1 Risk Management Approaches to the Japanese Regulations of Hydrogen Supply Stations September 12, 2007 Japan Petroleum Energy Center (JPEC) Hydrogen Technology Group Shigeki Kikukawa INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HYDROGEN SAFETY Second Plenary Risk Management Approaches to Hydrogen Safety, Regulations, Codes, and Standards (RCS)
35
Embed
1 Risk Management Approaches to the Japanese Regulations of Hydrogen Supply Stations September 12, 2007 Japan Petroleum Energy Center (JPEC) Hydrogen Technology.
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
1
Risk Management Approaches to the Japanese Regulations of Hydrogen Supply Stations
September 12, 2007
Japan Petroleum Energy Center (JPEC)Hydrogen Technology Group
Shigeki Kikukawa
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HYDROGEN SAFETY
Second Plenary
Risk Management Approaches to Hydrogen Safety, Regulations, Codes, and Standards (RCS)
2
First Glance
In this section:
1. Introduction
2. Risk Assessment Approaches to Hydrogen Supply Stations
3. Overview of the new combined gasoline/hydrogen supply station
4. Future issues
5. Summaries
3
1. Introduction Japanese government positively promotes
widespread use of fuel cells. They address a wide variety of technologies
from the basic study about FC to the demonstrations of automotive FC and stationary FC system.
METI's Total Budget for Fuel Cell and Hydrogen
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007Fiscal Year
Bud
get
(Bill
ion
Yen
s)
Stationary FC System
Safety evaluation facilities for FCV
206 million Euro
4
The society using hydrogen energyThe society using hydrogen energy
DemonstrationCodes & Standards
HarmoniHarmonizeze
International C&SInternational C&S
R&D of Hydrogen and FC
5
Establishment of Codes & Standards Establishment of Codes & Standards for the society using hydrogen energyfor the society using hydrogen energy
Code & standard review projects in Japan FCV Japan Automobile Research Institute
Stationary FC System Japan Gas Association
Hydrogen supply stations Japan Petroleum Energy Center
Aim: to collect data necessary to review the codes and standards,
and to establish test methods.
Budget: 2.6 billion Yen (16 million euro) for 2007 from New
Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization
(NEDO).
6
2. Risk Assessment Approaches to Hydrogen Supply Stations
7
Hydrogen supply stations
Reformer
Trailer
Compressor Accumulator Dispenser
On-site type
Off-site type
FCVOverview
IWATANI, JHFC HP
Liquid hydrogen type
FCV (LH2)
Tanker truck LH2 tank, Evaporator LH2 dispenser
8
Key Issue: Setback Distance
H2
17m11.3m8m
17m: Hospital, school, etc.
11.3m: Dwellings
8m: Fire sources
Setback distance for general high pressured equipment
H2
We had to review the High Pressure Gas Safety Law.
Hydrogen stations must be FREE from DANGER!
To establish safety hydrogen stations in an urban area
6m
9
Review of the High Pressure Gas Safety Law Traditional ways
Accumulation of safety related results Negotiations with relevant authorities Review of laws by empirical rules
In this case Needs about review of laws are increased to spread hydrogen supply
stations. Data about safety of hydrogen supply stations is insufficient. The risk is not zero (0).
Risk Assessment approach Becoming popular and there is a lot of proof based on the past
experiences ISO/IEC Guide 51 There have been no examples to review the law using the risk
assessment. So it is epoch-making.
10
Risk Assessment Approach
Definition of H2 station model
Hazard Identification
Risk Estimation
Risk EvaluationRisk Reduction
Tolerable Risk?N
Y
Output of the study : Safety requirements for H2 stations
Experiments, Simulations,Surveys, etc.
by Project Partners
END
START
11
Definition of the Hydrogen Station model
To undertake risk assessments, we designed a detailed model of the hydrogen station.
We decided on a design that could actually be built and that would be widely used in the future after several years.
