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1 Lecture 31: Monetary policy goals, strategy and tactics – part one Mishkin Ch16 – part A page 393-411
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1 Lecture 31: Monetary policy goals, strategy and tactics – part one Mishkin Ch16 – part A page 393-411.

Dec 22, 2015

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Page 1: 1 Lecture 31: Monetary policy goals, strategy and tactics – part one Mishkin Ch16 – part A page 393-411.

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Lecture 31: Monetary policy goals, strategy and tactics – part one

Mishkin Ch16 – part A

page 393-411

Page 2: 1 Lecture 31: Monetary policy goals, strategy and tactics – part one Mishkin Ch16 – part A page 393-411.

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Outline

Monetary goals price stability and others

Monetary targeting inflation targeting and others

Next lecture: policy tacticschoice of policy instruments

Page 3: 1 Lecture 31: Monetary policy goals, strategy and tactics – part one Mishkin Ch16 – part A page 393-411.

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The price stability goal

Social and economic costs of inflation:Uncertainty Lowers economic growthStrains social fabric

Price stability: low and stable inflation

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Nominal anchor

Nominal anchor: a nominal variable such as inflation rate or the money supply, which ties down the price level to achieve price stability.

Adherence to a nominal anchor

Time-inconsistency problem

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Other goals of monetary policy

High employment

Economic growth

Stability of financial markets

Interest-rate stability

Foreign exchange market stability

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Should price stability be the primary goal? In the long run there is no conflict between other

goals In the short run it can conflict with

the goals of high employment and interest-rate stability

European central bank: Hierarchical mandates The Fed: Dual mandates - two co-equal

objectives: price stability and maximum employment

Price stability as the primary, long-run goal

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Monetary strategies

1. Monetary targeting Central bank announces that it will achieve a target

value of annual growth rate of money supply (M1 or M2).

2. Inflation targeting Inflation rate as the target.

3. Monetary policy with an implicit nominal anchor No explicit target but have an implicit nominal anchor

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Monetary targeting

Flexible, transparent, accountable Advantages

Almost immediate signals, help fix inflation expectations and produce less inflation

Almost immediate accountability

DisadvantagesMust exist a strong and reliable relationship

between the goal variable and the targeted monetary aggregate

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Monetary targeting in the U.S.

Former chairman Paul Volcker used monetary targets but often misses itTrue intent was to keep inflation in checkShocks in U.S. economy and financial

innovation Former chairman Allan Greenspan

abandoned monetary targeting

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Inflation targeting

Public announcement of medium-term numerical target for inflation (e.g. 3-5%).

Institutional commitment to price stability as the primary, long-run goal of monetary policy and a commitment to achieve the inflation goal.

Information-inclusive approach in which many variables are used in making decisions.

Increased transparency of the strategy. Increased accountability of the central bank.

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Comments on inflation targeting Advantages

Does not rely on one variable (such as money supply) to achieve target

Easily understood Reduces potential of falling in time-inconsistency trap Stresses transparency and accountability

Disadvantages Delayed signaling Too much rigidity Potential for increased output fluctuations Low economic growth during deflation

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Implicit nominal anchor The Fed uses implicit nominal anchor:

Primary goal is to control inflation in the long-run

Doesn’t have a explicit monetary aggregate or an inflation target, it is a ‘just do it’ policy

Involves forward-looking behavior and preemptive

Allen GreenspanLow inflation and steady economic growth

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Comments on implicit nominal anchor Advantages

Uses many sources of information Avoids time-inconsistency problem Demonstrated success

Disadvantages Lack of transparency and accountability Strong dependence on the preferences, skills, and

trustworthiness of individuals in charge Inconsistent with democratic principles

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What happens when Greenspan is gone by Ben S. Bernanke, Frederic S. Mishkin

and Adam S. Posen. Ben is a strong proponent of inflation

targeting and increasing transparency of Fed

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