CASE # 1G.R. No. L-7859February 12, 1913VICTRIA SEANE,
a!"#$#%&ra&r#' o( T)e I$&e%&a&e E%&a&e
o( E!uar!o Far*a%, plaintif-appellee, vs.CATALINA FRANC,
a!"#$#%&ra&r#' o( T)e I$&e%&a&e E%&a&e
o( +a$ue, Fra$-o, defendant-appellant.Ramon Salinas, for
appellant.Gibbs, McDonough and Blanco, for appellee.+RELAN.,
J.:This is an appealfroma judgment of the Court of First Instance
ofZamboanga in favor of the plaintif, holding that the right of
actionupon the mortgage debt hich as the basis of the claim
presentedagainst the plaintif!s estate had prescribed.The mortgage
in "uestion as e#ecuted on the $%th of &ctober, $''(,to secure
thepa)ment of the sumof *(,'+,.-$, themortgagoragreeing to pa) the
sum .little b) little.. The claim appears to havebeen presented to
the plaintif!s intestate on the 'th of /ugust, $0$$.1othing has
been paid either of principal or of interest.2eareof theopinionthat
thiscasefallsithintheprovisionsofarticle $$3' of the Civil Code,
hich reads as follos:$$3'. 2hen the obligation does not 4# a term,
but it can beinferred from itsnatureandcircumstancethatthere
asanintention of granting it to the debtor, the courts shall 4#
theduration of such a term.The courts shallalso 4# the duration of
a term hen it ma)have been left at the ill of the debtor.The
obligation in "uestion seems to leave the duration of the periodfor
the pa)ment thereof to the ill of the debtor. It appears also
thatit as the intention of the instrument to give the debtor time
ithinhichtopa)theobligation. Insuchcasesthiscourthasheld, onseveral
occasions, that the obligation is not due and pa)able until
anaction has been commenced b) the mortgagee against the
mortgagorfor the purpose of having the court 4# the date on and
after hich theinstrument shall bepa)ableandthedateof maturit)is
4#edinpursuance thereof. The case of Eleizegui vs. The Manila a!n
Tennis"lub 53 *hil. 6ep., %-07, in hich the opinion as ritten b)
the Chief8ustice of the court, is the leading case upon the
subject. In that casethe "uestion as over the duration of a lease
concerning .a piece ofland for a 4#ed consideration and to endure
at the ill of the lessee..In discussing the "uestion the court said
5p. %$-7:2ith respect to the term of the lease the present "uestion
hasarisen. Inits discussion three theories havebeen
presented:&nehichma9esthedurationdependupontheill of thelessor,
ho, upon one month!s notice given to the lessee, ma)terminate the
lease so stipulated: another hich, on thecontrar), ma9es it
dependent upon the illof the lessee, asstipulated: and the third,
in accordance ith hich the right isreserved to the court to 4# the
duration of the term.The clause on hich the case turns is as follos
5p. %$37:;r. 2illiamson, or hoever ma) succeed him as secretar)
ofthe club, ma) terminate this lease henever desired ithoutother
formalit) than that of giving a month!s notice. Theoners of the
land underta9e to maintain the club as tenant aslong as the latter
shall see 4t.Considering the case the court said 5%$(7:The Civil
Code has made provision for such a case in all 9indsof obligations.
In spea9ing in general of obligations ith a termit has supplied the
de4cienc) of the former la ith respect tothe .duration of the term
hen it has been left to the ill ofthe debtor,. and provides that in
this case the term shall be4#ed b) the courts. 5/rt. $$3', sec. 3.7
In ever) contract, aslaid don b) the authorities, there is ala)s a
creditor ho isentitled to demand the performance, and a debtor upon
homreststheobligationtoperformtheunderta9ing.
Inbilateralcontractsthecontractingpartiesaremutuall)creditorsanddebtors.
Thus, inthis contract of lease, thelesseeis thecreditor ith respect
to the rights enumerated in article $cult as to be manifestl)
be)ond thecontemplation of the parties, the court should be
authoriGed toreleasetheobligorinholeorinpart. Theintentionof
theparties should govern and if it appears that the service
turnsout to be so di>cult as to have been be)ond
theircontemplation, it ould be doing violence to that intention
toholdtheircontemplation, itouldbedoingviolencetothatintention to
hold the obligor still responsible. 2In other ords,fair and
s"uareconsiderationunderscores the legalprecept therein.1aga
Telephone Co., Inc. remonstrates mainl) against the applicationb)
the Court of /ppeals of /rticle $3,+ in favor of Camarines @ur
IIBlectric Cooperative, Inc. in the case before us. @tated
diferentl), theformer insists that thecomplaint
shouldhavebeendismissedforfailure to state a cause of
action.Theantecedent facts, asnarratedb)respondent Courtof
/ppealsare, as follos:*etitioner 1aga Telephone Co., Inc.
