1 Designing Dedicated Acc ess Privileges: Should They Be Place-based or Species-based? James E. Wilen, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis Hiro Uchida, Department of Environmental and Resource Economics, U niversity of Rhode Island Jose Cancino, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis Prepared for presentation at AAAS meetings: New Approaches to Fisheries Management: A Deeper Look at Dedicated Access Privileges San Francisco February 18, 2007
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1 Designing Dedicated Access Privileges: Should They Be Place-based or Species- based? James E. Wilen, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
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Designing Dedicated Access Privileges: Should They Be Place-based or Species-based?
James E. Wilen, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, DavisHiro Uchida, Department of Environmental and Resource Economics, University of Rhode IslandJose Cancino, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis
Prepared for presentation at AAAS meetings:
New Approaches to Fisheries Management:
A Deeper Look at Dedicated Access Privileges
San FranciscoFebruary 18, 2007
The theme of the talk Two primary ways to establish dedicated access privileg
e-based fisheries management: ITQs--grant privileges to harvest individual species to in
dividual decision makers TURFs--grant use privileges to the ecosystem services in a
unit of space, generally to a group of decision makers ITQs (as conventionally operated) fail to account for c
ertain residual inefficiencies, chiefly spatial and within-season effort misallocation
TURFs may, in principle, account for some of these inefficiencies, but not without transactions and coordination costs
Literature and policy discussion focused on ITQs but less attention to TURFs
We discuss: case studies from Japanese and Chilean nearshore TURF systems.
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Motivation Accumulating Experience with ITQs suggests precondition
s and designs for success Clearly defined and secure harvest privileges that encoura
ge decentralized decision makers to innovate and protect the value of asset
Effective enforcement and monitoring system Corresponding conditions for success with TURFs less cl
ear Scope of privileges must be legitimized and codified at hi
gher level of government Co-management group must be able to establish and enforce
coordination mechanismso TURF sustainability requires resolving efficiency and equi
ty conflictso In developing countries, TURFs may be only hope for ration
alization
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Research Context of Talk Ongoing thesis research examining two TURF “meta- cas
e” studies, each with: Many different organizational configurations. Variations in key variables.
Organization characteristics, rules, activities, and performance.
Some variables constant. Social and cultural characteristics, legal structure.
Japanese coastal fisheries management 1,734 management organizations based on TURFs. Diverse fisheries, management rules and outcomes. One nation, same governing laws.
Chilean coastal Management Exploitation Areas About 400 TURFs with varying conditioning variables
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Japanese costal fishery management:Two fundamental institutions
Fishery Cooperative Associations (FCAs) Origin: fishermen guild in
feudal era. Granted rights to manage m
ultiple resources in nearshore TURF
Fishery Management Organizations Delegated rights to manage
Fishery Management Organizations (FMOs) Subgroup of FCA fishermen formed to collectively
manage a specific fishery/gear group.
FCA Co-op
(members)
trawl abalone seine shrimp
Decide tomanage
FMO
Decide tomanage
FMO
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Policy Questions
Why are FMOs created?What do harvester coops (FMOs) do?How do they decide what to do?Are their internal management mechanisms successful?Comparison: decentralized individual vs. centralized cooperative
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Data/Methods
FMO focus group interviews FCA Census: cross section/panel FMO mail survey
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Example of FMO:Small pink shrimp fishery
1960s race to fish: over harvesting, market glut, uneven grounds use, low price and income.
FMO established in 1968. Fishing Committee makes de
cisions on harvest and effort allocation--daily and annually
pooling arrangement harvest reduction, stock r
ebuilding local monopoly, volume con
trol, market facilities large income increase
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Effort coordination:Centralized effort assignment Without effort coordination:
Too much fishing effort at nearby hotspots Harvest focused on small and less valuable shrimp Too little fishing effort at less productive/distant hotspots.
