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1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217
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1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

Dec 21, 2015

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Page 1: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

1

Computer Security

Professor Jennifer Rexford

CS 217

Page 2: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

2

Interacting With the World

Hardware

OS Kernel

UserProcess

UserProcess

Internet

Keypress goesto OS kernel

OS looks up which window has “keyboard focus,” routes to appropriate user process’s stdin

User process does fprintf (asks OS to write to disk)

OS writes to disk

TCP packet goes to OS kernel

OS looks up which process is listening on that port, sends data to stdin

User process does fprintf (asks OS to write to disk)

OS writes to disk

Page 3: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

3

Protection Mechanisms

Keypress goesto OS kernel

OS looks up which window has “keyboard focus,” routes to appropriate user process’s stdin

User process does fprintf (asks OS to write to disk)

OS writes to disk

TCP packet goes to OS kernel

OS looks up which process is listening on that port, sends data to stdin

User process does fprintf (asks OS to write to disk)

OS writes to disk

• Not to user process directly!

• Not to unauthorized user process!

• User process can’t access disk directly!

• OS writes only to files that user process has privileges to open!

Page 4: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

User Processes Can’t Directly Access I/O

• Input/output instructions are privileged instructions Trying to run them in unprivileged mode triggers trap to OS

• Input/output device registers may be memory-mapped Virtual-memory system doesn’t map those pages into user space

• Virtual-memory system prevents user process from

modifying OS memory Can’t fool OS into performing unauthorized services

• Virtual-memory prevents user processes from modifying

each others’ memory Can’t fool other processes into writing bad data to its files on disk

Page 5: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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How Attackers Defeat Protection

• Make the protection mechanism fail By exploiting bugs in protection software

• Operate politely through the protection mechanism Manipulating application semantics to obtain services

By exploiting bad design of applications

• Example: buffer overflow attacks Exploit a program that doesn’t perform bounds checking

By presenting large input that runs past the array bounds

… and craft that input to be executed as machine code

Page 6: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

6

A Nice Little Program% a.out

What is your name?

John Smith

Thank you, John Smith.

% #include <stdio.h>int main(int argc, char **argv) { char a[12]; int i; printf(“What is your name?\n”); for (i=0; ; i++) { int c = getchar(); if (c ==‘\n’|| c == EOF) break; a[i] = c; } a[i]=’\0’; printf(“Thank you, %s.\n”,a); return 0;}

Page 7: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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Why Did This Program Crash?% a.out

What is your name?

adsli57asdkhj5jklds;ahj5;klsaduj5klysdukl5aujksd5ukals;5uj;akukla

Segmentation fault

% #include <stdio.h>int main(int argc, char **argv) { char a[12]; int i; printf(“What is your name?\n”); for (i=0; ; i++) { int c = getchar(); if (c ==‘\n’|| c == EOF) break; a[i] = c; } a[i]=’\0’; printf(“Thank you, %s.\n”,a); return 0;}

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Stack Frame Layout: Local Variables

• Allocates 12 bytes on the stack for array a[]

• Uses registers for integers i and c(compiled with “gcc –O”)

2

Saved Registers

argc

argvParametersOld EIP

%EBPOld EBP

#include <stdio.h>int main(int argc, char **argv) { char a[12]; int i; printf(“What is your name?\n”); for (i=0; ; i++) { int c = getchar(); if (c ==‘\n’|| c == EOF) break; a[i] = c; } a[i]=’\0’; printf(“Thank you, %s.\n”,a); return 0;}

%ESPa

Local

variables ? ? ? ?

? ? ?

? ? ?

?

?

Page 9: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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Stack Frame: Modifying Local Variable

%EBP

2

%ESP

Saved Registers

argc

argv

a n h o J

i m S _

? \0 h t

Local

variables

Parameters

% a.out

What is your name?

John Smith

Thank you, John Smith.

