1 Bioweapons Political Dimensions. 2 I. Supplements to Guillemin’s History: World War II A.The case of Stalingrad… 1.Suspicious outbreak of tularemia.

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Bioweapons

Political Dimensions

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I. Supplements to Guillemin’s History: World War II

A. The case of Stalingrad…1. Suspicious outbreak of tularemia at Stalingrad

2. Kenneth Alibek (Soviet weapons scientist) alleges USSR used bioweapons

3. Other scientists believe outbreak was natural

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B. Japan’s Unit 731

1. Guillemin lowballs the figures for Chinese deaths. But Langford (Introduction to Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2004, p.142) says 250,000 Chinese killed by Japanese BW, mainly plague.

2. A few thousand – 250,000 is a big range. Can we narrow down the effectiveness of the Japanese program?

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a. Testimony of Hayashi Shigemi (October 7, 1954)

• "In 1943…(we) spread cholera once in Shantung Province... The germ was first dumped into the Wei River, then the dike was destroyed to let the water flow into a larger area to rapidly spread the germ. I personally participated in this mission. I handed the germ to Kakizoe Shinobu, an Army medical doctor. He then in turn sent someone else to spread the germ. According to my knowledge, in our local area there were twenty five thousand two hundred ninety one Chinese people who died from this. How many died altogether I do not know, because it was top-secret information. Our mission was to murder Chinese people in mass, to test the effectiveness of the cholera germ, and to be ready to use it in fighting the Russians.“

• Problem: Unable to locate source of testimony (reprinted on highly nationalist web sites – but no trials in 1954…)

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b. Sources of evidence• Estimate of 3000 = testimony of one official

who witnessed about 600 deaths/year for 5 years at Ping Fan

• Now considered “gross underestimate” because excludes other camps

• Prisoners not issued unique IDs: 101-1500 used as ID numbers, then recycled with next batch of prisoners. X-Rays destroyed by end of war.

• NONE of these estimates include the actual plague outbreaks in China. But can those be blamed on Japanese BW, or were they natural?

• Ishii had incentives to exaggerate effects of BW

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c. Possible BW-caused epidemics, 1939-1942

• 1939-1940: Typhoid (near Harbin) from well poisonings

• 1940: Cholera (near Changchun)• 1942: Paratyphoid A and Anthrax (near

Nanking)• 1939-1942: Plague epidemics near

Ningbo (possibly from infected rats released in cities by Japanese troops)

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3. Bureaucratic Politics?• Japanese forces were decentralized (Unit 731, Unit 100,

Eu 1644, other units)• Ishii-Kitano rivalry created incentives to overestimate

BW effectiveness by both researchers• Hypothesis: Ishii and Kitano deliberately avoided use of

controls (i.e. comparison to plague deaths in non-BW areas) in order to produce results (think US BMD tests or manufacturers’ tests of effectiveness for parallels)• Hypothesis suggests deaths were >10,000 (killed directly) but

<250,000 (because that ascribes all epidemics to BW, which is probably false)

• Proven BW-induced epidemics killed <1000 in each case, sometimes < 100

• Accordingly, real figures more likely to be in 20,000-50,000 range

• Problem: No evidence with which to test hypothesis. Much was destroyed and most of the rest is STILL classified by the US

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II. Biodefense: Prevention

A. Preventing state use of BW1. Mass vaccination is impractical (unless

one has time – i.e. intends to use them first)

2. Deterrence – Threaten retaliation with something that exceeds benefits of BW use (thus increased BW effectiveness increases threat needed to deter)

3. Nonproliferation – Prevent the spread of capability (more on this later…)

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B. Preventing Bioterrorism1. Access control. US data and

regulations:• >300 registered institutions

with bioweapons agents• >16,000 registered

individuals with bioweapons agents

• Only security requirement is a lock on the door

• No requirement to exclude non-screened personnel for labs

• No requirement for secure transport

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2. Challenges of Detection

AnthraxAnthrax

PlaguePlague

Q feverQ fever

Tularemia Tularemia

SmallpoxSmallpox

AgentAgent

MediastinitisMediastinitis

PneumoniaPneumonia

Pleuritis, Pleuritis, hepatitishepatitis

PneumoniaPneumonia

PustulesPustules

Clinical Clinical EffectEffect

}HeadacheHeadache

FeverFever

MalaiseMalaise

CoughCough

InitialInitial SymptomsSymptoms

a. Initial Symptoms too vague to know attack has occurred

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b. Epidemiologic Clues• Tight cluster of cases• High infection rate• Unusual or localized

geography (rural disease in urban area)

• Unusual time of year (i.e. flu-like symptoms in midsummer)

• Dead animals (for some diseases)

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3. Thinking Ahead: Which groups are threats?

a. Required capabilities• Virulent strain of agent• Equipment and expertise to culture agent

safely• Equipment and expertise to stockpile agent

until use• Equipment and expertise to generate right

size aerosol OR access to processed food / water supplies

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b. Intent: Which groups try?

c. Nonstate CBRN use is rare

• Only 10 of 74 CBRN attacks involved pathogens (typhoid and anthrax) or biological toxins (botulism toxin)• From Whitlark and Stepak (2010)

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C. Defense against accidental release

1. Encourage other countries to implement safeguards, esp. on government programs

2. US: High security for BW research but not private research.

Universities: Essentially no safety regulations (voluntary only, apply to NIH grants for recombinant-DNA research only)

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III. Proliferation of BW

A. What are the incentives to build BW?

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1. Advantages of Bioweapons

• Small amount needed• Pathogens grow inside host

• Extremely toxic• Botox: Dot of an “i” kills 10

• Easy/inexpensive to grow• Cheese making equipment

(viruses more difficult than bacteria / toxins)

• Large amount produced in short period of time• Days to weeks

• Potential for panic

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2. Disadvantages of Bioweapons• Protection of Workers and Public

• Release into environment (Sverdlovsk was state of the art!)

