1 Innenpolitik and the Origins of World War I 1 Adam Levine-Weinberg University of Chicago Prepared for delivery at the 2012 International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, California: April 1-4, 2012. 1 The author would like to thank participants in the 2010 APSA Annual Meeting and members of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. The author would especially like to thank Keren Fraiman, Chad Levinson, Sebastian Schmidt, John Stevenson, and Felicity Vabulas for reading and commenting on multiple early drafts.
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1
Innenpolitik and the
Origins of World War I1
Adam Levine-Weinberg
University of Chicago
Prepared for delivery at the 2012 International Studies Association Annual Convention,
San Diego, California: April 1-4, 2012.
1 The author would like to thank participants in the 2010 APSA Annual Meeting and members of the Program on
International Security Policy at the University of Chicago for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
The author would especially like to thank Keren Fraiman, Chad Levinson, Sebastian Schmidt, John Stevenson, and
Felicity Vabulas for reading and commenting on multiple early drafts.
2
Abstract
Today, the majority of scholars in the historical community agree that Germany provoked World
War I. However, the question of why Germany did so is far more controversial. Unfortunately,
no existing explanation can adequately account for both 1) why serious conflicts of interest
developed between Germany and the other great powers; and 2) why these conflicts escalated to
war. In this paper, I provide a new Innenpolitik theory of war that can explain both steps. I argue
that domestic resource conflict leads to war by causing state leaders to engage in economic and
social imperialism, which in turn lead to arms races and windows of opportunity, increasing the
probability of war. I then apply the theory to the case of Germany prior to World War I. I
demonstrate that German leaders systematically implemented an aggressive foreign policy, in
order to reinforce the position of powerful German agrarian and business interests while
neutralizing working class demands for redistribution. I then show how these foreign policy
decisions directly led to the European arms race of 1910-1914 and the creation of a window of
opportunity, which Germany fatefully jumped through in the July Crisis.
3
Introduction
From time to time in modern world history, great power state leaders have provoked or
initiated wars despite recognizing in advance that doing so would risk the destruction of their
state, or at the least, destruction of the ruling regime. Whether temporary or longer-term, this
destruction of the state or regime—which I will call “loss of sovereignty”—constitutes the worst
possible outcome for states in the view of mainstream international relations theorists.2 This
leads to a puzzle. What could motivate leaders to undertake risky behavior when the stakes are
so high?
The dominant explanation for risky aggression and war initiation in the international
relations literature is “preventive war”.3 This literature claims that if a great power (particularly
the most powerful state in the system)4 faces deep and inevitable decline in military and/or
economic terms relative to a competitor, it will typically prefer the certainty of war now to the
possibility of war later under worse conditions. Due to inherent uncertainty about other states’
intentions (especially future intentions), this possibility of war cannot be eliminated.5 Therefore,
such a state has an incentive to engage in risky behavior, up to and including war initiation: the
hope being that victory will halt the relative decline. At the extreme, this is achieved by
eliminating the competitor state.
However, I argue that this risk-taking behavior can be better explained by Innenpolitik
(domestic policy) motivations. The rise of popular sovereignty over the past two hundred years
has greatly circumscribed the ability—and motivation—of leaders to practice realpolitik to
2 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 126; John J. Mearsheimer,
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 31. 3 Jack S. Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October,
1987), p. 82. 4 Some versions of the theory seek to generalize it beyond great powers.
5 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, pp. 31-36.
4
maximize the state's power or security in a straightforward way. Instead, leaders must primarily
concern themselves with the population's (economic) welfare, because economic well-being
determines in large part whether people will support or oppose the regime.
When a great power’s leaders foresee stagnation or decline in the state’s economic
prospects, they worry about their continued ability to 1) promote the favored sectors in the
population, while 2) maintaining at least passive consent from the rest.6 The former concern
induces economic imperialism: the acquisition of new resources through either conquest or the
opening of new markets. The latter concern induces social imperialism: the use of aggressive
foreign policy to rally the dominant groups or classes while appeasing or co-opting the rest of the
population.7 Clearly, both economic and social imperialism entail aggressive behavior. This can
take the form of war initiation or hard-line measures short of war. In the latter case, war is
nevertheless the typical result, because these measures provoke arms races and upward “spirals”.
The timing of Innenpolitik-motivated wars is usually determined by windows of opportunity8:
temporary power advantages, which increase the chances of success.