%

Old EBP

Old EIP

#include <stdio.h>int main(int argc, char **argv) { char a[12]; int i; printf(“What is your name?\n”); for (i=0; ; i++) { int c = getchar(); if (c ==‘\n’|| c == EOF) break; a[i] = c; } a[i]=’\0’; printf(“Thank you, %s.\n”,a); return 0;}

Page 10: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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Stack Frame: Returning From Function

• Discard the stack frame by setting ESP to EBP movl %ebp, %esp

• Pop the old base pointer (EBP) to restore the value popl %ebp

• Pop instruction pointer (EIP) to return control to calling function ret

%EBP

2

%ESP

Saved Registers

argc

argv

a n h o J

i m S _

? \0 h t

Local

variables

Parameters

Old EBP

Old EIP

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Buffer Overrun

%EBP

117

%ESP

Saved Registers

argc

argv

a d c b a

h g f e

l k j i

Local

variables

Parameters

% a.out

What is your name?

abcdefghijklmnopqrstu

Segmentation fault

%

Old EBP

Old EIP

p o n m

t s r q

u

#include <stdio.h>int main(int argc, char **argv) { char a[12]; int i; printf(“What is your name?\n”); for (i=0; ; i++) { int c = getchar(); if (c ==‘\n’|| c == EOF) break; a[i] = c; } a[i]=’\0’; printf(“Thank you, %s.\n”,a); return 0;}

Page 12: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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Innocuous? Buffer Overrun

%EBP

1

%ESP

Saved Registers

argc

argv

a d c b a

h g f e

l k j i

Local

variables

Parameters

% a.out

What is your name?

abcdefghijkl????!!!!^A

%

Old EBP

Old EIP

? ? ? ?

! ! ! !

^A

#include <stdio.h>int main(int argc, char **argv) { char a[12]; int i; printf(“What is your name?\n”); for (i=0; ; i++) { int c = getchar(); if (c ==‘\n’|| c == EOF) break; a[i] = c; } a[i]=’\0’; printf(“Thank you, %s.\n”,a); return 0;}

After “return”, the computer

starts running the “code”

stored at this address!!!

Page 13: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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Buffer overrun

%EBP

executable

machine

code. . .

argc

argv

a d c b a

h g f e

l k j i

Local

variables

Parameters

% a.out

What is your name?

abcdefghijkl????&&&&executable-machine-code...

How may I serve you, master?

%

Old EBP

Old EIP

? ? ? ?

& & & &

Cleverly malicious?Maliciously clever?

#include <stdio.h>int main(int argc, char **argv) { char a[12]; int i; printf(“What is your name?\n”); for (i=0; ; i++) { int c = getchar(); if (c ==‘\n’|| c == EOF) break; a[i] = c; } a[i]=’\0’; printf(“Thank you, %s.\n”,a); return 0;}

%ESP

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Buffer-Overrun Vulnerabilities

Hardware

OS Kernel

E-mailclient

Web Browser

Internet

Keypress goesto OS kernel

OS looks up which window has “keyboard focus,” routes to appropriate user process’s stdin

User process does fprintf (asks OS to write to disk)

OS writes to disk

TCP packet goes to OS kernel

OS looks up which process is listening on that port, sends data to stdin

User process does fprintf (asks OS to write to disk)

OS writes to disk

Page 15: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

15

Attacking a Web Server

Web ServerClient PC

for(i=0;p[i];i++) url[i]=p[i];

• URLs

• Input in web forms

• Crypto keys for SSL

• etc.

Page 16: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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Attacking a Web Browser

Web Server@ badguy.com

Client PC

for(i=0;p[i];i++) gif[i]=p[i];

• HTML keywords

• Images

• Image names

• URLs

• etc.

www.badguy.com

Earn $$$ Thousandsworking at home!

Page 17: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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Attacking everything in sight

The Internet@ badguy.com

Client PC

for(i=0;p[i];i++) gif[i]=p[i];

• E-mail client

• PDF viewer

• Operating-system kernel

• TCP/IP stack

• Any application that ever sees input directly from the outside

Page 18: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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Your Programming Assignment% a.out

What is your name?

