1 The Centre for the Study of Small States, The Source of Wealth in Small States University of Reykjavik Small States as Financial Centres Ireland as a Case Study Brendan Walsh University College Dublin 14 th September 2007
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The Centre for the Study of Small States, The Source of Wealth in Small States
University of Reykjavik
Small States as Financial Centres Ireland as a Case Study
Brendan WalshUniversity College Dublin
14th September 2007
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Jan 1988
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May 1997
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Oct 2004
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The Irish ExperienceBetween the 1980s and the end of the
1990s, Ireland moved quickly up the international league tables in terms of
average living standards.The Irish labour market was also transformed from one of the worst-
performing to one of the best-performing in Europe.
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Rising living standardsDespite the opening up to external trade and investment in the 1960s and entry to the EEC
in 1973, Ireland in the 1980s remained relatively poor by western European standards.However, between the late 1980s and the year
2000, very rapid growth in GNP raised Irish income per person (adjusted for differences in
purchasing power) to or even above the EU average.
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GNP/GDP growth ratesIreland and EU
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
%
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Comparison of living standards in 1986 (EU average = 100)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Ireland (GNP) Portugal Spain Greece
•
9
Comparison of living standards in 2004(EU average = 100)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Ireland (GNP) Portugal Spain Greece
•
10
Comparison of standards in 1986 and 2004(EU average = 100)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Ireland(GNP)
Portugal Spain Greece
19862004
•
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Not “just” wealthier . . .Healthier also Irish life expectancy had been
slowing rising, and mortality rates slowly declining
But since the late 1990s they have surged ahead and caught up with the most advanced nations
Belies the complaints over the poor delivery of state controlled health services
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During the boom
The rich got richer and the poor . ..Got richer tooDramatic decline in absolute povertyThe the biggest cause of social exclusion –
unemployment – fell extraordinarily raidply during the second half of the 1990s
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The Irish labour market was completely transformed
Since the early nineteenth century Ireland had been a prime example of a “labour
surplus economy”• Overt unemployment kept in check
– By emigration– By large subsistence agricultural sector– By low labour force participation rates
Until the 1980s….
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Irish unemployment rate, 1961-1986
02468
1012141618
%
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Surge in employment in the 1990s
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2,000
2,200
1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
thou
sand
s
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Irish unemployment rate, 1986 - 2004
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
%
17
Irish unemployment rate, 1961-2004
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
%
18
Irish and EU unemployment rates, 1961-2005
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
%
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A renewed population
Net emigration turned into net immigrationso that by the end of the 1990s Ireland had
the fastest growing population and labour force in the EU
– reversing the long decline in our population that was the clearest symbol
of our national failure after Independence
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-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
per
1000
pop
ulat
ion
Net Migration Rate
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Explaining the boom
• No single “magic bullet”
We can classify the key factors into
• Favourable demand side shocks and
• Favourable supply-side responses
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Demand-side developments• Fiscal correction and renewed confidence
– Reduced tax burden
– Cross party support for tough policies
• Falling real interest rates– Run-up to Euro
• Strategic exchange rate weakness
• Global boom
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Supply-side developments• Increased inflow of FDI
– Full integration into the EU
– Increased attractiveness of Ireland’s low corporation tax
regime
– Investments by premier US companies in IT and
Pharmaceuticals
• Increased inflows of EU structural funds
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Supply side developments• Elastic labour supply– High initial unemployment
– Return migration– Low initial participation rates
• Rising educational attainment of outflow from education system
• Wage moderation – Role of centralised wage bargains
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Structural labour market reforms
• Stricter social welfare regime
• Falling unemployment benefit
replacement ratio
• Active labour market policies
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Changes in social welfare code• Stricter eligibility criteria
• Reduced replacement ratio – (facilitated by cuts in income tax rates)
• Some reclassification of the unemployment into “inactive”
• More spending on active labour market policies, less on income support
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The Contribution of Tax Policy
• The rising burden of taxation, and widening tax wedges, contributed to the protracted recession of the 1980s
• The reversal of these trends contributed to the rapid recovery of the 1990s.– A return of “social partnership” in 1987
facilitated these developments– Trade of nominal wage claims for income tax
cuts
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The facts• During the first part of the fiscal
correction, the economy seemed to shrinking
• When the emphasis shifted to expenditure control – rather than tax increases – the economy grew strongly
• Cause and effect less straightforward!