I test these two theories against each other as explanations of World War I.9 This case is
of interest based on three main criteria. First, Fritz Fischer’s pioneering work on World War I
and the subsequent debate resulted in a near-consensus within the historical community that
6 Presumably, the same concerns occur in lesser powers. However, their relative power disadvantage rules out
solving the problem through aggressive policies. 7 For a thorough intellectual history and analysis of imperialism (with some discussion of the variants discussed
here), see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism, trans. P.S. Falla (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1980). The classic statement of the social imperialist thesis is probably Hans Ulrich-Wehler, Bismarck und
der Imperialismus (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1969). Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire: 1871-
1918, trans. Kim Traynor (Leamington Spa, UK: Berg, 1985) esp. Ch. 6 discusses similar themes. For an application
to international relations, see Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). 8 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1999), Ch. 4. 9 Numerous authors have explained World War I as a preventive war instigated by Germany. See references in
Levy, “Declining Power,” pp. 84-85, n. 8 and n. 9. Also see especially Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major
War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), Ch. 3-4.
5
Germany provoked that conflict.10
Second, the conflict led to what I have termed “loss of
sovereignty” for Germany. In the closing days of World War I, the November Revolution led to
the collapse of the regime and the permanent exile of the Kaiser. A punitive peace treaty was
subsequently imposed on Germany at Versailles. Third, as I will show in the paper, German
civilian and military leaders understood that they were taking a substantial risk.
In the following section, I lay out in greater detail the two theories to be compared in the
empirical sections. Next, I offer a few clarifications on how to evaluate evidence in light of
potential observational equivalence between the two candidate explanations compared here.
Then, I use a process-tracing approach to examine the causes of World War I and compare the
two candidate explanations for Germany’s decision to risk a war in light of the evidence. The
final section summarizes my findings and concludes with some theoretical implications and
suggestions for further research.
Preventive War vs. Innenpolitik
What are the distinguishing characteristics of preventive wars?11
The logic of preventive
war theory is very adequately summarized by Dale Copeland. He writes, “A state… superior in
military power but inferior in economic and especially potential power is more likely to believe
that, once its military power begins to wane, further decline will be inevitable and deep… Under
these circumstances, a dominant military power is likely to be pessimistic about the future and
more inclined to initiate major war as a ‘now-or-never’ attempt to shore up its waning
10
Keir A. Lieber, "The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory,"
International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007), p. 156. See also, Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First
World War, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967); Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914,
trans. Marian Jackson (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975). For a dissenting opinion that blames the war on Austria-
Hungary, see Samuel R. Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, (New York: St.
Martin’s, 1991). For a classic interpretation of the war as an accident, see Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of
August, (New York: Macmillan, 1962). 11
Jack Levy argues that we should instead speak of the “preventive motivation” as a contributing factor to war.
While this paper often uses the standard “preventive war” terminology, it compares the relative weight of preventive
and Innenpolitik motivations as a cause of great power war. Levy, “Declining Power,” p. 86
6
security.”12
A key assumption is that states are primarily motivated by the search for security or
survival. The anarchic and self-help nature of international politics makes relative military
power the surest guarantee of continued survival.13
States also realize that in the long run, their
military power is largely a function of their resources, both human and natural; these factors
determine their economic and military potential. Therefore, if a currently powerful state lacks
the resource base to maintain its position in the future, and fears that its rising competitor may
attack when it has become stronger,14
the declining state faces a powerful incentive to attack its
competitor now, while conditions are still relatively favorable. The timing of war is thus
motivated by the closing window of opportunity created by relative decline. Declining states
also engage in competitive behavior short of war (such as crisis and arms race initiation) if such
hard-line policies are seen as sufficient to prevent further relative decline. These hard line
policies may in turn lead to a war not initially intended.
The preventive war logic assumes that state leaders act in an intendedly rational manner
to further the national interest.15
This points to a distinction we should make. Jack Snyder
agrees that what he calls “preventive aggression” can sometimes be a rational response to a
state’s strategic situation. But he claims that in practice, arguments in favor of preventive war
typically rely upon a “paper-tiger image of the opponent”16
, which “is seen as an implacable foe
posing an immense security threat, yet at the same time as too weak, inert, or irresolute to
combat aggressive countermeasures.”17
Snyder argues that this “paper-tiger” image is usually a
myth generated in the process of coalition logrolling that is typical in cartelized political
12
Copeland, Origins, p. 20. 13
See for instance, Waltz, Theory, pp. 126, 168; Mearsheimer, Tragedy, pp. 32-36. 14
The traditional realist view is that this is always be the case. Fear is omnipresent in international relations due to
states’ uncertainty and mistrust about other states’ future intentions. See Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,”
International Organization Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-477; Mearsheimer, Tragedy, esp. pp. 42-46. 15
Copeland, Origins, p. 28 goes further and assumes complete rationality for theoretical purposes. 16
Snyder, Myths of Empire, pp. 25-26. 17
ibid., p. 5.