51/TBCC&7 is a telephonecompan) rendering local as ell as long
distance telephone service in1aga Cit) hile private respondent
Camarines @ur II BlectricCooperative, Inc. 5C/@A6BC& II7 is a
private corporation establishedforthe purposeof
operatinganelectricpoer serviceinthesamecit).&n 1ovember $,
$0++, the parties entered into a contract 5B#h. ./.7for the use b)
petitioners in the operation of its telephone service theelectric
light posts of private respondent in 1aga Cit). In
considerationtherefor, petitioners agreed to install, free of
charge, ten 5$-7telephone connections for the use b) private
respondent in thefolloing places:5a7 % units = The ;ain &>ce
of 5private respondent7:5b7 3 Anits = The 2arehouse of 5private
respondent7:5c7 $ Anit =The @ub-@tation of 5private respondent7
atConcepcion *e"ueNa:5d7 $ Anit = The 6esidence of 5private
respondent!s7 *resident:5e7$Anit=The6esidenceof
5privaterespondent!s7 /ctingFeneral ;anager: K5f7 3 Anits = To be
determined b) the Feneral ;anager. 3@aid contract also provided:5a7
That the term or period of this contract shall be as long asthe
part) of the 4rst part has need for the electric light postsof the
part) of the second part it being understood that thiscontract
shall terminate hen for an) reason hatsoever, thepart) of the
second part is forced to stop, abandoned OsicP
itsoperationasapublicserviceandit becomesnecessar)toremove the
electric lightpost: 5sic7 /It as prepared b) or ith the assistance
of the other petitioner, /tt).Cuciano;. ;agga), thenamember of
the?oardof Hirectors ofprivate respondent and at the same time the
legal counsel ofpetitioner./fter the contract had been enforced for
over ten 5$-7 )ears, privaterespondent 4led on 8anuar) 3, $0'0 ith
the 6egional Trial Court of1aga Cit) 5?r. 3'7 C.C. 1o. '0-$,(3
against petitioners for reformationof the contract ith damages, on
the ground that it is too one-sided infavor of petitioners: that it
is not in conformit) ith the guidelines ofthe 1ational
Blectri4cation /dministration 51B/7 hich direct that thereasonable
compensation for the use of the posts is *$-.-- per post,per month:
that after eleven5$$7 )earsof petitioners! useof theposts,
thetelephonecablesstrungb)themthereonhavebecomemuchheavieriththeincreaseinthevolumeoftheirsubscribers,orsened
b) the fact that their linemen bore holes through the postsat hich
points those posts ere bro9en during t)phoons: that a postno costs
as much as *3,,%-.--: so that justice and e"uit) demandthat the
contract be reformed to abolish the ine"uities thereon./s second
cause of action,privaterespondent alleged that startingith the )ear
$0'$, petitioners have used %$0 posts in the tons of*ili, Canaman,
;agarao and ;ilaor, Camarines @ur, all outside 1agaCit), ithout an)
contract ith it: that at the rate of *$-.-- per post,petitioners
should pa) private respondent for the use thereof the totalamount
of *3,+,0,-.-- from$0'$ up to the 4ling ofits complaint:andthat
petitioners had refusedto pa) private respondent saidamount despite
demands./ndasthirdcauseof action,
privaterespondentcomplainedaboutthe poor servicing b) petitioners
of the ten 5$-7 telephone units hichhad caused it great
inconvenience and damages to the tune of notless than *$--,---.--In
petitioners! anser to the 4rst cause of action, the) averred that
itshould be dismissed because 5$7 it does not su>cientl) state a
causeof action for reformation of contract: 537 it is barred b)
prescription,the same having been4led more than ten 5$-7 )ears
after thee#ecutionof thecontract: and5%7 it isbarredb)estoppel,
sinceprivate respondent see9s to enforce the contract in the same
action.*etitioners further alleged that their utiliGation of
private respondent!spostscouldnothave caused
theirdeteriorationbecausethe)havealread) been in use for eleven
5$$7 )ears: and that the value of theire#pensesfor theten5$-7
telephonelineslongenjo)edb)privaterespondent free of charge are far
in e#cess of the amounts claimed b)the latter for the use of the
posts, so that if there as an) ine"uit), itas sufered b)
them.6egarding the second cause of action, petitioners claimed that
privaterespondent had as9ed for telephone lines in areas outside
1aga Cit)forhichitspostsereusedb)them:
