0.041) (0.024)
Observations 14 13 14 13 13 12
R-squared 0.36 0.61 0.15 0.06 0.49 0.72
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Sensitivity analysis
Lagged ownership
Overall ownership rate (proxy for thin rental mkt)
Property vs. transaction taxes
Social security income replacement rate
Price to income ratio
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Conclusion We estimated the home-ownership rate for the
elderly using data from 17 OECD countries.
The analysis at the individual level
Controlling for cohort effects, the ownership rate falls after age 70; after age 75 falls at 1% per year.
Differences across countries are highly explained by the degree of morgage mkt regulation and by the economy-wide regulation.
Credit market imperfections are an explanatory factor for international differences in the aggregate saving rate.