• Quality control• Particles must be aerosolized (1 micron or so)

• Delivery problems• Rain, wind, UV light• Bombs, bomblets, and shells produce poor,

localized aerosols• Heat and shock waves (explosions) kill most

organisms• Poor storage survival• Difficult to control release – “boomerang

effects”

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B. Patterns of Proliferation

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1. CBW Proliferation (Official)

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2. Suspected BW Proliferation

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3. Causes of BW Proliferation

a. Portfolio Strategy: Every BW aspirant has also pursued Chemical and/or Nuclear Weapons. What does this suggest?

b. Cost-Effectiveness: BW cheaper than other WMD

c. Ease of acquisition: offensive BW relies on dual-use technology

d. Difficult to detect: Weakness of BWC, permissibility of defensive research

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4. Predicting BW Proliferation

• Best predictors are security variables:• Enduring Rivalry Increases Risk• Dispute Involvement Increases Risk• Defense Pact Decreases Risk

• Large states more likely to develop BW

• Other predictors include:• Democracy Decreases Risk• IO Membership Slightly Increases Risk• Wealth Increases Risk

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C. Proliferation: The Risks

1. Risk of state use – Relationship depends on balance between deterrence and escalation

a. Deterrence – Use of threats to prevent BW

b. Escalation – Use of BW to achieve dominance in war

c. Little evidence to test comparisons – State BW use has always been rare. Only examples are cases where no retaliation was possible.

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d. BW Doctrines as Evidence (Planning the Unthinkable)

i. Realism: States use BW to alter the balance of power with rivals. Implies BW good for the weak side in asymmetric dyads, bad for the strong side in asymmetric dyads, and good for balanced dyads. Problem = balance of capabilities appears to increase war risk!

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ii. Organization theory

• Military organizations pursue autonomy and therefore develop offensive strategies

• Undermines ability of BW to deter (realism) because militaries are partially independent of political calculations that drive civilians to avoid war

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iii. Strategic culture theory

• Civilians also pursue goals other than national security – i.e. re-election

• Militaries differ in the degree to which they seek autonomy

• No clear conclusions about whether more BW is dangerous

• Which theory is correct? Read the case studies…

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2. Risk of nonstate use• Proliferation should increase

risk of nonstate use, ceteris paribus. Why?

• However, hypothesis is difficult to test because all is not equal: Role of nonstate actors in politics changes over time (increase in foreign military intervention by nonstate actors)

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3. Risk of accidental use

a. Risk is not zero – remember Sverdlovsk

b. Risk increases with each new BW state

c. Safety measures can slow the increase but not avert it.

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4. The danger of proliferationa. The nonstate dimension: We don’t need to

assume “rogue states” are any different in order to conclude that more BW is dangerous. Majority of BW uses have been nonstate or accidental releases!

b. State-level deterrence fails: does not deter nonstate actors and has only limited effect on accidental releases (provides incentive for strong safety systems)

c. Conclusion: Deterrence alone is insufficient. Efforts to reduce proliferation or roll back BW programs necessary to decrease BW risk

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D. Anti-Proliferation Strategies

1. Nonproliferation: Arms Control

(See Assignment 1 and in-class exercises for details on the BWC and its effect on proliferation)

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a. The 5th Review Conference of the BWC

i. US scuttles the conference (Guillemin) BUT

ii. Russia also tried to undermine BWC through definition of dozens of terms (would create legal loopholes to enable “everything but” BW programs)

iii. NAM (led by China and including Pakistan and India) sought to strengthen Article X (sharing technical expertise) at the expense of Article III (export controls) and even inspections

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b. The 6th Review Conference

• Ended December 8, 2006

• Only significant accomplishment was agreement on annual meetings before the next Review Conference in 2011

• (The 2011 meeting is our simulation)

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2. Counterproliferation: Compellence as a strategy

a. Rejects deterrence alone – must have ability to coerce states or groups with BW into renouncing it, not just to refrain from using it

b. Distinct from arms control – includes use of force; associated with reluctance to make concessions (bargain)

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3. Paradoxes of Anti-Proliferation

a. Counterproliferation can undermine nonproliferation – Threat of pre-emptive war may encourage WMD development. New counterproliferation strategies threaten first use of nuclear weapons (new bunker busters). See the Sagan article for why this might be a bad idea.

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b. The deterrence dilemma

• Deterrence cannot roll back BW, because BW programs built in full knowledge of the deterrent threat (i.e. already taken into consideration)

• Increased ability to deter increases threat (primary driver of proliferation)

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c. The nonproliferation paradoxes

i. Rewarding bad behavior: Incentives to renounce BW may encourage others to build BW as bargaining chips

ii. Substitution effect: Verification on one dimension of WMD may increase appeal of other dimensions