Volume Three
EUROPE: ARGUMENT TO V-E DAYJANUARY 1944 TO MAY 1945
T H E ARMY A I R F O R C E SI n World W a r I1PREPARED UNDER T H
E EDITORSHIP OF
WESLEY JAMES
FRANK LEA
CRAVENPrinceton University
GATEf University o Chicago
New Imprint by the Office of Air Force History Washington, D.C.,
1983
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.Uovernment
Printing Oface Washington, D.C. 20402
THEUNIVERSITY CHICAGO OF PRESS,CHICAGO 37Cambridge University
Press, London, N.W. 1, England W. J. Gage & Co., Limited,
Toronto 2B, Canada Copyright 1951 by The University of Chicago. All
rights reserved. Copyright 1951 under the International Copyright
Union. Published 1951. Composed OF PRESS, and printed by
THEUNIVERSITY CHICAGO Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. Copyright
registration renewed 1979This work, first published by the
University of Chicago Press, is reprinted in its entirety by the
Office of Air Force History. With the exception of editing, the
work is the product of the
United States government. Library of Congress Cataloging in
Publication Data Main entry under title: The Army Air Forces in
World War 11.
Vol. 1 originally prepared by the Office of Air Force History;
v. 2, by the Air Historical Group; and v. 3-7, by the USAF
Historical Division. Reprint. Originally published : Chicago :
University of Chicago Press, 1948-1958. Includes bibliographical
references and indexes. Contents: v. 1. Plans and early operations,
January 1939 to August 1942-v. 2. Europe, torch to pointblank,
August 1942 to December 1943-[etc.]-v. 7. Services around the
world. 1. World War, 1939-1 945-Aerial operations, American. 2.
United States. Army Air ForcesHistory-World War, 1939-1945. I.
Craven, Wesley Frank, 1905. 11. Cate, James Lea, 1899. 111. United
States. Air Force. Office of Air Force History. IV. United States.
Air Force. Air Historical Group. V. United States. USAF Historical
Division. D790.A89 1983 940.544973 83-17288 ISBN 0-912799-03-X (v.
1)
11
FOREWORD to the New 1mprin t
N March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget ordering each war agency to
prepare an accurate and objective account of thart agencys war
experience. Soon after, the Army Air Forces began hiring
professional historians so that its history could, in the words of
Brigadier General Laurence Kuter, be recorded while it is hot and
that personnel be selected and an agency set up for a clear
historians job without axe to grind or defense to prepare. An
Historical Division was established in Headquarters Army Air Forces
under Air Intelligence, in September 1942, and the modern Air Force
historical program began. With the end of the war, Headquarters
approved a plan for writing and publishing a seven-volume history.
In December 1945, Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, Deputy Commander
of Army Air Forces, asked the Chancellor of the University of
Chicago to assume the responsibility for the publication of the
history, stressing that it must meet the highest academic
standards. Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Frank Craven of New York
University and Major James Lea Cate of the University of Chicago,
both of whom had been assigned to the historical program, were
selected to be editors of the volumes. Between 1948 and 1958 seven
were published. With publication of the last, the editors wrote
that the Air Force had fulfilled in letter and spirit the promise
of access to documents and complete freedom of historical
interpretation. Like all history, The Army Air Forces in W r d War
II ol reflects the era when it was conceived, researched, and
written. The strategic bombing campaigns received the primary
emphasis, not only because of a widely-shared belief in
bombardments con-
I
tribution to victory, but also because of its importance in
establishing the United States Air Force as a military service
independent of the Army. The huge investment of men and machines
and the effectiveness of the combined Anglo-American bomber
offensive against Germany had not been subjected to the critical
scrutiny they have since received. Nor, given the personalities
involved and the immediacy of the events, did the authors question
some of the command arrangements. In the tactical area, to give
another example, the authors did not doubt the effect of aerial
interdiction on both the German withdrawal from Sicily and the
allied landings at Anzio. Editors Craven and Cate insisted that the
volumes present the war through the eyes of the major commanders,
and be based on information available to them as important
decisions were made. At the time, secrecy still shrouded the Allied
code-breaking effort. While the link between decoded message
traffic and combat action occasionally emerges from these pages,
the authors lacked the knowledge to portray adequately the
intelligence aspects of many operations, such as the interdiction
in 1943 of Axis supply lines to Tunisia and the systematic
bombardment, beginning in 1944, of the German oil industry. All
historical works a generation old suffer such limitations. New
information and altered perspective inevitably change the emphasis
of an historical account. Some accounts in these volumes have been
superseded by subsequent research and other portions will be
superseded in the future. However, these books met the highest of
contemporary professional standards of quality and
comprehensiveness. They contain information and experience that are
of great value to the Air Force today and to the public. Together
they are the only comprehensive discussion of Army Air Forces
activity in the largest air war this nation has ever waged. Until
we summon the resources to take a fresh, comprehensive look at the
Army Air Forces experience in World War 11, these seven volumes
will continue to serve us as well for the next quarter century as
they have for the last.
R I C H A R D H . KOHN Chief, Ofice of Air Force H s o y
itriv
F 0 R E W 0 - RD
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of unity in a complex narrative which seemed to divide itself
into three related but sometimes disparate themes: air operations
against the European Axis; air operations against the Japanese; and
those services in the United States and in the several theaters
which made combat operations possible. T o those hardy souls who
get through the seven stout volumes-and the editors hope they are
legion-this unity may be discernible; but for readers whose
endurance is less rugged or whose interests are less catholic the
volumes have been so arranged that the three themes may be found
treated with some degree of completeness in, respectively, Volumes
I, 11, and 111; Volumes I, IV, and V; and Volumes I, VI, and VII.
This information has been purveyed in an earlier volume, not
without an eye to its possible effect on sales; it is repeated here
to fix the present volume into the context of the whole series. For
with Volume I11 the story of the AAFs war against Hitlers Germany
and his satellite nations-and hence one subsection of the series-is
completed. Volume I dealt mainly with plans and preparations;
Volume I1 described the AAFs war against Hider which began in
mid-1942 in the skies over Libya and France. In the Mediterranean,
where U.S. air forces were part of an effective Anglo-American
team, the war went well and in a number of combined operations the
Allies conquered North Africa, Sicily, and southern Italy and by
the end of 1943 were confronting the enemy, strongly intrenched,
along the Sangro and Garigliano rivers and were planning an
amphibious operation designed to open the road to Rome. In
northwestern Europe, however, the AAF had scored no such obvious
victories. Its only sustained operations, strategic bombardment by
the Eighth Air Force as a part of the Anglo-American Combined
Bomber Offensive, had not as yet provedV
I
N PLANNING a seven-volume history of The Army Air Forces in
World War ZZ the editors hoped to achieve a reasonable degree
THE A R M Y AIR FORCES I N W O R L D W A R I1
decisive nor had the Allies achieved that superiority over the
Luftwaffe which was prerequisite to both the strategic and the
tactical air mission. As 1943 wore out, the AAF was anxiously
awaiting the spell of clear weather which would allow a
concentrated series of strikes against the sources of German air
power and thus, in respect to both the ETO and MTO, Volume I1 ended
on a note of expectancy. The present volume begins with the winter
bombardment campaign of I 943-44 and ends with the German surrender
in May I 945 : it tells of airs contribution to the slow drive up
the Italian peninsula; it describes the activities of the strategic
bombers as they beat down the Lufnvaffe and, turning to other
targets, ruined the German war economy; it tells how tactical
forces prepared for and supported the landings in Normandy and then
spearheaded the Allied sweep across France and, after a check and a