John Smith

Thank you, John Smith.I recommend that you get a grade of D on this assignment

%

char grade = 'D';

int main(void) {

printf("What is your name?\n");

readString(Name);

if (strcmp(Name,"Andrew Appel")==0)

grade='B';

printf("Thank you, %s.\n\

I recommend that you get a grade of %c \

on this assignment.\n", Name, grade);

exit(0);

}

Page 19: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

Three Ways to Change the Grade

• Smashing the stack in readString() Change OldEIP point to the “grade=‘B’” code

Write entirely new machine code, and have OldEIP point to it

Write machine code to change grade and jump back to main()

char grade = 'D';

int main(void) {

printf("What is your name?\n");

readString(Name);

if (strcmp(Name,"Andrew Appel")==0)

grade='B';

printf("Thank you, %s.\n\

I recommend that you get a grade of %c \

on this assignment.\n", Name, grade);

exit(0);

}

Page 20: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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OK, That’s a B...% a.out

What is your name?

John Smith\0.????@*&%}

Thank you, John Smith.I recommend ... a grade of B ...

%

char grade = 'D';

int main(void) {

printf("What is your name?\n");

readString(Name);

if (strcmp(Name,"Andrew Appel")==0)

grade='B';

printf("Thank you, %s.\n\

I recommend ... grade of %c \

...nment.\n", Name, grade);

exit(0);

}

%EBP

%ESP

Saved Registers

buf

Local

variables

Parameters

Old EBP

Old EIP

7 k A ?

n h o J

i m S

. \0 h t

} % * @

? ? ? ?

Page 21: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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How About an A?% a.out

What is your name?

John Smith\0.????@*&%}3k1n1l5018

Thank you, John Smith.I recommend ... a grade of A ...

%

char grade = 'D';

int main(void) {

printf("What is your name?\n");

readString(Name);

if (strcmp(Name,"Andrew Appel")==0)

grade='B';

printf("Thank you, %s.\n\

I recommend ... grade of %c \

...nment.\n", Name, grade);

exit(0);

}

%EBP

bufLocal

variables

Parameters

Old EBP

Old EIP

7 k A ?

n 1 k 3

n h o J

i m S

. \0 h t

} % * @

? ? ? ?

new

machine

code

%ESP

Page 22: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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A Simpler Solution% a.out < getA

What is your name?Thank you, John Smith.I recommend ... a grade of A ...

%

char grade = 'D';

int main(void) {

printf("What is your name?\n");

readString(Name);

if (strcmp(Name,"Andrew Appel")==0)

grade='B';

printf("Thank you, %s.\n\

I recommend ... grade of %c \

...nment.\n", Name, grade);

exit(0);

}

%EBP

%ESPbuf

Old EBP

Old EIP

? ? ? ?

n h o Ji m S . \0 h t

} % * @

grade=’A’

jmp

Page 23: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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The File getA

% a.out < getA

What is your name?Thank you, John Smith.I recommend ... a grade of A ...

%

? ? ? ?

n h o Ji m S . \0 h t

} % * @

grade=’A’

jmp

getA:John Smith\0.movl ‘A’,grade; jmp wherever0000????7@*%}

Size of buffer

new “old EIP” (return address)

New machine codeGarbage overwriting “Old EBP”

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What Value to Use for New Return Address?

