1 Conference on the Political Dimensions of Poverty Reduction Holiday Inn, Lusaka 9-11 th March 2005.

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Conference on the Political Dimensions of Poverty Reduction

Holiday Inn, Lusaka9-11th March 2005

Politics and the PRS Approach in Politics and the PRS Approach in Southern AfricaSouthern Africa

Benjamin RobertsBenjamin Roberts

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Scope of presentation

Aim:Provide a desk-based review of emerging findings on the political dimensions of the PRSP approach in the sub-regionBuilds upon recent research by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI, London)

Outline:Coverage of the PRSP initiative in the sub-regionEmergent themes from the process of development and ongoing implementation of PRS’

Limitation:Formulation versus implementation (evidence base)

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Sub-Saharan Africa (48)• 19 full PRSPs• 9 I-PRSPs• 8 not eligible• 12 no (I-)PRSP

Southern Africa (14)• 5 full PRSPs• 1 I-PRSP• 6 not eligible• 2 no (I-)PRSP but started process

PRSPs: dominant vehicle for development policy in SSA.

Full PRSP

Interim PRSP

Neither

Full PRSP

I-PRSP

Not eligible

PRSPs in Africa

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SADC Country

I-PRSPCompletion

PRSPCompletion

Time Taken (months)

Countries finished or finalising PRSPs

Tanzania Mar-00 Oct-00(Aug 2004)

7

Mozambique Feb-00 Apr-01 14

Zambia Jun-00 Mar-02 21

Malawi Aug-00 Apr-02 20

Lesotho Dec-00 Nov-04 47

DRC Mar-02 -35 (not completed)

Countries in initial stages of PRSP process

Angola, Zimbabwe

Countries not eligible for PRSPs

Botswana (UMC), Namibia (LMC), South Africa (LMC), Swaziland (LMC), Seychelles (UMC), Mauritius (UMC)

PRSPs in Southern Africa: Experience to date

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Source: World Bank, UNDP (2004)

Country GNI per capita (US$

2003)

Per capita GDP

growth 1993-2003

HDI ranking 2002

(of 177)

SEY 7480 2.0 35 (high)

MAU 4090 4.0 64 (med)

BOT 3440 3.5 128 (med)

RSA 2780 0.6 119 (med)

NAM 1870 0.9 126 (med)

SWAZ 1350 0.3 137 (med)

ANG 740 .. 166 (low)

LES 590 2.0 145 (low)

ZIM .. -2.4 148 (low)

ZAM 380 -0.1 164 (low)

TAN 290 1.9 162 (low)

MOZ 210 5.7 171 (low)

MAL 160 0.8 165 (low)

DRC 110 -4.6 168 (low)

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Country

Corruption Perception

ranking2004 (of 145)

Aid as % of GNI (2002)

Freedom HouseStatus, 2003

SEY 48 1.3 Partly free

MAU 54 0.5 Free

BOT 31 0.8 Free

RSA 44 0.6 Free

NAM 54 4.5 Free

SWAZ .. 2.0 Not free

ANG 133 4.5 Not free

LES .. 8.7 Free

ZIM 114 .. Not free

ZAM 102 18.1 Partly free

TAN 90 13.2 Partly free

MOZ 90 60.4 Partly free

MAL 90 20.2 Partly free

DRC 133 14.7 Not free

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Creating Spaces: Opening up policymaking processes

PRSP formulation: conceived as being conducted in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders.

Opening new spaces for domestic policy dialogue one of potentially most salient contributions of PRSP process

Southern Africa: Some supporting evidence that process of formulating PRS’ begun to encourage opening up of policy spaces.

Representation of CS in PRSP processes has commonly assumed the form of the participation of NGOs, both in institutional structures overseeing PRSP formulation and local consultations.

Process: catalyst for establishment of new national networks of CSOs to engage with poverty policy (e.g. MEJN, CSPR) Pre-existing umbrella organizations also instrumental (e.g. LCN).

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Creating Spaces: Opening up policymaking processes

Predominant form of CS participation through district, regional and national consultations.

Varied in coverage and depth: from 7 zonal workshops in Tanzania to, consultations in 200 villages in Lesotho.

Engagement with CSOs: varied in level of inclusiveness and representation: Collaboration less frequent, and joint decision-making extremely rare (Eberlei, 2001).

‘Fast trcak’ PRSPs (Tan, Moz) appear less consultative in nature than some more recently produced PRS’ (Zam, Les).

Relative inexperience of govts; desire to secure debt relief.

Despite positive achievements, concerns that PRSP process may have by-passed politics in some countries and established forms of representation that do not necessarily advance the interests of the poor over the longer term.