andthatifpetitionershadrefused to compl) ith private respondent!s
demands for pa)ment forthe use of the posts outside 1aga Cit), it
as probabl) because hatis due to them from private respondent is
more than its claim againstthem./ndithrespecttothethirdcauseof
action, petitionersclaimed,inter alia, that their telephone service
had been categoriGed b) the1ational Telecommunication Corporation
51TC7 as .ver) high. and of.superior "ualit)..Huring the trial,
private respondent presented the folloingitnesses:5$7 Hioscoro
6agragio, one of the to o>cials ho signed the contractin its
behalf, declared that it as petitioner ;agga) ho prepared
thecontract: that theunderstandingbeteenprivaterespondent
andpetitioners as that the latter ould onl) use the posts in 1aga
Cit)because at that time, petitioners! capabilit) as ver) limited
and the)had noe#pectation of e#pansion because oflegals"uabbles
ithinthe compan): that private respondent agreed to allo
petitioners touseits posts
in1agaCit)becausethereereman)subscriberstherein ho could not be
served b) them because of lac9 of facilities:and that hile the
telephone lines strung to the posts ere ver) lightin $0++, said
posts have become heavil) loaded in $0'0.537 Bngr. /ntonio ?orja,
Chief of private respondent!s Cine &perationand ;aintenance
Hepartment, declared that the posts being used b)petitioners
totalled $,(-% as of /pril $+, $0'0, $03 of hich ere inthe tons of
*ili, Canaman, and ;agarao, all outside 1aga Cit) 5B#hs..?. and
.?-$.7: that petitioners! cables strung to the posts in $0'0
aremuch bigger than those in 1ovember, $0++: that in $0'+, almost
$--posts ere destro)ed b) t)phoon @isang: around 3- posts
erelocatedbeteen1agaCit)andthetonof *ili hilethepostsinbaranga)
Concepcion, 1aga Cit) ere bro9en at the middle hich hadbeen bored
b) petitioner!s linemen to enable them to string biggertelephone
lines: that hile the cost per post in $0++ as onl) from*+--.-- to
*$,---.--, their costs in $0'0 ent up from *$,cers, namel): Bngr.
8oventinoCruG,Bngr. /ntonio ?orja, Bngr. /ntonio ;acandog, ;r.
8esus &pianaand/tt).Cuis Feneral, 8r. beginning 8anuar), $0'0.
*laintif!sclaimfor attorne)!s fees and e#penses of litigation
anddefendants! counterclaim are both hereb) ordered
dismissed.2ithout pronouncement as to
costs.Hisagreeingiththeforegoingjudgment, petitioners
appealedtorespondentCourt of /ppeals. Inthedecisiondated;a)3',
$003,respondent court a>rmed the decision of the trial
court,5but basedon diferent grounds to it: 5$7 that /rticle $3,+ of
the 1e Civil Codeis applicable and 537 that the contract as subject
to a potestativecondition hich rendered said condition void. The
motion forreconsiderationasdeniedintheresolutiondated@eptember
$-,$003. 2 Eence, the present petition. *etitioners assign the
folloing pertinent errors committed b)respondent court:$7 in ma9ing
a contract for the parties b) invo9ing /rticle $3,+of the 1e Civil
Code:37inrulingthatprescriptionoftheaction forreformation ofthe
contract in this case commenced from the time it
becamedisadvantageous to private respondent: and %7 inrulingthat
thecontract as subject toapotestativecondition in favor of
petitioners.*etitioners assert earnestl) that /rticle $3,+ of the
1e Civil Code
isnotapplicableprimaril)becausethecontractdoesnotinvolvetherendition
of service or a personalprestation and it is not for futureservice
ith future unusual change. Instead, the ruling in the case
of-cce0a, et al. v. (abson, etc., et al.,7hich interpreted the
article,shouldbefolloedinresolvingthiscase. ?esides,
saidarticleasnever raisedb)thepartiesintheir pleadingsandasnever
thesubject of trial and evidence.In appl)ing /rticle $3,+,
respondent court rationaliGed:2e agree ith appellant that in order
that an action forreformation of contract ould lie and ma) prosper,
there mustbe su>cient allegations as ellas proof that the
contract in"uestion failed to e#press the true intention of the
parties dueto error or mista9e, accident, or fraud. Indeed, in
embod)ingthe e"uitable remed) of reformation of instruments in the
1eCivil Code, the Code Commission gave its reasons as follos:B"uit)
dictates the reformationof an instrument inorder that the true
intention of the contracting partiesma)bee#pressed.