%EBP

%ESPbuf

Old EBP

Old EIP

? ? ? ?

n h o Ji m S . \0 h t

} % * @

grade=’A’

jmp

} % * @getA:John Smith\0.movl ‘A’,grade; jmp wherever0000????@*%}

Size of buffer

Garbage overwriting old EBP

new “old EIP” (return address)

New machine code

• Computers are deterministic

• Operating system initializes stack pointer to predictable value

• Stack grows deterministic amount from process entry to call of readString

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Use gdb to Find Out

%EBP

%ESP0030a898

bfffbb64

bfffbad8

080484c3

08049770

00000001

00000007

0030a898

bfffbb64

00000001

buf

Old EBP

Old EIP

% gdb a.outGNU gdb Red Hat Linux Copyright 2004 Free Software Foundation(gdb) break readStringBreakpoint 1 at 0x804843d(gdb) runStarting program: a.out (no debugging symbols found)...What is your name?Breakpoint 1, 0x0804843d in readString ()(gdb) x/10x $esp0xbfffbab0: 0x0030a898 0xbfffbb64 0xbfffbad8 0x080484c30xbfffbac0: 0x08049770 0x00000001 0x00000007 0x0030a8980xbfffbad0: 0xbfffbb64 0x00000001(gdb)

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Defenses Against This Attack

• Best: program in languages that make array-out-of-bounds impossible (Java, C#, ML, ....)

• Good: use discipline in C programming always to check bounds of array subscripts

• Better than nothing: Operating system randomizes initial stack pointer

Can jump anywhere in here, so don’thave to know exact value of stack pointer

How to attack it: John Smith\0.....nop;nop;nop;nop;...;nop;do_bad_things;exit(0)

Page 27: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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Defenses Against This Attack

• Best: program in languages that make array-out-of-bounds impossible (Java, C#, ML, ....)

• Good: use discipline in C programming always to check bounds of array subscripts

• Better than nothing: Operating system randomizes initial stack pointer How to attack it:

John Smith\0.....nop;nop;nop;nop;...;nop;do_bad_things;exit(0)

For this assignment, you don’t need such a fancy attack.

The hello.c program copies the buffer to the global bss data space (into the Name array) so you can just jump there, don’t have to know the stack height.

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Defenses Against This Attack

• Best: program in languages that make array-out-of-bounds impossible (Java, C#, ML, ....)

• Good: use discipline in C programming always to check bounds of array subscripts

• Better than nothing: Operating system randomizes initial stack pointer

• Better than nothing: Prohibit execution of machine code from the stack and data segments

• Problem 1: backward compatibility

• Problem 2: need VM hardware with “exec/noexec” bit on a page by page basis; x86/Pentium family lacks this

• Amazing hack solution: use obsolete “segment registers” left over from 80286.

Page 29: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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Segment Register Defence

• In normal (modern) usage, all segment registers point to entire range of addressable memory, 0 to 0xffffffff

Text

Data

BSS

Stack

Heap

CodeStackHeapetc

• Amazing hack is to have code segment point just to Text area

• Problem: what if program wishes to create executable code on the fly? dynamic code

• Solution: undo protection

Page 30: 1 Computer Security Professor Jennifer Rexford CS 217.

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At Your Service...

• For your convenience in this programming assignment, we have turned off the segment-register defense

char grade = 'D';

int main(void) {

mprotect(((unsigned)Name) & 0xfffff000,1,

PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);

printf("What is your name?\n");

readString(Name);

if (strcmp(Name,"Andrew Appel")==0)

grade='B';

printf("Thank you, %s.\n\

I recommend ... grade of %c \

...nment.\n", Name, grade);

exit(0);

}

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How to Get Started

• Use gdb to map out where things are Stack frame of “readString” Stack frame of “main” underneath it Global data area containing “grade” and “Name” Machine code for “main” Take notes of all these things, by address.

• Write a little assembly-language program Set the “grade” variable to ‘A’; jump to wherever Assemble it, maybe even link it into a copy of hello.c, and examine

what it looks like using gdb

• Prepare your attack data Write a C program to print out the data string Useful functions: printf, putchar, putw

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Start Early

• Use gdb to map out where things are Stack frame of “readString” Stack frame of “main” underneath it Global data area containing “grade” and “Name” Machine code for “main”Take notes of all these things, by address.

If possible, get this part done by the time your Weds/Thursprecept meets this week. Bring your notes with youto precept. We recommend you work in pairs on thisassignment.