1 National Evaluation Team (NET) Boston University School of Public Health and Department of Veterans Affairs Dan Berlowitz, MD, MPH Matthew Guldin, MPH Barbara Bakhour, PhD Mark Meterko, PhD James Burgess, PhD Bert White, MBA, D Min Gary Young, JD, PhD Financial support provided by Agency for Healthcare Researc and Quality and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
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1 National Evaluation Team (NET) Boston University School of Public Health and Department of Veterans Affairs Dan Berlowitz, MD, MPH Matthew Guldin, MPH.
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National Evaluation Team (NET) Boston University School of Public Health
and
Department of Veterans Affairs
Dan Berlowitz, MD, MPH Matthew Guldin, MPH
Barbara Bakhour, PhD Mark Meterko, PhD
James Burgess, PhD Bert White, MBA, D Min
Gary Young, JD, PhD
Financial support provided by Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
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Seven Demonstration ProjectsSeven Demonstration ProjectsMeasuring Impact of Financial and Measuring Impact of Financial and
• Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan • Blue Cross of California• Bridges to Excellence• California Health Care Strategies/Medi-Cal• Excellus/Rochester IPA• Integrated Healthcare Association: Pay for Performance• Massachusetts Health Plan Quality Partners
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Blue Cross Blue Shield of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan Michigan
Demonstration Projects Differ on Demonstration Projects Differ on Various Dimensions Regarding Various Dimensions Regarding Quality Targets and IncentivesQuality Targets and Incentives
Thresholds– 93%, 89%
– 75%, 67%, 61%
– 83%
– 87%
– 96%
• Selected quality targets– HbA1c screening
– Diabetic eye exam
– Mammography
– Pap smear
– Childhood immunization, MMR
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• Eligible recipients– Contracting entities
Group practice IPA IDS Hospitals
– Individual physicians
Demonstration Projects Differ on Demonstration Projects Differ on Various Dimensions Regarding Various Dimensions Regarding
Quality Targets and Incentives (cont.)Quality Targets and Incentives (cont.)
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• Type of financial incentive arrangements– Withhold (5% - 20% of claims) – Block bonus potential to group (e.g.
$60,000/40 PCPs; $1.2 million/280 PCPs)– PMPM bonus potential for total panel (e.g.
$1.50 PMPM; $3.00 PMPM)– Hybrid: withhold and bonus– Enhanced fee schedule in subsequent year
Demonstration Projects Differ on Demonstration Projects Differ on Various Dimensions Regarding Various Dimensions Regarding
Quality Targets and Incentives (cont.)Quality Targets and Incentives (cont.)
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• Type of non-financial incentive arrangements– Honor rolls and handshakes– Education resources and subscriptions– Internal practice-wide and peer comparisons– Public report cards
Demonstration Projects Differ on Demonstration Projects Differ on Various Dimensions Regarding Various Dimensions Regarding
Quality Targets and Incentives (cont.)Quality Targets and Incentives (cont.)
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• Components of payout algorithms– Quality measures (HEDIS, homegrown,
outcome control)– Utilization – total medical expense trends– Information systems – Infrastructure– Patient access and satisfaction
Demonstration Projects Differ on Demonstration Projects Differ on Various Dimensions Regarding Various Dimensions Regarding
Quality Targets and Incentives (cont.)Quality Targets and Incentives (cont.)
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National Evaluation Team National Evaluation Team ActivitiesActivities
• Conduct comparative analyses with uniform data
• Technical support to local evaluators for each demonstration project
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Key Research QuestionsKey Research Questions
• Does linking financial incentives to quality goals lead to better quality of care?
• Is quality of care further enhanced when a combination of financial and non-financial incentives is linked to quality goals?
• What key characteristics of providers moderate the impact of a program that links incentives to quality goals?
• Does linking financialand/or non-financial incentives to quality goals have unintended consequences for quality of care?
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Data Collection ProtocolData Collection Protocol
• Draw random sample of contracting entities in selected demonstration sites (~25-30/site)
• Conduct telephone interview with practice executive for contracting entity
• Conduct survey of physicians affiliated with contracting entity (~1500/site)
• Conduct site visits to selected contracting entities
– Physicians are aware of the incentive features of health plan contracts that apply to them.
• Scope of control– Most physicians are able to achieve the quality targets
set by health plans and other payers.
• Unintended consequences– Physicians’ efforts to achieve quality targets hinder
them from providing other essential medical services.
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Preliminary Results Preliminary Results (Telephone Interviews and Pilot Surveys)(Telephone Interviews and Pilot Surveys)
• Divergent opinions among physicians about importance of financial incentives:– Adequacy of dollars– Complex distribution formulas– Clinical validity is key– Concerns about data validity
• Divergent opinions among practice administrators about physician’s role:– Physician-centered– Doctor is necessary but not sufficient– System/management-centered