Thecourtsb)thereformationdonot attempt to ma9e a ne contract for
the parties, butto ma9e the instrument e#press their
realagreement.The rationale of the doctrine is that it ould be
unjustand ine"uitable to allo the enforcement of a ritteninstrument
hichdoes not reMector disclose therealmeeting ofthe minds ofthe
parties. Therigor ofthelegalistic rule that a ritten instrument
should be the4nal and inMe#ible criterion and measure of the
rightsand obligations of the contracting parties is thustempered to
forestall the efects of mista9e, fraud,ine"uitable conduct, or
accident. 5pp. ces and other places chosen b)plaintif!s
generalmanager hich as the onl) considerationprovided for in said
agreement for appellant!s use of plaintifselectric posts. 1ot
onl)that, appellant
evenstartedusingplaintif!selectricpostsoutside1agaCit)althoughthisasnot
provided for in the agreement B#h. ./. as it e#tended
ande#pandeditstelephoneservicestotonsoutsidesaidcit).Eence, hile
ver) fe ofplaintif!s electric posts ere beingusedb)appellant
in$0++andthe)ereall intheCit)of1aga, thenumber of
plaintif!selectricpoststhat appellantas
usingin$0'0hadjumpedto$,(-%,$03of hichareoutside1agaCit)5B#h. .?.7.
/ddtothisthedestructionofsome of plaintif!s poles during t)phoons
li9e the strongt)phoon @isang in $0'+ because of the heav)
telephonecablesattachedthereto, andtheescalationof
thecostsofelectric poles from $0++ to $0'0, and the conclusion is
indeedineluctable that the agreement B#h. ./. has alread) becometoo
one-sided in favor of appellant to the great disadvantageof
plaintif, in short, the continued enforcement of saidcontract has
manifestl) gone far be)ond the contemplation ofplaintif, so much so
that it should no be released therefromunder /rt. $3,+of the1eCivil
Codetoavoidappellant!sunjust enrichment at its 5plaintif!s7
e#pense. /s statedb)Tolentino in his commentaries on the Civil Code
citing foreigncivilist 6uggiero,1e/uit# demands a certain
economice/uilibrium bet!een the prestation and the
counter.prestation, and does not permit the unlimited
impoverishmentof onepart#for thebene2t of theother
b#thee3cessiverigidit# of the principle of the obligator# force of
contracts 5IJTolentino, Civil Code of the *hilippines, $0', ed.,pp.
3(+-3('7.2etherefore, 4ndnothingrongiththerulingof thetrialcourt,
although based on a diferent and rong premise 5i.e.,reformation of
contract7, that from the date of the 4ling of thiscase, appellant
must pa) for the use of plaintif!s electric postsin 1aga Cit) at
the reasonable monthl) rentalof *$-.-- perpost, hile plaintif
should pa) appellant for the telephones inthe same Cit) that it as
formerl) using free of charge underthe terms of the agreement B#h.
./. at the same rate beingpaid b) the general public. In a>rming
said ruling, e are notma9ing a necontract for the parties
herein,but e 4nditnecessar)to do soinorder not to disrupt thebasic
andessential services being rendered b) both parties herein to
thepublicandtoavoidunjust enrichment b)appellant at thee#penseof
plaintif, saidarrangementtocontinueonl)untilsuch time as said
parties can re-negotiate another agreementover the
samesubject-matter covered b) the agreement B#h. ./.. &nce
saidagreement is reached and e#ecuted b) the parties,
theaforesaidrulingof theloercourtanda>rmedb)usshallceasetoe#ist
andshall besubstitutedandsupersededb)their ne agreement. . . ..
8/rticle $3,+ spea9s of .service. hich has become so di>cult.
Ta9inginto considerationtherationale behindthis
provision,9theterm.service. should be understood as referring to
the .performance. ofthe obligation. In the present case, the
obligation of privaterespondent consists inalloing petitioners to
useitsposts in 1agaCit), hich is the service contemplated in said
article. Furthermore, abare reading of this article reveals that it
is not a re"uirementthereunder that the contract be for future
service ith future unusualchange. /ccordingto@enator /rturo;.