Problem: key actors and institutions (parliament, politicians, and political parties) marginally involved

What organizations, interest groups or social forces have managed to take advantage of the political space?

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Political Timing of PRSPs

Launch of the PRSP approach by IFIs and subsequent adoption by countries in Southern Africa: corresponded to different national political events and processes.

Political timing can be either more or less favourable to the PRS process.

Some instances: relatively fortuitous concurrence between national and international timetables, allowing both governments to use ongoing domestic processes to feed into PRSP formulation, helping to shape them as ‘nationally owned’ strategies.

Less favourable: in the face of electoral politics, the PRSP initiative may produce a tension between the desire for a deep, participatory process on the one hand and the urgency of finalizing the PRSP quickly in order for poor countries to access debt relief

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Political Timing of PRSPs

Tanzania: 2000 was an election year: President Mkapa keen to be seen to be doing something about poverty and debt burden. The PRSP/HIPC initiative provided President and CCM with a crucial opportunity in run-up to the elections:

Decision to eliminate primary school fees: politically popular policy change; Accessing debt relief

Theme of his re-election campaign. Next elections scheduled for October 2005: Election calendar is again coinciding with the development of the second PRSP.

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Political Timing of PRSPs

Mozambique: Timing proved to be of mixed favour.Political deadlock following disputed Dec-99 electoral outcomes deteriorated into riots in Nov-00. Increasing focus on these events crowded out time and space for political dialogue on poverty reduction policy during a key phase of the PRSP process. Consequently, neither parliament nor political parties were brought into the PRSP process. Nonetheless, fortuitous coincidence betw. national and international timetables: govt use Action Programme for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty 2000-2004 (PARPA) as basis of I-PRSP and PRSP formulation, thus helping to shape them as ‘nationally owned’ strategies.

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Political Timing of PRSPs

Zambia: PRSP process coincided with debacle and fragmentation of the ruling party following President Chiluba’s attempt (late ‘00/early ’01) at changing constitution to allow for a third term. Also occurred alongside Dec 2001 electoral campaign. Impact: parties and candidates notably absent from the PRSP debate. Fear that the PRSP would be perceived as a political platform for political parties to gain unnecessary mileage. This made it difficult to invite parties to PRSP conferences.

Malawi: I-PRSP preparation understood simply as a requirement for reaching the HIPC Decision Point.

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Political Timing of PRSPs

Lesotho: potential political risks to PRSP process emerged around May 2002 elections (in middle of PRS formulation):

Concern: result in insufficient attention being paid to developing the PRSP: affect participatory process; quality and timeliness of final document (disruption of process). Concern: change in government may affect commitment to PRSP (ownership). Community consultations occurred weeks before Election Day: were not disrupted. Timing of Parliamentary briefings during the preparation of the 2002 General Elections not ideal.

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PRS Implementation and Good Governance

When governments perform poorly: resources are wasted, services go undelivered, and citizens are denied social, legal, and economic protection.

Emphasis on good governance underlies PRSP approach and the associated ‘process conditionality’

Latent political objective of PRSP approach: by encouraging good governance, the state will become more responsive to the needs of the citizenry, especially the poor

Lingering questions: Is there any indication that governments are becoming more responsive to citizen demands across a range of policy areas?Are neopatrimonial structures beginning to weaken and consequently facilitate progress in reducing poverty?

Examining existing documentation together with attitudinal data from Afrobarometer series: rather tentative conclusions

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PRS Implementation and Good Governance

Limitation: in most instances, 1 year is probably insufficient time to see significant results.

Tanzania Mozambique

Malawi Zambia

Afrobarometer Round 1

Jan/Mar-01 - Nov/Dec-99

Oct/Nov-99

PRSP approved Oct-00 Apr-01 Mar-02 Apr-02

Afrobarometer Round 2

Jul/Aug-03 Aug/Oct-02 Apr/May-03 Jun/Jul-03

Time elapsed: implementation phase of PRS

2 months;2 years 8 months

1 year 3 months

1 year 1 year 1 month

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State Responsiveness: Economic Reform

Management of the national economy in 2002/03 is viewed in a moderately positive light in all countries except Malawi.

Tanzania: 68% say government handling macroeconomic affairs fairly/very well; 50% in Zambia; 48% in Mozambique. Malawi: two-thirds feel that economy being managed fairly/very badly.

Specific economic policies: generally negative appraisal53% of Tanzanians feel government is doing well at keeping inflation stable, a third or less think so in the other three countries. In all 4 countries, government is rated as doing poorly in creating employment and narrowing gaps between the rich and the poor, especially Malawi and Zambia.