serious counterattack, across Germany. The volume contains then the
climax of air operations, and the denouement too-for before the
armistice the strategic bombers had run out of targets and the
Eighth Air Force had begun its redeployment to the Pacific, while
tactical forces had little to do beyond policing duties. T h e
measure of the air victory and of the vast power which made it
possible may be seen in a typical American gesture a t wars end-a
great sight-seeing excursion in which the Eighth flew 30,000 of its
ground personnel over Europe to view the damage wrought by the
planes they had serviced. T h e chapter headings and subtitles
provide a working outline of the present volume. Roughly, these may
be grouped around four main topics: ( I ) the air war in Italy; ( 2
) the strategic bombing campaign; (3) tactical operations in
support of the land armies from the Cotentin to the Elbe; and (4)
supporting operations of various sorts. T h e war in Italy brought
more than its share of disappointments to the Allies. For a year
after the T O R C H landings the Mediterranean had been the active
theater for the Allied forces as they pushed, with only temporary
checks, from Oran and Casablanca and from Egypt to a line well
above Naples. But as this volume opens they had bogged down,
thwarted in their effort to break through to Rome by rugged
terrain, rugged weather, and a rugged German defense. With the
OVERLORD invasion of France imminent, the Mediterranean no longer
had first priority for resources; it became, and was to remain, a
secondary theater. Nevertheless, in early 1944 the Allies in Italy
enjoyed a markedVi
FOREWORD
superiority over the Germans in air power and this would
increase in time. The newly established Mediterranean Allied Air
Forces, which Eaker had come down from England to command, was a
complex organization in which the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces
were the principal U.S. components. T h e Twelfth was to carry a
heavy responsibility for tactical operations and the Fifteenth,
though engaging occasionally in like activities, was to find its
primary role in assisting the Eighth and RAF's Bomber Command in
the Combined Bomber Offensive. Both forces participated in the
first large-scale endeavor to break the stalemate, the landing at
Anzio. They cut communications lines into the battle area, softened
defenses, and provided-in spite of the distance of their fighter
bases from Anzio-an effective cover for the landings. T h e
lodgment was made but Operation SHINGLE, successful as an
amphibious assault, failed in its purpose of forcing the Germans to
withdraw from their Gustav Line, and the Anzio beachhead became a
liability whose defense put a heavy drain on air and ground
resources. Winter weather severely handicapped the air war; its
only useful function was to ease a difficult command decision in
February-whether to send the Fifteenth A r Force on the longi
awaited attacks on German aircraft factories or to use it
tactically to help protect the endangered beachhead at Anzio. T w o
spectacular air operations after Anzio have attracted a degree of
attention wholly incommensurate with their military importance. On
1 5 February U.S. bombers destroyed the Benedictine abbey at Monte
Cassino, hallowed throughout Christendom as the wellspring of
western monasticism. Eaker was opposed to the strike, though he
thought the monastery was being used by German troops, an
assumption which is still being debated. T h e reluctance of AAF
leaders to bomb cultural or historical monuments is sufficiently
documented in this history-witness the extreme care exercised in
hitting military targets at Rome; the tragedy in the case of Monte
Cassino is made more bitter by its futility as a military act. The
same was true at the town of Cassino which was literally razed by
U.S. bombers on 15 March in an effort to crack the*GustavLine. Here
Eaker was flatly against a tactic which he thought more likely to
impede, by craters and rubble, than to help the advance of armor;
when ground forces moved in too slowly to take advantage of the
momentary shock the heavy pounding gave German defenders, the
vii
THE A R M Y AIR FORCES IN W O R L D WAR I1
operation failed as he had predicted. Criticisms of air power
that came afterward were not always fair, since the attack was
clearly a misuse of a weapon; unfortunately the lesson was not
wholly absorbed and similar errors were to be repeated later. With
the coming of spring, air operations increased in intensity as MAAF
inaugurated STRANGLE, an appropriately labeled operation designed
to choke off the enemys communications so that his Gustav Line
might be forced when he had consumed reserve supplies at the front.
After much debate over rival suggestions-whether to concentrate on
bridges or on marshalling yards-the issue was settled by a
latitudinarian compromise which listed for simultaneous attack all
features of the railroad system: bridges, yards, tunnels, tracks,
rolling stock, and shops, and coastal shipping as well. Launched
officially on 19 March, STRANGLE enjoyed an early success which
grew more marked as bombers and fighter-bombers increased the
accuracy of their strikes. Severely hampered in their use of
railroads, the Germans came to depend more heavily upon M / T but
as trucks were diverted to the long north-south haul the number
available for lateral distribution shrank. Thus when a heavy ground
offensive (DIADEM, jumped off 1 2 May) forced the Germans to expend
more supplies at the front the carefully hoarded reserves were
quickly depleted and the Allies cracked the line, linking up with
the Anzio beachhead which at last began to pay dividends. Tactical
air forces rendered close support in the assault but it was their
sustained interdiction program that turned the trick. By 4 June the
Allies had reached Rome and thereafter the German retreat became a
rout which seemed to presage an early German collapse in Italy. In
the air especially the Allies enjoyed an overwhelming superiority;
the Germans came to depend more upon heavily reinforced AA forces
than upon fighter defense, until MAAF claims of enemy planes
destroyed were often less than Allied losses. An even stronger
defense for the enemy was the weather which worsened at the end of
June; by August the Germans had dug in again along the Gothic Line.
An Allied attempt to sever all communications in the Po Valley
(MALLORY MAJOR) achieved a considerable success but it was
impossible to choke off supplies in the broad Lombard plain as it
had been in the narrow peninsula and the enemy held tenaciously to
his new line. T h e Allied cause in Italy was weakened by the
diversion of air and ground forces for the invasion of southern
France (DRAGOON).Vlll
...
FOREWORD
This assault, long a matter of contention among the Americans,
the British, and the Russians, was postponed until August but moved
thereafter rapidly enough. It offered little that was novel to
combined forces who had gone over half-a-dozen beaches in the M T O
and in size it was dwarfed by the recent OVERLORD landings. There
had been the familiar pattern of preparation: strikes at
communications by which enemy reinforcements might move in; attacks
on German air installation? (only light blows were required here);
and bombing of coastal defenses. Planes based in Italy and Corsica
participated in these pre-invasion activities and in providing
cover for the landings. Several successful airborne operations gave
clear indication of how much had been learned since the tragic
attempts in Sicily. XI1 TAC stayed with the Seventh Army, helped
chase the Germans up the Rhone Valley and beyond until b y early
September they pulled up just short of Belfort. In Italy, as in
northwestern Europe, Allied hopes of an early victory continued
strong well into September as the Fifth Army crossed the Arno and
broke through segments of the Gothic Line and the Eighth Army took
Rimini. MAAFs tasks were to sever escape routes, particularly at
the Po, and to help ground forces thrust the enemy back on those
closed exits. But the armies, weakened by transfers and tired by
long battles, could not breach the stubborn German defense and in
October it was no longer a question of cutting the enemys lines of
retreat; the interdiction program continued but priorities now
favored more northerly lines in an effort to cut off supplies
coming from north of the Alps via the Brenner and other northeast
passes while fighterbombers attempted to destroy supply dumps in
the forward area. Allied operations had been handicapped by much
wet weather which slowed the ground advance and which held back the
bombers often enough to allow the Germans to repair bridges and
rail lines. Allied air forces, weakened by diversions in favor of
DRAGOON, suffered further losses as additional bomber and
fighter-bomber units were sent to France and to the Pacific.