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Taxes as % of GNP
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
Taxes on incomeTaxes on ExpenditureTotal
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Taxes as % of GNP and Real Growth
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
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Change in tax burden and real growth rates
Change in tax burden
Change in tax burden
-23
-13
-3
7
17
27
37
1979-88 1989-2003
%
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The tax reductions delivered under social partnership
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%
Average tax rate (incl employeesocial security contirbutions)
Marginal tax rate (incl employeesocial security contirbutions)
1979 1984 2002 2007
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Corporation Tax Policy
The tax regime experienced by business in Ireland has remained stable over long periods and consistently favour a low tax rate on profits:
• A zero tax rate on profits from exports lasted from 1954 to 1980.
• A 10% tax rate on manufacturing profits applied from 1980, and will continue until 2010 for those entitled to it in July 1998.
• A 12½% tax rate on corporate trading income applies from 1/1/2003 and is EU approved.
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Corporation Tax Policy
Full repatriation of profits was always permitted
However, a generous corporation tax regime not sufficient to attract FDI:
But when combined with a well-educated labour force, competitiveness wage levels, and open access to the large EU market, it worked wonders
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Not all the effects of this policy are positive
Transfer pricing and the growth of an entrepôt economy
Sectors with extraordinarily high value added per employee
Round Island One (Microsoft)• Turnover $3.9 billion• Value added per employee $2.5 million• Corporation taxes paid in Ireland: $3.8 million
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Impact of transfer pricing
Very marked in sectors such as • Pharmaceuticals• Soft ware• Microelectronics• Certain food concentrates (Coca Cola)The gap between GDP and GNP is now
15% of GDP – a world record
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Corporation Tax Policy
The present uniform low rate of corporation tax has been used in particular to drive the development of Ireland’s international financial services sector, where employment has grown spectacularly.
It has also generated uneasy among some EU members, who fear that “tax competition” will lead to a “race to the bottom”
Ireland is strongly opposed to “tax harmonization” as a response to this.
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International Financial Services
The International Financial Services Centre (IFSC). established with EU approval as a tax-incentive zone in 1987.
Initially a ring-fenced tax jurisdiction in a designated area in the north inner city of Dublin.
Since December 2000 new cross-border international-financial services companies are taxed at the new standard rate of 12.5 per cent
The Centre has become an integral part of the jurisdiction of Ireland
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International Financial ServicesThe initial employment target of 8,000 jobs has long been
exceeded. The level of employment in the wider Irish international
financial services sector has reached 22,000 by 2006. The largest single sub-sector was banking, which employs
9,923, followed by Fund Management, with 9,227, and Insurance, with 3,027.
Thus the original scheme has been extremely successful, exceeding its overall employment targets and creating a significant international financial service centre in what was until recently a derelict area of Dublin.
Attracted large inflow of service FDI
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Fallout from US sub-prime mortgage market
• On 15th August 2007 Sachsen LB Europe plc confirmed that its Dublin subsidiary in Dublin, the Ormond Quay conduit, had to be rescued by a loan of €17.3 billion.
• This episode highlights the need to have a single financial regulator across the Eurozone and drew some unwelcome attention to the nature of some of the firms in Irish International Financial Services Industry.
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SummaryMany favourable factors came together to create
the Irish economic “miracle”Rapid economic growth was facilitated by
• Favourable external developments• A successful fiscal correction
• An elastic labour supply and increased flexibility of the labour market• Increased inflows of FDI
• Increased flows of EU structural funds
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SummaryThe reversal of the upward trend in the burden of
taxation after the mid-1980s was undoubtedly a key feature of the fiscal adjustment
This reduced tax wedges, especially on labour, and stimulated an increased supply of work
effortIt was facilitated by the return to “social
partnership” in 1987The effectiveness of Ireland’s low corporation tax
rate greatly increased in the new global economic environment of the 1990s.
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SummaryThe extension of Ireland’s low corporation
tax rate to a ring-fenced International Financial Centre in Dublin in 1987
proved hugely successfulThere are now 22,000 people employed in
International Financial Services in Ireland and the sector has been
integrated into the economy.
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The future…The economy has now entered an
adjustment phase.The construction sector, which accounts for
12.5% of employment and fuelled a very high level of immigration, is now
contractingHow rapidly?
The exceptionally buoyant fiscal situation is deteriorating
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The future
It remains to be seen how steep the slowdown will be and which sectors of
the economy will be the engines of growth going forward