Tolentino,10/rticle$3,+states in our la the doctrine of unforseen
events. This is said to bebasedon the discredited theor) ofrebus
sic stantibusinpublicinternational la: under this theor), the
parties stipulate in the lightof certain prevailing conditions, and
once these conditions cease toe#istthecontractalsoceasestoe#ist.
Consideringpractical needsand the demands of e"uit) and good faith,
the disappearance of thebasis of a contract gives rise to a right
to relief in favor of the part)prejudiced.In a nutshell, private
respondent in the &cceNa case 4led a complaintagainst
petitioner before the trial court pra)ing for modi2cation of
theterms and conditions of the contract that the) entered into b)
4#ingthe proper shares that should pertainto themout of the
grossproceeds from the sales of subdivided lots. 2e ordered the
dismissalof thecomplaint thereinfor failuretostateasu>cient
causeofaction. 2e rationaliGed thatthe Court of/ppeals misapplied
/rticle$3,+ because:. . . respondent!s complaint see9snotrelease
fromthesubdivision contract but that the court .render
judgmentmodif#ingthetermsandconditionsof thecontract . . .
b)23ingtheproper sharesthat shouldpertaintothehereinparties out of
the gross proceeds from the sales of subdividedlots of subject
subdivision.. Thecitedarticle5/rticle$3,+7does not grant the courts
5the7 authorit) to rema9e, modif) orrevise the contract or to 4#
the division of shares beteen theparties as contractuall)
stipulated ith the force of labeteentheparties, soas
tosubstituteitsonterms forthosecovenantedb)theparties themselves.
6espondent!scomplaint for modi4cation of contract manifestl) has no
basisinlaandthereforestates nocauseof action. Ander theparticular
allegations of respondent!s complaint and thecircumstances therein
averred, the courts cannot even ine"uit) grant the relief sought.
11The ruling in the &cceNa case is not applicable because e
agree ithrespondent court that the allegations in private
respondent!scomplaint and the evidence it has presented
su>cientl) made out acause of action under /rticle $3,+. 2e,
therefore, release the
partiesfromtheircorrelativeobligationsunderthecontract. Eoever,
ourdisposition of the present controvers) does not end here. 2e
have tota9e into account the possible conse"uences of merel)
releasing theparties therefrom: petitioners ill remove the
telephone iresQcablesinthepostsof privaterespondent,
resultingindisruptionof theirserviceto thepublic: hile
privaterespondent,in consonance iththe contract12ill return all the
telephone units to petitioners,causing prejudice to its business.
2e shall not allo such eventualit).6ather, e re"uire, as ordered b)
the trial court: $7 petitioners to pa)privaterespondent fortheuse
of its posts in 1agaCit) and in thetonsof;ilaor, Canaman, ;agarao
and *ili, Camarines @urandinother
placesherepetitionersuseprivaterespondent!sposts, thesum of ten
5*$-.--7 pesosper post, per month, beginning 8anuar),$0'0: and 37
private respondent to pa) petitioner the monthl) dues ofall its
telephones at the same rate being paid b) the public
beginning8anuar), $0'0. Thepeculiar circumstancesof thepresent
case, asdistinguished further from the &cceNa case,
necessitates e#ercise ofour e"uit) jurisdiction.13?) a) of
emphasis, e reiterate therationaliGation of respondent court that:.
. . In a>rming said ruling, e are not ma9ing a ne contractfor
the parties herein, but e 4nd it necessar) to do so in ordernot to
disrupt the basic and essential services being renderedb) both
partiesherein to the public and to avoid unjustenrichment b)
appellant at the e#pense of plaintif . . . . 1/*etitioners!