Indeed, Throughout autumn and winter there was much sentiment in
favor of moving all AAF forces in Italy up into France, and the
Fifth Army as well. Though this drastic step was never taken, the
very threat, coupled with the piecemeal cannibalization of Twelfth
Air Force, brought to the several MTO headquarters an air of
uncertainty which lasted until the eve of victory. Internal changes
in the command structure-the estabix
THE A R M Y AIR FORCES IN WORLD W A R I1
lishment of XXII T A C on I 9 October and the wholesale
reshuffling of commanders when Eaker went back to the States in
March 1945seem to have had less effect on operations than transfers
of combat and service units. At any rate, the Italian campaign
became to Allied soldiers the forgotten war. Air preparations for a
winter attack on the German lines proved abortive when a
counterattack launched by Kesselring on 26 December induced M T O
Headquarters to cancel the planned drive. Thereafter the Allies
went on the defensive and for three months there was little ground
activity. This threw upon air the main burden of the theater
directive to maintain constant pressure upon the enemy, and the 280
combat squadrons of MAAF became by far the most potent Allied
weapon in the Mediterranean. Except for a brief period in November
when Fascist Italian air units trained in Germany gave a futile
challenge, MAAF was untroubled by enemy air opposition; the general
practice of sending out medium bombers without escort was a
taunting symbol of the impotence of the GAF. T h e long-anticipated
withdrawal of German divisions toward the Reich began on 2 3
January and thereafter MATAF (supported occasionally by SAF)
intensified efforts to interdict the routes toward the Alpine
passes. Other communications were cut and when the final Allied
offensive jumped off in April, XXII T A C and DAF greatly aided the
breakthrough by a tremendous effort against German positions. So
thoroughly had communications been disrupted, especially at the Po,
that there was no chance of an orderly retreat to a new line and
the total surrender came on z May, just a year after the beginning
of the punch through the Gustav Line. T h e Fifteenth had meanwhile
been engaged in strategic operations (which will be described
presently) and, with the Balkan Air Force, in supporting the
Russian advance which drove the Axis powers from Rumania, Bulgaria,
Greece, Yugoslavia, and part of Hungary. Bombing airdromes, supply
centers, and rail targets, MAAF forces encoutitered the usual
difficulties in cooperating with an ally who would not allow any
real system of liaison to be established or any rationally
determined bomb line. The subtitle of the present volume suggests
that it begins with January 1944. Actually the narrative reviews
briefly the strategic air operations of the last two months of
1943. The Eighth Air Force had begun its attack against the German
war machine on 17 August 1942.X
FOREW 0liD
Dedicated to the principle of high-altitude daylight precision
bombardment the Eighth had with difficulty resisted outside
pressure to change its tactics, and diversion of forces to North
Africa and of effort to unprofitable attacks on U-boat pens had
interfered with its primary mission. The Casablanca Directive of z
I January I 943 had insured the continuation of strategic
bombardment in the Combined Bomber Offensive and with growing
forces the Eighth had increased the weight and effectiveness of its
attacks during spring and summer 1943. In spite of the fine
defensive qualities shown by B- I 7s and B-24,S flying in large
formations, the G A F had on occasion taken heavy toll of the U.S.
bombers and as German fighter strength in the west increased it had
become apparent that an all-out attack on Nazi air power would be a
necessary preliminary to any successful strategic bombardment
campaign and to the great invasion of Europe planned for the spring
of 1944.During the autumn of 1943 weather prevented any such attack
and, as the opening chapter shows, the Eighth turned instead to an
experiment with radar bombing. Hopes based on initial success were
not borne out by later missions; here as in most cases involving
use of intricate instruments the majority of crews never succeeded
in getting maximum results from their equipment. The only
justification was the assumption that blind bombing was better than
no bombing and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the numbers
racket-pressure from Washington to get more planes over Europewas
responsible for some wasted effort. A more fruitful experiment of
the period was concerned with the development of long-range fighter
escorts. The failure to produce such a plane had been one of the
AAFs most serious mistakes and now under pressure of necessity
engineers in the ETO and the United States combined to improve and
enlarge auxiliary tanks which gave seven-league boots to
conventional fighters -the P-38, P-47, and especially the P-5 I . T
o Goerings discomfiture these fighters eventually went to Berlin
and beyond and mixed it with German interceptors on better than
even terms, but it was months before there were enough of them to
provide adequate protection. By the beginning of 1944 the Eighth
Air Force in England and the Fifteenth in Italy were approaching
planned strength. An inter-theater headquarters, Gen. Carl Spaatzs
U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, enhanced the flexibility
inherent in the widely based heavy bombers with their threat of
coordinated blows. In November 1943 Eighth Air
xi
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I1
Force had drafted a plan (ARGUMENT) for a series of closely
spaced attacks against about a dozen factories producing fighter
components or fighters-Me- I 09s and - I I os, Ju-88s and - I 88s,
and FW-190s. The program would need a succession of half-a-dozen
clear days and at last, on 19 February, such a period was
predicted. USSTAF laid on the first missions next day and in less
than a week had dispatched more than 3,300 sorties from the Eighth,
500 from the Fifteenth. Bombing varied from excellent to fair but
the over-all results were certainly great and perhaps decisive. It
is difficult even now to judge exactly how big was the Big Week.
German fighter production was to increase rather than decrease
during 1944 but the significant point is that production did not
keep up with the planned schedule and for that failure the Big Week
and subsequent bomber attacks were largely responsible. In last
analysis the pragmatic test is perhaps the best: never after
February was the Lufnvaffe to be the menace it had been; though it
would inflict heavy losses at times Goerings force had lost control
of the skies over Europe. In this victory over the GAF other
factors besides the bombing of aircraft plants must be considered:
attacks on airfields and losses inflicted in battle. Here tactical
air forces and the heavies little brothers, the fighter escorts,
played their part, as did the RAF. T h e Big Week cost USSTAF 226
heavy bombers and 2 8 fighters destroyed but the Luftwaffe suffered
even more heavily and was to continue to suffer whenever
challenging a well-escorted bomber formation. ARGUMENT was
considered by the AAF as a prerequisite for the systematic
destruction of carefully determined segments of the Nazi war
economy, but the heavies were not allowed to turn immediately to
that program. T h e main weight of their efforts during the early
spring was expended on nonstrategic objectives in attacks against
V-weapon installations and in strikes preparatory to the invasion.
It had long been agreed that the strategic arm should be used in
support of the landings until the beachhead was secured and
thereafter as needed by the armies, and with this there was no
argument in USSTAF. But there was long debate over the best
possible use of the heavies, Spaatz favoring an all-out attack on
the oil industry but losing to those who preferred an extensive
campaign against communications. T h e subordination of strategic
forces to the invasion involved no command difficulties, however,
when in March Eisenhower as su-
xii
FOREWORD
preme commander took over USSTAF along with RAF Bomber Command
and Allied Expeditionary Air Forces. Spaatz and many of his senior
officers had served under Eisenhower in the Mediterranean and the
formal chain of command was strengthened by the great mutual
understanding and respect that existed between SHAEF and USSTAF.
Tactical demands on the heavies continued after D-day, with a
lasting responsibility for attacks on airdromes and for carpet
bombing for the ground forces; but late in June USSTAF was able to
devote more attention to strategic targets. T h e oil campaign had
begun earlier, in a small way: in April for the Fifteenth, in May
for the Eighth. Now to Spaatzs satisfaction this target system
assumed first priority as the Eighth joined the RAF in assaults on
synthetic plants in Germany. The Fifteenth continued to return to
Ploesti and to installations in Hungary, Austria, and eastern
Germany with such pertinacity that when the Russians overran
Rumania the Ploesti refineries were idle and ruined. The success of
the oil campaign could be gauged immediately by shortages of fuel
which were discernible in German operations and as well by the
desperate efforts made to minimize the effectiveness of the
attacks. Passive defenses were used extensively, and AA guns were
clustered around oil centers so heavily that for the Eighth Air
Force flak became a more dangerous weapon than the fighter, and
bomber formations were opened up to reduce losses from ground fire.
Fighters still offered rugged resistance on occasion and the
Fifteenth especially suffered from their interceptions so that it
was necessary to renew attacks on factories producing conventional
aircraft as well as jet planes, not yet in combat but a threat
greatly feared by Allied airmen. T h e forces sent out during the
summer were huge and the tempo of operations fast. The telling pace
created problems of morale among overworked aircrews; there were
charges that some crews deliberately sought refuge in neutral
countries-Switzerland and Sweden-but careful investigation showed
these charges groundless. T h e summer of 1944 witnessed an
experiment in cooperation with the Russians that was more
enlightening than fruitful, an effort to utilize airdromes in
Soviet-held territory as alternate bases for heavies from England
or Italy. T h e concept of shuttle bombing, well liked by the AAF,
was in this case particularly attractive to Arnold and other air
commanders who hoped thus to lay under heavy attack
industrialxIl1
...
THE A R M Y AIR FORCES IN WORLD W A R I1
plants in eastern Germany, to foster closer relations with the
Soviets, and to impress them with the importance of strategic
bombardment so that they might furnish bases in Siberia for B-29
attacks against Japan. Stalin gave full verbal consent to the
project but subordinate officials moved slowly and it taxed
American patience to prepare three airfields for heavy bomber use.
