1 August 14, 2003 Blackout MAC Meeting October 8, 2003 Paul Murphy IMO.

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August 14, 2003 Blackout

MAC Meeting

October 8, 2003

Paul Murphy

IMO

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Thursday, August 14, 2003 at approximately 04:11 PM EDTNortheastern United States and portions of Canada

lost major portions of load, generation and transmission

Effects felt throughout the Eastern Interconnection centered around the Great Lakes

Approximately 61, 800 MW of customer load was lost affecting 50 million people.

The Event

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The Interconnections

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4:10:00 – 4:10:38 PM Transmission Lines Disconnect across Michigan and Northern Ohio, Generation

Trips Off Line in Northern Michigan and Northern Ohio, and Northern Ohio Separates from Pennsylvania

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Remaining paths into eastern

Michigan

ONTARIO

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Summary of the Situation at 4:10:38

R e m a i n i n g p a t h s i n t o e a s t e r n

M i c h i g a n

O N T A R I O

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Interface flows 3:10:38 PM EST

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4:10:42 – 4:10:45 PM Transmission Paths Disconnect in Northern Ontario and New Jersey, Isolating the

Northeast Portion of the Eastern Interconnection

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29(North of Lake

Superior)

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ONTARIO

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4:10:50 – 4:11:57 PM Ontario Separates from New York West of Niagara Falls and West of St.

Lawrence. Southwestern Connecticut Separates from New York and Blacks Out.

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33ONTARIO

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FREQUENCY - Resources

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15:10:00 15:10:43 15:11:26 15:12:10 15:12:53

August 14, 2003 EST

Freq

uenc

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Beck2 freq Cherrywood freq Generation + interchange

Unstable Island remainsBeginning of collapse

Quickly reduces to ~ 1200 MW

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S m o k y3 0 M W

4 0 M W L o a d7 2 0 G e n e r a t i o n

D e s J o a c h i m s2 0 M W

8 0 0 M W L o a d4 8 0 M W G e n e r a t i o n

T o N e w Y o r k

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Restoration Plan Priorities

Restore Class IV AC power to all nuclear sitesRestore power to critical transmission and

generating station, station service loadsRestore critical utility owned telecom facilitiesRestore customer loads only to the extent

necessary to control voltages and secure generating units

Synchronize islands together and/or to adjacent power systems

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Restoration Paths

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Complexities of the Restoration Process

Equipment Problems

Communications

Balancing generation/load and maintaining frequency and voltage

Using load to control high voltage during the line restoration process

Assessing available generation to support restoration

Post Contingency conditions

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Nine Days of Emergency Operations

Over the week, assessment of insufficient internal and external generation to meet the normal Ontario demand

August 14

Provincial Government declares a Provincial Emergency August 17

Government requests industrial, commercial and residential customers to reduce load by 50% over peak hours.

Reliable supply maintained at reduced demand level due to: Customer response to requests for curtailment and conservation dispatch of emergency generators emergency purchases from Ontario’s neighbours

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Nine Days of Emergency Operations

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Dem

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NormalForecast

Actual Estimated Demand Response

The IMO remained in an EEA 2 state until August 22, 2003. The emergency lasted for 9Days and was declared over at 1900 EST. The IMO Administered Market resumedoperation at 0:00 EST on August 23, 2003.

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ObservationsSystem Restoration and Crisis Management Processes

> Equipment protections operated as designed

> Public telephone system was generally availableEfficient and effective assignment of accountabilities within

the control roomGood cooperation from field staff of generators and

transmitters, distributors and customersGood cooperation with neighbouring area operatorsSuccessful restoration plan

Large-scale restoration is inherently complex, and our control room staff adapted to changing circumstances as the restoration proceeded, modifying approaches as necessary to achieve objectives.

The overall restoration and crisis management processes proceeded in an orderly fashion and met their objectives.

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A Communications Centre was set up to brief media on status of system restoration in Ontario and to provide information as to how customers could assist in the restoration effort. Press conferences, scheduled twice daily, were coordinated with Provincial officials.

Provincial government officials were continuously briefed on power restoration to ensure coordination with other government agencies.

Communication Centre / Provincial Decision Support

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1. We confirmed that the devices that are in place to protect equipment operated as planned

2. We confirmed that maintaining a well-documented restoration plan, supported by training and rehearsals involving the IMO, market participants and government, was and will continue to be a key investment

3. We confirmed that close cooperation amongst the IMO, the interconnections, and Ontario Transmitters, Generators, market participants and government is essential to achieving an orderly restoration.

Early Lessons Learned

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4. Effective communications is essential to reliable operation.

5. The extreme speed at which events can cascade across the system increases the significance of timely information.

6. Frequent communication with customers is critical to support their decision making

7. Administered pricing rules need review

Early Lessons Learned

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1. Maintain and enhance the integration of systems and markets through robust interconnections with our neighbours

Prevention of Future Incidents

2. Reliability standards for the interconnected North American grid should be mandatory.

3. The industry should build on the strong institutional and regulatory foundations already in place

4. The industry should continue to pursue the three part strategy of Prevention, Containment and Minimization of Impact:

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Ongoing Review

• Internationally:– Canada-U.S. Joint Task Force

• Within Ontario:– Emergency Preparedness Task Force’s (EPTF)

Restoration Working Group– Compliance Assessment

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Canada-U.S. Joint Task Force• 3 Working Groups to develop recommendations

– Electricity – Nuclear– Security

• IMO is supporting Electricity and Security WGs, through NERC and directly with Joint Task Force– Electricity - sequence of events, event simulation, standards,

operations, and planning– Security - physical and cyber security review

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The Ongoing Investigation

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Restoration Working Group• Restoration Working Group (RWG) established by the EPTF Sep 22

Goal:• To improve our level of preparedness

Objectives: • Review the facts regarding the restoration of the IMO-controlled grid• Assess the effectiveness of our restoration efforts• Identify findings and recommend improvements

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RWG Areas of Interest• Rules and procedures

– restoration priorities– rotational load shedding– curtailment requests

• Auxiliary equipment and tools• Generator re-start• Voice communications• Class IV to nuclear

Focus on items essential to restoring the grid and the supply to consumers (by Nov 26)

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Compliance

• Examine Compliance With Market Rules:– NPCC criteria– Ontario Power System Restoration Plan– Communication Requirements– Technical Performance Requirements

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Thanks to all of you for aiding in a successful

restoration of the IMO Controlled Grid and restoring supply to Ontario consumers