7
regimes.18
Snyder’s discussion suggests that policymakers can suffer from deluding myths or
cognitive biases, which lead them to wrongly think that preventive war is a rational response to
the state’s environment.19
We should distinguish such explanations of war, grounded in bias,
from the hard core of preventive war explanations, which have a rationalist logic.
By contrast, the aggressor in an Innenpolitik explanation is motivated by the fear of
worsening internal conditions. While preventive war theory assumes that foreign policy
decisions are designed with “the national interest” in mind, the Innenpolitik explanation
presented here focuses on decision makers’ pursuit of sectional interests. I assume that in the
modern era—at least since the 1848 revolutions for most of the Western world—state leaders
have been dependent on the consent of the governed. Even so-called “totalitarian” regimes
require, at a minimum, the passive consent of the majority in order to function.20
But I also
assume that each regime owes its power to a particular portion of the population (hereafter
“favored sectors” or “favored groups”),21
and the government implements policies to promote
these group(s)’ interests—particularly economic interests.
The Innenpolitik explanation of war presented here derives its power from the conflict
between maintaining the consent of the full population and promoting the interest of the favored
sectors. Since outright repression of the majority is no longer viable,22
governments need to find
ways to promote the favored sectors’ interests without alienating the majority so far as to push it
into active subversion or revolution. When economic opportunities, on a national level, are
expected to expand at a steady rate for the foreseeable future, this conflict is usually tractable.
18
ibid., pp. 17-18. 19
Levy, “Declining Power,” p. 101 agrees that misperception is often associated with preventive war. 20
This in large part derives from advances in communication that tend to undermine the government’s monopoly on
information. This increases the danger to the government of subversion or outright rebellion. 21
I deliberately avoid the theoretically and ideologically loaded terms “ruling class” and “dominant class”. In this
regard, it should be noted that government favoritism need not be directed along class lines, strictly speaking. 22
See for instance the Staatsstreich strategy in considered by some in Germany circa 1900; below, p. 16. It was
rejected for being extremely impractical.
8
When “a rising tide lifts all boats”, it is possible to satisfy the majority even while distributing a
disproportionate benefit to the favored sectors. However, even with the benefit of economic
growth, leaders may find that the growth in national resources is outstripped by faster growing
demands for resources.
On the other hand, in the face of actual or expected stagnation in the economy, efforts to
secure benefits for the favored groups risk provoking more active opposition from the majority,
whose economic position is now actively being eroded by such discriminatory policies. Yet the
government cannot abandon its most stalwart base of support; doing so would spur the favored
groups to use their political and financial power to replace the government. The attempt to
negotiate a path between this Scylla and Charybdis tends to unleash two mutually reinforcing
processes that eventually lead to war: 1) economic imperialism; and 2) social imperialism.
These will be dealt with in turn.
Economic imperialism is the most straightforward method of securing benefits for the
favored sectors. The threat or actual use of military force stimulates economic expansion either
directly, by conquering new resources for the national economy, or indirectly, by opening up
new markets for exports and new sources of imports and improving terms of trade. If economic
imperialism is directed at the periphery—i.e. colonialism—the power disparity between the great
power colonizer and the colonized area rules out major war between the two. But if economic
imperialism is directed at another great power, war is nearly inevitable. Even if force is not used
immediately but only threatened, the threatened states will increase their military power to avoid
further demands of an economic or political nature.23
In order to maintain its superior bargaining
position, the threatening state must respond in kind; an arms race is thus a typical result. The
arms race in turn creates windows of opportunity and vulnerability. As one state or the other
23
In the meantime, threatened states may be forced to yield concessions.
9
pulls ahead in the arms race, it gains an incentive to initiate war while conditions are favorable. 24
An economic imperialist state that initially only threatened the use of force, now uses its window
of opportunity to provoke or initiate war in pursuit of its economic goals.
Social imperialism is a two-pronged strategy to make the interests of the majority and the
interests of the favored sectors more compatible with each other. On the one hand, social
imperialist policies attempt to facilitate cooperation within the favored sectors through issue
manipulation. Whereas these groups do not necessarily see eye-to-eye on issues of domestic
policy, they typically can agree on an active nationalist policy. By making foreign policy the
dominant concern of popular politics, the government can create an improved basis for
cooperation between these groups, which constitute the main pillars of the regime’s support. On
the other hand, social imperialist policies attempt to broaden the basis of active support for the
regime, or at least to dampen active opposition, by promoting the perception of external threat.