A number of missions were staged from these fields, some with fair
success but none of great significance. Certainly none was as
brilliant an operation as the German night attack on the airdrome
at Poltava which caught the B-17s on the ground, destroying
forty-three and damaging twenty-six. Russian interest, never very
warm, cooled perceptibly. The Soviet command limited unreasonably
(or so the AAF thought) the choice of targets and the venture
fizzled out in an argument over whether heavies from the Russia
bases should be allowed to supply the forces of Gen.
B6r-Komorowski, beleaguered in Warsaw. Altogether the experiment
was of little importance tactically and early estimates that it had
fostered better relations between the two allies were overly
optimistic. Americans did learn something of the Russians genius
for obstruction and one may wonder if the code name for the
project, FRANTIC, was chosen with some foreknowledge of the frayed
nerves which would be characteristic of men imbued with Arnolds
hurry-up pace when faced with the Russian slowdown. Other relations
between the AAF and the Soviets, particularly in regard to U.S.
efforts to get agreement on a bomb line, were equally fhstrating.
In September control of the strategic forces reverted to the CCS,
not without opposition from Eisenhower and most of the air leaders,
who had suffered little in the way of interference from SHAEF.
Insofar as USSTAF was concerned, the change in command structure
made little practical difference; the U.S. heavies continued to
render support to the ground forces on occasion but were able to
devote an increasing share of their missions to strategic targets.
By the end of September hopes of an immediate invasion of the Reich
and of an early collapse of the Nazi government had faded; the
Allied armies had outrun their supply lines and as they regrouped
and set up a more stable logistical system it was the strategic air
forces alone which carried the war to the German homeland. With
unprecedented power available various plans were discussed for
concentrated attacks on German population areas that might crush
the will to resist. Usually Arnold, Spaan, and other top commanders
in the AAF opposed these plans asXiV
POREWORD
contrary to their doctrines of precision bombing; the record is
clear enough on their often-reiterated objection to terror or
morale bombing. Their concern with public opinion in America and in
Germany and with what history would say contrasts strikingly with
the nonchalance with which area bombing was introduced in Japan,
and it is interesting to speculate as to whether the practice in
the Pacific war was responsible for the change in policy for
Germany during the months just before V-E Day. The directive under
which USSTAF opened its autumn campaign put oil in first priority.
Heavy fighting during summer had depleted German fuel reserves and
the damage to refineries had brought production to a low ebb by
September; but Germany was making the most of its great
recuperative powers and throughout the autumn (especially in
November) the Eighth and Fifteenth and RAFs Bomber Command
continued to hammer steadily and heavily a t refineries with an
over-all success which was not fully appreciated at the time. In
second category came ordnance, armored vehicles, and motor
transport in an effort to blast those factories which would equip
the new peoples army. This target system was scratched as
unprofitable after a brief trial; post-war investigations suggest
that further attention to the munition plants might have paid big
dividends. As the armies prepared for a late autumn offensive the
heavies, along with the tactical air commands, were thrown against
the German railroad system, not without some misgivings on the part
of USSTAF, where it was feared that the system was too complex and
flexible to be destroyed. Efforts at the time could not cut off
shipments of military goods but they did minimize civilian traffic
and this was the begining of the internal collapse of the Nazi
economy. USSTAF during the autumn returned to attack aircraft
factories and, more often than was customary with heavies,
airfields. Some of this effort was against jet plants and fields,
but conventional singleengine fighters had again become a threat as
the Germans concentrated on production of Me-109s and FW-190s and
shifted more of their units from the eastern front to the Reich.
They had plenty of fighters (and Allied estimates were surprisingly
accurate) but had lost many of their skilled pilots. There was not
enough fuel for an adequate training program or for intercepting
each bomber formation but occasionally the Lufnvaffe would put up a
nasty fight. When the counterattack in the Ardennes came in
December strateXV
T H E A R M Y AIR FORCES IN WORLD W A R I1
gic forces were thrown into the battle. T h e ability of the
Nazis to mount so formidable an attack brought on a great deal of
soul-searching among air leaders and with them, as with ground
commanders, there was a swing from the overconfidence of early fall
to an unwarranted pessimism. Actually, the Ardennes offensive had
drained the Nazi machine dry and misgivings about the success of
the strategic bomber programs against oil, transportation, and
armaments were not justified by conditions in the Reich. A new
directive for the bomber campaign issued on 1 2 January listed oil,
railroads, tank factories, counter-air strikes, support of ground
forces, and yards producing new-type submarines in that order of
priority. Technically support of ground forces might take
precedence over other objectives and during January accounted for
three-fourths of USSTAF missions, but much of that effort was
expended against rail communications. In the west rail objectives
were more limited in area and more concentrated than in previous
efforts to knock out the whole German network. In the southeast the
Fifteenth aided the advance of Russian armies by striking
transportation centers in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria while
continuing its homework for the Allies in Italy. As in the oil
campaign, this air force, overshadowed in publicity by the older
and larger Eighth, conducted its missions with skill and
persistence. England-based bombers also aided the Russian armies by
a series of great strikes against German cities where rail yards
were gorged with trains carrying troops to the front and evacuating
refugees from the east. Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, and other cities
were hit by mighty formations in attacks which, especially in the
case of Dresden, drew the sort of criticism which the AAF had long
feared. By this time, however, USSTAF even experimented briefly
with the idea of sending out radar-controlled war-weary B- I 7s
filled with explosives. With 80 per cent of the very heavy bomb
tonnage in February dropped by radar, precision bombing was no
longer the shibboleth it had once been and the accidental bombing
of Schaffhausen in Switzerland was a symbol of the fury of the air
war in the desperate effort to knock out Germany. T h e CLARION
operation of 2 2 February, in preparation for a great ground
offensive, was a moderately successful variation of the sort of
wide-ranging attack, advocated during the previous autumn, which
would bring the war home to towns and villages previously
undisturbed. In March, with the ground armies making progress on
all fronts,
xvi
FOREWORD
the heavies were able to return to strategic targets though they
participated in the successful attempt to isolate the Ruhr which
began on z I March. Strategic targets became less numerous as one
industrial organization after another was scratched from the list.
On 16 April, with few profitable targets left, the bomber offensive
was officially declared finished though several missions were
dispatched thereafter. For it there was no dramatic finish marked
by a surrender or an armistice but of its success the gutted shell
of German industry was a grim reminder. Meanwhile the advance of
the Allied armies from the English Channel to the Elbe had been
made possible by the operations of the tactical air forces,
operations of such magnitude and variety that in their context one
reads with some perplexity post-war charges that the AAF was
dominated wholly by its concept of strategic bombardment. Planning
for the OVERLORD invasion had been begun by a combined
Anglo-American team early in 1943 and had continued at an
accelerating pace in 194.4.. The detailed plan with its annexes is
a complex document of extraordinary interest-and in passing one may
hope that in time security regulations will permit the publication
in full of this or some similar plan for the edification of the
public; the science of war is to be seen in its most impressive
form in such an attempt to predict and organize requisite forces.
The command arrangement provided, as has been shown above, that
both strategic and tactical forces should come under Eisenhowers
control in advance of the invasion. Tactical forces, British and
American alike, were united under AEAF with Air Marshal
Leigh-Mallory in command. This headquarters was an unfortunate
exception to the rule of harmonious command relations in combined
Anglo-American organizations. A reviewer of an earlier volume
objected mildly to the tendency of our authors to go into detail in
discussing command relations and the personalities which made for
their success or failure. Here one may suggest, without belaboring
the point, that the personality of Leigh-Mallory and the reaction
of American airmen to his control of their combat units were
factors of more than passing interest. It had been planned
originally that AAF tactical units would operate as part of an
expanded Eighth Air Force, but the final decision was to establish
a separate tactical force. Its numerical designation, its commander
(Brereton), and the nucleus of its staff were taken from
xvii
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S IN W O R L D W A K I 1
the old Ninth Air Force of the desert war. A few medium bomber
groups were drawn from VIII Air Support Command but almost all of
its combat units came fresh from the States during the months
immediately preceding OVERLORD, a fact which determined in large
measure the nature of its extensive training program and of its
early operations. The Ninths internal structure, highly complex,
was arranged along functional lines with an emphasis on flexibility
and mobility. Its numerous combat units were to be grouped into the
tactical air commands (IX, XIX, XXIX TACs), each of which was to be
attached to an army on the continent, but with the understanding
that units would be shifted from one to the other as needed.
