1 Network-based Intrusion Detection, Prevention and Forensics System Yan Chen Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Northwestern University Lab for Internet & Security Technology (LIST) http://list.cs.northwestern.edu
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Network-based Intrusion Detection, Prevention and Forensics System
Yan Chen
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Northwestern UniversityLab for Internet & Security Technology (LIST)
http://list.cs.northwestern.edu
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The Spread of Sapphire/Slammer Worms
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Current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
• Mostly host-based and not scalable to high-speed networks– Slammer worm infected 75,000 machines in <10
mins– Host-based schemes inefficient and user dependent
»Have to install IDS on all user machines !• Mostly simple signature-based
– Cannot recognize unknown anomalies/intrusions– New viruses/worms, polymorphism
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Current Intrusion Detection Systems (II)
• Cannot provide quality info for forensics or situational-aware analysis– Hard to differentiate malicious events with
unintentional anomalies» Anomalies can be caused by network element faults,
e.g., router misconfiguration, link failures, etc., or application (such as P2P) misconfiguration
– Cannot tell the situational-aware info: attack scope/target/strategy, attacker (botnet) size, etc.
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Network-based Intrusion Detection, Prevention, and
Forensics System• Online traffic recording
[SIGCOMM IMC 2004, INFOCOM 2006, ToN to appear]– Reversible sketch for data streaming computation– Record millions of flows (GB traffic) in a few hundred KB– Small # of memory access per packet– Scalable to large key space size (232 or 264)
• Online sketch-based flow-level anomaly detection[IEEE ICDCS 2006] [IEEE CG&A, Security Visualization 06]– Adaptively learn the traffic pattern changes – As a first step, detect TCP SYN flooding, horizontal and
vertical scans even when mixed• Online stealthy spreader (botnet scan) detection
[IWQoS 2007]
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Network-based Intrusion Detection, Prevention, and
Forensics System (II)• Polymorphic worm signature generation &
detection[IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2006]
[IEEE ICNP 2007 to appear]
• Accurate network diagnostics [ACM SIGCOMM 2006] [IEEE INFOCOM 2007]
• Scalable distributed intrusion alert fusion w/ DHT[SIGCOMM Workshop on Large Scale Attack Defense 2006]
• Large-scale botnet and P2P misconfiguration event forensics [work in progress]
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System Deployment• Attached to a router/switch as a black box• Edge network detection particularly powerful
Original configuration Monitor each port
separately
Monitor aggregated
traffic from all ports
Router
LAN
Internet
Switch
LAN
(a)
Router
LAN
Internet
LAN
(b)
RANDsystem
scan
po
rtsc
an
port
Splitter
Router
LAN
Internet
LAN
(c)
Splitter
RA
ND
syst
em
Switch
Switch
Switch
Switch
Switch
HPNAIDMsystem
RANDsystem
Yan Chen, Hai ZhouDept. of Electrical Engineering
and Computer Science
Northwestern University
Vulnerability Analysis for WiMAX Networks
Z. Judy FuMotorola Labs
The Current Threat Landscape and Countermeasures of WiMAX
Networks • WiMAX: next wireless phenomenon
– Predicted multi-billion dollar industry
• WiMAX faces both Internet attacks and wireless network attacks– E.g., 6 new viruses, including Cabir and Skulls, with
30 variants targeting mobile devices
• Goal: secure WiMAX networks through intrusion prevention/detection
• Big security risks for WiMAX networks– No formal analysis about WiMAX security
vulnerabilities
Our Approach
• Vulnerability analysis of various layersFocus on 802.16e specs (WiMAX standards) and mobile IP v4/6 protocols so far– Intelligent and complete checking through combo of
manual analysis + auto search through formal methods
– First, manual analysis provide hints and right level of abstraction for auto search
– Then specify the specs and potential capabilities of attackers in a formal language TLA+ (the Temporal Logic of Actions)
– Then model check for any possible attacks
Mobile IPv6 (RFC 3775)