Applied Methods : HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Studies) FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis)
233 accident scenarios were identified for the on-site type H2 station model Failure and deterioration Human Error Natural Disasters
13
Risk Matrix (Risk Acceptance Criteria)
H (High):Risk is not acceptable. Remedial actions should be considered to reduce risk to an acceptable level.
M (Medium):In principle, risk is not acceptable. It can be accepted only when risk reduction cannot be achieved by reasonably practical action
L (Low):Acceptable. Further risk reduction is not necessarily required.
Likelihood
Consequence
severity
AImprobable
BRemote
COccasional
DProbable
1 Extremely Severe Damage H H H H
2 Severe Damage M H H H3 Damage M M H H4 Small Damage L L M H5 Minor Damage L L L M
14
Likelihood Levels
Level Description DefinitionA Improbable Possible, but the probability is extremely low.
About once in several thousand years or less.
B Remote Unlikely to occur in the lifetime of one H2 station.
About once in several hundred years.
C Occasional Likely to occur once in the lifetime of one H2 station.
About once in several decades.
D Probable Likely to occur several times in the lifetime of one H2 station. About once in several years or more.
Likelihood Estimation Qualitative Evaluation
Based on engineering judgment Not enough data available for quantitative evaluation
15
Consequence Levels
Level Description Material Damage Human Damage
1 Extremely Severe Damage
Collapse of nearby houses
One or more fatalities of pedestrians or residents
2 Severe Damage Major damage to nearby houses
One or more fatalities of customers or station workers
3 Damage Minor damage to nearby houses
Injury requiring hospitalization
4 Small Damage Windows broken Injury requiring medical treatment
5 Minor Damage No damage to nearby houses
Minor injury
16
Experiments, Simulations and Surveys
Basic data for likelihood and consequence estimation were provided by project partners. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. Japan Steel Works Tatsuno Corporation Japan Industrial Gas Association
17
Blow-out flame of Hydrogen with protection wall
Large Scale Hydrogen Release Experiments Large Scale Hydrogen Release Experiments (( 40MPa40MPa,, φ10mmφ10mm ))
Hydrogen release experiment (in snow) Hydrogen explosion experiment
障壁あり障壁なし
Blow-out flame of Hydrogen
Release point
18
Note: The temperature region higher than 1,100 is made visible with an ℃NaCl solution mist.
0.32mmφ
0.53mmφ
1.17mmφ
2mmφ
Blow-out Flame of Hydrogen per hole diameter (40MPa)Blow-out Flame of Hydrogen per hole diameter (40MPa)
Hole diameter
19
Dispenser
Durability Tests for Filling hose & Joint Hand valve Breakaway device Etc.
20
Compressor
Durability Tests Hydrogen leakage Noise Control Vibration Etc.
21
Metal Material (Stainless Steel and Chromium Molybdenum Steel)
Tests for Hydrogen Embrittlement in a pressurized hydrogen environment are necessary.
Tensile test Deep notch test Fracture toughness test Fatigue test Etc.
45MPa hydrogen test unit
22
Reflection of risk assessment results on regulations and standards
Risk Assessment Approach to Hydrogen supply stations
90 safety measures
Regulation Exemplification Standard
Voluntary Standard
Points
・ Social acceptability about safety
・ Cost effectiveness about safety
・ Public profits
・ Consistency with conventional regulations Example Gasoline stations CNG stations Other pressure vessels
Government The High Pressure Gas Safety Institute of Japan (KHK)
JPEC
23
3. Overview of the new combined gasoline/hydrogen supply station
P
A
C
DContinual improvement
We proposed new regulations for hydrogen supply stations through the risk assessment.
Then we installed a hydrogen supply station in conformity with the new regulations.
This station is intended to verify the safety of overall hydrogen supply station.