Pre-invasion operations consisted of attacks on coastal defenses,
against airdromes, against communications, and against V-weapon
sites. So thorough were these preparations and so skilful was the
planning that D-day, for all its tremendous air effort, went off
with relative smoothness. An airborne operation of unprecedented
magnitude preceded the touchdown of seaborne troops and, with
losses that were heavy enough but well under expectations,
contributed notably to the success of the landings. Fighters
assigned to cover the amphibious assault found little to do, for
the Lufnvaffe made no serious effort to attack the wars greatest
invasion fleet. This lethargy on the part of the GAF was in itself
proof of the success of attacks on aircraft factories, airdromes,
and on planes in flight and it justified the great resources thrown
into the air war. The one air operation on D-day that proved
unsuccessful was the bombardment of defense positions on OMAHA
beach by Eighth Air Force heavies, an attack laid on at the
insistence of ground commanders and against the better judgment of
AAF leaders. In the struggle to consolidate the beachhead and
secure the whole of the Cotentin, Ninth Air Force furnished close
support first with planes flying out of England, then by the
roulement method froin hastily prepared strips near the front, and
finally from bases set up in Normandy as unit after unit moved
across the Channel. At the instigation of the ground commanders,
the AAF put on a big show calculated to facilitate the capture of
the key port of Cherbourg. The hastily conceived operation was not
a model of planning or of air-ground cooperation and though it
eased somewhat the capture of Cherbourg the attack, like most of
the saturation bombings of strongly defended enemy positions, was
only moderately successful. Airs most impor-
xviii
F 0R E W 0R 1 1
tant contribution was the isolation of the battlefield and here,
following accepted doctrines, the AAF was spectacularly successful.
Mediums and fighter-bombers cut every rail bridge over the Seine
between Paris and Rouen and, when deception was no longer
paramount, they scored heavily on crossings over the Loire;
marshalling yards and rail lines in a wide area were smashed. The
difficulty of moving up German reinforcements and the decisive
effect the delays had on the battle for Normandy were attested by
practically every enemy general interviewed after the war. To aid
in the breakout from the Cotentin the air forces put on COBRA, a
stupendous carpet-bombing attack. Again the gains scored, though
not negligible, hardly justified the effort expended and the day
was saddened by heavy casualties among friendly troops through
errors in bombing. Far more significant in the long run was the
development of a most intimate type of air-ground cooperation in
the airplane-tank team. Involving a generous exchange of liaison
officers between the two arms and efficient VHF communication
between fighter-bombers and tanks, the system gave to armor a new
mobility which was in large part responsible for Pattons breakout
and rapid careen across France. Meanwhile the interdiction program
continued, but with a new set of targets chosen with a view toward
a more open type of warfare. While Allied armies pushed ahead
steadily, bombers continued to slug at harbor defenses, rarely with
unequivocal success. Heavily built fortresses, some of ancient
vintage, absorbed all that the heavies and fighter-bombers could
throw at them and the grim tenacity of the garrisons paid off
abundantly by depriving the Allies of harbors badly needed to
nourish the battle for France. The success of the German holding
action here (like that of the Japanese in some of their cavepitted
Pacific islands) was in flat contradiction to much stuff that has
been written decrying the Maginot complex; heavy fortifications may
win no war but ruggedly defended they were of great strategic value
against the most formidable air and artillery weapons. By
mid-September France had been liberated, most of Belgium and
Luxembourg, and part of Holland. Momentary hopes for a rapid push
into the Reich began to fade as the armies ground to a halt for
lack of supplies. The stormy weather of June that had curtailed the
use of artificial harbors, the failure to seize or to seize intact
the regular ports, damage done to the French transportation system,
and the very rapidity of the advance once the Allies had shaken
their columns out ofXiX
T H E A R M Y A I R FORCES IN W O R L D W A R I1
Normandy-these factors played hob with logistical phasing and it
was necessary to pause until an adequate supply system could be
built up. Air had helped defer that pause by hauling fuel and other
supplies to columns racing across France. Heavy bombers as well as
transports had turned to this emergency trucking business for which
small provision had been made. More might have been done had there
been preliminary planning and had it not been necessary to hold
troop carrier units on stand-by alert against expected calls for
airborne operations; but since it is useful to know the limitations
as well as the potentialities of air power, it should be pointed
out here that with available equipment ground operations on the
scale of the Battle of France could not have been supported by air
transport alone. While ground and air forces were regrouping at the
threshold of Germany, the long debate over future strategy was
decided against the advocates of a single drive into the Reich and
in favor of the twopronged attack, north of the Ardennes and in the
southeast, but with pressure along the whole front and with the
heaviest support going to Montgomerys z I Army Group at the extreme
left of the Allied lines. That decision had been determined in
advance by terrain, proximity to Englands airfields, the need to
get Antwerp or Rotterdam as a port of entry, and the desire to
overrun V-weapon sites within range of England. As an opening round
in the battle to break into the north German plain the Allies began
Operation MARKET-GARDEN on I 7 September. T h e immediate objective
was the territory between Arnhem and the Zuider Zee, possession of
which would allow the British Second Army to cross the Ijssel and
flank the Siegfried Line. The airborne phase was the largest yet
executed, with the whole of Breretons First Allied Airborne Army
being dropped or landed in the Eindhoven-Amhem-Nijmegen area during
a period of three days. Although the long-drawn-out landing
operation was executed by day, losses were slight; fighters from
Eighth Air Force and ADGB completely throttled the Lufnvaffe and
heavy attacks on AA positions by RAF Bomber Command helped keep
down losses from flak. Weather, originally favorable, delayed air
landings subsequent to D-day and the resupply of troops and
although the airborne units seized a number of key water
crossings-their most important objectives-the ground troops were
slow in effecting a junction with them. German defense proved more
stubborn than had been expected and the Allies had to
xx
FOREWORD
withdraw from some of their positions, while holding a few
important bridgeheads. With this failure to get across the Rhine in
September the Allied armies lost all chance of ending the war
before the Germans could rally from the disastrous effects of the
summer campaigns. Though some hope of an early victory persisted,
it required several weeks to clear the water approaches to Antwerp;
and progress on other fronts served chiefly to bring American
armies into position for an all-out Allied offensive scheduled for
December. That month saw instead Hitlers last desperate bid in the
Ardennes. T h e Fuehrers plan and his aims, as fully as they can be
reconstructed, are well enough known to most readers of military
history. Familiar too is the general attitude of overconfidence
among the Allies that made it possible for von Rundstedt to score
one of the wars most important surprises. In retrospect it is
difficult to understand why the Allies were so completely fooled.
There was available much incidental intelligence, some from ground
reconnaissance, more from air. Bad weather between I 7 November and
I 6 December helped cloak the extensive preparations of the Nazis
but the frequent sorties of tac/recce groups and visual sightings
by fighter-bombers on armed reconnaissance brought in countless
bits of detailed information on troop movements, build-up of
supplies, and, an especially grim portent, of concentrations of
ambulances and hospital trains. Air passed this raw material of
intelligence along and its interpretation (save in the case of
information on the GAF) was the ultimate responsibility of G-2. Air
intelligence was not blameless, however. Here, as in the Kiska
fiasco of August 1943, the &4F was at fault in not stressing
more incisively the significance of the data provided by its planes
and the failure suggests that there was a shadowy twilight zone
between air and ground headquarters which proved disastrous. Even
after the breakthrough it was difficult to pin down
responsibilities. Arnold, ever sensitive to criticism of the AAF,
attempted to get a critique from Spaatz but the latters reply was
noncommittal, perhaps in loyalty to Eisenhower since the major
fault could not be blamed on USSTAF. During the initial
breakthrough and the fluid battle which followed, weather was a
staunch ally of the Germans. Only the stubborn resistance of ground
units blunted the enemys drive and held him to * See Vol. W ,
391-92.
xxi
T H E ARhlY AIR FORCES IN WORLD W A R I1
gains which though substantial were less than anticipated; the
time thus gained allowed Eisenhower to rearrange his commands and
to develop a strategy for containing, then pushing back, the German
armies. T h e GAF, momentarily resurgent, came to the support of
its own troops in greater strength than it had shown in months. In
the Allied counter-air strikes which followed the versatile
fighter-bomber again proved its worth and night fighters worked
overtime. Here, as was so often true in the Pacific, the A M showed
a quantitative weakness in the latter category, perhaps to be
accounted for by dominant offensive doctrines and preference for
daylight operations. Within a few days the G A F had shot its bolt
and as von Rundstedts armies approached the Meuse the weather
turned. Five wonderfully clear days (23-27 December) followed
during which Allied planes of every type hammered incessantly at
enemy airdromes and at communications a t the front and the rear.