• Provides mobility at IP Layer
• Enables IP-based communication to continue even when the host moves from one network to another
• Host movement is completely transparent to Layer 4 and above
Mobile IPv6 - Entities
• Mobile Node (MN) – Any IP host which is mobile
• Correspondent Node (CN) – Any IP host communicating with the MN
• Home Agent (HA) – A host/router in the Home network which:– Is always aware of MN’s current location– Forwards any packet destined to MN– Assists MN to optimize its route to CN
Mobile IPv6 - Process
• (Initially) MN is in home network and connected to CN
• MN moves to a foreign network:– Registers new address with HA by sending Binding
Update (BU) and receiving Binding Ack (BA)– Performs Return Routability to optimize route to CN
by sending HoTI, CoTI and receiving HoT, CoT– Registers with CN using BU and BA
Mobile IPv6 in Action
Home AgentCorrespondent
Node
Home Network
Foreign Network
InternetMobile Node
Mobile Node
HA
– MN
TunnelBU
BAHoTI
HoTI
CoTI
HoT
HoT
CoT
BU
BA
Mobile IPv6 Vulnerability
• Nullifies the effect of Return Routability• BA with status codes 136, 137 and 138
unprotected• Man-in-the-middle attack
– Sniffs BU to CN– Injects BA to MN with one of status codes above
• MN either retries RR or gives up route optimization and goes through HA
MIPv6 Attack In ActionMN HA AT CN
HoTI
HoTI
CoTI
CoT
HoTHoT
Start Return
Routability
Restart Return
Routability
Silently Discard
Bind Ack
Bind Update (Sniffed by AT along the way)
Bind Ack Spoofed by AT
Bind Ack
• Only need a wireless network sniffer and a spoofed wired machine (No MAC needs to be changed !)
• Bind ACK often skipped by CN
MIPv6 Vulnerability - Effects
• Performance degradation by forcing communication through sub-optimal routes
• Possible overloading of HA and Home Link• DoS attack, when MN repeatedly tried to
complete the return routability procedure • Attack can be launched to a large number of
machines in their foreign network– Small overhead for continuously sending spoofed
Bind ACK to different machines
TLA Analysis and Experiments
• With the spec modeled in TLA, the TLC search gives two other similar attacks w/ the same vulnerability– Complete the search of vulnerabilities w/
unprotected messages
• Implemented and tested in our lab– Using Mobile IPv6 Implementation for Linux (MIPL)– Tunnel IPv6 through IPv4 with Generic Routing
Encapsulation (GRE) by Cisco– When attack in action, MN repeatedly tried to
complete the return routability procedure – DOS attack !
Extensible Authentication Protocols (EAP)
PPP802.3
Ethernet
802.5
Token Ring
802.11
WLAN802.16
EAP-FASTEAP-TTLS EAP-SIM EAP-AKAEAP-TLS
EAP Over LAN (EAPOL)
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
EAP Layer
Data Link Layer
Authentication method layer
GSM CDMA
PEAP
Extensible Authentication Protocols (EAP)
• EAP is an authenticaiton framework– Support about 40 different EAP methods
• Current targets– EAP-SIM for GSM cellular networks– EAP-AKA for 3G networks, such as UMTS and
CDMA2000– EAP-FAST (Flexible Authentication via Secure
Tunneling)»Most Comprehensive and secure EAP method
for WLAN»Will compare it w/ EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA
Insider Attack Analysis • Not hard to become a subscriber• Can five subscribers bring down an entire
WiMAX network ?• Check vulnerability after authentication
• Plan to analyze various layers of WiMAX networks– IEEE 802.16e: MAC layer– Mobile IP v4/6: network layer– EAP layer
802.16e SS Init Flowchart
Work Done
Future work
Outline
• Overview of Network Intrusion Detection, Prevention and Forensics System
• Case Study: Vulnerability analysis of the MIP v6 system
• Student recruiting
Northwestern Lab for Internet and Security
Technology (LIST)• About Northwestern Univ.
– US News and World Report, overall ranking #14, the Engineering grad school ranking #21.– On the Michigan lake, close to Chicago downtown
•Sponsors for LIST: – Department of Energy (Early CAREER Award)– Air Force Office of Scientific Research (Young
Investigator Award)– National Science Foundation – Microsoft Research– Motorola Inc.
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Recruiting Ph.D. Students
• Bachelor in Computer Science or Computer Engineering
• Research experience a big plus• TOEFL• GRE• Strongly motivated in independent research
• Feel free to talk to me after the talk