assertion that /rticle $3,+ as never raised b) the partiesin their
pleadings and as never the subject of trial and evidence hasbeen
passed upon b) respondent court in its ell reasoned resolution,hich
e hereunder "uote as our on:First, e do not agree ith
defendant-appellant that inappl)ing /rt. $3,+ of the 1e Civil Code
to this case, e
havechangeditstheor)anddecidedthesameonanissuenotinvo9ed b)
plaintif in the loer court. For basicall), the mainand pivotal
issue in this case is hether the continuedenforcement of the
contract B#h. ./. beteen the parties has,throughthe)ears
5since$0++7, becometooine"uitous ordisadvantageous to the plaintif
and too one-sided in favor ofdefendant-appellant, so that a
solution must be found torelieve plaintif from the continued
operation of saidagreement andtoprevent defendant-appellant
fromfurtherunjustl) enriching itself at plaintif!s e#pense. It is
indeedunfortunate that defendant had turned deaf ears to
plaintifsre"uests for renegotiation, constrainingthelatter
togotocourt. ?ut although plaintif cannot, as e have held,
correctl)invo9e reformationof contract as a proper remed)
5therehaving been no shoing of a mista9e or error in said
contracton the part of an) of the parties so as to result in its
failure toe#press their true intent7, this does not mean that
plaintif isabsolutel) ithoutaremed) in order torelieve itselffrom
acontract that has gone far be)ond its contemplation and hasbecome
so highl) ine"uitous and disadvantageous to itthroughthe)ears
becauseof thee#pansionof defendant-appellant!s business
andtheincreaseinthevolumeof itssubscribers./nd as it is the dut) of
the Court to administerjustice, it must do so in this case in the
best a) and mannerit caninthelight of theprovenfactsandthelaor
lasapplicable thereto.It is settled that hen the trial court
decides a case in favor ofa part) on a certain ground, the
appellant court ma) upholdthe decision belo upon some other point
hich as ignoredor erroneousl)decidedb)thetrial court 5FarciaJaldeG
v.TuaGon, (- *hil. 0(%: 6elativo v. Castro, +, *hil. rmed b) us in
abrief opinion, e no avail ourselves of the occasion of the 4ling
of amotiontorehear b)theattorne)s for
theplaintiftomodif)thejudgment inaslight
measureandtostatemorefull)thereasonsunderl)ing our
decision.ItappearsthatonHecember$3, $0$',
theplaintifcontractedhisservicestoTanCiuanandCo., assuperintendent
of anoil factor)hich the latter contemplated establishing in this
cit). The period ofthe contract e#tended over to )ears from the
date mentioned: andthe salar) as to be at the rate of *,-- per
month during the 4rst)ear and *+-- per month during the second, ith
electric light andater for domestic consumption, and a residence to
live in, or in lieuthereof *,- per month./t the time this agreement
as made the machiner) for thecontemplatedfactor)hadnot
beenac"uired, thoughtene#pellershad been ordered from the Anited
@tates: and among the stipulationsinsertedinthecontract
iththeplaintifas aprovisiontothefolloing efect:It is understood and
agreed that should the machiner) to beinstalled in the said factor)
fail, for an) reason, to arrive in thecit) of ;anila ithin a period
of si# months from date hereof,this contract ma) be cancelled b)
the part) of the second partat its option, such cancellation,
hoever, not to occur beforethe e#piration of such si# months.The
machiner) above referred to did not arrive in the cit) of
;anilaithin the si# months succeeding the ma9ing of the contract:
nor asothere"uipmentnecessar)fortheestablishmentof thefactor)atan)
timeprovided b)thedefendants.The reason forthis does notappear ith
certaint), but a preponderance of the evidence is to theefect that
the defendants, in the 4rst months of $0$0, seeing that theoil
businessnolongerpromisedlargereturns,
eithercancelledtheorderforthemachiner)fromchoiceorereunabletosuppl)thecapital
necessar) to 4nance the project. /t an) rate on 8une 3',
$0$0,availing themselves in part of the option given in the clause
above"uoted, the defendants communicated in riting to the plaintif
thefact that the) had decided to rescind the contract, efective
8une %-ththen current, upon hich date he as discharged. The
plaintifthereupon instituted this action to recover damages in the
amount of*$%,---,
coveringsalar)andper"uisitesdueandtobecomedueunder the
contract.Thecasefortheplaintifproceedsontheideathatthestipulationabove
"uoted, giving to the defendants the right to cancel thecontract
upon the contingenc) of the nonarrival of the machiner) in;anila
ithin si# months, must be understood as applicable onl) inthose
cases here such nonarrival is due to causes not having theirorigin
in the ill or act of the defendants, as dela)s caused b) stri9esor
unfavorableconditionsof transportingb)landorsea: anditisurged that
the right to cancel cannot be admitted unless
thedefendantsa>rmativel)shothat thefailureof
themachiner)toarrive as due to causes of that character, and that
it did not have itsorigin in their on act or volition. In this
connection the plaintif reliesonarticle$3cient reason can be
adduced for limiting the operationof the ords conferring the right
of cancellation. Apon this point it isour opinion that the language
used in the stipulation should be givenefect in its ordinar) sense,
ithout technicalit) or circumvention: andin this sense it is
believed that the parties to the contract must haveunderstood
it./rticle $3