Before the clouds shut in again this interdiction program had
already hurt the mobility of the German columns. Air had also
rendered close support over difficult terrain, had flown numerous
armed recces, and had dropped supplies to the beleaguered forces at
Bastogne. By the end of the year the Germans had given up the idea
of reaching the Meuse; the surprise attack delivered by the
Luftwaffe against Allied airdromes on New Years Day was a futile
gesture by a defeated air force. During January, as the Allies
slowly pinched off the Ardennes salient, weather was generally bad
with a dozen days in which not even fighter-bombers could get up.
On flyable days, however, Allied air put tremendous forces over the
battle and the eastern approaches thereto with notable effect. With
the enemy in full retreat planes took over a function not unlike
that of cavalry in earlier wars, harrying the withdrawing columns
by hitting bridges, road junctions, road blocks, and fortified
positions, and beating up traffic congestions. Von Rundstedts
opinion accorded to air a highly significant share in his defeat.
By mid-January, with the Bulge no longer a menace, SHAEF was
planning its own offensive with Devers and Bradley erasing German
holdings west of the Rhine and Montgomery making the big push
across the north German plain. Air operations in each sector
followed the by now familiar pattern of interdiction and close
support, but on a scale never equaled in war before. Beginning with
the lucky seizure of the bridge a t Remagen on 7 March, the Allies
crossed the Rhine ssii
a
FOREWORD
in a number of places with aid of a huge lift of the First
Allied Airborne Army near Wesel (VARSITY) that showed great
improvement over the September jump at Arnhem. Thereafter the drive
across Germany went a t a fast clip which at times outran the
short-ranged tactical planes whose bases could not be moved up in
time to permit fighter-bombers to spearhead the attack. The
Luftwaffe too suffered for want of bases as the ground armies swept
over their ruined fields, and though there was an occasional flurry
of activity by German fighters their efforts were feeble enough. As
the armies moved into assigned positions to await junction with the
Russians the tactical forces turned for a while against munitions
factories that might arm a new peoples army and to the task of
isolating the so-called National Redoubt in Bavaria. But the real
tactical job had been done, and with distinction, when the armies
reached the Elbe. Four scattered chapters in the volume deal with
miscellaneous activities which for want of a better designation
have been called supporting operations. One deals with logistical
support of the Ninth Air Force before and after D-day. Machinery
for support of U.S. strategic air forces had been in operation in
England since 1942 and in Italy had been developed for the
Fifteenth in the winter of 1943-44. Because those air forces
continued to fly from semipermanent installations their stepped-up
operations of I 944-45 required little more than an extension and
improvement of existing facilities. For the Ninth, however, a new
type of warfare opened with the OVERLORD invasion, a war of
movement with shifts more rapid, if of less distance, than those in
the Pacific; if terrain and transportation were more favorable for
the constant shift from airfield to airfield than in the Pacific,
the formidable size of the Ninth Air Force created special
problems. It has become the fashion of late years for the civilian
historian to pay tribute to the importance of logistics, perhaps a
t times, in healthy reaction against the blood-and-trumpet writers
of an earlier day, to the neglect of the combat operations for
which supply systems are created. The editors, not wholly
unpartisan readers, have felt that this chapter has achieved a nice
balance with the combat narrative in describing the move to the
continent and the successive advances from OMAHA and U T A H
beaches to the borders of the Reich and on to the Elbe. T h e story
includes the work of the aviation engineers who built the airfields
and other installations, and the arrangements for supply and
maintenance of the huge tactical forces. These activities, if
xxiii
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR I1
less than perfect in every detail, showed boldness in design,
skill in execution, and something of the American genius for
large-scale organization. On a smaller scale and along lines less
familiar to the AAF were operations in support of underground
resistance forces on the continent. These activities were shrouded
in an aura of mystery which heightens their drama but which tended
to minimize during the war recognition due those crews who flew the
difficult and hazardous missions. In these operations the A M acted
only as a common carrier, delivering parcels and passengers a t the
behest of Special Force Headquarters, a coordinating agency of
which the U.S. members were drawn from OSS. The earliest task of
this sort (and a continuing one) was the dropping of propaganda
leaflets. Originally performed by tactical units as an additional
duty, the job of nickeling was taken over by special squadrons on a
separate basis, with equipment and tactics peculiarly adapted to
their mission and with an argot of their own that enriched the
English language with a number of apt expressions. Even after the
establishment of these squadrons tactical units were levied upon
for large operations, as in the case of the 3d Bombardment Division
which spent much of the summer of 1944 in special operations. These
included dropping or landing supplies for resistance forces,
infiltrating agents, and evacuating agents, Partisans, casualties,
American airmen, and occasionally noncombatants. As France was
liberated the foci of carpetbagger activities in western Europe
shifted north, to the Low Countries, Denmark, Norway, Poland, and
even Germany. In Italy the Partisans were less well organized than
in France and operations in the peninsula were not on a large scale
until autumn of 1944, though a fantastic murder case recently made
public has indicated something of the importance of the supplies
dropped in the battle for northern Italy. In the Balkans operations
were fairly heavy and relatively very significant in encouraging
resistance movements in Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia. Aid to
Titos forces was particularly important; it included as well as the
usual operations three mass evacuations. That of June 1944, done at
Titos request, rescued him and his staff from an almost certain
threat of capture by the Germans. T h e story, in light of present
conditions, is not without its sardonic humor: the Americans did
most of the heavy work while the Russians carried Tito and his top
brass. But that was 1944, not 1951.WdV
FOREWORD
Nazi boasts of a secret weapon were common enough to become a
standard joke among the Allies. During 1944 the Germans did produce
such weapons, which with better luck might have saved them from
defeat. Allied airmen were justified in their apprehensions about
jet fighters, which but for Hitlers bad judgment might well have
won for the Germans control of the skies over Europe. In another
case the Fuehrers intuition helped the cause of the Allies, when he
delayed development of the guided missiles known usually as the V -
I and V-2. The former was a pilotless jet aircraft with an
explosive warhead, cheap to produce and within its limits an
efficient and effective weapon. The latter, a supersonic rocket of
frightening potentialities, was more difficult to perfect, and the
Germans lost valuable time through rivalries within the Nazi
hierarchy. British intelligence became acquainted, though
imperfectly, with the V-weapon threat in the spring of 1943 and by
autumn was thoroughly alarmed; because of a lack of complete
exchange of information with the Americans-a most unusual and
regrettable exception to the usual rule-the Allies were slow in
developing a policy for defensive measures. T h e only immediate
countermeasure seemed to consist of bombardment of V-weapon
installations, particularly those diagnosed as launching sites.
Various tactics were attempted with bombers of every type, but with
results which did not seem decisive. American airmen objected to
the diversion of heavy bombers from the strategic campaign for
CROSSBOW strikes with as much fervor and as little success as they
had in the case of the diversion to U-boat pens in 1942-43. In
extensive experiments at Eglin Field the AAF perfected a technique
of low-altitude attacks by fighter-bombers which seemed more
economical and more effective than that involving use of B-17s and
B-24s but this innovation was resisted by the British, particularly
by Leigh-Mallory, and was never given a fair trial. And so the
heavies and mediums bore the brunt of the bombing of V-weapon
sites; by sheer weight these attacks delayed the German program by
some several months, enough probably to explain the postponement of
the V-weapon attack until after the OVERLORD invasion. By D-day
many responsible leaders had come to the conclusion that the whole
threat was a hoax but on the night of I 2 1 I 3 June the first V-I
hit in England and the rate of attack was soon adjudged dangerous.