- Safety verification test - Investigation of extension of inspection frequency
24
Overview of the Facility
HydrogenProduction
UnitUtility
Accumulator
Road
GasolineStation area
HydrogenStation area
Office Compressor
Off-gasholder
H2-gasholder
Water Tank
Water Pump
Electric Supply Unit
H2 Dispenser
Canopy
Firewalls
Cable Pit
Barriers
HydrogenProduction
UnitUtility
Accumulator
Road
GasolineStation area
HydrogenStation area
Office Compressor
Off-gasholder
H2-gasholder
Water Tank
Water Pump
Electric Supply Unit
H2 Dispenser
Canopy
Firewalls
Cable Pit
Barriers
Site Ichihara city Chiba prefecture
Space 726m2
Feedstock Kerosene
Process Steam reforming with desulfurization of kerosene+ PSA purification
Production capacity50Nm3/h
Hydrogen purity More than 99.99% in volume( CO less than 1ppm)
Refueling capacityPressure : 25MPa(3,600psi) and 35MPa(5,000psi)Capable of refue l ling 5 passenger vehicles continuously
25
Sequential flow of processes
Reformer PSAGas
holderFeedKerosene
Desulfurizer
CO-remover
Hydrogen Production Unit
Compressor
Accumulator
DispenserFCV
Reformer PSAGas
holderFeedKerosene
Desulfurizer
CO-remover
Hydrogen Production Unit
Compressor
Accumulator
DispenserFCV
26
Major Safety measures(High Pressure Gas Safety Law)
Road
H2 Dispenser
Office
CT
Compressor Accumulator
Gasoline Dispenser
Reformer
R
PSA
A
A
A
AP
Tank
Setback Distance 6 mWall h=2m
Setback Distance can be shortened with appropriatefire protection wall
27
Road
H2 Dispenser
Office
CT
Compressor Accumulator
Gasoline Dispenser
Reformer
R
PSA
A
A
A
AP
Tank
H2 leak detector
Flame detector
Earthquake detector
28
Road
H2 Dispenser
Office
CT
Compressor Accumulator
Gasoline Dispenser
Reformer
R
PSA
A
A
A
AP
Tank
Emergency isolation valve
Excess flow valve
29
•Compressor should be placed in an enclosure.•Ventilation with Interlock System
Compressor
H2 Leak Detector
30 Frame Structure
H2 Leak Detector
Emergency Isolation Valve,Check Valve
Water SprinklerFlame Detector
Accumulator
Pressure Indicator, Safety Valve
Metal materials are limited to SUS316L or SCM435.
31
Excess flow valve
Closed (Emergency) Open (Normal)
32
Breakaway Device
Guardrail Piping in Trench
Flame Detector
Emergency Stop Button
Pressure releaseafter refueling
Dispenser
33
4. Future Issues
To widespread use of hydrogen supply stations We need to research and develop metal materials having les
s hydrogen embrittlement. We also need to reduce the costs of each unit, compressor,
and accumulator used for hydrogen supply stations. Additionally, we must promote development of new units in p
arallel to review of regulations and standards. To extend the cruising range of FCV
We need to verify the safety of the hydrogen supply stations applicable to 70MPa-charging.
To achieve highly efficient hydrogen transportation and storage We need to utilize liquid hydrogen. We must research and develop utilization of metallic alloy for
hydrogen storage or organic hydride.
34
5. Summaries
We used the risk assessment approach to review the High Pressure Gas Safety Law so as to make proposal drafts.
Japanese government reviewed the regulations and standards based on our proposals. New regulations and standards have been in effect since March, 2005.
We installed a hydrogen supply station combined with the gasoline station that is in conformity with new regulations and standards. From this time onward, we will conduct the verification test of the safety.
Presently, we are investigating safety measures for hydrogen gas supply station applicable to 70MPa-charging.
35
Thank you for your attention.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This study is a partial summary of results obtained by JPEC as part of a study into safety technology for a hydrogen supply infrastructure. The study was commissioned by the independent administrative organization New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) and conducted from 2003 to 2006.