Often, this is accomplished by increasing armament spending and provoking international crises;
both lead towards what Robert Jervis calls “spirals”.25
This decreases the state’s security, but
creates a real external threat, encouraging the population to rally around the flag. The effective
use of propaganda can also be used to inflate threats, and thereby accomplish the same goal.
All these aspects of social imperialist policies raise the likelihood of war. Raising the
salience of foreign policy issues, encouraging nationalist fervor, and fostering an exaggerated
perception of threat all tend to create or increase the power of domestic “war lobbies”: groups
that believe war (or aggressive measures short of war) will solve the state’s security, economic,
or social problems. This increases the attractiveness of war initiation, as well as crisis initiation
and arms racing. The latter two create upward spirals and periodic windows of opportunity
24
For analysis of windows of opportunity and vulnerability as a cause of war, see Van Evera, Causes of War, Ch. 4. 25
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1976), Ch. 3, esp. pp. 62-67.
10
which in turn lead to war. This mechanism is the most common route from social imperialism to
war; while economic imperialist goals often necessitate a direct resort to war, social imperialism
can generally achieve the desired integrative effect through aggressive behavior short of major
war. Leaders try to avoid the costs of major war if possible, but may lose control of the situation.
Evaluating Evidence
As Copeland recognizes, both “preventive” motives and domestically-oriented aggressive
motives can lead to war directly, or indirectly: e.g. via crises and arms-racing.26
Unfortunately,
this causes substantial observational equivalence between the two theories: for example, they
predict same timing for major wars (and the same rationale motivates the timing). Both the
preventive war and Innenpolitik explanations expounded above predict that war occurs when the
aggressor achieves a window of opportunity, so this cannot prove one theory superior to the
other. We can also try to distinguish between the two motives by looking at statements made by
leaders about their motivations. This evidence is important, but potentially unreliable: leaders
have an incentive to lie (or misrepresent) because neither “preventive” motivations nor pursuit of
sectional interests are generally considered legitimate reasons for provoking war. This leaves
two types of indirect evidence: the timing and character of hard-line measures short of war.
The timing of hard-line measures short of war is the most important type of evidence
available. While war itself is initiated based on windows of opportunity for both theories, this is
not the case for hard-line measures short of war. The preventive war theory predicts aggressive
behavior to occur only after relative decline has begun. Doing otherwise risks war breaking out
before the state’s relative power has peaked.27
By contrast, the Innenpolitik explanation expects
aggressive behavior to begin as soon as economic difficulties are foreseen, because this triggers
26
Copeland, Origins, pp. 42-46. 27
Since relative decline (which creates a closing window of opportunity) explains both the aggressive behavior and
its timing, there would be no reason to attack before the expected peak in power.
11
economic and social imperialism. We should expect an Innenpolitik-motivated state to be
proportionally more aggressive as the fear of economic stagnation and opportunity for economic
gain increase. This can occur before the state peaks in relative power; if we see aggression in
such a case, we can conclude that it is Innenpolitik-motivated.
The last type of useful evidence is the “character” of aggression. Preventive motives
should be associated with aggression directed specifically at the rising competitor(s), and the
goal should be more explicable in terms of security or relative power than economic interest or
ideology.28
By contrast, Innenpolitik motives should be associated with opportunistically-
directed aggression: whichever state presents the “easy mark” or the most unifying enemy for a
social imperialist strategy should be targeted. We therefore expect more variation over time in
the targets of aggression. Additionally, the goal of aggression should be something of economic
benefit or something particularly potent for nationalist purposes.29
Having explained how the
evidence will be evaluated, it is time to examine the roots of World War I.
World War I
Overview
The fundamental cause of World War I was tension in the political and social structures
of the Wilhelmine Empire. The Empire was what we might call a “partial democracy”. An
idiosyncratic feature of the constitution was that while the Reichstag was elected by universal
manhood suffrage, the Chancellor and other government ministers were appointed by the Kaiser
28
Ideology is important for choosing a potent “enemy” figure to present as a threat to the population as part of a
social imperialist strategy. 29
Obviously, this may lead us back into the realm of observational equivalence. For instance, a major economic
gain could reverse relative decline and thus be the proper target of preventive aggression. But in some cases, the
evidence can be fairly clear-cut (i.e. far more consistent with one explanation than the other). This is particularly the
case when the goal provides absolute but not relative gains. See Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and
Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press), esp. Ch. 2; Joseph M. Grieco,
“Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International
Organization, Vol 42, No. 3 (June, 1988), pp. 485-507.
12
and served at his pleasure. They did not sit in the Reichstag and were not directly associated
with political parties.30
Furthermore, the Reichstag had merely negative powers: only the non-