Even then the Anglo-American organization for defense was too loose
for efficient action. Under general control of the Air Ministry,
this staff held resolutely to an emphasis on bombing launching
sitesxxv
T H E A R M Y AIR FORCES I N W O R L D WAR I1
as opposed to bombing component factories, assembly lines,
supply
dumps, and transportation lines. CROSSBOW missions continued to
infringe upon other operations, rarely upon tactical but frequently
upon strategic. By the end of August the V-I threat had abated but
it was the capture of launching sites by ground forces rather than
bombing which put an end to the peril. The final phase was that of
the V-2, which in the early autumn was launched against targets in
England and on the continent, especially the strategic port of
Antwerp. In defense of Great Britain against this danger the AAF
took litkle part and again it was the advance of the armies which
wiped out the V-weapon menace. Air power had failed to eradicate
these unconventional air weapons but here again it was the airmen
who first understood the limitations of their arm; and Spaatz may
have been right in believing that given a free hand the AAF could
have made a better showing. In the final chapter, Mission
Accomplished, an attempt is made to evaluate the contributions of
the Army Air Forces toward the victory in Europe. This was not an
easy chapter to write, Records of our own air forces and of the G A
F provide ample data for the operational story and, thanks to the
indefatigable efforts of the United States Strategic Bombing
Survey, there is a wealth of materials on the German industry under
bombardment. T h e mute evidence of physical destruction is
impersonal enough but much of the written record and all of the
recorded interviews are colored by a personal or organizational
bias. For a series of events as complex as was the war against
Germany the historian, no matter how well informed and how
dispassionate, will find it difficult to establish universally
acceptable causal explanations and it is hardly likely that the
interpretation contained herein will satisfy every reader. T o the
editors, at any rate, the judgments offered seem fair and sober,
calling attention as they do to the mistakes of the AAF as well as
to its very substantial accomplishments. Overenthusiastic claims
advanced during the war are corrected but the author points out too
the errors of those who, by citing out of context isolated
statements from the USSBS, have used those authoritative critiques
to belittle the cause of air power. Briefly, the thesis put forth
in this volume is that air power did not win the war but that the
Allies could not have gained the victory at all without the air
ascendancy gained by the AAF and RAF and that the final victory was
won more rapidly and at less cost because Anglo-Auerican air
xxvi
FOREWORD
power was superior to the German in production, in strategy, in
coinbat, and in related services. In the face of that general
superiority individual errors in concept and failures in execution
lose their importance save as they inform those who plan for other
wars. Practical considerations of publication made it convenient to
bring out Volume I V of this series in advance of Volume 111. This
inversion of order has subjected the editors to some mild chaffing
about absentminded professors but since the fourth volume brought
the story of the AAFs war against Japan down to July 1944 it makes
possible some useful if preliminary comparisons between that
struggle and the air war in Europe. From 1941 most top strategists
in Washington believed that Germany was the most dangerous enemy
and Europe the most important theater and that hence the
preponderant effort should be made in that area until Hitler was
defeated. This thesis was sharply challenged by commanders in the
Pacific and by some in Washington but was upheld, save as naval
forces were concerned, until V-E Day. The long debate during World
W a r I1 is given fresh interest by current discussions of national
policy in which, under different circumstances, a similar problem
has emerged: how best to divide our not unlimited resources to
confront aggression in Europe and in the Far East. Perhaps the
differences outweigh the similarities in the situation as of 1941
and 195I but no thinking American can afford to neglect such
evidence as recent history affords. Throughout World War 1 , AAF
Headquarters strategists were 1 staunchly in favor of the
beat-Hitler-first thesis. Their appraisal of potential enemies and
their strategy for the air war were incorporated in AWPD/x, a plan
drawn up in September 1941.This remarkable document, classified as
secret but published in a competent abstract by the Washington
Times-Herald, the Chicago Tribufie, and other papers on 4 December
1941, can be found in the Congressional Record, Vol. 87, Pt. 14,
A5448-51. Read in connection with the present volume and especially
with the appraisal contained in Chapter 2 2 , AWPD/r takes on a new
significance. T h e strength and resourcefulness of Germanys armed
forces, the skill of her scientists and technicians, and the
resilience of her industry and transportation system-all these
appear graphically in the story of the air war and to the editors
seem to justify the most important decision of the war. One matter
of appraisal has involved much labor for the authors and some
embarrassment for the editors-that is, the question of just
xxvii
T H E A R M Y AIR F O R C E S I N W O R L D WAR I 1
how heavy were the losses inflicted upon German fighters by U.S.
planes, particularly heavy bombers. A more significant question is
whether the GAFs offensive and defensive power was broken by Allied
air forces and here an affirmative answer can be documented from
the early spring of 1944 on. T h e defeat of the Luftwaffe was the
work of the AAF and RAF and in terms of final results it matters
little whether, to paraphrase a favorite saying of Arnolds, the
German planes were destroyed in the factories, on the ground, or in
the skies. But current assessment of enemy losses was a most
important factor in operational planning during the war and for the
historian the effort to evaluate those assessments constitutes a
most interesting problem in source criticism. T h e Eighth Air
Force realized quite early that the claims by bomber crewmen of
German fighters destroyed were too high. Efforts were made to
tighten up on methods of reporting and evaluating claims and early
records were repeatedly scaled down-for whatever may have been
their attitude in regard to headlines for the public, operational
officers in the desperate struggle wanted facts, not bloated
claims. In spite of, or perhaps because of, these corrections
authors in this series have treated official scores with
reservation unless substantiated by other evidence. When Volume I1
was going to press a new file of German records turned up which
seemed to show AAF claims preposterously exaggerated, and with
consent of the authors involved the editors called attention to
this evidence and to results obtained when it was applied in a few
test cases chosen at random. Unfortunately some reviewers
emphasized this feature of the volume without noticing the
tentative nature of conclusions based on new but fragmentary
evidence. The editors were pleased that press notices critical of
the AAF, though they came during the B-36 controversy when
unfavorable publicity might have been mischievous, brought no
recrimination from the U.S. Air Forces. Subsequent research in
other enemy records in England and in Germany has modified sharply
the impression created by a hasty use of the one file available in
1949. No firm answer can be given to the question of fighter Iosses
on the basis of German files so far discovered-and in passing it is
interesting to note that the official records of the methodical
Germans are in respect to air force matters much less precise than
our own and in some cases are quite obviously padded. But the
historian who has done more research on
xxviii
FOREWORD
the problem than any other has calculated that the AAF shot down
perhaps half as many GAF fighters as were claimed, a not
unreasonable margin of error if one considers the conditions under
which the original observations were made. And so, with new
evidence available the editors have again accepted a new
interpretation and, they hope, a more lasting one. T h e tasks in
Volume I11 have been spread more widely than in Volumes I1 and IV.
T e n authors, whose current professional connections are indicated
in the Table of Contents, have contributed to this volume; of
these, three, Arthur B. Ferguson, Alfred Goldberg, and Albert F.
Simpson, are already known to readers of the series and it is
necessary only to introduce the newcomers, Joseph W. Angel1 served
during the war as historical officer of the AAF Proving Ground
Command and after the end of hostilities undertook at AAF
Headquarters a special study of V-weapon operations. John E. Fagg,
after service with the Far East Air Forces, turned his attention to
strategic operations in Europe as a member of the staff of the AAF
Historical Division. Robert T. Finney joined that staff after a
lengthy tour of duty with the AAF in MTO. Robert H. George became
historical officer of the Ninth Air Force shortly after its
establishment in ETO in the fall of 1943. During the war Martin R.
R. Goldman served on combat duty with a B-24 unit of the Eighth Air
Force. David G. Rempel represented the AAF Historical Division at
Air Staff, SHAEF. After service with the ground forces in MTO,
Harris Warren was assigned to study special air operations in the
AAF Historical Division. Col. Wilfred J. Paul, Director of the U.S.
Force Historical DiAir vision, and Dr. Albert F. Simpson, Air Force
Historian, again have given editors and authors alike every
assistance at their command. It is no mere formality to say that
without the intelligent understanding with which this assistance
has been rendered the completion of the volume would have been
impossible. Of Colonel Pauls capable staff Mrs. Wilhelmine Burch,
Sgt. James B. Donnelly, and Messrs. Ernest S. Gohn and Robert F.