Port
A
B
C
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Effort coordination:Centralized effort assignment
Location assignment (e.g. Suruga Bay shrimp fishery) Fishing Committee meets regularly Directs vessels (or groups of vessels) where to operate
Port
A
B
C
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Harvest, price and revenue: 1960-2002 (real price/revenues)
Harvest, Value, and Unit Price: 1960-2002In real price (base = 1995)
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
Metric tons
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
Harvest
Value
Price
Revenue
Price
Price: YenRevenue: K Yen
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Focus Group Findings
The small pink shrimp fishery example, and other successful cases of FMOs often adopt: Effort coordination (EC) mechanisms in fishing to smooth effort over space
Effort coordination mechanisms and pooling arrangements
EC mechanisms AllA B
Location assignment 77.5% 75.5% 81.8 %
Joint fish search 15.5 16.3 13.6
Exchange information 47.9 46.9 50.0
Help landing at ports
57.7 63.3 45.5
Joint ownership: vessels
18.3 24.5 4.5
Joint ownership: gear
31.0 38.8 13.6
Total observed number
71 49 22
With PA Without PA
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Descriptive statistics:Self-imposed rules and practices
Rules and practices
AEC&PA
BEC only
DNone
Total
Joint Marketing
77.6% 68.2% 26.7% 64.4%
Volume control
75.5 72.7 60.0 72.2
Operation rules
91.8 100.0 86.7 92.2
Vessel/gear reg 46.9 18.2 0.0 32.2
N 49 22 15 90
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Preliminary Conclusions
Many FMOs adopted pooling originally to share burden of rebuilding, or to support spatial effort coordination
Pooling requires either homogeneous fishermen, or enough average revenue gain to compensate highliners loss in relative position
Once pooling is in force, it facilitates other collective activities such as marketing, branding, quality control
Collective output marketing activities have significant impacts on revenues.
More mature institutions jointly own vessels/gear
Gains emerge from intensification of use of each species
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Chilean TURF SystemManagement Exploitation Areas (MEAs)
Export boom in 1970s/1980s Led to overexploitation ITQ plan put in place for loco Monitoring/enforcement failure TURF system established
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Chilean TURFs
o Access privileges granted to harvester coops
o Privileges granted to all marine resources within well-defined nearshore space
o Main resources are benthic organismso Federal oversight--TACs, size limits and closed seasons, annual consultant reports
o Coops pay tax per hectare to federal government---supports oversight function
o No FMO-like organizations
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Structure of MEA system
11 large zones; north to south Harvester coops must apply to establish MEA
MEA determined by traditional use Currently over 400 MEAs Loco, limpet, urchin chief species Variation in initial conditions, methods adopted, success
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Data/methods
Focus group interviews Analysis of consultant reports Analysis of export data In person survey of MEA leaders
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Performance
Diversity of internal management methods
Range: virtually open access and overexploited to highly coordinated management
Successful MEAs coordinate: Spatial exploitation Harvest volume and timing Size distribution of landings Poaching enforcement
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Management mechanisms
Most create de facto IQs Allocate total TURF-specific TAC equally across production units
Spatial assignments plus pooling Harvest to fill market orders either: Free-for-all until market order filled Piece rates for divers for quantity/quality
Individual harvest targets Effort assignment, with and w/o pooling
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Interesting findings
Most MEAs harvest less than TAC Don’t agree with govt. biologists Adjusting harvest to market (banking)
Most also set larger size limit Some practice “ecosystem mgmt.”
Removing or relocating predators Moving loco to prey Removing loco prey predators
Some aquaculture MEA supplements income/part time Marine services use for tourism
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Comparative findings: Japanese Case
In Japan, rights originally granted to FCAs, but devolved to FMO groups
Most management innovation directed at intensification-by species Spatial management Revenue enhancement, collective marketing Aquaculture, production enhancement
o Pooling supports effort coordinationo Pooling also promotes club activities
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Comparative findings: Chile
Chilean MEA case grants rights to space; no FMO-like organizations
Much more focus on system (MEA-scale) externalities Predator/prey control Alternative uses (tourism) Poaching enforcement
Intensification of harvesting via: Spatial effort coordination-rotation/assignment
Temporal control of volume IQ allocation to harvesting units Some pooling, or harvest scheduling
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Take Home Messages (1): TURFs
Space-based DAPS are a viable alternative to species-based DAPS
Federal legitimization of spatial boundaries Creation of closed class---initial allocation Backstop regulations/scientific support
Incentives for collective stewardship Actual outcomes depend upon
The scale question Socio-economic vs. ecological? Role of negotiation and bargaining Mergers Resource productivity per capita Work time realignment; compression