1 IADI GUIDANCE FOR THE RESOLUTION OF BANK FAILURES Ganiyu A. Ogunleye, OFR Managing Partner Jaffa Consulting Limited Email: [email protected].

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IADI GUIDANCE FOR THE RESOLUTION OF BANK FAILURES

Ganiyu A. Ogunleye, OFRManaging Partner

Jaffa Consulting LimitedEmail: [email protected]

Presented at IADI Africa Regional Workshop on Problem Bank ResolutionHeld on May 9, 2011 In Abuja, Nigeria

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Presentation Outline

1. Introduction2. General Issues3. Interrelationship & Cross-Border

Issues4. Statutory Powers & Mandate5. Operational & Administrative Issues6. Resolution of Failing and Failed Banks7. Conclusion

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1.0Introduction Guidance for Failure Resolution was issued in

December 2005 in pursuance of IADI’s mission“to contribute to the enhancement of DI effectiveness by promoting guidance and international cooperation”

It seeks to assist Deposit Insurers in establishing or enhancing their mechanism for dealing with bank failures.

Resolution is defined as a disposition plan generally designed to fully protect insured deposit while minimising costs to the Deposit Insurer

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1.0Introduction - continued

Guidance is encapsulated in the Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems issued by BIS and IADI in June 2009 (see Principles 15 and 16)

Guidance is divided into 5 sections: General Issues Inter-relationship and Cross-Border Issues Statutory Powers of a DI Operational and Administrative Issues Resolution of Failed Banks

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2.0General Issues

2.1Robust Institutional Framework Key elements include:

sound macro-economic policies effective bank supervision/regulation market discipline efficient failed bank resolution process effective judicial and criminal investigation

system

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2.0General Issues

2.2Sound Corporate Governance of DI Four Key Elements :

operational independence (insulation from undue political and industry influence)

accountability transparency integrity

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2.0General Issues

2.3Alignment of Mandate & Powers Powers granted to a DI should be consistent

with its public policy objectives and mandate

Example: A least-cost mandate should be supported with power to decide on appropriate resolution approach or take preventive measures before bank failure

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2.0General Issues

2.4Exceptional Recourse to Temporary Blanket Guarantee Blanket guarantee could be used to handle a large

bank failure or where a systemic crisis has occurred There should be a clear and explicit definition of

qualifying circumstances Be provided on a temporary basis with explicit dates

of expiration Shareholders to bear losses where public funds

are used 8

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3.0 Inter-relationship & Cross-Border Issues

3.1 Delineation of Roles, Duties and Responsibilities of Safety Net Participants (SNPs) Who has power to declare whether or not a

bank has failed Who decides resolution method Division of duties either through legal

arrangement, contracts or administrative regulation

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3.2 Information Sharing & Coordination Mechanism Formal mechanism for information sharing and

coordination amongst SNPs should be in place DI to have advance notice prior to intervention

to enable it assess potential impact on DIF

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3.0 Inter-relationship & Cross-Border Issues

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3.3 Mechanism for Dealing with Systemic Crises Need for criteria for determining what

constitute systemic crisis Clear intervention framework for dealing with

bank failures and resolutions Statutory mechanism for dealing with “Too Big

To Fail Institutions”

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3.0 Inter-relationship & Cross-Border Issues

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3.4 Cross-Border Coordination Mechanism Information sharing and coordination framework amongst

international deposit insurers and supervisory authorities Need for formal contracts, agreements or arrangement to

deal with cross-border issues The current dispute between Iceland, Britain and

Netherlands is instructive. Iceland rejected compensation claims by Britain and Netherlands for making good local deposits in failed Iceland Banks. Iceland’s offer to pay €4 billion claims of foreign depositors in icesave, the on-line arm of failed Landsbanki from disposition of the bank’s assets, not acceptable

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3.0 Inter-relationship & Cross-Border Issues

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4.0 Statutory Powers & Mandate

4.1 Mandate should be clearly defined – Pay-box or Risk-minimizer

4.2 Clearly defined funding mechanism Establish DIF Statutory target for the fund Clear procedure for achieving funding goal

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4.3 Authority to accept or reject membership Ability to control risk exposure and moral hazard Power to terminate insurance status (in

coordination with supervisory authority)

4.4 Authority to conduct onsite reviews by DI4.5 Legal protection for DI’s officers &

employees4.6 Explicit legal system for prosecution of

directors, officers and auditors of failed banks

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4.0 Statutory Powers & Mandate

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5.0 Operational & Administrative Issues

5.1 Articulate appropriate policies and Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) for bank resolution

5.2 Authority to outsource services where internal resources are insufficient

5.3 Ensure transparent valuation and disposal of assets

5.4 Put in place effective public awareness and communication mechanism

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5.5 Code of conduct for employees

5.6 Ability to investigate and if necessary litigate against those responsible for bank failure

5.0 Operational & Administrative Issues

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6.0 Resolution of Failing or Failed Banks

6.1 Rule Based or Statutory Trigger Mechanism for early intervention

6.2 Determination of viability or non- viability of problem bank by professional staff or experts

6.3 Authority to decide on Resolution Method Open Bank Assistance Deposit Pay-out / Reimbursement Purchase for Assumption Bridge Bank

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6.4 Establish effective resolution policies and procedures

Application of least-cost methods Dealing with systemic repercussion of

failures Avoiding disruption of banking services

6.5 Resolution strategies should seek to maximise recovery of assets

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6.0 Resolution of Failing or Failed Banks

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6.6 Adopt market principles and mechanisms as much as possible in resolution transactions

Use cost-effective rather than lowest cost method Where possible, employ mark-to-market approach

in appraisal process

6.7 Provide incentives to facilitate market-based resolution. Examples:

Tax incentives ( M & A, Debt write-offs) Administrative incentives (interest waiver)

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6.0 Resolution of Failing or Failed Banks

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6.8 Ensure efficient and effective depositor reimbursement

Explicit time frame between revocation of banking licence and actual deposit payout

Continuous disclosure of information to the public during reimbursement process and liquidation

Unfettered access to failed bank’s depositor records before bank closure

Legal rules regarding set-offs and subrogation should be well defined

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6.0 Resolution of Failing or Failed Banks

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Ability to effect partial payment to needy depositors before the actual payout

6.9 Guiding rules of liquidation process should be well defined and documented

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6.0 Resolution of Failing or Failed Banks

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7.0Conclusion

7.1 Guidance should serve as a benchmark for IADI members and other interested parties

7.2 IADI members are encouraged to conduct self assessment

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Questions and Comments

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