Gleckner are due special acknowledgment for the many blunders they
have saved the editors through their careful review of both
manuscript and proof. For whatever they may have overlooked the
editors are happy to take full responsibility. T h e generous
spirit which has characterized other members of the Historical
Division has laid the editors under an obligation for so many and
such
mix
T H E A R M Y AIR FORCES I N WORLD W A R I1
varied services that it is possible only to list those to whom
the indebtedness is heaviest: Col. Garth C. Cobb, Col. Byron K.
Enyart, Lt. Col. Arthur J. Larsen, Lt. Col. Eldon W. Downs, Lt.
Col. Ernest B. Stevenson, Maj. Thad s. Strange, Capt. George H.
Satterfield, Capt. George H. Saylor, S/Sgt. John A. Hennessey,
S/Sgt. Marjorie 2. Nicodemus, ?'/Sgt. John C. Rayburn, Jr., Sgt.
Jerry L. Hawes, Sgt. Malcolm J. Gentgen, Mrs. Juliette A.
Hennessey, Miss Marguerite K. Kennedy, Dr. Edith C. Rodgers, Mr.
Frank Myers, Mrs. Lucille Sexton, Mrs. Lola Lowe, Miss Sara
Venable, Miss Ruth McKinnon, and Mr. David Schoein. Once more Mr.
John C. Nerney of the Air Historical Branch of the British Air
Ministry has responded to appeals for help in a spirit which
faithfully reflects the close parmership in which the RAF and the
AAF fought the war. With equal generosity and helpfulness Mr. L. A.
Jackets and other members of the same organization have lent to us
their special knowledge of pertinent records. No less friendly has
been the response to requests for aid by numerous AAF officers who
during the war bore a heavy responsibility for the operations here
recorded. Their names appear repeatedly in the footnotes, and it is
hoped that these citations may serve as sufficient acknowledgment
by authors and editors of a heavy debt. If any one of them should
be singled out for special mention, it is Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker,
now retired, whose consistent support of historical officers under
his command was supplemented by a decision at the close of the war
to turn over to the Historical Division his own personal files. The
editors like to think, not without reason, that his action
represents the willingness of air officers to stand on the
record.
WESLEY FRANK CRAVEN JAMES LEA CATECHICA~~O, ILL~NO~S I z October
195I
xxx
CONTENTS
*
*
*
* * * * * * * *
I. FROM POINTBLANK T O OVERLORDARTHUR FERGUSON, University B.
Duke JOHN E. FAGG, e w York University N JOSEPH W. ANGELL, Pomona
College ALFRED GOI~DBERG. Historical Division USAFI.
WINTERBOMBING . .BIGWEEK .. . .
.
3
ARTHUR FERGUSON R.2.
30
ARTHUR FERGUSON B.
3 . PLAN FOR OVERLORD JOHN E. FAGC.
67
4. CROSSBOWJOSEPH
84I 07
W. ANGELL
5. THE NINTH FORCE AIRALFRED GOLDBERG
6. PRE-INVASION OPERATIONSJOHN
I38
E. FACC
11. INVASION OF WESTERN EUROPEROBERT GEORGE, H. Brown University
JOHN E. FAGG, e w York University N
7. NORMANDY . .ROBERT GEORGE H.
.
18j
8. THE BATTLE FRANCE OF ROBERT GEORGE H.
,
228
xxxi
THE A R M Y AIR FORCES IN W O R L D W A R I1
9.
THE STRATEGIC BOMBER STRIKES AHEAD .JOHN
.
.
.
.
.
z7 8
E. FAGG
111. ITALYALBERT SIMPSON, F. USAF Historical Division ROBERT
FINNEY, T. USAF Historical Division10.
ANZIO ROME
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
'
325
ALBERT SIMPSON F.I I.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
37'408
ALBERT SIMPSON F.I 2.
INVASION SOUTHERN OF FRANCEALBERT SIMPSON F.
I 3.
BATTLE NORTHERN OF ITALYROBERT FINNEY T. ALBERT SIMPSON F.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
'
439
IV. SUPPORTING OPERATIONSHARRIS WARREN, University of
Mississippi JOSEPH W. ANGELL, Pomona College ALFRED GOLDBERG,
Historical Division USAF
14. AIRSUPPORT FOR
THE
UNDERGROUND
49 3
HARRIS WARRENI
5. CROSSBOW-SECOND PHASEJOSEPH
525
W. ANGELL. . . . . . . .
I 6.
LOGISTICAL MOBILITYALFRED GOLDBERG
547
V. THE GERMAN FRONTIER DAVID REMPEL, Mateo Junior College G.
SanJOHN
E. FAGG, e w York University N
xxxii
CONTENTSI
7 . CHECK AT
THE
RHINE
595636672
DAVID REMPEL G.I 8.
AUTUMN ASSAULT GERMANY ONJOHN
E. FAGCTHE
19.
BATTLE OF
BULGE
DAVID REMPEL G.
VI. GERMANYJOHN E. FACC, e w York University N DAVID REMPEL,
Mateo Junior College G. Sun MARTIN R. GOLDMAN, R. USAF Historical
Division
20.
THE CLIMAX STRATEGIC OF OPERATIONSJOHN
7'5756
E. FAGG.
2 I.
FROM RHINE THE ELBE THE TO .DAVID REMPEL G. MARTIN R. GOLDMAN
R.
.
.
.
.
.
,
'
2 2.
MISSION ACCOMPLISHEDJOHN
783..
E. FACC, ,
NOTES .
,
.
.
..
..
.
811
GLOSSARYINDEX
9'3 9'7
.
.
.
xxxiii
L I S T OF M A P S A N D C H A R T S* * * * * * * * * I *
MAINOBJECTIVES BIGWEEK OF OPERATIONS
34 94111120
THE CROSSBOW NETWORK, JANUARY 1944 ORGANIZATION O F THE N I N T
H AIR FORCE,JUNE I944 6 TACTICAL DrsPosrnoN NINTH FORCE, AIR 6 JUNE
I 944AIRBORNE OPERATION NEPTUNE, 5-6JUNE
1944
87
D-DAYAIR DISPOSITIONS PRIXCIPAL AND TARGETS ASSIGNED IN THE
ASSAULT AREA
THE BATTLE AREA, JUNE-SEPTEMBER I944 INTERDICTION, MAY-AUGUST944
IPRINCIPAL OIL
TARGETS BY THE STRATEGIC AIR FORCES BOMBED. . . . ..
TWELFTHFORCE, JANUARY 1944 AIR 29AI.LIED STRATEGY IN ITALY,
JANUARY
. .
. .
3 34338
1944.
.
THE ANZIO LANDING THE INITIAL EXPANSION OF THE BEACHANDHEAD.
.
.
.
,
,
,
.
.
.
.
.
. .
. .
347375
CENTRAL ITALY PRINCIPAL
RAIL LINES ROADS. AND.
FIFTEENTH FORCE, JUNE 1944 . AIR 15
398422
PRINCIPAL LINES, RAIL SOUTHERN FRANCE TWELFTH FORCE,I AUGUST AIR
3 1944 PRINCIPAL LINES, ~ H E R N RAIL NOR ITALY MAAF, I NOVEMBER
1944 BALKAN AREA SERVED AAF SPECIAL BY OPERATIONS STATUS U.S.
AIRFIELDS WESTERN OF IN EUROPE, 8 MAYI 94j HEADQUARTERS FORCE IX
AIR SERVICE COMMANDxxxv
44445 7
465508j
64
576
T H E A R h l Y AIK FORCES I N W O R L D W A R I1
NAVIGATION FOR OPERATION MARKET DIAGRAMOPERATIONS IN
OPEIu-rIoN
.
.
.
.
HOLLASW, SEPTEMBER-3 I7. . ..
DECEMBER. . .
I944. . .
MADISON,
.
SIXTH ARMY GROUP OPERATIONS, 5 NOVEMBER-I 6 DECEMBER1944,
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
RAILWAYS GERMANY IX BOMBED ALLIED FORCES . BY AIR