Tanzanians, Mozambicans: think mass living standards have improved since the adoption of economic structural adjustment and the PRSP while in Zambia and Malawi the converse is true.

Agreement that economic reform has reduced the availability of job opportunities and led to inequality. especially pronounced in Malawi and Zambia (nearly 80% perceive a worsening trend).

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State Responsiveness: Economic Reform

Growing social inequalities emerge as a driving force for popular dissatisfaction with market-oriented economic reforms.

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33

35

22

26

18

24

38

59

56

65

71

72

73

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

2002

2001

2003

1999

2003

1999

2003

Moz

Tan

zan

iaM

alaw

iZ

amb

ia

Percent

Helped most people Hurt most people Do not agree/DK

Majority think government’s economic policies have ‘hurt most people’ and that reforms have ‘only benefited a few’. Zambia: 3 times as many people think that economic reform incurs more costs than benefits. Moz: slim majority believe that ‘the government’s economic policies have helped most people’: possibly reflects relatively robust per capita economic growth 1993 - 2003 (5.7%). Trends: little change with majority still perceiving adverse impact.

Perception of Economic Policies

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State Responsiveness: Economic Reform

While one might anticipate that, under such circumstances, people would support abandoning market-driven economic policies; reality is more mixed.

Tanzanians and Zambians: remarkable degree of economic patience, with 58% and 50% respectively willing ‘to accept some hardships now…in order for the economy to get better in the future’ Malawians (40%) and Mozambicans (37%) are the less patient, and in the former case there is majority support (55%) for an overhaul of economic policy.

Economic patience: positive in that it gives policymakers time to achieve results, negative in that it may be sign of uncritical acceptance of status quo 53

37

40

50

37

30

31

55

39

58

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

2001

2003

2002

2003

2003

Tan

Moz

Mal

Zam

Accept some hardships now Abandon current economic policies.

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State Responsiveness: Social Reform

After more than 2 years experience in implementing PRS in Tanzania and approx. 1 year in other 3 cases: Remains great variation in perceived state responsiveness, as measured by the level of difficulty in accessing certain types of state provided services.

Relatively easy to get a place in a school for a young child; but difficult to access HH services, business loans or welfare payments

Perceived state responsiveness subsequently influences the overall assessment of government’s social performance.

All cases: majority believe government doing a good job in terms of addressing educational needs and improving basic health services.Tanzania: approximately three-quarters give a positive appraisal. More negative assessment is reported in relation to the delivery of water to the household.

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State Responsiveness

Limited level of agreement in these countries that ‘elected leaders…look after the interests of people like (me)’ or ‘listen to what people like (me) have to say’.

Despite participatory PRSP processes, upwards of two-thirds of citizens in the PRSP countries acknowledge that the agents of the state are unresponsive to popular needs (esp. high in Zam, Mal)

Elected leaders never/some of the time...

72

66

88

88

74

63

87

88

0 20 40 60 80 100

2003

2002

2003

2003

Tan

Moz

Mal

Zam

Look after people's interests Listen to what people have to say

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State Responsiveness: Summing Up

Economic domain: Deeply entrenched view among citizens in the 4 countries that government’s economic policies continue to hurt most people, related to real concerns about the shortage of wage-paying jobs and about the poverty, destitution, and shortages of food that often accompany unemployment.

Social front: some signs that pro-poor spending is increasing the assets of the poor through the provision of social services (e.g. abolition of school fees in Tanzania).

Tension between the two dynamics: PRS’ likely to exacerbate this (‘old wine in new bottles’ debate) unless pro-poor growth achieved.

Tendency of PRS’ to privilege social sector spending (educ, health) while longer-term structural issues (e.g. employment, agriculture) tend to be underempahsised

Result: increasing disaffection, and belief that state is not listening to what people have to say and responding to their needs.

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Clients or citizens? Political Values2002/03 Afrobarometer round: Some tension between democratic and neopatrimonial political values

Strong desire to influence the decisions taken by political leaders and belief in equal treatment by leaders (rejection of neopatrimonialsm),

Apparent contradiction: 60 - 69% still tend to see themselves as the clients of “big men”.

Perceived Govt performance w.r.t. allowing ordinary people to influence government and treat people fairly?

Results indicate that further institutional development is required in these areas.

73% Malawians think democratic transition improved ‘ability of ordinary people to influence what government does’; compared with half of Tanzanians, Mozambicans and Zambians. Even less (47-56%) perceive gains in ‘equal and fair treatment for all people by the government since democratization.

Appears to be emerging an increasing demand for political accountability. However, despite this, there is still substantive room for improvement on the supply side in enabling the citizenry to influence government and promoting the equal treatment of all.